This is the second interview about historical myths Russian propaganda. It's about about the events of 1654, better known under the propaganda cliché “Reunification of Ukraine with Russia.” The second component of the conversation is the motivation and logic of Ivan Mazepa’s actions during Northern War.
Olga Kovalevskaya – Doctor of Historical Sciences, senior Researcher Institute of History of Ukraine NAS Hromadske radioAndrey Kobalia: Starting the topic of 1654, I wanted to ask what circumstances forced Bogdan Khmelnitsky to enter into an alliance with the Muscovite kingdom?
Olga Kovalevskaya: The thing is that in the context of the events that took place then, unfortunately, Bogdan Khmelnytsky in 1653 clearly understood that he did not have those allies who fully satisfied him. The Tatars in all those battles that took place did not demonstrate themselves in the best possible way. As a rule, all the problems that Bogdan had were due to their behavior. That is, due to non-compliance with treaty obligations, the same applied to the rest of the allies. For example, the same Moldavian ruler.
All attempts to find an ally were unsuccessful. In order to continue the war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth there had to be an ally. At that time, Bogdan Khmelnitsky saw the Moscow Kingdom as this ally. He repeatedly appealed for the Hetmanate to be taken under the high royal hand with the sole purpose of finding an ally and, with joint forces, ultimately putting the squeeze on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. To get the result that he wanted - to clearly define the Cossack territory, which was under the control of the hetman, to determine the rights, the size of the register and to determine the status quo.
A.K.: That is, besides the Moscow Kingdom, he could not have had other allies, another alternative?
OK.: At that time there was none yet. Prospects opened up a little later, but it was already too late in terms of those events.
A.K.: What happened in 1654? Can this be called the reunification of Russia and Ukraine?
OK.: At that time, of course, this was not the case. The thing is that back in October 1653, when there was an appeal to Alexei Mikhailovich and the Zemsky Sobor, which was supposed to consider this issue. The issue was indeed considered in favor of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporozhye Army. What did it consist of? You can accept Bogdan Khmelnitsky with the Zaporozhye Army and with all the cities and population that lived there under the high royal hand.
But the problem was simply that there were completely different political tradition, in which Bogdan Khmelnitsky grew up, and representatives of the elders from the one that was in the Moscow Kingdom. Therefore, when it came to being accepted under the high royal hand, representatives of the Moscow state saw for themselves only one thing - the annexation of new lands. While for Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the foreman it looked completely different. It was a temporary military alliance, only to achieve a certain military goal. IN in this case- defeat the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its army.
Therefore, the situation developed this way: on January 8, 1654, in the city of Pereyaslav - the territory of the Pereyaslav Regiment, the foreman, the hetman gathered, there were representatives of the clergy, representatives of cities and various segments of the population. Negotiations began. A delegation from the Moscow Kingdom was presented, headed by boyar Vasily Buturlin. Negotiations were underway to sign a temporary military alliance. In order for this agreement to receive legal confirmation, it was necessary to prepare the relevant documents.
In Pereyaslav itself, it was also not only about holding a solemn prayer and taking the oath from the hetman and some representatives of the elders and clergy, but also about preparing documents and submitting them to Buturlin for discussion. Only later, in March, out of 23 articles that were submitted by the foreman for discussion to the Moscow side, only 17 were approved. And in accordance with these articles, it was possible to observe a military alliance, nothing more. What happened next is a completely different story.
Soviet poster"Together forever!". The poster depicts a Russian archer and a Ukrainian Cossack holding a shield with the image of warriors Kievan Rus. K.K. Ivanovov, V.B. Koretsky, O.M. Savostyuk, B.A. Uspensky. 1954 A.K.: What sources can we rely on when analyzing this event?
OK.: Usually, all the hetmans who came to power after Bohdan Khmelnytsky signed so-called articles with the Moscow state. Articles are international treaty, which fixes the responsibilities, obligations, rights and capabilities of the two parties. What the hetman and foreman should do in relation to the Moscow State as a protector and what they can do Moscow State in relation to Ukraine (Hetmanate) as a vassal. If we talk about Khmelnytsky himself and the March articles of 1654, this document has now been lost. Historians have never been able to find the original of this text.
Moreover, subsequent events that took place in the history of Ukraine indicate that the Moscow side was interested in losing, so to speak, this document. When Bogdan Khmelnitsky’s son, Yuri, came to power, he was offered to sign articles that were not his father’s March ones. Although he was told that these were the same ones that were signed by his father. Actually this is not true. The articles were called Pereyaslavsky. But in essence they were completely different.
This is where the stumbling block was laid, which, in fact, laid the foundation for the subsequent myth. The hetman's rights were already quite limited. It was already discussed that the Ukrainian lands would be part of the Moscow state precisely as an autonomous territory on the one hand. But on the other hand, the rights of the Moscow side on these lands were significantly expanded. Both the number of troops and the rights of the Moscow governors who were present here were greatly expanded. Great demands were placed on the hetman and foreman in relation to the Moscow state in order to fulfill these obligations that were recorded.
Thus, this myth subsequently began to take shape. But anniversaries began to play a special role, which were then celebrated in Russian Empire in the 19th century and already in the 20th century in the Soviet Union.
A.K.: If I understand correctly, there is no original document of the March articles as such?
OK.: No, we have copies, nothing more.
A.K.: Then tell us a little more about the myth of the “Reunification of Ukraine with Russia.” It has spread very widely in Soviet times. How was it formed? What was the idea? What kind of holiday was this?
OK.: If we talk about the events of 1954, then formally this year they should have celebrated the tricentenary of this event - the Rada in Pereyaslav. It was at this time that some changes to the administrative structures within the USSR were also dated. The point is that Khrushchev decided to transfer Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. And at this very moment, taking advantage of the needs of the 20th century, they made very good use of those events. It was quickly shown that we had a reunion and now we are celebrating a reunion, although in fact there was no reunion. The Hetmanate retained its autonomy for quite a long time, and all the cases that came from the Hetmanate to the Moscow State for discussion did not go to the internal bodies of the state, but to external departments. Which emphasizes the absolutely external status of this territory.
Badge for the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia http://katia-lexx.livejournal.com/1889318.html A.K.: Having talked about the events of 1654, let's move on to the beginning of the 18th century and Mazepa. Against the backdrop of what world events did the Battle of Poltava take place? Which sides took part in the Northern War? Why did it start?
OK.: The point is that everything is connected with the way in which late XVII, V early XVIII century, the status of the Moscow state itself changes. There is a need to expand the territory, develop, and carry out reforms. And this was greatly facilitated by who exactly was in power at that time in Russia - Peter I. In 1699, first of all, Russia noticed that it made sense to start fighting for access to the Baltic Sea. The predominance of Sweden in this region did not suit Russia very much. And as it turned out, not only Russia, but also Poland and Denmark. They were unhappy that at the end of the 17th century, Sweden gained a significant advantage there. Therefore, in 1699 the so-called “ Northern Union" It included: the Muscovite kingdom, Poland and Denmark. They provoked this war against Sweden. But at the first stage of the war, this coalition was not very lucky, since the advantage was on the side of the Swedish king Charles XII And Swedish army.
The Northern War itself lasted quite a long time a large number of time, from 1700 to 1721. As for the Battle of Poltava, it became key; it determined all the following events. For Ukraine, this event is interpreted by today's historians as a disaster. On the one hand, because for Ukraine this battle has become a practical option for implementation civil war, since Hetman Mazepa and the Cossacks led by Kostya Gordienko were on Karl’s side. And on Peter’s side are Ivan Skoropadsky and another part of the Cossack army. By and large, in the Battle of Poltava they hypothetically fought against each other. In addition, the defeat of Mazepa and Karl at Poltava determined the course of all those reforms and changes that awaited the Hetmanate. Peter I had long been planning to reorganize the army and change the administrative structure. Mazepa’s transition to Karl’s side somewhat slowed down the process of incorporation of the Hetmanate into the future Russian Empire, which it became precisely after the signing of the Peace of Nietzstadt, which ended the Northern War in 1721.
Herself Battle of Poltava determined how relations between the Hetmanate and Muscovy would subsequently develop. On the one hand, Peter understood that it was impossible to start reform very quickly, as this would cause another wave of uprisings, and more people will support Mazepa. On the other hand, he understood that it was very necessary to carry out these reforms, in otherwise Ukrainians will continue to fight for their independence.
A.K.: Why did Mazepa go over to the side of Sweden? What were the reasons?
OK.: The reasons were precisely that up to a certain point Mazepa carried out following policy: he believed that it was necessary to very subtly appease the Moscow authorities so that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hetmanate. For him, this was a fairly acceptable strategy. But later he began to understand that Russia, having its own geological interests and expanding territorially, would sooner or later come into conflict with the interests of the Hetmanate, the hetman and the elders. Russia claimed to incorporate the territory of the Hetmanate into its own state as quickly as possible, and to extend to its territory the administrative system that existed in the Moscow state. That’s what happened - division into provinces and districts. And myself a big problem is that Peter really wanted to change the structure Cossack army. Transform irregular regiments into dragoons and not only regular regiments. That is, the idea of creating a regular army.
Naturally, the foreman and ordinary Cossacks did not want this and resisted it. These were the reasons that Mazepa clearly understood that sooner or later this would all start to happen, and it was necessary to find an option on how to resist it. In this case, he tried his best to ensure that the military operations of the Northern War did not take place on the territory of Ukraine. But when the Swedish army approached its borders and then crossed it, he realized that he had no choice. He had to make a decision very quickly. Mazepa went over to Karl's side, wanting to get a new protector in his person, who, without having territorial claims to Ukraine, will be able to provide him with the protection that was so lacking. So that Ukraine can strengthen its position and become an independent state.
A.K.: What points of view are there? historical science? What do foreigners think about this, but not Russian historians? What neutral views are there on this event?
OK.: Almost exactly what I said. Any researcher who is outside Ukraine and outside Russia has the opportunity to assess what is happening in a more balanced and detached manner, without becoming emotionally involved in this process. There are reasons that force the hetman to act in this way; they really justify such actions. In addition, he did not act independently, he relied on the foreman. The foreman herself clearly understood what was happening. Ukrainian troops constantly took part in the events of the Northern War outside Ukraine. Our troops were near Narva, on the territory of Poland, on the territory of Belarus. They suffered losses. Being in these territories, they did not have the right to obey only the colonels; there was power over them Russian generals. The attitude of the generals towards the Cossacks was very negative. They were humiliated, beaten and insulted. The hetman knew about this, and, trying to protect his army, he looked for the most acceptable option.
A.K.: That is, if we talk about Ukrainian and foreign, but not Russian historiography, they do not disagree on anything?
OK.: They don't disperse. There is only one caveat. Now we are talking quite generally, but if we take specific works, for example, from the 19th century, and analyze them, we need to clearly understand on what sources these works were written, who the informant was, this is very important. If the work was written in Russian sources and the informants were Russian residents, then the attitude towards Mazepa is negative or neutral-negative. If a person tried to avoid dependence on his sources as much as possible and relied not only on Russian, but also on, for example, Swedish, English, German, French sources, then a normal picture would emerge.
First issue about medieval Rus' you can listen
Tatiana Ponka
In 1654 it happened significant event Russian history - Russia returned Left Bank Ukraine .
By the 14th century based Old Russian people Russians formed around Moscow, by the 15th - 16th centuries. on the lands of southwestern Rus' (Galicia, Kyiv, Podolia, Volyn) - Ukrainians, by the 16th - 17th centuries. on the lands of Black Rus' (the Neman River basin) - Belarusians.
By the beginning of the 17th century. Poland has become one of largest states in Europe. Poland emerged as a great state twice. In 1385, the Krevo Union (union) was concluded between Poland and Lithuania. The unification between the two states was not close. Poland and Lithuania were autonomous and each lived according to its own laws. Lithuania consisted of ¾ of the lands of the former Kievan Rus. The population of ancient Russian lands - Belarusians and Ukrainians - professed Orthodoxy and were not oppressed.
In 1569, under pressure from Poland, the Union of Lublin was signed between the two states, which implied a closer unification of the two states. This time the king, the laws, and the army became common. IN Eastern Europe a new strong state emerged - Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth- Poland “from sea to sea”. This time, the Polish government forcibly began to introduce Polish orders and laws throughout the entire territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Thus, only Polish gentry. And the Polish kings began to distribute the lands of Belarusian and Ukrainian peasants to the Poles, and turn the peasants themselves into serfs. Serfdom in Poland developed 100 years earlier than in Russia and was the most severe in Europe: Polish nobles had the right to punish death penalty their peasants.
In 1587, Sigismund III Vasa, an ardent supporter of Catholicism and an enemy of Orthodoxy, became the Polish king. He sought to Catholicize the Orthodox population. The Polish king failed to completely eradicate Orthodoxy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But Sigismund III ensured that in 1596 in Brest the Kiev Metropolitan and several bishops of the Western Ukrainian Orthodox Church signed a union with the Roman Catholic Church. According to the union, the Orthodox recognized the primacy of the Pope over themselves (and not the Orthodox patriarch), switched to Catholic dogmas, but retained Orthodox rituals. So, in Western Ukraine arose Uniatism.
In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poles, Catholics, and Uniates had preferential rights. Therefore, the Ukrainian nobility began to convert to Uniatism, to adopt Polish language, the way of life of the Poles. Small nobles and peasants remained in Orthodoxy.
From that time on, national and religious oppression of Ukrainians and Belarusians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began. But the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth tenaciously clung to the lands of the former Kievan Rus. Having given them away, Poland would have turned into a small, mediocre state.
From national and religious oppression, the population fled to the outskirts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia, in particular, to the lower reaches of the Dnieper. This is how they appear Zaporozhye Cossacks and town Zaporizhzhya Sich . Initially, the Zaporozhye Cossacks, like Cossacks in general, lived off raids and robberies in neighboring territories - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russia, Crimean Khanate, Ottoman Empire.
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth decided to attract Cossacks to protect its territories. The Polish government began to form special lists - registers . A Cossack registered in the register was considered to be in the service of the Polish king and received a salary and weapons. From now on, the Zaporizhian army was headed by hetman (Polish - military leader).
The Zaporozhye Sich became the force that led the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Polish ruling elite.
The oppression of Poles and Uniates led to the fact that in the 20s. Ukraine began to be shaken by uprisings. In a number of places, Ukrainians were exterminated by Poles, Poles by Ukrainians. In 1648, the hetman of the Zaporozhye army, Bogdan Khmelnytsky, became the head of the uprising. In the spring of 1648, B. Khmelnitsky’s army set out from Zaporozhye Sich. An open armed struggle between the Cossacks and the Poles began. In the Battle of Zhelti Vody, the army of B. Khmelnitsky destroyed the advanced detachments of the Polish army. Soon a general battle took place near Korsun, in which the Poles suffered crushing defeat. B. Khmelnitsky developed his success and reached Lvov and Zamosc. Only a lack of ammunition and provisions, as well as a plague epidemic, stopped the advance of his troops, and he turned back. In December 1648, B. Khmelnitsky solemnly entered Kyiv. Meanwhile, the gentry hastily began to gather new forces for a new campaign against Ukraine. In the summer of 1649, near Zborov (Prikarpattya), B. Khmelnytsky’s troops once again proved their superiority over the Poles. In the same year, the Polish government was forced to conclude the Peace of Zborov.
In the agreement, B. Khmelnytsky was recognized as the hetman of Ukraine. Three voivodeships were placed under his authority: Kiev, Chernigov, Bratslav. These voivodeships could be governed exclusively by Orthodox Christians. Kyiv Metropolitan received the right to participate in meetings of the Sejm of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The hetman was allowed to have his own army of 40 thousand people. An important condition The peace agreement meant that Polish landowners could return to their lands. This outraged the peasants, who had initially fought for their liberation from the Polish landowners. Everyone understood that the Zboriv peace would be only a short truce.
In 1650, a new wave of discontent among the Orthodox population began. Soon hostilities resumed. In the summer of 1651, near Berestechko (on the Styr River in Volyn), the superior Polish troops met with the army of B. Khmelnitsky and won the battle. Punitive expeditions Poles against local population forced B. Khmelnitsky to make peace. By Peace of Belotserkov(1651) only the Kiev Voivodeship remained under the rule of the hetman. The number of his troops could not exceed 20 thousand people. The return of the Poles to their once abandoned estates took place against the background of the introduction of stricter regulations and oppression of the peasants. This led to the outflow of the local population to the Moscow border in the upper reaches of the Don and Oskol and the formation of a new region, the so-called Sloboda Ukraine(Kharkov, Sumy, Izyum, Okhtyrka, etc.). On next year the war resumed with new strength. In the spring of 1652, B. Khmelnitsky completely defeated the Polish army, but there was not enough strength to finally free himself from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Ukraine in mid-17th century found itself between three strong states - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russia, Ottoman Empire. At that time the conditions for creating an independent Ukrainian state did not have. Ukraine did not have its own developed production; it could not resist external expansion. B. Khmelnitsky and the Zaporozhye Cossacks understood that they could not survive in the ring of such strong states that they needed an ally in the person of one of these three states. And the Cossacks decided to choose Orthodox Russia as an ally, but on the condition that it would not command the Cossacks. Requests for accession have been received from Ukraine to Moscow since the 1920s. But Poland was a very strong adversary for Russia. Russia was overcoming the consequences of the Time of Troubles and could not openly take the side of the Zaporozhye Cossacks.
In 1653, ambassadors from Khmelnitsky arrived in Moscow with the news that the Ukrainians were turning to the Moscow Tsar with last request. This time Alexey Mikhailovich did not hesitate. In 1654 he gathered Zemsky Sobor, at which the issue of reunification with Ukraine was discussed at length and in detail. Finally, it was decided to take Ukraine under its protection.
In turn, in 1654 in the city of Pereyaslavl (modern Kiev region) gathered glad (advice, gathering). It was attended by the hetman, colonels, nobles, and peasants. All those present kissed the cross for allegiance to the Moscow sovereign.
Thus, in 1654 Ukraine was admitted to the Russian state. Ukraine was accepted with the rights of the broadest autonomy. Russia recognized the election of the hetman, the local court and other authorities. The tsarist government confirmed the class rights of the Ukrainian nobility. Ukraine received the right to establish diplomatic relations with all countries except the then enemies of Russia - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire. The hetman could have his own troops of up to 60 thousand people. But taxes had to go to the royal treasury.
Russian-Polish War 1654 - 1667 and the Russian-Swedish war of 1656 - 1658.
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did not recognize the decisions of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 on the entry of Ukraine into Russia. Then in 1654 Russia began another war with Poland to return cities and lands seized during the Time of Troubles in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. and achieve recognition of Ukraine's accession to Russia. The war was marked by the success of Russian and Ukrainian troops. Russian troops occupied Smolensk, Belarus, Lithuania; B. Khmelnitsky - Lublin, a number of cities in Galicia and Volyn.
Sweden made every effort to prevent Russia from entering the Baltic Sea. Seeing the victories of the Russian troops, in 1655 she declared war on Poland. Swedish troops advanced deeper Polish territory and occupied Warsaw and Krakow. Then Alexei Mikhailovich declared war on Sweden in the summer of 1656 (1656 - 1658). An agreement was signed with Poland in 1656 to cease hostilities and continue negotiations a year later. Part of the Russian troops moved to Ingria (eastern coast Gulf of Finland), and the main forces moved from Polotsk to Riga. Russian troops captured a number of fortresses on the Baltic Sea coast and besieged Riga. But the Swedes strengthened their presence in the Baltic states, and Russian troops, having no support from the sea, were forced to retreat. In December 1658, Russia was forced to conclude the Treaty of Valiesar with Sweden, and in 1661 - the Treaty of Kardis (near Tartu). All gains in the war with Sweden were lost. The problem of access to the sea remained unresolved.
Meanwhile, Poland, having received a peaceful respite and seeing Russia's difficulties in the war with Sweden, refused to recognize the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. The war with Poland continued, and in 1658-1663. walked with with varying success. The situation in Russia was complicated by the betrayals of hetman I. Vygovsky, who replaced the deceased B. Khmelnitsky, and then Yu. Khmelnitsky, the son of B. Khmelnitsky. But the population of Zaporozhye and Left Bank Ukraine did not support anti-Russian actions. In 1662, Yuri Khmelnytsky renounced the hetmanship and became a monk. Ataman I. Bryukhovetsky became Hetman of Ukraine. He also sought the separation of Ukraine from Russia. The Right Bank had its own hetman P. Doroshenko, who was ready to succumb to the Turkish Sultan in order to get rid of both Russia and Poland.
In 1664, Russian troops were able to seize the initiative from the Poles and began to push them back in the Glukhov area. Polish Army began to retreat, but the war exhausted both sides. In 1667, the governments of both countries agreed to sign the Andrusovo (near Smolensk) truce. Smolensk and Chernigov voivodeships and Seversk land were returned to Russia. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth recognized the reunification of Left-Bank Ukraine with Russia. Right-bank Ukraine and Belarus remained with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Zaporizhian Sich remained under the joint control of Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Kyiv by Andrusovo truce remained with Russia for two years, but was retained by Russia under the terms of the “eternal peace” of 1686.
The significance of the reunification of Ukraine and Russia
The reunification of Ukraine with Russia had great value for both countries:
Freed the people of Ukraine from national and religious oppression, saved them from enslavement by Poland and the Ottoman Empire, contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nation;
Contributed to strengthening Russian statehood. It was possible to return the Smolensk and Chernigov lands. This made it possible to begin the fight for the Baltic coast. In addition, the prospect of expanding Russia’s ties with other countries opened up. Slavic peoples and Western states.
Russia in the 16th century.
1. The reign of Mikhail Romanov
1) 1613 - 1645 3) 1676 – 1682
2) 1645 – 1676 4) 1619 – 1633
2. A representative of the House of Romanov, who became a patriarch
1) Fedor 3) Nikon
2) Alexey 4) Job
3. Archpriest Avvakum was:
2) the royal confessor;
3) leader of opponents church reform;
4) mentor of the royal children
4. The Council Code of 1649 played decisive role V:
1) the emergence of enlightened absolutism;
2) enslavement of peasants;
3) establishment of an estate-representative system;
4) replacing orders with collegiums.
5. The Council Code of 1649 did not provide for:
1) the eternal right of the owners to search for runaway peasants;
2) increasing the period for searching fugitive peasants to 9 years;
3) protecting the interests of wealthy citizens;
4) introduction of the concept of “state crime”.
6. At the Zemsky Councils in the 17th century there were no representatives from:
1) nobles;
2) merchants;
3) landowner peasants;
4) clergy.
7. The Zemsky Sobor loses its significance during the reign of
1) Mikhail Romanov 3) Alexey Romanov
2) Fyodor Romanov 4) Princess Sophia
8. The church reform of Patriarch Nikon did not provide for:
1) the supremacy of the power of the patriarch over the power of the king;
2) correction of church books;
3) introduction of three-finger baptism;
4) replacing prostrations with bows.
9. Which of the following was a consequence of the church reform carried out by Nikon?
1) establishment of the patriarchate;
2) church schism;
3) secularization of church lands;
4) establishment of the Synod.
10. What event happened in 1654?
1) annexation of Left Bank Ukraine to Russia;
2) publication of the Charter of the Nobility;
3) adoption of the Council Code;
4) signing of the Peace of Nystad.
11. Which of the following was a consequence of the development of the command system of management in the 17th century?
1) increasing role local authorities self-government;
2) increasing the role of officials in government;
3) strengthening the role of Zemsky Sobors and the Boyar Duma;
4) election of government bodies.
12. The advance of Russians into Siberia in the 17th century is associated with the name:
1) Ermak Timofeevich;
2) Semyon Dezhnev;
3) Stepan Razin;
4) Vitus Bering
13. Which of the named persons was a contemporary of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich?
1) Joseph Volotsky;
2) Patriarch Nikon;
3) Metropolitan Macarius;
4) Sergius of Radonezh.
14. What was the name of the uprising in Moscow in 1662?
2) Copper Riot;
3) Plague riot;
4) Salt riot.
15. The followers of Archpriest Avvakum were called:
1) Old Believers;
2) non-acquisitive;
3) strigolniki;
4) pagans.
16. What architectural style was common in Russia in the 17th century?
1) Naryshkin baroque;
3) classicism;
4) modern.
17. During the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, the following happened:
1) annexation of Kazan;
2) annexation of Alaska;
3) conquest of Crimea;
4) reunification of Ukraine with Russia.
18. Under whom was the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy established?
Enter the year.
1) Mikhail Fedorovich;
2) Alexey Mikhailovich;
3) Boris Godunov;
4) Sofya Alekseevna.
19. The result of the conclusion of the “eternal peace” with Poland (1686) was that:
1) Russia received Left Bank Ukraine and Kyiv;
2) Russia received access to the Baltic Sea;
3) The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth refused Right Bank Ukraine;
4) The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth returned Novgorod to Russia.
20. Which event happened later than all the others?
1) adoption of the Council Code;
2) accession of the Romanovs;
3) Copper Riot;
4) Polyanovsky peace with Poland.
21. Which of the above related to the results of the foreign policy activities of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich?
1) obtaining access to the Baltic Sea;
2) refusal of Prince Vladislav from claims to the Russian throne;
3) the return of Smolensk, lost during the Time of Troubles;
4) annexation of Left Bank Ukraine to Russia.
22. What date is associated with the final enslavement of the peasants?
23. Which of the following was one of the reasons for the riots of 1648 and 1662 in Moscow?
1) the introduction of new duties and money;
2) liquidation of city government;
3) the introduction of conscription for the townspeople;
4) providing foreign merchants with advantages in trade.
24. What is the date of the church reform of Patriarch Nikon:
25. Pereyaslavl Rada is:
1) the governing body of the annexed lands;
2) an assembly that decided to transfer Ukraine under Russian rule;
3) a festive meeting dedicated to Russia’s military victories;
4) the legislative body that elected Mikhail Romanov to the kingdom.
26. Uprising led by S.T. Razin came into power. Enter the date.
1) Boris Godunov;
2) Mikhail Fedorovich;
3) Alexey Mikhailovich;
4) Fyodor Alekseevich.
27. The 17th century went down in history under the name:
1) the era of palace coups;
2) Time of Troubles;
3) rebellious age;
4) the era of feudal fragmentation.
28. During the period 1687 – 1689:
1) the Smolensk War was going on;
2) the annexation of Left Bank Ukraine took place;
3) Crimean campaigns were carried out;
4) church reform was being developed.
29. The famous monk was involved in raising the children of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich:
1) Sergius of Radonezh;
2) Simeon of Polotsk;
3) Archpriest Sylvester;
4) Maxim Grek.
30. Education in Russia in the 17th century:
1) was of a class nature;
2) was of a church character;
3) divided into natural-technical and humanitarian;
4) represented a coherent system from the lowest to the highest echelons.
31. In 1677 – 1678:
1) administrative reform was carried out;
2) localism was abolished;
3) the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy was founded;
4) Chigirin’s campaigns took place.
32. During the reign of Mikhail Fedorovich:
1) the Cossacks captured Azov;
2) the first theater appeared in Russia;
3) Left-Bank Ukraine went to Russia;
4) the circle “zealots of ancient piety” began its work.
33. To whose reign does the appearance of the order of Secret Affairs belong?
1) Princess Sophia;
2) Alexey Mikhailovich;
3) Ivan the Terrible;
4) Fyodor Ivanovich.
34. As a result of the Smolensk War:
1) the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was assigned territorial acquisitions made during the Time of Troubles
2) they failed to annex the Azov fortress to Russia
3) the city of Smolensk was recaptured by Russian troops
4) King Vladislav put forward claims to the Moscow throne
35. As a result of the Russian-Turkish war:
1) most of Right Bank Ukraine came under Turkish rule
2) The Ottoman Empire recognized the transition of Left Bank Ukraine and Kyiv to Russia
3) the Chigirin fortress and the city of Kyiv were captured by the Turks
4) the raids of the Crimean khans on Russian lands stopped
5) the Bakhchisarai Peace Treaty was concluded
36.Main directions foreign policy Russia in the 17th century (before 1689):
1) the struggle for access to the Sea of Azov
2) return of lands lost during the Troubles
3) the struggle for access to the Baltic Sea
4) reunification of Ukraine with Russia
5) security southern borders from the Crimean Khanate
6) weakening of the Ottoman Empire
37. The Smolensk War lasted. Enter the date.
1) 2 years 2) 4 years 3) 7 years 4) 10 years
38.The first higher education institution was opened in:
1) 1662 3) 1687
2) 1671 4) 1689
39.The main entertainment of the king and his court:
a) theatrical performances
b) performances of buffoons
c) hunting and falconry
The Pereyaslav Rada, which decided to reunite Ukraine with Russia.
Supreme body until 1654, i.e., before the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, there was a Sich Rada, which elected a military sergeant-major headed by the Kosh chieftain. The army was divided into kurens led by kuren atamans. The Zaporozhye Sich consisted of 38 kurens. At first, only Cossacks who lived in one area united in the kuren, but later Cossacks from other areas began to be accepted into it. Women and children were not allowed into the Sich.
After the reunification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, elections remained in Ukraine. Cossack administration headed by the hetman, the local legal procedure continued to operate. Ukraine even retained its foreign policy independence: it could conduct independent contacts with all countries except Poland and Turkey.
1654-67 - Russian-Polish War.
The annexation of Little Russia to Russia in January 1654 was the reason for the war with Poland under Alexei Mikhailovich. On May 18, 1654, the Tsar himself set out on a campaign, going to the Trinity and the Savvin Monastery to pray. The detachments of Alexy Trubetskoy, Shein and Khovansky threw back the Polish-Lithuanian detachments and occupied Roslavl, Mstislavl, Bely, Nevel, Polotsk from the battle; the advanced detachments of the main forces took Dorogobuzh, and then the tsar approached Smolensk and began its siege. At the same time, Disna and Druya were busy; in the Mstislavl voivodeship, Trubetskoy drove the enemy beyond the Dnieper, and in August Zolotarenko occupied Gomel, Chersk, Propoisk and stood on the Dnieper at Novy Bykhov. The Lithuanian hetman Radzivil was defeated at Gomel and Orsha. Among Belarusian population a gravitation towards Moscow began to clearly manifest itself, expressed in the voluntary surrender of Mogilev and in the formation of a special detachment of Mogilev residents for joint actions with Russian troops. By this time, after a three-month siege, Smolensk had surrendered and Vitebsk was occupied. After the surrender of Smolensk on September 23, the tsar returned to Vyazma. The further advance of Russian troops into the interior of Belarus was suspended, mainly due to the departure of Alexei Mikhailovich from the army and disagreements among the governors. Khmelnitsky, for his part, acted slowly and inconsistently with the tsarist commanders; even relations between the highest were revealed Little Russian clergy with the Polish government.
In 1654, a church council of Russian saints and clergy was assembled in the royal chambers in the presence of the tsar and the patriarch. Nikon, pointing out to them the errors in the books, asked for blessings to correct them. The Council unanimously answered: “It is worthwhile and righteous to correct (the books) against the old Charatean and Greek ones”; but when it came to signing the resolution of the council, some, they say, refused; and indeed, there are no signatures: one bishop (Paul Kolomensky), two archimandrites, one abbot and two archpriests. Then Nikon sent 26 questions to the Patriarch of Constantinople Paisius regarding the rituals and errors that had crept into the liturgical books; Paisius fully approved of Nikon's thought and the resolutions of the Moscow Council. Nikon, by the way, asked how to deal with disobedient people. Paisius announced that disobedient people were subject to excommunication, and also spoke out in favor of triplicate.
Arseny Sukhanov was sent to the East again with rich alms; he had to spare no expense in acquiring Greek manuscripts. Sukhanov took out up to 500 handwritten books, between which one gospel was then considered to be up to 1050 years old; Eastern patriarchs also sent at least 200 handwritten ancient books.
There is news that in 1654 the tsar, at the insistence of Nikon, sent out extracts from the nomocanon to the governors with instructions to judge criminal cases based on them), to whom he further blames the subordination of the clergy to the secular court. In the vast patriarchal region, Nikon was the sovereign administrator: he was removed, along with all his employees, monasteries and peasants, from the authority of the monastic order. Contrary to the Code, which prohibited the patriarch and the clergy in general from acquiring real estate through purchase, the tsar allowed Nikon to buy new lands and estates as his given name, and for three new monasteries founded by Nikon - New Jerusalem (Voskresensky near Moscow, founded in 1655), Iversky (near Valdai, founded in 1652) and Krestny (near Onega, founded in 1656). ), - the estates of which constituted, separately from the patriarchal, a vast region, entirely subordinated personally to Nikon. These monasteries soon surpassed even the most ancient monasteries, by the way, thanks to the fact that the sovereign, at Nikon’s request, assigned to them 14 monasteries that were located in the dioceses of other bishops. All the parish churches, up to 500 in number, located in his estates and the monasteries assigned to them, also came under the jurisdiction of Nikon, with which was combined the right of court, as well as certain duties and tributes. Having received significant awards, Nikon, however, regards them as nothing: “And we will not bow down for the king’s alms... since (the king) will accept it a hundredfold and inherit an eternal life,” he writes. Large material resources were also matched by the extraordinary pomp that surrounded Nikon both in his church and official environment and in his home life. In administrative matters he was strict and unforgiving. The number of banned priests under Nikon was so great that in some places there was no one to perform religious services. To supervise the clergy, he had his own clerks and archers; the lower clergy complained about the severity of their economic dependence, which intensified from the demanding executors of the will of the patriarch. Finally, with his arrogance and lust for power, with his incessant interference in worldly affairs, he armed the boyars against himself. He subjected the image of the Fryazhsky (Latin) script to public ridicule, he directly took away the Polish costumes from some, and lured others (for example, Boyar Romanov) by cunning and burned them.
Loving Nikon and respecting the patriarchal rank, the tsar invited his “king’s friend” to accept the title of “great sovereign” (according to Nikon - in 1654, but the title is already found in the act of the council on the annexation of Little Russia in 1653); Patriarch Filaret once bore this title, but as the father of the king. In the preface to the Service Book of 1655, Tsar Alexei and Patriarch N. are spoken of as “a God-chosen and God-wise duo, for which “all who live under their power, .. and under their united sovereign command... glorify with consoling songs the one who raised them our true God." In 1654, leaving on a campaign, the tsar entrusted Nikon with supervision of the administration and care of the royal family, which, together with Nikon, moved, on the occasion of a pestilence, from Moscow to Vyazma. This also caused popular displeasure.
By decree of April 30. 1654 it was forbidden to collect small customs duties (myt, road duties and anniversary) or farm them out and it was ordered to be included in the ruble duties collected at customs.
Traffic on the roads was greatly hampered by numerous tolls; they were destroyed by the same decree. Only bridging and transportation fees were retained, which were levied either for the benefit of the treasury or for the benefit of private individuals who maintained bridges and crossings.
The first action of the Kalmyk leader Shukur-Daichin upon his return from Tibet (1654) was to attack Russian lands.
Tubins are a Tatar Samoyed tribe that lived in the 16th century. in the river valley Tubes. Both the Tubins and the neighboring tribes related to them - the Dzhesars and the Motors - lived along the river. Tuba and its tributaries were one people. Before the Russians came to Tuba, they paid tribute to Altyn Khan of the Mongol, and to the Kirghiz, and partly to the Buryats. There were only 500 yasak Tubans. n. For the first time, the Russians explained them in 1609, but back in 1630, Ataman Zlobin went to war against them from Krasnoyarsk. In 1640, the Tubans, led by their prince Ungur, destroyed the Kansky fort. In 1643 they were pacified by Ivan. Kobylsky from Krasnoyarsk. The Tubins finally conquered in 1654, when some of them went to the Chinese borders, others moved beyond the Yenisei to Abakan, and old places they were occupied by the Russians.
The annexation of Ukraine to Russia (1654) took place against the backdrop of complex socio-political events related to the desire of Ukrainians to become more independent and not depend entirely on Poland. Since 1648, the confrontation entered the armed phase, but no matter how many victories the Cossacks under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky won over the Polish troops, they were unable to turn victories on the battlefield into tangible political dividends. It became clear that without the help of a powerful ally it would not be possible to leave the tutelage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; as a result, Ukraine was reunited with Russia. Let us briefly describe the reasons for the historical event.
Equality and autonomy
During the six years of war in numerous bloody battles The Ukrainian people, with a huge effort of their strength, defeated the Polish troops many times. But, inflicting significant blows to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Khmelnitsky at first was not yet going to tear Ukraine away from Polish state. He stood for the position of Cossack autonomy, that is, he strived for the Cossacks and the gentry to have equal rights, and Ukrainian lands became equal within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth along with Poland and Lithuania. At that time there was no talk about the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. 1654 changed the situation.
Or maybe independence?
Meanwhile, few believed in the idea of equality within the framework of autonomy. Already in the first years of the war in Ukraine, and even in Poland, rumors spread that:
- Khmelnitsky wants to restore some kind of “Old Russian” or create a new principality.
- He calls himself "Prince of Rus'."
- The Cossacks want to found an independent state.
But at that time, the necessary prerequisites for Ukraine’s independence had not yet developed. The main participants in the war - and these are the illiterate Cossacks and the equally illiterate peasantry - could not create their own state ideology, the leadership layer - the Cossack elders and the gentry - did not have the proper political weight to implement separatist plans. Moreover, even Hetman Khmelnitsky did not yet have popular confidence. Only during the war, in the process of forming the Ukrainian Cossack state, the idea of independence became more and more widespread and established.
Union with Turkey
The longer we walked fighting, the more Khmelnitsky, the elders and the masses became convinced that Ukraine would not be able to free itself from the power of gentry Poland solely on its own without outside help. There were only two powerful neighbors ready to resist the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: the Russian state in the east and the Ottoman Empire in the south. Khmelnitsky had little choice: either Ukraine’s entry into Russia, or recognition of vassal dependence on Turkey.
Initially, the Turkish Sultan, who had enough strength to resist Poland's encroachments in Ukraine, became a contender for the role of patron of Ukraine. Negotiations were held between Khmelnitsky and the Sultan's government. In 1651 Ottoman Porte declared that it accepted the Zaporozhian Army as vassals. In practice real help Turkish Sultan was limited only to the fact that they took part in the battles Crimean Tatars, who had been at war with the Cossacks for centuries. They remained very unreliable allies and with their treacherous behavior, robberies and captivity of the population brought more troubles than benefits to the Ukrainians.
Appeal to Russia for help
The alliance with the Ottoman Empire never actually took place. It was not even a matter of the Sultan’s weak military-financial assistance, but of mental incompatibility. The differences between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, whom the people called “Basurmans,” turned out to be insurmountable. In this situation, the gaze of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the population of Ukraine turned to their coreligionists - the Russians.
On June 8, 1648, six years before Ukraine annexed to Russia (1654), Bogdan Khmelnitsky wrote the first letter for help to the Russian autocrat Alexei Mikhailovich. Initially, Russia was in no hurry to get involved in full scale war with a strong Polish-Lithuanian kingdom. But the leader of the Ukrainians spent six years convincing the tsar to provide assistance, seeking the inclusion of the Russian state in the war with gentry Poland. Khmelnitsky emphasized to the Moscow ambassadors the importance of joint defense of the common fraternal peoples Orthodox faith, with his victories debunked exaggerated ideas about the strength of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, noted the great advantages that the reunification of Ukraine with Russia would have. The year 1654 showed the foresight and correctness of Khmelnytsky.
Russia's wait-and-see attitude
Moscow understood the importance of an alliance with Ukraine:
- The strategic alliance, first of all, opened the way to the south all the way to the Black Sea and to the west.
- He weakened Poland.
- Destroyed a possible alliance with Turkey.
- Strengthened the state by joining Russian banners three hundred thousand Cossack army.
However, for a long time, due to difficult internal and external circumstances, as well as counting on the weakening of both warring parties - Poland and Ukraine - the tsarist government took a wait-and-see attitude. Help was limited to sending bread and salt to Ukraine, allowing Ukrainians to move to outlying lands, and exchanging embassies.
Rendezvous course
Relations between Bogdan Khmelnytsky and the Russian government intensified in 1652-1653, in last years liberation war. There were almost continuous embassies from Ukraine to Moscow and from Moscow to Ukraine. In January 1652, Khmelnitsky sent to Russian capital his messenger Ivan Iskra. Iskra stated that the hetman and the entire Zaporozhye army want “the Tsar’s Majesty to take them to his side.”
In December 1652 and January 1653, Samoilo Zarudny held negotiations with his comrades in Moscow. Zarudny said that the king “ordered them to be accepted under his sovereign High hand.” On January 6, 1653, Khmelnitsky convened a council of elders in Chigirin, which decided not to put up with Poland, but to continue to fight until Ukraine’s entry into Russia was completed.
In April-May 1653, negotiations in Moscow were conducted by ambassadors Kondraty Burlyai and Siluan Muzhilovsky. The tsarist government also sent ambassadors to Bogdan Khmelnitsky, in particular, at the end of May 1653, A. Matveev and I. Fomin left for Chigirin.
1654: Ukraine-Russia - together for centuries
The worsening situation in Ukraine forced the tsarist government to speed up its decision. On June 22, 1653, steward Fyodor Ladyzhensky went to Ukraine from Moscow with a letter from Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, in which consent was given to the transfer of the lands of Ukraine under the “high royal hand.”
On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor met in Moscow, designed to finally resolve the issue of relations between Russia and Ukraine and declare war on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the Faceted Chamber of the Kremlin, they decided to “take the Zaporozhian Army and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with their lands and their cities under the arm of the sovereign.” This is how history was made. The reunification of Ukraine with Russia was approved not only by the tsar, but also by all segments of the population (except for the serfs, who did not have the right to vote), whose representatives gathered at the council. At the same time, the Zemsky Sobor decided to start a war with Poland.
However this is not final accession Ukraine to Russia. 1654 required several more meetings before the final terms of entry were worked out. Russia's recognition of Ukraine as a free, independent country was important. The decision of the Zemsky Sobor spoke about this as follows: “So as not to release them into citizenship To the Turkish Sultan or Crimean Khan because they became free people by the royal oath.”
Signing the contract
January 31, 1653 Russian embassy arrives at Khmelnitsky's headquarters - the city of Pereyaslav - with a letter about the decision of the Zemsky Sobor and the “highest command”. The embassy, headed by V. Buturlin, was solemnly greeted by the elders and ordinary people.
On January 6, 1654, Bogdan Khmelnitsky arrived in Pereyaslav and the next day met with the ambassadors to discuss the terms of the alliance. January 8, after secret negotiations with the elders regarding the conditions of accession, Bogdan Khmelnitsky came out to the people and confirmed the accession of Ukraine to Russia. The year 1654 became a turning point in the fate of the two peoples.
Ukrainian embassies visited Moscow several more times to discuss the details of the voluntary entry of Left Bank Ukraine under the protectorate of the Russian Empire.
History of Ukraine in dates: reunification with Russia
- 1591-1593 - uprising against and the first appeal of Hetman Kryshtof Kosinski for help to the Russian Tsar.
- 1622, 1624 - an appeal from Bishop Isaiah Kopinsky, and then Metropolitan Job Boretsky to the Tsar to accept the Orthodox of Little Rus' into Russian citizenship.
- 1648 - Bogdan Khmelnitsky raises an all-Ukrainian uprising against the gentry and on June 8 writes the first letter to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich about help and alliance. The first victories of the Cossack army and the signing of the Zboriv Peace Treaty, which granted autonomy to the Zaporozhye Army.
- 1651 - resumption of hostilities, heavy defeat of the Cossacks near Berestechko.
- 1653 - a new appeal from Bohdan Khmelnytsky to the Russians with a request to help the Cossacks and a request to accept Left Bank Ukraine as citizenship. On October 1, the Zemsky Sobor met.
- 1654 - On January 8, the Pereyaslav Rada met and popularly decided to unite with Russia. The Zemsky Sobor and the Tsar satisfied most of the requests put forward by the elders and the hetman, which provided for broad autonomy. This document finally cemented the reunification of Left Bank Ukraine with Russia.