In early July 1943, the famous Battle of Kursk began. As Russian historians write about this, the battle on the Kursk Bulge and the Battle of Stalingrad provided a very significant turning point in the course of the military operations of the Second World War. A lot of literary works have been created about the Battle of Kursk, but few people still know about some points...
Mysterious "Werther"
By mid-1943, the USSR had caught up and even surpassed the state of the Third Reich both in the production of weapons and in other areas of military affairs.
Intelligence among the very top of Hitler's command was unusually effective. Since January 1943, the agents reported to Stalin all the details of the Nazi offensive scheme, which was scheduled for the summer. This scheme was called "Citadel".
Already in mid-April 1943, a directive already translated into Russian was delivered to Joseph Stalin, where the scheme of Operation Citadel was recorded. This important document bore the visas of all Wehrmacht services. Only Adolf Hitler has not yet signed it. He endorsed the scheme only three days after Stalin studied it. Hitler, of course, did not know about this.
The “mole” in the Third Reich, who obtained this very valuable document for Stalin, was highly classified. The only nickname they knew about him was “Werther.” At present, historians can only assume that he was a photographer who personally served Hitler.
Rokossovsky's plan
Soviet senior military officials had different opinions about how Soviet troops should behave during the Nazi offensive in the summer of 1943. Konstantin Rokossovsky, who headed the Central Front, proposed to first carry out a long defense so that the enemy army would run out of strength, and then launch a counterattack and utterly defeat the battle-worn and weakened enemy. And the head of the Voronezh Front, Nikolai Vatutin, expressed the opposite opinion - he called for going on the offensive first, skipping the period of long defense.
Commander of the Central Front Konstantin Rokossovsky
Joseph Stalin, although he preferred Vatutin’s proposal, however, supported the majority’s point of view, which, by the way, was also shared by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, and chose the strategy option that Rokossovsky proposed.
However, contrary to expectations, the Nazis still did not go on the attack, although it was already July, and Stali even doubted that he had chosen the right strategy.
But soon the Nazis suddenly actively went on the offensive, and everything went according to Rokossovsky’s plan - the Soviet Union won the battle on the Kursk Bulge.
An incomprehensible fight near Prokhorovka
Historians recognize the tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka as the most decisive period of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.
It is striking that there is no consensus among academic historians regarding the exact circumstances of this battle, and there is still heated debate on this topic.
In Soviet times, scientists wrote that the Red Army had eight hundred tanks, and the Nazis had seven hundred. Scientists of our period often overestimate the number of Russian military vehicles and underestimate the number of Hitler's.
Cambridge professor Richard Evans even went so far as to point out in his works that the Nazis had only 117 tanks during the battle near Prokhorovka, and only three of them were destroyed.
Evans also claims that there was no victory for the Russian troops there, and it was Hitler himself who gave the order to stop the battle. And he declares, as some modern scientists also believe, that during this battle the USSR troops lost ten thousand tanks.
However, if you believe Richard Evans, why then exactly after this battle did the Nazis begin to rapidly retreat to Berlin?
Yes, of course, the losses of Soviet troops exceeded the damage suffered by the Nazis during the battle near Prokhorovka. The main strength of tank units and all armies at that time were the T-34s, which were much weaker than Hitler’s Tigers and Panthers, which is why there was such an advantage in combat losses.
However, despite all the advantages, the German tracked vehicles did not advance further than the village of Prokhorovka, which broke the entire scheme of Hitler’s offensive called “Citadel”.
Offensive operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"
When talking about the battle on the Kursk Bulge, everyone usually talks first about Hitler’s Operation Citadel, that is, about the scheme of the fascist offensive. But when the Nazi attack fizzled out, the Red Army carried out two unusually successful offensive operations. But much fewer people know about them than about the Citadel.
In mid-July 1943, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts moved to attack towards the city of Orel. After 3 days, the Central Front also launched an attack. This operation was called "Kutuzov".
In continuation of this offensive, Soviet troops greatly “upset” the fascist Army Group Center, which then retreated for a long time. During Kutuzov, many large cities were liberated, and in early August the Red Army entered the city of Orel.
At the beginning of August 1943, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts carried out Operation Rumyantsev, carrying out a massive attack on Nazi fortifications. On August 5, the Red Army occupied Belgorod and continued to recapture Ukrainian lands. Twenty days later, Soviet troops were already near Kharkov. On the night of August 24, 1943, troops of the Steppe Front stormed this city, and in the morning Kharkov was ours.
It was these successful operations - “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” that were awarded the first salute during the war years, held in Moscow in honor of the conquest of Orel and Belgorod.
The Battle of Kursk, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943, in terms of its scale, the forces and means involved, as well as the results and military-political consequences, is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War.
The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted 50 days. As a result of this operation, the strategic initiative finally passed to the side of the Red Army and until the end of the war it was carried out mainly in the form of offensive actions on its part.
On the day of the 75th anniversary of the start of the legendary battle, the website of the Zvezda TV channel collected ten little-known facts about the Battle of Kursk.
1. Initially the battle was not planned as offensive
When planning the spring-summer military campaign of 1943, the Soviet command faced a difficult choice: which method of action to prefer - to attack or defend. In their reports on the situation in the Kursk Bulge area, Zhukov and Vasilevsky proposed to bleed the enemy in a defensive battle and then launch a counteroffensive. A number of military leaders opposed it - Vatutin, Malinovsky, Timoshenko, Voroshilov - but Stalin supported the decision to defend, fearing that as a result of our offensive the Nazis would be able to break through the front line. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when the Citadel plan became known.
“The actual course of events showed that the decision on deliberate defense was the most rational type of strategic action,” emphasizes military historian, candidate of historical sciences Yuri Popov.
2. The number of troops in the battle exceeded the scale of the Battle of Stalingrad
The Battle of Kursk is still considered one of the largest battles of World War II. More than four million people were involved in it on both sides (for comparison: during the Battle of Stalingrad, just over 2.1 million people participated at various stages of the fighting). According to the General Staff of the Red Army, during the offensive alone from July 12 to August 23, 35 German divisions were defeated, including 22 infantry, 11 tank and two motorized. The remaining 42 divisions suffered heavy losses and largely lost their combat effectiveness. In the Battle of Kursk, the German command used 20 tank and motorized divisions out of a total of 26 divisions available at that time on the Soviet-German front. After Kursk, 13 of them were completely destroyed.
3. Information about the enemy’s plans was promptly received from intelligence officers from abroad
Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparations of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge. Foreign residencies obtained information in advance about Germany’s preparations for the spring-summer campaign of 1943. Thus, on March 22, GRU resident in Switzerland Sandor Rado reported that “...an attack on Kursk may involve using the SS tank corps (an organization banned in the Russian Federation - approx. edit.), which is currently receiving replenishment." And intelligence officers in England (GRU resident Major General I. A. Sklyarov) obtained an analytical report prepared for Churchill, “Assessment of possible German intentions and actions in the Russian campaign of 1943.”
“The Germans will concentrate forces to eliminate the Kursk salient,” the document said.
Thus, the information obtained by the scouts in early April revealed in advance the plan of the enemy’s summer campaign and made it possible to forestall the enemy’s attack.
4. The Kursk Bulge became a large-scale baptism of fire for Smersh
The Smersh counterintelligence agencies were formed in April 1943, three months before the start of the historic battle. "Death to Spies!" - Stalin so succinctly and at the same time succinctly defined the main task of this special service. But the Smershevites not only reliably protected units and formations of the Red Army from enemy agents and saboteurs, but also obtained valuable information that was used by the Soviet command, conducted radio games with the enemy, and carried out combinations to bring German agents to our side. The book “Fire Arc”: The Battle of Kursk through the eyes of Lubyanka,” published based on materials from the Central Archives of the FSB of Russia, talks about a whole series of operations by security officers during that period.
Thus, in order to misinform the German command, the Smersh department of the Central Front and the Smersh department of the Oryol Military District conducted a successful radio game “Experience”. It lasted from May 1943 to August 1944. The work of the radio station was legendary on behalf of the reconnaissance group of Abwehr agents and misled the German command about the plans of the Red Army, including in the Kursk region. In total, 92 radiograms were transmitted to the enemy, 51 were received. Several German agents were called to our side and neutralized, and cargo dropped from the plane was received (weapons, money, fictitious documents, uniforms). This and much more contributed to the overall success of the strategic operation near Kursk.
5. On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality
What is considered to be the largest battle of armored vehicles of the entire Second World War began near this settlement. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The Wehrmacht had superiority over the Red Army due to the greater efficiency of its equipment. Let's say the T-34 had only a 76-mm cannon, and the T-70 had a 45-mm gun. The Churchill III tanks, received by the USSR from England, had a 57-millimeter gun, but this vehicle was characterized by low speed and poor maneuverability. In turn, the German heavy tank T-VIH "Tiger" had an 88-mm cannon, with a shot from which it penetrated the armor of the thirty-four at a range of up to two kilometers.
Our tank could penetrate armor 61 millimeters thick at a distance of a kilometer. By the way, the frontal armor of the same T-IVH reached a thickness of 80 millimeters. It was possible to fight with any hope of success in such conditions only in close combat, which was done, however, at the cost of heavy losses. Nevertheless, at Prokhorovka, the Wehrmacht lost 75% of its tank resources. For Germany, such losses were a disaster and proved difficult to recover almost until the very end of the war.
6. General Katukov’s cognac did not reach the Reichstag
During the Battle of Kursk, for the first time during the war, the Soviet command used large tank formations in echelon to hold a defensive line on a wide front. One of the armies was commanded by Lieutenant General Mikhail Katukov, the future twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Armored Forces. Subsequently, in his book “At the Edge of the Main Strike,” he, in addition to the difficult moments of his front-line epic, also recalled one funny incident related to the events of the Battle of Kursk.
“In June 1941, after leaving the hospital, on the way to the front I dropped into a store and bought a bottle of cognac, deciding that I would drink it with my comrades as soon as I achieved my first victory over the Nazis,” the front-line soldier wrote. “Since then, this treasured bottle has traveled with me on all fronts. And finally the long-awaited day has arrived. We arrived at the checkpoint. The waitress quickly fried the eggs, and I took a bottle out of my suitcase. We sat down with our comrades at a simple wooden table. They poured cognac, which brought back pleasant memories of peaceful pre-war life. And the main toast - “To victory! To Berlin!""
7. Kozhedub and Maresyev crushed the enemy in the sky above Kursk
During the Battle of Kursk, many Soviet soldiers showed heroism.
“Every day of fighting provided many examples of courage, bravery, and perseverance of our soldiers, sergeants and officers,” notes retired Colonel General Alexey Kirillovich Mironov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War. “They consciously sacrificed themselves, trying to prevent the enemy from passing through their defense sector.”
Over 100 thousand participants in those battles were awarded orders and medals, 231 became Hero of the Soviet Union. 132 formations and units received the guards rank, and 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. The future three-time Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Kozhedub shot down 15 enemy aircraft with his fighter during the battle of Kursk. Alexey Maresyev also took part in the battles. On July 20, 1943, during an air battle with superior enemy forces, he saved the lives of two Soviet pilots by destroying two enemy FW-190 fighters at once. On August 24, 1943, the deputy squadron commander of the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant A.P. Maresyev, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
8. Defeat at the Battle of Kursk came as a shock to Hitler
After the failure at the Kursk Bulge, the Fuhrer was furious: he lost his best formations, not yet knowing that in the fall he would have to leave the entire Left Bank Ukraine. Without betraying his character, Hitler immediately laid the blame for the Kursk failure on the field marshals and generals who exercised direct command of the troops. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:
A German historian from the military-historical department of the Bundeswehr, Manfred Pay, wrote:
“The irony of history is that Soviet generals began to assimilate and develop the art of operational leadership of troops, which was highly appreciated by the German side, and the Germans themselves, under pressure from Hitler, switched to Soviet positions of tough defense - according to the principle “at all costs.”
By the way, the fate of the elite SS tank divisions that took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge - “Leibstandarte”, “Totenkopf” and “Reich” - later turned out even more sad. All three units took part in battles with the Red Army in Hungary, were defeated, and the remnants made their way into the American zone of occupation. However, the SS tank crews were handed over to the Soviet side, and they were punished as war criminals.
9. The victory at Kursk brought the opening of the Second Front closer
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the disintegration of the fascist bloc began - the Mussolini regime collapsed, Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force in the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. In August 1943, the US Committee of Chiefs of Staff prepared an analytical document in which it assessed the role of the USSR in the war.
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It is no coincidence that President Roosevelt realized the danger of further delaying the opening of the Second Front. On the eve of the Tehran Conference he told his son:
It is interesting that a month after the end of the Battle of Kursk, Roosevelt already had his own plan for the dismemberment of Germany. He presented it just at the conference in Tehran.
10. For the fireworks in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, the entire supply of blank shells in Moscow was used up
During the Battle of Kursk, two key cities of the country were liberated - Orel and Belgorod. Joseph Stalin ordered an artillery salute to be held on this occasion in Moscow - the first in the entire war. It was estimated that in order for the fireworks to be heard throughout the city, about 100 anti-aircraft guns would need to be deployed. There were such fire weapons, but the organizers of the ceremonial event had at their disposal only 1,200 blank shells (during the war they were not kept in reserve at the Moscow Air Defense Garrison). Therefore, out of 100 guns, only 12 salvos could be fired. True, the Kremlin mountain cannon division (24 guns) was also involved in the salute, blank shells for which were available. However, the effect of the action may not have been as expected. The solution was to increase the interval between salvos: at midnight on August 5, all 124 guns were fired every 30 seconds. And so that the fireworks could be heard everywhere in Moscow, groups of guns were placed in stadiums and vacant lots in different areas of the capital.
On July 5, 1943, one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War began - the Battle of Kursk. According to domestic historiography, the Battle of Kursk, along with the Battle of Stalingrad, constitutes the so-called period of a radical turning point in the war.
Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many facts are still little known to a wide audience. AiF.ru collected 5 of them.
Stalin's "Werther"
By the summer of 1943, the Soviet Union had caught up and surpassed Nazi Germany not only in terms of weapons production, but also in virtually all areas of military activity.
Soviet agents also worked brilliantly behind enemy lines. Already from the beginning of 1943 Stalin and the Soviet General Staff was aware of the preparation by the German command of a plan for a summer offensive codenamed “Citadel”.
On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, appeared on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was the visa itself Hitler. He staged it three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.
Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command except his code name - “Werther”. Various researchers have put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.
Rokossovsky turned out to be more perspicacious than Vatutin
There was no consensus among Soviet military leaders on how to proceed in the summer of 1943. Commander of the Central Front Konstantin Rokossovsky proposed a transition to a deliberate defense in order to exhaust and bleed the advancing enemy, followed by a counteroffensive for his final defeat. But the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolay Vatutin insisted that our troops go on the offensive without any defensive actions.
Stalin, who was more impressed by Vatutin’s point of view, nevertheless, listened to the opinion of the majority of the military and, first of all, Zhukova, supported Rokossovsky’s position.
However, the Germans showed amazing passivity in early July, which made Stalin doubt the correctness of the decision.
Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!
What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.
Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! - answered the commander.
Rokossovsky was not mistaken.
The mysterious battle of Prokhorovka
The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka.
Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the opposing sides still causes fierce debate among historians.
Classic Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and reduce the number of German ones.
Professor of the Royal Department of Modern History at the University of Cambridge went the furthest Richard Evans, writing that the Germans at Prokhorovka had only 117 tanks, of which only three were lost.
According to Evans, the Battle of Kursk did not end in a Soviet victory, but on “Hitler’s orders.” The same Evans, who is supported by many young Russian historians, states that by the end of the battle the Red Army had lost 10,000 tanks.
This version has one extremely weak point - it is not clear why, with such successes, the Nazis suddenly began to rapidly roll back to the West?
The losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Prokhorovka were greater than those of the Nazis. The backbone of the Soviet tank corps and armies at that time was the T-34, which was significantly inferior to the newest German Tigers and Panthers - this explains the high number of Soviet losses.
Nevertheless, Nazi tanks were stopped on the field at Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of plans for the German summer offensive.
"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"
When people talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel, the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the Wehrmacht onslaught was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out two of their offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than “Citadel”.
On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed “Kutuzov”. During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to “Kutuzov”, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Orel.
August 1943. Photo: RIA Novosti
On August 3, 1943, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began the offensive operation "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then began to liberate the territory of Left Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing Nazi forces and reached Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 a.m., troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.
“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Maresyev's feat
Writer's book Boris Polevoy“The Tale of a Real Man,” which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexey Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.
But not everyone knows that the fame of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, arose precisely during the Battle of Kursk.
Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived in the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, was faced with distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him, fearing that a pilot with prosthetics would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.
The squadron commander took him as his partner Alexander Chislov. Maresyev coped with the task, and at the height of the battles on the Kursk Bulge he carried out combat missions along with everyone else.
On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexey Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.
This story immediately became known throughout the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
It is interesting that during his participation in battles, fighter pilot Alexey Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to duty after amputation of both legs.
For the fascists, this was the last hope to try to take the strategic initiative and again go to Moscow. The bet was placed not only on the number of troops - special hopes were placed on weapons. This was Hitler's paranoid dream: he demanded from the Wunderwaffe engineers a miracle weapon with which his soldiers would take over the whole world.
Mental abnormalities of this type are contagious. In his memoirs, the Reich Minister of Arms and Ammunition of Germany Albert Speer described: the creator of the German V-Fau, Wernher von Braun, was thrown into prison by order of the Reichsführer SS Himmler. For the fact that, on his personal initiative, at the secret missile center in Peenemünde, he began to develop... an intercontinental postal rocket. Brown decided: since we will soon conquer the whole world, including the USA, then we need to deliver mail to the colonies...
Himmler was furious not because of the postal rocket, but because Brown was obliged to complete a priority project: the V-2 ballistic missile.
For Brown, the story ended with a happy ending: Hitler felt a kindred spirit and ordered the rocket scientist to be released from prison. Wernher von Braun successfully survived the collapse of the Third Reich and left for the USA. On his rocket, the first American flew into space (lagging behind the USSR: Korolev’s rocket earlier launched a ship with Yuri Gagarin into orbit), and US astronauts landed on the Moon...
Focke-Wulf aircraft for Hitler were created by a man named Tank
But let's return to earth. It was during the Battle of Kursk that it became clear that no technical innovations would ensure victory. Hitler threw his best personnel at us: Erich von Manstein, Hermann Hoth, Walter Model. Did not help. Germany could only hope for a miracle - so they began to hope for it. Space rockets and stratospheric “flying saucers” are by no means fiction, but real projects of Nazi Germany. Some were implemented, some were not.
However, there were no “flying saucers” in the Battle of Kursk, but our army was faced with very advanced projects: Tiger and Panther tanks, Focke-Wulf-190 fighters. They were opposed by weapons created by Soviet gunsmiths.
1. Klim speed
The heavy KV-1 (Klim Voroshilov-1) was the most powerful tank in the world before the appearance of the Panthers and Tigers. The Germans called him Gespenst - "Ghost".
But there were reports from the troops about its lack of mobility, and there were complaints about the gearboxes and sights.
The situation with the defective gearbox acquired such proportions that in the spring of 1942, a commander with a terrible reputation was sent to the Crimean Front: Army Commissar 1st Rank Lev Mehlis. Joseph Kotin, one of the fathers of the KV, also went to the troops.
But the main problem is the engine. Attempts to boost the existing one - from 600 to 650 hp. - were unsuccessful, the engine overheated. But it was not possible to replace it with a new one during the war.
The generals looked at the situation from “their bell tower.” And they reported to Stalin that the KV was destroying bridges and breaking up roads. And most importantly, the gun on the heavy Klim and the medium T-34 are the same.
Measures have been taken. The designers reduced the weight to 42.5 tons. The KV-1S tank was tested both here and in the USA. There were some comments (there are no perfect tanks), but overall the results were positive. The weapon remained the same: 76.2 mm ZiS-5 cannon. Maneuverability has improved, speed has increased: from real 28 km/h (according to the passport 34 km/h) to 43 km/h. Actually, the “C” in the name speaks of the speed qualities of the new tank. But the thickness of the armor had to be sacrificed somewhat.
It went into production in August 1942. KV-1S tanks distinguished themselves at Stalingrad and performed well in the Kursk operation. But a good tank found itself in a difficult niche. It had equal armament with the T-34, superior to the latter in armor, but inferior in mobility. And it was more difficult and expensive to produce. And when a powerful 85-mm cannon was installed on the T-34, the management considered that the advantages of a heavy tank over a medium one were lost.
KV-1 was deciphered by knowledgeable people: Kotin - Voroshilov
Well, personal factors, where would we be without them. Stalin somewhat disliked this tank. His phrase went down in history: “The T-34 walks well in deep snow, like a swallow flies, but the KV does poorly.” Actually, this applied to the KV tank without the letter “C”. But objectively, the heavy KV-1S was not a swallow compared to the medium T-34.
By the way, knowledgeable people deciphered the name of the tank: Kotin - Voroshilov. Joseph Kotin was married to the daughter of the legendary marshal. But even such names did not change the fate of the extraordinary car. In September 1943, the KV-1S was discontinued (having produced 1,200 vehicles) in favor of the IS-1.
2. Tanks from the sky
Our pilots dubbed the heavy fighter FW-190 ("Focke-Wulf-190") "Fokker" or "Fokka" and considered it a strong adversary. Noting that it is still possible to hit the "focus".
German aircraft designers Heinrich Focke and Georg Wulf had nothing to do with the creation of the Focke-Wulf 190. They founded a company named after themselves in the 1920s. Georg Wulf crashed in 1927 while testing an aircraft. Heinrich Focke left the management of the company, switching to the creation of helicopters. The FW-190 for Hitler was created by a designer named Kurt Tank.
In their memoirs, our veterans use an unkind word to remember the fascist “frames” - the “eyes” of the Wehrmacht - the FW-189 reconnaissance aircraft. It was designed and personally tested by the same Kurt Tank. Production of the FW-189 was established at factories in Bremen, Germany, Prague and Bordeaux, France. In 1942, the Czechs and French produced four times as many Rams for the Luftwaffe as the Germans. Moreover, the French “frames” surpassed even the German ones in technical perfection. So at the Battle of Kursk, “frames” assembled by the calloused hands of French and Czech workers hung in our sky.
But history loves paradoxes. The French from Normandy-Neman on the Yak-3 also fought against the Fokkers over Orel and Belgorod. Later they were joined by Czechs from the 1st Mixed Czechoslovak Division of the USSR Air Force, flying the La-5FN.
As for the FW-190, they were used sporadically on the Eastern Front at the beginning of the war (near Leningrad and in the area of Lake Ilmen). They tried to use them near Rzhev, but the foresail motors overheated and they didn’t dare send them into battle. Our Air Force encountered squadrons armed with FW-190s already during the Battle of Kursk.
These were already “finished” aircraft, free of engine problems. Our magnificent La-5FN ("boosted model with direct fuel injection") became a worthy rival to it. "Lavochkin" was armed with two 20-mm ShVAK cannons. The Fokker carried two machine guns and 2 to 4 20 mm cannons.
The La-5FN was inferior in some characteristics to the Fokker, but in some respects superior to it. Ultimately, everything depended on the pilot.
On July 20, 1943, Senior Lieutenant Alexey Maresyev shot down two FW-190s in a La-5. The Lavochkin has a heavy steering wheel. To understand: the pilot’s feet are on the pedals that control the rudder on the fin. And Maresyev lost his legs in 1942: they were amputated in the lower leg area. Flew on prosthetics. But how he flew!
During the course, the Germans used hundreds of FW-190s. Few survived. German squadrons were again rearmed with cheaper Messerschmitts. The Focke-Wulf factories did not have time to make up for the losses.
Kurt Tank improved his fighters, proposed a version of a jet fighter... But the sky already belonged to our aces. Germany has run out of experienced pilots. Their bones lay among the wreckage of Fokkers and Messers on our soil.
Grimace of history: aircraft designed by Kurt Tank lost to Soviet fighters again, after the war. In the early 1960s, he created the Marut (Storm Spirit) fighter-bomber for the Indian Air Force. The plane was not bad, it successfully fought with Pakistan. At its base, Tank began to create a supersonic fighter. But India abruptly curtailed projects in favor of Soviet MIGs. Kurt Tank consulted on various projects, including Tornado, and received awards from the government. But he didn’t create any more airplanes. By some irony of fate, competition with our designers ended badly for him.
Fate perhaps.
3.Trophy
Both sides used equipment captured from the enemy.
The Germans formed entire companies of captured T-34 tanks. German tankers considered the T-34 an excellent tank. Like the KV-1.
The USSR also did not neglect trophies. During the war, 800 German tanks and self-propelled guns were repaired at the factories of Moscow and Stalingrad alone.
Most of all we had German T-III and T-IV tanks. Detailed instructions for crew training were even developed.
Heavy Panthers and Tigers were also captured in smaller numbers. "Panthers" were first used on the southern bulge of the Kursk Bulge in July 1943.
Naturally, there were problems with trophies. The crews often broke them. Spare parts were in short supply: they could only be taken from other cars. Excellent 75-mm tank gun mod. 1942 KwK42, which was installed on the Panther, allowed the tank to be used in tank destroyer units. But the question arose: where to get ammunition? Ours were not suitable, the captured ones quickly ran out.
But there were cases when Soviet troops in captured tanks entered the rear of the Germans (they mistook them for their own) and caused a terrible defeat.
But the use of both our own and captured tanks in one unit at the same time led to unpredictable results. A real case: in the fall of 1943, in the battle formations of the 59th separate tank regiment, along with Soviet tanks, a captured Panther was sent into battle. At first, the German artillerymen took care of it: they thought that it was one of their own, it had just gone far behind enemy lines in battle. But when the truth was revealed, all the firepower of the artillery was concentrated on this “Panther”.
And there were many such cases. Special heroism was required from the crews of this equipment.
Among the oddities of using captured armor is the following fact: at the 1st repair base (Moscow), captured Tigers, which could not be restored, became a source of spare parts for Soviet tanks. In particular, the T-34 balancer buffer cushions were made from Tiger rubber bands.
4. Death to spies
Germany, in addition to relying on miracle weapons, tried to organize massive sabotage in our rear. Why did they organize a network of intelligence schools that trained saboteurs, signalmen and provocateurs?
We created Soviet counterintelligence under the somewhat unusual name "Smersh" ("Death to Spies!") in the spring of 1943.
During the Battle of Kursk, Smersh earned fame as one of the most effective counterintelligence agencies in the world. Beginning in 1943, 157 Abwehr messengers who defected to our side took part in the Smersh radio games. At the height of the Battle of Kursk, 10 radio stations of converted agents were used to disseminate information about the positions of the Red Army. Our counterintelligence officers made a worthy contribution to the success of the operation near Kursk.
By the way, the name could have been slightly different. The key historical figures who created this special service - Merkulov, Abakumov and Beria - proposed calling the special service "Smernesh". From the slogan "Death to German spies!" To which Stalin asked: why only German? Aren't spies from other countries working against our army?
Nobody objected.
5. Don't believe your eyes
The German "Tiger" is a powerful tank. But a number of “researchers” and directors today mythologize his fighting qualities. For example, they praise the Tiger cannon, which destroyed the armor of “any tank” from 2 km. It is said that Zeiss telescope sights allowed the Tiger to hit the target with the first shot.
A shell from an 88-mm Krupp gun penetrated up to 80 mm of armor at 2000 meters - this is true. But it took 60 seconds for the Tiger turret to fully rotate, and the enemy tanks did not stand still.
And about “defeat at the first shot” - as they say, first-hand. From the memoirs of a participant in the Battle of Prokhorov, SS Oberscharführer J. Holl, commander of the VI Tiger tank of the 102nd SS battalion "Das Reich". Holl writes: “July 11-12, 1943. I won my first victory. Okay, it was just a tractor towing an artillery piece, but still a destroyed target. My gunner, Karl, fired about 30 shells at it...”
Bravo, Karl: 30 shells on a slow-moving tractor from a supercannon? With such excellent aim.
Miracle gun, miracle sight, miracle gunner...
And further. Increasingly, in films about the Second World War, tanks fire on the move. Director's find, it looks impressive. In principle, you can fire a tank gun like this. Provided that the task is not to get somewhere.
But in general, tankers shoot at specific targets.
Effective gun stabilizers began to be installed en masse on tanks only in the 1950s. During the war, the stabilizer was installed only on the American Sherman. We received 4060 of these tanks from the USA under Lend-Lease. German engineers tried to create a stabilizer for the "Royal Tiger", but did not have time. War is over.
T-34 is a tank symbol and a tank legend. It had an excellent combination of sloped armor, an effective cannon and high speed. 70% of our tanks in the Battle of Kursk are T-34s.
By the way
The beginning of Kozhedub's career was difficult. In the first air battle, his La-5 was shot down by a Messerschmitt, and then also came under fire from its own anti-aircraft guns. They wanted to write off the pilot as an aircraft controller. But he still remained at the flying job, and his amazing talent was revealed in the Battle of Kursk. During the war he fought 120 battles, shooting down 64 aircraft. Three times Hero of the Soviet Union, one of the best Soviet aces and the most effective fighter of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The plane, built with the money of the collective farmer-beekeeper Konev, has an interesting fate. Vasily Konev asked to name the plane in honor of his deceased nephew, Hero of the Soviet Union pilot Georgy Konev. The request was granted. On the Konevsky La-5FN, Kozhedub shot down 8 aircraft. Then ace Pavel Bryzgalov flew on this machine and won 12 victories, later also a Hero of the Soviet Union.
The Battle of Kursk is the largest tank battle of World War II. It happened on July 12, 1943 on the Kursk Bulge near Prokhorovka. The battle was bloody, with more than 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns taking part on both sides. It was this battle that largely predetermined the outcome of all military operations near Kursk and Orel in the summer of 1943, which led to a strategic turning point in World War II.
The battle consisted of two stages - defensive and offensive.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command Headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh Fronts) with 1,336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,172 aircraft. For the offensive, the fascist German command attracted troops from the Army Groups “Center” (G. Kluge) and “South” (E. Manstein), concentrating in them 70% of the tank divisions and over 65% of the combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front. The enemy group numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and about 2,050 aircraft. An important place in the enemy's plan was given to the massive use of new tanks and self-propelled guns.
The first stage is the Kursk strategic defensive operation on July 5-23, 1943. The operation was carried out by troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts. During the fighting, additional commands of the Steppe Front, 27th, 47th and 53rd combined arms, 5th Guards Tank and 5th Air Armies, five tank and one mechanized corps, 19 divisions and one brigade were introduced. The duration of the operation is 19 days. The width of the combat front is 550 km. The depth of withdrawal of Soviet troops is 12-35 km. In terms of its scope and intensity, the Kursk defensive operation is one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. During the defensive battles, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts bled and then stopped the advance of the strike forces of the fascist German army and created favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. Hitler's plan to defeat Soviet troops in the Kursk salient was a complete failure.
Second stage: Oryol strategic offensive operation (Kutuzov) July 12 - August 18, 1943 and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation (Rumyantsev) August 3 - 23, 1943.
The Oryol operation was carried out by troops of the Bryansk, Central Fronts and part of the forces of the Western Front. During the offensive, the commands of the 11th combined arms, 3rd guards and 4th tank armies, five tank, one mechanized and one cavalry corps, and 11 divisions were additionally introduced. The duration of the operation is 38 days. The width of the combat front is 400 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 150 km. Average daily rate of advance: rifle formations 4-5 km; tank and mechanized formations 7-10 km. During the offensive, Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the German Army Group Center and liberated a significant territory from the occupiers, including the regional center of Orel. With the liquidation of the enemy's Oryol bridgehead, from which he launched his attack on Kursk, the situation on the central section of the Soviet-German front changed dramatically, and wide opportunities opened up for the development of an offensive in the Bryansk direction and the entry of Soviet troops into the eastern regions of Belarus.
The Belgorod-Kharkov operation was carried out by troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. During the offensive, additional commands of the 4th Guards, 47th and 57th armies, tank and mechanized corps, 19 divisions and two brigades were introduced. The duration of the operation is 21 days. The width of the combat front is 300-400 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 140 km. Average daily rate of advance: rifle formations - 7 km, tank and mechanized formations - 10-15 km. During the operation, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated the powerful Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and liberated the Kharkov industrial region, the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Favorable conditions were created for the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine. In the Prokhorovka area alone, where the largest oncoming tank battle of World War II took place on July 12, the enemy lost 400 tanks and more than 10 thousand people killed. As a result of the counteroffensive, enemy groups in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions were defeated.
In the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks, over 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. His offensive strategy was a complete failure. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. This battle and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the course of the war.
BATTLE OF KURSK: FIGURES AND FACTS
The general balance of forces and means of the warring parties by the beginning of July 1943
Composition of the Voronezh Front on July 5, 1943
Commander – Army General N.F. Vatutin.
The 38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards armies were deployed in the first echelon of the front. In the second echelon were the 1st Tank and 69th Armies, in reserve were the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps and artillery, anti-aircraft units and formations. The Oboyan direction was covered by the 6th Guards Army (commander - Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) consisting of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps (71, 67, 90 Guards Rifle Division), 23 Guards Rifle Corps (51, 52, 89 Guards Rifle Division, 375 sd). The Korochan direction was covered by the 7th Guards Army (commander - Lieutenant General Shumilov M.S.) consisting of the 24th Guards Rifle Corps (15, 36, 72nd Guards Rifle Division), 25th Guards Rifle Corps (73, 78, 81st Guards Rifle Division, 213 sd)
Composition of the Steppe Military District at the beginning of the battle
Commander Colonel General I.S. Konev
4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd combined arms armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, as well as one rifle, three tank, three mechanized and three cavalry corps. Total: soldiers and officers - 573 thousand people, guns and mortars - 7401, tanks and self-propelled guns - 1551, aircraft - more than 500.
Losses of the Voronezh Front in the defensive operation
According to the combat report of the Voronezh Front headquarters No. 01398 to the Chief of the General Staff on losses from July 4 to 22: killed - 20,577, missing - 25,898, total irretrievable human losses - 46,504, wounded - 54,427, total human losses - 100,931. Equipment lost irretrievably: tanks and self-propelled guns - 1,628, guns and mortars - 3,609, aircraft - 387 (damaged).
Soviet troops (Voronezh and Steppe fronts) as of August 3, 1943
Soldiers and officers - 980,500 people; guns and mortars - 12,000 pieces; tanks and self-propelled guns - 2400 pieces; aircraft - 1,300 pieces.
List of units and formations that took part in the liberation of Belgorod on August 5, 1943.
89 Guards SD, 305, 375 SD 48SK, 93, 94 Guards SD, 96 TBR 35 SK, 10 OIPTABR. 26 ZENAD, 315 Guards. minregiment 69A IIISD 49sk 7th Guards A 19 mechanized brigade, 37 mechanized brigade, 35 mechanized brigade, 218 tbr I mechanized corps 53A 16th breakthrough artillery division RGK 302 IAD and 264 IAD 4 fighter air corps; I Guards bad and 293 bad I Bomber Corps; 266 shad, 203 shad, 292 shad I assault air corps 5 VA 23 Guards. long-range air regiment.
Nazi troops
The composition of the units of Army Group South allocated to the group for the attack on Kursk
48 Panzer Corps and 2 SS Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army; army group "Kempf" consisting of 11, 42 army corps, 3 tank corps. In total, 14 divisions were involved, including 8 tank and one motorized, and also at the disposal of the commander of the GA "YUG" were: 503 separate battalion of heavy tanks "Tiger", 39 tank regiment "Panther", 228 and 911 separate divisions of assault guns. Total strength of the group: 440,000 soldiers and officers, up to 4,000 guns and mortars, 1,408 tanks and assault guns (including 200 Panthers and 102 Tigers), approximately 1,050 aircraft.
Losses of Army Group South from July 5 to July 17, 1943
The 4th TA and AG Kempf lost about 40,000 killed, wounded and missing from July 4 to 23. During the period from July 5 to July 17, more than 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns were damaged, 190 vehicles were irretrievably lost (including 6 Tigers and 44 Panthers). 1,200 guns and mortars were disabled.
Nazi troops (4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf) as of August 3, 1943
Soldiers and officers - 200,000 people; guns and mortars - 3,000 pieces; tanks and self-propelled guns - 600 pieces; Aircraft - 1,000 pieces.
BATTLE OF PROKHOROVSKY - LEGEND AND REALITY
Karl-Heinz Friser - military historian
(Germany)
A) Soviet encirclement plan.
During the first two years of the war, the Red Army achieved qualitative progress. But the initial stage of the Battle of Kursk demonstrated how much more tactically competent the Wehrmacht was. At the strategic level, however, she managed to create a real masterpiece even before the first tactical actions began. This was expressed not only in hiding individual armies and entire army groups in the depths of space from German intelligence. It was, for example, the Steppe Front as a strategic reserve. Undoubtedly, this is one of the most outstanding examples of camouflage to deceive the enemy during the war.
The use of strategic reserves was planned only at the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops in the summer, in order to bury the German troops defeated in defensive battles near Kursk like an avalanche. But when the Voronezh Front was threatened with collapse, a few days later this avalanche was set in motion - in the direction of Prokhorovka. This was supposed not only to stop the Nazi invaders, but to “encircle and destroy” the three German tank corps that had rushed forward. The Supreme Command of the Red Army did not want an “ordinary victory,” but a “crushing victory,” i.e. "Cannes" is a kind of tank Stalingrad.
The front line almost facilitated the pincer operation of the 4th Panzer Army, which was advancing to the north. In front of the massive armored wedges, however, there was a long narrow corridor, convenient for a flank attack. Vatutin, in accordance with the Operational Plan of the Headquarters, developed an attack plan in four directions - to create strike groups on both flanks of the tank armies in the Yakovlevo-Bykovka direction to threaten the rear of the 48th Panzer Corps and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. In addition, counter attacks by combined arms armies were planned. According to this plan, the German tank corps, unaware of the trap, were to be attacked from four sides:
From the west by the forces of the 1st Tank Army (6th and 41st Tank Corps, as well as the 3rd Mechanized and 5th Guards Tank Corps),
From the north-west by the forces of the 6th Guards Army,
From the northeast by the forces of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front,
From the east - by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Steppe Front (XVIII-XXIX Tank Corps and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps), reinforced by the 2nd Tank and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, as well as other independent formations.
The situation was no better for the 3rd Panzer Corps of Task Force Kempf, located southeast. According to Vatutin's plan, the Soviet 7th Guards Army was supposed to attack the corps on the flank in the Razumny area (Belgorod direction). The decisive day of the Battle of Kursk, according to the Soviet Headquarters, was July 12. On this day, in the north of the Kursk ledge, the Bryansk Front and most of the forces of the Western Front went on the offensive against the scattered forces of the 2nd Tank Army of the Wehrmacht. As the front collapsed, Model's 9th Army stopped its attack on Kursk.
On the same day, a crushing blow was planned against the attacking formations of Army Group South. Powerful forces were represented by the 5th Guards Tank Army, which had a total of 909 tanks and 42 assault guns. This army was tasked with stopping the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the battle near Prokhorovka.
B) Prokhorovka. Legend and Reality
The Battle of Kursk is often referred to as the turning point of the Second World War, effectively decided on July 12, 1943 in the largest tank battle in the Prokhorovka area. This thesis is found mainly in Soviet historiography. Supposedly, the leading edge of the entire course of World War II was the wide isthmus between the Psel River and the Prokhorovka railway station near Belgorod. In a truly titanic duel between two steel armadas, no less than 1,500 tanks collided in a limited space. From the Soviet point of view, this represented a collision of two moving avalanches - 800 Soviet tanks against 750-800 German ones. On July 12, 400 German tanks were destroyed and units of the SS Panzer Corps suffered losses. Marshal Konev melodramatically called this battle "the swan song of the German tank forces."
The creator of the myth about Prokhorovka is Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, which on July 12 suffered the heaviest losses of its entire existence. Since he needed to justify himself to Stalin, he composed a legend about the great victory over the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This myth was also adopted by Western historians and continues to this day.
“By chance, just at the same time, German tanks launched an attack from the opposite side of the field. Huge masses of tanks rushed into a head-on collision. Taking advantage of the confusion, the T-34 crews attacked the Tigers and Panthers, firing at a short distance on the sides or rear, where ammunition was stored. The failure of the German offensive at Prokhorovka marked the end of Operation Citadel. More than 300 German tanks were destroyed on July 12. The Battle of Kursk tore the heart out of the German army. The Soviet success at Kursk, in which so much was at stake, was the most important success in the entire war.”
In German historiography, the vision of this battle is even more dramatized. In “the largest tank battle in history,” “two armored formations with a very complex structure faced each other in open close combat in an area no more than 500 meters wide and 1000 meters deep.
What the Battle of Prokhorovka was like in reality.
Firstly, it should be noted that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 12, 1943 could not have lost 300 or (like Rotmistrov) 400 tanks;
In total, in the entire Operation Citadel, his total losses amounted to only 33 tanks and assault guns, which is clearly evident from German documents. He could not resist the Soviet troops, even without losing the Panthers and Ferdinands, because they were not in his composition;
In addition, Rotmistrov’s statement about the destruction of 70 Tigers is a fiction. On that day, only 15 tanks of this type were ready for use, of which only five saw action in the Prokhorovka area. In total, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, by decree on July 12, had a total of 211 tanks, 58 assault guns, and 43 tank destroyers (self-propelled guns) in working order. However, since the SS Panzergrenadier Division “Totenkopf” was advancing to the north on that day, above the Psel River, the 5th Guards Tank Army had to be confronted by 117 serviceable and combat-ready tanks, 37 assault guns and 32 fighters, as well as another 186 combat vehicles.
Rotmistrov had 838 combat vehicles ready for battle on the morning of July 12 and another 96 tanks were on the way. He thought about his five corps and withdrew the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps into reserve and gave it about 100 tanks to protect his left flank from the forces of the Wehrmacht 3rd Tank Corps advancing from the south. 186 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions were involved in the battle against 672 Soviet ones. Rotmistrov’s operational plan can be characterized by two directions of the main attack:
The main blow was delivered frontally from the northeast against the SS panzergrenadier division Leibstandarte. It was applied from Prokhorovka between the railway embankment and the Psel River. However, since the river was swampy, there was only one section of 3 kilometers left for maneuver. In this area, to the right of Psel, the 18th Tank Corps was concentrated, and to the left of the railway embankment, the 29th Tank Corps. This meant that on the first day of the battle, more than 400 combat vehicles went to 56 tanks, 20 tank destroyers and 10 Leibstandarte assault guns. The Russian superiority was approximately fivefold.
At the same time, another blow was to be delivered to the German flank at the junction between the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions. Here the 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced, supported by the 2nd Tank Corps. In total, about 200 Soviet tanks were ready to go against the German division, which consisted of 61 combat-ready tanks, 27 assault guns and twelve tank destroyers.
In addition, we should not forget about the formations of the Voronezh Front, especially the 69th Army, which fought in this direction. In the battle zone of the 5th Guards Tank Army, in addition to reserve units, formations of the 5th Guards Army, for example, the 9th Guards Parachute Division, also operated. Vatutin also sent Rotmistrov 5 artillery and 2 mortar regiments, reinforced with anti-tank units, and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades. As a result, in the Prokhorovka area the density of fire was such that the chances of surviving outside armor protection were minimal. The Soviet counterattack was supported by two air armies, while the German side could only occasionally count on air support at the climax of the battle. The 8th Air Corps was supposed to allocate two-thirds of the aircraft at its disposal for operations on other fronts, in particular in the offensive zone of the 9th Army.
In this regard, the psychological aspect should not be neglected. In the 2nd SS Panzer Corps since July 5, soldiers were in continuous combat and experienced serious supply difficulties. Now they found fresh Soviet units, namely the elite units of the Fifth Guards Tank Army led by P.A. Rotmistrov, a famous tank specialist in the Red Army. The Germans were afraid of the principles of warfare by Russian troops, the distinctive feature of which was an avalanche-like massive attack without taking into account losses. It was not just the overwhelming numerical superiority that caused concern. The attacking soldiers often fell into a kind of trance and did not react to the danger at all. What role vodka played in the fighting on the Eastern Front was no secret to the Germans; Russian historiography, apparently, only recently began to consider this topic. According to two American military historians, such a violent attack near Prokhorovka on July 12 was not without the use of psychotropic drugs.
This may be a partial explanation for the mysterious events that occurred at altitude 252.2. For the rest it was a complete surprise. It was an outstanding achievement by Rotmistrov and his staff to quickly and quietly bring an armada of tanks and other vehicles into battle. This was supposed to be the logical conclusion of a three-day march with a length of 330-380 km. German intelligence indeed expected a counterattack, but not on such a scale.
The day of July 11 ended with local success for the Leibstandarte panzergrenadier division. The next day, the division was tasked with overcoming the anti-tank ditch. Then it swept over the height of 252.2 like a “giant wave”. Having occupied the heights, the Leibstandarte went to the Oktyabrsky state farm, where it encountered resistance from the 9th Guards Airborne Division 2.5 kilometers from Prokhorovka. But at the same time, they themselves exposed the flanks of their position. On the right flank, the Leibstandarte could be supported by the motorized division "Das Reich". An even more dangerous situation arose on the left wing, which was almost hanging in the air.
Commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps Obergruppenführer P. Hausser (left)
sets the task to the artillery commander of the SS division Death's Head, SS Brigadeführer Priss
Since the attack of the SS motorized division Death's Head was not in the east, but rather in the north, the striking wedges dispersed. A gap was created, which was monitored by the Leibstandarte intelligence department, but was unlikely to be controlled by it. An enemy strike along the Psela could lead to fatal consequences at this stage. Therefore, the Leibstandarte was tasked with stopping the enemy’s advance.
The 2nd SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive the next day. The first blow, under the noticeable impact of the entire artillery of the corps, was the attack of the “Totenkopf” division on the Pselsky bridgehead and the dominant height of 226.6. Only after capturing the heights north of the Psel River could the other two divisions continue their attack. The Leibstandarte formations advanced scatteredly. On the right southern wing of the railway embankment the 1st SS Motorized Regiment operated; to the left, closer to height 252.2, the 2nd SS Motorized Regiment operated. The tank regiment redeployed to a bridgehead beyond Height 252.2 to recuperate. But the regiment actually consisted of only one battalion with three companies, and one battalion of heavy tanks with four combat-ready Tigers. The second battalion, equipped with Panther tanks, was sent to the zone of operation of the Das Reich division.
It is necessary to note the following bright point - in the space between the Prokhorovka station and the Psel River there was no German tank army with 800 combat-ready tanks, as Soviet historians claim, but only one tank battalion. It is also a legend that on the morning of July 12, two tank armadas met in battle, attacking in close formation, like knights clad in armor.
According to Rotmistrov, at 7:30 (8:30 Moscow time) the attacks of the Leibstandarte tankmen began - “In deep silence, the enemy appeared behind us, without receiving a worthy response, because we had seven difficult days of fighting and sleep, as a rule, was very short".
At that time, the 3rd tank battalion of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment was operating on the front line, whose commander was Sturmbannführer Jochen Peiper, who became famous later (during the offensive in the Ardennes).
Joachim Piper
The day before, his formation occupied the trenches at an altitude of 252.2. On this hill on the morning of July 12, the following scene played out: “We were almost all asleep when they suddenly, with the support of aviation, threw all their tanks and motorized infantry at us. It was hell. They were around us, above us, and between us. We fought against each other." The first German tankman who saw the approaching columns of Soviet tanks was Obersturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop (son of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs J. von Ribbentrop - A.K.)
Rudolf von Ribbentrop
When he looked up at 252.2 that morning, he saw a purple flare that meant "Attention, tanks." While the other two tank companies continued to stand behind the ditch, he led his company's seven Panzer IV tanks into the attack. Suddenly he saw a huge tank column coming towards him. “Having walked 100 - 200 meters, we were shocked - 15, 20, 30, 40, and then simply countless numbers of Russian T-34s appeared in front of us. Now this wall of tanks was coming at us. Vehicle after vehicle, wave after wave, building up "Incredible pressure was coming towards us at maximum speed. Seven German tanks had no chance against superior forces. Four of them were immediately captured, while the other three tanks escaped."
At this moment, the 29th Tank Corps, led by Major General Kirichenko, consisting of 212 combat vehicles, entered the battle. The attack was carried out by the 31st and 32nd tank brigades and the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, with the support of a self-propelled gun regiment and the 26th Guards Airborne Regiment. When the tanks passed the peak of height 252.2 at maximum speed, they went down the slope to attack two German tank companies that were stationed in the valley and opened fire on them. The Russians mistook the German tanks for Tigers and wanted to destroy them using their technical superiority. A German eyewitness reported: “Those who saw all this believed in the kamikaze attack that the Russians were forced to undertake. If the Russian tanks had continued to break through, the collapse of the German front would have followed.”
However, in a matter of minutes everything changed, and the seemingly inevitable success turned into a disaster for the attackers. The reason for this was incredible Soviet carelessness. The Russians forgot about their anti-tank ditches. The aforementioned obstacles, 2 meters deep, were dug by Soviet sappers below the level of Hill 252.2 along the entire line of the German - and now Soviet - attack. The German soldiers saw the following picture: “All the new T-34s were going up the hill, and then picking up speed and falling into their own anti-tank ditches before seeing us.” Ribbentrop was saved by the fact that he managed to slip between Soviet tanks in his tank, covered with a dense cloud of dust: “Well, obviously, these were T-34s trying to get out of their own ditches. The Russians were concentrated on the bridge and presented an easy target for encirclement; most of their tanks were shot down. It was a Hell of fire, smoke, dead and wounded, as well as burning T-34s!” - he wrote.
On the opposite side of the ditch, there were only two German tank companies that could not stop this steel avalanche. But now there was no “shooting at a moving target.” Finally, four Tiger tanks, which were located on the left flank of the division, were brought into battle. The 2nd SS Panzer Regiment managed to carry out a counterattack before noon to capture Hill 252.2 and the Oktyabrsky state farm. The front edge of this height looked like a tank cemetery. Here were the most charred wrecks of more than 100 Soviet tanks and several armored personnel carriers from Peiper's battalion.
As can be seen from the logistics of the Leibstandarte division, on July 12, the division captured more than 190 abandoned Soviet tanks. Most of them were found in a small area on the indicated hill. However, this number seemed so incredible that Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, went to the front line to see it with his own eyes.
According to the latest Russian information, the 29th Tank Corps alone lost 172 of its 219 tanks and assault guns on July 12, 118 of which were permanently lost. The casualties in manpower amounted to 1,991 people, of which 1,033 were dead and missing.
While at height 252.2, the frontal attack of the 19th Panzer Corps was repulsed, the critical situation on the left flank of the Leibstandarte division reached its climax. Here, the offensive of units of the 18th Tank Corps of Major General Bakharov, advancing in the area of the Psel River with forces of 170, 110 and 181 tank brigades, was supported by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and a number of front-line units, such as the 36th Guards Tank Regiment, equipped with British tanks." Churchill."
Commander of the 18th Tank Corps, Major General B.S. Bakharov
From the German point of view, this unexpected attack was the worst case scenario, namely, the attack was delivered into the previously described gap between the SS motorized divisions "Totenkopf" and "Leibstandarte". The 18th Soviet Tank Corps penetrated almost unhindered into enemy positions. The left flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment was in disarray, and a clear front line no longer existed. Both sides lost control, control, and the course of the battle fell apart into many separate battles in which it was difficult to determine “who is attacking and who is defending.”
Commander of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division, SS Oberführer Theodor Wisch
Soviet ideas about this battle are full of myths, and in the next episode the level of drama reaches its apogee. On the morning of July 12, the second battalion of the 181st Armored Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps joined the offensive along the Petrovka-Psel line. A shell fired from a Tiger tank hit the T-34 tank of the guard battalion commander, Captain Skripkin. The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev replaced him in the burning car.
Senior lieutenant (captain during the Battle of Kursk) P.A. Skripkin,
commander of the 1st tank battalion 181st brigade 18th tank with his daughter Galya. 1941
This episode is traditionally interpreted as follows: “The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev jumped back into the burning tank, started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The tank rushed like a flaming fireball towards the enemy. The Tiger stopped and prepared to retreat. But it was too late. "A burning Soviet tank crashed into a German tank at full speed. The explosion shook the earth. The courage of the Soviet tank crews shocked the Germans, and they retreated."
Tank driver Alexander Nikolaev
This episode became the hallmark of the Battle of Kursk. Artists captured this dramatic scene on artistic canvases, directors - on movie screens. But what did this incident look like in reality? The mechanic-driver of the allegedly exploded Tiger, Scharführer Georg Letzsch, describes the events as follows: “In the morning the company was on the left flank of the second tank division. Suddenly, about 50 enemy tanks, protected by a small forest, attacked us on a wide front [...] I knocked out 2 tanks "T-34, one of which, blazing like a torch, was rushing towards me. At the last moment I was able to dodge the burning mass of metal, which was coming at me with great speed." The attack by the 18th Tank Corps was repelled with heavy losses, including (according to Soviet data) 55 tanks.
The attack of Soviet troops in the southeast of the Prokhorovka-Belgorod railway embankment developed no less unsuccessfully. At the Stalinskoe 1 state farm there was an SS panzergrenadier regiment operating on the right wing of the Leibstandarte division, without any tank support and with lightly armored Marder tank destroyers as reinforcement. They were opposed by the 25th Tank Brigade of the 19th Tank Corps, with the support of the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of the 28th Guards Airborne Regiment and part of the formations of the 169th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps.
To the south was the extended right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was covered by the Das Reich division. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operated in this direction. Their attacks, planned in the Yasnaya Polyana-Kalinin direction, were repulsed after heavy fighting. Then German troops counterattacked and captured the village of Storozhevoye, located on the left wing.
The most significant successes were achieved on July 12 by the motorized SS division "Totenkopf", which, contrary to Soviet ideas, did not fight with the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Rotmistrov in the Prokhorovka area. In fact, all the tanks operated on the opposite bank of the Psel and attacked north from there. Despite the losses suffered, the division planned to counterattack in the Mikhailovka area in order to knock over the Soviet tanks, which were striking at the Leibstandarte division, with a blow in the back. But this attempt failed due to the swampy banks of the river. Only in the Kozlovka area did some infantry units remain, operating as part of the 6th SS Motorized Regiment. They remained on the south bank to provide a reserve.
SS Gruppenführer Max Simon - commander of the "Totenkopf" division
Also incorrect is Rotmistrov’s statement that on July 12 he launched an attack on the “Dead Head” positions with the forces of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and with the help of his reserves. Although he sent the 24th Guards Tank Brigade and the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade on an offensive north of the Psel River. But, as American historians write, these formations were delayed on the march and took part in the battle only the next day.
The "Dead Head" division at this time attacked the positions of the 5th Guards Army of General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov, reinforced by units of the 6th Guards Army and the 31st Tank Corps. By mid-day, crushing Russian attacks in the direction of the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road were repulsed, which made Rotmistrov nervous. He was afraid of losing control of his formations due to the threat to his flanks and rear. This northernmost attack became the symbol of the entire day of July 12th. The German forces were initially surprised by the strength of the Soviet counteroffensive and huddled together to defend themselves, but then abruptly launched a counterattack and drove back the Soviet formations with heavy losses, leaving the Russians unable to continue their offensive in the afternoon.
(To be continued)
Translation from German was carried out by ONER researcher Kadira A.S.