The Nazi leadership attached great importance to the capture North Caucasus. Already in the first days after the attack on the Soviet Union, the German command began to plan an offensive in the Caucasian direction. The idea of ​​the operation was formulated in the addition to Directive No. 33 of July 22, 1941 and then concretized in a document entitled “Operation from the North Caucasus region through the Caucasus Range and Northwestern Iran with the aim of capturing the Revanduz and Hanagan passes on the Iran-Iraq border.”

The purpose of the operation, which was planned to be carried out from November 1941 to September 1942, was to capture the Caucasian oil-bearing areas and access to the Iran-Iraq border. The seizure of the North Caucasus allowed the Nazi leadership not only to use richest resources this region, but also to extend its hegemony to the entire Transcaucasus, and then to the Middle East with its huge oil reserves. In an order dated August 21, 1941, Hitler again emphasized that before the onset of winter, the main thing was not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus. However, these plans failed to come true in 1941. In the first year of the war, the Wehrmacht did not solve a single strategic problem: Leningrad and Moscow remained inaccessible to it, the Red Army not only was not destroyed, but also inflicted very sensitive blows on the enemy near Moscow, Tikhvin and Rostov.

The fascist leadership returned to plans to conquer the North Caucasus in the spring of 1942. Directive No. 41 of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) dated April 5 noted that “first of all, all available forces must be concentrated to carry out main operation on southern section with the goal of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus ridge.”

Favorable conditions for the Germans were created by the major defeat of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kharkov, and then in the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad defensive operation. “The unexpectedly rapidly and favorably developing operations against Timoshenko’s troops,” noted the OKW directive of July 21, 1942, “give reason to hope that it will soon be possible to cut off the Soviet Union from the Caucasus and, consequently, from the main sources of oil and seriously disrupt delivery of British and American military materials. This, as well as the loss of the entire Donetsk industry, deals a blow to the Soviet Union that will have far-reaching consequences.” These consequences, in the opinion of the Nazi leadership, consisted, in particular, in the fact that the Wehrmacht had a path to Transcaucasia, the Middle East and India, access to the border with Turkey and drawing it into the war on its side, as well as Japan’s entry into the war against the USSR.

In July 1942, having suffered defeat during the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad defensive operation, Soviet troops retreated beyond the Don. The enemy received favorable conditions for an offensive in the North Caucasus. The plan of his operation, codenamed "Edelweiss", envisaged encircling and destroying Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov, capturing the North Caucasus, then bypassing the Main Caucasus ridge with one group of troops from the west, capturing Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and another from the east, capturing Grozny and Baku. At the same time, it was planned to overcome the Caucasus ridge in its central part and reach Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi. With access to Transcaucasia, it was planned to seize the bases of the Black Sea Fleet, ensure complete dominance in the Black Sea, and create conditions for an invasion of the Near and Middle East.

Advancement of Hitler's troops to the East

Army Group A under the command of Field Marshal W. List was intended to solve these problems. It included the 17th Army, the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, the Romanian 3rd Army, part of the forces of the 4th air fleet. It consisted of about 170 thousand people, 1,130 tanks, over 4.5 thousand guns and mortars, and up to 1 thousand aircraft. The actions of this group were supported naval forces Germany and Romania.

The enemy was opposed by the troops of the Southern (Lieutenant General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and North Caucasian (Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny) fronts consisting of the 51,37,12,56,24,9 and 47th armies, which with The air was supported by aviation from the 4th and 5th Air Armies. This grouping in the first echelon consisted of 112 thousand people, 121 tanks, 2,160 guns and mortars, 230 serviceable aircraft. In the coastal direction, ground forces were supported by the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla.

The battle for the Caucasus lasted over 14 months, from July 25, 1942 to October 9, 1943. According to the nature of the actions of the Soviet troops, it is divided into two periods. The first of these is the North Caucasus defensive operation of 1942, which was carried out from July 25 to December 31.

On July 25, the enemy went on the offensive from bridgeheads in the lower reaches of the Don in the Salsk and Krasnodar directions. The southern front, unable to hold its defenses along the Don River, began to retreat to the south and southeast. On July 28, the Supreme Command Headquarters united the troops of two fronts into one North Caucasus Front, led by Marshal S. M. Budyonny. For the convenience of controlling the troops operating over a vast area, the front was divided into two operational groups: Don under the command of Lieutenant General R. Ya. Malinovsky and Primorskaya led by Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. At the same time, the Headquarters demanded to impose the strictest discipline in the troops (on the same day, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense Order No. 227, known as the “Not a Step Back” order) was issued), to establish control and interaction, to stop the enemy’s further advance, and then to defeat and throw him back with strong counterattacks. Don.

However, the situation continued to deteriorate. Already on July 28, the Germans occupied Azov, reached the Kagalnik River and the valley of the Manych River. The dam blown up by Soviet troops flooded the valley, but this only temporarily delayed the enemy's advance. On July 31, German troops captured Salsk and continued moving towards Voroshilovsk (now Stavropol) and Krasnodar. Having an overwhelming superiority in tanks (the North Caucasus Front had only 74 serviceable tanks at that time), they were able to conduct highly maneuverable operations on flat terrain and quickly concentrate efforts in selected directions. But even under these conditions, Soviet soldiers courageously defended every inch of their native land. West of the village of Kushchevskaya, formations of the Kuban Cossack corps struck and defeated the 196th German Infantry Division. At the same time, after the battles on the Manych River, the command of the German 40th Tank Corps noted: “The enemy’s tenacity can be illustrated by the fact that in the floodplains, individual riflemen are up to their necks in water, without any hope of retreat, fighting to the last bullet, that riflemen located in nests built in a stone dam, they can only be destroyed in close combat. Both field fortifications and shores are defended with equal tenacity.”

But the forces were unequal. The enemy continued to rush forward. At the beginning of August, the Soviet command decided to deploy a new defensive group on the Terek and Urukh rivers at the expense of the forces of the Transcaucasian Front, commanded by Army General I.V. Tyulenev. The front troops were also ordered to take up defensive positions on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range and create a multi-line defense in the Grozny-Makhachkala direction. The troops of the 9th (Major General F. A. Parkhomenko) and 44th (Major General I. E. Petrov) armies operating here, as well as the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, were united on August 10 into the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front . Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov was appointed commander of the group. On August 11, the 37th Army (Major General P. M. Kozlov) of the North Caucasus Front was also included in it. On the same day, the Don Task Force was disbanded.

Due to the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the German command was forced to turn the 4th Tank Army there. This somewhat eased the position of the North Caucasus Front, however, the enemy's superiority in tanks remained overwhelming. On August 3, the troops of the Primorsky Group began to withdraw across the Kuban River. Due to poor management, only a weak screen was created on the left bank of the river, which the enemy overcame without much difficulty.

On August 5, the Headquarters ordered the commander of the North Caucasus Front to firmly cover the Maykop area and the Maykop-Tuapse road in order to prevent the Germans from reaching the Black Sea coast and isolating the Primorye Group of Forces. However, on the same day the enemy occupied Voroshilovsk, on August 7 - Armavir and continued the attack on Maykop. Fierce battles broke out at the turn of the Kuban, Laba, and Belaya rivers.

Horse attack. Photo by N. Bode

By the end of August 9, the mobile units of the 1st Tank Army broke into Maykop, hoping to capture fuel and oil, but all supplies were removed in advance, the boreholes were plugged, and the equipment was either buried in the ground or evacuated. Having captured the city, the enemy attempted to break through to Tuapse via highways and railways. However, the stubborn resistance of the soldiers of the 12th (Major General A. A. Grechko) and 18th (Lieutenant General F. V. Kamkov) armies thwarted his plans. The soldiers of the 17th Cossack Cavalry Corps demonstrated courage and perseverance in these battles. They not only skillfully defended themselves, but also constantly counterattacked the enemy. The rapid attacks of the Cossacks terrified the enemy. In mid-August, the Supreme High Command Headquarters instructed the commander of the North Caucasus Front: “Ensure that all our troops act like the 17th Cavalry Corps.” On August 27, the corps and the four Cossack cavalry divisions that were part of it were transformed into guards; 555 soldiers were awarded orders and medals.

On August 6, large enemy forces rushed to Krasnodar. For several days, small formations of the 56th Army of Major General A.I. Ryzhov and fighters of the Krasnodar people's militia courageously repelled the onslaught of the infantry and motorized divisions of the 5th Army Corps. Particularly fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the Pashkovo crossing, where the 30th Irkutsk Rifle Division under the command of Colonel B.N. Arshintsev fought selflessly. Pressed against the river and experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition, Soviet soldiers fought off one attack after another. Only by order of the command did they leave Krasnodar on August 12 and retreat to the left bank of the Kuban, blowing up the Pashkovskaya crossing behind them. In the Mozdok direction, Soviet troops held the line along the Terek River.

Local residents at the construction of anti-tank barriers. Caucasus, 1942

On August 17, the first stage of the defensive period of the Battle of the Caucasus ended, the enemy was stopped and temporarily ceased active hostilities. During the period from July 25 to August 17, the enemy managed to advance to a depth of 600 km. The commander of the North Caucasus Front did not have sufficient reserves with which to reinforce the first echelon of troops in the most dangerous areas. There were no large mobile formations, while the Nazis had tank and motorized divisions that made up more than 40%. Often this allowed them to get ahead of Soviet troops when occupying defense lines. The small number of its aviation had a negative impact on the front's actions.

While maintaining air superiority, the enemy exerted effective impact on the defending armies. The command and headquarters of the front and armies often lost control of the troops. Formations and units were in dire need of ammunition, fuel, and food. The enemy captured a number of large cities and reached the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range. Despite this, the Nazis were unable to surround Soviet group between Don and Kuban.

The defenders of the Caucasus defended Tuapse and blocked the enemy's path to the Black Sea. Retreating, the troops of the North Caucasus Front exhausted the enemy in fierce battles and destroyed their manpower and equipment. According to Army Group A, the Nazi losses during this period amounted to about 54 thousand soldiers and officers. The resistance of the Soviet troops became increasingly stronger, and their confidence that the invaders would be stopped grew stronger.

Stabilization of the situation made it possible for the North Caucasus Front to essentially re-create the front and army rear areas, transfer their services to coastal communications, organize supplies from local resources, begin replenishing troops from this region, as well as transfer new formations across the Caspian Sea and by rail Baku – Tbilisi – Sukhumi. A deeply layered defense was created along the banks of the Terek and Baksan rivers, and defensive areas were created around Nalchik, Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz), Grozny, Makhachkala, and Baku.

Caucasus. In the Malgobek area. Photo by Y. Khalip

However, the Nazi command did not abandon its plans for a breakthrough in Transcaucasia. From mid-August, it began regrouping forces to develop a simultaneous offensive on Baku and Batumi. To do this on in certain directions Strong groups were created that aimed at Novorossiysk, Malgobek and the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. Understanding the complexity of the situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters in its directive on August 20 indicated to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front that the enemy, seeking to invade the Transcaucasus, would not limit himself to the actions of large forces in the main directions. “The enemy, having specially trained mountain units, will use every road and trail through the Caucasus Range to penetrate into Transcaucasia, acting both in large forces and separate groups thugs and saboteurs. Those commanders are deeply mistaken, the directive emphasized, who think that the Caucasus Range itself is an impassable barrier for the enemy. Everyone must firmly remember that only the line that is skillfully prepared for defense and stubbornly defended is impassable.” Further events fully confirmed the conclusions of the Headquarters.

The Nazi command assigned its 49th Mountain Rifle Corps, consisting of two mountain rifle and two light infantry divisions, to capture the passes, and also sent two Romanian mountain rifle divisions here. On August 15, units of the German 1st mountain rifle division"Edelweiss" captured the Klukhorsky pass, on August 18 they reached the southern slopes of Mount Elbrus, and on September 7 they captured the Marukhsky pass. Lieutenant General K.N. Leselidze, appointed on August 23 as commander of the 46th Army, units of which defended the passes, reinforced the threatened areas with a significant part of his troops. Repeated attempts to retake the passes were unsuccessful, but the enemy was unable to advance either. Stubborn fighting broke out on the passes north of Sukhumi. On August 25, units of the 4th Mountain Division captured the Sancharo Pass and began moving south. To restore the situation, the commander of the 46th Army created the Sanchar group of troops consisting of the 307th regiment of the 61st Infantry Division, two battalions of the 155th and 51st Rifle Brigades, the 25th Border Regiment of the NKVD, the consolidated regiment of the NKVD and the 1st detachment. of Tbilisi infantry school, which stopped and then threw the enemy back to the northern bank of the Bzyb River. On October 16, units of the Sanchar group went on the offensive and by October 20 captured the Sanchar group of passes. The battles for the passes of the Main Caucasus Range continued until the onset of winter. Despite the fact that the enemy managed to capture some of them, German troops were unable to build on their success and penetrate Transcaucasia. Heroic Actions Soviet troops and local partisans played an important role in the defense of the Caucasus.

In the second half of August the enemy began active actions in the Novorossiysk direction, trying to capture Novorossiysk, and subsequently advance along the Black Sea coast in the direction of Tuapse - Batumi. Even on the eve of the German offensive, on August 17, the Novorossiysk defensive region (NOR) was created. It included the 47th Army, the 216th Rifle Division of the 56th Army, the Azov Military Flotilla, the Temryuk, Kerch, and Novorossiysk naval bases and a combined aviation group. The commander of the 47th Army, Major General G.P. Kotov, was appointed commander of the NOR, and the commander of the Azov military flotilla Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov.

On August 19, the enemy went on the offensive, delivering the main attack on Novorossiysk and Anapa with the forces of the German 5th Army Corps and an auxiliary attack on the Taman Peninsula with the cavalry corps of the Romanian 3rd Army. Despite the enemy's significant superiority in forces and means, the NOR troops defended themselves staunchly and forced him to suspend the offensive on August 25. The command of the German 17th Army, having transferred part of its forces here from the Tuapse direction, again tried to achieve its goal. The enemy managed to break through the defenses of the 47th Army on its left flank, reach the Black Sea coast and capture Anapa on August 31. The position of the Soviet troops deteriorated significantly.

Marine units defending the Taman Peninsula found themselves cut off from the main forces of the 47th Army and on September 2-5 were evacuated by sea to Gelendzhik, and the ships of the Azov military flotilla had to break through into the Black Sea. This allowed the enemy to transfer additional forces from Crimea to the Taman Peninsula. On September 7, the enemy broke into Novorossiysk, captured the railway station, then the port, but was unable to completely capture the city.

For the convenience of controlling the troops operating in the Caucasus and improving their supply, the Supreme High Command Headquarters on September 1 transformed the North Caucasus Front into the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front under the command of Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. On the night of September 10, Soviet troops were evacuated to the eastern shore of Tsemes Bay. The enemy captured most of Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula, but was unable to develop an offensive along the Black Sea coast on Tuapse and, from September 26, went on the defensive here.

Simultaneously with the attack on Novorossiysk, the enemy attempted to break through to the Black Sea through Mozdok. On September 1, he launched diversionary strikes 40 km east of Mozdok, and the next day attacked Soviet troops with the main forces of the 1st Tank Army in the city area. Having crossed the Terek, the enemy penetrated the defense to a depth of 12 km on September 4. However, the tenacity of the Soviet soldiers did not allow the enemy to build on their success.

Units of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Major General I.P. Rosly acted heroically. The soldiers and commanders of the 62nd Marine Rifle Brigade, the 249th Separate Tank Battalion and the 47th Guards Anti-Tank Fighter Division showed courage and resilience.

Thanks to the efforts of reserves brought forward from the depths and air strikes from the 4th Air Army of Aviation Major General K. A. Vershinin, the enemy was first stopped, and on September 7 was thrown back 9 km to the north. Nevertheless, the bridgehead he captured could not be eliminated. Having brought up reserves, German troops resumed the offensive on September 12. At the cost of heavy losses, they managed to advance southward to a depth of 50 km and capture Elkhotovo on September 27. This was where their successes ended; on September 28, the enemy went on the defensive here. As a result of the Mozdok-Malgobek operation, the enemy’s attempt to break through to the Grozny and Baku oil-bearing regions along the Alkhan-Churt valley failed. It became increasingly obvious that the plans of the German leadership for a breakthrough in Transcaucasia were failing. Hitler expressed displeasure with the actions of Army Group A. Its commander, V. List, was removed from his post on September 10, and Colonel General E. Kleist was appointed instead. Some commanders of tank divisions who failed to encircle Soviet troops between the Don and Kuban were also displaced.

In the second half of September, formations of the German 17th Army tried to break through to Tuapse. Having concentrated a strong group here, which outnumbered the Soviet troops in personnel and artillery by 2 times, in tanks - absolutely, in aviation - by 5 times, the enemy went on the offensive on September 25. As a result of 6 days of fierce fighting, he managed to penetrate the defenses of the 18th Army by 5-10 km, and at the junction of the 18th and 56th Armies by 8 km. However, its further advance slowed down, and by the end of October 9, Soviet troops stopped the enemy in all directions with stubborn resistance and counterattacks. Having regrouped its forces and brought up reserves, the 17th Army resumed its offensive on October 14. On October 17, the enemy captured the village of Shaumyan, one of the passes, and, moving in a southwestern direction, created a threat of encirclement of the 18th Army.

To repel the blow, the commander of the Transcaucasian Front moved reserves to the threatened direction. However, on October 19, the enemy, having forestalled a counterattack by the Soviet troops, captured the Elisavetpolsky pass, which forced the formations of the left flank of the 18th Army (Major General A. A. Grechko took command of it on October 18) to retreat to a new line. With the arrival of fresh reserves to the Black Sea Group, the balance of forces changed in its favor. On October 23, the enemy was stopped.

In the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range, soldiers of the 30th Irkutsk Rifle Division distinguished themselves. The right-flank regiment of the division occupied the defense along the valley of the Psekups River, the so-called Wolf Gate. A convenient route to Tuapse lay through this gorge, so the enemy concentrated large forces here and furiously rushed forward. Soviet soldiers steadfastly repulsed all enemy attacks, but their strength was dwindling.

Then the division commander, Colonel B. N. Arshintsev, decided to deceive the enemy. Having placed artillery on the heights along the edges of the gorge, he tried to lure the Germans into a fire bag. When the main forces of the 125th Infantry Division launched another attack, the defenders began to slowly retreat from line to line. Having reached the village of Fanagoriyskoye, they took up a strong defense. In an effort to build on their success, the enemy threw their reserves into battle. At this time, a barrage of fire fell on him from the flanks, and one of the battalions went behind enemy lines. The fierce battle continued until nightfall. Only at night the remnants of two German regiments managed to escape from the encirclement. The defense front of the Soviet division was restored. For the steadfastness and courage shown in defending the North Caucasus, the 30th Irkutsk Rifle Division on December 18, 1942 was reorganized into the 55th Guards Irkutsk Division. Subsequently, for exemplary performance of command tasks, she received the honorary name Pinskaya and was awarded the Order of Suvorov, II degree.

On October 31, having failed to achieve success, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive, but did not abandon his plans to break through to the Black Sea coast. In mid-November, formations of the 17th Army again began active operations and in some areas wedged themselves into the defenses of the Soviet troops, approaching Tuapse within 30 km. At this point the enemy's forces dried up. On November 26, two strike groups of the 18th Army launched a counteroffensive, defeated the enemy group, and by December 20 drove its remnants across the Pshish River.

The German command did not abandon attempts to break through to Transcaucasia and the coast of the Caspian Sea. Having failed to achieve success in the Mozdok direction, Kleist decided to transfer the efforts of the 1st Tank Army to the Nalchik direction in order to break through the Sunzha River valley to Grozny, and through Ordzhonikidze along the Georgian Military Road to Tbilisi. Concentrating large forces in this direction, including about 200 tanks, which outnumbered the troops of Major General P. M. Kozlov’s 37th Army defending here by 3 times in infantry, 10.5 times in artillery, and absolutely in tanks (in the army there were no tanks), the enemy unexpectedly struck a powerful blow on October 25. Having crushed the defenses of the Soviet troops, he captured Nalchik and began to develop an offensive against Ordzhonikidze. On November 2, the advanced units of the enemy reached the near approaches to the city.

By this time, the commander of the Northern Group of Forces, Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov, brought here the troops of the 9th Army (since September it was commanded by Major General K. A. Koroteev) and the 11th Guards Rifle Corps of Major General I. P. Rosly, who, with continuous counterattacks supported by aviation from the 4th Air Army (in September, Aviation Major General N. N. F. Naumenko took command of it), stopped the enemy. On November 5, the enemy went on the defensive.

A deep wedge in a narrow section of the front of the enemy tank group created favorable conditions for its encirclement and defeat. On November 6, Soviet troops went on the offensive, during which two tank divisions were destroyed. Despite the fact that it was not possible to encircle and completely destroy the wedged German formations, the enemy suffered heavy losses and by November 12 was driven back from Ordzhonikidze. The enemy finally abandoned the offensive in the Grozny direction.

Already at the beginning of December, it became obvious that the enemy’s attempts to break into Transcaucasia were doomed to failure. His offensive potential has dried up. In addition, his attention was increasingly drawn to the successfully developing offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad. Now he was forced to think about how to retain Rostov, the loss of which could result in the encirclement of the entire North Caucasian group. The Edelweiss plan failed.

The selfless actions of the Soviet troops stopped the enemy hordes in the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range. They took an active part in protecting their native land Caucasian peoples. Literally on the eve of the Battle of the Caucasus in Transcaucasia, the formation of 11 rifle divisions (4 Georgian, 3 Azerbaijani and 4 Armenian) was completed. In addition, 4 rifle, 1 mountain rifle, 1 tank brigade and 2 cavalry divisions were formed from representatives of other nationalities. The local population provided great assistance in the construction of defensive lines and in the delivery of material resources to the defenders of the passes.

At the end of December, the front in the North Caucasus stabilized in all areas. Soviet troops began preparing for the offensive. The hour of expelling the enemy from the North Caucasian land was approaching. It struck on January 1, 1943, when the North Caucasus offensive operation began.

Armor-piercing squad. Photo by N. Bode

The Supreme Command Headquarters began planning an offensive operation in the North Caucasus back in September 1942, when fierce battles took place in the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range. Initially, it was planned to simultaneously defeat two German army groups - “B” and “A” - at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. However, then the Soviet command came to the conclusion that there were not enough forces and means to implement this plan. The dispersion of efforts in two strategic directions led to the weakening of strike groups. Therefore, the Headquarters decided to first deal with the enemy’s Stalingrad group, and then transfer the main efforts to the North Caucasus direction.

The intensive preparation of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front for the offensive and especially the threat looming over Rostov seriously worried the German command. However, Hitler invariably rejected his General Staff’s proposals to withdraw troops from the North Caucasus, rightly believing that it would be unlikely to return to these lines later. Moreover, he feared the demoralizing consequences of retreat. Only on December 12, when the issue of withdrawing the motorized SS Viking division to the Stalingrad direction was being decided, the command of Army Group A was allowed to withdraw troops from Ordzhonikidze to the Urukh River.

Meanwhile, the situation for the enemy was deteriorating. On December 20, when the German relief strike at Stalingrad was thwarted, the commander of Army Group Don, Field Marshal E. Manstein, suggested to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General K. Zeitzler, to withdraw Army Groups Don and A to new lines, but not received support. After 4 days, Manstein again reminded of his proposal. This time Zeitzler no longer hesitated. On the night of December 28, left alone with Hitler, he, describing the situation in the south, said that if the order to retreat from the Caucasus was not immediately given, then “soon we will have to endure a second Stalingrad.” Hitler was forced to allow the command of Army Group A to plan measures to prepare a withdrawal on the condition that they would not weaken the strength of the resistance.

Huntsmen from Edelweiss are trying to conquer the Caucasus

On December 28, in Operational Order No. 2, Hitler, emphasizing his intention to keep the 6th Army in Stalingrad, demanded that new pockets be avoided. Based on this, the command of Group “A” was given the task of gradually retreating to intermediate defense lines along the Laba, Kuban, Egorlyk, and Manych rivers. First of all, it was proposed to withdraw the main forces of the 1st Tank Army operating in the Nalchik area, while simultaneously strengthening the defense of the Black Sea coast and mountainous regions. Army Group Don was given the task of actively containing the advance of Soviet troops east of Rostov.

The troops of the North Caucasus (from January 24), Southern, Transcaucasian fronts and the Black Sea Fleet, operationally subordinate to the Transcaucasian Front, were involved in the North Caucasian offensive operation. They consisted of over 1 million people, more than 11.3 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.3 thousand tanks and 900 aircraft. The southern front was opposed by the German task force "Holidt" and the 4th Tank Army, the Transcaucasian Front - by the 1st Tank and 17th Armies - a total of 764 thousand people, about 5.3 thousand guns and mortars, 700 tanks, 530 aircraft .

Tank from the German 1st Panzer Army in the Caucasus

The plan of the operation was to dismember and defeat the main forces of Army Group A with coordinated strikes by troops of both fronts from the northeast, south and southwest, preventing their withdrawal from the North Caucasus. Achieving this goal depended primarily on the successful actions of the Southern Front in the Rostov and Salsky directions, and the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front in the Krasnodar and Tikhoretsky directions.

On the night of January 1, 1943, the German 1st Tank Army, covered by strong rearguards, began to retreat. The Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front launched an offensive from the area north of Mozdok, but did not achieve success. Formations of the 44th Army (from November 1942 it was commanded by Major General V.A. Khomenko), and then the 58th Army of Major General K.S. Melnik, struck with limited forces. Only on January 3, when the enemy withdrew not only the main forces of the 1st Tank Army, but also parts of the covering force, did the Northern Group of Forces begin pursuit along the entire front. It was conducted indecisively and disorganized. In a number of directions, control of formations and units was lost. The advance of the Black Sea Group of Forces was delayed. This was largely due to the delay in the regrouping of troops, the insufficient number of roads and their poor condition.

This situation caused a sharply negative reaction from the Soviet leadership. The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated January 4, 1943 noted: “... the enemy is leaving the North Caucasus, burning warehouses and blowing up roads. Maslennikov's northern group turns into a reserve group with the task of light pursuit. It is not profitable for us to push the enemy out of the North Caucasus. It is more profitable for us to detain him in order to encircle him with a blow from the Black Sea group. Because of this, the center of gravity of the Transcaucasian Front’s operations is moving to the area of ​​the Black Sea Group.”

Soviet soldiers take positions

However, it was not possible to comply with the requirements of the directive. The Black Sea group of troops remained at the same lines and hastily continued the regrouping of troops. The northern group, carrying out the pursuit, advanced 15 - 20 km to the northwest by the end of January 6. Malgobek, Mozdok, and Nalchik were liberated. It was not possible to prevent the enemy's withdrawal from the Main Caucasus Ridge. The formations of the 46th Army, stretched across a wide front, were unable to create strong strike groups and carried out the pursuit only with isolated scattered forces.

Nevertheless, the actions of the Soviet troops gradually became more purposeful and organized. The frontal attack was combined with enveloping attacks. On January 7, the tank units of the Northern Group of Forces were combined with the 4th and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps into a cavalry-mechanized group under the command of Lieutenant General N. Ya. Kirichenko. From it cavalry detachments were allocated for raids on Stavropol and Armavir. In combined arms armies, mobile motorized groups were created to bypass the enemy's rearguards and enter the retreat route of his main forces.

Participants climbing to the top of Elbrus
to install the Soviet flag. From left to right: N. Marinets, G. Odnoblyudov, N. Gusak, B. Grachev, V. Kukhtin, I. Persianinov, A. Sidorenko

The tone of German reports also began to change. If on January 3, the log of combat reports from the headquarters of Army Group “A” noted that the retreat was proceeding systematically, then already on January 7, alarming notes sounded. The documents of the same headquarters emphasized that a powerful offensive was launched against the 52nd Army Corps, in which superior forces of infantry and tanks were involved. And a few hours later, the next report indicated that the infantry units of the corps were surrounded. However, overall there was no fracture.

By the end of January 8, the formations of the 1st Tank Army, having retreated 80-110 km, occupied a defensive line along the Kuma River. Only by January 10 did the main forces of the 44th, 9th and 58th armies reach him. Their individual advanced units managed to break through into the depths of the German defense. The 52nd Tank Brigade, having overtaken the retreating enemy by 40-50 km, reached Mineralnye Vody and on January 11, in cooperation with the 131st Brigade, liberated the city. The enemy began to retreat to a new line. Developing the offensive, the troops of the Northern Group captured the cities of Budennovsk, Georgievsk, Kislovodsk, Pyatigorsk, Essentuki by January 15, but at the line along the Kalaus and Cherkessk rivers they were stopped again and fought fierce battles for two days.

Realizing that it would not be possible to hold out here, the German command decided to withdraw its troops and organize a continuous defense behind water barriers - the Kuban, Egorlyk, Manych and Don rivers to the mouth of the river Seversky Donets. This line was beneficial both from an operational and strategic point of view, since it left a ghostly hope for organizing a new offensive in the Caucasus and made it possible to present the retreat as a deliberate maneuver.

Pursuing the enemy, who had resumed his retreat, on January 17, the 37th Army captured Cherkessk. On the same day, the 9th Army occupied the Kursavka railway station, and on January 20 liberated the important railway junction of Nevinnomyssk. By this time, the 44th Army had reached the approaches to Voroshilovsk. In the middle of the day, the advanced detachment of the 347th Infantry Division, Colonel N.I. Seliverstov, burst into the center of the city and began a stubborn battle with its garrison. Soon the main forces of the army arrived, and on January 21, Voroshilovsk was liberated.

Battles for the passes

The cavalry-mechanized group of General N. Ya. Kirichenko, having made a 200-kilometer throw across off-road terrain, on January 23 reached an area 20 km south of Salsk, where it united with units of the 28th Army of Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko of the Southern Front, advancing on Rostov and Bataysk. The next day, Soviet troops began fighting for Armavir, which the enemy turned into a major node of resistance on the third defensive line. The German command hoped to hold it for a long time, for which it began to move troops here from other sectors of the front. But his hopes did not come true: on January 24, Armavir was completely cleared of the enemy.

In 22 days, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front advanced 400-500 km, reached the enemy’s third defensive line throughout the entire offensive zone, and overcame it in a number of sectors. However main task– to encircle the German group – I couldn’t do it. The group's formations and formations delivered predominantly frontal attacks, which allowed the German command to organize defense at intermediate lines and systematically withdraw the main forces. In addition, the Soviet divisions suffered heavy losses and experienced an acute shortage of ammunition and fuel.

But the Wehrmacht command also faced the question: what to do next? Hitler's headquarters clearly understood that organizing a new offensive in the Caucasus was out of the question. Even holding the Rostov neck became problematic. After much debate, Hitler decided on January 22 to withdraw as many forces as possible through Rostov, and use the remaining ones to defend the Gotenkopf (Goth's Head) position. Depending on the situation, three such positions were planned: “Big Gotenkopf” - east of Krasnodar and Timashevskaya; “Middle Gotenkopf” - from Novorossiysk to Krymskaya and Slavyanskaya; "Small Gotenkopf" - from Anapa to Temryuk. However, the situation was such that only part of the forces of the 1st Tank Army, defending north of the Kuban River, had to be withdrawn to Rostov. All other troops located south of the Kuban River, including four divisions from the 1st Tank Army and the entire 17th Army, were forced to retreat to the Taman Peninsula.

Guerrilla concert. Photo by B. Ignatovich

On January 24, the Supreme Command Headquarters assigned new tasks to the troops. The Northern Group of Forces was withdrawn from the Transcaucasian Front and transformed into the North Caucasus Front, whose commander was Colonel General I. I. Maslennikov. The front had to advance in three diverging directions: to Rostov, from the area north of Armavir to the Sea of ​​Azov to Yeisk and Krasnodar. The Transcaucasian Front was instructed, in cooperation with the North Caucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet, to defeat the Krasnodar and Novorossiysk enemy groups.

The German command, trying to contain the advance of the troops of the left wing of the Southern Front, commanded by Colonel General A.I. Eremenko, along the left bank of the Don to Rostov, transferred half the forces of the 1st Tank Army to this direction. This weakened the enemy in the offensive zones of the 44th, 58th and 9th armies, allowing them to quickly break the enemy defenses between the Manych River and Armavir. By February 4, the troops of the North Caucasus Front reached the coast of the Azov Sea from Azov to the Beysug Estuary, on the approaches to Rostov and Krasnodar. On February 5, Kirichenko's cavalry-mechanized group and the 44th Army were transferred to the Southern Front and, as part of it, participated in the liberation of Rostov (February 14).

The offensive of the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was much more difficult. The front commander's plan provided for two strikes. The first - with the forces of the 56th Army (since January it was commanded by Major General A. A. Grechko) from the area of ​​​​the settlement of Goryachiy Klyuch to Krasnodar with the task of reaching the line of the Kuban River and capturing Krasnodar or blocking it. Subsequently, with the main goal of cutting off the retreat routes of the enemy Caucasian group to Rostov and Yeisk, capturing the village of Tikhoretskaya, striking in the direction of Bataysk and capturing it. This plan was called "Mountains". The second blow was delivered by the 47th Army under the command of Lieutenant General F.V. Kamkov from the area of ​​the village of Shapsugskaya through Krymskaya to Novorossiysk with the task of capturing Novorossiysk, and then all Taman Peninsula. This plan was called "Sea". The offensive was planned to begin in the zone of the 47th Army on January 12, in the zone of the 56th Army - on January 14.

Soviet tank crews on captured tanks and self-propelled guns are heading to the front line

The Black Sea Group operation plan approved by the Supreme Command Headquarters required a large-scale regrouping of troops, the supply large quantity material resources. The poorly developed road network and complex mountainous terrain did not allow concentration of formations in designated areas in deadlines. In addition, rain and snow left the roads in unusable condition. For these reasons, the concentration of troops of the strike groups was not completed by the beginning of the offensive. So, in the 56th Army, the 10th Guards Rifle Corps was on the move, most of reinforcement artillery and military artillery were still located on the southern slopes of the passes. The tank units attached to the army had to make a difficult 165-km march. A similar situation was in the 47th Army.

Nevertheless, in connection with the general situation in the North Caucasus, the armies of the Black Sea Group went on the offensive in auxiliary directions on January 11. The 46th Army was the first to strike along the valley of the Pshekha River at Neftegorsk and with part of its forces at Maikop.

The next day, the 47th Army began to attack northeast of Novorossiysk, and the 18th Army began to attack in the Tuapse direction, the command of which was taken over by Major General A.I. Ryzhov in early January. But their actions did not bring much success. After a slight penetration into the enemy’s defenses on the third or fourth day, the offensive had to be stopped. On the morning of January 16, the 56th Army struck the enemy. By this time, only one third of its artillery could support the advancing troops with fire. Due to bad weather, aviation could not operate. On the first day, the army formations advanced 12 km in the center and 5-6 km on the flanks. The pace of the offensive was significantly lower than planned.

According to the operation plan, on the first day the troops were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses and leave the foothills to the plain. In reality, it took a week. Nevertheless Soviet formations moved forward steadily. By January 23, the troops of the Black Sea Group broke through the enemy’s defenses and advanced 15-20 km. At this time, due to successful actions troops of the Southern Front in the Rostov and Bataysk directions, as well as the exit of troops of the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front to Armavir general situation in the North Caucasus has changed dramatically. The German command was forced to withdraw the bulk of its North Caucasian group not through Rostov, but to the Taman Peninsula.

Partisans in reconnaissance in the mountains of the North Caucasus

On January 23, the Supreme Command Headquarters stated in its directive that the Black Sea Group was unable to fulfill its tasks of advancing to the Krasnodar area and would not be able to reach Tikhoretsk and Bataysk on time. In this regard, the Black Sea Group was given the task of moving to the Krasnodar region and seizing positions on the Kuban River; direct the main forces to capture Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula. Subsequently, the main task of Petrov’s troops was to capture the Kerch Peninsula. Thus, the main efforts of the Black Sea Group of Forces moved from the center to its left flank, into the zone of the 47th Army, which Lieutenant General K. N. Leselidze took command of on January 25. The army was strengthened by two rifle divisions and nine artillery regiments.

On January 26, army troops launched a strike in the direction of Abinskaya and Krymskaya. For five days they tried unsuccessfully to break through the enemy defenses. Then the front commander decided to strike directly at Novorossiysk through the mountains surrounding the city. The offensive began on February 1 after a five-hour artillery preparation. But this time it was not crowned with success. It was possible to capture only the first two trenches. To assist the troops of Leselidze's army, on the night of February 4, to the west of Novorossiysk, in the area of ​​​​South Ozereyka and south of the city, an amphibious assault was landed on the western shore of Tsemes Bay. Due to a strong storm, the main landing force in the South Ozereyka area was only able to land partially. Left without fire support, it was almost completely destroyed by the enemy.

The landing of auxiliary troops in the amount of 870 people in Tsemes Bay was carried out more successfully. It was composed of a special forces detachment under the command of Major Ts. L. Kunikov. When the boats approached the shore, the paratroopers threw themselves into ice water and swam to get to it. With a swift attack, Kunikov’s detachment occupied a small bridgehead in the Stanichka area, the southern suburb of Novorossiysk. After him, 2 more groups landed in succession. The bridgehead was expanded to 4 km along the front and 2.5 km in depth. Subsequently it received the name Malaya Zemlya. Over the course of several nights, other units were landed here, expanding the bridgehead to 30 square meters. km. For 7 months, Soviet troops heroically defended Malaya Zemlya, repelling attacks by large enemy infantry forces and tanks. Subsequently, the bridgehead played an important role in the successful conduct of the Novorossiysk offensive operation.

A group of Marines from the detachment of Caesar Kunikov. Photo by E. Khaldey

By the end of February 4, the troops of the Black Sea Group reached the approaches to Krasnodar, but were unable to capture the city. It was not possible to overcome the enemy’s defenses near Novorossiysk. In the current situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, in order to unite the efforts of the troops on the Kuban bridgehead and in the Rostov region, reassigned the Black Sea Group of Forces to the North Caucasus Front, and transferred the 44th Army and the cavalry-mechanized group to the Southern Front. Thus, two strong groups with strictly defined tasks were created. This concluded the North Caucasus strategic offensive operation, and Soviet troops began preparing for subsequent operations.

On February 9, troops of the North Caucasus Front began the Krasnodar operation. Its plan provided for concentric attacks by the 58th (Major General K.S. Melnik) and 9th (Major General V.V.V. Glagolev) armies, striking from the north on the Slavyanskaya, 37th and 46th (in February - March it was commanded by Major General A. I. Ryzhov) armies from the east - to Krasnodar, the 18th (from the beginning of February commanded by Major General K. A. Koroteev) and the 56th army from the south - to Troitskaya , encircle and destroy the enemy’s Krasnodar group, preventing its withdrawal to Crimea. The Black Sea Fleet was supposed to blockade the Kerch Peninsula and the coastal zone from Anapa to Feodosia from the sea. The five days that were allotted for preparing the operation were clearly not enough. The armies of the right wing of the front, which had previously pursued the retreating enemy, stretched out and dispersed over an area of ​​about 2000 square meters. km. The artillery lagged behind the troops by 80-100 km, and supply bases and warehouses - by 200-300 km. As a result, the concentration of forces and means was not completed by the start of the operation, and some troops were unable to reach their initial and firing positions. In addition, the formations and units, having already marched about 600 km in battle, needed rest and replenishment. Nevertheless, at the appointed time they began to advance.

The 58th and 9th armies tried to break through the enemy’s defenses for 2 days, but were unsuccessful. The troops of the 37th and 18th armies coped with this task. Using their success, the 46th Army went on the offensive, which, together with formations of the 18th Army, with the assistance of partisans, liberated Krasnodar on February 12. The enemy, hiding behind strong rearguards and launching counterattacks, began to retreat to previously prepared defense lines and evacuate the rear of the 17th Army to the Crimea.

In this regard, the Supreme High Command Headquarters on February 22 ordered the troops of the North Caucasus Front to enter the retreat route of the main forces of the 17th Army, encircle and destroy them. During February 23 and 24, the 58th and 9th armies tried to break through the enemy's defenses, but were unsuccessful. The offensive of the 47th and 18th Airborne Armies on the left flank of the Black Sea Group of Forces was also unsuccessful. The troops of the 56th Army broke the stubborn resistance of the German 44th Army Corps and by February 25 advanced westward up to 30 km. Using the success of the 56th Army, the 46th Army went forward along the left bank of the Kuban River. This forced the German command to begin withdrawing troops north of the river. Fulfilling the front commander’s demand for more active actions, the commander of the 58th Army decided to strike along the Azov floodplains in order to cut off the enemy’s escape route to the Taman Peninsula.

For this purpose, a strike force of three divisions was created on the right flank of the army under the general leadership of the chief of staff of the army, Major General M. S. Filippovsky. However, by the appointed time, only two of them reached the concentration area. Nevertheless, General K. S. Melnik launched an offensive on February 26. The troops advanced successfully, however bad management them, poor support for the flanks and the lag of the second echelons allowed the enemy to strike at the base of the breakthrough and encircle the strike group. Waging continuous battles with the contracted enemy, the Soviet divisions used up ammunition and food and were unable to hold their positions. In this regard, the group commander, who had no contact with army headquarters for two days, decided to withdraw through the floodplains. On March 3, the troops, having destroyed the material, began to retreat in separate groups and by the end of the next day they reached the area indicated to them.

The 37th Army achieved noticeable success, which, having defeated units of two German infantry divisions opposing it, advanced 10-12 km and by March 6 reached the Protoka River in the Slavyanskaya area. However, the German defense was unable to capture this large hub. From March 6 to 8, there was a calm at the front. Only in some areas did local fighting continue.

On March 9, the command of the 17th Army, seeking to further reduce the front line and fearing an attack from the troops of the 58th Army hanging over its left flank, began to withdraw its units to a new defensive line, called the Blue Line. It passed between the previously planned positions “Middle Gotenkopf” and “Small Gotenkopf”, on the flanks it faced powerful defensive units created in the areas of Novorossiysk and Temryuk, and in the center - on the Protoka River, which represented a rather serious obstacle. The Blue Line was built over several weeks. By the time the Soviet troops reached the defensive line, it consisted of two positions. The first had a depth of 1-1.5 km and was equipped with 2-3 trenches, covered with a continuous strip of wire and mine barriers. Behind it passed the second, which included several trenches and prepared for all-round defense settlements. In the depths, all directions and defiles available for attack were blocked by resistance units and individual strongholds.

The troops of the North Caucasus Front attempted to break through the Blue Line on the move, but were unsuccessful. They were exhausted from the battles and experienced an acute shortage of ammunition, fuel, and food. The tank units of the front, due to the lack of fuel, for 10-15 days could not not only conduct battles, but even march to the troops with which they were supposed to act. For the same reason, aviation found itself confined to airfields.

Based on an analysis of the situation and the state of the troops, the front command turned to Headquarters for permission to temporarily stop the offensive and prepare a new offensive operation within 10-12 days. It was also proposed to disband the field administration of the Black Sea group, and appoint its commander, General I.E. Petrov, as chief of staff of the front. On March 16, the Headquarters approved these proposals and ordered the offensive to begin in early April to give the troops more time to prepare. This completed the Krasnodar offensive operation.

The troops of the North Caucasus Front again failed to complete their assigned task - to encircle the enemy’s North Caucasian group. This was due to poor control of troops by the command of the front and armies, poor supply of advancing units and formations with all types of materiel, and difficult weather conditions. Having failed to encircle the entire North Caucasian enemy group, Soviet troops now had to destroy his forces on the Taman Peninsula.

The German command attached great importance to holding the Taman Peninsula. On March 10, 1943, the commander of Army Group A, E. Kleist, the commander of the 17th Army, General R. Ruoff, and the commander of the 4th Air Fleet, General W. Richthofen, were summoned to a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters. When discussing plans for 1943, Hitler stated: “... it is desirable that Novorossiysk be retained by us and included in the Taman bridgehead, on the one hand, for reasons political influence against the Turks and, on the other hand, in order to keep the Russian Black Sea Fleet away from Crimea.” On March 13, Army Group A received Hitler's order to “hold the Taman bridgehead and Crimea at all costs.”

In carrying out this task, the command of the 17th Army took intensive measures to strengthen the Blue Line. Its total depth increased to 20-25 km. The main zone, 5-7 km deep, included 3-4 positions, covered with minefields (in some areas up to 2500 mines per 1 km of front) and 3-6 rows of wire barriers. There was a second lane 10-15 km from the main one. Both strips were filled with pillboxes, bunkers and machine-gun sites, connected by a network of trenches and communication passages. In the depths, 3 more lines and cut-off positions were being prepared. All dominant heights and settlements located within them were turned into strongholds and centers of resistance, adapted for all-round defense.

Novorossiysk was especially strongly fortified: a powerful anti-landing defense was created on the approaches to it from the sea, the approaches to the port were covered with minefields, artillery fire, mortars and small arms. All troops of the 17th Army were withdrawn to the Blue Line. In the spring and summer, the armies of the North Caucasus Front repeatedly tried to break through the enemy’s defensive line, but were unsuccessful. This was done only in September 1943.

In April–June, fierce battles for air supremacy unfolded, resulting in Russian literature title "Air battles in Kuban 1943". By mid-April, the German command concentrated 820 aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet at the airfields of Crimea and Taman, and also attracted up to 200 bombers based in the Donbass and southern Ukraine. The aviation group included the best units of the Luftwaffe, equipped experienced pilots and aircraft of a new modification. WITH Soviet side aviation from the North Caucasus, partly from the South and Southwestern Fronts, the Black Sea Fleet and the long-range aviation group - a total of 1048 combat aircraft, most of which were also new. The general management of their actions was carried out by the commander of the Red Army Air Force, Air Marshal A. A. Novikov, and the immediate direction was carried out by the commander of the Air Force of the North Caucasus Front (since May 1943, commander of the 4th Air Army) Lieutenant General of Aviation K. A. Vershinin.

The first air battle took place on April 17-24 during the fighting on Malaya Zemlya. About 650 enemy aircraft and 500 Soviet aircraft took part in it. Subsequent battles took place in the areas of the villages of Krymskaya (April 29 - May 10), Kyiv and Moldavanskaya (May 26 and June 7) and lasted continuously for many hours. On some days, in a relatively small area (20-30 km), up to 40 group air battles took place with the participation of 50-80 aircraft on both sides. At the same time, airfields were attacked.

"Night Witches" from the Women's Bomber Regiment

Pilots during a break between flights. Photo by E. Khaldei

The results achieved by Soviet aviation were an important step towards achieving strategic air supremacy, which was achieved during Battle of Kursk. Soviet pilots demonstrated courage, courage, and ingenuity; 52 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the troops of the North Caucasus Front continued preparations for the offensive operation complete liberation territory of the North Caucasus from the enemy. In August, in connection with the favorable situation that had developed in the South-Western strategic direction, Headquarters gave instructions to the front commander (in May he was headed by Lieutenant General I.E. Petrov) to prepare an offensive operation in order to complete the defeat of the enemy Taman group and prevent its withdrawal to Crimea. The idea of ​​the operation was to launch a sudden combined attack from sea and land on Novorossiysk, capture it, and then develop an offensive on Anapa with the goal of enveloping the entire enemy group defending the Blue Line from the south.

At the same time, north and south of the Kuban River, the main forces of the front were supposed to deliver cutting blows, cut off the enemy’s escape route to the Crimea and destroy it piece by piece. Three combined arms and one air army took part in the operation, in which there were over 317.4 thousand people, more than 4.4 thousand guns and mortars, more than 300 tanks and self-propelled guns artillery installations, about 700 aircraft. About 150 ships and auxiliary vessels of the Black Sea Fleet (Rear Admiral L.A. Vladimirsky) and the Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov) were also involved. The formations of the German 17th Army under the command of General E. Eneke that opposed them had over 400 thousand people, up to 2.9 thousand guns and mortars, more than 100 tanks and assault guns, and 300 aircraft.

The troops carefully prepared for the offensive. In special towns, equipped like German defenses in mountainous areas, they trained to break through heavily fortified enemy positions. Fleet forces trained in amphibious landings and interaction between groups of combat support ships and landing craft. Much attention was paid to preparing torpedo boats for the destruction of boom nets and minefields, and for delivering a fire strike on the enemy in the landing areas.

To ensure the secrecy of the offensive preparations, operational camouflage measures were taken. There was no correspondence or negotiations via communications about the upcoming operation. Its plan was developed personally by the front commander; all documents were drawn up by a limited circle of people in the part that concerned them, and only in one copy, by hand. The regrouping of troops was carried out, as a rule, at night. In order to misinform the enemy, reconnaissance in secondary directions was intensified. These events disoriented the German command. The enemy began to regroup its troops in areas where the front's main attacks were not planned. A lot of work was done on the logistical support of troops and naval forces.

The Novorossiysk-Taman strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops began on the night of September 10, 1943 with powerful artillery and air preparation and the landing of 3 detachments amphibious assault in the Novorossiysk port. At the same time, the troops of the shock group of the 18th Army under Lieutenant General K. N. Leselidze (took command of the army on March 16, 1943) went on the offensive east and south of Novorossiysk. The enemy put up stubborn resistance, throwing its reserves into a counterattack. On the first day, the formations of the 18th Army were not successful. The German command began hastily transferring the nearest reserves to the Novorossiysk area. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to separate one landing detachment, encircle and isolate another, but he was unable to stop the advance of the third landing detachment.

The front commander strengthened the eastern group of the 18th Army rifle formations and tanks. At the same time, another rifle regiment was sent to help the landing force. In order to prevent the enemy reserves from maneuvering, the 9th Army of Major General A. A. Grechkin was ordered to go on the offensive on the morning of September 11. This made it possible to increase the impact force.

The enemy's position became even more complicated when the 56th Army of Lieutenant General A. A. Grechko went on the offensive on September 14. Having broken through the Blue Line, it began to quickly move into the depths, cutting through the main group of the 17th Army. At the same time, fierce battles were taking place in Novorossiysk. Both groups of the 18th Army also resumed their offensive. Its eastern group broke through the enemy’s defenses northeast of the city, made its way to the station and began to bypass Novorossiysk. Western group The army also managed to break the enemy's resistance and penetrate its defenses. On the night of September 16, the remnants of the Novorossiysk garrison in small groups began to retreat to the northwest, and during the day the city and port of Novorossiysk were completely liberated from the enemy. Moscow solemnly saluted the soldiers of the North Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Fleet in honor of the victory.

Realizing the impossibility of holding on to the North Caucasus, the German command decided to evacuate its formations from the Taman Peninsula to Crimea. Soviet troops successfully advanced along the entire front. They broke through the enemy’s retreat route, forestalled him in reaching intermediate lines, and forced him to hastily abandon his positions. Panic arose more than once in the retreating German and Romanian units. The captured soldiers and officers called the Taman bridgehead “a living hell”, “a fiery inferno”, “a bloody meat grinder”. The advancing troops were supported by naval artillery fire and air strikes by the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla.

At the same time, amphibious assault forces were landed behind enemy lines on September 21, 25 and 26. These days, the partisans launched a particularly active struggle. They launched surprise attacks on the enemy's rear, sowed panic among the fascists and inflicted significant damage on them, and delivered important intelligence information to the headquarters of divisions and regiments. Units of the 18th Army approached Anapa on September 21 and, with the coordinated actions of units of the 5th Guards Tank Brigade and amphibious assault, cleared the city of fascists on the same day. On October 3, army troops liberated Taman, and by the morning of October 9, the 56th Army captured the entire northern part of the Taman Peninsula and the Chushka Spit. Soviet troops reached the coast of the Kerch Strait and completed the liberation of the North Caucasus. With the end of the Novorossiysk-Taman operation on October 9, 1943, the battle for the Caucasus also ended.

The victory of Soviet troops in the battle for the Caucasus was of great military and political significance. Germany was unable to obtain oil from the Caucasus and the Middle East, fertile lands Kuban and Stavropol. Hitler's aspirations to break through Transcaucasia to Iran and India were put to rest. Hitler’s generals also dreamed of India. On July 24, 1942, when fascist German troops managed to capture Rostov, the commander of the 17th Field Army, General R. Ruoff, inviting the Japanese military attaché to the blown-up bridge across the Don, extended his hand in the direction of Bataysk and self-confidently declared: “The gates to the Caucasus are open. The hour is approaching when the German troops and the troops of your Emperor will meet in India." Dreams were shattered by the fortitude and courage of the Soviet soldier, the dedication of the Caucasian peoples.

Flowers for the winners! Photo by A.Shaikhet

In stubborn bloody battles in the summer and autumn of 1942, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, abandoned most of the territory of the North Caucasus, but still stopped the enemy. In the foothills and passes of the Main Caucasus Range, they stood as an insurmountable wall on the path of the German armies. Expulsion of the German fascist troops from the North Caucasus and the defeat at Stalingrad buried Hitler’s hope of uniting with the Turkish army and involving Turkey in the war against the USSR.

His dreams of destroying the friendship of the peoples of the Caucasus with other peoples of the Soviet Union did not come true either. Fascist propaganda in every possible way inspired the local population that German troops were fighting only the Russians, and were bringing liberation to the mountain peoples. Things got to the point that the commander of the 1st Panzer Army, General E. Mackensen, converted to Islam. Despite the fact that the Germans managed to create a number national formations from the peoples of the North Caucasus, they turned out to be of little use for fighting against their compatriots. The enemy subsequently had to transfer them to the West, where they acted against units of the Resistance movement. The overwhelming majority of the population of the Caucasus not only did not support the invaders, but also actively fought against them. 180 fought in enemy-occupied territory partisan detachments with a total number of over 9 thousand people. In the republics of Transcaucasia, national divisions, from here reinforcements were sent to other units and formations. A significant part of the rear forces were located on the territory of the Transcaucasian republics, and military equipment was repaired.

The operations to liberate the North Caucasus demonstrated the increased power of the Soviet Armed Forces. The art of war received further development. The troops gained experience in conducting pursuit, breaking through heavily fortified defensive lines and positions, crossing rivers, conducting offensives in mountains and floodplains, preparing and carrying out amphibious landing operations, and fighting for air supremacy.

The enemy suffered significant damage. Its losses during the offensive operations of the Soviet troops alone amounted to 281 thousand soldiers and officers, about 1.4 thousand tanks, 2 thousand aircraft, more than 7 thousand guns and mortars. No less important was the fact that the morale of Soviet soldiers rose. The confidence has come that the enemy can be beaten, the hour of liberation of the native land is approaching.

But the victory came at a high price. The total losses of Soviet troops in the battle for the Caucasus were: irrevocable - over 344 thousand people, sanitary - more than 605 thousand people. To a large extent, this was due to the command’s errors in assessing the enemy’s intentions and the state of his troops. The necessary measures were not always taken to maintain the combat effectiveness of their formations and units at the proper level. Many divisions often operated with a large shortage of personnel and equipment, and constantly experienced an acute shortage of ammunition, fuel, and food. Most of the operations were prepared hastily; the troops did not have time to fully concentrate in the areas they had established and carry out comprehensive preparations for action. As a result, it was not possible to create powerful strike groups and break through enemy defenses in a short time and to great depth. Taken together, all this led to the fact that it was not possible to encircle the enemy’s North Caucasian group. The enemy was driven beyond the Don and into the Crimea and, in general, retained the combat effectiveness of their armies. The troops that retreated through Rostov strengthened Army Group South, which held back the advance of Soviet troops conducting the Rostov operation. Units of the 17th Army were evacuated through the Kerch Strait to Crimea. Their final defeat was carried out in the spring of 1944 during the Crimean offensive operation.

The military feat of the defenders of the Caucasus was highly appreciated by the entire country. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 1, 1944, the medal “For the Defense of the Caucasus” was established, which was awarded to about 600 thousand people. Many units and formations were awarded the honorary names of Anapa, Kuban, Novorossiysk, Taman, Temryuk. Novorossiysk for outstanding services to the Motherland, mass heroism, courage and fortitude shown by its workers and soldiers of the army and navy in the Great Patriotic War, and in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the defeat of fascist troops in the North Caucasus on September 14, 1973, it was awarded honorary title"Hero City"

In one of the liberated villages. Photo by Y. Khalip

F.P. Usypenko. Battle of Mozdok in 1943. 1950 Studio of military artists named after M.B. Grekova

Since ancient times, the Caucasus has connected Europe and the Middle East and was a necessary springboard for the successful campaigns of European and eastern conquerors. IN modern times strategic importance Caucasus region increased even more due to the opening huge deposits minerals, a key component of the industrial age, including oil. Possible takeover of the Caucasus Nazi troops would have placed the USSR in extremely difficult conditions for waging war, depriving the country in the most difficult times of the bulk of oil, gas, manganese ore, molybdenum, tungsten, as well as the largest food and resort bases. And, on the contrary: as the strategy collapses, “ lightning war“The problem of supplying the German motorized army with fuel took on increasingly acute forms, and already in the spring of 1942, according to Hitler, it began to threaten catastrophe.

The Battle of the Caucasus, as one of the most important battles Extensive research and memoir literature is devoted to the Great Patriotic War. It is distinguished by a high level of military-historical analysis of the events that took place and the extensive use of archival material.

The battle for the Caucasus unfolded in an extremely difficult situation. In the spring of 1942, Hitler set his troops the task of depriving the USSR of its main economic bases in the south of the country and, most importantly, taking possession of Caucasian oil, without which the German military machine was doomed to defeat. As a result, the main enemy forces were concentrated on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front.

A meeting dedicated to the departure of the 115th Kabardino-Balkarian National Cavalry Division to the front. Nalchik, April 12, 1942

In July, the Germans and their allies with their main forces reached the lower reaches of the Don, from where, in accordance with Hitler’s Directive No. 45 of July 23, 1942, they were preparing to develop an offensive in two directions - to the Caucasus (Army Group A) and to Stalingrad (Army Group armies "B") The Caucasian enemy group numbered 167 thousand soldiers and officers, 1130 tanks, 4540 guns and mortars, and up to 1 thousand aircraft.

German tank formations in the foothills of the Caucasus. 1942

The troops of the North Caucasus and Southern fronts defending the Don lines were few in number and exhausted by previous battles. After enemy attacks at the end of July - beginning of August, they split and retreated in disorder. In heavy battles near Novorossiysk and in the Tuapse direction in August-September 1942, units of the North Caucasus Front (commander Marshal) managed to stop the enemy and retain the Black Sea coast, but the front did not have the forces to defend all the approaches to Transcaucasia from the north. This task was assigned to the Transcaucasian Front (commanding army general), which at that time carried out cover tasks state border USSR from the south from hostile Turkey and to protect communications in Iran, where Soviet troops were temporarily deployed under the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921.

In anticipation decisive battle With the main forces of the German Army Group “A”, the Soviet government, the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front, the Soviet and party leaders of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia carried out a set of defensive measures in August and early September 1942, which required the full mobilization of forces and resources.

First of all, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, with the forces of the newly formed Northern Group of Forces (37th, 9th, 44th and 58th Armies) equipped and occupied a completely new line of defense, over 400 km long (from Nalchik to the mouth of the river Terek at its confluence with the Caspian Sea) and in depth in some directions up to 300 km (to Derbent and Baku). The northern group of troops was supposed to cover the most important Baku direction. Units of the 46th Army were transferred to the passes of the Main Caucasus Ridge. At the same time, the front troops were few in number, were armed with mostly outdated equipment and did not have combat experience. Some armies (9th and 37th) were replenished after the withdrawal from the Don lines, and the 58th Army was formed for the first time.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) and the General Staff of the Red Army had to take a big risk and weaken the remaining areas of defense of the Transcaucasian Front to the limit. During the first half of August, 6 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades and a significant part of reinforcements were transferred from Transcaucasia. At the same time, the main forces of the 46th Army were deployed north to defend the passes and the junction with the North Caucasus Front, and in the 45th Army, located on the border with Turkey, only three divisions remained. The situation on southern border was aggravated by the fact that due to an acute shortage of weapons, they had to be confiscated from the troops of the 45th and 46th armies. From the second half of August, the Supreme High Command Headquarters began providing military assistance, sending two guards rifle corps, 11 rifle brigades, tanks and other types of weapons to Transcaucasia over the next month and a half.

German mountain units in the Caucasus. 1942

The labor feat was accomplished by the population of the North Caucasus, who built defensive structures, and by the railway workers, who ensured the uninterrupted transfer of troops and the evacuation of the wounded and equipment.

In heavy battles near Mozdok, Tuapse and on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range in September-October, Soviet troops exhausted the enemy, knocked down his offensive impulse and created the preconditions for launching a counter-offensive. However, the enemy retained a lot of strength and repelled all the counterattacks of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front in November and December 1942.

Machine gunners cover the advance of infantrymen near Mozdok. 1942

The operation to defend the Caucasus as a whole was typical for the first period of the war with its inherent shortcomings - poor motorization of troops, lack of armored vehicles and aircraft, inexperience of most of the command and control personnel. commanding staff, especially specialists (intelligence officers, signalmen, artillerymen), etc. This often resulted in miscalculations in planning, conducting and supporting operations and battles, weak interaction branches of troops and, ultimately, protracted battles and unjustifiably large losses. On the other hand, the front command and headquarters showed fairly high organizational and managerial qualities. They often came to Headquarters with bold initiatives, firmly defended their point of view, intensely searched for ways to overcome the acute shortage of people and material resources, improvising with the means that were available.

The defense of the Caucasus is also characterized by another feature of the initial period of the war, without which victory over the enemy would have been unthinkable: mass heroism, self-sacrifice, and tireless work of Soviet people of all nationalities and religions. There are thousands of examples of this. Thus, during the battles on the outskirts of Vladikavkaz in November 1942, the young sniper Mamatov took refuge not far from enemy positions. At his request, our mortars drove the fascists with fire to ambush Mamatov, who began to methodically shoot them. As a result, the invaders were missing 17 people. Much of the credit for increasing the discipline and determination of the defenders of the Caucasus belonged to political workers, who often became indispensable assistants to commanders and replaced them in case of injury. For example, in the battles near Mozdok in October 1942, the battalion of the 404th regiment of the 176th Infantry Division was surrounded. The battalion commander and his political commander, senior political instructor Mironenko, acted hand in hand, leading the battalion into a bayonet attack five times. For three days the battalion was surrounded without food or ammunition, but did not flinch and reached the location of its troops without serious losses.

An amazing massive feat was accomplished by the soldiers and commanders of the 392nd Infantry Division (commander Colonel). After the Germans broke through the defense of the 37th Army near Nalchik on October 25, 1942, the division found itself pressed against the mountains in complete isolation from other Soviet troops, and it seemed that it would inevitably be crushed by the enemy. However, thanks to skillful and firm leadership, the division was able to cross the high-mountain Dovguz-Orunbashi pass in its entirety in five days, carrying weapons, equipment, 12 tons of molybdenum from a molybdenum plant left behind enemy lines, and 400 bedridden wounded from evacuated army hospitals. 30 thousand heads of cattle were also driven to Transcaucasia. Having made an unprecedented transition, the brave Georgian division remained as a combat-ready unit.

The women's night bomber regiment under the command became famous throughout the country. Behind the threatening name “night bombers” were only slow-moving U-2 training machines. At first, the Germans mockingly called them “sewing machines” and “Russian plywood”. But soon they felt the brunt of night attacks from invisible small planes, which, gliding at extremely low altitudes, approached enemy positions, sowing panic and death among them. Military merits female military pilots were noted 22 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief; 23 pilots were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Female officers of the 46th Guards Taman Night Bomber Aviation Regiment of the 325th Night Bomber Aviation Division of the 4th Air Army: Evdokia Bershanskaya (left), Maria Smirnova (standing) and Polina Gelman

The struggle did not subside even behind enemy lines. Immortal feat committed by the fighters of the Gofitsky partisan detachment, on August 18, 1942, who entered into an unequal battle with the advanced units of the enemy advancing on Grozny. A small detachment died, but destroyed over 100 fascists. No one, including children and youth, remained aloof from the fight against the enemy. They scattered leaflets, burned German cars, and disabled communication lines.

The heroism of the Soviet people on the front line and behind enemy lines weakened the enemy to the limit. Under pressure from units of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front, on January 1, 1943, he began to retreat in the direction of Stavropol and Rostov. The second stage of the battle for the Caucasus - liberation - began. On initial stage(January 1 - February 4, 1943) the enemy was driven back from the foothills of the Caucasus to the lower reaches of the Kuban.

Episode of the Battle for the Caucasus

The offensive proceeded rapidly: Mozdok was liberated on January 3, Pyatigorsk on the 11th, and Stavropol on January 21. On January 24, 1943, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was transformed into the North Caucasian Front of the 2nd Formation (commander - Lieutenant General). On February 5, the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was included in the North Caucasus Front. On February 12, 1943, front troops liberated Krasnodar. During the pursuit of the enemy from the river line. Terek suffered significant damage. Heavy losses The German 1st Panzer and 17th armies suffered in manpower and equipment. However, the Soviet troops were unable to solve the main task - to prevent the withdrawal of troops from the territory of the North Caucasus, to encircle and defeat the Wehrmacht group and its allies.

Subsequently, the enemy was pushed back to the Taman Peninsula, where he offered desperate resistance to Soviet troops at a previously prepared line of defense (“Gotenkopf” - literally “Cat’s Head”; in modern sources it is better known as the “Blue Line”). The fascist German command created a strong, deeply echeloned defense here, which ran from the Azov to the Black Seas, covering the Taman Peninsula from the east. Bloody battles in this direction continued until October 9, 1943, until the last German soldier was thrown into the Kerch Strait. The heroes of Malaya Zemlya, a bridgehead established on February 4, 1943 at Cape Myskhako, which included part of the city of Novorossiysk, covered themselves with unfading glory. Malaya Zemlya attracted large enemy forces and played a big role in the defeat of his troops in 1943. In the battle on Malaya Zemlya, a captain of the 3rd rank distinguished himself. In the spring of 1943, he was entrusted with the difficult task of landing troops on Myskhako. Under fire from enemy coastal batteries, they made their way to the defenders of Malaya Zemlya with reinforcements, ammunition, and food. Sipyagin's boat division played its role - Novorossiysk was liberated on September 16. For his participation in this operation, Nikolai Ivanovich Sipyagin was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero.

During the offensive of Soviet troops in the North Caucasus in 1943, the enemy suffered enormous damage: about 275 thousand soldiers and officers were killed, over 6 thousand were captured, 890 tanks were destroyed and shot down, over 2 thousand aircraft, 2127 guns, over 7 thousand vehicles, etc. During the same time, our troops captured 458 tanks, 1,392 guns, 1,533 mortars, over 15 thousand vehicles and other property.

Offensive operations in the Caucasus in 1943 took place under the conditions of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War, to which the defenders of the Caucasus also made their contribution. The successes of the Red Army were explained by the sharply increased capabilities of the Soviet defense industry, the great skill and experience of Soviet commanders and soldiers.

The offensive operations of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts in 1943, as a rule, were characterized by good preparation, the correct choice of the direction of the main attack and clear leadership of the troops during the offensive.

The exploits of the defenders of the Caucasus were highly appreciated by the Soviet people and government. On January 25, 1943, the medal “For the Defense of the Caucasus” was established, which was awarded to many participants in the battle for the Caucasus and home front workers (583,045 people in total). The peoples of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia always preserve the memory of their great work and dear sacrifice.

Memorial complex of Glory named after Akhmat Kadyrov in Grozny (Chechen Republic)

Alexey Bezugolny, senior researcher at the Research Institute (military history)
Military Academy General Staff RF Armed Forces Report of the commander of the North Caucasus Front troops to the General Staff of the Red Army on the battles in the Myskhako and Tsemes Bay area.

Battle for the Caucasus 1942-1943
	Kuban, North Caucasus
	First stage: German troops fail to break through to Transcaucasia. Second stage: The Red Army fails to encircle enemy troops in the Kuban and inflict a decisive defeat on them. After six months of defense on the Taman Peninsula, German troops are evacuated to Crimea. Indirect result: On charges of collaborating with the occupiers, they were subjected to mass deportation peoples of the North Caucasus: Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmyks, Karachais.
Opponents
	Slovakia
	Croatia
Commanders
S. M. Budyonny
I. V. Tyulenev	E. von Kleist
I. E. Petrov	E. von Mackensen
I. I. Maslennikov
R. Ya. Malinovsky	P. Dumitrescu
F. S. Oktyabrsky	J. Turanec
L. A. Vladimirsky
	I. Gariboldi
Strengths of the parties
By July 25, 1942: 112 thousand people, 121 tanks, 2160 guns and mortars, 230 aircraft. by January 1, 1943: over 1 million people, more than 11.3 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.3 thousand tanks, 900 aircraft.	By July 25, 1942: 170 thousand people, 1130 tanks, over 4.5 thousand guns and mortars, up to 1 thousand aircraft. from July 31: 700 tanks. by January 1, 1943: 764 thousand people, 5290 guns and mortars, 700 tanks, 530 aircraft. At the end of January 1943: all German tank units (except the 13th Panzer Division) were withdrawn from Kuban to Ukraine
344 thousand people	281 thousand people

Battle for the Caucasus(July 25, 1942 - October 9, 1943) - battle of the armed forces Nazi Germany, Romania and Slovakia against the USSR during the Great Patriotic War for control of the Caucasus. The battle is divided into two stages: the German offensive (July 25 - December 31, 1942) and the Soviet counteroffensive (January 1 - October 9, 1943).

In the fall of 1942, German troops occupied most of the Kuban and North Caucasus, but after the defeat at Stalingrad they were forced to retreat due to the threat of encirclement.

In 1943, the Soviet command failed to either lock the German units in the Kuban or inflict a decisive defeat on them: the Wehrmacht tank units (1st Tank Army) were withdrawn from the Kuban to Ukraine in January 1943, and the infantry units (17th Army) were taken from Taman Peninsula to Crimea in October.

In 1943-1944. Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush and Balkars were accused of collaboration and deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan, where many died from hunger and disease.

Previous Events

By June 1942, the Soviet front in the southern sector was weakened due to the failure of the spring offensive near Kharkov. The German command did not fail to take advantage of this circumstance.

On June 28, the 4th Tank Army of the Wehrmacht under the command of Hermann Hoth broke through the front between Kursk and Kharkov and rushed to the Don. On July 3, Voronezh was partially occupied, and the troops of S.K. Timoshenko, defending the direction to Rostov, were covered from the north. The Red Army lost more than 200 thousand people in this area alone as prisoners. The 4th Tank Army, having fought about 200 km in ten days, rapidly advanced south between Donets and Don. On July 23, Rostov-on-Don fell - the path to the Caucasus was open.

Plans of the German command

The breakthrough of the Soviet front near Kharkov and the subsequent capture of Rostov-on-Don opened up for Hitler not only the real prospect of access to Baku oil in the Transcaucasus, but also the opportunity to capture Stalingrad - the most important transport node And major center military industry. In German sources, this offensive is called “Operation Blue” (German. Fall Blue).

Caucasus

Baku and the North Caucasus were the main source of oil for the entire economy of the USSR. After the loss of Ukraine, the importance of the Caucasus and Kuban as a source of grain increased sharply. There were also reserves of strategic raw materials, for example, the Tyrnyauz tungsten-molybdenum ore deposit. The loss of the Caucasus could have a noticeable impact on the overall course of the war against the USSR, so Hitler chose this particular direction as his main one. The army group created for the attack on the Caucasus received the code "A".

The task of Group “A” was to: encircle and destroy south and southeast of Rostov-on-Don the troops of the Southern Front, which had retreated across the Don River, and capture the North Caucasus; then it was planned to bypass the Greater Caucasus group from the west, capturing Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and by another group from the east, capturing the oil-bearing regions of Grozny and Baku. Simultaneously with the roundabout maneuver, it was planned to overcome Watershed Ridge in its central part along the passes and access to Georgia. After the supposed victory at Stalingrad, the preparation of a springboard for combat operations against Great Britain in the Middle East.

The German command took into account that the Many Terek Cossacks, the Cossack population of the Kuban and the mountain population of the North Caucasus were hostile to Soviet power. In Chechnya, anti-Soviet riots began in February 1940 under the leadership of Khasan Israilov and intensified after the defeats of the Red Army in 1941-1942. Subsequently, the Germans' assumptions were confirmed - several Cossack and mountain formations were formed in the Caucasus, joining the Wehrmacht.

Stalingrad

After the fall of Rostov-on-Don, communication between the Caucasus and the regions of European Russia was possible only by sea through the Caspian and Volga and by the Salsk-Stalingrad railway. The German command believed that by cutting these communications they could quickly establish control over the Caucasus and deprive the USSR of critical resources. To solve this problem it was planned to strike in the direction of Stalingrad. Army Group B was created for the attack on Stalingrad under the command of Field Marshal von Weichs. Until November 1942, the Stalingrad direction was considered auxiliary to the offensive in the Caucasus.

Hitler's strategic miscalculation

According to some historians, the division of strategic directions in the face of limited military forces was erroneous and led to the dispersal of German forces, ultimately to the failure of both the Stalingrad and Caucasian offensive plans.

Alignment of forces in the 1st stage of the battle

USSR

• Southern Front (commander - R. Ya. Malinovsky). It included the 9th Army, 12th Army, 18th Army, 24th Army, 37th Army, 51st Army and 56th Army. Air support was provided by the 4th Air Force. On July 25, the front numbered 112 thousand people, 121 tanks, 2,160 guns and mortars. On July 28, 1942, the front was merged with the North Caucasus Front, the 51st Army was transferred to the Stalingrad Front.
• North Caucasus Front (commander - S. M. Budyonny). It included the 47th Army, the 1st Rifle Corps and the 17th Cavalry Corps. Air support was provided by the 5th Air Force. On July 28, the troops of the Southern Front, except for the 51st Army, were included in the front. On September 4, 1942, the front was disbanded, its troops were transferred to the Transcaucasian Front.
• Transcaucasian Front (commander - I.V. Tyulenev). At the beginning of the battle it included the 44th Army, the 45th Army, the 46th Army and the 15th Cavalry Corps. Front aviation consisted of 14 aviation regiments. At the beginning of August 1942, the 9th, 24th (disbanded on August 28) and 37th armies from the North Caucasus Front were transferred to the front. On August 30, the 58th Army was formed. At the beginning of September, the 12th, 18th, 56th and 58th armies from the disbanded North Caucasus Front were transferred to the front. On September 20, the 12th Army was disbanded.
• Black Sea Fleet (commander - F. S. Oktyabrsky). At the beginning of the battle it consisted of a squadron, brigades submarines, torpedo boat brigades, trawling and barrage brigades, divisions gunboats, air force and the Azov military flotilla.

Germany and allies

To attack the Caucasus, Army Group A was allocated from Army Group South, consisting of:

• 1st Tank Army (Kleist)
• 17th Army (Ruoff)
• 3rd Romanian Army

Initially, it was planned to include in the group the 4th Panzer Army of Hermann Hoth and the 11th Army of Manstein, which, after the siege of Sevastopol, was located in the Crimea, but it never reached the Caucasus (with the exception of units of the 42nd Army Corps), but was transferred to north for an attack on Leningrad. 4th Panzer Army, leaving one tank corps as part of Army Group A, was transferred to Stalingrad. The 3rd Romanian Army was also soon transferred to Stalingrad. Thus, the attack on the Caucasus was carried out by the 1st tank and 17th field armies of the Wehrmacht, as well as the 1st Romanian army corps and cavalry corps.

Initially, the command of the group was entrusted to Field Marshal List. However, within a month, Hitler, dissatisfied with the pace of the offensive, took command. The leadership of Hitler, who was at his headquarters in Rastenburg, was only nominal, dealing with current issues former boss List's headquarters, Hans von Greifenberg. At the end of November, when it became clear that the main events were unfolding not in the Caucasus, but in Stalingrad, command of the group was transferred to the commander of the 1st TA von Kleist. Command of the 1st TA passed to General Regiment. von Mackensen.

Air support was provided by the Luftwaffe's 4th Air Fleet.

German offensive

Chronology

• August 3 - Stavropol fell
• August 7 - Armavir fell
• August 10 - Maykop fell
• August 12 - Krasnodar and Elista fell
• August 21 - the German flag was hoisted on Elbrus
• August 25 - Mozdok fell
• September 11 - most of Novorossiysk is captured, with the exception of the eastern outskirts of the city.
• end of September 1942 - the German offensive was stopped in the Malgobek area

Developments

Having occupied Rostov-on-Don on July 23, 1942, Army Group A began an attack on Kuban. The Germans delivered the most powerful blow with the forces of the 1st and 4th tank armies on the left flank of the Southern Front, where the Soviet 51st and 37th armies were defending. The Soviet armies, having suffered heavy losses, retreated. In the zone of the 18th Soviet Army, German troops broke through to Bataysk, but in the zone of the 12th Soviet Army things were worse for them, and they were never able to cross the Don on the first day. On July 26, the 18th and 37th Soviet armies, reinforced by two divisions, attempted to launch a counterattack to restore the situation on the Don, but this attempt ended in vain.

As a result, already in the first two days of fighting, the situation for Soviet forces in the entire zone of operations of the Southern Front sharply worsened. There was a real threat of a German breakthrough into the Salsk region. With its successful development, German troops were able to cut the Southern Front into two parts and open the way for their tank group to reach the rear of the main forces of the Soviet troops, which continued to hold positions south of Rostov. To prevent this, the Soviet command ordered on the night of July 28 to withdraw the formations of the left wing of the front to a line running along the southern bank of the Kagalnik River and the Manych Canal. German troops, under the cover of large aviation forces, transported formations of seven corps to the left bank of the Don, where overwhelming superiority was created, especially in tank forces and artillery. The troops of the Southern Front were unable to withdraw in an organized manner to the lines indicated by them. The gradual retreat turned into flight. German troops, without encountering serious resistance, began to rapidly advance deeper into the Kuban steppes.

On July 28, the Southern Front was disbanded, and its troops were transferred to the North Caucasus. The front was given the task of stopping the enemy's advance by any means and restoring the situation along the southern bank of the Don. The North Caucasus Front was divided into two operational groups: Don (51st Army, 37th Army, 12th Army and 4th Air Army), which covered the Stavropol direction, and Primorskaya (18th Army, 56th Army). I Army, 47th Army, 1st Rifle Corps, 17th Cavalry Corps and 5th Air Army with the support of the Azov Military Flotilla), which defended in the Krasnodar direction. The 9th and 24th armies were withdrawn to the area of ​​Nalchik and Grozny. The 51st Army was transferred to the Stalingrad Front. At the same time, the German command transferred the 4th Panzer Army to Army Group B.

On August 2, 1942, German troops resumed their attack on Salsk, which developed quite successfully, and on August 5 they captured Voroshilovsk. The 37th Soviet Army retreated beyond the Kalaus and Yankul rivers, and the 12th Army was transferred to the Don Group. In the Krasnodar direction, units of the 17th German Army were unable to immediately break through the defenses of the 18th and 56th Armies. Soviet troops tried to respond with a counterattack, but were soon forced to retreat behind the left bank of the Kuban.

On August 6, the 17th German Army launched an attack on Krasnodar. After fighting with the 56th Soviet Army, the Germans managed to take the city on August 12. On August 10, the Azov military flotilla was evacuated from the Azov coast. The German command, taking advantage of the favorable situation, decided to encircle Soviet troops south of Kuban. On August 6, the 1st German Tank Army captured Armavir, on August 9 - Maykop and continued to advance in the Tuapse direction. On August 12, the Germans occupied Belorechenskaya, and on August 13, Tverskaya. By August 15-17, the advance of German troops was stopped at the Samurskaya, Khadyzhenskaya, south of Klyuchevaya and Stavropolskaya line. Soviet troops managed to stop the 17th Army and prevent it from breaking through to Tuapse.

As a result, during the first stage of the offensive (July 25 - August 19), German troops partially succeeded in fulfilling the tasks assigned to them - inflicting a major defeat on Soviet troops and capturing most of Kuban; The 1st TA advanced east along north side Caucasian ridge to Mozdok. Soviet troops were able to organize resistance to the enemy only on the approaches to Tuapse.

Battles for Novorossiysk, Malgobek and in the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range

To strengthen troops in the Caucasus, from August 1 to 12, the Soviet command regrouped the Transcaucasian Front. Troops of the 44th Army from the region of Makhachkala and Baku were advanced to defensive lines on the Terek, Sulak and Samur rivers. At the same time, 5 rifle divisions, 1 tank brigade, 3 rifle brigades, three artillery regiment, armored train and several other parts. Simultaneously with the organization of the regrouping, significant forces were allocated from the Headquarters reserve to strengthen the troops of the Transcaucasian Front. From August 6 to September, the Transcaucasian Front received 2 guards rifle corps and 11 separate rifle brigades.

On August 19, in the Novorossiysk direction, the German 17th Army went on the offensive, delivering the main attack on Novorossiysk and Anapa and auxiliary attacks on Temryuk and the Taman Peninsula. The Soviet 47th Army, inferior in strength, was able to repel the attack and push back the enemy by August 25. On August 28, German troops resumed the offensive in this direction and captured Anapa on August 31, as a result of which the marine units defending the Taman Peninsula were cut off from the main forces of the 47th Army, and the ships of the Azov military flotilla were forced to break into the Black Sea. On September 11, units of the 17th Army, having captured most of Novorossiysk, were stopped on the southeastern outskirts of the city. In the new offensive, launched from August 19 to 26, the 3rd Romanian Mountain Division was almost completely destroyed. Due to heavy losses on September 26, German troops went on the defensive near Novorossiysk, which lasted more than a year.

On August 23, German troops launched an offensive on Mozdok, while the 23rd German Tank Division attacked Prokhladny and captured it on August 25. Further attempts to advance along the Prokhladny-Ordzhonikidze railway were unsuccessful. On the morning of September 2, the Germans began crossing the Terek in the Mozdok area. Having captured a small bridgehead on the southern bank of the river, German troops struck a strong blow on the night of September 4 and advanced 10 km south of Mozdok. However, at the same time they suffered heavy losses, especially as a result of the actions of Soviet aviation (4th Air Army).

On September 24, German troops, having reinforced the Mozdok group with the SS Viking tank division, removed from the Tuapse direction, went on the offensive through the Elkhotov Gate (along the valley along the Terek) in the direction of Ordzhonikidze and along the Prokhladny - Grozny railway along the Sunzha River valley to Grozny. By September 29, after 4 days of stubborn fighting, German troops captured Terek, Planovskoye, Elkhotovo, Illarionovka, but were unable to advance further than Malgobek and were forced to go on the defensive.

Simultaneously with the battles in the Grozny and Novorossiysk directions, in mid-August, fierce battles began between units of the 46th Army of the Transcaucasian Front on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range, where the German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps and two Romanian mountain rifle divisions acted against them. By mid-August, units of the 1st German Mountain Division approached the Klukhor Pass and Elbrus, where German climbers hoisted the Nazi flag on August 21. At the beginning of September, German troops also captured the Marukh and Sanchar passes.

During the second stage of the German offensive (August 19 - September 29), despite a number of setbacks, on the whole, Soviet troops managed to stop the advances of German troops and prevent them from breaking through into Transcaucasia. The balance of forces also gradually improved in favor of the Soviet troops.

The failure of German troops to break through to Transcaucasia

Preparations for the defense of Transcaucasia

On August 23, GKO member L.P. Beria arrived from Moscow to Tbilisi, who replaced a number of senior officials of the army and front-line apparatus of the Transcaucasian Front, including the commander of the 46th Army. Major General K.N. Leselidze was appointed as the new commander

At that time, the fate of the peoples of the Middle East and Asia was decided on the passes of the Main Caucasus Ridge.

Front aviation received the task of conducting daily air reconnaissance of all passes through the Main Caucasus Range and the roads leading to them from the north.

Measures were also taken to install barriers on the most important pass routes leading to the Black Sea coast. On the Military-Ossetian and Military-Georgian roads, work began to prepare for the collapse of rocks, the destruction of roads and their flooding. In addition to the barrier system, a system was built along these roads defensive structures- defense nodes, strong points, pillboxes and bunkers, trenches and anti-tank ditches. Commandant's offices were created on the main directions and roads, which had reserves of sapper forces, equipment and were equipped with radio stations.

To counter enemy outflanking, special detachments of up to a company strength with a sapper squad were formed, which advanced to possible directions for the outflanking maneuver. For the same purpose, paths that were not covered by troops were undermined. Separate mountain rifle detachments were urgently created, each consisting of a company-battalion. These detachments, which included climber-instructors, were sent to the most inaccessible areas.

Defense of Tuapse

In September 1942, the situation in the Caucasus gradually began to improve in favor of the Soviet troops. This was also facilitated by the failures of the Germans and their allies at Stalingrad. The German command, without additional reserves, could no longer attack simultaneously along the entire front and decided to launch successive attacks, first in the Tuapse direction, then on Ordzhonikidze.

September 25, 1942, after a two-day powerful aerial bombing with the forces of the 4th Aviation Corps, in the direction of Tuapse against the troops of the Soviet Black Sea group (18th Army, 47th Army and 56th Army), the 17th German Army, previously reinforced by two German and two Romanian infantry divisions, went on the offensive, and also by mountain rifle units, united in a divisional group under the command of General Lanz. After 5 days of heavy fighting, German-Romanian troops managed to break through the defenses of the 18th and 56th armies in some areas. The threat of capture loomed over Tuapse. On October 4, the Headquarters gave the order to the troops of the Black Sea group to launch counterattacks from the Rozhet, Maratuk area in the direction of the Red Cemetery and from the Belaya Glina area to Pervomaisky and Khadyzhenskaya. By October 9, German and Romanian troops were stopped in all directions. On October 14, German troops again went on the offensive, pushing back the 18th Army and somewhat pushing back the 56th Army. Soviet troops tried to launch a counterattack on the enemy group, and by October 23, the German-Romanian troops were stopped, and on October 31 they went on the defensive.

On October 25, the German 1st Tank Army went on the offensive in the direction of Nalchik. The fact that they managed to secretly regroup troops played into the hands of the Germans, as a result of which the Soviet command was unprepared for an attack in this direction. Having broken through the weak defenses of the 37th Soviet Army, German troops captured Nalchik on October 27, and Gisel on November 2. In this area, the German command concentrated large tank forces, trying to expand the breakthrough, but was not successful. On November 5, Soviet troops stopped the enemy's advance. Taking advantage of the favorable situation, the Soviet command tried to encircle the Gisela group. On November 11, Gisel was recaptured, but German troops retreated across the Fiagdon River. The last attempt of the German-Romanian troops to break through to the Grozny and Baku oil regions and in Transcaucasia was thwarted.

Having brought up reserves, the 17th German Army tried to break through to Tuapse again and in mid-November went on the offensive. German-Romanian troops managed to penetrate the defenses of the 18th Army up to 8 km deep, but their forces quickly dried up. On November 26, Soviet troops went on the offensive, and with the help of the Black Sea Fleet and the forces of the 5th Air Army, by December 17 they defeated the German group and threw its remnants across the Pshish River. The German command gave the order to go on the defensive along the entire front of the Black Sea Group of Forces.

After an attempted German breakthrough in Transcaucasia, the Soviet command decided to launch counterattacks on German-Romanian troops from the Gisel area in the Mozdok direction. On November 13, units of the 9th Army went on the offensive, but within ten days they were unable to break through the enemy defenses, but only penetrated to a depth of 10 km, reaching the eastern bank of the Ardon and Fiagdon rivers. In connection with these failures and poor command, on November 15, the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Army General I.V. Tyulenev and the commander of the Northern Group of Forces, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov, were summoned to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, who received new tasks - firmly covering the main directions of the Grozny and Ordzhonikidze, strike on both flanks and defeat the Mozdok and Alagir groupings of German troops. On November 27, units of the 9th Army launched an offensive in the general direction of Digora. On December 4, they launched new attacks, but this time they were forced to stop the offensive. According to Soviet historians, the failure of the operation was explained by the unsuccessful choice of the direction of the main attacks. These failures forced the Soviet command to postpone a major counteroffensive in the Mozdok direction until January.

Results of the 1st stage of the Battle for the Caucasus

The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus took place from July to December 1942. German-Romanian troops, having suffered heavy losses, managed to reach the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range and the Terek River. However, in general, the German Edelweiss plan failed. In total, during the 1st stage of the battle, Army Group A lost almost 100 thousand people killed; The Germans failed to break through to Transcaucasia and the Middle East. Türkiye never decided to enter the war on the side of the Third Reich.

One of the factors in the failure of the Germans in the Caucasus was that the German command paid main attention to the battle of Stalingrad, where events unfolded in a far from favorable way for the Wehrmacht. In September 1942, with the task of protecting the flanks of Army Group B at Stalingrad, the 3rd Romanian Army was transferred from the Caucasus direction. In December 1942, due to the failures at Stalingrad, some German formations were also withdrawn from the Caucasian front, as a result of which the German group in the Caucasus weakened even more, and by the beginning of 1943 it began to yield to Soviet troops in numbers - as in personnel, and in technology and weapons.

Alignment of forces in the 2nd stage of the battle

USSR

• Transcaucasian Front (commander - I.V. Tyulenev). By January 1, 1943, it included the 9th Army, 18th Army, 37th Army, 44th Army, 46th Army, 47th Army, 56th Army, 58th Army, 4th Kuban Guards Cavalry Corps and 5th Don Guards Cavalry Corps. Front aviation consisted of the 4th Air Army and the 5th Air Army. The front troops were divided into two groups: Northern and Black Sea. On January 24, the Northern Group of Forces was transformed into the North Caucasus Front. On February 6, the Black Sea Group of Forces was also included in the North Caucasus Front, after which the 45th Army, the 13th Rifle Corps, the 15th Cavalry Corps and the 75th Rifle Division remained as part of the Transcaucasian Front.
• Southern Front (commander - A.I. Eremenko). By January 1, 1943, it included the 28th Army, the 51st Army, the 5th Shock Army and the 2nd Guards Army. Front aviation consisted of the 8th Air Army.
• The North Caucasus Front (commander - I. I. Maslennikov, from May 1943 - I. E. Petrov) was formed on January 24 from the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front. It included the 9th Army, 37th Army, 44th Army, 4th Kuban Guards Cavalry Corps, 5th Don Guards Cavalry Corps and 4th Air Army. On February 6, the 44th Army was transferred to the Southern Front.
• Black Sea Fleet (commander - F. S. Oktyabrsky). It also included the Azov military flotilla. The fleet consisted of 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, a leader, 7 destroyers, 29 submarines, 69 torpedo boats, as well as other small warships. The Black Sea Fleet Air Force had 248 aircraft.

Germany and allies

• Army Group “A” (commander - E. von Kleist). It included the 17th Army and the 1st Tank Army - a total of 32 infantry, 3 tank and 3 motorized divisions. Aviation support was provided by the 4th Air Fleet, which had 900 aircraft. At the beginning of February 1943, the 1st Tank Army, having successfully avoided encirclement, left the Kuban in the Azov region and no longer took part in the battles in the Kuban.
• The combined German-Romanian-Italian naval forces on the Black Sea consisted of 1 auxiliary cruiser, 7 destroyers and destroyers, 12 submarines, 18 torpedo boats and a significant number of small warships.

By the beginning of 1943, the strategic situation in the Caucasian direction of the Soviet-German front was favorable for the encirclement and complete defeat of a large German group in the North Caucasus. The troops of the Stalingrad Front (January 1, 1943, renamed the Southern Front), as a result of the successful development of events in the Battle of Stalingrad, reached the Loznoy - Priyutnoye line by the beginning of 1943, creating a threat to the rear of the German group in the Caucasus. This circumstance forced Hitler to allow the command of Army Group A to plan measures to prepare a withdrawal on the condition that they would not weaken the strength of the resistance. The idea of ​​the operation of the Soviet command was to use coordinated strikes by troops of the Southern and Transcaucasian fronts from the northeast, south and southwest to dismember and defeat the main forces of Army Group “A”, preventing its withdrawal from the North Caucasus.

On January 1, 1943, the troops of the Southern Front went on the offensive in the Rostov and Salsk directions. The German 1st Tank Army, trying to avoid encirclement, began to retreat in the direction of Stavropol under the cover of strong rearguards. On January 3, the troops of the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front went on the offensive (44th Army, 9th Army, 37th Army, 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps, 5th Guards Don Cossack Cavalry Corps and 4th Air Army) . Pursuing the enemy, the 58th Army captured Mozdok and, together with formations of the Northern Group, began pursuing the enemy along the entire 320-kilometer front. However, German units managed to break away from the Soviet troops. This was facilitated by the fact that the persecution began two days late and was carried out without proper determination and organization. The control of the connections was disrupted, the parts were mixed up. In three days, the troops of the Northern Group advanced in some areas only 25-60 km. Developing the pursuit, formations of the Northern Group, with the support of the 4th Air Army, liberated the cities of Georgievsk, Mineralnye Vody, Pyatigorsk and Kislovodsk by mid-January.

Due to the not very successful offensive of the Soviet army, the Germans managed to retreat in an organized manner to the fortified defense line along the Kuma and Zolka rivers, where from January 8 to 10, the troops of the Northern Group had to fight stubborn battles. Only on January 21, the 44th Army, with the support of partisans, liberated Stavropol. On January 23, the cavalry-mechanized group reached the Salsk area, making a 200-kilometer throw, where it connected with the approaching units of the 28th Army of the Southern Front. On January 24, the Northern Group of Forces was transformed into the North Caucasus Front, which received the task of using the troops of the right wing (44th, 58th armies and cavalry-mechanized group) to develop an attack on Tikhoretsk, the village of Kushchevskaya, and defeat the retreating units of the German 1st tank army and, in cooperation with units of the Southern Front, capture Bataysk, Azov and Rostov-on-Don. The German command, trying to avoid encirclement of its troops, sent units of the 4th Tank Army of Army Group Don against the Southern Front. Southern Front forces for successful implementation The operation and encirclement of German units was not enough. Meanwhile, the troops of the 37th Army, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, began to bypass Krasnodar from the north, and by February 4 reached the line 30-40 km northeast of Krasnodar in the Razdolnaya and Voronezhskaya areas. The troops of the North Caucasus Front almost came close to the Sea of ​​Azov in the areas of Novobataysk, Yeisk and Yasenka.

The forces of the Black Sea Group (46th Army, 18th Army, 47th Army, 56th Army, 5th Air Army) of the Transcaucasian Front also failed to regroup and go on the offensive on time. On January 11-12, in the auxiliary direction from the area northeast of Tuapse, strike groups of the 46th and 18th armies went on the offensive. The German 17th Army managed to repel the initial attacks. The offensive of the 56th Army developed more successfully - in seven days of fighting it broke through the German defenses in the Goryachiy Klyuch area and, having advanced 30 km, reached the closest approaches to Krasnodar. In order to prevent German troops from leaving for Crimea through the Kerch Strait, the Supreme High Command Headquarters ordered the Black Sea Group of the Transcaucasian Front to capture Novorossiysk with its main forces and liberate the Taman Peninsula, and to reach the Krasnodar region with right-flank formations. On January 29, Maikop was liberated. By February 4, the troops of the Black Sea Group reached the line of the Kuban River and the area of ​​the Ust-Labinskaya village.

In general, German troops managed to avoid encirclement and retreat to the western part Krasnodar region and to the area north of Rostov. Despite this, the results of the North Caucasus operation were of great political significance. The plans of the German command for a further offensive in the Caucasus, for which it now did not have the strength, were thwarted.

Fighting in Kuban

At the beginning of February, the Soviet command set new tasks for its troops and regrouped its troops. The 44th Army and the cavalry-mechanized group were included in the Southern Front, and the Black Sea Group of Forces was transferred to the North Caucasus Front. The remaining troops of the Transcaucasian Front received the task of guarding the Black Sea coast, the Soviet-Turkish border and leading troops in Transcaucasia and Iran. The North Caucasus Front received the task of defeating the Krasnodar-Novorossiysk group of German troops.

From January 26 to February 6, the 47th Soviet Army unsuccessfully tried to break through the German defenses in order to capture Novorossiysk. To help the ground forces, on February 4, the Black Sea Fleet landed an amphibious assault in the Novorossiysk area. During fierce battles, the bridgehead was expanded to 28 square meters. km, and additional units were sent to it, including the 18th Army.

On February 7, the troops of the Southern Front went on the offensive with the goal of capturing the cities of Bataysk and Rostov-on-Don. By the morning of February 8, Bataysk was liberated, and formations of the 28th Soviet Army reached the left bank of the Don. Planning to encircle German troops in the Rostov-on-Don area, the Soviet command moved the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies to bypass the city from the northeast, and the 44th Army and a cavalry-mechanized group from the southwest. German troops managed to avoid encirclement and retreat to a previously fortified position on the river line. Mius (see Mius-front). On February 13, Soviet troops entered Rostov.

On February 9, the troops of the North Caucasus Front launched an offensive against Krasnodar. Best of luck In the first days of the offensive, the 37th Army succeeded, which managed to break the defending enemy and create a threat to his troops near Krasnodar. On February 12, Krasnodar was captured by the 12th and 46th Soviet armies. The German command began to withdraw its troops to the Taman Peninsula, while at the same time, with the support of aviation, launching counterattacks on Soviet forces, of which the 58th Army suffered the most. The Soviet fleet and aviation tried to completely paralyze communications between German formations on the Taman Peninsula and in the Crimea, but this task was not accomplished. In the second half of February, the resistance of the German troops, the basis of which was the 17th Army, increased sharply.

On February 23, the forces of the North Caucasus Front launched a new offensive, but it did not bring the expected result. From February 28 to March 4, troops of the German 17th Army, supported by aviation, launched strong counterattacks, especially in the 58th Army zone, and partially managed to push it back. The attacks of the Soviet 37th and 9th armies forced the Germans to begin retreating to a prepared defense line on the night of March 9. During the pursuit of the retreating 17th Army, Soviet troops captured important defense centers and by mid-March reached a new defensive line of German troops 60-70 km west of Krasnodar, but were unable to break through it. On March 16, the troops of the North Caucasus Front went on the defensive and began preparing a new offensive operation with the goal of defeating German troops on the Taman Peninsula.

The German command created a powerful defense center in the area of ​​the Krymskaya village. Two German infantry and a Romanian infantry, previously in reserve, were additionally transferred here. cavalry division. Not having sufficient forces to hold the Taman bridgehead, the German command hoped to disrupt the impending offensive of the Soviet troops with the help of aviation forces. For this purpose, up to 1 thousand combat aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet were concentrated at the airfields of the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula. Additional aviation forces were transferred here from other fronts.

On April 4, the troops of the North Caucasus Front went on the offensive, but immediately ran into stubborn resistance from German-Romanian troops. German aircraft dealt particularly strong blows. Taking advantage of the temporary lull on April 17, a large German group went on the offensive with the goal of eliminating the Soviet bridgehead in the Myskhako area and destroying the 18th Army. To repel the offensive, the Soviet command attracted large aviation forces - units of the 8th and 17th Air Armies were additionally brought into this area. From April 17 to 24, a major air battle took place in the skies over Kuban, which was won by Soviet aviation. Taking advantage of the victory in the air, units of the 18th Army restored the situation in the Myskhako area by April 30.

From the beginning of April to May, Soviet troops continued to carry out attacks with the aim of defeating the enemy group on the Taman Peninsula. On May 4, troops of the 56th Army liberated the village of Krymskaya, an important communications hub on the Taman Peninsula. At the beginning of June, Soviet troops, at the direction of Headquarters, went on the defensive, without fully completing the assigned task.

Decisive battles on the Taman Peninsula

In the summer of 1943, there was a lull in the Kuban sector. In order to hold the Taman bridgehead, the Germans erected a defensive line - the so-called. "blue line". Fighting on the Blue Line lasted from February to September 1943.

The total strength of the Taman group of German-Romanian troops, which included the 17th Army and part of the forces of the 1st Tank Army, reached 400 thousand people.

Landing on Malaya Zemlya

On February 4-15, 1943, a landing operation was carried out in the Novorossiysk area. Its goal was to assist the troops advancing north of Novorossiysk. The main landing force was planned to land in the area of ​​South Ozereyka, a demonstrative (auxiliary) landing on west bank Tsemes Bay, in the area of ​​the Novorossiysk suburb - Stanichki. The landing was provided by ships of the Black Sea Fleet. Aviation support was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet Air Force (137 aircraft) and the 5th Air Army (30 aircraft). On the night of February 4, 1943, landings began in the designated areas. However, due to a strong storm, it was not possible to land the main landing force in full strength in the South Ozereyka area. Events unfolded more successfully in the area of ​​the auxiliary landing: Caesar Kunikov’s detachment managed to occupy a small bridgehead in the Stanichka area. Along with the troops, partisans from the Novorossiysk group of partisan detachments landed on the bridgehead under the command of the secretary of the Novorossiysk city committee of the CPSU (b) P. I. Vasev. The demonstration landing became the main one. The bridgehead was expanded to 4 km along the front and to 2.5 km in depth, and subsequently it received the name “Malaya Zemlya” (a section of terrain on the western shore of the Novorossiysk (Tsemes) Bay and southern outskirts Novorossiysk), where from February 4 to September 16, 1943, Soviet troops fought heroic battles. On the bridgehead, according to eyewitnesses, there was “not a meter of area where a bomb, a mine or a shell would not fall” (Brezhnev).

Evacuation of the Blue Line

The successful offensive of Soviet troops in Ukraine in the spring of 1943 put the Taman group of the Wehrmacht in a difficult situation. On September 3, 1943, Hitler gave the order to withdraw troops from Kuban. The evacuation continued until October 9. Despite all the efforts of the Red Army to prevent this, 260 thousand soldiers, 70 thousand horses, all equipment, artillery and food supplies were transported through the Kerch Strait to Crimea. Only fodder for the horses had to be left. The troops withdrawn from Taman were sent to defend the Perekop isthmuses of Crimea.

The Soviet offensive began on the night of September 10 with an amphibious landing in the port of Novorossiysk. Units of the 18th Army went on the offensive east and south of the city. On the night of September 11, the second echelon of troops was landed. On the same day, the troops of the 9th Army went on the offensive, striking at Temryuk, and on September 14, the troops of the 56th Army, operating on the central sector of the front. On September 15, the eastern and western groups of the 18th Army united in Novorossiysk, and the next day the city was completely liberated.

By October 9, the 56th Army captured the entire northern part of the peninsula and reached the Kerch Strait. This completely ended the fighting in the Caucasus.

Results of the 2nd stage of the Battle for the Caucasus

In general, the second stage of the battle in the Caucasus was quite successful for the Soviet troops. Kalmykia, Checheno-Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Rostov region, Stavropol Territory, Cherkessk Autonomous Okrug, Karachay Autonomous Okrug and Adygei Autonomous Okrug. The Maikop oil fields, as well as the most important agricultural areas of the country, were returned to the control of the Soviet government.

After the return of Soviet power to the Caucasus, on charges of mass collaboration and in order to eliminate the anti-Soviet detachments still operating in the rear, the following peoples were completely deported to Siberia and Central Asia: Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars, Kalmyks. The autonomies of these peoples were eliminated.

The victory in the Battle of the Caucasus strengthened the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, and close cooperation between ground forces, aviation, navy and partisans was achieved. Thousands of soldiers were awarded the medal “For the Defense of the Caucasus,” established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 1, 1944.

For skillful leadership of troops during the battles for the Caucasus and Kuban, on February 1, 1943, the commander of the German troops in the Kuban, E. von Kleist, was promoted to the rank of field marshal.

In February 1943, a group of Soviet climbers from the 46th Army removed German flags from the peaks of Elbrus and installed USSR flags (on February 13, 1943, the Soviet flag was hoisted on the western peak by a group led by N. Gusak, and on February 17, 1943 on Eastern, a group led by A. Gusev).

Defense of the Caucasus (Battle for the Caucasus) is a major defensive-offensive operation of Soviet troops during the second period of the Great Patriotic War in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.

• From July 25 to December 31, 1942, an offensive was carried out by the Germans, who managed to capture part of the territories;
• From December 31 to October 9, 1943, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, recaptured territory and forced German troops to retreat.

By the beginning of autumn 1942, German troops were able to conquer most of the Kuban and North Caucasus, but after the defeat at Stalingrad they were forced to retreat again, as they suffered serious losses and feared that Soviet troops would encircle them. In 1943, the Soviet army planned an operation, as a result of which German troops were to be surrounded in the Kuban territory and defeated, but the operation failed - the Germans were evacuated to Crimea.

Background and balance of power

By June 1942, the Soviet army was in a weakened state after the failure at Kharkov. The German command, seeing that the Soviet troops could not provide worthy resistance, decided to launch an offensive in the Caucasus, taking advantage of the situation. After a series of battles, German troops were able to conquer several cities, including Rostov-on-Don, which opened the way for Hitler to the Caucasus.

The Caucasus, like Ukraine, was a very important strategic point that German troops sought to capture as early as possible. The Caucasus and Kuban contained large reserves of Soviet oil, grain and other crops, which could provide serious support for the German army to conduct further battles on the territory of the USSR. In addition, Hitler hoped that by reaching the sea he would be able to turn to Turkey for help. Moreover, the German command also counted on the help of the residents themselves, since they were aware that part of the local population did not accept Soviet power.

After the fall of Rostov-on-Don, communication between the Soviet command and the Caucasus could only be carried out by sea or by rail passing through Stalingrad. That is why Stalingrad became an important point that the Germans needed to capture. Despite the fact that Hitler threw enormous forces into the fight at Stalingrad, he was never able to take the city. The Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad. They suffered significant losses and, largely thanks to this, later they never managed to conquer the Caucasus.

Progress in the defense of the Caucasus

The battle took place in two stages. During the first stage, the German army, not without difficulty, managed to take a number of cities: Stavropol, Armavir, Maykop, Krasnodar, Elista, Mozdok and part of Novorossiysk. In September 1942, the German army approached the Malgobek area, where it was stopped by Soviet troops.

The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus took place from July to December 1942. The German army was able to approach the foothills of the Caucasus Range and the Terek River, but this victory was not easy - Hitler’s troops suffered colossal losses. The original plan to capture Transcaucasia was never completed, despite the fact that the Germans were still leading in this operation - Soviet troops were able to stop the German offensive in time and force the army to stop fighting, since most of the army was simply destroyed. Turkey also failed, because it never decided to enter the war and come to the aid of Hitler.

The German offensive failed largely due to the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad. Hitler, who had too high hopes for the capture of this city, simply did not foresee the possibility that the Soviet army could defend Stalingrad and, therefore, one of the routes to the Caucasus.

As a result of numerous losses, by the beginning of 1943 the German army was numerically inferior to the Soviet army several times.

The second stage of the battle for the Caucasus can be considered a counter-offensive of Soviet troops, which became extremely successful for the Soviet Union. Territories previously captured by the Germans were recaptured, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Rostov region, Stavropol Territory and other areas were completely liberated. Oil fields and grain crops were again returned to the control of the Soviet Union, which gave a colossal advantage in the war.

Despite the fact that the Soviet army was able to achieve serious successes, it cannot be considered that the victory definitely belonged to the Soviet Union, since the main goal that Stalin set for his army - to capture and destroy the Germans in Kuban - was never achieved. The German army fled to Crimea, however, despite this, the Caucasus returned again to the command of the USSR.

The meaning and results of the battle for the Caucasus

The successes of the Soviet Union in the battle for the Caucasus can be considered one of the most important parts of the general counter-offensive of the USSR in the second period of the war. At this time, the Soviet army not only began to recapture its territories and return captured people, but also greatly increased its combat power and could engage in battles with the German army on equal terms. Return to the control of the USSR such an important strategic point how the Caucasus can be considered one of the greatest victories of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, the battle for the Caucasus had Negative consequences. Part of the population was accused of assisting the enemy and many of the local residents were later exiled to Siberia.

With the victory at Stalingrad and the battle in the Caucasus, the victorious march of the Soviet Union in the Second World War began.

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Battle for the Caucasus (defensive period from July 25 to December 31, 1942)

Year after year, the events of the Great Patriotic War move further and further away from us. The means of armed struggle and views on its conduct are changing. However, its results, the most important lessons, still have enormous theoretical and practical significance. The experience accumulated by the Soviet Armed Forces in the fight against German aggressors is an inexhaustible source for the further development of domestic military science. In this regard, the modern generation of commanders needs to deeply study and carefully select from the past everything that has not lost value even today, that can be creatively used in training troops.

During the years of the last war, the Soviet Armed Forces carried out offensive and defensive strategic operations as a set of coordinated and interconnected strikes, operations and combat operations of associations and formations of various types of armed forces in order to achieve strategic goals. The main criteria on the basis of which a particular operation can be classified as strategic include the following: the solution of important strategic tasks and the achievement of major military-political goals, the large spatial scope of combat operations and the participation in them of a significant number of forces and means, as well as planning by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) and coordination of the actions of fronts, fleet forces and other types of armed forces by its representatives. All these criteria can be fully attributed to one of the battles of the Great Patriotic War - the battle for the Caucasus.

The battle for the Caucasus was one of the longest in the Great Patriotic War. It lasted 442 days (from July 25, 1942 to October 9, 1943) and went down in the history of military art as a complex of defensive and offensive operations carried out over a vast territory in difficult conditions of steppe, mountainous and mountain-wooded terrain, in coastal areas . Its content included the North Caucasus strategic defensive operation, which lasted more than five months, the North Caucasus strategic offensive operation, the Novorossiysk landing operation, the Krasnodar and Novorossiysk-Taman offensive operations, lasting a total of more than nine months. During these operations, troops of the Southern, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts, together with units of internal and border troops People's Commissariat Internal Affairs (NKVD), in cooperation with the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov and Caspian military flotillas, in fierce battles and battles, they exhausted the formations of the German Army Group “A”, stopped their advance and, having defeated them, expelled them from the Caucasus.

The task is to stop the enemy, wear him down defensive battles…

In the strategic plans of the German leadership, the capture of the Caucasus, where before the war up to 95% of all oil in the USSR was produced, was given an important place. At a meeting in Poltava in June 1942, Hitler said: “If we fail to capture the oil of Maikop and Grozny, then we will have to stop the war!” That is why, apparently, the German command’s plan to Soviet-German front in the summer of 1942, it envisaged delivering the main attack in the Caucasian direction with a simultaneous attack on Stalingrad.

The plan for the operation, codenamed “Edelweiss,” was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov and seize the North Caucasus. In the future, it was envisaged that one group of troops would bypass the Main Caucasus Range from the west and capture Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and the other would attack from the east with the goal of capturing Grozny and Baku. Simultaneously with this bypass maneuver, it was planned to overcome the ridge in its central part through passes with access to the regions of Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi. With a breakthrough in Transcaucasia, the enemy hoped to paralyze the bases of the Black Sea Fleet, achieve complete dominance in the Black Sea, establish direct contact with the Turkish army and thereby create the preconditions for an invasion of the Near and Middle East.

To solve such large-scale problems, the German command concentrated Army Group A (commander Field Marshal V. List) in the Caucasian direction, consisting of the German 1st, 4th Tank, 17th and 11th armies, 3rd Romanian army. They were supported by units of the 4th Air Fleet. In total, Army Group A consisted of over 170 thousand people, 1130 tanks, about 4.5 thousand guns and mortars, and up to 1 thousand aircraft. At this time, the 6th Army from Army Group B was aimed at Stalingrad.

These groups had high combat effectiveness and were impressed by recent victories. Many of their formations took part in the defeat of Soviet troops near Kharkov and southwest of Voronezh; in the June battles, moving towards the lower reaches of the Don, they immediately captured a number of bridgeheads on its left bank.

The German Army Group A was opposed by the troops of the Southern and part of the forces of the North Caucasus fronts. At first glance, they included many armies - the 51st, 37th, 12th, 18th, 56th combined arms and 4th air force. However, all of these armies, except the 51st, suffered significant losses in previous battles and numbered only 112 thousand people, 120 tanks, about 2,200 guns and mortars and 130 aircraft. They were inferior to the enemy in men by 1.5 times, in guns and mortars by 2 times, in tanks by more than 9 times, and in aviation by almost 8 times. To this must be added the lack of stable control of formations and units, which was disrupted during their hasty retreat to the Don.

The Soviet troops faced a very difficult task stop the enemy, exhaust him in defensive battles and prepare the conditions for going on the offensive. Back on July 10-11, 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the Southern and North Caucasian fronts to organize defense along the river. Don. However, the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the fronts was complicated by the fact that the armies of the Southern Front fought intense battles with the advancing large German forces in the Rostov direction. They essentially had neither the time nor the means to prepare the defense of the left bank of the Don.

By this time, troop control in the Caucasian direction had not been restored. In addition, the close attention of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff at this time was paid to the Stalingrad direction, where the enemy was rushing towards the Volga.

Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the armies of the Southern Front (commanded by Lieutenant General R.Ya. Malinovsky) by July 25 retreated to the southern bank of the Don in a strip 330 km long, from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the river. They were weakened and outnumbered, with only 17 tanks. Some of them had no contact with front headquarters.

Troops of the North Caucasus Front under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny, meanwhile, continued to defend the coasts of the Azov and Black Seas to Lazarevskaya, and the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, led by Army General I.V. Tyulenev, covered the Black Sea coast from Lazarevskaya to Batumi, the border with Turkey and provided communications for Soviet troops in Iran. The 44th Army was located in the Makhachkala region and covered the coast of the Caspian Sea.

The Black Sea Fleet (commanded by Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky), after the loss of Sevastopol and Kerch, was based in the ports of the Caucasus coast, which were in the zone of action of German aviation. It was supposed to interact with ground forces in the defense of coastal areas, provide sea transportation, and also strike at enemy sea communications.

In such extremely unfavorable conditions for the Soviet troops, the North Caucasus strategic defensive operation unfolded.

North Caucasus strategic defensive operation

On July 26, 1942, the enemy, having begun active operations, began to intensively transport its units to the southern bank of the Don. In the current situation, Headquarters is taking measures to repel the enemy’s offensive. In order to combine efforts and improve command and control of troops in the North Caucasus, the armies of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts were united into one North Caucasian Front under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny. The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were operationally subordinate to him. The newly created front was given the task of stopping the enemy's advance and restoring the situation along the left bank of the Don. Such a task was practically impossible, since the enemy had complete initiative and was conducting an organized offensive with superior forces. In addition, it turned out to be extremely difficult to ensure control of the combat operations of front troops in a strip more than 1000 km long. Therefore, the Headquarters allocated two operational groups as part of the North Caucasus Front: Don, led by Lieutenant General R.Ya. Malinovsky and Primorskaya, led by Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko.

The troops of the Transcaucasian Front received the task of occupying and preparing for defense the approaches to the Caucasus from the north. In this regard, the Front Military Council developed a combat action plan, which Headquarters approved on August 4. Its essence was to stop the enemy’s advance at the Terek line and the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. The troops of the 44th Army were entrusted with the defense of Baku and Grozny, covering the Georgian Military and Ossetian Military roads. The defense of the Black Sea coast was entrusted to the 46th Army.

The fighting in the North Caucasus at the end of July - beginning of August took on an extremely dynamic character. Possessing numerical superiority and command of the initiative, the German corps quickly advanced towards Stavropol, Maikop and Tuapse. Under these conditions, in order to restore the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops and ensure the defense of the Caucasus from the north, on August 8, Headquarters united the 44th and 9th armies into the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front, and on August 11, it included the 37th Army. Lieutenant General I.I. was appointed commander of the group. Maslennikov. An important place was also given to strengthening cover in the direction of Maikop, Tuapse, as well as the defense of Novorossiysk. The measures taken since mid-August had a positive effect on increasing resistance to the enemy.

Nevertheless, the enemy had sufficient forces to develop a simultaneous offensive both in the direction of Baku and Batumi by formations of the 1st Tank and 17th Field Armies, and to capture the passes of the Main Caucasus Range by units of the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps. At the end of August, the Germans managed to capture Mozdok, and they intended to develop an offensive against Grozny. However, this plan was thwarted by active defensive actions of the Soviet troops.

In mid-August, intense fighting broke out in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range. At first, they were clearly not in favor of the Soviet troops, who poorly organized defense in the foothills. The Germans, with forces specially trained for operations in the mountains, were able to quickly capture almost all the passes west of Mount Elbrus, creating a threat to access to Sukhumi and coastal communications. After the intervention of the Headquarters in the course of hostilities and its demands to strengthen the defense of the Georgian Military and Ossetian Military roads, the situation here improved somewhat. The enemy, repelling counterattacks from formations of the Northern Group of Forces, was forced to go on the defensive.

At the same time, there were battles near Novorossiysk and Tuapse. By mid-September the enemy managed to capture most of Novorossiysk, but his attempts to break through to Tuapse along the coast were thwarted. Back on September 1, the Headquarters made an important organizational decision - to unite the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts. The united front was called the Transcaucasian Front. The Directorate of the North Caucasus Front formed the basis of the Black Sea Group of the Transcaucasian Front, which significantly increased the stability of defense on the coastal section of the front.

In October-December, the German command again attempted to conduct an offensive in the Tuapse and Grozny directions, however, having encountered stubborn resistance from Soviet troops, it was unable to achieve noticeable success.

In the autumn months of 1942, the armies of the Transcaucasian Front, having received reinforcements, significantly intensified their actions, launching a series of counterattacks that forced the enemy to constantly change their intentions and more and more often go on the defensive. Gradually the situation stabilized, and then the initiative began to shift to the side of the Soviet troops.

During the North Caucasus strategic defensive operation (July 25 - December 31, 1942), troops of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts, forces of the Black Sea Fleet carried out Armaviro-Maikop (August 6-17), Novorossiysk (August 19 - September 26), Mozdok -Malgobek (September 1-28), Tuapse (September 25 - December 20), Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze (October 25 - November 11) defensive operations. As a result, their enemy was stopped east of Mozdok, on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range, in the southeastern part of Novorossiysk. Intense battles were fought at a front from 320 to 1000 km and to a depth of 400 to 800 km.

Defensive Operations were carried out in extremely difficult conditions and in conditions unfavorable for the Soviet troops. The enemy managed to achieve significant successes during these battles, capture the rich agricultural regions of the Don and Kuban, the Taman Peninsula, reach the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range, capturing part of its passes. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops, having withstood the powerful onslaught of the enemy, solved the main problem - they stopped and did not allow the Germans to access the Baku and Grozny oil. In stubborn defensive battles they inflicted on the enemy major losses, bleeding his strike force dry.

It is necessary to note the great role of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff in directing military operations in the Caucasus. Their special attention was focused on restoring the stability of the command and control system and immediately taking measures to improve it. Despite the difficult situation in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, Headquarters in every possible way strengthened the troops of the North Caucasus direction with its reserves. Thus, from July to October 1942, the fronts operating in the Caucasus received about 100 thousand marching reinforcements, a significant number of formations and units of military branches and special troops, a considerable amount of weapons and equipment.

The defense of the Caucasus took place in the difficult conditions of the mountain theater, which required the troops to master specific forms and methods of fighting with the use of all types of weapons. The troops gained experience in conducting combat operations in different directions, building deep-echelon combat formations, and interacting with all branches of the military. The organization of formations and units was improved. They were reinforced with engineering equipment, transport, including pack vehicles, equipped with mountain equipment, and received more radio stations.

During defensive operations, the ground forces interacted with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla, whose ships covered their flanks from the sea, supported them with naval and coastal artillery fire, carried out anti-landing defense of the coast, and disrupted the enemy’s supply by sea.

In addition, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov, Volga and Caspian military flotillas provided great assistance to the troops, carrying out sea transportation of reserves, delivery of military cargo, timely evacuation of the wounded and material assets. In the second half of 1942, the fleet transported more than 200 thousand people and 250 thousand tons of various cargo, sank 51 enemy ships with a total displacement of 120 thousand tons.

In November 1942, the enemy's offensive capabilities in the Caucasus were depleted, and the activity of Soviet troops increased noticeably. There was a turning point in the course of the battle, which was greatly facilitated by sudden change the situation near Stalingrad, where the troops of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts, which went on a counter-offensive, surrounded a large enemy group and were preparing to eliminate it.

As a result of defensive operations carried out by Soviet troops in the Caucasus, the enemy was seriously defeated, and the initiative in this strategic direction began to pass into the hands of the Soviet command. Despite the fact that in the Caucasian direction, enemy troops managed to occupy a significant part of the territory of the North Caucasus, they were unable to overcome the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops, seize the oil sources of the Grozny and Baku regions and other sources of valuable strategic raw materials. In addition, the plans of the Hitlerite leadership, through a breakthrough in Transcaucasia, to draw Turkey into the war against the USSR, to unite with their troops operating in North Africa, and to continue aggression towards the Middle East, failed. Soviet command in a difficult situation, it preserved some naval bases that supported the operations of the fleet, and also created the conditions for the troops to go on a decisive offensive. The plans of the fascist German command to seize the Caucasus were thwarted by the efforts of the Soviet Armed Forces with the active assistance of the entire Soviet people, including the peoples of the Caucasus.

The defense of the Caucasus, undoubtedly, was an important source of development of domestic military science. Defensive operations carried out by Soviet troops even today represent a certain instructiveness, practical significance and special relevance for military theory and practices in preserving the independence and integrity of the Fatherland.

Sergey Grebenyuk, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Head of the Department of the Research Institute (Military History) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces