Tragedy of the Crimean Front

Possession of the Crimean peninsula was of strategic importance. Hitler called it a Soviet unsinkable aircraft carrier threatening Romanian oil.

October 18, 1941The 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of Infantry General Erich von Manstein began an operation to seize Crimea. After ten days of stubborn fighting, the Germans reached operational space. TO November 16, 1941 all of Crimea, except Sevastopol, was occupied.

December 26, 1941started Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. The troops of the Soviet 51st and 44th armies of the Transcaucasian Front recaptured the Kerch Peninsula, advancing to 100-110 km behind 8 days.

Soviet troops stopped January 2, 1942 at the line Kiet - Novaya Pokrovka - Koktebel. The Soviet 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades and 2 tank battalions were opposed there by one German infantry division, a reinforced infantry regiment and Romanian mountain and cavalry brigades.

Mansteinwrote in his memoirs:

“If the enemy took advantage of the created situation and began to quickly pursue the 46th Infantry Division, and also decisively hit the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a hopeless situation would have been created not only for this new section of the 11th Army’s front. The fate of the entire 11th Army would have been decided 1st Army. A more decisive enemy could have paralyzed all the army's supplies with a rapid breakthrough on Dzhankoy. Troops recalled from Sevastopol– 170th and 132nd PD– could arrive in the area west or north-west of Feodosia no earlier than 14 days later."

The command of the Transcaucasian Front nevertheless planned to carry out operations to liberate Crimea. The operation plan was reported to the People's Commissar of Defense January 1, 1942. The attack of the motorized mechanized group (2 tank brigades and a cavalry division) and the 51st Army (4 rifle divisions and 2 brigades) was planned to reach Perekop, where it was planned to drop an airborne assault force in advance. 44th Army (3 rifle divisions) - reach Simferopol. Two mountain rifle divisions were to strike along the Black Sea coast. The Primorsky Army was supposed to pin down the enemy near Sevastopol and land troops in Yevpatoria, followed by a direction to Simferopol. General task–destruction of all enemy forces in Crimea. The operation began on January 8-12, 1942.

However, the operation was not started on time, and January 15, 1942 The Germans and Romanians launched a counterattack, recapturing Feodosia on January 18. Soviet troops were pushed back 10-20 km, to the Karpacz Isthmus.

February 27, 1942The Soviet offensive began both from Sevastopol and from the Karpacz Isthmus. There, Soviet 7 rifle divisions and 2 brigades, and several tank battalions acted against 3 German and 1 Romanian infantry divisions. The second echelon of Soviet troops included 6 rifle divisions, one cavalry division and two tank brigades. The Romanian division on the northern flank retreated again to Kiet, 10 km. March 3, 1942 the front stabilized - now it arched to the west.

On March 13, 1942, Soviet troops (8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades) again went on the offensive. The Germans held out, and on March 20, 1942 they tried to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 22nd Panzer Division (which had just been reorganized from an infantry division) and two infantry divisions. The Germans were repulsed.

On March 26, 1942, four Soviet divisions attempted to advance, but were in turn repulsed.

The last attempt at a Soviet offensive in Crimea was April 9-11, 1942.

“There will be no increase in the forces of the Crimean Front at the present time. Therefore, the troops of the Crimean Front will firmly gain a foothold on the occupied lines, improving their defensive structures in engineering terms and improving the tactical position of the troops in individual sectors, in particular by capturing the Koi-Asan node.”

By this time, the Crimean Front included 16 rifle divisions and 3 brigades, a cavalry division, 4 tank brigades, and 9 artillery reinforcement regiments. The front had 225 bombers and 176 fighters (serviceable). The enemy had 5 German infantry and 1 tank divisions, 2 Romanian infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, as well as the Groddeck motorized brigade, which consisted mainly of Romanian units under the command of the German headquarters.

With such a balance of forces (Manstein assessed Soviet superiority in forces as double) the Germans and Romanians crossed May 8, 1942 on the offensive.

Mansteindecided to reverse the factor of the numerical superiority of Soviet troops in St. oh good. The front line consisted of two sections. The southern section from Koi-Asan to the Black Sea coast (8 km) consisted of well-equipped (since January 1942) Soviet defensive positions, occupied by the 44th Army. The northern section from Koi-Asan to Kiet (16 km) curved to the west. The Soviet command should have expected that the Germans would strike in the Koi-Asan area in order to cut off the northern group (47th and 51st armies).

Indeed, given the small number of his forces, Manstein could only count on environment as many Soviet forces as possible in as small a territory as possible and then destroying them with aviation and artillery. His forces were sufficient for operations on a narrow section of the front, but further east the Kerch Peninsula expands, and there the numerical superiority of Soviet forces could cost the Germans dearly.

The idea of ​​the German operation "Hunting for Bustards" was based on delivering the main attack not in the Koi-Asan area, but at the southern end of the front line, where it was least expected. Moreover, three German infantry and tank divisions, as well as the Groddeck brigade, were supposed to attack here, that is, at least half all German-Romanian forces. In the northern and central sectors of the front, the Germans and Romanians were supposed to conduct a demonstration of the offensive, truly moving into it only after the breakthrough of the southern group. In addition, in the first hours of the operation, massive air strikes were carried out on the headquarters of units of the 47th and 51st armies.

The German ploy worked - Soviet reserves remained in the north after the start of the offensive. On May 8, the Germans broke through the Soviet defenses in a 5 km section, to a depth of 8 km. On May 9, heavy rain began to fall, which prevented the Germans from bringing a tank division into battle, but before the downpour, the Groddeck motorized brigade managed to advance, cutting off the 44th Army from its rear positions.In addition, a German boat landing force landed in the rear of the 44th Army. This was only one battalion, but it assisted the German offensive.

May 11, 1942The German 22nd Panzer Division reached the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. It was followed by the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade. 8 Soviet divisions found themselves in the resulting cauldron, and on that day the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, died. On the same day, Stalin and Vasilevsky sent an angry directive to the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, which began with the words

“The Military Council of the Crimean Front, including Kozlov, Mekhlis, have lost their heads, and to this day cannot contact the armies...”

And ending by order:

"don't let the enemy pass".

However, the Germans and Romanians advanced rapidly. On the evening of May 14, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Kerch. On May 15, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered:

“Don’t surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol.”

However, already May 16, 1942 The German 170th Infantry Division took Kerch. May 19, 1942 fighting on the Kerch Peninsula ceased, with the exception of the resistance of the remnants of Soviet troops in the Adzhimushkai quarries.

From 270 thousand fighters and commanders of the Crimean Front for 12 days battles were lost forever 162.282 person - 65% . German losses amounted to 7.5 thousand. As it is written in “History of the Great Patriotic War”:

“it was not possible to carry out the evacuation in an organized manner. The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol”.

On June 4, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters declared the command of the Crimean Front to be responsible for the “unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation.”

Army Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis was removed from his posts as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and demoted to the rank of Corps Commissar.

Lieutenant General Kozlov was removed from his post as front commander and demoted to the rank of major general.

Divisional Commissar Shamanin was removed from his post as a member of the Front's Military Council and demoted to the rank of brigade commissar.

Major General Vechny was removed from the post of chief of staff of the front.

Lieutenant General Chernyak and Major General Kolganov were removed from their posts as army commanders and demoted to the rank of colonel.

Major General Nikolayenko was removed from his post as commander of the front air force and demoted to the rank of colonel.

July 1, 1942 (even before the capture of Sevastopol) Manstein received the title Field Marshal General.

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photo from the Internet, Kerch region. prisoners of war

I "d say it"s rather May 1942 (17-19), after Operation Trappenjagd.

Clarification

It is after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Image attached is from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Krim. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of world historical importance), which describes an international delegation who came to see how the German-Romanian troops conquered Sevastopol.

Text translation:

It was after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Images taken from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Crimea. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of World-Historical Significance), which describes the international delegations that came to see German-Romanian troops capture Sevastopol.

Presumably this is Marfovka.

Also Marfovka.

Soviet ammunition, the first two are high-explosive, the rest are fragmentation.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

my excavations

Spent cartridges

Akmonai positions. Dota.

bullet marks

Personal weapon of a soldier 633 SP, 157 SD.

Fragment of a Mosin sniper rifle.

Kerch area, May 1942, in the photo Il-2.

May 1942, Kerch region.

All 5 photos from the Bundesarchiv, Germany

“Alarmists will be shot on the spot...”

FROM THE TRAGEDY of the Crimean Front during the reign of Khrushchev, one of the most confusing myths about the Great Patriotic War was created - the myth that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief specially sent his mediocre in military affairs, but “faithful dog” Mehlis to various fronts, and he kept the command in fear. As a result, in particular, the Crimean disaster of May 1942 occurred.

On the cover of the book by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Rubtsov “Mekhlis. Shadow of the Leader" (M., 2007) the following summary about the hero of the work was made: "The mere mention of the name of Lev Mekhlis caused horror in many brave and honored generals. For many years this man was Stalin’s real shadow, his “second self” and, in fact, the master of the Red Army. He was so fanatically devoted to his leader and country that he stopped at nothing to complete his task. On the one hand, Mehlis is accused of having the blood of hundreds of innocent commanders on his hands, some of whom he personally shot. On the other hand, he was respected by ordinary soldiers, whom he always took care of. On the one hand, Mehlis was one of the main culprits for the defeat of the first months of the Great Patriotic War and the collapse of the Crimean Front in the spring of 1942. On the other hand, his inflexibility and firmness more than once saved troops in the most desperate situations. Was Mehlis the embodiment of evil? Or did he simply personify his controversial times?

The documents cited in the book by a respected colleague did not allow either the author or the readers to draw an unambiguous conclusion. Although, I note that our historiography is dominated by a persistent hostility towards the personality of this deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The majority of the creative intelligentsia evaluates this historical figure with a minus sign.

Our information. Lev Zakharovich Mehlis was born in 1889 in Odessa. He graduated from 6 classes of the Jewish commercial school. Since 1911 in the army, he served in the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. In 1918 he joined the Communist Party and was in political work in the Red Army. In 1921-1922 - in the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, which was headed by Stalin. In 1922-1926 - one of the personal secretaries of the General Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin, in 1926-1930 he studied at courses at the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors. In 1930, he became the head of the press and publishing department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and at the same time the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Pravda. In 1937-1940 - Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, in 1940-1941 - People's Commissar of State Control. According to the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, “he was truly an honest man, but in some ways crazy,” because he had a mania for seeing enemies and saboteurs everywhere. On the eve of the war, he was reappointed head of the Main Political Directorate, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (while retaining the post of People's Commissar of State Control). In 1942 he was a representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters on the Crimean Front. After the defeat of the Crimean Front troops in May 1942, he was removed from his posts, and in 1942-1946 he was a member of the military councils of a number of armies and fronts. In 1946-1950 - Minister of State Control of the USSR. Died February 13, 1953.

Konstantin Simonov is sometimes credited with the following statement about Mehlis: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason for the most shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust of the army and front commanders, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mehlis, a man illiterate in military affairs... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the very front line. Three armies stood on a front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere and never have I seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because a madman commanded the front ... "

BUT THIS, I note, is not Simonov’s personal assessment. Here is how it was. On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Victory, on April 28, 1965, the front-line writer decided to express some thoughts related to the history of the Great Patriotic War. There is such a fragment in the material. It is worth citing in full (I quote from: K. Simonov. “Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on I.V. Stalin.” M., APN, 1989).

“I would like to give an example of an operation in which the true interests of waging war and false, sloganeering ideas about how a war should be waged, based not only on military illiteracy, but also on the lack of faith in people generated in 1937, clearly collided. I'm talking about the sad memory of the Kerch events of the winter - spring of 1942.

Seven years ago, one of our front-line writers wrote to me the following: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason for the most shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust of the commanders of the armies and the front, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mehlis, a man illiterate in military matters... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the most advanced positions, etc. Three armies stood on a front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere have I ever seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because the front was commanded not by a commander, but by a madman...” (I emphasize that these are not the words of Simonov, but of a writer he knew. - A.M.)

I did not talk about this in order to once again give an unkind word to Mehlis, who, by the way, was a man of impeccable personal courage and did not do everything he did with the intention of personally becoming famous. He was deeply convinced that he was acting correctly, and that is why, from a historical point of view, his actions on the Kerch Peninsula are fundamentally interesting. This was a man who, during that period of the war, regardless of any circumstances, considered anyone who preferred a convenient position a hundred meters from the enemy to an uncomfortable position fifty meters away, a coward. He considered everyone who wanted to simply protect the troops from possible failure to be an alarmist; He considered everyone who realistically assessed the enemy’s strength to be unsure of their own strength. Mehlis, for all his personal readiness to give his life for his Motherland, was a pronounced product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938.

And the front commander, to whom he came as a representative of Headquarters, an educated and experienced military man, in turn also turned out to be a product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938, only in a different sense - in the sense of fear of taking full responsibility, fear of contrasting a reasonable military decision with an illiterate one. the onslaught of “everything and everything - forward”, fear of transferring his dispute with Mehlis to Headquarters at the risk of himself.

The difficult events of Kerch from a historical point of view are interesting in that they seem to screw together both halves of the consequences of 1937-1938 - both the one that was presented by Mehlis and the one that was presented by the then commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov.”

I WILL NOT argue with the great writer. Everyone has their own view of the past. I will express my personal opinion about Mehlis, supported by familiarity with the documents of that time. Yes, indeed, Lev Zakharovich is a very difficult and controversial political figure. He was harsh, sometimes even very, often straightforward in his assessments and demands. To put it mildly, he did not like to be diplomatic. He was tough, even to the point of cruelty, and during the war he went beyond this line in a difficult front-line situation.

Several examples can be given in this regard. September 12, 1941. 34th Army of the North-Western Front. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Mehlis personally draws up order No. 057 for front troops: “...For demonstrated cowardice and personal withdrawal from the battlefield to the rear, for violation of military discipline, expressed in direct failure to comply with the front order to come to the aid of units advancing from the west, for failure to take measures to save the material part of the artillery... Major General of Artillery Goncharov, on the basis of the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 270, is to be publicly shot in front of the formation of the commanders of the headquarters of the 34th Army.” Moreover, the general had already been extrajudicially shot the day before on the basis of an oral order from Mehlis and Army General K.A. Meretskova.

Cruel? Yes, it's cruel. But this is war, and we were talking about the fate of the entire state... Moreover, in those tragic months, a very nervous situation reigned at the front in the conditions of retreat under the pressure of German troops.

In this regard, it should also be noted that Stalin did not condone this kind of reprisals. At the beginning of October, he harshly reprimanded commanders and commissars who practiced lynching and assault instead of educational work. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0391 of October 4, 1941, signed by Stalin and Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov, was called: “On the facts of the replacement of educational work with repression.” In it, Stalin demanded “in the most decisive manner, right up to bringing the perpetrators to trial in a military tribunal, to fight all phenomena of illegal repression, assault and lynching.”

I'LL ALLOW myself a little digression. Since the time of perestroika, historical literature and journalism have been dominated by the desire to evaluate the actions of statesmen and their motives from the standpoint of the realities of the present time - a time of peace and goodness. Then the situation was fundamentally different, and the life school of that generation was different. Many were tested in the fight against the special services of Imperial Russia and in the fratricidal Civil War. This embittered the future Soviet leaders; there were no sentimental people among them.

It is also impossible to understand the reasons for the extreme cruelty towards other military leaders in 1941 - the same command of the Western Front - without the context of the circumstances of the dramatic beginning of repelling the aggression of Nazi Germany. Unfortunately, despite the decisions made to declassify documents from the Great Patriotic War, we do not know everything about them.

A specific example: a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff, Army General G.K. Zhukov to the troops of the western military districts on June 18, 1941. This document is still inaccessible to researchers - even to employees of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, involved in the preparation of a new multi-volume history of the Great Patriotic War.

And such a telegram existed. In 2008, the Kuchkovo Pole publishing house published a book by counterintelligence veteran Vladimir Yampolsky, “...Destroy Russia in the Spring of 1941,” which included materials on the case of the commander of the Western Front, Army General D.G. Pavlova. There is such an episode in the protocol of a closed court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on July 22, 1941. Member of the court A.M. Orlov reads out the testimony of the defendant - the former communications chief of the Western Front headquarters, Major General A.T. Grigoriev at the investigation: “...And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff of June 18, the district troops were not put on combat readiness.” Grigoriev confirms: “All this is true.”

There is every reason to assert that on June 18, 1941, Stalin allowed the troops of the first strategic echelon to be brought to full combat readiness, but the directive of the General Staff authorized by him turned out to be, for some reason, unfulfilled by the command of the western military districts, and primarily in the Western Special.

Another document has survived, indicating that on June 18, 1941, a telegram was sent from the Chief of the General Staff to the command of the western military districts. This research was carried out in the late 1940s - the first half of the 1950s by the military scientific department of the General Staff under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky. Then, while Stalin was still alive, it was decided to generalize the experience of concentrating and deploying troops of the western military districts according to the plan for covering the state border on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. For this purpose, five questions were asked to the participants in those tragic events who held command positions in the troops of the western districts before the war (fragmentary answers to some questions were published in the Military Historical Journal in 1989).

The questions were formulated as follows: 1. Was the plan for the defense of the state border communicated to the troops, as far as they were concerned; when and what was done by the command and headquarters to ensure the implementation of this plan? 2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities? 3. When the order was received to put troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22; what and when were the instructions given to carry out this order and what was done by the troops? 4. Why was most of the artillery located in training centers? 5. To what extent were the headquarters prepared for command and control of troops and to what extent did this affect the course of operations in the first days of the war?

The editors of the Military Historical Journal managed to publish answers to the first two questions, but when it was the turn to answer the third question: “When was the order received to put the troops on combat readiness?”, the editor-in-chief of the magazine, Major General V.I. Filatov received a command from above to stop further publication of responses from participants in the events of June 1941. But even from the first two answers it follows that the telegram (or directive) of the Chief of the General Staff existed...

NOW about the behavior of Mehlis himself at the front.

From the memoirs of Colonel General of the Engineering Troops Arkady Khrenov: “In one of the companies he was caught by an order to attack. Without hesitation, he became the head of the company and led it behind him. None of those around him were able to dissuade Mehlis from this step. It was very difficult to argue with Lev Zakharovich..."

From the memoirs of Major General David Ortenberg, who edited the newspaper of the 11th Army “Heroic March” during the war with Finland (1939-1940) and, together with Mehlis, was surrounded by one of our divisions: “Army Commissar 1 1st rank put the editorial staff on a truck - a former Leningrad taxi, and gave several soldiers for security: “Get through.” And they broke through the still fragile ice of the lake. And Mehlis himself, together with the division commander, led its exit from the encirclement... Seeing that ours could not knock down the Finnish barrier near the road, Mehlis placed the soldiers in a chain, got into the tank and, moving forward, opened fire from a cannon and machine gun. The soldiers followed. The enemy was knocked out of his position.”

The statement of Army General Alexander Gorbatov about Mehlis has also been preserved: “At every meeting with me until the liberation of Orel, Mehlis did not miss an opportunity to ask me any question that could lead to a dead end. I answered simply and probably not always the way he wanted. However, it was noticeable that, although with difficulty, he was changing his previous attitude towards me for the better. When we were already behind the Eagle, he suddenly said:

I have been looking closely at you for a long time and I must say that I like you as an army commander and as a communist. I followed your every step after you left Moscow and didn’t quite believe the good things I heard about you. Now I see that I was wrong.”

Mehlis, of course, did not have an academic military education and did not possess military leadership talents like the great Rokossovsky. By the way, he highly valued this commander and, shortly before the disaster of the Crimean Front, which became obvious to him in the spring of 1942, he asked Stalin to appoint Konstantin Konstantinovich as commander of the Crimean Front. Alas, due to a serious wound, Rokossovsky was still in the hospital (on March 8, 1942, the commander of the 16th Army of the Western Front, Rokossovsky, was wounded by a shell fragment and was treated until May 23. - Ed.).

At the same time, Mehlis knew what war was. After all, during the Civil War he was at the front, was a commissar of a brigade, then the 46th Infantry Division and the Right Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine, participated in battles against the gangs of Ataman Grigoriev and one of the most talented commanders of the White Army - General Ya.A. Slashchev, was wounded.

Since the Civil War, Mehlis had a habit of telling people directly about mistakes and miscalculations. Naturally, he made many enemies from this. Mehlis always spoke with pathos, but sincerely. Of course, he could not do without his characteristic manner of seeing everything either in white or in black. It should be noted that as People's Commissar (Minister) of State Control, he was forced to engage in what today would be called anti-corruption measures, and as a result of inspections, many Soviet officials had to change their warm offices to barracks in Kolyma. Even under Stalin, officials stole and ruled at the expense of the state. Is this not where the origins of hatred towards Stalin’s “chief controller” come from on the part of the descendants of the families of the Soviet nomenklatura, most of whom have adapted well to the new life?..

And then the Great Patriotic War began. Mehlis is back in the army. On January 20, 1942, he arrived at the Crimean Front (until January 28, 1942, the front was called the Caucasian Front) in the status of an authorized representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On the eve of his arrival, the troops successfully carried out the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation (December 26 - February 2) and captured a vast bridgehead.

Commander of the Caucasian Front, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov received instructions from the Supreme Command Headquarters to speed up the concentration of troops on the bridgehead in every possible way. They decided to transfer additional forces there (47th Army) and, no later than January 12, launch a general offensive with the support of the Black Sea Fleet. The point was to reach Perekop as soon as possible and strike at the rear of the Sevastopol Wehrmacht group. By the summer of 1942, Crimea could actually become Soviet again.

Our information. As a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, by January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. As the commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, admitted after the war, “in the first days of January 1942, for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch, the path to the vital artery of the 11th Army - the Dzhankoy - Simferopol railway - was actually open. The weak covering front (of the Sevastopol Wehrmacht group - Ed.), which we managed to create, could not withstand the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia area.” The German general also believed that “if the enemy took advantage of the created situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would have been created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector ... However, the front command postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

The offensive of the Soviet troops nevertheless began, but it was not possible to break through the positions of the German divisions. This breakdown is usually described as saying that our command underestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy. Historians try not to name the specific culprits for the failure of the offensive, which could have led to the liberation of all of Crimea, so as not to offend anyone.

It is kept silent that the offensive failed due to the lack of a well-thought-out plan, as well as clear logistical and combat support for the troops landing in Crimea. This was primarily manifested in the lack of transport ships for the transfer of manpower and artillery from the “mainland”. The situation with the provision of ammunition and fuel to the troops was also catastrophic. This is the testimony of Major General A.N. Pervushin, commander of the 44th Army participating in this operation (he was seriously wounded in January 1942 - Ed.).

Then weather conditions intervened - the ensuing thaw rendered field airfields completely unusable. The lack of normal communications and air defense systems also had an impact. They “forgot” to deliver anti-aircraft artillery to the port of Feodosia, and as a result, until January 4, 5 transports were killed from unpunished actions of German aviation, and the cruiser “Red Caucasus” was seriously damaged.

On January 18, the Germans, taking advantage of the passivity of the Soviet troops, recaptured Feodosia. Then General Kozlov decided to withdraw troops to the Ak-Monai positions - a defensive line approximately 80 kilometers from Kerch. It was in this situation that Mehlis arrived at the front.

Two days after his arrival, he sent Stalin a telegram with the following content: “We arrived in Kerch on January 20, 1942. We found the most unsightly picture of the organization of command and control... Komfront Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as the enemy grouping. For any division there is no data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front have been in the troops since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula...”

Our information. Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich (1896–1967). In military service since 1915, he graduated from the school of warrant officers. Participant of the First World War. In the Red Army since 1918, he commanded a battalion and a regiment. After the Civil War he studied at the Frunze Military Academy. During the Soviet-Finnish War, he commanded the 1st Rifle Corps of the 8th Army. Since 1940 - Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District, then - Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the Red Army. Since 1941 - commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District. After the disaster in Crimea, he was demoted to the rank of major general. In August 1942, he was appointed commander of the 24th Army of the Stalingrad Front, and from August 1943, deputy commander of the Trans-Baikal Front. Participated in battles against Japan.

Mehlis’s telegram is usually characterized as follows: two days were “enough” for the arrogant People’s Commissar of State Control to get an idea of ​​the state of affairs at the front. However, in essence Mehlis was right. The main provisions of his telegram corresponded, by the way, to the contents of the order of the front command itself No. 12 of January 23, 1942. The order was signed by Kozlov, a member of the Military Council of the front F.A. Shamanin and Mehlis.

To this we must add that the command of the Caucasian Front at that time was in Tbilisi. And from there he directed the fighting. From a thousand kilometers away.

Mehlis really quickly figured out what was going on. And he immediately raised before Headquarters the question of separating an independent Crimean Front from the Caucasus Front and transferring command and control of troops to the Kerch Peninsula. At the same time, he demanded replenishment of manpower (3 rifle divisions), and began to demand that the front-line command urgently restore order in artillery, air defense, and logistics support.

"1. The command of armies, divisions, regiments should take into account the experience of the battles of January 15-18, 1942, immediately restore order in the units... Have regimental artillery and anti-tank artillery (anti-tank - A.M.) in infantry battle formations...

2. Alarmists and deserters should be shot on the spot as traitors. Those caught intentionally wounding left-handed crossbowmen should be shot in front of the line.

3. Within three days, restore complete order in the rear..."

Mehlis especially carefully checked the condition of the air force and artillery of the front, on which the combat effectiveness of the entire group of our troops depended to a decisive extent. It turned out that due to poor logistics, 110 faulty aircraft accumulated on the Kerch Peninsula, so less than one sortie was carried out per day.

Mehlis, using his official status, obtained additional weapons from the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff - the front received 450 light machine guns, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 mortars of 120 mm caliber and 50 mortars of 82 mm caliber, two divisions of M-8 rocket launchers. The issue of allocating an additional number of tanks to the front, including heavy KVs, anti-tank rifles and ammunition, was being resolved.

On January 24, a new commander of the front air force was appointed - Major General E.M. Nikolaenko. A little later, the new chief of the engineering troops arrived - Major General A.F. Khrenov. In anticipation of the planned offensive, Mehlis also ensured that a large number of political workers at various levels were sent to the front, including specialists in special propaganda against the Germans.

The 47th Army (commander - Major General K.S. Kalganov), transferred from northern Iran, crossed the ice of the Kerch Strait to the peninsula.

On February 15, Stalin received Mehlis. At the meeting, to the displeasure of the Supreme, he asked for additional time to prepare the front for the offensive. This relates to the question of whether Mehlis thoughtlessly carried out the orders of Headquarters. And Stalin agreed with him - apparently, Mehlis’s arguments worked.

On February 27, 1942, the planned offensive began. The Crimean Front had 12 rifle divisions, four tank brigades, and one cavalry division. But the command of the Crimean Front, instead of actively using tanks, including KV and T-34, to break through the German defense in the treeless terrain of the Kerch Peninsula, sent forward infantry, whose attacks the Germans repulsed with machine-gun fire.

For three days they drove the infantry into senseless attacks, killing thousands of people. 13 Soviet divisions advanced against three German and one Romanian. And the irretrievable losses are enormous (by April already 225 thousand people).

On March 9, Mehlis sent Stalin a proposal to immediately remove Kozlov and the staff of Major General F.I. Tolbukhin from his posts. Only the chief of staff of the front was replaced - with Major General P.P. Eternal. On March 29, Mehlis again insisted in writing to Stalin on the removal of Kozlov. The description given to the commander is unflattering: he is lazy, “a gluttonous gentleman of the peasants,” is not interested in operational issues, regards trips to the troops as “punishment,” in frontline troops, does not enjoy authority, does not like painstaking, everyday work.

Instead, Mehlis asked to appoint one of the following generals: N.K. Klykov, but he commanded the 2nd Shock Army breaking through to Leningrad and at that moment it was impossible to change him; K.K. Rokossovsky, who was still recovering in the hospital; Commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, whom he met on the Kerch Peninsula. But for some reason the latter’s candidacy did not find Stalin’s support.

By the beginning of May, the front group of troops prepared for an offensive, but it was postponed. On May 6, 1942, Headquarters ordered the front to go on the defensive, apparently having information about the upcoming German offensive. But the front command did not have time to reorganize the troops for defense. Their group remained offensive.

Meanwhile, the German command strengthened its 11th Army. Back in early April, the 22nd Tank Division appeared in its composition (180 Czech tanks LT vz.38: weight - 9.5 tons, frontal armor - from 25 to 50 mm, 37 mm gun). On May 8, the Germans went on the offensive with massive air support (Operation “Hunting for Bustards”). The command post of the 51st Army was destroyed, and General Lvov was killed on May 11.

Already during the May breakthrough of our defense by the Germans, Headquarters gave General Kozlov the following instructions:

“1) The entire 47th Army must immediately begin to withdraw beyond the Turkish Wall, organizing a rearguard and covering the retreat with aviation. Without this there will be a risk of being captured...

3) You can organize a strike with the forces of the 51st Army so that this army is gradually withdrawn beyond the Turkish Wall.

4) The remnants of the 44th Army also need to be withdrawn beyond the Turkish Wall.

5) Mehlis and Kozlov must immediately begin organizing defense along the Turkish Wall.

6) We do not object to the transfer of headquarters to the place you indicated.

7) We strongly object to the departure of Kozlov and Mekhlis to the Lvov group.

8) Take all measures to ensure that artillery, especially large artillery, is concentrated behind the Turkish Wall, as well as a number of anti-tank regiments.

9) If you are able and manage to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement...”

But neither the Turkish Wall nor the Kerch contours were equipped in engineering terms and did not pose a serious obstacle for the Germans.

Worse than that. All three armies of the front (44th, 47th and 51st), prepared for the offensive, were deployed in one echelon, which sharply reduced the depth of defense and sharply limited the ability to repel enemy attacks in the event of a breakthrough. When the Germans launched a decisive offensive, their main blow fell precisely on the most unsuccessful formation of troops - on the 44th Army (commander - Lieutenant General S.I. Chernyak). The second echelon of this army was located only 3–4 km from the front line, which gave the Germans the opportunity, even without changing the positions of their artillery, to inflict fire on our units throughout the entire operational depth. Which is what they did.

In addition, most of the Soviet troops were concentrated on the northern sector of the Crimean Front. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command, imitating the main efforts in the north, delivered the main blow from the south, where the 44th Army was located.

Here is Mehlis’s sharp and emotional opinion about her commander: “Chernyak. An illiterate man, incapable of leading an army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One can wonder whose hand nominated Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general.”

“Failures in wars are always inevitable, but they cannot be justified if they arose due to the carelessness of the people entrusted with the conduct of the war. This apparent disregard for the enemy served as a tragic prelude to the fateful turns of May 1942.”

Valentin Pikul. "Square of fallen fighters."

On the night of May 7, the military council of the Crimean Front, with the approval of Mehlis, sent the necessary orders to the troops (in connection with the expected German offensive - Ed.). Alas, the workers at the front headquarters were not concerned with the speed of their transfer. As a result, by morning they had not even reached all the army commanders!

On May 7, the Germans began intensive air strikes against Soviet positions, especially control posts. The next day, under cover of artillery fire, infantry units launched an attack.

On May 8, Mehlis sent a telegram to Stalin in which he wrote: “Now is not the time to complain, but I must report so that Headquarters knows the front commander. On May 7, that is, on the eve of the enemy’s offensive, Kozlov convened a military council to discuss the project for a future operation to capture Koi-Aksan. I recommended that this project be postponed and that instructions be immediately given to the armies in connection with the expected enemy advance. In the signed order of the front commander, he stated in several places that the offensive was expected on May 10–15, and proposed to work until May 10 and study the army defense plan with all command personnel, unit commanders and headquarters. This was done when the entire situation of the previous day showed that the enemy would advance in the morning. At my insistence, the erroneous timing was corrected. Kozlov also resisted the movement of additional forces to the 44th Army sector.”

All the data is stark: tomorrow the Germans will launch an offensive, and the commander in the order indicates the period of May 10–15. Obviously, the reconnaissance of the front headquarters did not work.

In response to his telegram, in which he once again asked to replace Kozlov, Mehlis received a very irritated message from Stalin: “You are holding the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is completely rotten. On the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the command’s mistakes on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a resistance, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as State Control, but as a responsible representative of Headquarters.

You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you cannot help but know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve... If you had used attack aircraft not for side activities, but against the enemy’s tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the tanks would not have gotten through. You don’t need to be Hindenburg to understand this simple thing while sitting on the Crimean Front for two months.”

Mekhlis seems to have deservedly received the nuts. Especially considering that Stalin then recalled him from the front and demoted him. The Supreme’s irritation is understandable: despite the numerical superiority of our troops in the Kerch region, they were unable to stop the German offensive. But let's figure out what in Mehlis's position could have caused Stalin's anger? In my opinion, first of all, Mehlis limited himself to the position of an observer and did not interfere in the decision-making process, which was obvious even to a non-professional military man. Having attack aircraft, anti-tank artillery, and T-34 and KV, superior to German Czechoslovak-made tanks with a weak 37-mm cannon, the Soviet command could stop the German 22nd Panzer Division.

Today all the pressure is falling on the head of Mehlis, on the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, who supposedly “created tricks for the Crimean Front,” against the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, Marshal S.M. Budyonny, to Headquarters. And the front command had nothing to do with it... Without justifying Mehlis’s mistakes, for which he was punished by Stalin, I note that until the last he tried to reverse the rapidly deteriorating situation in May 1942.

It is known how the German “hunt for bustards” ended: on May 13, the defense of our troops was broken through, on the night of May 14, Marshal Budyonny allowed the evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula, on May 15, the enemy occupied Kerch. This allowed the Germans to concentrate their efforts on taking Sevastopol.

This is the price of the disaster on the Crimean front. But we will not “savor” its details and will keep in our hearts the bright memory of all the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who died on Crimean soil.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

About the facts of replacing educational work with repression

Recently, there have been frequent cases of illegal repression and gross abuse of power by individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates.

Lieutenant of the 288th joint venture Komissarov, without any reason, killed Red Army soldier Kubica with a revolver shot.

The former chief of the 21st UR, Colonel Sushchenko, shot and killed Jr. Sergeant Pershikov because he was slow to get out of the car due to a hand problem.

The platoon commander of a motorized rifle company of the 1026th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Mikryukov, shot and killed his assistant, junior platoon commander Baburin, allegedly for not following orders.

The military commissar of the 28th Panzer Division, Regimental Commissar Bankvitser, beat one sergeant for smoking at night; He also beat up Major Zanozny for having an incontinent conversation with him.

The chief of staff of the 529th Infantry Regiment, Captain Sakur, without any reason, hit Art. Lieutenant Sergeev.

Such facts of perversion of disciplinary practice, excesses [the word “excesses” was written by Stalin instead of “violations”, intolerable in the Red Army. - Ed.] granted rights and power, lynchings and assault are explained by the fact that:

a) the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, and the method of repression in relation to subordinates took first place;

b) everyday educational work in units in a number of cases is replaced by abuse, repression and assault;

c) the method of explanations and conversations between commanders, commissars, political workers and Red Army soldiers has been abandoned, and clarification of issues incomprehensible to the Red Army soldiers is often replaced by shouting, abuse and rudeness;

d) individual commanders and political workers in difficult battle conditions become confused, panic and cover up their own confusion by using weapons without any reason;

e) the truth has been forgotten that the use of repression is an extreme measure, permissible only in cases of direct disobedience and open resistance in a combat situation or in cases of malicious violation of discipline and order by persons deliberately going to disrupt the orders of the command.

Commanders, commissars and political workers must remember that without the correct combination of the method of persuasion with the method of coercion, it is unthinkable to impose Soviet military discipline and strengthen the political and moral state of the troops.

Severe punishment in relation to malicious violators of military discipline, accomplices of the enemy and obvious enemies must be combined with a careful analysis of all cases of violation of discipline that require detailed clarification of the circumstances of the case.

Unreasonable repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and lack of arms, often lead to the opposite results, contribute to the decline of military discipline and the political and moral state of the troops and can push unstable fighters to defect to the enemy’s side.

I order:

1. Restore rights to educational work, widely use the method of persuasion, and do not replace everyday explanatory work with administration and repression.

2. All commanders, political workers and superiors should talk daily with the Red Army soldiers, explaining to them the need for iron military discipline, honest performance of their military duty, the military oath and orders of the commander and superior. In conversations, also explain that a serious threat looms over our Motherland, that defeating the enemy requires the greatest self-sacrifice, unshakable steadfastness in battle, contempt for death and a merciless fight against cowards, deserters, self-harmers, provocateurs and traitors to the Motherland.

3. Widely explain to the commanding staff that lynchings, assault and public abuse, which humiliates the rank of a soldier of the Red Army, lead not to strengthening, but to undermining the discipline and authority of the commander and political worker.

At the front I found unimaginable panic. All cannons, machine guns, and anti-tank rifles were abandoned on the battlefield, and people fled in groups and alone to the Kerch Strait. And if they saw a board or log floating near the shore, several people immediately jumped on this object and immediately drowned. The same thing happened if they managed to find any floating craft on the shore or saw an approaching boat - they rushed in like a cloud, immediately everything was flooded, and people died.

I have never seen such panic in my life - this has never happened in my military experience.

It was some kind of disaster, although the enemy did not particularly attack. His aviation worked well, and it created panic. But she managed to do this only because our aviation was inactive, and the front command was confused and lost control.

Despite this, I managed to occupy the near defensive Kerch perimeter and gain a foothold on it. I ordered Mehlis and Kozlov to lead this defense, and if we have to evacuate, they must be the last to leave Kerch land.

Some people have already reached the Taman Peninsula through the Kerch Strait. There I had a three-regiment rifle brigade stationed. I ordered her to detain everyone crossing and put them on the defensive line of Taman.

After all this, I called HF I.V. Stalin and reported on the situation. He asked, “What do you think you’ll do next?” I replied that we would fight on the near defensive line (to defend Kerch). But Stalin said: “You must now firmly defend the Taman Peninsula and evacuate Kerch.”

I nevertheless decided to defend Kerch for as long as possible, because the fall of Kerch would immediately affect the defense of Sevastopol, which had half of its combat ammunition in this direction when I arrived. And I brought it to 15.5.42 to 6 rounds of ammunition...

I was at the front command post when I.A. approached me. Serov (Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - Ed.) and introduced himself as an NKVD commissioner from Beria. Serov asked me what the orders would be. I replied that during the evacuation he should sink the locomotives so that they would not fall into the hands of the Germans.

After 2-3 hours, Serov came up to me and reported that my order had been carried out and the locomotives were flooded. I asked: “How?!” He replied that he lowered them from the pier. I said: “What a fool. I told you that this needs to be done during the evacuation, but we are not going to leave yet, and we need steam locomotives.” I ordered him to leave Kerch and not complicate matters.”

Then we moved to Taman, where my command post was. And suddenly I lost contact with Kerch, with which we were connected by a single wire - a high-frequency telephone. It turned out that Serov ordered him to be cut.

When I asked why he did this, Serov replied that this connection belonged to the NKVD and he had the right to dispose of it.

I told him: “But, unfortunately, you don’t know how to manage things. Therefore, I will put you on trial as a traitor to the Motherland, because you deprived me of the opportunity to manage the front, I was left without communication.”

The next day, Beria called me from Moscow and asked me to settle the matter with Serov. I repeated that Serov would be brought to justice. Then Beria said that he was recalling Serov to Moscow and would punish him himself.”

From the diary entries of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny,
in May 1942, commander-in-chief of the troops
North Caucasian direction.

Letter from the “disgraced general”

“11.2.66 Hello, Alexander Ivanovich!

Thank you very much for not forgetting the old disgraced general. My fall from grace has lasted for almost 25 years.

The events of those days often appear in my memory. It’s hard to remember them, especially because the blame for the death of all our regiments lies not only with us, the direct participants in these battles, but also with the leadership that was exercised over us. I don’t mean Mehlis, a layman in operational art, but the commander of the North Caucasus direction and Headquarters. I also mean Oktyabrsky The outstanding writer of the twentieth century, Konstantin Simonov, who repeatedly visited the Kerch Peninsula during the days of military confrontations reflected in his famous “Different Days of the War,” had every right to declare: “You can’t film a war from afar, a war can only be filmed up close.” With these words, K. Simonov once again emphasized the invaluable role of film and photographic documents, which left for posterity the heroism and tragedy of the people's victory over fascism.

One of such genuine evidence of the horrors of the Great Patriotic War was the photograph of military photojournalist Anatoly Garanin, “The Death of a Soldier,” which became a classic of Soviet military photography.

Assigned to the headquarters of the Crimean Front, A. Garanin, as a representative of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, in the spring of 1942 once again went to the front line to film the attack of soldiers on the enemy during the battle.

The unit, carried away by the commander, rushed forward. Anatoly pointed his “watering can” at a group of soldiers. The shot should have been successful - several people were caught in the lens, rushing forward in a single impulse towards the enemy. But at that very moment, before the camera shutter was released, an enemy shell suddenly exploded a few meters from the attackers. The frame instantly became different. The explosion disrupted the picture of the battle and made terrible adjustments to the photo. Instead of the intended image of the attack, the film captured the tragedy. The mortally wounded soldier closest to us slowly sinks to the Crimean soil. For him, the war was over - his body accepted the deadly metal.

Somewhere far from here there will be the tears of a wife, mother, children and relatives and the eternal hope for the return of a loved one from that damned war - a hope that fades away every day after the Victory...

An archive of film and photographic documents helped establish that the famous Ak-Monai positions, located in the western part of the Kerch Peninsula, became the location where the photograph “Death of a Soldier” was taken. Unfortunately, no one yet knows the exact location of filming. A strip of land from the village of Ak-Monay (Kamenskoye) to the Black Sea itself, almost 17 kilometers long, bears witness to the death of a soldier. The very place where from January to May 1942 there were fierce battles with varying success, ending in tragedy for the troops of the Crimean Front.

Who is the fighter whose death we see in the picture? His name remains unknown. He was most likely buried in one of the many mass graves located in the Ak-Monai Isthmus area. The remains of a soldier may rest in Semisotka, Kamenskoye, Batalny, Yachmennoye, Uvarovo and other villages, in which there are several mass graves with thousands buried. The majority, despite the almost seventy years that have passed since the end of hostilities in Crimea, remain nameless. And the main reason for this is the destruction of archival documents.

The photograph “Death of a Soldier” once again makes us think about the cruelty of the most barbaric war in the history of mankind, where the death of one is a tragedy, and the death of millions is a statistic. The same imperturbable statistics that consider more than seventy percent of those who did not return from the war to be missing in action. In combat - Marines of the 83rd Brigade (1942).

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation

E. Manstein (left)

On December 17, 1941, after strong artillery bombardment, German troops launched a second assault on Sevastopol. By order of Manstein, five divisions rushed to the offensive.

Erich von Manstein

As a result of the December offensive, the Germans managed to get 6-7 km closer to the city in the northern sector. The position of the defenders of Sevastopol became significantly more complicated: the city, bay and airfields found themselves in the fire zone of German artillery of all calibers. The introduction of another division into battle on December 21 - the 170th Infantry - allowed Manstein to re-densify the battle formations of the assaulters and ultimately achieve a change in the situation in his favor. By December 25, Manstein’s troops were literally a stone’s throw from the Northern Bay.

However, at this moment the Soviet command made a “knight’s move” and tried to seize the initiative by landing a large amphibious assault in the Crimea.

The Crimean coast was a fairly long area that needed to be defended, even in sparse formations. The concentration of the main efforts of German troops in the Crimea against Sevastopol made the defense of the coast almost formal. Despite serious problems with air cover for warships far from bases, the Soviet fleet could rightfully lay claim to dominance in the Black Sea.

The plan for landing sea and airborne assault forces on the Kerch Peninsula appeared at the command of the Transcaucasian Front at the end of November 1941, shortly after the abandonment of Crimea by Soviet troops. The first report outlining the main ideas of the operation was sent to the Supreme Command Headquarters on November 26, 1941.

The proposal was received with interest, and on November 30, a detailed report was sent to the Supreme Command Headquarters detailing the plan and calculating the number of troops allocated. Initially, it was planned to capture the landing force only in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and move further to Feodosia. By Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 005471 of December 7, 1941, this plan was approved and the front began its practical implementation.

By the time the landing plan in Crimea was approved, E. von Manstein’s 11th Army defending the peninsula was opposed by part of the forces of D.T. Kozlov’s Transcaucasian Front located on the Taman Peninsula - the 51st and 44th Armies.

D.T. Kozlov

Of course, the 51st and 44th armies did not transform from troops hastily leaving the Kerch Peninsula into a grouping for a relatively large landing operation by magic. As in other sectors of the front, the armies were strengthened for active operations due to newly formed formations.

The 51st Army of Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov included the 224th, 302nd, 390th and 396th Infantry Divisions, the 12th Infantry Brigade, and the 83rd Marine Brigade.

V.N. Lviv(killed in battle)

The 44th Army of Major General A.N. Pervushin included the 157th, 236th, 345th and 404th Rifle Divisions, the 9th and 63rd Mountain Rifle Divisions, and the 74th Marine Brigade. Of these, the 345th and 404th divisions and the 74th brigade were formed in the fall of 1941.

A.N. Pervushin

The reserve of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front on the Taman Peninsula included the 156th, 398th and 400th rifle divisions and the 72nd cavalry division. The last three formations belonged to the formations of the autumn of 1941.

Preparations for the operation were ordered to be completed by December 19. The landing was supposed to begin on December 21.

Preparations for the operation were interrupted by the aggravation of the situation in the Sevastopol region. To counter the crisis, it was necessary to transfer to the city on December 20 and 21 the 345th Infantry Division and the 79th Marine Brigade, originally intended for landing in Feodosia. The transfer of troops also distracted the combat and transport ships involved in the landing operation. As a result, it was possible to begin the landing only on December 26.

On December 26, troops of the 51st and 40th Soviet armies were landed in the Kerch area and 30 in the Feodosia area.

Landing plan

Auxiliary landing at Kerch. The Azov flotilla was supposed to deliver from Temryuk and Kuchugur the 244th Infantry Division and the 83rd Marine Brigade, which were subordinate to the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Lvov (13 thousand people in total), and land the first detachment in the north in Ak-Monai and Arabat, the second detachment - north of Kerch at capes Zyuk, Tarkhan and Khroni. The third detachment is at Yenikape.
These detachments were supposed to force the enemy defense to disperse their forces.

The enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by the German 46th Infantry Division and the Romanian regiment of mountain riflemen guarding the Parpach ridge area.

The total number of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula was 25 thousand personnel, 180 guns and 118 tanks. Two aviation groups with up to 100 aircraft were based at airfields in the Kerch region. In addition, the grouping of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula could be supported by aviation from airfields located in the areas of Simferopol and Saki.

To enhance surprise, no artillery preparation was planned. A group of paratroopers was supposed to land in the southern part of Cape Zyuk. After occupying Kerch, the 51st Army was supposed to advance on Vladislavovka.
In the south, the 302nd Infantry Division, transferred here from Kerch, was supposed to land from the Taman Peninsula. Disembarkation points: Old Karantin, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen and the Initiative commune. Troops were to land at these points suddenly and simultaneously. Three attack waves were envisaged.
The short distance to the landing site allowed Rear Admiral Frolov to quickly transfer troops and bring coastal artillery into action.

K.S. Frolov

Therefore, fire support from ships was not provided. The patrol boats were to take over the defense of the landing beaches, while the torpedo boats were to provide smoke screens to the attacking force.
Auxiliary landing on Cape 0puk. A division of gunboats and a detachment of torpedo boats, together with a patrol boat and a patrol ship, were to be delivered from Anapa to Cape Opuk and 3 thousand people from the 44th Army (Detachment “B”) were to land there. This landing group was supposed to prevent any movement of troops along the coast and advance north in the direction of Kerch, in order to connect there with the 51st Army and act together with it. This group was supposed to be supported by the artillery of the southern group, expelled from Feodosia.

The main landing in Feodosia. The troops assigned for landing in Feodosia were Detachment “A” (23 thousand people, 34 tanks, 133 guns), which arrived from Novorossiysk; only the last train arrived from Tuapse. Detachment “A” was formed from units of the 44th Army (Major General Pervukhin). The transportation of troops was provided by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Captain 1st Rank Basisty, who replaced Rear Admiral Vladimirsky, who was wounded on September 21, 1941, when the destroyer Frunze was sunk off the Tendra Peninsula by dive bombers. The ships were to be boarded at night. It was planned to land the troops after strong artillery preparation directly on the piers of Feodosia.
The landing forces in Feodosia were divided into three detachments. The frontline included a marine assault detachment of 300 people and an amphibious force of 12 patrol boats, 2 minesweepers, tugs and barges and a hydrographic group, as well as an artillery support detachment - the cruisers "Red Crimea" and "Red Caucasus", the destroyers "Zheleznyakov", “Shaumyan” and “Nezamozhnik”, which provided fire support and, in addition, themselves had to transport the forward detachment - approximately 3 rifle regiments and heavy equipment.

destroyer “Shaumyan”

The main landing forces were planned to land in two echelons. The first - 11,270 people, 572 horses, 51 4.5-12.2 cm guns - was loaded onto transports:
“Zyryanin” (2593 br. tons), “Tashkent” (5552 br. tons), “Zhores” (3972 br. tons), “Red Profintern” (4638 br. tons), “Nogin” (2109 br. tons) , Shakhtar (3,628 br. tons) and Kuban (3,113 br. tons). Two destroyers were brought in to guard them.
The second echelon—6,365 people, 905 horses, 58 guns, 14 tanks—was loaded onto the transports “Berezina” (3,087 tons), “Kalinin” (4,156 tons), “Kursk” (5,801 tons), “Dmitrov” "(3689 br. tons), "Krasnogvardeets" (2719 br. tons), "Azov" (967 br. tons), "Fabricius" (2334 6 rub. tons) and "Serov", security - leader, for the destroyer and three minesweepers.

transport “Jacques Jaurès”

The covering force consisted of the cruiser Molotov, the leader Tashkent and one destroyer.

cruiser "Molotov"

leader of “Tashkent”

After the capture of Feodosia and the Ak-Monaisk Isthmus, part of the 44th Army was supposed to advance to the east and, in cooperation with the 51st Army, destroy the encircled German troops. Having successfully completed this task, the 44th and 51st armies were to advance on Karasubazar, 60 km west of Feodosia.
Auxiliary landing on the southern coast.

In order to disrupt the coastal communication between Alushta and Feodosia, west of Feodosia, near Sudak and Koktebel, a landing of one battalion of minesweepers and torpedo boats was planned.

Landing on the Kerch Peninsula

On the evening of December 25, after the troops boarded ships in Temryuk, a strong storm began (wind 14 m/s). The cold wave spread throughout Crimea, and the Kerch Strait froze. General Lvov and Admiral Eliseev (Chief of the Fleet Staff) were of the opinion that this circumstance would provide greater surprise. They decided to start the operation. According to the plan, the landing was supposed to begin on December 26 at 5:00 am, 2 hours before dawn, but all groups were late.
The 2nd group landed at Cape Zyuk only at 10 a.m., after two hours of artillery fire to suppress German batteries.

It was soon reinforced by the first group, which was too late to reach Arabat and Ak-Monai. However, the difficulties encountered - great excitement, attacks by German aircraft and resistance from German defenses - prevented the landing of all groups.
The Azov flotilla managed to create 3 minor bridgeheads between December 26 and 29. Strong opposition prevented her from unloading heavy equipment. The paratroopers were able to bring only a small part of their equipment ashore, as they were forced to jump into icy water. The lack of fuel did not allow aviation to provide support to the landing force. German aviation significantly interfered with the transportation of troops.
The second echelon managed to land only partially. On December 29, the Soviet high command decided to group its forces (approximately 6 thousand people, 9 tanks and 10 guns) at Cape Tarkhan. There they prepared for defense, while two bridgeheads had to retreat. The attack on Kerch was delayed.
At the moment when the Azov flotilla was preparing to leave on December 25, the troops were loaded onto the ships of Admiral Frolov in Taman and Komsomolsk. Bad weather delayed the departure of transport ships. Only the first echelon landed systematically. The patrol ships were discovered before they approached the shore. German artillery opened fire, but the Russians managed to land in 4 places.

The second echelon was 4 hours late and arrived only at 7:00 a.m., and only one group managed to strengthen the bridgehead in Kamysh-Burun. Soon the third echelon arrived, but the groups returned back to the Taman coast. By the evening of December 27, the Russians only had a bridgehead at Kamysh-Burun, which contained half of the originally planned troops. They were driven out from other bridgeheads. In total, 3,600 people were landed. On December 27, stormy weather (wind 7-8 points) prevented ships with landing forces from going to sea. Only on the night of December 29 could the transfer be resumed again. Now almost the entire landing force was landed in Kamysh-Burun (a total of 11,225 people, 47 guns and 12 armored vehicles). Thus, on December 29, 17,500 people were landed on the northern and eastern coast of the peninsula.

The weakness of Soviet air cover allowed German aviation to operate unhindered. Some of the vehicles were sunk, and without artillery and tanks the Russians could not advance. Manstein gave the order to the commander of the 42nd Army Corps, Lieutenant General Sponeck, with the forces of the only division remaining on the Kerch Peninsula to throw the enemy into the sea.

Hans von Sponeck

The assault on Sevastopol had reached its decisive stage; it seemed that one more effort was enough to occupy the most important of the resistance centers - Stalin's fort. Manstein could not send reinforcements to Feodosia and Kerch, except for two Romanian brigades (8th Cavalry and 4th Mountain). In Sevastopol, both opponents were at the limit of their capabilities. The Russians hastily sent there the battleship Paris Commune, the cruiser Molotov, the leader Tashkent and three destroyers to fire at the tip of the advancing wedge of German troops north of the city.
On the morning of December 30, a Soviet reconnaissance group accidentally discovered that the Germans had abandoned Kerch. General Sponeck received news the day before that the Russians had landed troops in Feodosia and, in order not to be cut off, by his own decision, contrary to Manstein’s directive, ordered the 46th Infantry Division to retreat by a forced march to the west. Manstein's cancellation of this order did not reach the corps command, since all lines of communication were broken. The Russians occupied Kerch.

On December 25 at 9:00 a.m., Russian landing detachment “B” was concentrated in Anapa. He went to sea four hours late. The onset of the storm did not allow heavy equipment to be loaded onto the patrol ship "Storm" and onto the lighter. On December 26, the detachment went to sea, but due to poor organization and stormy weather, it was forced to return to Anapa twice without reaching Cape Opuk, where a support group was waiting for it. Then Rear Admiral Abramov 2 received an order to land troops on the bridgehead in Kamysh-Burun. Leaving Novorossiysk at 17:00 on December 28, he began disembarking at 22:00.
On December 28, loading onto the vessels of Detachment “A” in Tuapse and Novorossiysk was completed. The organization was no better than in Kerch and Taman. Some regiments were late, others confused transport ships. At 18:00 the landing force left, an hour later a group of artillery support ships left. Two submarines, intended to provide navigation support for the landing, left at 3 o'clock. The Germans knew this movement of the Russians, and they followed it. The lack of naval forces made it impossible for the Germans to attack the Russians at sea. Soviet aviation, on the contrary, bombed Marfovka, where the headquarters of the German troops was located, as well as Vladislavovna and the railway line near Feodosia.
At 03:18 on December 29, a detachment of artillery support ships opened fire. At 04:03 they stopped firing, and the first group landed on the pier from the patrol boat SKD 0131, followed by SKA 013. After a short battle, the Russians took possession of the lighthouse. The entrance to the port was provided by the Russian tug "Kabardinets". At 04:00 the first destroyer entered the port, at the same time the cruiser "Red Crimea" entered the port, anchored 360 m from the pier. Boats and boats began to transport paratroopers to the shore. The weather was getting worse. A snowstorm hampered the landing operations, and four German batteries opened fire.

Then the commander of the cruiser "Red Caucasus", Captain 2nd Rank Gushchin, decided to land troops directly on the pier. Enemy fire intensified, and German aircraft began operating at dawn. When the cruiser moved away from the wall, it received a direct hit in one of the towers, and the first victims appeared. By lunchtime the landing of 4,500 men was completed. The ships retreated to the raid to provide artillery support to the landing forces, of course, without a spotter aircraft. The adjustment was carried out on the shore by artillery observers. At 08:30, five Soviet aircraft of the LAGG-3 type appeared. At midnight the cruisers were forced to leave the raid. "Red Caucasus" returned to Novorossiysk.

On the evening of December 28, Feodosia was occupied by the Russians. At 23:00, one minesweeper landed a small group at the Sarygol station, which was supposed to cover the approaches to Feodosia from the east. The Germans, with air support, put up stiff resistance north of the city. The Russians did not have any heavier military equipment. The guns were transported on longboats one at a time and unloaded without cranes. The arrival of both subsequent landing groups was delayed. The first detachment, due to a large wave and seasickness of the troops, arrived on December 29 at 22:00, and on the morning of December 30 it was attacked by aircraft. Soon a thick, black smoke screen rose over the roadstead. The cruisers were attacked from the air more than 10 times, but all attacks were repulsed. The second detachment arrived on December 31 at 01:00.
On the shore, events unfolded favorably for the Russians, but somewhat slowly. On December 30, the 44th Army was still 6 km from Feodosia. German reinforcements (170th and 132nd infantry divisions withdrawn from Sevastopol) could arrive in the Feodosia area only after a few days. If the Russians decided to advance on Dzhankoy, they would completely cut off the supply of the German 11th Army. However, their plan, in which they overestimated the German defenses, called for the movement of the 44th Army in the first phase (from 29 December to 4 January) north and east in order, together with the 51st Army, to destroy German forces on the Kerch Peninsula. The 51st Infantry Division pursued the German 46th Infantry Division retreating from Kerch, which, due to poor roads, was forced to abandon all heavy military equipment (398 armored vehicles, 68 guns). But, nevertheless, the division avoided encirclement.
On December 31, the Russians occupied Vladislavovka. In order to cut off the Germans' lines of communication on the northern coast, the 12th Infantry Brigade was landed in Ak-Monay, and the parachute group occupied the approaches to the Arabat line; however, this turned out to be useless, because the Germans did not try to occupy it. Taking advantage of the slowness of the Russians, Manstein succeeded with the remnants of the 46th Infantry Division and the 213th Infantry Regiment of the 73rd Infantry Division, as well as two Romanian brigades, to create, however, a weak front line east of Feodosia.

Romanian General Radu Corne

Bad weather interfered with the actions of aviation on both sides, which, however, was more noticeable for the Germans than for the Russians. The German command was also concerned about the capabilities that the Russians had due to complete dominance at sea. On December 29, an order was given: just in case, to strengthen the defense of Yevpatoria and Ak-Mosque. The 4th Air Fleet mined raids in Kerch, Feodosia, Yalta, Yevpatoria, Ak-Mechet and Perekop on January 1 and the following days.
By January 1, the Russians had the following forces: 40,519 people, 236 guns, 43 tanks and 330 armored vehicles.
Despite the activity of German aviation, the fleet landed the last echelon in Fesdosia. 4 transports were soon sunk and many were damaged. In the frozen Kerch Strait, ship movement was impossible. By January 5, the ice was so thick that it allowed the crossing of troops. The next day, 13 thousand people from the 302nd, 244th and 296th rifle divisions and the 12th rifle brigade crossed the ice without heavy equipment. People walked at intervals of 5-7 m. The rest of the 51st Army (8250 people, 113 guns, 820 armored vehicles) was transferred from Taman on small ships using two basic icebreakers. The 47th Army and the Cossack division returned back to Anapa and Novorossiysk in order to cross from there by ship to Kamysh-Burun.
Meanwhile, Manstein suspended the assault on Sevastopol. On December 25, he stopped the attack on the southern sector and sent the 170th Infantry Division in the direction of Kerch. It was followed on December 30 by the 132nd Infantry Division. On January 2, the garrison of Sevastopol went on the offensive in the northern sector.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation ended with the capture of an important operational bridgehead in Crimea - the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of important enemy strongholds in Crimea - the cities and seaports of Kerch and Feodosia, the troops advanced 100-110 km to the west.

As a result of the operation, the position of the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region was strengthened. On January 1, 1942, the German command was forced to stop its second attack on Sevastopol and transfer part of its forces from there to the Feodosia region. The Kerch enemy group suffered heavy losses. These results were achieved thanks to the heroic actions of the ground forces and navy. The operation, carried out as part of the Red Army's counteroffensive in December 1941, was the largest amphibious landing operation during the Great Patriotic War. Its main significance was that the enemy lost the opportunity to use the Kerch Peninsula as a springboard for penetration into the Caucasus. At the same time, it diverted part of the enemy’s forces from near Sevastopol, making it easier for its defenders to repel the second enemy assault.

Memorial “Adzhimushkay” (Kerch)

Hero of the Soviet Union

Major Sergei Borzenko

LANDING IN CRIMEA

(From the notes of a war correspondent)

1

In the morning I went ashore again.

The wind knocked down my feet. The sea was colorful with long white-crested waves.

The muddy waves of the strait and the high enemy shore were well illuminated by the sun. The Germans were busy targeting their shallows.

On our shore, near the pier, machine guns of a sunken patrol boat were sticking out of the water.

It would be madness to sail through the strait in such weather. The operation was postponed.

This went on for several days.

The sea raged even more than in previous days. It was foggy. Darkness came earlier than usual.

I went to the commander of the naval battalion, Captain Nikolai Belyakov. The battalion stood in formation in the courtyard. Everything was ready for loading onto the ships.

It was already completely dark when we went down to the pier. Our battalion was the first to load. I decided to go with Belyakov, on his motorboat.

The motorboat was already filled with machine gunners and signalmen; on the nose there was a 45-mm cannon and a heavy machine gun. The motorboat lifted forty-five people. At the very last moment, fifteen more people were added to us.

We were towed by armored boats.

I looked around at those with whom fate united me today. All these were Russian sailors with concentrated faces, red from the wind, ready for the most severe tests.

At twelve o'clock at night we set sail from the pier. The motorboat was clearly overloaded. When someone tried to walk along the side, the indignant foreman shouted:

Hey, be careful, you'll turn the motorboat over!

Our squadron went to sea.

The welcoming cry of the people on the shore remained in my ears for a long time:

Happy sailing!

A strong north wind was blowing.

The engines of the armored boats towing us were noisy.

Covered with raincoats over their back bags, people sat in motorized boots, on the crests of longboats, and even on rafts placed on empty iron barrels.

It was cold. People tried not to move, keeping warm in their quilts and overcoats.

Next to me sat my contact, a twenty-year-old boy from Stalingrad, Vanya Sidorenko.

The ships passed the red and green lights on the sandy island of Tuzla and turned sharply west, towards the shores of Crimea.

The waves began to flood the motorboat. I had to bail out the water with hats and bowler hats. Everyone was wet from head to toe.

There, near the coast, occupied by the enemy, searchlights were searching across the sky and sea. Obviously, the Germans were harassed by our night bombers.

We moved forward inexorably. Nobody spoke.

I glanced at the watch dial several times. Time passed slowly. I wish it all started soon!

At a quarter to five, several beams of searchlights suddenly pulled us out of the darkness and lingered on the ships.

I saw previously invisible dozens of boats and motorboats walking nearby.

The light blinded my eyes. We were discovered.

And at this time, shaking the sky and the sea, rolling, a terrible tight thunder struck. The shells, pumping air, began to fly over our heads. Clouds of fire appeared over the enemy shore.

It was artillery preparation.

Our heavy guns from the Taman Peninsula hit the German coastal fortifications.

At the same time, the armored boats uncoupled from the motorboats, the engines on our ships began to rustle, and we set off on our own.

After some time, the artillery preparation ended. The shells set fire to several buildings and haystacks on the shore.

The flames of the fires served as a guide for us: the ships were heading towards the fire.

But the spotlights flashed again. The Germans began firing flare shells and throwing hundreds of rockets. In their trembling light we saw a high, uncomfortable shore and white houses.

To the shore.

The first two motorboats with fighters approached the shore.

Enemy shells exploded all around, raising columns of cold water and showering everyone with prickly splashes.

A shell exploded on our motorboat. He disabled one engine. A flame broke out. But the motorboat continued to walk. It was as if he was being carried forward by a humming sail of fire.

Suddenly the shore seemed to hit us.

I got on board and, making a three-meter jump, jumped onto Crimean soil.

The motorboat crashed into the sand. Marines jumped into the water. With incredible speed they unloaded the cannon and machine gun.

After the motorboat it was very spacious on the ground.

Directly in front of us was a huge pillbox from which a heavy machine gun was firing. I saw how the battalion commander Belyakov rushed to him. Anti-tank grenades flew into the embrasure.

I moved to the right. The soldiers lay motionless on the sand in front of the barbed wire. Hundreds of shells exploded between them. A bright spotlight, like the light of an electric welder, illuminated us. The sailors saw my shoulder straps - I was the senior among them - and shouted:

What now, Comrade Major?

Sappers, come to me!

Six sappers appeared.

Cut the wire!

Less than two minutes passed before the passage was made. We rushed into it. A cannon fired at us point-blank. The infantrymen crawled behind me. I recognized Tsibizov, the commander of a company of machine gunners; I heard Belyakov send someone to attack the cannon.

Suddenly I saw a girl nearby. She rose to her full height and, stepping now to the right, now to the left, walked forward.

At this time, a small plane with red stars on its wings passed overhead. The plane descended into a German searchlight, firing a machine gun.

The light turned off. The same planes were buzzing to the right and left, and I realized how on time they arrived.

We rushed forward. Shells and mines exploded thickly.

The machine gunner running nearby fell to the ground. He was mortally wounded. Dying, he whispered:

Still, I lived a good life...

The beam of a second searchlight struck from the cape, illuminating the road, the bare trees of the cherry orchards, and the stone houses of the village. Machine guns and German submachine gunners fired from there. For some reason, no one shot at us.

Our machine guns began to crackle.

For motherland for Stalin! - the sailors shouted, bursting into the village, throwing grenades at the houses from which the Nazis were shooting back.

The victory cry, taken up by all the fighters, struck the Germans like fire.

The Nazis fired from windows, attics and basements, but the first, most terrible line of their coastal pillboxes had already been bypassed.

It was beginning to get light. The battle took place in the streets. I saw the infantry of the guard of Captain Peter Zhukov, which was landing to our right.

Forward to the heights! - shouted the wet captain who crawled out of the water.

The heights, which in the light of the rockets seemed to hang over the very sea, were in fact behind the village, three hundred meters from the coast.

The infantry rushed to the heights.

I ran into the first house I came across. Hot cutlets were still smoking on the table, and there were bottles of wine. I pushed them aside and wrote my first correspondence in just a few minutes. It mentioned officers Nikolai Belyakov, Pyotr Deikalo, Platon Tsikaridze, Ivan Tsibizov, Pyotr Zhukovar. They fought bravely at the time of landing.

It was important to let readers know that we did not die, but clung to the Kerch Peninsula and continue to fight. I wrote the headline: “Our troops broke into Crimea.” The note ends with the words: “There are fierce battles ahead to expand the bridgehead.”

Just at that moment a shell hit the house. Dazzling sparks, rainbow circles and dark spots appeared in the eyes. For a moment he lost consciousness, but still got up.

Having wrapped the correspondence in a piece of tarpaulin so that it would not get wet in the water, my messengers and I rushed to the shore.

There, under heavy enemy fire, the last motorboat was unloaded. I put the messenger in it and looked around. Our patrol boats and armored boats fired machine guns and cannons at the enemy.

The motorboat walked away. I ran up to the high-rise and saw how two shells lit up a motorboat. The crew, putting out the flames, stubbornly steered the ship away from the shore.

“Will the correspondence arrive?” I thought sadly, but a minute later I forgot about her.

By the shore.

I ran to a group of fighters attacking a pillbox that looked like a mound from a distance. The German machine gun had already been destroyed by a grenade, but two machine guns were firing from the embrasure.

I ran with one Red Army soldier from the back of the pillbox. An officer appeared on the concrete stairs. He shot point-blank from a machine gun and killed a Red Army soldier. The bullets knocked off my cap. If I had not deviated, the entire burst of the machine gun would have entered my head.

I pulled the trigger of my PPD, but there was no shot: the disk was empty. He kicked the German in the head with all his might. He swayed, dropped the machine gun, and raised his dirty hands. I no longer remembered myself from rage. There was a revolver in his hands. A shot rang out. The German fell. On his neck was a white, silver-framed, brand-new iron cross.

On December 2, 2017, the Russian commander of the Airborne Forces, Andrei Serdyukov, announced the formation of a separate airborne assault battalion of the Airborne Forces in Crimea. According to ITAR-TASS, Serdyukov handed over the battle flag to the new unit at a ceremony held in Feodosia, where the battalion is stationed. The Crimean air assault battalion is subordinate to the Seventh Guards Air Assault Division. It is the first military unit in the entire history of the Airborne Forces, which is located on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula.

Military maneuvers do not stop

The formation of an air assault battalion in Crimea means the resumption of military maneuvers in the region. In April of this year, the Airborne Forces, Aerospace Forces and the Black Sea Fleet already conducted large-scale military exercises in Crimea. According to the TASS news agency, more than 2,500 people took part in these exercises, which took place at the Opuk training ground. The Novorossiysk air assault division, as well as separate air assault brigades from Kamyshin and Ulan-Ude, were involved in the exercises. Moreover, units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the 4th Red Banner Air Force and Air Defense Army were sent to the exercises. Before this, in January 2017, the Triumph anti-aircraft missile system went on combat duty in Crimea for the first time.

Anti-aircraft missile system S-400 "Triumph" of the air defense regiment in Feodosia

According to the report of the commander of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Lieutenant General Sevostyanov, the S-400 complex will increase its combat effectiveness in the future. Thanks to this, the population of Crimea will be under reliable air protection. At the same time, this complex will ensure security not only on the Crimean Peninsula, but also on the territory of the Krasnodar Territory. Serdyukov also stated that the Favorit and Triumph anti-aircraft missile systems will perform military tasks in this region. In the future, it is planned to increase the number of Triumph complexes in Crimea.

This anti-aircraft missile system is one of the newest weapons in service with the Russian army. It can thwart threats posed by helicopter gunships and guided missiles, and can engage air targets over 400 kilometers away. In fact, back in late 2016, according to data received from the Russian army, the process of integrating the air defense systems of Crimea and Russia was completed.

Causes of the Cold War between the USA and Russia

Crimea is located in the south of Ukraine, on the Crimean Peninsula. It is washed by the waters of the Black and Azov Seas. Previously, this region was the only autonomous republic within Ukraine. The area is more than 25 thousand square kilometers. The population is about 2.5 million people, of which 60% are Russians, approximately 24% are Ukrainians. The peninsula has an extremely important strategic location.

Throughout history, Crimea belonged to various peoples. In 1783, the peninsula was annexed to the territories of the Russian Empire. In 1918, Crimea became part of Russia, and in October 1921, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed, which became part of the RSFSR. In 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree changing the status of the Crimean Republic to the Crimean region. In May 1954, in honor of the celebration of the Tercentenary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been ongoing talk about whether Crimea should gain independence or return to Russia. Because the region had close ties to Russia, the issue of Crimea was not only the cause of ongoing disputes over the administration of the territory between Russia and Ukraine, but also became the basis for the existence of disagreements in Russian-Ukrainian relations for a long time.

In April 2014, a referendum was held in Crimea and Sevastopol, more than 90% of the population voted to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. After which, Putin and representatives from the Crimea signed an agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation as a subject of the Russian Federation. Ukraine did not recognize this referendum and challenged the transfer of territories to Russia. In 2014, the United States, the European Union and some other European countries imposed economic sanctions against the Russian Federation due to the Crimean issue and disputes with Ukraine. For this reason, relations between Russia and the United States seem to have entered a new round of the Cold War.

Crimea is a kind of enclave, since the peninsula is surrounded by the waters of the Black Sea, and by land it borders only with Ukraine. Currently, in order to connect Crimea with Russia directly, the Kerch Bridge is being built. It is intended for road and rail transport, and will also connect the Taman Peninsula of the Krasnodar Territory and the Crimean city of Kerch. The bridge is designed in such a way that it will not affect the free passage of ships. It is planned to open transport links by the end of 2018.

Conditions of the American side for lifting sanctions against Russia

According to Russian media reports on December 3, 2017, during one of his last interviews, US Ambassador to Russia Jon Huntsman spoke about the conditions for US lifting sanctions. The solution to this issue largely depends on the resolution of the “Ukrainian issue.” Huntsman noted that the introduction of sanctions against Russia was carried out not only by the United States, but also by the countries of the European Union. If a solution is reached on the issue of Crimea that fully satisfies all parties to the conflict, then only in this case will it be possible to begin the procedure for lifting sanctions. Huntsman emphasized that the United States and Russia must first clearly understand what led to the imposition of sanctions, after which it will be possible to consider ways to lift them.

The head of the Center for Russian-American Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Pavel Podlesny, said that all of Huntsman’s comments have no basis. Russia is not a party to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, Russia contributed to the conclusion of the Minsk Agreements aimed at resolving the conflict. Until the United States abandons its approach to the Ukrainian problem, changes for the better are not possible in relations with Russia.

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Exactly 75 years ago, on December 26, 1941, the Kerch-Feodosia naval landing operation began, forcing the Germans to stop the assault on Sevastopol. With this largest operation of the USSR Navy, a difficult struggle for the Kerch Peninsula began.

Chest-deep in icy water, under enemy fire

On the morning of December 26, 1941, overcoming a storm raging at sea, a strong cold wind and a frost of 15 degrees, sailors of the 83rd Marine Brigade and soldiers of the 224th and 302nd Rifle Divisions began landing near Kerch. Due to the lack of equipment on the coastline, the infantry landed directly into the icy sea, and moved forward in chest-deep water under enemy fire.

On the night of December 29, Soviet paratroopers began the assault on Feodosia. A group of ships under the command of the commander of the Light Forces Detachment of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Basisty, opened hurricane fire on the port, thereby allowing the first wave of landing forces to arrive undetected on patrol boats and small minesweepers.

As a result, 600 marines from the 1st Special Landing Detachment of the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Senior Lieutenant Arkady Aydinov, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, captured the port and the northern part of Feodosia.

The Aydinovites quickly installed navigation lights and ensured passage of destroyers and self-propelled landing craft with the main landing force into the bay.

Against the backdrop of the victories of the Red Army

By the beginning of December 1941, the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front began to develop in favor of the Red Army.
On November 29, troops of the Southern Front liberated Rostov-on-Don. Stalin congratulated by telegram “the valiant troops of the 9th and 56th armies, led by generals Kharitonov and Remezov, who hoisted our glorious Soviet banner over Rostov.”

On December 5-6, a powerful counteroffensive began in the Moscow direction, during which the troops of the Western, Kalinin, and Southwestern Fronts, breaking the resistance of Army Group Center, began to drive German troops westward from the capital of the USSR.

On December 9, the 4th Army of the Northwestern Front stormed the city of Tikhvin in the Leningrad region. Thus, units of the Red Army did not allow the Wehrmacht to cover the northern capital with a second blockade ring and distracted enemy forces at the time of the decisive battle near Moscow.

Open a window to Crimea

Against the backdrop of these victories, the country's leadership decided to organize an offensive on the extreme southern flank of the Soviet-German front - in the Crimea, which had previously been captured by the 11th German Army of General Erich von Manstein. The only Soviet bridgehead remained Sevastopol, repelling the furious attacks of the enemy.

On December 7, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, General Dmitry Kozlov, together with the commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky, to prepare and conduct an amphibious operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula within two weeks.

The chief of staff of the front, General Fyodor Tolbukhin (who grew up during the war years to become the Marshal of the Soviet Union), developed an operation plan, according to which the main blow in the Feodosia region would be delivered by the 44th Army transferred from the Iranian border under the command of General Andrei Pervushin. The 51st Army of General Vladimir Lvov was advancing in the Kerch region, in the auxiliary direction.

Save the city of Russian sailors

To transport and support troops from the sea, 250 ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were involved. Naval aviation and the Air Force of the Transcaucasian Front had 700 aircraft.

On December 17, 1941, units of the German 11th Army resumed their attack on Sevastopol to take the city by New Year. The Germans delivered the main blow through the Belbek Valley to the Mekenzi Mountains, and a secondary blow along the Chernaya River valley to Inkerman.

As a result of fierce fighting, units of the Primorsky Army of General Ivan Petrov were pushed back to the south; as a result, the enemy came close to the Mekenzi Mountains, from the heights of which they could control the entire city and the approaches to it. Sevastopol was in critical condition.

Mortal danger for the German 11th Army

Like a gambler, Manstein threw all the forces of his army into storming the last Soviet bridgehead in Crimea, while he had minimal forces on the then secondary Kerch Peninsula. The leadership of the Red Army understood that it was urgently necessary to provide assistance to Sevastopol.

The 345th Infantry Division and the 79th Marine Brigade were urgently transported there by ship. At the same time, the battleship Paris Commune, the cruiser Molotov and the destroyers Bezuprechny and Smart used their guns to help the defenders of the citadel repel a number of attacks.

But the main help to Sevastopol was the amphibious landing in the east of Crimea. In his memoirs, Manstein admitted that “this was a mortal danger for the army at a time when all its forces, with the exception of one German division and two Romanian brigades, were fighting for Sevastopol.”

This meant the 46th Division from the 42nd Corps of General Hans von Sponeck. The baron found himself in an unenviable position, since in total the forces of the Soviet landing force amounted to more than 80 thousand people, while he had about 35 thousand soldiers.

At the same time, the actions of the invading troops were covered by warships of the Black Sea Fleet, including cruisers and destroyers. Sponeck's soldiers were threatened with encirclement, so the general asked Manstein for permission to retreat from the Kerch Peninsula in order to block the Red Army's further route to Crimea in the narrow 15-kilometer Ak-Monai Isthmus.

But Manstein forbade him to do this, because he did not want another front to arise in the Crimea against Soviet troops until Sevastopol was taken. Sponeck was ordered to throw the enemy into the sea at any cost. With the remaining forces, the commander-in-chief of the 11th Field Army continued the assault on Sevastopol.

This decision was also explained by the fact that Hitler took over the responsibilities of commander-in-chief of the German ground forces and forbade his generals to even think about retreat.

Losing equipment and soldiers

For three days the 46th Infantry Division held Kerch and the surrounding area. One of the most combat-ready Romanian units, the Radu Corne brigade, named after its commander, was moving to her aid. However, the capture of Feodosia on December 29, 1941 dramatically changed the situation. A threatening situation was created for the Germans, in which Soviet troops went to the rear under Sponeck’s subordinates.

Sponeck, who was repeatedly awarded the Iron Cross for bravery during the First World War and was one of the creators of the parachute troops, could not be called a coward. However, he understood that he did not have fresh reserves to fend off the Russian advance from Feodosia to the north.

His nerves could not stand it, and he decided to immediately withdraw his troops from the trap and attack the Soviet troops before they managed to close the encirclement ring. On the morning of December 31, 1941, fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the Ak-Monai Isthmus.

Losing heavy equipment, artillery, killed and wounded, units of the 46th Infantry Division managed to escape from the Kerch Peninsula. The attempt by Romanian troops to help their German allies failed miserably. Under attacks from tankers of the 44th Army, they retreated deeper into the peninsula.

In the face of ever-increasing resistance from the city’s defenders and the appearance of two enemy armies in the rear, the assault on Sevastopol on December 30 ended in failure for the Germans. Moreover, the Nazis had to withdraw troops from the northern sector of the front to the heights near the Belbek valley due to fears that Soviet units could break through the weakened German battle formations.

Postponed execution of the general

Hitler gave permission for this with difficulty. But retreating without Sponeck's orders infuriated him.

The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South, Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, categorically forbade the submission of soldiers and officers of the 46th Infantry Division, which was also deprived of insignia, for awards. Its commander, General Kurt Himer, was soon seriously wounded on the Ak-Monai Isthmus and died on April 4, 1942.

As for Sponeck, he was removed from command of the corps and appeared on January 23, 1942 before a military tribunal presided over by Nazi No. 2 Hermann Goering at the Fuhrer's headquarters. After which he was sentenced to death, which Hitler, due to Manstein’s protest, replaced him with six years of imprisonment in the fortress.

On July 23, 1944, after an assassination attempt on the Fuhrer, von Sponeck was shot on the personal order of Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler.

They were the first

General Alexei Pervushin was seriously wounded during an enemy air raid on his headquarters on January 16, 1942, and then the 44th Army fought with another commander. His colleague, commander of the 51st Army, General Vladimir Lvov, died on May 9, 1942 during a bombing.

After the liberation of Feodosia, the commander of the 1st Special Landing Detachment, Arkady Aidinov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and appointed the first commandant of the city. As a commandant's company, order was restored by the sailors from his detachment who survived. On March 19, 1942, Arkady Fedorovich died a brave death in battle.
But the struggle for Crimea continued.