The battles in Crimea from December 25, 1941 to January 2, 1942 went down in history as the “Kerch-Feodosia landing operation" To some extent this is fair, because the main fighting took place on the Kerch Peninsula. But in the shadow of this battle there remained a small landing in Evpatoria, Sudak and Alushta.

According to the original plan of the Soviet command, the troops of the 51st and 44th armies were to unite and develop an offensive in the direction of Karasu Bazar. At the same time, the troops of the Primorsky Army were to advance from Sevastopol in the direction of Bakhchisarai - Simferopol. As the offensive progresses, troops should be landed: from the Caucasus - to the area of ​​Sudak and Alushta, from Sevastopol - to the areas of Yevpatoria and Yalta.

The offensive plan was drawn up correctly. It is easy to assume that it would not be difficult for even a small number of German troops to hold the narrow Kerch Isthmus, and then, having pulled up reserves, counterattack the Soviet landing force. Could it be hoped that the SOR units, not having a sufficient number of howitzers and mortars, and very little ammunition for the existing guns, without heavy tanks would quickly break through the German defense in depth with complex terrain and enter the operational space?

And here important role there was supposed to be a landing in Sudak, Alushta, Yalta and Evpatoria. Few enemy troops were concentrated there, and mostly not Germans, but Romanians. Thanks to this landing, the enemy in Crimea could be practically surrounded. The paratroopers landed at Yevpatoria and Sudak could quickly cut the roads connecting Sevastopol with Simferopol, Feodosia and Kerch. But, alas, the command of the Black Sea Fleet allocated insignificant forces for the landing, and even those landed at large intervals. Everywhere, even small landing forces were lucky, but then, due to the lack of reinforcements and proper fire support for the ships, the paratroopers died, unable to complete the assigned tasks.

On January 3, 1942, Admiral Oktyabrsky informed the chief of staff of the fleet, who was in Novorossiysk for a report to the commander of the Caucasian Front, that a landing party had been prepared in Sevastopol for landing in the Yevpatoria area, consisting of one battalion as the first echelon and one battalion as the second echelon. The landing was planned to take place as soon as the weather permitted.

The Evpatoria region was favorable for landing troops, as the Crimean War showed at one time. But landing two battalions there was at least stupid, if not a crime. It is not difficult to guess that the Germans could transfer significant forces there and easily destroy the landing force. At least a division should have been landed. And the SOR command could allocate enough forces for the landing in Yevpatoria, fortunately, the Germans at the beginning of January did not even think about storming the city, especially since by January 4 the 386th Infantry Division arrived in Sevastopol.

The first echelon of landing forces in Yevpatoria consisted of a reinforced marine battalion under the command of Lieutenant Commander G.K. Buzinova. The battalion included a company of NKVD troops (100 people) from the 24th Border Commandant's Office. In total, there were more than 700 people in the landing force.

For the landing of the first echelon, a detachment of ships was formed consisting of the high-speed minesweeper "Vzryvatel", the tugboat "SP-14" and seven patrol boats of the MO-4 type (MO-041, MO-081, MO-062, MO-0102, MO-0195 , MO-0125, MO-036) from the 1st and 2nd OVR divisions of the main base. A native of Yevpatoria, chief of staff of the Novorossiysk naval base, Captain 2nd Rank N.V., was appointed commander of the detachment of ships and commander of the landing. Buslaev, military commissar - military commissar of the OVR main base, regimental commissar A.S. Boyko.

Three tankettes (apparently T-38 or T-39), as well as three 45-mm anti-tank guns, were loaded onto the SP-14 tugboat.

At 23:30 on January 4, the formation secretly left Sevastopol. At 2:41 a.m. on January 5, the ships with the landing force approached the tactical deployment point and, following a signal from the flagship, headed to pre-agreed landing points near Yevpatoriya. Some of the Defense Ministry patrol boats immediately approached the shore without any opposition from the enemy. At three o'clock in the morning, disembarkation from boats began at the berths of the Khlebnaya and Tovarnaya piers. The tug SP-14 was moored on the left side of the passenger pier. The minesweeper “Vzryvatel” also successfully moored.

The landing was carried out quickly and ended by six o'clock. Together with the first echelon of troops, workers of the organizing bureau of the regional party committee, headed by Ya.N., were landed. Tsypkin and F.A. Pavlov, security officers led by state security captain L.M. Polonsky, police officers under the leadership of Major S.I. Ivanov and captain P.V. Berezkina and workers of the special department of the Black Sea Fleet, headed by Major A.I. Galushkin. They were supposed to “restore Soviet power in Yevpatoria, and if the landing failed, remain behind enemy lines for reconnaissance and sabotage work.”

Apparently they came to the aid of the paratroopers local residents, which gave Manstein the opportunity to write: “At the same time, an uprising broke out in the city, in which part of the population took part, as well as partisans who apparently infiltrated from outside. The small security forces assigned to defend the city and port were unable to prevent the landing and suppress the uprising. The Romanian artillery regiment, intended for coastal defense, abandoned its positions."

And now let’s turn to the “Chronicle...”: “The ships and troops came under enemy artillery and mortar fire and continuous bombardment from the air. Conducting street battles, the landing party suffered heavy losses, and at 9:00 am its advance was suspended. At about 10:30 a.m., radio contact with the landing party stopped.

At about 14:00 the minesweeper “Vzryvatel” fired all the ammunition of its 100-mm gun. By this time it had serious damage and heavy losses in personnel. Soon, the “Fuse” was thrown aground by a rolling wave in the salt mines area.

Torpedo boats No. 91 and No. 111 with ammunition in the Kachi area, sent from the main base to Yevpatoria, were attacked by aircraft and fired upon by an enemy coastal battery, as a result of which boat No. 91 sank, its personnel were killed, and boat No. 111 returned to the main base. Two torpedo boats with ammunition sent a second time to Yevpatoria did not complete the task; No. 111 ran aground near Yevpatoriya, and the second boat returned to base without finding the minesweeper “Vzryvatel”. The Germans refloated the boat and commissioned it under the name S-47.

At 23:32, the damaged sea tug "SP-14" and five patrol boats of the Ministry of Defense returned from Yevpatoria to Sevastopol. There was no contact with the landing party in Yevpatoria.”

It seems that the Evpatoria landing force was deliberately sent to slaughter. The SOR aviation was engaged in everything but helping the landing force. I quote from the “Chronicle...” for January 5: “In the first half of the night, four I-153, four I-15 and two U-2 bombed and stormed enemy troops in the areas of the villages of Duvankoy, Gadzhikoy and Biyuk-Otarkoy. Nine cars and five buildings were destroyed in Gadzhikoy, and two fires broke out in Duvankoy.

Two DB-3 and seven MBR-2 bombed the German Sarabuz airfield. Bombs were dropped on eight aircraft stationed in the northwestern part of the airfield. The enemy offered no resistance.

In the second half of the night, two DB-3 bombed the village and the Karasubazar airfield, but no German aircraft were found at this airfield; in the village; three strong explosions were noted. One DB-3 bombed the Sarabuz airfield again. Two I-15bis struck enemy vehicles in the village of Gadzhikoy, destroying three vehicles.

In the first half of the day, one MBR-2 again bombed the Sarabuz airfield; Bomb explosions were noted at the location of ten enemy aircraft. Five ICBM-2, one GST, three Pe-2, two Il-2, four I-16 and two Yak-1 bombed enemy troops in the villages of Duvankoy, Biyuk-Otarkoy, Gadzhikoy, Orta-Kesek, Karasubazar and others.

In the afternoon, four Pe-2s, two Il-2s, three I-16s and two Yak-1s attacked German convoys on the Simferopol-Kurman-Kemelchi road, on the Nikolaevna-Saki-Evpatoria road and on the Mamasai-Kacha road.

[And only] two Pe-2s, accompanied by four Yak-1s, bombed enemy troops in Yevpatoria (in the Kursaal area).”

What is the use of night attacks by fighters on “enemy vehicles”? Did they have night vision devices? But aviation could help the paratroopers, and at the same time adjust the fire of naval artillery.

On January 4, at 5:07 a.m., the cruiser Molotov entered the main base. And in Yevpatoria the battle had been going on for two hours. Let's look at the map. The Molotov would have needed to travel only 12 km north of Sevastopol for Yevpatoria to be within the range of fire of its 180 mm cannons, that is, it would have required only 20-25 minutes of full speed.

Of course, the destroyers could also support the landing with the fire of their 130-mm guns. Instead, on January 5 and 6, the cruiser Molotov and the leader Tashkent, anchored in Sevastopol Bay, fired at enemy troops at the front of the main base. "Molotov" fired 251 shots, and "Tashkent" - 68 shots.

It is clear that Manstein, unlike our brilliant admirals and no less brilliant generals, realized that the loss of Yevpatoria could lead to the loss of the entire Crimea. He wrote: “Although the situation in the Feodosia sector was very serious, the army command was forced to decide to turn back the first regiment heading there in vehicles from the southern front from near Sevastopol (105th infantry regiment) and send him to Evpatoria with the task of destroying the troops that landed here and the armed elements supporting them from the population as quickly as possible. The reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd Infantry Division, several batteries and the 70th engineer battalion, which were at the disposal of the army command, had previously been sent to Yevpatoria.”

On January 6, at 2:15 a.m., the destroyer “Smyshlyny” and the base minesweeper No. 27 left Sevastopol for Yevpatoriya for a landing. But the weather was not favorable to the operation - there was a force seven wind blowing from the south-west, and the sea had a roughness of up to 5 points. All this prevented the completion of the mission, and the ships left for the main base. "Smyshlenny" in the Evpatoria area was fired upon by a German battery.

On the same day, at 20:26, another detachment of ships, consisting of the leader "Tashkent", minesweeper No. 27 and two patrol boats of the Ministry of Defense, left Sevastopol for Yevpatoriya for a landing. But the weather did not improve, the southwest wind continued to blow with a force of up to 7 points, the sea state increased to 6 points, and the landing had to be abandoned.

On January 6, SOR aviation carried out intensive strikes on the enemy. I quote from the Chronicle: “In the first half of the day, four Il-2s, accompanied by four I-16s, struck enemy troops in a ravine north of mark 35.7; two cars, three carts were destroyed and three mortar batteries were suppressed.

Six Il-2s, accompanied by eight I-16s, two Yak-1s and two MiG-3s, carried out an assault strike on ten enemy mortars in a ravine north of mark 37.5 and on a gun at mark 48.68.

In the afternoon, four I-153 bombers and assault strikes destroyed a German field battery in the area of ​​altitude 133.3.

Six Pe-2s, flying singly, bombed successively, and two Il-2s, accompanied by four I-16s, stormed enemy infantry concentrations and mortar batteries in the area of ​​height 103.9.”

And 60 km from Sevastopol, the Evpatoria landing force died, but not a single plane was sent there. The next day, the SOR Air Force carried out 61 sorties, but Yevpatoria was not bombed again.

On January 7, at 1:27 a.m., the leader "Tashkent", the base minesweeper No. 27 and two patrol boats of the Ministry of Defense, which had left the previous day at 20:27 a.m. for the Evpatoria area for landing, arrived in Sevastopol and at 20:00 a.m. again went to sea with the same task.

On the same day, at 20:40, the submarine M-33 left Sevastopol for the Evpatoria area to land a sabotage group.

Early in the morning of January 8, not far from the lighthouse, the submarine "M-33" landed 13 reconnaissance officers led by battalion commissar U.A. Latyshev, who penetrated the city and radioed about the death of the landing force. Due to the storm, the submarine was unable to approach the shore and receive the scouts. And on January 14, our scouts were discovered in Yevpatoria by the Germans. At 15:49 Latyshev conveyed in plain text: “We are blowing ourselves up with our own grenades. Farewell!"

On January 8, at 1:45 a.m., the leader of “Tashkent” fired at enemy batteries and a searchlight in the port of Yevpatoria. The Germans responded with artillery fire and shined spotlights. A reconnaissance group landed on shore reported that all the piers in the port were occupied by the Germans, and there was a searchlight on one of the piers and a battery on the other. There was no fighting in the city. Houses were burning near the station. Having failed to establish contact with the previously landed troops and having encountered strong fire resistance from the enemy, a detachment of ships consisting of the Tashkent, the base minesweeper No. 27 and two patrol boats of the Ministry of Defense returned to the main base at eight o’clock in the morning.

In Yevpatoria, the minesweeper "Vzryvatel", washed ashore, was shot at point-blank range by German tanks that came onto the beach.

Manstein wrote: “The units sent to Yevpatoria, first under the command of Colonel von Heigl and then Colonel Müller (commander of the 105th Infantry Regiment), managed to defeat the enemy in heavy street battles. Particularly stubborn resistance was provided by the rebels and partisans who had settled in big building. Finally there was nothing left to do but to blow up this building with the help of assault groups sappers. In the battles in Yevpatoria, along with many brave soldiers, the commander of the reconnaissance battalion, Lieutenant Colonel von Boddin, one of our bravest officers and a commander beloved by the soldiers, died a hero’s death. He was shot by partisans who were in ambush.

On January 7, the battle in Yevpatoria was over. The landing Russian troops were partially destroyed and partially captured. About 1,200 armed partisans were killed."

The landing in Sudak was planned to take place simultaneously with the Evpatoria landing. Initially, it was planned to land on the night of January 6 a reinforced battalion of the 226th regiment of the 63rd Infantry Division of the 44th Army. The delivery and landing of troops was to be carried out by the destroyer Sposobny and a patrol boat.

January 5 Captain 3rd Rank E.L. Kozlov (commander of “Sposobny”) received an order from the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet at 20:00 on January 5 to leave Novorossiysk together with the patrol boat SKA-0111 and by six o’clock on the morning of January 6 to land troops in the Sudak area, in case of enemy opposition to cover the landing ship's artillery. After the landing, shell Sudak and Biyuk-Kuchuk. Upon completion of the task, return to Feodosia.

Having taken on board a marine landing force of 218 people from the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment (of which 35 people with machine guns were put on SKA-0111 for the first throw), ammunition and food, the ships left Novorossiysk at 21:00 on January 5. But the patrol boat could not give more than 16 knots, and then, due to an increased wave and engine malfunction, its speed decreased to 10 knots. Therefore, the destroyer commander decided to take paratroopers from the boat and complete the task independently.

At 4:53 a.m. on January 6, “Sposobny” approached Sudak. The wind was blowing force 7, the sea was up to 5. A strong wave was hitting the shore directly. Having walked along the coast to Cape Chekanny, the destroyer commander decided to land in this place, since the cape was covered from the wind and breakers.

At 5:40 a.m., a boat with twelve machine gunners was launched from the destroyer. Having landed on the shore, the paratroopers did not find the enemy nearby and gained a foothold. After this, the transfer of troops was carried out simultaneously by a boat and a boat, which each took 35 people with weapons and made seven trips.

At 8:50 a.m., having picked up a boat and a boat, “Sposobny” weighed anchor and from 9:21 a.m. to 9:50 a.m. fired on Sudak and Biyuk-Kuchuk, and then went to Feodosia, where it arrived at 0:30 a.m. min 7 January.

The paratroopers tried to capture the German commandant's office in the village of Novy Svet. The attack was repulsed, the group commander and several soldiers were killed. The remaining paratroopers went into the forest, to Mount Perchem. The group kept the Alushta-Sudak road under surveillance until the main forces of the regiment arrived.

I note that Admiral Oktyabrsky and the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet opposed the landing with all their might, citing the fact that the enemy, taking into account the experience of Kerch and Feodosia, strengthened the defense of certain points of the southern coast of Crimea and that therefore a small landing force would not be successful, since it could not connect with your troops within a few days and will be destroyed by the enemy.

In addition, the fleet suffered heavy losses in ship personnel. In this regard, and also taking into account further operations of the fleet and large transportation to support the troops of the Crimea, the Military Council of the fleet asked the fleet commander not to organize given time additional landing force, and limit it only to the actions of the fleet's ships to support the army's flank with naval artillery fire at night.

The front commander, in clarification of the directive of January 8, proposed: landing a small assault force in the Mamasai-Kacha area and in the southern part of the Evpatoria Gulf in order to influence the enemy’s rear, and in a day or two connect with their units advancing on Duvankoy-Bakhchisarai; in the southern part of the Crimean peninsula, in the Foros - Alupka - Yalta section, on the night of January 12, conduct a raid operation with a simultaneous landing in the Sudak area; support the actions of this landing force with naval artillery fire.

On January 10, the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet reported to the Military Council of the Caucasian Front the plan for the landing operation in the Sudak area, approved by the Military Council of the fleet. This plan was as follows:

1. Land troops in the Sudak area from warships (the cruiser "Red Crimea", the gunboat "Red Adzharistan", the destroyer "Soobrazitelny" and four patrol boats of the Ministry of Defense) as part of the 226th mountain rifle regiment (1750 soldiers with four 76-mm mountain tools).

The landing begins at 1:00 a.m. on January 13th. Artillery preparation - according to the situation. The task of the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment is, in cooperation with the Koktebel group of our troops, to capture the Sudak-Kutlak region and act in the direction of the village of Sala to strike the flank of the enemy’s Sala group.

After the landing, the cruiser "Krasny Krym" and the destroyer "Soobrazitelny" with two patrol boats depart to Novorossiysk, and the gunboat "Red Adzharistan" and two patrol boats remain in the Sudak area to provide fire support for the landing force. These ships should be covered by fighter aircraft of the 44th Army. The fleet's bomber aviation will operate against enemy troops on the Yalta-Sudak road.

2. Simultaneously with the landing in Sudak, on patrol boats of the Ministry of Defense, carry out a landing in Alushta consisting of 35 people. The task of the sabotage landing is to divert the enemy's attention from the landing in the Sudak area. At dawn, the sabotage group will be removed by the same Defense Ministry patrol boats.

3. The battleship "Paris Commune", guarded by three destroyers, will fire at the village of Saly, and the cruiser "Red Crimea" will fire at the village Old Crimea from 2:00 to 3:00 on January 12.

As you can see, the plan was drawn up well.

I note that the battleship Paris Commune operated quite intensively in January 1942. Thus, on January 5, the battleship, accompanied by the destroyer Boykiy, left Novorossiysk at 16:15 for the Feodosia area to fire at enemy positions in the area of ​​the villages of Stary Krym and Saly. On January 6, at 6:55 a.m., the battleship fired, expending 168 main-caliber shells, and returned to Novorossiysk.

On January 7, “Paris Commune” and “Boikiy” left Novorossiysk for Poti and arrived there on January 8 at 10:30 a.m. At seven o’clock in the morning on January 11, “Paris Commune”, guarded by the destroyer “Svobodny”, went out again to fire at enemy positions in the village area Old Crimea and Saly. Already at sea, the Svobodny turned to Poti, and its place was taken by the destroyers Bodriy and Zheleznyakov. On January 12, from 2 hours 32 minutes to 2 hours 59 minutes, the battleship fired with its main caliber at enemy positions in the area of ​​the villages of Stary Krym and Saly, expending 139 shells, and at 8 hours 35 minutes on January 13 it returned to Poti.

At 16:40 on January 14, the gunboat “Red Adzharistan”, having taken on board 580 landing troops, together with a detachment of landing craft, which also received 136 paratroopers, left Novorossiysk for the Sudak area.

At 13:00 on January 15, a naval support detachment (battleship Paris Commune and destroyers Bezuprechny and Zheleznyakov) and a landing detachment (cruiser Krasny Krym with 500 paratroopers and destroyers Soobrazitelny and Shaumyan, also with landing soldiers) left Novorossiysk. At 14:00 these ships fired at a reconnaissance aircraft that had appeared and, in order to deceive the enemy, set a course of 260°, which led significantly south of Sevastopol.

On the way, it turned out that the landing units had mixed up the names of the ships when landing. Therefore, the unit that was supposed to board the Shaumyan ended up on the Soobrazitelny. Having found out this, the commander of the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment assigned new tasks to the landing units traveling on destroyers by semaphore, according to their new landing sites.

With the onset of darkness, the detachment changed course and at 22:30 arrived at the rendezvous point, but did not find either the gunboat “Red Adzharistan” or the patrol boats. Without stopping, the detachment went to the landing area, and the gunboat and patrol boats were ordered by radio to proceed to the landing site on their own.

Navigation support for the transition was provided by the submarines Shch-201 and M-55. One was anchored 25 cables from Sudak, and the other was five miles south of the first. At the appointed time, they turned on the lights, the visibility range of which was 5-7 miles.

At 23:00, the Soobrazitelny and Shaumyan went to their landing sites, and the remaining ships went to the artillery positions. From 23:45 on January 15 to 0:25 on January 16, the ships fired at the landing area of ​​the main landing forces.

On January 15, at 13:00, the battleship Paris Commune left Novorossiysk and on the night of January 16 shelled the Sudak area, firing 125 305 mm and 585 120 mm shells, some of which were illumination.

At midnight on January 16, the destroyers Svobodny and Shaumyan began landing. The first is in Novy Svet Bay, and the second is east of the cape Elchan-Kaya.

At 0:44 a.m. on January 16, the landing began from the gunboat “Red Adzharistan”, which managed to successfully touch its nose to the shore at the appointed place, and at one in the morning the landing from the “Red Crimea” began. By five o'clock in the morning the boats of the landing detachment had completed the transfer of troops from the cruiser to the shore, and at six o'clock they had completed the landing and gunboat. After which the ships went to their bases.

At 15:25 on January 16, “Red Crimea” arrived in Novorossiysk, at 17:22 – “Shaumyan”, and at exactly midnight – “Savvy”. On January 17, at 11:25 a.m., the gunboat “Red Adzharistan” arrived in Novorossiysk.

At nine o'clock in the morning on January 17, the Paris Commune, guarded by the destroyers Bezuprechny and Zheleznyakov, arrived in Poti.

The landing's further actions are unclear. The Chronicle is silent about them, and G.I. Vaneev writes briefly and unclearly: “The enemy did not offer significant resistance to the landing. This is explained by the fact that his 30th and 42nd corps were advancing on Feodosia at that time. The troops of the Caucasian Front retreated to the Kerch Peninsula and took up defense in its narrowest place - at the Ak-Manai positions. In the current situation, the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment could not influence the situation and was forced to go on the defensive. The regiment heroically held the coastal bridgehead occupied in Sudak.”

That is, there seemed to be no enemy troops, but the regiment fought stubborn battles with someone. Needless to say, this enemy could only be the Tatars.

On the night of January 23, the destroyer Bodriy delivered ammunition and food to the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment operating in the Sudak area. Despite the fact that on the night of January 23 the storm reached force 9, the destroyer fired 273 shells along the shore.

On January 22, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet ordered on the night of January 23 to land troops in the Sudak-Novy Svet area as part of the 544th Mountain Rifle Regiment of the 138th Mountain Rifle Division. After the landing, the 544th Regiment was to come under the command of the commander of the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment.

To carry out this landing operation, a detachment of ships was allocated, consisting of the cruiser "Krasny Krym", destroyers "Soobrazitelny", "Impeccable" and "Shaumyan" and a detachment of landing craft consisting of the base minesweeper No. 412 and six patrol boats of the MO type. To ensure the ships' approach to the shore, the submarines "Shch-201" and "M-55" were located in the Sudak area. The detachment's ships were in Tuapse, and the landing craft detachment was in Novorossiysk.

"Red Crimea" and "Shaumyan" took on board the personnel of the 554th Mountain Rifle Regiment (1576 people), after which "Red Crimea" with the destroyers "Soobrazitelny" and "Bezuprechny" at 16:00 on January 23 left Tuapse for Novorossiysk . The Shaumyan, which received minor damage in Tuapse during the storm, sailed on its own. By seven o'clock in the morning on January 24, all ships participating in the operation were concentrated in Novorossiysk.

On the same day at 10:40 a detachment of landing craft left Novorossiysk, and at 12:00 the ships with the landing force also left.

At 22:15, the Red Crimea noticed fire from the Shch-201 submarine, and soon discovered a detachment of landing craft. "Red Crimea" and "Shaumyan", having anchored, lowered boats and barges, and at 23:30 began the landing.

At this time, "Impeccable" and "Savvy" withdrew, the first to the west and the second to the east of the landing site, in order to immediately suppress the enemy firing points if they opened fire on the landing party from the flanks. Two boats were lowered from the “Impeccable” and sent to the “Shaumyan” to assist in the landing.

The Defense Ministry patrol boats, having transported a detachment of sailors from minesweeper No. 412 to the shore, also approached the “Shaumyan” and the “Red Crimea” to assist in the landing. The boats primarily transported ammunition and food from the cruiser, and the longboats landed landing personnel. The enemy did not interfere.

But there were not enough landing craft, weather conditions complicated the transportation of troops - the sea was quite rough, the boats quickly became icy, unloading on the shore was slow, since there was only one small pier, from which the boats were unloaded only one at a time. All this greatly delayed the landing.

At 23:45 a representative of the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment arrived from the shore and reported that fighting was taking place in the area of ​​the village of Bolshoi Taraktash. He asked to support the regiment with naval artillery fire. To more accurately clarify the situation, a representative of the fleet was sent ashore, who returned at 3:30 a.m. on January 25. And at 5:17 a.m., the “Savvy” opened fire on the enemy.

By six o'clock in the morning on January 25, the landing was basically over, only 250 more paratroopers remained on the cruiser "Red Crimea". With the increased roughness of the sea, their landing took more than an hour, and the proximity of dawn did not allow the ships to linger at the landing site. Therefore, at 6:05 a.m. the landing force of ships weighed anchor and went to Novorossiysk. The Defense Ministry patrol boats were ordered to unload all ammunition from minesweeper No. 412, take the wounded from the shore and depart for Novorossiysk at dawn.

At 16:30 a landing party of ships arrived in Novorossiysk. And minesweeper No. 412, having completely unloaded its ammunition and taken on board 200 wounded, left the Sudak area at 8:30 a.m. and arrived safely in Novorossiysk at 5:05 p.m. At 22:00 the last patrol boat from the landing craft returned to the base.

Little is known about the fate of the second and third Sudak landings. On the night of January 17, it was possible to land 1,750 people with four 76-mm regimental guns of the 1927 model under the command of Major Selikhov. The Romanian garrison fled from Sudak without waiting for the paratroopers to approach.

By the evening of January 17, the paratroopers captured Kuchuk-Taraktash and Biyuk-Taraktash. Major Selikhov placed a company of soldiers on the Alushtinskaya and Grushevskaya roads. To guard Sudak, he left some of the soldiers and two cannons and with the main forces began to solve the main task assigned to the regiment - to connect with the Feodosian landing force.

The advance group of the Sudak landing force entered the village of Ottuzy and encountered the enemy. Not a single person from this group returned.

Apparently, as during the first landing, Tatar self-defense units took an active part in the battles, which, for ideological reasons, was not advertised in any Soviet time, not now, under the “independent” government in Crimea.

On the night of January 26, the 554th Mountain Rifle Regiment under the command of Major Zabrodotsky was landed in Sudak. A total of 1,376 paratroopers and 150 marines landed. The landed regiment was also not fired upon and was poorly armed. The landing took place under enemy artillery and tank fire. The paratroopers suffered heavy losses. In the area of ​​Maly Taraktash, about 800 people were surrounded and killed. The surviving paratroopers had to go into the forest to join the partisans. About 350 people came to the first partisan district with Selikhov.

This is what it says in the “Chronicle...”. In fact, there were no German troops in the New World, but we're talking about, apparently, about the Romanian commandant’s office or the headquarters of the Tatar self-defense forces.

Vaneev G.I. Sevastopol 1941-1942. - Book 2. P. 28.

Exactly 75 years ago, on December 26, 1941, the Kerch-Feodosia naval landing operation began, forcing the Germans to stop the assault on Sevastopol. With this largest operation The USSR Navy began a difficult struggle for the Kerch Peninsula.

Chest-deep in icy water, under enemy fire

On the morning of December 26, 1941, overcoming a storm raging at sea, a strong cold wind and a frost of 15 degrees, sailors of the 83rd Marine Brigade and soldiers of the 224th and 302nd Rifle Divisions began landing near Kerch. Due to the lack of equipment on the coastline, the infantry landed directly into the icy sea, and moved forward in chest-deep water under enemy fire.

On the night of December 29, Soviet paratroopers began the assault on Feodosia. A group of ships under the command of the commander of the Light Forces Detachment of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Basisty, opened hurricane fire on the port, thereby allowing the first wave of landing forces to arrive undetected on patrol boats and small minesweepers.

As a result, 600 marines from the 1st Special Landing Detachment of the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Senior Lieutenant Arkady Aydinov, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, captured the port and the northern part of Feodosia.

The Aydinovites quickly installed navigation lights and ensured passage of destroyers and self-propelled landing craft with the main landing force into the bay.

Against the backdrop of the victories of the Red Army

By the beginning of December 1941, the strategic situation in Soviet-German front began to take shape in favor of the Red Army.
On November 29, troops of the Southern Front liberated Rostov-on-Don. Stalin congratulated by telegram “the valiant troops of the 9th and 56th armies, led by generals Kharitonov and Remezov, who hoisted our glorious Soviet banner over Rostov.”

On December 5-6, a powerful counteroffensive began in the Moscow direction, during which the troops of the Western, Kalinin, and Southwestern Fronts, breaking the resistance of Army Group Center, began to drive German troops westward from the capital of the USSR.

On December 9, the 4th Army of the Northwestern Front stormed the city of Tikhvin in Leningrad region. Thus, units of the Red Army did not allow the Wehrmacht to cover the northern capital with a second blockade ring and distracted the enemy forces at the time of the decisive battle near Moscow.

Open a window to Crimea

Against the backdrop of these victories, the country's leadership decided to organize an offensive on the extreme southern flank of the Soviet-German front - in the Crimea, which had previously been captured by the 11th German Army of General Erich von Manstein. The only Soviet bridgehead remained Sevastopol, repelling the furious attacks of the enemy.

On December 7, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, General Dmitry Kozlov, together with the commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky, to prepare and conduct an amphibious operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula within two weeks.

The chief of staff of the front, General Fedor Tolbukhin (who grew up during the war years to become a marshal of the Soviet Union), developed an operation plan, according to which main blow in the Feodosia region, the 44th Army, transferred from the Iranian border, under the command of General Andrei Pervushin, was inflicted. The 51st Army of General Vladimir Lvov was advancing in the Kerch region, in the auxiliary direction.

Save the city of Russian sailors

To transport and support troops from the sea, 250 ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were involved. Naval aviation and the Air Force of the Transcaucasian Front had 700 aircraft.

On December 17, 1941, units of the German 11th Army resumed their attack on Sevastopol to take the city by New Year. The Germans delivered the main blow through the Belbek Valley to the Mekenzi Mountains, and a secondary blow along the Chernaya River valley to Inkerman.

As a result of fierce fighting, units of the Primorsky Army of General Ivan Petrov were pushed back to the south; as a result, the enemy came close to the Mekenzi Mountains, from the heights of which they could control the entire city and the approaches to it. Sevastopol was in critical condition.

Mortal danger for the German 11th Army

Like a gambler, Manstein threw all the forces of his army into storming the last Soviet bridgehead in Crimea, while he had minimal forces on the then secondary Kerch Peninsula. The leadership of the Red Army understood that it was urgently necessary to provide assistance to Sevastopol.

The 345th Infantry Division and the 79th Marine Brigade were urgently transported there by ship. At the same time, the battleship Paris Commune, the cruiser Molotov and the destroyers Bezuprechny and Smart used their guns to help the defenders of the citadel repel a number of attacks.

But the main help to Sevastopol was the amphibious landing in the east of Crimea. In his memoirs, Manstein admitted that “it was deadly danger for the army at a time when all its forces, with the exception of one German division and two Romanian brigades, were fighting for Sevastopol."

This meant the 46th Division from the 42nd Corps of General Hans von Sponeck. The baron found himself in an unenviable position, since in total the forces of the Soviet landing force amounted to more than 80 thousand people, while he had about 35 thousand soldiers.

At the same time, the actions of the invading troops were covered by warships of the Black Sea Fleet, including cruisers and destroyers. Sponeck's soldiers were threatened with encirclement, so the general asked Manstein for permission to retreat from the Kerch Peninsula in order to block the Red Army's further route to Crimea in the narrow 15-kilometer Ak-Monai Isthmus.

But Manstein forbade him to do this, because he did not want another front to arise in the Crimea against Soviet troops until Sevastopol was taken. Sponeck was ordered to throw the enemy into the sea at any cost. With the remaining forces, the commander-in-chief of the 11th Field Army continued the assault on Sevastopol.

This decision was also explained by the fact that Hitler took over the responsibilities of commander-in-chief of the German ground forces and forbade his generals to even think about retreat.

Losing equipment and soldiers

For three days the 46th Infantry Division held Kerch and the surrounding area. One of the most combat-ready Romanian units, the Radu Corne brigade, named after its commander, was moving to her aid. However, the capture of Feodosia on December 29, 1941 dramatically changed the situation. A threatening situation was created for the Germans, in which Soviet troops went to the rear under Sponeck’s subordinates.

Sponeck, who in the First world war was repeatedly awarded the Iron Cross for bravery, and was one of the creators of the parachute troops, he could not be called a coward. However, he understood that he did not have fresh reserves to fend off the Russian advance from Feodosia to the north.

His nerves could not stand it, and he decided to immediately withdraw his troops from the trap and attack the Soviet troops before they managed to close the encirclement ring. On the morning of December 31, 1941, fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the Ak-Monai Isthmus.

Losing heavy equipment, artillery, killed and wounded, units of the 46th Infantry Division managed to escape from the Kerch Peninsula. The attempt by Romanian troops to help their German allies failed miserably. Under attacks from tankers of the 44th Army, they retreated deeper into the peninsula.

In the face of ever-increasing resistance from the city’s defenders and the appearance of two enemy armies, the assault on Sevastopol on December 30 ended in failure for the Germans. Moreover, the Nazis had to withdraw troops from the northern sector of the front to the heights near the Belbek valley due to fears that Soviet units could break through the weakened German battle formations.

Postponed execution of the general

Hitler gave permission for this with difficulty. But retreating without Sponeck's orders infuriated him.

The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South, Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, categorically forbade the submission of soldiers and officers of the 46th Infantry Division, which was also deprived of insignia, for awards. Its commander, General Kurt Himer, was soon seriously wounded on the Ak-Monai Isthmus and died on April 4, 1942.

As for Sponeck, he was removed from command of the corps and appeared on January 23, 1942 before a military tribunal presided over by Nazi No. 2 Hermann Goering at the Fuhrer's headquarters. After which he was sentenced to death, which Hitler, due to Manstein’s protest, replaced him with six years of imprisonment in the fortress.

On July 23, 1944, after an assassination attempt on the Fuhrer, von Sponeck was shot on the personal order of Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler.

They were the first

General Alexei Pervushin was seriously wounded during an enemy air raid on his headquarters on January 16, 1942, and then the 44th Army fought with another commander. His colleague, commander of the 51st Army, General Vladimir Lvov, died on May 9, 1942 during a bombing.

After the liberation of Feodosia, the commander of the 1st Special Landing Detachment, Arkady Aidinov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and appointed the first commandant of the city. As a commandant's company, order was restored by the sailors from his detachment who survived. On March 19, 1942, Arkady Fedorovich died a brave death in battle.
But the struggle for Crimea continued.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation became one of the largest offensives of the Red Army on initial stage Great Patriotic War. It took place in the most difficult conditions.

As a result of the failure of the operation, the problems of the Soviet army and navy were exposed, which made it possible to avoid future mistakes. Until the Allied landing in Normandy, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was considered one of the largest.

Background

The occupation of Crimea began in 1941. By the beginning of autumn, the Wehrmacht captured almost the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. After the fall of Kyiv, hope for a counteroffensive was lost. Since most of the combat-ready armies of the entire front found themselves in the “cauldron”. The retreat to the East began. In September, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Crimea. The importance of the peninsula was well understood by both sides. Firstly, it ensured control over most of the Black Sea. Especially because of the hesitant Turkey. Which, although it supported the Third Reich, did not enter the war.

The peninsula was also a good air base. It was from here that Soviet bombers took off and carried out strategic air strikes on Romanian oil wells. Therefore, on September 26, the Wehrmacht went on the offensive on the isthmus. Less than a month later, the peninsula was almost completely captured. Soviet units retreated to Taman. Only Sevastopol remained, whose heroic defense was still ongoing. At this time, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was born at the Supreme Command Headquarters.

Preparation

As a result of the withdrawal from Crimea, the only place of resistance became Sevastopol. The city held a heroic defense, despite complete blockade from land and only partial supplies by sea. The Germans launched several assaults, but all of them were unsuccessful. Therefore, the commander of Army Group Manstein decided to begin a siege. Almost all the armies were needed to surround the huge agglomeration. At the same time, the Kerch crossing was defended by only one Wehrmacht division.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was developed by General Kozlov. To implement it, two armies were brought in. For two weeks, under the leadership of General Kozlov, possible landing routes were developed. Due to a lack of reserves, the border with Iran was removed a whole army. As a result, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was scheduled for the twenty-sixth of December. The plan involved a simultaneous attack on Feodosia and the strait. Soviet troops were supposed to drive the Germans out of the city, and then surround the entire enemy group. The command was counting on a quick victory, since the main German forces were concentrated near Sevastopol. At the same time, Kerch was covered only by a small German garrison and several Romanian armies. Already at that time, the Headquarters knew that the Romanian formations were extremely unstable to massive attacks and could not conduct a long-term defense.

If successful, the Red Army would be able to destroy the enemy group in the peninsula area. This would make it possible to freely transport new units to the coast from Taman. After this, Soviet troops could quickly advance west and strike in the rear German troops, besieging Sevastopol. According to Kozlov’s plan, after the city was released, a large-scale offensive could be launched in Crimea.

First hit

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942 began on December twenty-sixth. The "auxiliary" blow was struck first. He not only fettered the enemy’s forces, but distracted his attention from the main goal - Feodosia. With the support of the Black Sea Fleet, Soviet troops secretly approached the shore. After the artillery barrage, the landing began.

The landing took place in extreme difficult conditions. The shore was unsuitable for mooring ships and barges. The Germans also managed to start shelling the attackers. Therefore, the soldiers had to jump into the water as soon as the depth was sufficient to walk. That is, on a cold December day, the Red Army soldiers were up to their necks in ice water. As a result, there were large sanitary losses due to hypothermia. But a few days later the temperature dropped even more, and the strait froze. Therefore, the remainder of the 51st Army advanced across the ice.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942 on the main direction began on the twenty-ninth. Unlike the landing in Kerch, the landing in Feodosia took place directly at the port. The soldiers landed on the shore and immediately rushed into battle. In total, on the first day, about 40 thousand people were landed in both directions. The German garrison of the city numbered three thousand people. Their resistance was crushed by the end of the day. After landing in Feodosia, a threat loomed over the Nazis complete environment. In Kerch, the line was held by only one German division and Romanian mountain riflemen.

Retreat

Headquarters almost immediately learned about the results that the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation brought. The forces of the parties in the Kerch region were unequal. Soviet troops outnumbered German ones several times. Therefore, General von Sponeck decided to begin a retreat to the west. The order began to be executed instantly. The Nazis retreated to avoid the connection of two landing armies. However, at the front, Manstein categorically prohibited any retreat. He feared that if the Soviet troops retreated, they would be able to catch up with the German and Romanian armies and destroy them.

This was the plan of the Soviet leadership. The defeat of the Kerch garrison would lead to a shortage of German forces.

The road to Sevastopol would have been open to the Red Army. However, the landing force did not begin to advance rapidly. Instead of a quick push west, the Forty-Fourth Army moved towards Kerch to meet the Fifty-First Army. This delay allowed the Germans to gain a foothold on the new line of defense near Sivash. Reserves and heavy weapons were brought there. In Berlin they immediately began to take retaliatory measures as soon as they learned that the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation had begun. The 1st stage allowed Soviet troops to gain a foothold on the coast. However, the hardest part was yet to come.

Difficult position

After the defeat of the Germans in Feodosia and Kerch, the Red Army units were extremely exhausted. This is primarily due to extreme conditions disembarkation Ice water, low air temperature, etc. had a bad effect on the well-being of the soldiers. There was not a single hospital on the captured bridgeheads. Therefore, wounded soldiers could only rely on first aid. After that, they were delivered to Kerch and from there, across the sea, to the mainland. The seriously wounded were not always able to travel such a long distance.

It was also not possible to establish a crossing due to constant attacks German aviation. Air defense equipment was not delivered on time. Therefore, in fact, the planes did not encounter any resistance. As a result, many warships were seriously damaged.

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation: 2nd stage

In less than a week, the Red Army soldiers recaptured the entire coast. Fascist resistance was suppressed quite quickly. Due to uncertainty in the Romanian units, the Wehrmacht introduced regular German officers into their ranks. The defense along Sivash was strengthened by a reserve infantry regiment.

The main direction of impact for Soviet troops there was a railway that supplied the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht. Taking into account the weakness of the Nazi troops, the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters ordered an immediate attack to the west. According to the plan, Kozlov was supposed to go to the rear of the Germans besieging Sevastopol and defeat them. After this, it was planned to launch another large-scale offensive and liberate all of Crimea. However, the general hesitated too long. He believed that there were still not enough resources for the throw. It would seem that the successful Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the Soviet troops brought severe disappointment. The Nazis counterattacked.

The following month, forty-two, a new large-scale offensive was being prepared. To support it, an additional corps was landed in Sudak. Ammunition and reinforcements arrived by sea and ice. However, one of best generals Kozlov was ahead of the Third Reich. In mid-January, the Nazis unexpectedly began their offensive. The main blow fell on the poorly fortified front line at the junction of the two armies. Three days later the Germans reached their original positions. By the end of January 18, Feodosia had fallen. The troops recently landed in Sudak put up desperate resistance. For almost two weeks, the Red Army soldiers fought heroically and almost completely gave up their lives in battle. Cargo ships carrying supplies were destroyed. After the loss of their only port, Soviet troops could only be transported to Kerch by ice.

Preparing for a new attack

After this, the command created a separate front in Crimea.

It included armies already operating on the peninsula and new formations. Soldiers of the 47th Army were removed from the Iranian border. The command transported a significant amount of equipment. A special commissioner was sent from Headquarters. Preparations for the offensive began. It was scheduled for the end of February. The goal was the enemy grouping near Sevastopol; in fact, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was developed to destroy it. The Crimean front was reinforced with artillery regiments and heavy tanks throughout the month.

On the twenty-seventh of February the offensive began. It was planned to concentrate the main attack in Kerch. However, weather conditions interfered with the plans. It began to thaw and it rained heavily. Mud and mud prevented the advance of heavy equipment. Tanks, especially heavy ones, could not keep up with the infantry. As a result, the Germans were able to withstand the attack of the Red Army. Only on one sector of the front was it possible to break through the defense line. The Romanian army could not withstand the onslaught. But nevertheless, the Soviet troops were unable to build on their initial success. Manstein understood that a breakthrough threatened the Red Army soldiers entering the flank of his armies. Therefore, I sent the last reserves to hold the line, and this yielded results. Stubborn fighting continued until the third of March. But it was not possible to make serious progress.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the Crimean Front troops continued in mid-March. Eight rifle divisions, supported by two tank brigades, launched an offensive. At the same time, the Primorsky Army struck from besieged Sevastopol. But they failed to break through to their own people. The Germans repelled ten attacks per day. But the Nazi defenses were never broken through. Some units achieved some success, but were unable to maintain their positions. After this, the front stabilized and the intensity of hostilities decreased.

German advance

By the end of March, Soviet troops had lost one hundred and ten thousand people since the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation began. The 3rd stage began with the German offensive.

It was planned carefully and for a long time. As a result of the unsuccessful attack of the Red Army, a front ledge (the so-called arc) was formed in the place where the Romanian division was defeated. The main forces of the Soviet army were concentrated here. While in the south, only three divisions occupied the defense.

Manstein decided to make a maneuver, striking precisely to the south. For this purpose, significant reinforcements were sent to Crimea. consisting of one hundred and eighty vehicles, arrived on the outskirts of Sevastopol. The Germans conducted a thorough reconnaissance and identified the weaknesses of the Soviet defense. The Nazis intended to use air power to support the planned offensive. For this, on Hitler’s personal orders, an air corps was sent to the peninsula. Planes also arrived from Romania. However, the pilots of all the aircraft were exclusively Germans.

Soviet troops were located too close to the front. Many eyewitnesses of those events recall this. According to historians, it was the inept command of Kozlov and Mehlis that led to the subsequent tragedy. Instead of leaving divisions in the rear, where they would be out of the range of artillery fire, they were constantly driven forward.

Fatal defeat

The offensive began on May 7th. The ground attack was preceded by air preparation. The Luftwaffe attacked previously identified targets. As a result, Soviet troops suffered losses in many directions. The headquarters of one of the armies was destroyed. As a result of this, command passed to Colonel Kotov.

The next day the infantry offensive began. With the support of heavy tanks, the Germans broke through the front seven kilometers deep. The sudden attack in this area could not be repelled. Troops also landed behind the Red Army lines. Its numbers were small, but the sudden attack from the sea caused panic among the Soviet soldiers. By May 9, Manstein brought another of his divisions into battle. The Germans managed to finally break through the front and defeat almost the entire southern group. Immediately after this, the Wehrmacht began to turn north, threatening to attack the remaining forces of the Crimean Front on the flank.

Taking into account the catastrophic situation, on the night of May tenth there is a personal conversation between Stalin and Kozlov. It was decided to retreat to a new line of defense. But the army left without a commander after the German air raid could no longer advance. A new blow was delivered in the direction of the Cimmerian Wall, which was assigned the role of a new line of defense. The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the Soviet troops failed. A German landing force from the air helped to finally break through the defenses. On May 14, the evacuation of Red Army soldiers from Crimea began. A day later, the Germans began their assault on Kerch. The city's garrison fought until it was left without ammunition, after which the city's defenders retreated to the quarries.

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation: results

The landing in Kerch initially brought success. Was educated new front, the opportunity arose for one of the first large-scale offensives. However, inept command of the troops led to tragic consequences. Over several months of heavy fighting, the Germans managed not only to hold their positions, but also to go on the offensive. As a result, the Wehrmacht delivered a strategically thought-out blow, which led to defeat, which ended the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. The battles are briefly described in the diaries of Kozlov and Manstein.

Despite the failure of the operation, it became a harbinger of the already victorious offensive on the peninsula in 1944.

Second attack

Two years after the tragic defeat, a new landing force landed in the Kerch port. 1944 was the year of the liberation of Crimea. When planning the offensive on the peninsula, the command considered all the details of the first operation. The Azov Fleet was used to deliver troops. The landing party was supposed to seize a bridgehead for a further large-scale offensive.

At this time, a large-scale offensive. Therefore, attacks were launched from two directions. On January 22, about one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers boarded ships and set off for Kerch. To cover up the upcoming operation, soviet artillery began a massive shelling of the coast. In this case, the greatest fire was applied not at the landing site in order to disorient the enemy. Several boats also simulated a landing.

Closer to the night of January twenty-second, troops landed in the Kerch port. 1944 was not nearly as cold as 42, so the Marines did not suffer significant losses from hypothermia. Immediately after landing, the paratroopers rushed into battle and achieved significant success. A significant part of the city was captured. However, the army advancing from the other side was unable to break through the German defenses. Therefore, the paratroopers had to break through to their own forces on their own. During the battles, one of the battalions managed to capture 170 German soldiers. A few days later, having suffered significant losses, Marines broke through the encirclement and linked up with the advancing units. In essence, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942 was repeated, only much more successful.

Tragedy of the Crimean Front

Possession Crimean peninsula was of strategic importance. Hitler called it a Soviet unsinkable aircraft carrier threatening Romanian oil.

October 18, 1941The 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of Infantry General Erich von Manstein began an operation to seize Crimea. After ten days of stubborn fighting, the Germans reached operational space. TO November 16, 1941 all of Crimea, except Sevastopol, was occupied.

December 26, 1941started Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. The troops of the Soviet 51st and 44th armies of the Transcaucasian Front recaptured the Kerch Peninsula, advancing to 100-110 km behind 8 days.

Soviet troops stopped January 2, 1942 at the line Kiet - Novaya Pokrovka - Koktebel. The Soviet 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades and 2 tank battalions were opposed there by one German infantry division, a reinforced infantry regiment and Romanian mountain and cavalry brigades.

Mansteinwrote in his memoirs:

“If the enemy took advantage of the created situation and began to quickly pursue the 46th Infantry Division, and also decisively hit the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a hopeless situation would have been created not only for this new section of the 11th Army’s front. The fate of the entire 11th Army would have been decided 1st Army. A more decisive enemy could have paralyzed all the army's supplies with a rapid breakthrough on Dzhankoy. Troops recalled from Sevastopol– 170th and 132nd PD– could arrive in the area west or north-west of Feodosia no earlier than 14 days later."

The command of the Transcaucasian Front nevertheless planned to carry out operations to liberate Crimea. The operation plan was reported to the People's Commissar of Defense January 1, 1942. The attack of the motorized mechanized group (2 tank brigades and a cavalry division) and the 51st Army (4 rifle divisions and 2 brigades) was planned to reach Perekop, where it was planned to drop an airborne assault force in advance. 44th Army (3 rifle divisions) - reach Simferopol. Two mountain rifle divisions were to strike along the Black Sea coast. The Primorsky Army was supposed to pin down the enemy near Sevastopol and land troops in Yevpatoria, followed by a direction to Simferopol. General task –destruction of all enemy forces in Crimea. The operation began on January 8-12, 1942.

However, the operation was not started on time, and January 15, 1942 The Germans and Romanians launched a counterattack, recapturing Feodosia on January 18. Soviet troops were pushed back 10-20 km, to the Karpacz Isthmus.

February 27, 1942The Soviet offensive began both from Sevastopol and from the Karpacz Isthmus. There, Soviet 7 rifle divisions and 2 brigades, and several tank battalions acted against 3 German and 1 Romanian infantry divisions. The second echelon of Soviet troops included 6 rifle divisions, one cavalry division and two tank brigades. The Romanian division on the northern flank retreated again to Kiet, 10 km. March 3, 1942 the front stabilized - now it arched to the west.

On March 13, 1942, Soviet troops (8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades) again went on the offensive. The Germans held out, and on March 20, 1942 they tried to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 22nd Panzer Division (which had just been reorganized from an infantry division) and two infantry divisions. The Germans were repulsed.

On March 26, 1942, four Soviet divisions attempted to advance, but were in turn repulsed.

The last attempt at a Soviet offensive in Crimea was April 9-11, 1942.

“At present, the forces of the Crimean Front will not be increased. Therefore, the troops of the Crimean Front will firmly gain a foothold on the occupied lines, improving them defensive structures in engineering terms and improving the tactical position of troops in certain areas, in particular by capturing the Koi-Asan node."

By this time, the Crimean Front included 16 rifle divisions and 3 brigades, a cavalry division, 4 tank brigades, and 9 artillery reinforcement regiments. The front had 225 bombers and 176 fighters (serviceable). The enemy had 5 German infantry and 1 tank divisions, 2 Romanian infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, as well as the Groddeck motorized brigade, which consisted mainly of Romanian units under the command of the German headquarters.

With such a balance of forces (Manstein estimated Soviet supremacy able as double) the Germans and Romanians crossed May 8, 1942 on the offensive.

Mansteindecided to reverse the factor of the numerical superiority of Soviet troops in St. oh good. The front line consisted of two sections. The southern section from Koi-Asan to the Black Sea coast (8 km) consisted of well-equipped (since January 1942) Soviet defensive positions, occupied by the 44th Army. The northern section from Koi-Asan to Kiet (16 km) curved to the west. The Soviet command should have expected that the Germans would strike in the Koi-Asan area in order to cut off the northern group (47th and 51st armies).

Indeed, given the small number of his forces, Manstein could only count on environment as many as possible Soviet forces in as small an area as possible and then destroy them with aviation and artillery. His forces were sufficient for operations on a narrow section of the front, but further east the Kerch Peninsula expands, and there the numerical superiority of Soviet forces could cost the Germans dearly.

The idea of ​​the German operation "Hunting for Bustards" was based on delivering the main attack not in the Koi-Asan area, but at the southern end of the front line, where it was least expected. Moreover, three German infantry and tank divisions, as well as the Groddeck brigade, were supposed to attack here, that is, at least half all German-Romanian forces. In the northern and central sectors of the front, the Germans and Romanians were supposed to conduct a demonstration of the offensive, truly moving into it only after the breakthrough of the southern group. In addition, in the first hours of the operation, massive air strikes were carried out on the headquarters of units of the 47th and 51st armies.

The German ploy worked - Soviet reserves remained in the north after the start of the offensive. On May 8, the Germans broke through the Soviet defenses in a 5 km section, to a depth of 8 km. On May 9, heavy rain began to fall, which prevented the Germans from bringing a tank division into battle, but before the downpour, the Groddeck motorized brigade managed to advance, cutting off the 44th Army from its rear positions.In addition, a German boat landing force landed in the rear of the 44th Army. This was only one battalion, but it assisted the German offensive.

May 11, 1942The German 22nd Panzer Division reached the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. It was followed by the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade. 8 Soviet divisions found themselves in the resulting cauldron, and on that day the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, died. On the same day, Stalin and Vasilevsky sent an angry directive to the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, which began with the words

“The Military Council of the Crimean Front, including Kozlov, Mekhlis, have lost their heads, and to this day cannot contact the armies...”

And ending by order:

"don't let the enemy pass".

However, the Germans and Romanians advanced rapidly. On the evening of May 14, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Kerch. On May 15, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered:

“Don’t surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol.”

However, already May 16, 1942 The German 170th Infantry Division took Kerch. May 19, 1942 fighting on the Kerch Peninsula ceased, with the exception of the resistance of the remnants of Soviet troops in the Adzhimushkai quarries.

From 270 thousand fighters and commanders of the Crimean Front for 12 days battles were lost forever 162.282 person - 65% . German losses amounted to 7.5 thousand. As it is written in “History of the Great Patriotic War”:

“it was not possible to carry out the evacuation in an organized manner. The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol”.

On June 4, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters declared the command of the Crimean Front to be responsible for the “unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation.”

Army Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis was removed from his posts as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and demoted to the rank of Corps Commissar.

Lieutenant General Kozlov was removed from his post as front commander and demoted to the rank of major general.

Divisional Commissar Shamanin was removed from his post as a member of the Front's Military Council and demoted to the rank of brigade commissar.

Major General Vechny was removed from the post of chief of staff of the front.

Lieutenant General Chernyak and Major General Kolganov were removed from their posts as army commanders and demoted to the rank of colonel.

Major General Nikolayenko was removed from his post as commander of the front air force and demoted to the rank of colonel.

July 1, 1942 (even before the capture of Sevastopol) Manstein received the title Field Marshal General.

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photo from the Internet, Kerch region. prisoners of war

I "d say it"s rather May 1942 (17-19), after Operation Trappenjagd.

Clarification

It is after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Image attached from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Krim. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of world historical importance), which describes an international delegation who came to see how the German-Romanian troops conquered Sevastopol.

Text translation:

It was after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Images taken from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Crimea. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of World-Historical Significance), which describes the international delegations that came to see German-Romanian troops capture Sevastopol.

Presumably this is Marfovka.

Also Marfovka.

Soviet ammunition, the first two are high-explosive, the rest are fragmentation.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

my excavations

Spent cartridges

Akmonai positions. Dota.

bullet marks

Personal weapon of a soldier 633 SP, 157 SD.

Fragment sniper rifle Mosin.

Kerch area, May 1942, in the photo Il-2.

May 1942, Kerch region.

All 5 photos from the Bundesarchiv, Germany

“Alarmists will be shot on the spot...”

FROM THE TRAGEDY of the Crimean Front during the reign of Khrushchev, one of the most confusing myths about the Great Patriotic War was created - the myth that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief specifically sent his mediocrity in military affairs to various fronts, but “ faithful dog“Mehlis and he kept the command in fear. As a result, in particular, the Crimean disaster of May 1942 occurred.

On the cover of a doctor's book historical sciences Yuri Rubtsov “Mekhlis. Shadow of the Leader" (M., 2007) the following summary about the hero of the work was made: "The mere mention of the name of Lev Mekhlis caused horror in many brave and honored generals. Long years this man was Stalin’s real shadow, his “second self” and in fact the master of the Red Army. He was so fanatically devoted to his leader and country that he stopped at nothing to complete his task. On the one hand, Mehlis is accused of having the blood of hundreds of innocent commanders on his hands, some of whom he personally shot. On the other hand, he was respected by ordinary soldiers, whom he always took care of. On the one hand, Mehlis was one of the main culprits for the defeat of the first months of the Great Patriotic War and the collapse of the Crimean Front in the spring of 1942. On the other hand, his inflexibility and firmness more than once saved troops in the most desperate situations. Was Mehlis the embodiment of evil? Or did he simply personify his controversial times?

The documents cited in the book by a respected colleague did not allow either the author or the readers to draw an unambiguous conclusion. Although, I note that our historiography is dominated by a persistent hostility towards the personality of this deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The majority of the creative intelligentsia appreciates this historical figure with a minus sign.

Our information. Lev Zakharovich Mehlis was born in 1889 in Odessa. He graduated from 6 classes of the Jewish commercial school. Since 1911 in the army, he served in the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. In 1918 he joined communist party and was on political work in the Red Army. In 1921-1922 - in people's commissariat Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, headed by Stalin. In 1922-1926 - one of the personal secretaries Secretary General Stalin's Central Committee, in 1926-1930 he studied at courses at the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors. In 1930, he became the head of the press and publishing department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and at the same time the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Pravda. In 1937-1940 - Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, in 1940-1941 - People's Commissar of State Control. According to the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, “he was truly an honest man, but in some ways crazy,” because he had a mania for seeing enemies and saboteurs everywhere. On the eve of the war, he was reappointed head of the Main Political Directorate, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (while retaining the post of People's Commissar of State Control). In 1942 he was a representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters on the Crimean Front. After the defeat of the Crimean Front troops in May 1942, he was removed from his posts, and in 1942-1946 he was a member of the military councils of a number of armies and fronts. In 1946-1950 - Minister of State Control of the USSR. Died February 13, 1953.

Konstantin Simonov is sometimes credited with the following statement about Mehlis: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason is clear to me most shameful defeat. Complete distrust of the army and front commanders, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mehlis, a man illiterate in military affairs... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the very front line. Three armies stood on a front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere and never have I seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because a madman commanded the front ... "

BUT THIS, I note, is not Simonov’s personal assessment. Here is how it was. On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Victory, on April 28, 1965, the front-line writer decided to express some thoughts related to the history of the Great Patriotic War. There is such a fragment in the material. It is worth citing in full (I quote from: K. Simonov. “Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on I.V. Stalin.” M., APN, 1989).

“I would like to give an example of an operation in which we clearly encountered true interests conduct of war and false, sloganeering ideas about how the war should be waged, based not only on military illiteracy, but also on the lack of faith in people generated in 1937. I'm talking about the sad memory of the Kerch events of the winter - spring of 1942.

Seven years ago, one of our front-line writers wrote to me the following: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason for the most shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust of the commanders of the armies and the front, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mehlis, a man illiterate in military matters... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the most advanced positions, etc. Three armies stood on a front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere have I ever seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because the front was commanded not by a commander, but by a madman...” (I emphasize that these are not the words of Simonov, but of a writer he knew. - A.M.)

I did not talk about this in order to once again give an unkind word to Mehlis, who, by the way, was a man of impeccable personal courage and did not do everything he did with the intention of personally becoming famous. He was deeply convinced that he was acting correctly, and that is why, from a historical point of view, his actions on the Kerch Peninsula are fundamentally interesting. This was a man who, during that period of the war, regardless of any circumstances, considered anyone who preferred a convenient position a hundred meters from the enemy to an uncomfortable one fifty meters away, a coward. He considered everyone who wanted to simply protect the troops from possible failure to be an alarmist; considered everyone who realistically assessed the enemy's strength to be unsure of own strength. Mehlis, for all his personal readiness to give his life for his Motherland, was a pronounced product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938.

And the front commander, to whom he came as a representative of Headquarters, an educated and experienced military man, in turn also turned out to be a product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938, only in a different sense - in the sense of fear of taking full responsibility, fear of contrasting a reasonable military decision with an illiterate one. the onslaught of “everything and everything - forward”, fear of transferring his dispute with Mehlis to Headquarters at the risk of himself.

The difficult events of Kerch from a historical point of view are interesting in that they seem to screw together both halves of the consequences of 1937-1938 - both the one that was presented by Mehlis and the one that was presented by the then commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov.”

I WILL NOT argue with the great writer. Everyone has their own view of the past. I will express my personal opinion about Mehlis, supported by familiarity with the documents of that time. Yes, indeed, Lev Zakharovich is a very difficult and controversial political figure. He was harsh, sometimes even very, often straightforward in his assessments and demands. To put it mildly, he did not like to be diplomatic. He was tough, even to the point of cruelty, and during the war he went beyond this line in a difficult front-line situation.

Several examples can be given in this regard. September 12, 1941. 34th Army of the North-Western Front. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Mehlis personally draws up order No. 057 for front troops: “...For demonstrated cowardice and personal withdrawal from the battlefield to the rear, for violation of military discipline, expressed in direct failure to comply with the front order to come to the aid of units advancing from the west, for failure to take measures to save the material part of the artillery... Major General of Artillery Goncharov, on the basis of the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 270, is to be publicly shot in front of the formation of the commanders of the headquarters of the 34th Army.” Moreover, the general had already been extrajudicially shot the day before on the basis of an oral order from Mehlis and Army General K.A. Meretskova.

Cruel? Yes, it's cruel. But this is war, and we were talking about the fate of the entire state... Moreover, in those tragic months, a very nervous situation reigned at the front in the conditions of retreat under the pressure of German troops.

In this regard, it should also be noted that Stalin did not condone this kind of reprisals. At the beginning of October, he harshly reprimanded commanders and commissars who practiced lynching and assault instead of educational work. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0391 of October 4, 1941, signed by Stalin and Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov, was called: “On the facts of the replacement of educational work with repression.” In it, Stalin demanded “in the most decisive manner, right up to bringing the perpetrators to trial in a military tribunal, to fight all phenomena of illegal repression, assault and lynching.”

I ALLOW myself small retreat. Since the time of perestroika, historical literature and journalism have been dominated by the desire to evaluate the actions of statesmen and their motives from the standpoint of the realities of the present time - a time of peace and goodness. Then the situation was fundamentally different, and the life school of that generation was different. Many were tested in the fight against the special services of Imperial Russia and in the fratricidal Civil War. This embittered the future Soviet leaders; there were no sentimental people among them.

It is also impossible to understand the reasons for the extreme cruelty towards other military leaders in 1941 - the same command of the Western Front - without the context of the circumstances of the dramatic beginning of repelling the aggression of Nazi Germany. About them we, unfortunately, despite decisions made We don’t know everything about the declassification of documents from the Great Patriotic War.

A specific example: a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff, Army General G.K. Zhukov to the troops of the western military districts on June 18, 1941. This document remains inaccessible to researchers - even to employees of the Institute of World History Russian Academy sciences involved in the preparation of a new multi-volume history of the Great Patriotic War.

And such a telegram existed. In 2008, the Kuchkovo Pole publishing house published a book by counterintelligence veteran Vladimir Yampolsky, “...Destroy Russia in the Spring of 1941,” which included materials on the case of the commander of the Western Front, Army General D.G. Pavlova. In the protocol of a closed court session of the Military Collegium Supreme Court USSR from July 22, 1941 there is such an episode. Member of the court A.M. Orlov reads out the testimony of the defendant - former boss communications of the headquarters of the Western Front, Major General A.T. Grigoriev at the investigation: “...And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff on June 18, the district troops were not brought into combat readiness" Grigoriev confirms: “All this is true.”

There is every reason to assert that on June 18, 1941, Stalin allowed the troops of the first strategic echelon to be brought to full combat readiness, but the directive of the General Staff authorized by him turned out to be, for some reason, unfulfilled by the command of the western military districts, and primarily in the Western Special.

Another document has survived, indicating that on June 18, 1941, a telegram was sent from the Chief of the General Staff to the command of the western military districts. This research was carried out in the late 1940s - the first half of the 1950s by the military scientific department of the General Staff under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky. Then, while Stalin was still alive, it was decided to generalize the experience of concentrating and deploying troops of the western military districts according to the plan for covering the state border on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. For this purpose, five questions were asked to the participants tragic events occupied before the war command positions in the troops western districts(fragmentary answers to some questions were published in the Military Historical Journal in 1989).

The questions were formulated as follows: 1. Was the plan for the defense of the state border communicated to the troops, as far as they were concerned; when and what was done by the command and headquarters to ensure the implementation of this plan? 2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to reach state border and how many of them were deployed before the outbreak of hostilities? 3. When the order was received to put troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22; what and when were the instructions given to carry out this order and what was done by the troops? 4. Why was most of the artillery located in training centers? 5. To what extent were the headquarters prepared for command and control of troops and to what extent did this affect the course of operations in the first days of the war?

The editors of the Military Historical Journal managed to publish answers to the first two questions, but when it was the turn to answer the third question: “When was the order received to put the troops on combat readiness?” Chief Editor magazine Major General V.I. Filatov received a command from above to stop further publication of responses from participants in the events of June 1941. But even from the first two answers it follows that the telegram (or directive) of the Chief of the General Staff existed...

NOW about the behavior of Mehlis himself at the front.

From the memoirs of Colonel General engineering troops Arkady Khrenov: “In one of his companies the order to attack was found. Without hesitation, he became the head of the company and led it behind him. None of those around him were able to dissuade Mehlis from this step. It was very difficult to argue with Lev Zakharovich..."

From the memoirs of Major General David Ortenberg, who edited the newspaper of the 11th Army “Heroic March” during the war with Finland (1939-1940) and, together with Mehlis, was surrounded by one of our divisions: “Army Commissar 1 1st rank put the editorial staff on a truck - a former Leningrad taxi, and gave several soldiers for security: “Get through.” And they broke through the still fragile ice of the lake. And Mehlis himself, together with the division commander, led its exit from the encirclement... Seeing that ours could not knock down the Finnish barrier near the road, Mehlis placed the soldiers in a chain, got into the tank and, moving forward, opened fire from a cannon and machine gun. The soldiers followed. The enemy was knocked out of his position."

The statement of Army General Alexander Gorbatov about Mehlis has also been preserved: “At every meeting with me until the liberation of Orel, Mehlis did not miss an opportunity to ask me any question that could lead to a dead end. I answered simply and probably not always the way he wanted. However, it was noticeable that, although with difficulty, he was changing his previous attitude towards me for the better. When we were already behind the Eagle, he suddenly said:

I have been looking closely at you for a long time and I must say that I like you as an army commander and as a communist. I followed your every step after you left Moscow and didn’t quite believe the good things I heard about you. Now I see that I was wrong.”

Mehlis, of course, did not have an academic military education and did not possess military leadership talents like the great Rokossovsky. By the way, he highly valued this commander and, shortly before the disaster of the Crimean Front, which became obvious to him in the spring of 1942, he asked Stalin to appoint Konstantin Konstantinovich as commander of the Crimean Front. Alas, because seriously injured Rokossovsky was still in the hospital at that time (on March 8, 1942, the commander of the 16th Army of the Western Front, Rokossovsky, was wounded by a shell fragment and was treated until May 23. - Ed.).

At the same time, Mehlis knew what war was. After all, during the Civil War he was at the front, was a commissar of a brigade, then the 46th Infantry Division and the Right Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine, participated in battles against the gangs of Ataman Grigoriev and one of the most talented commanders White Army - General Y.A. Slashchev, was wounded.

WITH Civil War Mehlis had a habit of telling people directly about mistakes and miscalculations. Naturally, he made many enemies from this. Mehlis always spoke with pathos, but sincerely. Of course, he could not do without his characteristic manner of seeing everything either in white or in black. It should be noted that as People's Commissar (Minister) of State Control, he was forced to engage in what today would be called anti-corruption measures, and as a result of inspections, many Soviet officials had to change their warm offices to barracks in Kolyma. Even under Stalin, officials stole and ruled at the expense of the state. Is this not where the origins of hatred towards Stalin’s “chief controller” come from on the part of the descendants of the families of the Soviet nomenklatura, most of whom have adapted well to the new life?..

And then the Great Patriotic War began. Mehlis is back in the army. On January 20, 1942, he arrived at the Crimean Front (until January 28, 1942, the front was called the Caucasian Front) in the status authorized representative Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On the eve of his arrival, the troops successfully carried out the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation (December 26 - February 2) and captured a vast bridgehead.

Commander of the Caucasian Front, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov received instructions from the Supreme Command Headquarters to speed up the concentration of troops on the bridgehead in every possible way. They decided to transfer additional forces there (47th Army) and, no later than January 12, launch a general offensive with the support of the Black Sea Fleet. The point was to reach Perekop as soon as possible and strike at the rear of the Sevastopol Wehrmacht group. By the summer of 1942, Crimea could actually become Soviet again.

Our information. As a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, by January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. As the commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, admitted after the war, “in the first days of January 1942, for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch, the path to the vital artery of the 11th Army - the Dzhankoy - Simferopol railway - was actually open. The weak covering front (of the Sevastopol Wehrmacht group - Ed.), which we managed to create, could not withstand the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia area.” German general also believed that “if the enemy took advantage of the created situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would have been created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector... However The front command postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

The offensive of the Soviet troops nevertheless began, but to break through the positions German divisions failed. This breakdown is usually described as saying that our command underestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy. Historians try not to name the specific culprits for the failure of the offensive, which could have led to the liberation of all of Crimea, so as not to offend anyone.

It is kept silent that the offensive failed due to the lack of a well-thought-out plan, as well as clear logistical and combat support for the troops landing in Crimea. This was primarily manifested in the shortage transport ships for the transfer of manpower and artillery from the “mainland”. The situation with the provision of ammunition and fuel to the troops was also catastrophic. This is the testimony of Major General A.N. Pervushin, commander of the 44th Army participating in this operation (he was seriously wounded in January 1942 - Ed.).

Then weather conditions intervened - the ensuing thaw rendered field airfields completely unusable. The lack of normal communications and air defense systems also had an impact. They “forgot” to deliver anti-aircraft artillery to the port of Feodosia, and as a result, until January 4, 5 transports were killed from unpunished actions of German aviation, and the cruiser “Red Caucasus” was seriously damaged.

On January 18, the Germans, taking advantage of the passivity of the Soviet troops, recaptured Feodosia. Then General Kozlov decided to withdraw troops to the Ak-Monai positions - a defensive line approximately 80 kilometers from Kerch. It was in this situation that Mehlis arrived at the front.

Two days after his arrival, he sent Stalin a telegram with the following content: “We arrived in Kerch on January 20, 1942. We found the most unsightly picture of the organization of command and control... Komfront Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as the enemy grouping. For any division there is no data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front have been in the troops since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula...”

Our information. Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich (1896–1967). In military service since 1915, he graduated from the school of warrant officers. Participant of the First World War. In the Red Army since 1918, he commanded a battalion and a regiment. After the Civil War he studied at the Frunze Military Academy. During the Soviet-Finnish War, he commanded the 1st Rifle Corps of the 8th Army. Since 1940 - Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District, then - Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the Red Army. Since 1941 - commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District. After the disaster in Crimea, it was reduced to military rank to major general. In August 1942, he was appointed commander of the 24th Army of the Stalingrad Front, and from August 1943, deputy commander of the Trans-Baikal Front. Participated in battles against Japan.

Mehlis’s telegram is usually characterized as follows: two days were “enough” for the arrogant People’s Commissar of State Control to get an idea of ​​the state of affairs at the front. However, in essence Mehlis was right. The main provisions of his telegram corresponded, by the way, to the contents of the order of the front command itself No. 12 of January 23, 1942. The order was signed by Kozlov, a member of the Military Council of the front F.A. Shamanin and Mehlis.

To this we must add that the command of the Caucasian Front at that time was in Tbilisi. And from there he directed the fighting. From a thousand kilometers away.

Mehlis really quickly figured out what was going on. And he immediately raised before Headquarters the question of separating an independent Crimean Front from the Caucasus Front and transferring command and control of troops to the Kerch Peninsula. At the same time, he demanded replenishment of manpower (3 rifle divisions), and began to demand that the front-line command urgently restore order in artillery, air defense, and logistics support.

"1. The command of armies, divisions, regiments should take into account the experience of the battles of January 15-18, 1942, immediately restore order in the units... Have regimental artillery and anti-tank artillery (anti-tank - A.M.) in infantry battle formations...

2. Alarmists and deserters should be shot on the spot as traitors. Those caught intentionally wounding left-handed crossbowmen should be shot in front of the line.

3. Within three days, restore complete order in the rear..."

Mehlis especially carefully checked the condition of the air force and artillery of the front, on which the combat effectiveness of the entire group of our troops depended to a decisive extent. It turned out that due to poor logistics, 110 faulty aircraft accumulated on the Kerch Peninsula, so less than one sortie was carried out per day.

Mehlis, using his official status, obtained additional weapons from the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff - the front received 450 light machine guns, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 mortars of 120 mm caliber and 50 mortars of 82 mm caliber, two divisions of M-8 rocket launchers. The issue of allocating an additional number of tanks to the front, including heavy KVs, anti-tank rifles and ammunition, was being resolved.

On January 24, a new commander of the front air force was appointed - Major General E.M. Nikolaenko. A little later, the new chief of the engineering troops arrived - Major General A.F. Khrenov. On the eve of the planned offensive, Mehlis also secured a transfer to the front large quantity political workers at various levels, including specialists in special propaganda against the Germans.

The 47th Army (commander - Major General K.S. Kalganov), transferred from northern Iran, crossed the ice of the Kerch Strait to the peninsula.

On February 15, Stalin received Mehlis. At the meeting, to the displeasure of the Supreme, he asked for additional time to prepare the front for the offensive. This relates to the question of whether Mehlis thoughtlessly carried out the orders of Headquarters. And Stalin agreed with him - apparently, Mehlis’s arguments worked.

On February 27, 1942, the planned offensive began. The Crimean Front had 12 rifle divisions, four tank brigades, one cavalry division. But the command of the Crimean Front, instead of actively using tanks, including KV and T-34, to break through the German defense in the treeless terrain of the Kerch Peninsula, sent forward infantry, whose attacks the Germans repulsed with machine-gun fire.

For three days they drove the infantry into senseless attacks, killing thousands of people. 13 Soviet divisions advanced against three German and one Romanian. A irrecoverable losses huge (by April already 225 thousand people).

On March 9, Mehlis sent Stalin a proposal to immediately remove Kozlov and the staff of Major General F.I. Tolbukhin from his posts. Only the chief of staff of the front was replaced - with Major General P.P. Eternal. On March 29, Mehlis again insisted in writing to Stalin on the removal of Kozlov. The description given to the commander is unflattering: he is lazy, “a gluttonous gentleman of the peasants,” is not interested in operational issues, regards trips to the troops as “punishment,” in frontline troops, does not enjoy authority, does not like painstaking, everyday work.

Instead, Mehlis asked to appoint one of the following generals: N.K. Klykov, but he commanded the 2nd Shock Army breaking through to Leningrad and at that moment it was impossible to change him; K.K. Rokossovsky, who was still recovering in the hospital; Commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, whom he met on the Kerch Peninsula. But for some reason the latter’s candidacy did not find Stalin’s support.

By the beginning of May, the front group of troops prepared for an offensive, but it was postponed. On May 6, 1942, Headquarters ordered the front to go on the defensive, apparently having information about the upcoming German offensive. But the front command did not have time to reorganize the troops for defense. Their group remained offensive.

Meanwhile German command strengthened its 11th Army. Back in early April, the 22nd Tank Division appeared in its composition (180 Czech tanks LT vz.38: weight - 9.5 tons, frontal armor - from 25 to 50 mm, 37 mm gun). On May 8, the Germans went on the offensive with massive air support (Operation “Hunting for Bustards”). The command post of the 51st Army was destroyed, and General Lvov was killed on May 11.

Already during the May breakthrough of our defense by the Germans, Headquarters gave General Kozlov the following instructions:

“1) The entire 47th Army must immediately begin to withdraw beyond the Turkish Wall, organizing a rearguard and covering the retreat with aviation. Without this there will be a risk of being captured...

3) You can organize a strike with the forces of the 51st Army so that this army is gradually withdrawn beyond the Turkish Wall.

4) The remnants of the 44th Army also need to be withdrawn beyond the Turkish Wall.

5) Mehlis and Kozlov must immediately begin organizing defense along the Turkish Wall.

6) We do not object to the transfer of headquarters to the place you indicated.

7) We strongly object to the departure of Kozlov and Mekhlis to the Lvov group.

8) Take all measures to ensure that artillery, especially large artillery, is concentrated behind the Turkish Wall, as well as a number of anti-tank regiments.

9) If you are able and manage to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement...”

But neither the Turkish Wall nor the Kerch contours were equipped in engineering terms and did not pose a serious obstacle for the Germans.

Worse than that. All three armies of the front (44th, 47th and 51st), prepared for the offensive, were deployed in one echelon, which sharply reduced the depth of defense and sharply limited the ability to repel enemy attacks in the event of a breakthrough. When the Germans launched a decisive offensive, their main the blow fell precisely because of the most unsuccessful formation of troops - the 44th Army (commander - Lieutenant General S.I. Chernyak). The second echelon of this army was located only 3–4 km from the front line, which gave the Germans the opportunity, even without changing the positions of their artillery, to inflict fire on our units throughout the entire operational depth. Which is what they did.

In addition, most of the Soviet troops were concentrated on the northern sector of the Crimean Front. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command, imitating the main efforts in the north, delivered the main blow from the south, where the 44th Army was located.

Here is Mehlis’s sharp and emotional opinion about her commander: “Chernyak. An illiterate man, incapable of leading an army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One can wonder whose hand nominated Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general.”

“Failures in wars are always inevitable, but they cannot be justified if they arose due to the carelessness of the people entrusted with the conduct of the war. This apparent disregard for the enemy served as a tragic prelude to the fateful turns of May 1942.”

Valentin Pikul. "Square of fallen fighters."

On the night of May 7, the military council of the Crimean Front, with the approval of Mehlis, sent the necessary orders to the troops (in connection with the expected German offensive - Ed.). Alas, the workers at the front headquarters were not concerned with the speed of their transfer. As a result, by morning they had not even reached all the army commanders!

On May 7, the Germans began intensive air strikes on Soviet positions, especially control points. The next day, under cover of artillery fire, infantry units launched an attack.

On May 8, Mehlis sent a telegram to Stalin in which he wrote: “Now is not the time to complain, but I must report so that Headquarters knows the front commander. On May 7, that is, on the eve of the enemy’s offensive, Kozlov convened a military council to discuss the project for a future operation to capture Koi-Aksan. I recommended that this project be postponed and that instructions be immediately given to the armies in connection with the expected enemy advance. In the signed order of the front commander, he stated in several places that the offensive was expected on May 10–15, and proposed to work until May 10 and study the army defense plan with all command personnel, unit commanders and headquarters. This was done when the entire situation of the previous day showed that the enemy would advance in the morning. At my insistence, the erroneous timing was corrected. Kozlov also resisted the movement of additional forces to the 44th Army sector.”

All the data is stark: tomorrow the Germans will launch an offensive, and the commander in the order indicates the period of May 10–15. Obviously, the reconnaissance of the front headquarters did not work.

In response to his telegram, in which he once again asked to replace Kozlov, Mehlis received a very irritated message from Stalin: “You are holding the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is completely rotten. On the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the command’s mistakes on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a resistance, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as State Control, but as a responsible representative of Headquarters.

You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you cannot help but know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve... If you had used attack aircraft not for side activities, but against the enemy’s tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the tanks would not have gotten through. You don't have to be the Hindenburg to understand this simple thing, sitting on the Crimean Front for two months.”

Mekhlis seems to have deservedly received the nuts. Especially considering that Stalin then recalled him from the front and demoted him. The Supreme’s irritation is understandable: despite the numerical superiority of our troops in the Kerch region, they were unable to stop German offensive. But let's figure out what in Mehlis's position could have caused Stalin's anger? In my opinion, first of all, Mehlis limited himself to the position of an observer and did not interfere in the decision-making process, which was obvious even to a non-professional military man. Having attack aircraft, anti-tank artillery, and T-34 and KV, superior German tanks Czechoslovakian production with a weak 37 mm gun, Soviet command could have stopped the German 22nd Panzer Division.

Today all the pressure is falling on the head of Mehlis, on the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, who supposedly “created tricks for the Crimean Front,” against the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, Marshal S.M. Budyonny, to Headquarters. And the front command had nothing to do with it... Without justifying Mehlis’s mistakes, for which he was punished by Stalin, I note that until the last he tried to reverse the rapidly deteriorating situation in May 1942.

It is known how the German “hunt for bustards” ended: on May 13, the defense of our troops was broken through, on the night of May 14, Marshal Budyonny allowed the evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula, on May 15, the enemy occupied Kerch. This allowed the Germans to concentrate their efforts on taking Sevastopol.

This is the price of the disaster on the Crimean front. But we will not “savor” its details and will keep in our hearts the bright memory of all the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who died on Crimean soil.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

About the facts of replacing educational work with repression

Behind Lately There are frequent cases of illegal repression and gross abuse of power on the part of individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates.

Lieutenant of the 288th joint venture Komissarov, without any reason, killed Red Army soldier Kubica with a revolver shot.

The former chief of the 21st UR, Colonel Sushchenko, shot and killed Jr. Sergeant Pershikov because he was slow to get out of the car due to a hand problem.

The platoon commander of a motorized rifle company of the 1026th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Mikryukov, shot and killed his assistant, junior platoon commander Baburin, allegedly for not following orders.

The military commissar of the 28th Panzer Division, Regimental Commissar Bankvitser, beat one sergeant for smoking at night; He also beat up Major Zanozny for having an incontinent conversation with him.

The chief of staff of the 529th Infantry Regiment, Captain Sakur, without any reason, hit Art. Lieutenant Sergeev.

Such facts of perversion of disciplinary practice, excesses [the word “excesses” was written by Stalin instead of “violations”, intolerable in the Red Army. - Ed.] granted rights and power, lynchings and assault are explained by the fact that:

a) the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, and the method of repression in relation to subordinates took first place;

b) everyday educational work in units in a number of cases is replaced by abuse, repression and assault;

c) the method of explanations and conversations between commanders, commissars, political workers and Red Army soldiers has been abandoned, and clarification of issues incomprehensible to the Red Army soldiers is often replaced by shouting, abuse and rudeness;

d) individual commanders and political workers in difficult battle conditions become confused, panic and cover up their own confusion by using weapons without any reason;

e) the truth has been forgotten that the use of repression is an extreme measure, permissible only in cases of direct disobedience and open resistance in a combat situation or in cases of malicious violation of discipline and order by persons deliberately going to disrupt the orders of the command.

Commanders, commissars and political workers must remember that without the correct combination of the method of persuasion with the method of coercion, it is unthinkable to impose Soviet military discipline and strengthen the political and moral condition of the troops.

Severe punishment in relation to malicious violators of military discipline, accomplices of the enemy and obvious enemies must be combined with a careful analysis of all cases of violation of discipline that require detailed clarification of the circumstances of the case.

Unreasonable repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and lack of arms, often lead to the opposite results, contribute to the decline of military discipline and the political and moral state of the troops and can push unstable fighters to defect to the enemy’s side.

I order:

1. Restore your rights educational work, widely use the method of persuasion, do not replace everyday explanatory work with administration and repression.

2. All commanders, political workers and superiors should talk daily with the Red Army soldiers, explaining to them the need for iron military discipline, honest performance of their military duty, the military oath and orders of the commander and superior. In conversations, also explain that a serious threat looms over our Motherland, that defeating the enemy requires the greatest self-sacrifice, unshakable steadfastness in battle, contempt for death and a merciless fight against cowards, deserters, self-harmers, provocateurs and traitors to the Motherland.

3. Widely explain to the commanding staff that lynchings, assault and public abuse, which humiliates the rank of a soldier of the Red Army, lead not to strengthening, but to undermining the discipline and authority of the commander and political worker.

At the front I found unimaginable panic. All cannons, machine guns, and anti-tank rifles were abandoned on the battlefield, and people fled in groups and alone to the Kerch Strait. And if they saw a board or log floating near the shore, several people immediately jumped on this object and immediately drowned. The same thing happened if they managed to find any floating craft on the shore or saw an approaching boat - they rushed in like a cloud, immediately everything was flooded, and people died.

I have never seen such panic in my life - this has never happened in my military experience.

It was some kind of disaster, although the enemy did not particularly attack. His aviation worked well, and it created panic. But she managed to do this only because our aviation was inactive, and the front command was confused and lost control.

Despite this, I managed to occupy the near defensive Kerch perimeter and gain a foothold on it. I ordered Mehlis and Kozlov to lead this defense, and if we have to evacuate, they must be the last to leave Kerch land.

Some people have already reached Taman Peninsula through the Kerch Strait. There I was located rifle brigade three-regiment composition. I ordered her to detain everyone crossing and put them on the defensive line of Taman.

After all this, I called HF I.V. Stalin and reported on the situation. He asked, “What do you think you’ll do next?” I replied that we would fight on the near defensive line (to defend Kerch). But Stalin said: “You must now firmly defend the Taman Peninsula and evacuate Kerch.”

I nevertheless decided to defend Kerch for as long as possible, because the fall of Kerch would immediately affect the defense of Sevastopol, which had half of its combat ammunition in this direction when I arrived. And I brought it to 15.5.42 to 6 rounds of ammunition...

I was at the front command post when I.A. approached me. Serov (Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - Ed.) and introduced himself as an NKVD commissioner from Beria. Serov asked me what the orders would be. I replied that during the evacuation he should sink the locomotives so that they would not fall into the hands of the Germans.

After 2-3 hours, Serov came up to me and reported that my order had been carried out and the locomotives were flooded. I asked: “How?!” He replied that he lowered them from the pier. I said: “What a fool. I told you that this needs to be done during the evacuation, but we are not going to leave yet, and we need steam locomotives.” I ordered him to leave Kerch and not complicate matters.”

Then we moved to Taman, where my command post was. And suddenly I lost contact with Kerch, with which we were connected by a single wire - a high-frequency telephone. It turned out that Serov ordered him to be cut.

When I asked why he did this, Serov replied that this connection belonged to the NKVD and he had the right to dispose of it.

I told him: “But, unfortunately, you don’t know how to manage things. Therefore, I will put you on trial as a traitor to the Motherland, because you deprived me of the opportunity to manage the front, I was left without communication.”

The next day, Beria called me from Moscow and asked me to settle the matter with Serov. I repeated that Serov would be brought to justice. Then Beria said that he was recalling Serov to Moscow and would punish him himself.”

From the diary entries of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny,
in May 1942, commander-in-chief of the troops
North Caucasian direction.

Letter from the “disgraced general”

“11.2.66 Hello, Alexander Ivanovich!

Thank you very much for not forgetting the old disgraced general. My fall from grace has lasted for almost 25 years.

The events of those days often appear in my memory. It’s hard to remember them, especially because the blame for the death of all our regiments lies not only with us, the direct participants in these battles, but also with the leadership that was exercised over us. I don’t mean Mehlis, a layman in operational art, but the commander of the North Caucasus direction and Headquarters. I also mean Oktyabrsky The outstanding writer of the twentieth century, Konstantin Simonov, who repeatedly visited the Kerch Peninsula during the days of military confrontations reflected in his famous “Different Days of the War,” had every right to declare: “You can’t film a war from afar, a war can only be filmed up close.” With these words, K. Simonov once again emphasized the invaluable role of film and photographic documents, which left heroism and tragedy for posterity people's victory over fascism.

One of such genuine evidence of the horrors of the Great Patriotic War was the photograph “Death of a Soldier” by military photojournalist Anatoly Garanin, which became a classic of Soviet military photography.

Assigned to the headquarters of the Crimean Front, A. Garanin, as a representative of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, in the spring of 1942 once again went to the front line to film the attack of soldiers on the enemy during the battle.

The unit, carried away by the commander, rushed forward. Anatoly pointed his “watering can” at a group of soldiers. The shot should have been successful - several people were caught in the lens, rushing forward in a single impulse towards the enemy. But at that very moment, before the camera shutter was released, an enemy shell suddenly exploded a few meters from the attackers. The frame instantly became different. The explosion disrupted the picture of the battle and made terrible adjustments to the photo. Instead of the intended image of the attack, the film captured the tragedy. The mortally wounded soldier closest to us slowly sinks to the Crimean soil. For him, the war was over - his body accepted the deadly metal.

Somewhere far from here there will be the tears of a wife, mother, children and relatives and the eternal hope for the return of a loved one from that damned war - a hope that fades away every day after the Victory...

An archive of film and photographic documents helped establish that the famous Ak-Monai positions, located in the western part of the Kerch Peninsula, became the location where the photograph “Death of a Soldier” was taken. Unfortunately, no one yet knows the exact location of filming. A strip of land from the village of Ak-Monay (Kamenskoye) to the Black Sea itself, almost 17 kilometers long, bears witness to the death of a soldier. The very place where from January to May 1942 there were fierce battles with varying success, ending in tragedy for the troops of the Crimean Front.

Who is the fighter whose death we see in the picture? His name remains unknown. He was most likely buried in one of the many mass graves located in the Ak-Monai Isthmus area. The remains of a soldier may rest in Semisotka, Kamenskoye, Batalny, Yachmennoye, Uvarovo and other villages, in which there are several mass graves with thousands buried. The majority, despite the almost seventy years that have passed since the end of hostilities in Crimea, remain nameless. AND main reason This means the destruction of archival documents.

The photograph “Death of a Soldier” once again makes us think about the cruelty of the most barbaric war in the history of mankind, where the death of one is a tragedy, and the death of millions is a statistic. The same imperturbable statistics that consider more than seventy percent of those who did not return from the war to be missing in action. In combat - Marines of the 83rd Brigade (1942).

The history of the Great Patriotic War knows many tactical amphibious assaults. At the same time, there were far from many landings that had independent operational or strategic tasks. One of these operations was the Soviet landing in Sudak in January 1942 - and these days it is almost forgotten.

Landing 6 January

The success of the Kerch-Feodosia operation prompted the command of the Caucasian Front to continue landing troops for the further liberation of Crimea. The next landings were in Evpatoria and Sudak. The landing in Yevpatoria was landed on the night of January 5, 1942, and its fate was tragic. The landing in Sudak took place the next night; the destroyer Sposobny and the patrol boat Maly Okhotnik (MO) No. 0111 were allocated for it. The destroyer commander received the order to land only after noon on January 5 on the way from Sevastopol - he was ordered to take two companies of the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment of the 63rd Infantry Division (218 people) in Novorossiysk and land them in Sudak by six in the morning on January 6. The "Small Hunter" was supposed to be used as a landing craft to transport paratroopers from the destroyer to the shore, but along the way, due to a storm and engine malfunctions, it began to lag behind, and the destroyer commander decided to carry out the task alone.

The position of Soviet troops in the Feodosia region on December 29, 1941 and the planned landing in Sudak. Fragment of the operational map of the headquarters of the Caucasian Front

In seven trips, a ship's boat and a boat managed to transport all the paratroopers to the shore. They did not meet resistance - there was no enemy in Sudak. On January 6 at 8:50, the destroyer boarded the craft and set off on a return course. From 9:21 to 9:50, he fired at the villages of Sudak and Biyuk-Kuchuk from 130-mm guns, expending 95 shells, and then went to Feodosia, where he arrived at night. At sea, the ship was attacked twice by German Ju.88 bombers, but without success.

What happened to the landing? The paratroopers did not have radios (or they were out of order), and no attempts were made to establish contact with those who landed. However, the absence of information in naval documents about the fate of the landing party did not necessarily mean its destruction by the enemy - the paratroopers could go deep into the peninsula and begin partisan actions, or they could go across the front line to the Soviet troops.

It cannot be said that the headquarters of the Caucasian Front were not at all worried about the fate of the landing. On January 16, the front intelligence department radioed the commander of the 2nd partisan region of Crimea, I.G. Genov:

“In the Sudak area, a naval landing force of 200 people was landed by transport, which was supposed to connect with you. Report what you know."

In response, Genov said that “The landing force landed on Sudak was scattered by the enemy, separate groups are going. 30 surrendered and the commander and commissars were killed.”

German documents suggest something. Apparently, there were no enemy patrols or posts in Sudak itself, with the exception of Tatar self-defense. According to the war diary of the 30th Army Corps, on January 11, north of Sudak, a German-Tatar patrol came across a large group of partisans and Soviet soldiers. In the ensuing battle, the patrol captured 39 people, and the Tatars shot five more - the diary especially emphasizes that these five were killed not in the battle, but after it. Soon 12 more prisoners were taken here, and the rest managed to escape to the mountains. Only then did the Germans learn about the amphibious assault landing on January 6th. According to the testimony of prisoners, the task of the landing was to attack German and Romanian headquarters with the beginning of the offensive of the troops of the Caucasian Front. However, this offensive never began...

Preparing the offensive of the 44th Army and planning a new landing

However, on January 8, the Military Council of the Caucasian Front issued directive No. 091/op on the transition of front troops to a general offensive. According to this document, the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to again land tactical troops in the Evpatoria Gulf, as well as conduct demonstrative landings in Alushta and Yalta.

But the front itself allocated only one mountain rifle regiment for landing operations, and the forces for landings in Yalta and Alushta were ordered to be taken from the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region. However, the command of the Primorsky Army reported that it had no extra troops, and the naval command on January 10 asked to postpone operations. In response, the front commander, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, explained that tactical landings in the Evpatoria Gulf are necessary, but their goal is only the near rear of the enemy, after which the troops "must rejoin their units on the second or third day of the operation". At the same time, it was ordered to conduct a raid operation on the southern coast of Crimea (in the Foros-Alupka-Yalta-Alushta area) on the night of January 12 and at the same time to land a new landing force in the Sudak area, supporting it with naval artillery fire.

The area between Sudak and Koktebel. Fragment of the operational map of the headquarters of the Caucasian Front. The grid spacing is 1 km. In the upper part - Old Crimea, in the upper right corner - Nasypkaya

As a result, the fleet and the Primorsky Army managed to cancel the landing in the Evpatoria Gulf and the raid on the southern coast of Crimea. It was decided to limit ourselves to the landing of the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment in Sudak.

To reconnaissance the area and clarify the situation, on January 12, a reconnaissance group of eight people was landed in the Sudak area from a “small hunter”. This time the landing was immediately discovered by the enemy. In the battle, two scouts were killed, two were captured, and three managed to escape. Apparently, the prisoners did not give the Germans any information, and they remained in the dark about the upcoming landing of the main landing forces. However, the command of the German 11th Army tried to strengthen the defense of the coast. A Romanian infantry company was sent to Sudak, reinforced by two platoons of anti-tank guns from the German 240th anti-tank division and a combined company of the first division of the 77th artillery regiment - 70 people without equipment. A unit of the Crimean Tatars was also located here. According to intelligence data from the Black Sea Fleet, in the Sudak area the enemy had more than a rifle battalion and two or three artillery batteries. Areas convenient for landing were mined and equipped with wire fencing.

Battleship Paris Commune at sea, 1940
Source – navsource.narod.ru

The offensive of the 44th and 51st armies near Feodosia was scheduled for January 16. In this regard, on January 14, the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet prepared a directive on the landing in Sudak. This time the operation was planned much more carefully. The cruiser "Red Crimea", the destroyers "Soobrazitelny" and "Shaumyan", the gunboat "Red Adzharistan", as well as six boats of the "MO" type took part in it. The overall command of the detachment was exercised by Captain 1st Rank Andreev. Even more powerful forces were brought in to provide fire support for the landing - the battleship Paris Commune, guarding the destroyers Bezuprechny and Zheleznyakov, under the overall command of the squadron commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral L. A. Vladimirsky.

The landing party left Novorossiysk to arrive at the landing site on January 15 at 22:00, the battleship, guarded by two destroyers, left Poti to begin shelling after midnight. Moreover, for fire support of the troops, the gunboat “Red Adzharistan” and four “small hunters” were supposed to remain off the coast all day on January 16. In addition, one boat (SKA No. 92) was supposed to land a sabotage group of 35 soldiers in the Alushta area, whose task was to disrupt communications and distract the enemy’s attention. Since dawn on January 15, the submarines M-55 and Shch-201 conducted reconnaissance of the situation in Sudak Bay.

Having landed in Sudak, the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment was supposed to occupy the area of ​​the villages of Bolshoi and Maly Taraktash, after which part of its forces would advance along seaside road to Otuz and, in cooperation with units of the 44th Army located at Koktebel, destroy the enemy’s coastal grouping here. The remaining forces of the regiment should have attacked from Sudak deep into the coast in the direction of Saly, cut the Simferopol highway west of Stary Crimea and, when the left flank units of the 44th Army approached, destroyed the enemy's Starokrymsk group.

Organization of landing forces and urgent change of plans

The main problem of the operation was the short time for its preparation - the directive was signed at noon on January 14, Admiral Vladimirsky arrived in Novorossiysk from Poti on a battleship and received the plan on January 15 at 8 am, and he should have left for Sudak at noon. Fortunately, Captain 1st Rank Andreev was his chief of staff and prepared the bulk of the landing documents himself in advance, and also organized the loading of equipment and weapons onto the ships on January 14th.

The personnel and equipment of the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment were supposed to be transported on warships - the cruiser "Red Crimea" (560 people, 40 tons of cargo), the destroyers "Soobrazitelny" (241 people) and "Shaumyan" (220 people), as well as a gunboat “Red Adzharistan” (580 people, four 76-mm guns, eight horses, ammunition, food and a wagon of planks for constructing a pier). Since the gunboat “in its youth” was a landing ship of the Elpidifor type, it had to moor directly to the shore and land troops along the gangplank - fortunately, the depths in the Sudak area are quite large. Five “small hunters” and two seiners, towed by a gunboat, were intended to transport troops from the cruiser and destroyers.

Light cruiser "Red Crimea" in Poti
Source – arsenal-info.ru

The landing was to take place at three points:

• "Red Crimea" and a gunboat with three "small hunters" – in Sudak itself;
• “Shaumyan” and “small hunter” No. 141 – east of the village, beyond Cape Alchak-Kaya;
• “Savvy” and “small hunter” No. 95 – west of the village, in Novy Svet Bay.

The “small hunters” were supposed to have a detachment of the first throw – 210 paratroopers, but in the end there were only 136 of them. The first echelon was located on the gunboat and destroyers, on the cruiser – second. The landing should have begun at midnight so that the ships could complete it by five o'clock in the morning and have time to move 40-60 miles from the coast, away from enemy aircraft, before dawn.

The landing was carried out according to the principle of secrecy - fire on the shore was opened only after the start of the landing and only at the signal of the squadron commander. Initially, the fire was supposed to be conducted simply at the landing area and road junctions (the latter is quite meaningful, since there are very few roads here, and troops will not pass in the mountains without roads), at dawn - at the request of correction posts from the shore.

Gunboat "Red Adzharistan" (formerly "Elpidifor-414")
Source – almanac “Military Faleristics”, No. 1 (August 2015)

The slow-moving gunboat, together with the “small hunters,” reached the landing site on January 14 at 16:00. The boarding of people on the remaining ships began early in the morning of January 15: on the destroyers – at 07:20, to the cruiser – at 08:00 (only 500 people were accepted). Meanwhile, on the way to Sudak, two “small hunters” collided, and the damaged No. 141 returned to Novorossiysk, transferring the landing party to other ships.

Gunboat "Red Abkhazia" (formerly "Elpidifor-413"), the same type as the "Red Adzharistan"
Source – arsenal-info.ru

This was not the only trouble. It turned out that the troops loaded onto the warships were mixed up, and the company commanders had to change the task already at the crossing using a semaphore. Finally, at 22:15, when the ships were scheduled to arrive in the Sudak area, very bad news came - German troops launched an offensive on Feodosia, the 44th Army’s attack on Old Crimea was canceled, Koktebel was abandoned by units of the Red Army. Therefore, the plan of action for the landing party on the shore urgently changed - instead of attacking deep into the coast towards Sala, it was now ordered to move to Otuz to strike in the back the German troops in the Koktebel area. Now it was planned to connect with units of the 44th Army in the Nasypkoi area - that is, almost at Feodosia.

Landing in Sudak

At 22:30, the detachment found itself at the pre-planned meeting point with the “Red Adzharistan”, but did not find either the gunboat or the M-55 submarine, which served as one of the two beacons (red light). This situation was foreseen, and the ships separated according to plan: at 23:00 the destroyers went to land their troops on the flanks, and the battleship and cruiser went into the fire maneuvering zone 20-25 cabins from the shore. Soon the green light of the Shch-201 boat was discovered, by which the gunners made a reference to the area. But when shooting along the shore began at 23:45, it turned out that the boat was standing further from the shore than it should be, and the first shells fell into the water. At 00:35 the ships moved their fire inland to target targets.

Another gunboat of this type – "Red Armenia" (formerly "Elpidifor-416"), seriously damaged by a German torpedo boat near Myskhako on the night of February 28, 1943. The boat took part in the transfer of reinforcements to Malaya Zemlya; landing gangplanks are visible on the sides of the bow
Source – zorich.ru

At about half past one in the morning, two splashes from bombs arose off the side of the battleship Paris Commune, and the fountain of one was so high that it flooded the bridges of the tower-like foremast. The shooting stopped, and in the ensuing silence the sailors heard the sound of an airplane engine - a night bomber bombed the ship in flashes of gunfire. At 01:48, four more bombs were recorded falling, landing 2-3 cabins astern.

Meanwhile, "Red Adzharistan" carried out the landing on its own. Two seiners received the troops of the first throw from the boat and approached the shore. Behind them, at one o'clock in the morning, the gunboat itself successfully moored to the shore, simultaneously lighting a blue light on the side, by which the boats and longboats approaching the shore were supposed to be guided. At 01:13, the gunboat began unloading soldiers ashore (using special gangways). Before 01:40, troops from boats No. 092, No. 140 and No. 022 landed ashore, and boat No. 051 offloaded its part of the landing party onto the gunboat. The enemy opened fire late, and its firing points were quickly suppressed by the 45-mm guns of the “small hunters”.

Painting by artist Viktor Puzyrkov “Chernomorets” (1947). This is exactly what the landing in Sudak looked like

Closer to two o'clock in the morning, the unloading of troops from the cruiser began with the help of seiners and "small hunters". By 03:20 it was completed, and the unloading of ammunition and supplies began, which was completed by 05:13. Alas, it was not without difficulties - at about two o’clock in the morning the gangplank on the “Red Adzharistan” broke down, so the unloading of people was completed only at 6 o’clock, and approximately half of the equipment and ammunition could not be removed from the boat.

The landings on the flanks also did not go entirely smoothly. “Small Hunter” No. 141, which accompanied the destroyer “Shaumyan,” was damaged and went to the base, so the detachment commander sent hunter No. 140 to the destroyer, but he did not find “Shaumyan” and decided to land his paratroopers at Cape Alchak-Kaya on his own. Near the shore, the “hunter” came under machine-gun fire, as a result of which its gas tank was pierced, two were killed and four were wounded. The boat refused to disembark and went to the cruiser, and later helped unload people in the Sudak area. From this boat it was planned to land a hydrographic party, which was supposed to light a blue navigation light on the top of the Alchak-Kaya rock to mark the eastern edge of Sudak Bay. As a result, the fire was never set - it was possible to light only a green fire on western edge bays (at the Mayachnaya Tower in Sudak). The destroyer "Shaumyan" nevertheless landed its people here, but very late, using only ship's boats and finishing unloading only at 03:45.

Cape Alchak-Kaya. Photo by the author

In the New World, things were little better - the “small hunter” No. 95 did not detect the destroyer “Savvy”, but at about half past twelve he landed people in the bay, after which the hydrographs installed a white light here. Only at three o'clock in the morning did the destroyer and the boat find each other, but the landing of troops from the destroyer still dragged on until 4:45.

At 02:13, the battleship Paris Commune finished firing, firing 125 main caliber shells and 585 130 mm caliber shells. At 02:25, accompanied by the destroyers Bezuprechny and Zheleznyakov, he moved to Poti. At 04:35, the cruiser Krasny Krym, accompanied by the destroyers Shaumyan and Soobrazitelny, departed for Novorossiysk. Thus, only the gunboat remained off the coast, and with it the “small hunters” No. 092 and No. 022. The boat set sail from the shore only at about half past six in the morning, having radio contact with the correction post and the commander of the 226th regiment, Major Selikhov. According to the report of the boat commander, communication with the correction post was interrupted at 12:30, with the regiment control at 18:30.

It is unclear from the documents whether the gunboat fired to support the landing, but this was not necessary - the village was captured quite quickly. But between nine and ten o'clock the boat was subjected to several attacks by single aircraft, after which the chief of staff of the fleet allowed her to leave for Novorossiysk. Around the same time, the destroyer Soobrazitelny, sent by the detachment commander to assist the gunboat, returned to Sudak Bay. “Hunter” No. 092, who accompanied him, headed to the shore to clarify the situation and returned with a report that fire support was not required, the landing force occupied the village and began an attack on Feodosia. At 14:45, the destroyer began departing for Novorossiysk, where it arrived exactly at midnight on January 17.

“Red Adzharistan”, accompanied by “hunters” No. 092 and No. 022, returned much more slowly - in rough conditions the old gunboat could not reach a speed of more than six knots. At 14:18 she was subjected to another air raid - as a result of close bomb explosions on the boat, the steam dynamo, all compasses and the bow 76-mm anti-aircraft gun were damaged. The boat arrived in Novorossiysk only the next day at 11:25.

Despite all the difficulties, the landing in Sudak was successful and with minimal losses. The management of the operation by the naval commanders, even taking into account the hasty planning, remained at its best. During the landing, the sailors showed themselves to be quite professional, despite unexpected problems that arose. As a result, it was only possible to unload some of the equipment from the gunboat “Red Adzharistan” and maintain radio contact with the landing command, which disappeared by the evening of January 16. However, successfully landing troops – half the battle. Second half – use it adequately in the current operational situation. This will be discussed in the next article.

To be continued

Sources and literature:

1. Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War Soviet Union at the Black Sea Theater. Vol. 2. From January 1 to July 3, 1942 - M.: Voenizdat, 1946.
2. A. Zablotsky, R. Larintsev, A. Platonov. Landing operations in Sudak, January 1942 // Landings of the Great Patriotic War - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2009.
3. A. Malgin. The mystery of the obelisk in the village of Voron: experience of historical investigation // Historical heritage Crimea, No. 17, 2006
4. A. Nemenko. 1941–42. Crimea. Mysteries and myths of the peninsula. Part 3, http://samlib.ru/n/nemenko_a_w/zim3.shtml
5. http://epron-pro.ru