1941 list of mineral waters mobilized for WWII. History of conscription for military service in Russia

From June 23, 1941, those liable for military service from 1905 to 1918 inclusive were conscripted into the army.

The conscription territory is Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasus and Transcaucasian military districts. There were also territorial nuances. For example, already on the night of June 23 in Siberia, military registration and enlistment offices sent out notices to conscripts, but not everyone received mobilization notices. In connection with the threat of an attack from Japan, some of the future soldiers were assigned to Far Eastern Front and they did not call us to collection points.

In total, in June and July 1941, a general and complete mobilization of men and partial mobilization of women was carried out. By this time, class restrictions had already been lifted - everyone could defend their homeland. And this is not a mere formality. The fact is that in 1925 the USSR adopted a law on compulsory military service. It was forbidden to conscript “persons of the exploiting classes” into the army, namely: children of former nobles, merchants, officers old army, priests, factory owners, as well as Cossacks and kulaks.

In 1935, an exception was made for the Cossacks. A 1939 law abolished restrictions on conscription based on class, but military schools still only accepted children of workers and peasants. The war corrected this rule too. In fact, everyone who wanted to go to the front and to school could do it one way or another.

From the archive

In total, 5.3 million people were drafted in the first 8 days of the war. That is, the army doubled: the actual number of the Red Army by June 22, 1941 was 5.4 million people. But the huge irreparable losses of the first months of the war required more and more soldiers. By the beginning of 1942, conscription into the Red Army was already provided by conscripts from 1923-1925. birth. And in total, during the war, 34.5 million people were put under arms.

The conscription took place like this: in cities, a summons from the military registration and enlistment office was brought to the house, in villages - to the village council. It was stated right on the agenda: the enterprise administrations should immediately release the conscript from work and give him money for two weeks in advance. On the back are instructions: shave your head bald, carry documents and food with you, do not take bulky things.

There was no single form; there were many variants of agendas. But the main thing was always indicated: where and when to arrive. They warned you that you will be held accountable for being late or not showing up.

Along with the mobilization to the front, the authorities “booked” specialists to work in military factories. During the 1942 conscription campaign, deferments were granted to combine operators and tractor drivers involved in harvesting. Depending on the region, “reservation” was also given to students of river technical schools and forestry institutes who were in navigation and logging in the taiga. In 1941 and until the first half of 1942, teachers also had the right to deferments, who were not hired at all until 1940. military service.

But the front required replenishment: millions of dead and wounded, prisoners and encirclement. Both 17-year-olds and 50-year-olds have already been taken into the army.

True, the term “mobilization” does not accurately reflect the situation. Yes, there were draft dodgers and deserters, but still, Komsomol volunteers are not an invention of propaganda. Volunteers born in 1922-1924 were selected for units in which service was associated with particular risk. The recruitment of paratroopers, skiers, pilots, and tank destroyers took place through the Komsomol district committees. Positive characteristics were required, preference was given to athletes, passing the BGTO standards ("Be ready for labor and defense of the USSR" - for schoolchildren in grades 1-8, GTO (for people over 16 years old) and PVHO ("Ready for the chemical defense of the USSR") was encouraged. ).

Quite a few types of wartime summons have been preserved: there was no single form. But the document necessarily indicated the main thing: when and where to arrive, what to take with you. The conscript was also reminded of the responsibility for failure to appear on time. In cities, a summons from the military registration and enlistment office was brought to the house, in villages - to the village council. Photo: From the archive

The legendary woman - nun Mother Adriana (Natalya Malysheva) - shortly before her death, spoke in an interview with RG about how young people greeted the news of the start of the war in Moscow. “As soon as Levitan’s voice came from the loudspeakers about the beginning of the war, I and my fellow students from the aviation institute ran to the military academies,” the nun said. “We demanded and begged to be transferred to them from our institute: in order to quickly get the specialty the army needed and - to front But only one of our company succeeded, and only because his father was a commander Red Army".

Many were afraid of only one thing: the war would end, and they would not have time to accomplish their feats. That’s why they tried to get into the war “through connections.” “They didn’t take me because I was a girl,” recalled Natalya Malysheva. “It was very disappointing. Well, if that’s the case, I think I’ll volunteer. But the military registration and enlistment office again refused, they said, study. However, by October, when the German approached close to Moscow, at the Komsomol district committee they looked at me strangely and without delay gave me a referral to the Third Communist Division of the People's Militia."

Division - 11 thousand volunteers who were not subject to conscription. They took everyone: the children of the repressed and the priests. Everyday life at the front made adjustments to the youth’s idea of war; in the trenches everything turned out to be more prosaic and more terrible. But the divisions fought to the death. Malysheva asked to become a nurse, but was accepted into divisional intelligence. She went behind the front line 18 times. She ended the war as a lieutenant in army intelligence. “You know, I still ask myself: how was this possible?” the nun reasoned. “There were so many repressed before the war, so many churches were destroyed! I personally knew two guys whose fathers were shot. But no one harbored a grudge. And these people rose above their grievances, abandoned everything and went to defend their homeland.”

Volunteers were selected for the airborne and ski brigades, as well as for the special units of tank destroyers, using Komsomol vouchers. Preference was given to athletes. Photo: Alexander Ustinov

Employees Central Museum Great Patriotic War showed me the document. Issued by the Stalinist District Military Commissariat of Moscow: subject to military service V.M. Yudovsky. On July 6, 1941 he enlisted in the people's militia. This is not a summons or a certificate - just a sheet of paper with a corner stamp and a round seal. The partisans had approximately the same situation with documents. Certificate: issued to comrade Nadezhda Vasilyevna Troyan stating that she was in the “Storm” partisan detachment as a fighter. The headquarters of the partisan movements most likely had to improvise - even in the regular army, not everything went smoothly with the official documents of the Red Army soldiers. Order NKO USSR N330 of October 7, 1941 “On the introduction of the Red Army book in military units and institutions in the rear and at the front” had to be carried out in the most difficult conditions, when the army was retreating and the soldiers lacked a lot, including documents and death tokens. What can we say about certificates for partisans and militias.

The losses of the Red Army, Navy, border and internal troops during the war amounted to 11.4 million people - including those captured and missing. No one can say for sure how many people died in partisan detachments.

By the way

After the end of the war, the army numbered 11 million people, which was excessive for peacetime. In July 1945, all soldiers and sergeants over 45 years of age and officers over 50 years of age were dismissed from the army. In September 1945, soldiers and sergeants over 30 years of age began to be transferred to the reserve, as well as soldiers, sergeants, and officers with specialties that were valuable for the restoration of the national economy (builders, miners, metallurgists, machine operators, etc.), regardless of age.
From 1946 to 1948 there was no conscription into the army. Young people were sent to restoration work in mines, heavy engineering enterprises, and construction sites. Military schools for officer training accepted people aged 17-23 with secondary education.
By the beginning of 1948, the size of the army had dropped to 2.8 million people.
After the Great Patriotic War, the new law on universal military duty was adopted in 1949. Young people aged 18 were subject to conscription: to the ground forces and aviation for 3 years, to the navy for 4 years.

2. Recruitment of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Personnel resources. Mobilization after the start of the war

Let us consider the features of recruiting the army and navy in the USSR in 1939–1941. Thanks to the enactment of the USSR Law “On Universal Military Duty” dated September 1, 1939 (“Vedomosti Supreme Council USSR", No. 32 (55), 09.23.39), as well as a number of other special measures (hidden mobilization under the guise of Great Training Camps in May-June 1941, extraordinary spring conscription in 1941 of persons born in the 1st half-year 1922 and others), the actual strength of the USSR Armed Forces increased from 1 596 400 people as of January 1, 1938 (“Strategic outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945,” M.: Voenizdat, 1961, p. 116) to 5 082 305 people by June 22, 1941 (see table 27, paragraph 1 of information sources).

To bring the Armed Forces of the USSR (hereinafter referred to as the USSR Armed Forces) to the wartime strength after the start of the war, it was necessary to additionally call up 4.887 million people according to the state of the Red Army staff as of January 1, 1941 (“1941 - lessons and conclusions”, team of authors, M. : Military Publishing House, 1992, p. 109). The total resources of reserve personnel as of this date were estimated in the following way(TsAMO RF, f. 14-A, op. 113, d. 1, l. 189):

1. Reserve conscripts, privates and junior commanding officers, categories 1 and 2 of all three categories, born in 1890 to 1921. inclusive (32 ages) – 20,024 thousand people.

2. Middle and senior reserve command staff – 893 thousand people.

3. Booked for national economy– 2781 thousand people.

4. The total resource of those liable for military service was 23,698 thousand people.

5. Members of the USSR Armed Forces were born in 1919–1921. – 3,679,200 people.

6. There were 554,200 people in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces.

It should be clearly understood that the number of 23.698 million people. does not include the number of personnel in the army by January 1, 1941, nor the resource of pre-conscription youth born in 1922, called up a few weeks before the start of the war, nor the resource of subsequent young people born in 1922–1927, nor the resource of officially non-conscripted 1886–1889 .r., also partially called up during the entire period of the war. Each age additionally provided a significant increase in the total conscription resource indicated in paragraph 4 above, amounting to a total of about 19 million people and not included in the given figures!

And the most interesting thing in this situation is that not a single historical source, even a priori respected one, still provides a detailed explanation of the situation on June 22, 1941 with personnel resources, even in such a primitive form:

a) this is our regular army at the beginning of the war - 5,082,305 people;

c) this is the size of the spring (1941) conscription of boys born in 1922. (1st half of the year) – Y;

d) and this is our conscription resource for boys 1922 (2nd half of the year) - 1927. births for the entire period of the war - Z.

What do these X's, Y's and Z's equal? We will not find this information anywhere in published sources. As a result of the organizational measures taken by June 22, 1941, the army's staffing levels were increased, and therefore the need for wartime personnel increased. The resource figures published above as of January 1, 1941, after two subsequent additions, were significantly clarified, but have not yet been made available to the public. Historical sources contain either general words and no specifics, or at best general figures without detail. The above information as of January 1, 1941 about the general resources of those liable for military service was published in the book “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.” (p. 113), published in Voenizdat in 1961 and until May 29, 1964, had the stamp “Sov. classified”, then until May 27, 1993 classified as “Secret”. The circulation of this respected book is limited, each copy is numbered. In the book on p. 113 only shows the number of army command personnel as of 06/01/41 at 568,300 people. Summary information on the “human” issue at TsAMO of the Russian Federation has just been classified again. Is this normal for understanding the specifics of the situation 70 years after the events took place?

In the army, navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD, by June 22, 1941, there were the following categories of private and junior commanding personnel undergoing active military service (TsAMO RF, f. 131, op. 12951, d. 10, ll .227–228):

- rank and file ground forces NGOs and internal troops of the NKVD from recruits born in 1918 (second half of the year), 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922 (1st half of the year), called up from the autumn of 1939 to the spring of 1941 - with a service life of 2 years;

- junior command staff of the ground forces of the NKO and internal troops of the NKVD (sergeants and foremen), called up from the autumn of 1938 to the autumn of 1940 (born in 1917 to 1921), - with a service life of 3 years;

– private and junior command personnel of the air forces of the NKO and NKVMF, the coastal defense of the NKVMF and the border troops of the NKVD, called up from the autumn of 1937 to the spring of 1941 (born in 1916 to 1922), - with a service life of 4 years;

- private and junior command staff of naval units and ships, called up from the autumn of 1936 to the spring of 1941 (born in 1915 to 1922), - with a service life of 5 years.

If we had not had such a number (more than 4 million people) of trained young people at the beginning of the war in the USSR Armed Forces, who knows how its events would have unfolded? Would you stand it, would you stand it?

Below we will describe the features of the most unclear to the public processes of recruiting personnel into the Red Army and the Red Navy, which took place during the summer and early autumn of 1941.

a) hidden mobilization, “... when in the interests of the defense of the country it is necessary to carry out mobilization without bringing this to public attention and without disclosing the real purpose of the activities being carried out”;

b) open mobilization, “... when the decision on mobilization is brought to the general attention of citizens of the Soviet Union and the mobilization of troops is carried out openly” (“Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders people's commissar Defense of the USSR", volume 13 (2–1), M.: TERRA, 1994, p. 149).

The process of open mobilization in the USSR had the following features. Its first day was June 23, 1941. It lasted for 7 days. For clarity, we will henceforth call it the first wave of mobilization. During this period, according to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated June 22, 1941, trained soldiers born in 1905–1918 were called up. reserve of the 1st category of the 1st stage, who completed active military service. They, as a rule, were sent to military units located in the same military district (including NKVD units) for deployment through mobilization to the wartime state, or to deployed military units in another military district, or to points , where, with the announcement of mobilization, new units began to form according to the MP-41 mob plan. As a result, by July 1, 1941, more than 5.35 million people liable for military service were called up, of which over 505 thousand reserve officers from a resource of 893 thousand people (“Strategic outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945”, M.: Voenizdat, 1961, p. 188, “1941 - lessons and conclusions”, team of authors, M.: Voenizdat, 1992, p. 114).

Not a single person liable for military service was called up, as they say, “just like that.” If the formation left for the West before June 22, then these soldiers, assigned to it in the spring of 1941 and called up with the beginning of open mobilization, were sent in trains after it to predetermined points, which were designated in the pre-war operational transportation plan. This plan, as well as the MP-41 mobplan, was integral part the general strategic operational plan of the USSR, finally developed in March-May 1941 by the highest political and military leadership of our country. The other part of the mobilized personnel was sent to the reserve rifle brigades, newly created at the beginning of the war in the military districts on the funds of the divisions that had left for the West, intended to recruit replacements for the units and formations that existed by June 22, 1941. The third part was designated for the formation of new military units , intended for creation in the first month of the war. The fourth part was sent by inter-district transportation for the deployment of military units to other military districts.

Each soldier sent to a military unit deployed to wartime or a newly formed military unit had a command number unique for each military district and unit in its mobilization order according to the deployment scheme. The deployment plan is the main document of any army in case of mobilization. No extra people who did not have mobilization instructions were called up. The “superfluous” were the volunteers who besieged the military registration and enlistment offices after the announcement of mobilization. Despite all the nobility of their actions, it should be noted that they, in fact, prevented the military registration and enlistment offices from carrying out planned conscription. The TsAMO of the Russian Federation contains many reports from military commissars with messages about volunteers and requests - what to do with them? On the other hand, it should be said that such a voluntary impulse of tens of thousands of people to join the army is always a sign of a healthy society, when an individual member of it tries to defend his country in case of danger!

In the briefly described picture of the first wave of mobilization in June 1941, which recruited into the army and navy, in addition to the 5.08 million people of the USSR Armed Forces, in just 7 days over 5.35 million people (including in the NKVD), almost there was no improvisation. This entire process was strictly planned for the period from August 1940 to early June 1941. At someone’s suggestion, it is believed that mobilization was nevertheless disrupted in several of the westernmost regions of Belarus and Ukraine. I must say that in fact it was not planned in the regions liberated in 1939, not a single person in them was subject to registration and was not assigned to any military unit (TsAMO RF, f. 8-A, op. 2729, d 28, pp. 17–30). Top management The USSR did not trust them. The recruits who had been drafted from there before the war were sent en masse to secondary units to the east, to the internal military districts and to Central Asia(TsAMO RF, f. 131, op. 12951, d. 2, l. 26). Persons of the remaining conscription age, if they did not have time to be taken to the east in July 1941 after the release of a special GSKA Directive, were called up only in 1944–45. after the liberation of the territory. In all other regions of the USSR, the turnout of reserve conscripts at recruiting stations after the announcement of mobilization was 99% or higher! Even in Belarus and Ukraine, which fell into the combat zone, and in the Transcaucasian Military District - 99.5% (TsAMO RF, f. 209, op. 1091, d. 4, l. 219)! Of the small number of no-shows, more than half had so-called good reasons, there were only a few obvious draft dodgers.

Due to the huge losses at the front in formations and people, the State Defense Committee of the USSR (hereinafter GKO) was forced to prepare GKO Resolution No. 48 of July 8, 1941 “On the formation of additional rifle divisions"(RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 1, pp. 154–155). From July 12–14, the second wave of mobilization began. It was not planned in the MP-41 mobile plan either so soon or in such a large volume. She was not planned in it at all, since no one could have foreseen such a catastrophic development of events. That is why the title of the Resolution mentions the word “additional”, which should be read as “infantry divisions additional to the MP-41 mobile plan.” The general unfavorable course of the war forced us to take such a step. No one could have imagined that the command of the Western Special Military District would not have communicated to the troops in 4 days the Directive of the Main Military Council of the Red Army of June 18, 1941 on bringing them to a state of full combat readiness (“State Security Bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War war,” collection of documents, M.: Publishing House “Rus”, 2000, vol. 2, book 1, p. 389), and a shower of bombs and shells will fall on the heads of the soldiers sleeping in the barracks in the very first minutes of the attack. No one could have imagined that Western and Northwestern fronts will burst at the seams after German attack in just 6 days, and the planned maximum retreat of our troops from the border to the line of border fortified areas will turn into their uncontrollable flight to the deep rear, aggravated by the panic of military, civilian and party bodies and sabotage by the enemy (TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2513, d. 72, l. 64). No one could have imagined that the Germans would invest their already mobilized force in a crushing first strike against the Western Front. And if anyone had any idea, his voice was drowned in a series of people contradicting him. No one could have imagined that the enemy would not allow us to have a mobilization period of 15–25 days to deploy troops to wartime levels. All this radically changed and even completely annulled pre-war plans and forced new solutions to be invented on the fly. In fact, by introducing an administrative order for the formation of new formations and units, the MP-41 mobilization plan was, if not cancelled, then adjusted to a very significant extent.

After the adoption of GKO Resolution No. 48 and the signing of the Directives of the General Staff of the Red Army, the headquarters of the military districts received orders for the conscription of several million people liable for military service from the remnants of conscription age, previously raised by mobilization or who had already served in the regular army (born 1905–1921). After the distribution of orders to regional and republican military registration and enlistment offices, from July 12–14, 1941, work began again on notification, conscription, recruitment and dispatch of mobilized teams to the points of formation of new formations, as well as to reserve brigades, which also sent part of their personnel to the formed connections. In total, in July, the formation of unscheduled additional 59 rifle and 30 cavalry divisions of NKOs began instead of the 56 rifle and 10 cavalry planned by GKO Resolution No. 48. Of this number, 3 rifle divisions were created from those reserve military personnel who were called up in the Moscow Military District on June 23–24 and assigned to deploy formations and units of the Baltic Special Military District to wartime levels, including six Baltic divisions (179 -184 Infantry Division), which had already fled by the end of June. Other formations retreated to the east without reporting their position and condition. There was no one to deploy. Therefore, trains with Russian personnel were stopped en route from June 27, turned back and sent to new points to form unscheduled NPO formations (242, 245, 248th Infantry Division) almost back to the Moscow Military District in the years. Rzhev, Vyshny Volochek, Vyazma (TsAMO RF, f. 56, op. 12236, d. 7, l. 1). The same picture occurred with the return from June 30 of tens of thousands of reserve personnel from the Oryol and Volga districts, the trains with which were deployed from the Gomel area and returned to Kursk, Yelets, Lipetsk, Voronezh, Tambov (ibid., l. 9). They were also turned to the formation of unscheduled formations from July 8, 1941.

From July 2, the transfer of trains with conscripted personnel from the internal military districts was canceled following the rifle and tank divisions that had left for the West before June 22 and were drawn into battle (“1941 – lessons and conclusions”, team of authors, M.: Voenizdat, 1992, p. 114). During battles, they were replenished from local resources or from the assigned personnel of other formations that had managed to arrive. And their assigned personnel were sent to other recipients, including to the 15 NKVD rifle divisions formed by a separate decision of the leadership from June 26–29, 1941. They were staffed with the involvement of about 5–7% of the staff of privates and up to 20% of the command staff from the personnel units of the NKVD troops (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 19, l. 36). The rest of the personnel for the NKVD divisions were called up from the reserves in the first and second waves of mobilization, which formed the NPO formations. In this regard, it is incorrect to call them in their pure form divisions of the NKVD, but we will have to leave these names, since it has historically developed that their shaper was the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

Also, a significant part of the personnel from the reserve brigades, starting from July 10, 1941, went to the front as part of marching battalions with a regular strength of 1000 soldiers each. In total, for the period from July 10 to September 6, 1941, it was sent to the fronts 752 marching battalions(TsAMO RF, f. 56, op. 12236, d. 7, pp. 49, 52, 61, 63, 65, 69, 123; d. 48, pp. 83–92; op. 12234, d. 19, pp. 59–195). In August, the departure of marchbats from reserve brigades began on the 16th, after the signing of GKO Resolution No. 459 of August 11 on the formation of new 85 rifle and 25 cavalry divisions and the beginning of the third wave of mobilization from August 18–22, 1941. In total, by September 6, 1941, 740 thousand trained soldiers went to the front as part of 752 marching rifle and machine gun battalions - and this is in addition to those who, in the amount of more than a million people, were sent to deploy new 110 divisions. Subsequently, from September 10, replenishment from spare parts began to be sent only by numbered marching companies - riflemen of 254 people and specialists of 140 people (NKO Order No. 0339 of 09/05/41 - “Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR”, volume 13 (2–2), M.: TERRA, 1997, p. 83). This practice continued throughout the war.

In the third wave of mobilization, the remnants of those born in 1905–1921 were called up. both categories, including untrained, and also for the first time the entire resource of 2nd category reserve military personnel born in 1904–1895 was raised. a total of 6.8 million people. (“1941 – lessons and conclusions”, team of authors, M.: Voenizdat, 1992, p. 109). More than a half Of these, it was necessary to re-teach the intricacies of military affairs in reserve units. In total, from the beginning of the war to October 1, 1941, military personnel of 24 ages from 1895 to 1918 were drafted into the ranks of the Red Army. birth inclusive, and in some places, for example, from areas occupied by the enemy, and before 1890. During the period October-December 1941, people from 1890–1894 were drafted into the army en masse. births, in particular, about 300,000 people. for the formation of 10 sapper armies (RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 12, pp. 118–119). In total, in 1941, over 14 million people were mobilized in addition to the size of the regular army. Of these, over 2.246 million people were sent to the front by marching reinforcements from the Center. (TsAMO RF, f. 56, op. 12236, d. 359, l. 224). The rest were additionally sent to form a huge number of new units or were recruited as reinforcements by the warring armies and fronts themselves. Shared resource the number of persons in the Armed Forces in 1941 amounted to almost 19.1 million people. We will talk about this in great detail in the future when considering personnel resources and their losses.

Description three waves open mobilization of the summer of 1941 would not be complete without a brief description of the process of covert mobilization, carried out at the end of May - June 10, 1941 under the guise of the “Great Training Camp”. By personal summons, without public announcements or ceremonial farewells, in order to secretly increase the number of military units to a size close to wartime levels, 755,859 people were drafted into the army. 1st category of military reserve trained private and junior command personnel and 46,279 commanding and political composition(M.V. Zakharov “On the eve of the great trials”, M.: Voenizdat, 1968, p. 249). This amounted to 24% of the assigned personnel according to the MP-41 mob plan (“1941 - lessons and conclusions”, team of authors, M.: Voenizdat, 1992, p. 82). Additional about 56,000 people. was sent to engineering units with their redeployment to military construction near the western borders.

Almost all professional rifle, artillery, and tank units, with the exception of some border units, were in summer field camps. Those mobilized and assigned to them were sent there at the end of May - June 1941. De jure, military units remained in the states and in peacetime numbers, and in the states they were 2–2.5 times smaller in number than the border units contained, and in fact, after the arrival of assigned personnel, they found themselves in numbers that exceeded them. For example, rifle divisions were increased to almost 12,000 people (TsAMO RF, f. 157, op. 12790, d. 47, pp. 18, 19, 25, 50, 83, 87). All the necessary stocks of weapons, equipment, and ammunition according to wartime states were already in the emergency reserve warehouses (hereinafter referred to as NZ) in each unit, as well as in the forward and head warehouses of the armies nearby state border. It was enough to distribute them according to report cards and the availability of personnel. There were only 2,500 men short of full wartime strength in each of the 99 such deployed rifle divisions. Their arrival was planned, and in most cases occurred with the announcement of open mobilization, which, as we know, did not take long to arrive.

It is difficult to even imagine how even more difficult the events of the initial period of the war would have unfolded if our leadership had not taken such a step as hidden mobilization in advance. Its implementation was disguised as the holding of “Great training camps”. Accordingly, all of the above-mentioned reserves liable for military service were quietly called up not by mobilization, but by personal summons for training, about which a corresponding note was made in their military ID cards, registration cards and registration cards (TsAMO RF, f. 135, op. 12462, d. 14, l. 17). In a huge number of military registration and enlistment offices, later, when compiling conscription (mobilization) books, these people remained “overboard” from the register, since they were not formally mobilized, and their registration cards were destroyed...

70 years have passed since the beginning of the war, but not a single official work of the military department has published information about four waves mobilization for the first summer of 1941. But there were two more waves in the fall of 1941. There were two more at the beginning of 1942. Each of them counted millions of people. Where are the specifics, because we still won’t see anything but general phrases in what was published. Information about the availability of resources for conscripts of all ages, born 1890–1918, conscripts and recruits born in 1919–1927, recruited from June 23, 1941, as well as information about the number of those booked at production, has not yet been declassified. and unbooking during the war years. There is no data on the amount of replenishment sent during the war years with spare parts. These are the cornerstones of all historical analysis of the war years period, inaccessible to researchers. For all 70 years they have been feeding us stories without revealing the real numbers. However, a drop wears away a stone!

It must be said that the accounting of the movement of personnel (arrival and departure) in many spare parts and their subdivisions was proper, with numerous ordered lists of personnel accounting and other documents located in the TsAMO of the Russian Federation. Reporting by teams is usually detailed. In the documents of the headquarters of the military districts from them there is almost all the summary data indicating the numbers of marching battalions and companies, the dates of their formation, loading and sending to the front, as well as their destinations and recipients. But no one will see consolidated figures even at the level of military districts, not to mention the entire Red Army. Summary archival documents classified, but no publications.

A significant layer of information that has been overlooked not only by the top military leadership, but also by local military authorities is data on residents of a particular area who went to fight but did not return. It's about about consolidated lists of soldiers taken into account by former village councils (village administrations), whose names can often be seen on monuments and steles at their place of residence in the village. This information was preserved by fellow countrymen both in the existing documentation of the former village councils, and in the most detailed household books, compiled as of 1940 and located in the regional archives, by the way, for the most part - in secret storage! Comparing these lists with data from the summoning books, depending on the territory, can lead to unexpected results. About 5–8% of people who are registered by village councils as being called up for mobilization and definitely dead (missing in action) and for whom the families have an official document about their fate, or about whom no information about their fate has appeared since the moment they went to war, may not be in the surviving draft books of military registration and enlistment offices. For example, due to the negligence of the performers who filled them out from the registration cards of mobilized reserves in 1949–1950. Moreover, notification of the fate of a soldier from a military unit could very often bypass the military registration and enlistment office. This happened in connection with the issuance in 1942 of NGO Orders that changed the procedure for sending notices (NGO Orders No. 10 of 01/14/42, 0270 of 04/12/42, 214 of 07/14/42 - “Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR", volume 13 (2–2), M.: TERRA, 1997).

It should be further clarified where this 5–8% came from: in the period 1993–2008. the author of these lines, together with his colleagues, sent over 19,000 requests about the fate of military personnel to the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, to which responses were received with the attachment of archive certificates; of which, from 5 to 8% of answers, depending on the district of the Arkhangelsk region where the warrior was born, contained the following words: “In the accounting files irrecoverable losses private and non-commissioned officers DO NOT MEAN so-and-so.” The same applied to information on officers and other categories of soldiers. Considering the large sample size, its pattern with a known assumption for a smaller bar can be fully used when estimating population, which is the total number of participants in the Great Patriotic War. Looking ahead, let's say that the share of 5% of approximately 35 million people who “put on an overcoat” is 1.75 million people. And the search practice at the battlefields every field season confirms with its personal finds the sad pattern of the lack of registration data of dozens of identified soldiers in the military command and control bodies, although there is information in families and household books.

Following receipt of the notification, the family may not have needed to register and receive a pension. And the military unit, which managed to send a notification to the family, could not send a report on losses to the authorities, and then the soldier would not be included in the centralized accounting of personal losses. As a result, we have the fact that a soldier may not be registered either by conscription or by fate in the military registration and enlistment office and the archives of the Ministry of Defense, but he is known and remembered in the family and in the village council of the territory.

As is known, according to the famous Federal law No. 131-FZ of October 6, 2003 “On the general principles of organization local government V Russian Federation» was completely redesigned in 2004 Administrative division Russia. New enlarged ones have appeared rural settlements, which included from 1 to 5–6 territories of former village councils. Borders have changed, and inevitably there has been a lot of confusion about the past. Documents from the former territories of village councils are good if they are preserved, at least in district archives. And if not?

In addition, many military registration and enlistment offices also in 2008–2009. were enlarged and subsequently reorganized. Now the military registration and enlistment office is called a department of the regional military registration and enlistment office in “such and such” district and serves the territories of 2–3 districts. There are no military positions left in them, except that there are two positions in the regional military registration and enlistment office - the military commissar and his deputy. The legacy of the abolished military registration and enlistment offices for the Great Patriotic War is not prescribed for new structures to preserve by any regulatory document of the RF Ministry of Defense. Also, no instructions were given for the transfer of their files related to wartime (accounting for resources, conscription, notices of fate, accounting for demobilization, correspondence to establish destinies, etc.) to local archives or local history museums. The management of many museums, understanding the value of the documents, at their own peril and risk, agreed with the leadership of the abolished military registration and enlistment offices on the secret transfer of heritage to their disposal, trying to preserve what the military is obliged to preserve “nosebleeds”. All this took place just 3 years ago. Perhaps what has been preserved to date in the former military registration and enlistment offices will be collected in the new Federal Archives of the Great Patriotic War, which is now being built on the territory of the Russian TsAMO in Podolsk. In Ukraine, the same thing was done back in 2006–2008.

In the practice of planned pre-war conscription and conscription for mobilization after the start of the war, as well as service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, there is another nuance that had a lot negative consequences from the point of view of establishing soldiers' destinies. It can even be called not a nuance, but an abyss where information about millions of warriors disappeared. Judge for yourself.

In accordance with the “Instructions on the procedure for surrendering passports to those liable for military service during mobilization” (NKO Order No. 0130 dated June 20, 1940), during the planned pre-war conscription, both the recruit and the reserve member were required to hand over their passport (and military ID - to the RVC or to the headquarters of the military unit) who was available). This order continued for subsequent waves of mobilization throughout the war. In place of the confiscated passport, a special receipt was issued, which indicated the last name, first name, patronymic of the soldier, the military registration and enlistment office or headquarters and regiment number, passport details, the number, the official seal of the military registration and enlistment office (or regimental headquarters), the signature of the military commissar or regiment commander. Search engines have already identified more than a dozen fighters who did not have medallions, but who retained receipts for surrendering their passports. The receipt stub remained at the military registration and enlistment office. According to the inventory, passports were handed over to district and city police departments, where their data was entered into a book (inventory) of invalid passports, and the passports themselves were destroyed. The passport inventories were then kept as carefully as blank passport forms. In case of return from the army, a demobilized soldier could receive a new passport and registration using a certificate, if it was preserved, or according to the inventory of surrendered passports. Military ID cards were handed over to the Military Military Commission for Conscription, where they were destroyed in accordance with the established procedure. After demobilization, the soldier received a new military ID.

In peacetime, after handing over the passport and military ID to the military personnel conscript service(personnel) filled out the “Service book for private and junior commanding personnel of the Red Army,” introduced by Order of the USSR NKO No. 171 of June 20, 1940. However, when the unit entered the theater of military operations, this book had to be submitted through the unit commander to the unit headquarters, and then to the archive local authorities military administration. In exchange for the book, a medallion with brief information about a soldier. But there were not always enough capsules and forms for medallions, even for the staff. As a result, a formation formed before the war arrived at the front, sometimes without any complete set medallions for all personnel, as well as any other documents that can comprehensively verify the identity of a warrior.

What was given to a reserve conscript, called up for covert (before the start of the war) and open (after the start of the war) mobilization, in exchange for a passport and military ID upon arrival at the military unit? NOTHING except the receipt for the passport and the ebonite capsule of the service medallion and the double form for it, if they existed at the disposal of the quartermaster service.

Filling out the medallion form with information about the soldier was supposed to be done by platoon commanders, but most often these duties were performed by the soldiers themselves with their inept, hard-to-read handwriting, as needed and with what – whether a chemical pencil, an ordinary pencil or an ink pen. Good commander in the absence of ebonite capsules and forms, he forced his subordinates to fill out any available blank piece of paper with biographical data and use a cartridge case instead of a capsule. The cartridges used were from a revolver pistol or a Mosin rifle with a bullet inserted in reverse, or even German cartridges, so that they differed from the soldier’s standard cartridges and could be easily found by funeral workers. Many commanders didn’t give a damn about all this...

In fact, until the spring-summer of 1942, the medallion was the only item that made it possible to at least somehow identify a soldier both during his lifetime and after his death.

Thus, when a soldier was at the front, instead of a passport and military ID (strict reporting forms with a photograph of the owner), he did not receive any similar official document that could confirm his identity during the period of military service. The medallion, filled in by the owner’s hand, had neither a photo nor details of the military unit where he served, nor the seal of the headquarters of this unit and the name of the chief of staff, and, thus, was not an official document. The authenticity of the data in the medallion has not been confirmed in any way. And if a fighter also lost a medallion, then it was impossible to correctly establish the identity of both the living and the dead. Millions of our compatriots started the war and died without documents officially confirming their identity, unlike the enemy troops, where each soldier had personal metal tokens and soldier’s books.

These circumstances, as well as the facts that the enemy sent an incredibly large number of spies into front line, taking advantage of the lack of official documents among the Red Army soldiers, necessitated the signing of the Order of the NCO of the USSR No. 330 of October 7, 1941 “On the introduction of the Red Army book in military units and institutions in the rear and at the front” (“Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR ", volume 13 (2–2), M.: TERRA, 1997, p. 111), and subsequently - the removal of medallions from the supply of the Red Army from November 17, 1942 (ibid., p. 368) after the end of full support books of the USSR Armed Forces by the fall of 1942. Accordingly, at the beginning of the war, for more than six months, millions of our soldiers were actually depersonalized, which was clearly manifested in the text of Order No. 330:

“The Red Army book, introduced by NKO order No. 171 in 1940, clause 7 of the same order, has been abolished for the active army. In view of this, Red Army soldiers and junior commanders found themselves at the front without documents proving their identity... There can be no doubt that many people hanging out in the rear of divisions and armies, dressed in Red Army uniforms, are enemy agents transmitting information about our units, the fight against which is impossible due to the lack of documents among the soldiers of the Red Army, so that we could distinguish our people from enemy agents... The lack of documents in the hands of reinforcements sent to the front and sick and wounded soldiers and junior commanders leaving the front for the evacuation made it impossible for supply authorities to check their provision of uniforms, weapons, equipment and other types of allowance... NPO Order No. 171 of June 20, 1940 - cancel... The Red Army book should be considered the only document identifying the Red Army soldier and junior commander. In the Red Army book, record the serviceman’s military service and his receipt of allowances (weapons, equipment and uniforms) from the military department.”

Better late than never…

All civilian researchers need to clearly understand the following: not one of the military registration and enlistment offices had any rights to independently send soldiers called up for mobilization to the front, either from Siberia or from Belarus. All movement of personnel occurred only according to the Directive of at least the headquarters of the military district, which, as a rule, appeared only after receiving the Directive from the General Staff. However, there were also rare independent exceptions, when the commander of the troops of a military district, at his own peril and risk, gave instructions on sending mobilized troops to one or another reinforced unit, but this applies only to the command of the Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts and the North operating in their territories. -Western, Western, Southwestern and Southern Fronts. Taking into account the above, the apparent impossibility of tracking the movement of a fighter from the moment of conscription from home to the front in most cases can be considered ephemeral.

Why am I saying this? Moreover, it is now possible to state the fact that after the declassification of documents from the military districts and the Main Directorate of Formations and the staffing of the Red Army troops in the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, tracing the movement of reinforcements to the front in June-July 1941 and further throughout the war from the military registration and enlistment office to the division ( brigades) at the front MAYBE. Including for an individual soldier. It’s one thing to say “missing in action” without specifying at least the region of the fighting; another is exact knowledge of the area of combat operations and even specific sections of the front line where the formation fought, in which a fighter with a marching unit ended up after being called up and sent to the front.

The most difficult thing to study here is the initial period of the war. For some reason, it is believed that there was no order then, but there was sheer confusion. It is not always so. In addition to detailed records of the movement of personnel in reserve units, there are numerous and very accurate documents on the dispatch of numbered trains with replenishment, detailed lists of the numbers of marching battalions and marching companies, the dates of their departure, the place of their loading, destination and actual unloading, indicating the front, the army , divisions, brigades that received reinforcements. The movement of mobilized reserve military personnel and recruits from border military districts to the east is also documented: from where, who was distributed where and how many people could not be drafted due to the rapid advance of the Germans. There are a lot of reports from regional military commissars, authorized persons of military districts, etc., which shed light on the details of the movement of huge masses of people after the outbreak of the war.

Has anyone figured out these obvious things? Did you figure it out? I assume that these “someone” have figured it out. We have all the bottlenecks military history“embroidered” after the quiet work of numerous commissions and commissioners. The trouble is that these reports on “embroidery” are not available. And if someone figured it out, say, while serving at the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense (RF), then they left their work in its 1st department under seven seals. But all that was needed was in the 50s–80s. give 5-6 years of time for 5 responsible executors with a small apparatus, who would be given the authority to study, systematize and publish documents from the State Defense Committee to the regiment - and the entire army with the fleet, from the People's Commissariats to a separate regiment, would be in full view. And people who perished too. Then the All-Russian Book of Memory, following the implementation of this research, would be more reliable, and Generalized bank data “Memorial” (hereinafter referred to as OBD) would become the final virtual monumental point of all work.

The upper part of the notice of the fate of a serviceman

But this did not happen; they kept it secret from top to bottom. And therefore, regional Books of Memory as the main source of information about the military fates of relatives of citizens in the regions leave much to be desired. For example, notifications about the fate of soldiers in military registration and enlistment offices and reports about losses in the TsAMO of the Russian Federation were declassified only in 1990, State Defense Committee resolutions began to be declassified only in 1998, and summary information about the movement of millions of personnel still remains in secret storage.

Regarding the fact of creating an array of OBD information that is amazing in terms of volume and quality of information, the following needs to be said directly. The data bank has so far summarized only the array of personal information that was preserved in the processed documents of the archives of the RF Ministry of Defense and some other archives of federal subordination (RGVA, GARF). In addition to them, it is absolutely necessary to continue work on filling the ODB, including processing the personal data of military registration and enlistment offices (on pre-war conscription, mobilization and losses), as well as documents from the 9 new huge archival sources of information discussed in detail below. The creation of the type of OBD that is now available on the Internet required the allocation of hundreds of millions of rubles over the years 2007–2011. The proposed scope of work will require 2–3 billion rubles. A lot of? Undoubtedly. But it is necessary to build a perspective before the authorities and work in this direction in the naive and adamant hope that those in power will have enough determination and funds to replenish the unique collection of electronic documentary materials.

1. Records of soldiers’ stages of service in the USSR were confiscated and possibly destroyed in almost all military registration and enlistment offices.

2. The conscription books for mobilization were scanty and incomplete, most of them only for the period from June 23, 1941 and later.

3. In many RVKs, persons who were drafted before the start of the war in the period 1938 - the first half of 1941 and who met the war in the personnel of the Red Army are not included in the mobilization conscription books due to the fact that they literally did not enter the army in connection with mobilization , but according to the planned pre-war conscription or direction. It would be funny if it weren't so sad. This literalness outrages you to the core when you realize that they forgot to include millions of soldiers and commanders in the saved sources of information, because from 1939 to the beginning of the war the army grew in size by more than 3.5 times due to newly recruited people. They are not included in the calculations of many military registration and enlistment offices regarding the number of those sent to fight. Therefore, it is difficult to establish the exact number of soldiers recruited into the USSR Armed Forces and who took part in the Great Patriotic War, as well as those killed and missing, given the huge volume of destroyed primary documents. But it is possible, if the state wishes to do so.

4. The registration cards of those liable for military service in reserve and the draft cards of recruits were also almost all confiscated from the military registration and enlistment offices; their fate is unknown.

5. Millions of soldiers at the beginning of the war did not have any official documents confirming their identities for more than six months.

6. The accounting of personnel losses and their movements in the troops turned out, frankly speaking, lousy, there is no other word for it.

7. From 5 to 8% of people who left to fight from one region or another are not accounted for anywhere or in any way. There are no primary sources of registration in the military registration and enlistment offices for them, they were not included in the draft books, they were not included in reports of losses from military units, their relatives did not report them to the military registration and enlistment office after the war; they had neither medallions nor official identity documents. Their fate can only be determined by chance.

8. In 1949–1950 The military department seized the primary records of reserve servicemen and recruits at local military registration and enlistment offices, cutting off the threads of tens of millions of destinies with their own hands. More powerful blows historical memory of our people than those that were inflicted on it by existing and existing leaders and government officials, probably, even the most vile enemy could not have inflicted on it in open battle.

9. The leadership of the USSR and Russia hid from society true dimensions losses of citizens of the USSR in 1941–1945, including the personnel of its Armed Forces, presenting a very underestimated unreliable estimate of their losses. This was due to both moral and political concerns and financial reasons.

Throughout the following material, the reader will be able to verify the validity of these harsh words. The reality turned out to be harsher than our ideas about it.

From June 23, 1941, those liable for military service from 1905 to 1918 inclusive were conscripted into the army.

The conscription territory is Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasus and Transcaucasian military districts. There were also territorial nuances. For example, already on the night of June 23 in Siberia, military registration and enlistment offices sent out notices to conscripts, but not everyone received mobilization notices. Due to the threat of a Japanese attack, some of the future soldiers were assigned to the Far Eastern Front and were not called to collection points.

In total, in June and July 1941, a general and complete mobilization of men and partial mobilization of women was carried out. By this time, class restrictions had already been lifted - everyone could defend their homeland. And this is not a mere formality. The fact is that in 1925 the USSR adopted a law on compulsory military service. It was forbidden to conscript “persons of the exploiting classes” into the army, namely: children of former nobles, merchants, officers of the old army, priests, factory owners, as well as Cossacks and kulaks.

Along with the mobilization to the front, the authorities “booked” specialists to work in military factories. During the 1942 conscription campaign, deferments were granted to combine operators and tractor drivers involved in harvesting. Depending on the region, “reservation” was also given to students of river technical schools and forestry institutes who were in navigation and logging in the taiga. In 1941 and until the first half of 1942, teachers, who were not accepted for military service at all until 1940, also had the right to deferments.

But the front required replenishment: millions of dead and wounded, prisoners and encirclement. Both 17-year-olds and 50-year-olds have already been taken into the army.

The legendary woman - nun Mother Adriana (Natalya Malysheva) - shortly before her death, spoke in an interview with RG about how young people greeted the news of the start of the war in Moscow. “As soon as Levitan’s voice came from the loudspeakers about the beginning of the war, I and my fellow students from the aviation institute ran to the military academies,” the nun said. “We demanded and begged to be transferred to them from our institute: in order to quickly get the specialty the army needed and - to front. But only one of our company succeeded, and only because his father was the commander of the Red Army."

Volunteers were selected for the airborne and ski brigades, as well as for the special units of tank destroyers, using Komsomol vouchers. Preference was given to athletes. Photo: Alexander Ustinov

Employees of the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War showed me the document. Issued by the Stalinist District Military Commissariat of Moscow: subject to military service V.M. Yudovsky. On July 6, 1941 he enlisted in the people's militia. This is not a summons or a certificate - just a sheet of paper with a corner stamp and a round seal. The partisans had approximately the same situation with documents. Certificate: issued to comrade Nadezhda Vasilyevna Troyan stating that she was in the “Storm” partisan detachment as a fighter. The headquarters of the partisan movements most likely had to improvise - even in the regular army, not everything went smoothly with the official documents of the Red Army soldiers. Order NKO USSR N330 of October 7, 1941 “On the introduction of the Red Army book in military units and institutions in the rear and at the front” had to be carried out in the most difficult conditions, when the army was retreating and the soldiers lacked a lot, including documents and death tokens. What can we say about certificates for partisans and militias.

By the way

After the end of the war, the army numbered 11 million people, which was excessive for peacetime. In July 1945, all soldiers and sergeants over 45 years of age and officers over 50 years of age were dismissed from the army. In September 1945, soldiers and sergeants over 30 years of age began to be transferred to the reserve, as well as soldiers, sergeants, and officers with specialties that were valuable for the restoration of the national economy (builders, miners, metallurgists, machine operators, etc.), regardless of age.
From 1946 to 1948 there was no conscription into the army. Young people were sent to restoration work in mines, heavy engineering enterprises, and construction sites. Military schools for officer training accepted people aged 17-23 with secondary education.
By the beginning of 1948, the size of the army had dropped to 2.8 million people.
After the Great Patriotic War, a new law on universal conscription was adopted in 1949. Young people aged 18 were subject to conscription: to the ground forces and aviation for 3 years, to the navy for 4 years.

Glukharev S.Ya. Borovsky call for mobilization during the Great Patriotic War /

At dawn on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The Great Patriotic War began. On the same day, in accordance with the current Constitution of the country, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the mobilization of military personnel was announced in 14 military districts. The military situation required the introduction of emergency measures, and by a special decree of the Presidium, martial law was declared in Moscow, Leningrad and most regions, territories, and republics of the European part of the USSR.

The city of Borovsk and the territory of the Borovsky district in the pre-war and war years until July 1944 were part of the Moscow region. With the introduction of martial law, all regional functions of bodies state power in terms of defense, ensuring public order and state security, they passed to the Military Council of the Moscow Military District. The commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District during the entire period of the Great Patriotic War was experienced military leader Lieutenant General Pavel Artemyevich Artemyev (since January 1942 - Colonel General).

The mobilization alert began on June 22, immediately after the Soviet government announced on the radio about the treacherous attack fascist Germany to the USSR. The corresponding telegrams announcing mobilization, signed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the country, were sent to all republican, regional, regional and regional centers. The mobilization procedure was communicated to citizens through military registration desks, heads of enterprises and institutions, village and town Councils, as well as orders posted everywhere.

In accordance with the mobilization plan, from June 23, 1941, those liable for military service who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive were subject to conscription. For the most part, these were men who had already served in military service or had attended training camps several times before the war. The announcement of mobilization also meant a delay in the dismissal of personnel who had served the established terms of service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet or the NKVD troops. The assigned personnel, called up for training camps in the pre-war months, also remained in their military units.

From the very first days of mobilization, the highest level of organization was noted in the work of local military authorities throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. This was explained not only by the experience gained in pre-war mobilization training and exercises, but also by the absolute understanding and readiness of the entire population of the country to join the ranks of the defenders of the Fatherland. In most regions of the USSR, the turnout of reserve conscripts at recruiting stations after the announcement of mobilization was more than 99%! There were only a few obvious draft dodgers.

The mobilization deployment schemes developed before the start of the war provided for the priority sending of conscripts to the troops of the covering armies stationed along western border Soviet Union. Special attention was devoted to the defense of the border with East Prussia and the directions to Riga, Kovno and Vilnius of the Baltic Special Military District. The protection of the sea coast was entrusted to the 67th Infantry Division and the Libavsk naval base Baltic Fleet.

The first conscription teams were sent by the Borovsky District Military Commissariat (RVK) to these areas. The Baltic destinations included in the instructions of the residents of Borovsk: Kovno (modern Lithuanian city Kaunas), Libava (Latvian city of Liepaja), Rokiskis and Ukmerge (Lithuania). However, the whole tragedy of the situation was that in the first four days of planned mobilization, from June 23 to June 26, 1941, conscripts were sent to cities that were already actually occupied by German troops. Therefore, after a few days, trains with personnel, including those from Borovchan, were stopped on their way to the west and redirected to other points to form new formations. Thus, the bulk of the Borovets from the first conscription teams intended for the Baltic military units became part of the new 248th Infantry Division.

The 248th Rifle Division was formed in Vyazma. An experienced military leader, Major General Karl Karlovich Sverchevsky, was appointed commander of the division. The bulk of the Borovsk residents were sent to one regiment - the 899th Rifle Regiment (commander - Colonel Fedor Mikhailovich Romashin). The number of the field mail that was on the letters of the division soldiers was 926 PPS. The division was formed in a short time - in just two weeks. On July 13, 1941, the 248th Rifle Division had already received combat mission for defense in the combat composition of the reserve armies of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky defensive line. Until the end of September, the division was engaged in the construction of defensive structures northwest of Vyazma (near the village of Kholm-Zhirkovsky) and combat training.

The fate of the 248th division was tragic. By decision of the Rate Supreme High Command On October 3, the division was planned to be transferred to another front, near Kursk. Units of the division have already begun loading into railway cars. However, the abandoned and uncovered defense line of the 248th Division found itself practically in the center of the German tank attack to capture Moscow. The loading of the division was urgently canceled, the regiments began to return to their previous line of defense and immediately enter the battle.

After several days of the most severe defensive battles the entire 248th division was surrounded by the Vyazemsky cauldron. Out of the division's roster of 13,830 people (as of September 20, 1941), only about 700 people managed to break out of encirclement. Due to huge losses, the 248th Infantry Division was disbanded.

In 2010, a historian from Vyazma, Igor Gennadievich Mikhailov, who studied in detail the Vyazma encirclement of 1941, published the book “Born and Died at Vyazma.” The book, created with the participation of many Vyazma local historians, search engines and old-timers, is entirely devoted to the military path and feat of the 248th Infantry Division. The division in which the first residents of the Borovsky district called up for mobilization heroically fought and died.

From the end of June to the first days of July 1941, the second wave of mobilization began, which was not provided for by the pre-war plans of the country's military leadership. All previously planned transfers of assigned personnel from internal military districts to the West were cancelled. The growing need of the front for human replacements put forward new tasks for the military commissariats. First of all, this is the emergency preparation of conscription teams for new military units and formations.

On June 29, the Headquarters of the High Command decided to immediately form 15 wartime divisions from the border and other NKVD troops. Two of them, the 252nd and 259th rifle regiments, were formed in Serpukhov and were assigned to the front of the reserve armies. On July 6, several conscription teams were sent from the Borovsky RVC for these new divisions.

The 252nd Rifle Division (field post number 815 PPS), formed in Serpukhov, went through a glorious battle path. The formation of the division was carried out on an emergency basis and was completed by July 11. On the same day, the division loaded into echelons and went to the front. On July 28, 1941, the division entered the first battle near the village of Ilino, Smolensk region. Participated in the defense of Moscow and the winter counter-offensive. In August 1942, she arrived in the Perm region for reorganization. Then back to the front. The most difficult battles followed to liberate Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Austria, and Hungary.

Borovchan residents were called up to serve in the 252nd Division almost throughout the war. It is noteworthy that the Belarusian writer Vasil Bykov fought as part of this division as a commander of a platoon of 45 mm guns. The everyday life of the 252nd Division at the front is reflected in many harsh and merciless works of the prose writer. Testimonies of several dozen soldiers and officers of the division, their short memoirs were collected and published in Perm as a separate book, “Our Rifle.”

For military services, the division was awarded the honorary names “Kharkov” and “Bratislava”. The 252nd Rifle Division ended the war in the Czech Republic.

The second division, which was formed in Serpukhov with the participation of Borovsk residents, was the 259th Rifle Division. Field mail number - 308 PPS. The first commander of the division was the head of the Ordzhonikidze military school of the NKVD troops, Major General Fedor Nikolaevich Shilov. Baptism of fire The division took over the area of the city of Staraya Russa as part of the 34th Army. Then she fought more than 150 kilometers, clearing more than 20 settlements of the enemy. After replenishment, the division was redeployed to the Volkhov Front.

In March 1942 she fought as part of the 2nd shock army. At the end of May 1942, the division found itself cut off from supply bases and led defensive battles surrounded. At the end of June 1942, the 259th Division fought its way out of encirclement, having only about 200 soldiers and commanders. After the restoration of combat strength, we went back to the front. The 259th Rifle Division ended the war in Bulgaria with the honorary name “Artyomovskaya”.

In addition to preparing conscription teams for new military units, employees of the Borovsky RVC selected conscripts according to the required military specialties and individual orders. They form special teams: sappers for the 83rd engineer battalion (conscription from 07/01/1941), cavalrymen for the 27th cavalry division (conscription 03-05/08/1941), drivers for the 176th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (conscription 07/06/1941 ) and Petushinsky RVC (conscription 07/15/1941).

Two teams with conscripted military dog trainers are preparing for Kuskovo near Moscow for the Central School of Military Dog Breeding. Conscripts are regularly sent to the 15th reserve tank regiment in Naro-Fominsk. Conscripts are being trained for anti-aircraft units of the Moscow air defense. Conscription teams are sent to other military registration and enlistment offices in the Moscow region, on the basis of which larger marching companies are formed.

The fighting fates of the Borovets residents of the second wave of mobilization turned out differently. Those who underwent retraining in the Naro-Fominsk 15th reserve tank regiment fought in tank units on all fronts.

Those who remained to serve in Naro-Fominsk in October 1941 fought very close to home - in the Vereisky district. Conscript drivers assigned to the 176th Artillery Regiment were subsequently redistributed to different artillery units, went through the entire war, and returned with military orders and medals. All sapper conscripts who served in the 83rd sapper battalion went missing west of Smolensk.

Tragic, but significant is the fate of the conscript machine gunners sent on June 29, 1941 to Efremov at the disposal of the commander of the 388th Infantry Regiment. Almost all of them are listed as missing near Mogilev, like most of the fighters of this regiment, including their commander, Colonel Semyon Fedorovich Kutepov.

However, the heroic actions of the 388th regiment on Belarusian soil turned out to be immortal.

388th rifle regiment became part of the 172nd Infantry Division and in early July was transferred to Belarus for the defense of Mogilev. A large strategic junction of railways, highways, and communication lines, the city was the key to Smolensk and Moscow. The order of the Soviet command was categorical: “To hold Mogilev at all costs...”

During three weeks Our units near Mogilev not only held back the enemy’s advance, but also inflicted significant losses on him with sudden counterattacks. Smolensk had already been taken, and in the encircled Mogilev there were fierce battles for several more days.

On July 20, 1941, the Izvestia newspaper published an essay by war correspondent Konstantin Simonov, “Hot Day,” about the battle near Mogilev, during which the 388th Infantry Regiment knocked out 39 enemy armored vehicles in one day. Arriving on the instructions of the editors at the 388th Infantry Regiment, Simonov for the first time since the beginning of the war saw a military unit in exemplary order: trenches, trenches of full profile, and most importantly - in the neutral zone, dozens of destroyed enemy tanks, hundreds of corpses of fascists. He was incredibly impressed by the soldiers and officers of the 388th Regiment, who were self-confident and had overcome their fear of tanks and fear of aviation. “Here I saw for the first time that the fascists were really being beaten,— wrote Simonov. — I saw that there are people who will stop the enemy.”

According to many researchers, the defense of Mogilev occupies the same place in the history of the first year of the Great Patriotic War as the heroic defense Brest Fortress. The battles near Mogilev are the origins of our victory in the war.

Konstantin Simonov described the heroic events near Mogilev in his novel “The Living and the Dead.” The commander of the 388th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Kutepov, became the prototype of the main character of the novel, General Serpilin. According to the last will of Konstantin Simonov, his ashes were scattered on the Buynichi field.

In 1962, an obelisk was erected on the Buynichi field in honor of the soldiers of the 388th regiment, and on May 9, 1995 it was opened memorial Complex. This is how the memory of the Borovites was preserved on Belarusian soil.

At the end of July, the Borovsky RVK sent two teams of conscripts to Dmitrov, where the 305th Infantry Division was being formed these days. More than half of the division’s personnel were volunteers from the Kominternovsky district of Moscow, the rest were conscripts from the Moscow and Kalinin regions. The 305th Division has been included in the active army since August 15, 1941, field post number 954 PPS. The division commander is Colonel Dmitry Ivanovich Barabanshchikov.

On August 17, 1941, the division arrived on the Northwestern Front (Novgorod Army Operational Group) and from the march entered into battle with superior enemy forces. According to the recollections of the participants in the battles, the division’s fighters fought skillfully, fiercely and knocked over the enemy on the move. Only the overwhelming fire superiority of the enemy, including the SS troops, forced the division to retreat and go on the defensive. For two months, the Germans in the division's area of responsibility were unable to move a single step forward.

In December 1941, the 305th Division became part of the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front. It is noteworthy that the commander of the 52nd Army at that time was a native Borovsk resident, Lieutenant General Nikolai Kuzmich Klykov. From the end of December, the division went on the offensive and crossed the Volkhov. At the end of February 1942, it was introduced into the breakthrough at Myasny Bor. At the beginning of June 1942, the division found itself surrounded, from which few managed to escape. Despite the fact that the banners of the division and regiments were saved, on July 30, 1942, the 305th Infantry Division was disbanded due to heavy losses.

At the end of the summer of 1941, the third wave of mobilization began. On August 11, 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to form 110 new rifle and cavalry divisions and expand the conscription age in connection with this. Military registration and enlistment offices are given the right to conscript citizens not born in 1905, as before, but from 1895, as well as conscript recruits born in 1922 and 1923. A decision is also made to replenish the Moscow militia divisions created in July 1941 with citizens called up for mobilization.

In the surviving draft lists of the Borovsk military registration and enlistment office there are no records of the sending of conscripts to specific divisions of the Moscow people's militia. However, the service of Borovets in militia divisions can be established by the preserved numbers of postal field stations from the data on the dead or missing, as well as by the registration data of prisoners of war. One should also take into account the established practice of that time (with rare exceptions) not to split up conscription teams, but to send them entirely to military units.

In September 1941, militia divisions, due to conscription for mobilization, were brought to the normal strength of a wartime rifle division (11,654 people) and received army-wide numbering. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the militias were engaged in the construction of defensive structures and engineering barriers, first at the Mozhaisk defense line, then at the Rzhev-Vyazemsky defensive line. Time for combat training the minimum was given.

Taking this into account, the table below provides information on the conscription of Borovets into the militia divisions of Moscow.

Name Divisions (July-September 1941)	Renaming Divisions (October 1941)	Mail Divisions	Draft date Borovsky RVC	Where is the team sent? From Borovsk	Dislocation As of October 1941
1st Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia (Leninsky District)	60th Infantry Division	933 PPP	14.08.1941	Mytishchi RVC	Spas-Demensk, Borovsky district (reformation)
2nd Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia (Stalinsky District)	2nd Infantry Division (II formation)	929 PPP	23.08.1941	Dmitrovsky RVC	Vyazma
4th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia (Kuibyshevsky District)	110th Infantry Division (II formation)	754 PPP	19.08.1941 19.08.1941	Mytishchi RVC	Borovsky district
5th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia (Frunzensky District)	113th Rifle Division (II formation)	932 PPP	19.08.1941 02.09.1941	Mytishchi RVC Kuntsevo RVC	Spas-Demensk, Borovsky district
6th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia (Dzerzhinsky District)	160th Rifle Division	303 PPP	20.08.1941 21.08.1941	Noginsk RVC	Dorogobuzh, Vyazma
8th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia (Krasnopresnensky District)	8th Infantry Division (II formation)	527 PPP	27.08.1941	Ramensky RVC	east of Yelnya
9th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia (Kirov region)	139th Infantry Division (II formation)	931 PPP	26.08.1941 27.08.1941	Naro-Fominsk RVC	northeast of Yelnya

On September 30, the German offensive against Moscow began in the Bryansk direction, and on October 2, in the Vyazemsky direction. Units of the Red Army stubbornly resisted, but the enemy broke through the defenses with powerful tank attacks and rushed to envelop our divisions. The Soviet military leadership was unable to unravel the enemy's plan, the direction of his main attack, and a few days later they lost control of their troops.

On October 7, 1941, the Wehrmacht closed the encirclement ring around Soviet troops west of Vyazma, and two days later in the Bryansk region. The Red Army suffered huge losses; according to some sources, more than 600 thousand people were captured alone. Of the twelve divisions of the Moscow people's militia formed in July 1941, nine actually died. Of the divisions where large groups of Borovsk residents fought, the following were officially disbanded due to heavy losses: the 2nd division (Stalinsky district of Moscow), the 8th division (Krasnopresnensky district of Moscow) and the 9th division (Kirovsky district).

Documents of units that were surrounded, including lists of personnel, in accordance with existing instructions were destroyed.

In the first ten days of October 1941, the territory of the Borovsky district found itself at the center of the retreat of our troops from the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line. The Soviet command took special measures to collect units that had broken through from encirclement, replenish them with conscripts and form new militia divisions.

Based on the remnants of units and subunits of the 60th Infantry Division (formerly the 1st Militia Division), which escaped from the Vyazemsky cauldron, near Borovsk, in the village of Ermolino, its new composition was formed.

On October 16, the 60th Division from the territory of the Borovsky region was transferred by vehicles to the right flank of the 49th Army to close the Tarusa-Serpukhov direction.

The reorganization of units of the 113th Infantry Division (formerly the 5th Militia Division), which managed to escape from the encirclement through difficult holding battles, took place 15 kilometers from Borovsk, in the area of modern Obninsk. On the evening of October 12, the incompletely equipped 113th Division, under the command of a new commander, Colonel Konstantin Ivanovich Mironov, was urgently transferred to the Borovsk direction. Here, at the border of the villages of Butovka-Satino-Krasnoe, the division accomplished its second feat, standing in the way of the main attack of the German 57th tank corps Wehrmacht The planned rapid rush of elite Wehrmacht divisions from Medyn to Naro-Fominsk and further to Moscow was stopped near Borovsk by the forces of former militias and recruits.

A few days of enemy delay in front of Borovsk was enough for the Soviet command to deploy another militia division just outside the city - the 110th, former 4th Infantry Division of the People's Militia of the Kuibyshevsky District of Moscow.

The fate of the Borovsk residents sent to serve in this division in the summer of forty-one is amazing. Immediately after the formation and occupation of the rightmost sector of the defense of the Western Front in the area of Lake Seliger, the division regiments did not conduct active combat operations. Being away from the main direction of impact German forces, soldiers of the 110th division were engaged in the construction of defensive lines.

On the morning of October 8, the division received an order for urgent loading and transfer to the defense of Moscow. "Soldier's Telegraph" quickly sent out an order about the place of future deployment, which turned out to be very close to home for the Borovites who served in the division - the Mozhaisk region. Probably even more exciting for the Borovsk militia was the news received on October 10, when the echelons with the division were already stationed near Moscow. The final transfer point has been changed. Borovsk became it!

The further combat fate of the 110th division is as tragic as all the other divisions near Moscow, which took on the full power of German tank attacks. On October 19-20, 1941, after the Wehrmacht introduced new reserves and struck the defenders in the Borovsk direction, German troops cut battle formations 110th Division. Individual groups managed to break through and reach their troops in the Naro-Fominsk area. The majority of the division's personnel are considered missing in the Borovsky district.

The essence of the first battles near Moscow was very accurately conveyed in the brilliant essay “Moscow” by Konstantin Simonov. And although he wrote only about the 110th Infantry Division (4th Militia), of course, these lines can be applied to all other divisions of the people’s militia.
“Near Borovsk, having closed the breakthrough, the 4th Moscow Militia Division entered the battle. The people in it were not yet sufficiently trained, they did not have enough machine guns and equipment, but they fought selflessly. At that time, no one from the division, naturally, knew strategic plans main command. And the pages of this desperate resistance, this withdrawal with the fiercest battles, which was then considered in the division to be a disaster difficult to correct, later turned out to be the main merit of the division. At the cost of unheard-of sacrifices, at the cost of its own blood, the division, as well as the other regiments fighting next to it, made it possible to concentrate troops to strike the Germans.”

Another division to which it was sent large group Borovsk residents in late summer - early autumn 1941, - 311th Infantry Division (recruitment of Borovsk residents on 08/30/1941 and 09/04/1941). The formation of this division began in the Ural Military District in the city of Kirov as the Kirov Division of the People's Militia. At the front - from August 16, 1941 with the name 311th Infantry Division. She was sent to defend Leningrad in the Novgorod region near Chudovo. After heavy losses, it was replenished with personnel, including Borovets. She took part in many military operations of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, trying at any cost to ensure the lifting of the blockade of Leningrad. Liberated the Baltic states, Poland, participated in Berlin operation. The war ended with the name 311th Infantry Dvina Red Banner Order of Suvorov Division.

The conscription to the front by the Borovsk military registration and enlistment office continued almost until the occupation of the area by German troops. The last conscription team, the list of which has been preserved, was sent on October 9, 1941 to Kubinka, to a tank training center. By October 10, the front line approached the borders of the Borovsky district. On October 12, the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Western Front, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank Alexander Mikhailovich Belyanov, arrived in Borovsk and gave the order for the relocation and evacuation of all rear units from the Borovsk region.

It is impossible to summarize the exact quantitative results of the 1941 mobilization call from the Borovsky region. Some of the draft lists have not survived. There are almost completely no conscription lists for pre-war training camps, the venues of which for the majority became the front on the very first day of the war. There is absolutely no data on the Borovsk RVC sending Borovsk residents to study at military schools. And in 1941, many Borovets became cadets in infantry, artillery, and aviation schools.

The fate of hundreds of Borovsk residents called up for military service back in pre-war years. It has only been established that some of them met the war not only as soldiers of the Red Army, but also as old-time servicemen of the Red Navy of the Baltic Fleet and submariners of the Northern Fleet.
But this is a topic for another study.

“Washed in blood”? Lies and truth about losses in the Great Patriotic War Zemskov Viktor Nikolaevich

2. Recruitment of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Personnel resources. Mobilization after the start of the war

Let us consider the features of recruiting the army and navy in the USSR in 1939–1941. Thanks to the introduction of the USSR Law “On General Military Duty” dated September 1, 1939 (“Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR”, No. 32 (55), 09.23.39), as well as a number of other special measures (hidden mobilization under the guise of Large training fees in May-June 1941, extraordinary spring conscription in 1941 of persons born in the 1st half of 1922 and others), the actual strength of the USSR Armed Forces increased from 1 596 400 people as of January 1, 1938 (“Strategic outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945,” M.: Voenizdat, 1961, p. 116) to 5 082 305 people by June 22, 1941 (see table 27, paragraph 1 of information sources).

To bring the Armed Forces of the USSR (hereinafter referred to as the USSR Armed Forces) to the wartime strength after the start of the war, it was necessary to additionally call up 4.887 million people according to the state of the Red Army staff as of January 1, 1941 (“1941 - lessons and conclusions”, team of authors, M. : Military Publishing House, 1992, p. 109). The total resources of those liable for military service as of this date were estimated as follows (TsAMO RF, f. 14-A, op. 113, d. 1, l. 189):

1. Reserve conscripts, privates and junior commanding officers, categories 1 and 2 of all three categories, born in 1890 to 1921. inclusive (32 ages) – 20,024 thousand people.

2. Middle and senior reserve command staff – 893 thousand people.

3. Reserved for the national economy - 2781 thousand people.

4. The total resource of those liable for military service was 23,698 thousand people.

5. Members of the USSR Armed Forces were born in 1919–1921. – 3,679,200 people.

6. There were 554,200 people in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces.

a) this is our regular army at the beginning of the war - 5,082,305 people;

c) this is the size of the spring (1941) conscription of boys born in 1922. (1st half of the year) – Y;

d) and this is our conscription resource for boys 1922 (2nd half of the year) - 1927. births for the entire period of the war - Z.

What do these X's, Y's and Z's equal? We will not find this information anywhere in published sources. As a result of the organizational measures taken by June 22, 1941, the army's staffing levels were increased, and therefore the need for wartime personnel increased. The resource figures published above as of January 1, 1941, after two subsequent additions, were significantly clarified, but have not yet been made available to the public. Historical sources contain either general words and no specifics, or, at best, general figures without detail. The above information as of January 1, 1941 about the general resources of those liable for military service was published in the book “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.” (p. 113), published in Voenizdat in 1961 and until May 29, 1964, had the stamp “Sov. classified”, then until May 27, 1993 classified as “Secret”. The circulation of this respected book is limited, each copy is numbered. In the book on p. 113 only shows the number of army command personnel as of 06/01/41 at 568,300 people. Summary information on the “human” issue at TsAMO of the Russian Federation has just been classified again. Is this normal for understanding the specifics of the situation 70 years after the events took place?

- rank and file of the ground forces of the NKO and internal troops of the NKVD from recruits born in 1918 (second half of the year), 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922 (1st half of the year), called up from the autumn of 1939 to the spring of 1941, - with a period of service 2 years;

- private and junior command staff of naval units and ships, called up from the autumn of 1936 to the spring of 1941 (born in 1915 to 1922), - with a service life of 5 years.

b) open mobilization, “... when the decision on mobilization is brought to the general attention of citizens of the Soviet Union and the mobilization of troops is carried out openly” (“Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR”, volume 13 (2–1), M.: TERRA, 1994, p. 149).

Not a single person liable for military service was called up, as they say, “just like that.” If the formation left for the West before June 22, then these soldiers, assigned to it in the spring of 1941 and called up with the beginning of open mobilization, were sent in trains after it to predetermined points, which were designated in the pre-war operational transportation plan. This plan, as well as the MP-41 mob plan, was an integral part of the general strategic operational plan of the USSR, finally developed in March-May 1941 by the highest political and military leadership of our country. The other part of the mobilized personnel was sent to the reserve rifle brigades, newly created at the beginning of the war in the military districts on the funds of the divisions that had left for the West, intended to recruit replacements for the units and formations that existed by June 22, 1941. The third part was designated for the formation of new military units , intended for creation in the first month of the war. The fourth part was sent by inter-district transportation for the deployment of military units to other military districts.

In the briefly described picture of the first wave of mobilization in June 1941, which recruited into the army and navy, in addition to the 5.08 million people of the USSR Armed Forces, in just 7 days over 5.35 million people (including in the NKVD), almost there was no improvisation. This entire process was strictly planned for the period from August 1940 to early June 1941. At someone’s suggestion, it is believed that mobilization was nevertheless disrupted in several of the westernmost regions of Belarus and Ukraine. I must say that in fact it was not planned in the regions liberated in 1939, not a single person in them was subject to registration and was not assigned to any military unit (TsAMO RF, f. 8-A, op. 2729, d 28, pp. 17–30). The top leadership of the USSR did not trust them. The recruits who managed to be drafted from there before the war were sent en masse to secondary units to the east in the internal military districts and to Central Asia (TsAMO RF, f. 131, op. 12951, d. 2, l. 26). Persons of the remaining conscription age, if they did not have time to be taken to the east in July 1941 after the release of a special GSKA Directive, were called up only in 1944–45. after the liberation of the territory. In all other regions of the USSR, the turnout of reserve conscripts at recruiting stations after the announcement of mobilization was 99% or higher! Even in Belarus and Ukraine, which fell into the combat zone, and in the Transcaucasian Military District - 99.5% (TsAMO RF, f. 209, op. 1091, d. 4, l. 219)! Of the small number of those who did not appear, more than half had so-called good reasons; there were only a few obvious evaders.

Due to the huge losses at the front in formations and people, the State Defense Committee of the USSR (hereinafter GKO) was forced to prepare GKO Resolution No. 48 of July 8, 1941 “On the formation of additional rifle divisions” (RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, 1, pp. 154–155). From July 12–14, the second wave of mobilization began. It was not planned in the MP-41 mobile plan either so soon or in such a large volume. She was not planned in it at all, since no one could have foreseen such a catastrophic development of events. That is why the title of the Resolution mentions the word “additional”, which should be read as “infantry divisions additional to the MP-41 mobile plan.” The general unfavorable course of the war forced us to take such a step. No one could have imagined that the command of the Western Special Military District would not have communicated to the troops in 4 days the Directive of the Main Military Council of the Red Army of June 18, 1941 on bringing them to a state of full combat readiness (“State Security Bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War war,” collection of documents, M.: Publishing House “Rus”, 2000, vol. 2, book 1, p. 389), and a shower of bombs and shells will fall on the heads of the soldiers sleeping in the barracks in the very first minutes of the attack. No one could have imagined that the Western and Northwestern fronts would burst at the seams after a German attack in just 6 days, and the planned ultimate retreat of our troops from the border to the line of border fortified areas would turn into their uncontrolled flight to the deep rear, aggravated by the panic of the military , civil and party bodies and enemy sabotage (TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2513, d. 72, l. 64). No one could have imagined that the Germans would invest their already mobilized force in a crushing first strike against the Western Front. And if anyone had any idea, his voice was drowned in a series of people contradicting him. No one could have imagined that the enemy would not allow us to have a mobilization period of 15–25 days to deploy troops to wartime levels. All this radically changed and even completely annulled pre-war plans and forced new solutions to be invented on the fly. In fact, by introducing an administrative order for the formation of new formations and units, the MP-41 mobilization plan was, if not cancelled, then adjusted to a very significant extent.

In the third wave of mobilization, the remnants of those born in 1905–1921 were called up. both categories, including untrained, and also for the first time the entire resource of 2nd category reserve military personnel born in 1904–1895 was raised. a total of 6.8 million people. (“1941 – lessons and conclusions”, team of authors, M.: Voenizdat, 1992, p. 109). More than half of them had to be retrained in the reserve units in the intricacies of military affairs. In total, from the beginning of the war to October 1, 1941, military personnel of 24 ages from 1895 to 1918 were drafted into the ranks of the Red Army. birth inclusive, and in some places, for example, from areas occupied by the enemy, and before 1890. During the period October-December 1941, people from 1890–1894 were drafted into the army en masse. births, in particular, about 300,000 people. for the formation of 10 sapper armies (RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 12, pp. 118–119). In total, in 1941, over 14 million people were mobilized in addition to the size of the regular army. Of these, over 2.246 million people were sent to the front by marching reinforcements from the Center. (TsAMO RF, f. 56, op. 12236, d. 359, l. 224). The rest were additionally sent to form a huge number of new units or were recruited as reinforcements by the warring armies and fronts themselves. The total resource of persons in the Armed Forces in 1941 amounted to almost 19.1 million people. We will talk about this in great detail in the future when considering personnel resources and their losses.

A description of the three waves of open mobilization in the summer of 1941 would not be complete without a brief description of the process of covert mobilization, carried out at the end of May - June 10, 1941 under the guise of the “Great Training Camp”. By personal summons, without public announcements or ceremonial farewells, in order to secretly increase the number of military units to a size close to wartime levels, 755,859 people were drafted into the army. 1st category of military reserve trained private and junior command personnel and 46,279 commanding and political personnel (M.V. Zakharov “On the Eve of the Great Trials”, M.: Voenizdat, 1968, p. 249). This amounted to 24% of the assigned personnel according to the MP-41 mob plan (“1941 - lessons and conclusions”, team of authors, M.: Voenizdat, 1992, p. 82). Additional about 56,000 people. was sent to engineering units with their redeployment for military construction near the western borders.

Almost all professional rifle, artillery, and tank units, with the exception of some border units, were in summer field camps. Those mobilized and assigned to them were sent there at the end of May - June 1941. De jure, military units remained in the states and in peacetime numbers, and in the states they were 2–2.5 times smaller in number than the border units contained, and in fact, after the arrival of assigned personnel, they found themselves in numbers that exceeded them. For example, rifle divisions were increased to almost 12,000 people (TsAMO RF, f. 157, op. 12790, d. 47, pp. 18, 19, 25, 50, 83, 87). All the necessary stocks of weapons, equipment, and ammunition according to the wartime states were already in the emergency reserve warehouses (hereinafter referred to as NZ) in each unit, as well as in the forward and head warehouses of the armies near the state border. It was enough to distribute them according to report cards and the availability of personnel. There were only 2,500 men short of full wartime strength in each of the 99 such deployed rifle divisions. Their arrival was planned, and in most cases occurred with the announcement of open mobilization, which, as we know, did not take long to arrive.

70 years have passed since the beginning of the war, but not a single official work of the military department has published, at least as briefly as above, information about the four waves of mobilization during the first summer of 1941. But there were two more waves in the fall of 1941. There were two more at the beginning of 1942. Each of them counted millions of people. Where are the specifics, because we still won’t see anything but general phrases in what was published. Information about the availability of resources for conscripts of all ages, born 1890–1918, conscripts and recruits born in 1919–1927, recruited from June 23, 1941, as well as information about the number of those booked at production, has not yet been declassified. and unbooking during the war years. There is no data on the amount of replenishment sent during the war years with spare parts. These are the cornerstones of all historical analysis of the war years period, inaccessible to researchers. For all 70 years they have been feeding us stories without revealing the real numbers. However, a drop wears away a stone!

It must be said that the accounting of the movement of personnel (arrival and departure) in many spare parts and their subdivisions was proper, with numerous ordered lists of personnel accounting and other documents located in the TsAMO of the Russian Federation. Reporting by teams is usually detailed. In the documents of the headquarters of the military districts from them there is almost all the summary data indicating the numbers of marching battalions and companies, the dates of their formation, loading and sending to the front, as well as their destinations and recipients. But no one will see consolidated figures even at the level of military districts, not to mention the entire Red Army. The consolidated archival documents are classified, but there are no publications.

A significant layer of information that has been overlooked not only by the top military leadership, but also by local military authorities is data on residents of a particular area who went to fight but did not return. We are talking about consolidated lists of soldiers taken into account by former village councils (village administrations), whose names can often be seen on monuments and steles at their place of residence in the village. This information was preserved by fellow countrymen both in the existing documentation of the former village councils, and in the most detailed household books, compiled as of 1940 and located in the regional archives, by the way, for the most part - in secret storage! Comparing these lists with data from the summoning books, depending on the territory, can lead to unexpected results. About 5–8% of people who are registered by village councils as being called up for mobilization and definitely dead (missing in action) and for whom the families have an official document about their fate, or about whom no information about their fate has appeared since the moment they went to war, may not be in the surviving draft books of military registration and enlistment offices. For example, due to the negligence of the performers who filled them out from the registration cards of mobilized reserves in 1949–1950. Moreover, notification of the fate of a soldier from a military unit could very often bypass the military registration and enlistment office. This happened in connection with the issuance in 1942 of NGO Orders that changed the procedure for sending notices (NGO Orders No. 10 of 01/14/42, 0270 of 04/12/42, 214 of 07/14/42 - “Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR", volume 13 (2–2), M.: TERRA, 1997).

It should be further clarified where this 5–8% came from: in the period 1993–2008. the author of these lines, together with his colleagues, sent over 19,000 requests about the fate of military personnel to the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, to which responses were received with the attachment of archive certificates; of these, from 5 to 8% of the answers, depending on the region of the Arkhangelsk region where the warrior was born, contained the following words: “In the card files for accounting for irretrievable losses of privates and sergeants, such and such DOES NOT LIST.” The same applied to information on officers and other categories of soldiers. Considering the large sample size, its pattern with a known assumption of a smaller standard can be fully used when assessing the general population, which is the total number of participants in the Great Patriotic War. Looking ahead, let's say that the share of 5% of approximately 35 million people who “put on an overcoat” is 1.75 million people. And the search practice at the battlefields every field season confirms with its personal finds the sad pattern of the lack of registration data of dozens of identified soldiers in the military command and control bodies, although there is information in families and household books.

As you know, according to the famous Federal Law No. 131-FZ of October 6, 2003 “On the general principles of organizing local self-government in the Russian Federation,” in 2004 the administrative division of Russia was completely redrawn. New enlarged rural settlements appeared, which included from 1 to 5–6 territories of former village councils. Borders have changed, and inevitably there has been a lot of confusion about the past. Documents from the former territories of village councils are good if they are preserved, at least in district archives. And if not?

In addition, many military registration and enlistment offices also in 2008–2009. were enlarged and subsequently reorganized. Now the military registration and enlistment office is called a department of the regional military registration and enlistment office in “such and such” district and serves the territories of 2–3 districts. There are no military positions left in them, except that there are two positions in the regional military registration and enlistment office - the military commissar and his deputy. The legacy of the abolished military registration and enlistment offices for the Great Patriotic War is not prescribed for new structures to preserve by any regulatory document of the RF Ministry of Defense. Also, no instructions were given for the transfer of their files related to wartime (accounting for resources, conscription, notices of fate, accounting for demobilization, correspondence to establish destinies, etc.) to local archives or local history museums. The management of many museums, understanding the value of the documents, at their own peril and risk, agreed with the leadership of the abolished military registration and enlistment offices on the secret transfer of heritage to their disposal, trying to preserve what the military is obliged to preserve “nosebleeds”. All this took place just 3 years ago. Perhaps what has been preserved to date in the former military registration and enlistment offices will be collected in the new Federal Archive of the Great Patriotic War, which is now being built on the territory of the TsAMO of the Russian Federation in Podolsk. In Ukraine, the same thing was done back in 2006–2008.

In the practice of planned pre-war conscription and conscription for mobilization after the start of the war, as well as service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, there is another nuance that had a lot of negative consequences from the point of view of establishing soldiers’ destinies. It can even be called not a nuance, but an abyss where information about millions of warriors disappeared. Judge for yourself.

In peacetime, after handing over their passport and military ID, conscripts (cadres) were issued a “Service Book for Private and Junior Commanding Staff of the Red Army,” introduced by Order of the USSR NCO No. 171 of June 20, 1940. However, when the unit entered the theater of military operations this book had to be submitted through the unit commander to the unit headquarters, and then to the archives of local military authorities. In exchange for the book, a medallion with brief information about the serviceman was to be issued. But there were not always enough capsules and forms for medallions, even for the staff. As a result, a formation formed before the war arrived at the front, sometimes without a complete set of medallions for all personnel, or any other documents that could comprehensively verify the identity of a warrior.

Filling out the medallion form with information about the soldier was supposed to be done by platoon commanders, but most often these duties were performed by the soldiers themselves with their inept, hard-to-read handwriting, as needed and with what – whether a chemical pencil, an ordinary pencil or an ink pen. A good commander, in the absence of ebonite capsules and forms, forced his subordinates to fill out any available blank piece of paper with biographical data and use a cartridge case instead of a capsule. The cartridges used were from a revolver pistol or a Mosin rifle with a bullet inserted in reverse, or even German cartridges, so that they differed from the soldier’s standard cartridges and could be easily found by funeral workers. Many commanders didn’t give a damn about all this...

In fact, until the spring-summer of 1942, the medallion was the only item that made it possible to at least somehow identify a soldier both during his lifetime and after his death.

These circumstances, as well as the fact that the enemy sent an incredibly large number of spies to the front line, taking advantage of the lack of official documents among the Red Army soldiers, necessitated the signing of the Order of the NCO of the USSR No. 330 of October 7, 1941 “On the introduction of the Red Army book in military units and institutions in the rear and on front" ("Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR", volume 13 (2-2), M.: TERRA, 1997, p. 111), and subsequently - the removal of medallions from the supply of the Red Army from November 17 1942 (ibid., p. 368) after the end of the full supply of books to the USSR Armed Forces by the fall of 1942. Accordingly, at the beginning of the war, for more than six months, millions of our soldiers were actually depersonalized, which was clearly manifested in the text of Order No. 330:

Better late than never…

All civilian researchers need to clearly understand the following: not one of the military registration and enlistment offices had any rights to independently send soldiers called up for mobilization to the front, either from Siberia or from Belarus. All movement of personnel occurred only according to the Directive of at least the headquarters of the military district, which, as a rule, appeared only after receiving the Directive from the General Staff. However, there were also rare independent exceptions, when the commander of the troops of a military district, at his own peril and risk, gave instructions on sending mobilized troops to one or another reinforced unit, but this applies only to the command of the Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts and the North operating in their territories. -Western, Western, Southwestern and Southern fronts. Taking into account the above, the apparent impossibility of tracking the movement of a fighter from the moment of conscription from home to the front in most cases can be considered ephemeral.

Has anyone figured out these obvious things? Did you figure it out? I assume that these “someone” have figured it out. In our country, all the bottlenecks of military history have been “embroidered” after the quiet work of numerous commissions and commissioners. The trouble is that these reports on “embroidery” are not available. And if someone figured it out, say, while serving at the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense (RF), then they left their work in its 1st department under seven seals. But all that was needed was in the 50s–80s. give 5-6 years of time for 5 responsible executors with a small apparatus, who would be given the authority to study, systematize and publish documents from the State Defense Committee to the regiment - and the entire army with the fleet, from the People's Commissariats to a separate regiment, would be in full view. And people who perished too. Then the All-Russian Book of Memory, following the implementation of this research, would be more reliable, and the Generalized Data Bank “Memorial” (hereinafter referred to as GDB) would become the final virtual monumental point of all the work.

The upper part of the notice of the fate of a serviceman

1. Records of soldiers’ stages of service in the USSR were confiscated and possibly destroyed in almost all military registration and enlistment offices.

2. The conscription books for mobilization were scanty and incomplete, most of them only for the period from June 23, 1941 and later.

5. Millions of soldiers at the beginning of the war did not have any official documents confirming their identities for more than six months.

6. The accounting of personnel losses and their movements in the troops turned out, frankly speaking, lousy, there is no other word for it.

7. From 5 to 8% of people who left to fight from one region or another are not accounted for anywhere or in any way. There are no primary sources of registration in the military registration and enlistment offices for them, they were not included in the draft books, they were not included in reports of losses from military units, their relatives did not report them to the military registration and enlistment office after the war, they had neither medallions nor official identity documents. Their fate can only be determined by chance.

8. In 1949–1950 The military department seized the primary records of reserve servicemen and recruits at local military registration and enlistment offices, cutting off the threads of tens of millions of destinies with their own hands. Even the most vile enemy in open battle probably could not have delivered stronger blows to the historical memory of our people than those inflicted on it by current and existing leaders and civil servants.

9. The leadership of the USSR and Russia hid from society the true extent of losses of USSR citizens in 1941–1945, including the personnel of its Armed Forces, by presenting a very underestimated unreliable estimate of their losses. This was due to both moral and political concerns and financial reasons.

Throughout the following material, the reader will be able to verify the validity of these harsh words. The reality turned out to be harsher than our ideas about it.

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