From the book "Forest Soldiers" by V. Spiridenkov.
The Sebezh underground district committee of the party, with the help of the commandant's office, in 1943 collected about half a million rubles for the defense fund, which were transferred behind the front line for the construction of the Kalininsky Collective Farmer tank column.
Ivan Moskalenko (Vanka the Bandit), a lone partisan operating in the Red Village Council, was released by the Germans from prison, where he ended up before the war for stabbing in a drunken brawl. He inflicted such damage on the Germans that they were forced to put a fabulous sum on his head. He obtained his first weapon by stringing a steel wire across the road, on which a German motorcyclist cut off his head. Single-handedly, I. Moskalenko destroyed a branch of a German intelligence school along with sleeping cadets in the village of Sutoki, throwing anti-tank grenades at it in the dark night. He died when he ran into an ambush while riding three horses to the village of Sutoki in broad daylight, dressed in the uniform of a railway station manager. The Germans only got a bloody cap. The partisan himself, firing back, went into the forest. They found him dead in a dugout on a swampy island, with a machine gun clutched in his hands.
Was captured large group German soldiers and police. The partisans shot the Germans. After that, U-shaped gallows were put together on captured sleighs with horses harnessed to them, on which the captured policemen were hanged. Mustard was smeared under the horses' tails. A madly rushing convoy with hanged dead men, their severed genitals stuffed into their mouths, burst into the village of Idritsa. After this terrible terrorist act, there were no longer any people willing to voluntarily join the police, and those who served there began to desert or ask to join partisan detachments.
From German letters home:
- The Red partisans are a two-legged beast, frenzied, hating everything that is not Soviet power, to which they are devoted with the fanaticism of the Janissaries. Such partisans do not need to be driven into battle with a revolver or a barrage machine gun. They are looking for a fight themselves and each is his own political instructor.
- Here, everywhere and everywhere, in the forests and swamps, the shadows of avengers rush around. These are partisans. Suddenly, as if growing out of the ground, they attack us, chop, cut and disappear like devils, falling into the underworld. The Avengers are pursuing us at every step and there is no escape from them. Now I am writing a diary and looking anxiously at the setting sun. Night is coming, and I feel shadows creeping silently out of the darkness, creeping up, and a chilling horror seizes me!...
The 4th brigade of V. Lisovsky collected 10 carts with captured flour, cereals, butter, pork and beef carcasses, smoked meats, sugar and warm clothes for besieged Leningrad. The carts were carried through the rear of the German troops by the best reconnaissance officers and handed over for further escort by the Leningrad partisans.
On May 1, 1943, a parade of partisan forces of the 10th brigade N.M. was held. Varaksov, free from completing tasks, in a clearing near the village of Mylenki, 20 km from Sebezh. A salute was fired with three mortar shots. In the evening, the commandant of the Sebezh garrison, Hoffman, learned about this parade and became furious.
July 1943. Not far from Idritsa, a Junkers transport plane flew very low. At this time, Chesnokov’s detachment was returning after carrying out an ambush, from which three Busing trucks were destroyed. The partisans opened fire on the plane with machine guns, machine guns, and anti-tank rifles. The plane crashed into a swamp. The partisans, having surrounded the crash site, captured almost all the crew members and passengers (20 officers flying on vacation). The partisans captured three escaped Germans near Idritsa the next day. The captured German pilot indicated the exact location of the airfield near Daugavpils. After some time it was bombed by our aircraft.
At the end of December 1943, a group of demolitionists was sent from the village of Kozeltsy to sabotage the railway, to the village of Kuznetsovka. The train was derailed. Near the crash site, a stake was driven in with a portrait of Hitler nailed to it, under which the partisans wrote the inscription: “The Fuhrer is pleased with the work of the partisans!” The next day, at the same place, the sabotage was repeated after the completion of the work of the German auxiliary train to clear and restore the track after the first sabotage. At 12 o'clock at night the Germans launched the first train, which was again derailed next to the previous one.
Partisans during the Great Patriotic War forced the German occupiers to be on guard all the time, giving the Germans no rest day or night, creating unbearable conditions for them. The eternal fear of a surprise attack by partisans haunted the Germans throughout the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR. The German command was forced to post guards and develop plans for punitive operations against the partisans. According to German sources, in 1941, 78 specially designated battalions operated against Soviet partisans. In 1942 there were already 140 of them. In the first half of 1943 there were already 270, and by the end of the year there were over 500.
In January-February 1942, the Germans tried to nip the partisan movement in the bud by sending large forces against it. Partisan detachments and formations carried out heavy battles with punitive forces in Ukraine, Belarus and western regions Russian Federation. Many partisan detachments were scattered and went underground to continue the fight, some of the detachments died, and some retreated behind the front line. So on the night of March 26, 1942, the security police and SS and SD units attacked the Minsk underground. 28 underground leaders were hanged, 251 underground members were shot. By the spring of 1942, the partisans began to pose a serious danger to the communications of the German army. Therefore, in order to decisively fight the partisans, the German command had to pull large forces into the already occupied areas of the country. And for large operations in areas where the partisan movement has become widespread, as in Belarus, Bryansk region and some other areas, German command was forced to withdraw individual military units from the front. According to the German command guerrilla warfare in Russia it took over more than 12 German divisions, one mountain rifle corps and 11 infantry and cavalry brigades.
On August 18, 1942, Hitler, realizing that the partisan movement had gone far beyond the limits of an insignificant local factor in the combat situation, issued a decisive order, which became known as Fuehrer Directive No. 46. The order began with the following statement: “The atrocities of bandits in the East have assumed such a scale that unacceptable for us, since it threatens to become a serious danger to the logistics supply and exploitation of the occupied territories." Hitler demanded an end to the partisans before the onset of winter in order to “avoid serious obstacles to the Wehrmacht’s operations in winter time"He appointed Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler responsible for collecting and assessing information on the progress of the anti-partisan struggle; in addition, Himmler was given all authority to organize operations against the partisans in all territories subordinate to the civil administration. Hitler appointed the OKH Chief of Staff responsible for conducting anti-partisan operations in front-line areas, and also ordered that reserve units transferred to the East be used as combat training to carry out such operations.
Realizing that the partisan movement could not be curbed by military means alone, Hitler admitted for the first time that in order to successfully fight the partisans it was necessary to enlist the support of the population in the relevant territories. To do this, it was necessary, firstly, to provide him with a sufficient standard of living so that people would not join the partisans, and, secondly, to create an incentive for active cooperation with the occupation authorities by assigning significant rewards for such cooperation. In addition, Hitler for the first time gave permission for the formation of anti-partisan units in the occupied territories, and the use of the local population from among prisoners of war in them. In addition to combat formations located directly on the front line, security divisions, units of field gendarmerie and secret field police, as well as police units from the nationalist and anti-Soviet population of the USSR were allocated to the German military command.
In the fall of 1942, Russian volunteers took the oath of allegiance to the Fuhrer. Here is the text of the oath in the regiment of Russian volunteers “Weise”: “I swear before God with this holy oath that in the fight against the Bolshevik enemies of my homeland I will unquestioningly obey Supreme Commander all armed forces to Adolf Hitler and, as a brave soldier, I am ready to give my life for this oath at any time." The number of police forces by the beginning of January 1942 was more than 60 thousand people, which was twice the size of the German order police used in the occupied territory .
To destroy the partisans, the so-called Jagdkomandos (destruction teams) were also created. Their structure made it possible to fight against the partisans with very limited forces. They were used most often for reconnaissance in force. Their numbers varied from platoon to company. The main thing in their tactics is secretive advance, allowing them to get as close as possible to the partisans, suddenly attack them and try to destroy them. The Germans began forming “fighter teams” or “hunting teams” (jagdkommando, zerstorungskommando) in the fall of 1941. Somewhat later, instructions were approved according to which experienced, fearless and well-trained soldiers and non-commissioned officers who could successfully act in any environment. Mainly penal officers served in the Jagdkommandos. These people were not required to have good military training. In such a matter, instinct and the skills of a person close to nature were needed, so preference was given to military personnel who worked as huntsmen and foresters before the war.
The Jagdkommandos used their own tactics against the partisans. They secretly tracked down Soviet patriots and suddenly attacked them with close range, shot or captured prisoners (tongues) - in a word, they acted as hunters act. The team could go to the starting line in the area of the upcoming combat operation independently or be delivered in the back of vehicles tightly covered with a tarpaulin. The landing was usually carried out on the move, on a section of the road closed from distant observation by dense vegetation, folds of terrain, dilapidated buildings, etc. Battle Groups teams, as a rule, moved at night, and during the day the personnel rested, carefully camouflaging their parking place. To prevent a surprise enemy attack, military guards and observers were set up.
“Hunters” also attacked large partisan columns. The idea of such attacks was to disrupt the operation for which the column was moving to the starting line. An unexpected fire raid from an ambush (lasting 10-15 seconds) knocked out commanders and machine gunners and forced the partisans to drag the wounded back to the camp. In addition, the factor of surprise disappeared, as a result they had to abandon the planned operation. One of the Jagdkommando fighters recalled after the war: “The hunt for partisans lasted two to three days. We combed the area and anyone we met in the forest, whether with or without weapons, was usually killed without investigation or trial.”
The Jagdkommandos were in constant contact with army units, which made it possible to quickly and timely organize operations against the people's avengers. The “hunters” operated most successfully in the spring and summer of 1944, during large anti-partisan actions (“Drizzling Rain”, “Heavy Rain”, “Spring Festival”, “Cormorant”, etc.) in Belarus, as a result of which the partisans suffered the most heavy losses throughout the war. However, despite professional training, the “hunting teams” of the Wehrmacht and Nazi intelligence services were unable to radically change the situation on the front of the fight against the Soviet partisan movement.
To strengthen the fight against the partisan movement and Soviet intelligence in the occupied regions of our country, along with the security police and SD departments, in March 1942 a special body, Sonderstab “R” (Special Headquarters for Russia), was created. Its tasks included identifying the location of partisan formations, their leadership, numbers, party stratum and committing terrorist acts against command and political personnel. The OKH mobilization department has already for a long time tried to bring to the attention of the command that Germany did not have sufficient human resources to conduct effective fight with the partisans only on their own.
However, regardless of what was said in Fuhrer Directive No. 46, Hitler did not abandon his plans to reduce Russian population to the status of slaves and subject him to the most ruthless exploitation. As a consequence, he refused to provide sufficient incentives to ensure real support German authorities. Moreover, as the year drew to a close, the Russian people increasingly began to realize that Germany's chances of winning were rapidly diminishing. Far from idealizing the German army and their comrades from the SS and SD, the Gestapo warned: “A necessary prerequisite for the fight against partisans is the suppression of all acts of arbitrariness and senseless cruelty towards the Russian population. Many soldiers carry a baton, which they use at the first possibilities, has become something taken for granted... The trust of the Russian population in the German army, which is a necessary condition for the pacification of the country, can only be strengthened as a result of fair treatment, energetic implementation of economic measures, purposeful and close to life propaganda and an effective fight against banditry..." But at the same time, torture and repression against partisans or those who were only suspected of belonging to them or to underground pro-Soviet organizations were not rejected.
German intelligence and the Gestapo paid great attention to work within the partisan movement. Head of the rear area Northern Front in September 1941 he demanded “the creation of a wide network of secret agents, well-instructed and knowledgeable of the nearest reporting points. The creation of this organization is a joint task of the rear security divisions and the secret police.” Agents from among the traitors to the Motherland were sent to the partisan detachments with the task of corrupting them from within, carrying out terrorist and sabotage activities. Often, groups of agents disguised as partisans or Red Army intelligence officers, equipped with original documents and radio equipment, were dropped into partisan formations to identify their locations. Combat operations against the partisans depended on intelligence, in most cases obtained through intelligence. In special instructions on the fight against partisans, and several of them were issued by the German command at different times, on November 11, 1942, February 10, 1943 and April 1, 1944, it was said that “raids against partisans without agents and guides will always be ineffective, so they should only be undertaken using agents."
As soon as the number of partisans in a partisan region reached 5 thousand - 10 thousand or more, they became invulnerable to operations carried out against them by the local police forces. And since the Germans could rarely afford to devote large regular army forces to carry out large-scale anti-partisan operations, the partisans could feel relatively safe. The German punitive operations carried out against the partisans were particularly cruel. The Germans treated the participants in the partisan movement as ordinary bandits, so only death awaited the captured partisans - execution or gallows. In turn, this caused a response from the partisans. The Germans, together with the “policemen” and sometimes with regular troops, organized large anti-partisan operations in which many civilians died. Large forces of Germans and collaborators combed the forest and destroyed all living things. Only a few were left behind to be taken to work in the Reich. It was believed that a person who went into the forest or found himself in a village or even an area controlled by partisans, even without weapons, automatically became an enemy of the Reich, for which there were corresponding orders. Like, " good man“He won’t go into the forest, he is either a partisan himself, or from a family of partisans. In addition, the Nazis formed false partisan detachments from traitors to the homeland, which were engaged in all kinds of discrediting of the Soviet partisans.
In the first week of February 1943, after the creation of a system of defensive strong points, the command of the 3rd tank army began to eliminate the partisan threat. With the onset of winter, guerrilla warfare broke out across the entire zone of Army Groups North and Center. As in the previous year, the Soviet side used partisans as an auxiliary force in the offensive. And again for this purpose the most favorable conditions. Experiencing an acute shortage of personnel at the front, the German command could afford to have rear areas only second-rate troops. Morale in partisan detachments significantly strengthened after recent Soviet victories; Support for the partisan movement and underground also increased among the civilian population.
Hitler, as at the beginning of the war, called for tougher measures to combat partisans. In January 1943, he issued an order that military personnel would not be brought to trial for brutal acts committed in the fight against partisans. He declared that the Geneva Convention and the rules of chivalry had no place in such a war. The atrocities of the Germans, and even more of the Latvian and Estonian formations, in “pacifying” the population of the partisan regions are well known. At the same time, the German generals were fully aware that they did not have enough forces to put an end to the partisans, and draconian measures, if applied, would only turn everyone against the Germans. civilian population in the occupied territories.
At the end of February 1943, the 3rd Tank Army carried out Operation Ball Lightning against partisans in the Surazhsky region, northeast of Vitebsk. Despite the fact that this operation had little impact on the course of the war as a whole, it is worth taking a closer look at for two reasons. Firstly, it is able to give an idea of a dozen similar anti-partisan operations carried out by the German command at different times and in different areas in the period from 1942 to 1944, and, secondly, it extremely clearly reflects the nature of partisan and anti-partisan warfare. The Surazhsky region was located directly behind the section of the front that was defended by the German 3rd Tank Army. The partisans were active in this territory for more than a year; Thanks to their activity, this territory received the unofficial name of the Vitebsk Corridor from the Russians. At the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942, partisans and units of the Red Army maintained communication with this area through gaps in the front line using horse-drawn and even truck transport, ensuring supplies for the partisan formations operating there.
By February 1943, the situation at the front had not undergone significant changes. The section of the front north of Surazh, which was a thin line of strong points, was held by German air field divisions. In places where the front line was broken, as well as in wooded and swampy areas, the Germans, due to a lack of troops, were forced to give the partisans complete freedom of action. The partisans, whose number was approximately 4-5 thousand people, were organized organizationally into brigades. They built long-term field fortifications and equipped their own airfields.
To carry out the anti-partisan operation, G. Reinhardt attracted two security divisions. At the first stage, which ended on February 21, it was necessary to determine the outlines of the territory in which the partisans operated, which included almost the entire Surazh region. When this task was completed, the troops began to advance into this territory, gradually tightening the ring and forcing the partisans to retreat to its center. At the same time, it was very difficult to ensure contact between units; the troops had to advance off-road, through forests in deep snow, so the soldiers soon got tired. In turn, the partisans sought to avoid open clashes with German troops; Where possible, they tried to slip through gaps in the encirclement without a fight. After the completion of the operation on March 8, the army command announced the destruction of about 3,700 partisans, but there was no way to determine which of those killed were actually partisans and which were civilians. As soon as the Germans withdrew their troops from this area, the partisans returned there again and soon almost restored their numbers.
In the spring of 1943, the Germans began extensive military operations against the Bryansk partisans. In May alone, a 40,000-strong army acted against them, including the 292nd Motorized Infantry Division, 2 regiments of the 492nd Infantry Division, the 102nd Hungarian Infantry Division, about 120 tanks of the 18th tank division, 3 artillery divisions, 7 special anti-partisan battalions with aviation support. Against large group Belarusian partisans in the Minsk region operated up to 30 thousand enemy soldiers with the support of tanks, artillery and aviation. In 1944, the Germans, anticipating the offensive of our troops, launched their attacks against the Belarusian partisans. In April, the Germans managed to encircle a 17,000-strong group of partisans, who for 25 days fought off a 60,000-strong punitive group that had 137 tanks and 235 guns. Her actions were also supported by aviation. But the partisans broke through the encirclement and went to the rear of the punitive forces.
In the spring of 1944, the Germans carried out three large-scale anti-partisan operations (as it turned out, the last during the war). The strikes were directed against partisan bases. Ever since the winter battles of 1941-1942. The rear areas of the German 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army on the left flank of Army Group Center became an area of the Eastern Front in which partisan detachments and groups were actively operating. In 1944, the command of the 1st Baltic Front hatched plans to turn this partisan region into a second front, with the help of which one day it would be possible to defeat two German armies. The most powerful partisan base was the so-called partisan republic in the area of the Ushacha River, which controlled the territory in a 60 km strip between Lepel and Polotsk. It was headed by an experienced brigade commander and former commissar, Colonel Vladimir Lobanok. Other partisan centers, almost as powerful, controlled areas east of Lepel to Senno and further south, between Lepel and Borisov. In the spring of 1944, they received orders to set up defensive positions and hold the area from attempts by German troops to capture it.
Beginning on April 11, 20 thousand troops from the German 3rd Panzer Army were recruited to participate in two related operations against a partisan base in the Ushachi area. The partisans put up fierce resistance, which, however, did not last long. Despite the support of Soviet aviation, the presence of a large number of minefields and defensive positions equipped to great depths, they were unable to prevent the advance of German units. Many of the partisans, sometimes entire brigades, were newcomers who had never been under enemy fire before. In addition, the degree of combat effectiveness of the partisan units was uneven; partisan brigades were often unable to cooperate in defense or carry out an organized retreat. By mid-May partisan center Ushachi was destroyed. The partisan losses amounted to up to 7 thousand killed and about the same number captured. On May 22, troops of the 3rd Tank Army began another anti-partisan operation. This time the attacks were carried out on partisan bases in the area limited by the settlements of Lepel, Senno, Borisov, Minsk and Molodechno. Once again, the partisan defense turned out to be disunited and uncoordinated. Applying pressure from all sides, the Germans pushed the partisans into narrow pockets, where they then destroyed them piece by piece. The Germans stopped the operation due to the beginning of the Soviet summer offensive, however, before this time, according to German data, more than 13 thousand partisans were killed. In July and August 1944, after the retreat of German troops from Soviet territory, the partisan movement gradually ceased to exist.
Operation Gypsy Baron
According to the headquarters, for example, of the Bryansk Front on October 1, 1942, for a month Soviet patriots On average, 8-10 locomotives and 150-200 cars were disabled. Between September and December 1942, 226 trains were derailed. The partisans, therefore, did everything possible to destabilize the situation in the rear of the 2nd German Tank Army, whose logistics authorities were responsible for maintaining the “new order” in the Oryol region.
And by the spring of 1943, the situation in the occupied regions of the USSR began to get out of the control of the German authorities responsible for maintaining “order and security.” The development of counter-guerrilla operations began to be carried out by the operational departments of army headquarters. Abwehr officers with special powers were assigned to corps and divisional headquarters, and so-called Abwehr officers were assigned to regiments and battalions. "defense officers" responsible for organizing anti-guerrilla warfare. Direct responsibility for conducting operations lay with the commanders of armies and army groups. When carrying out large-scale actions through the joint efforts of army units and auxiliary police, it was first of all considered necessary to deprive the partisan brigades of freedom of movement and force them to fight in extremely unfavorable conditions for them.
In order to destroy pockets of “gangster resistance,” the command of the 2nd German Tank Army more than once carried out punitive operations involving front-line formations. In particular, in the second half of 1942, major operational measures were carried out: “Birdsong” (Vogelsand), “Triangle” (Dreieck), “Quadrangle” (Viereck), “Polar Bear” (Eisbar), etc., but the desired results they didn't bring it. In May-June 1943, army formations were again involved in operations “Free Shooter” (Freischutz), “Help a Neighbor” (Nachbarhilfe), “Spruce Houses” (Tannenhauser) and “East” (Osterei).
In parallel with these operations, the Germans carried out their largest and most famous action, codenamed “Gypsy Baron” (Zigeunerbaron). The total number of the German collaborationist group was over 50 thousand people; it was supported from the air by aviation. Headquarters of the United Partisan Brigades Emlyutina D.V. had much smaller forces - 12 partisan formations (approximately 10 thousand people).
In the fight against punitive forces, the people's avengers were going, on the one hand, to use independently operating detachments, whose maneuverable tactics were supposed to allow them to constantly go behind enemy lines and inflict unexpected blows on them. On the other hand, since many local residents lived with the partisans and fled into the forest from the invaders, a decision was made to create a fortified area. Along its perimeter, bunkers and dugouts, firing positions for artillery, machine-gun nests, trenches for grenade launchers and riflemen, which were connected by trenches and communication passages, were built. Outside the fortified area, in the direction of the most likely appearance of the enemy, separate trenches were dug, designed for 7-10 people, carefully camouflaged underground passages messages.
The punitive operation “Gypsy Baron” received this name due to the fact that the Germans saw in the partisans a combined image of inveterate “bandits” and “gypsies”; it began on May 16. Although the partisans stubbornly resisted, by May 20, German troops and collaborators managed to penetrate deeply into the area where the partisan formations were based. They were surrounded and isolated from other units of the People's Avengers Brigade named after. Shchorsa (731 people), named after. Kravtsova (over 600 people), 1st. Voroshilov (about 550 people).
Headquarters Emlyutin D.V. and the units of the “Death” brigade directly assigned to him German occupiers"(about 1000 people) also ended up in the cauldron, communication and control of the units were lost. On May 21, the Germans captured the Khutor Mikhailovsky - Unecha railway, thanks to which they resumed the transfer of motorized divisions to the front in this area. The position of the partisans, due to the significant superiority of the Germans, became critical. For 10 days, from May 20 to 29, they fought off continuous attacks by German units supported by aviation, which, in addition to bombs, dropped leaflets calling on the partisans to surrender. By May 29, the partisans had almost run out of ammunition and food supplies. The general situation was saved only by the fact that food, ammunition and explosives were delivered by plane to the besieged brigades at night.
Bomber aircraft of the Central Front bombed the battle formations and locations of German troops operating against the partisans in the areas: Suzemka, Kokorevka, Ostryye Luki, Altukhovo, Glinnoe, Krasnaya Sloboda. But despite this support, the situation still remained difficult... However, on May 31, after 12 days of bloody fighting, the Germans captured a partisan airfield near the village of Smelizh and pushed the main forces of the people's avengers back to the Desna, resulting in the area being defended " Soviet district» narrowed to 6 sq. km. At this critical moment, the headquarters of the partisan movement at the Central Front took urgent measures to assist the partisans. Along with the delivery of ammunition, medicine and food, a group of officers led by Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Gorshkov was sent to the Bryansk forests, which led the leadership of the brigades.
The new command of the united partisan brigades decided to break out of the cauldron. IN as soon as possible an operational plan was developed. On the night of July 2, 1943, near the Pionersky farm, the remnants of the partisan formations made a breakthrough. During fierce battles and at the cost huge losses they managed to escape from the encirclement. Over the next days, the partisans tried, as far as conditions allowed, to restore their combat effectiveness, while continuing to fight heavy battles against the punitive forces. After July 6, the intensity of the fighting began to decrease, and by the 10th the fighting had almost ceased.
The German 2nd Panzer Army's report on Operation Gypsy Baron stated that the partisans suffered significant losses: 1,584 were killed, 1,558 were captured, and 869 deserted. 15,812 people, more than 2,400 people, were forcibly evacuated from the combat zone. were brought to trial as “gangster accomplices,” which led to punitive measures. In addition, 207 camps, 2,930 dugouts and firing points were destroyed, 21 heavy guns, 3 tanks, 60,000 rounds of ammunition, 5,000 hand grenades, dozens of machine guns, and hundreds of small arms were captured. However, the report expressed concern that since the command of the "bandits" and the "backbone of the gangs" had not been completely destroyed, the guerrillas could be expected to gradually increase in power unless new operations were carried out against them. However, as shown further events, there could be no talk of any major actions, since German offensive near Kursk demanded that all combat-ready units and formations take part in it.
Thus, the occupiers were unable to achieve their goals. The results of Operation Gypsy Baron turned out to be transitory and cannot be compared with the forces and resources expended. The partisans managed, although with significant losses, to escape from the encirclement. At the same time, the people's avengers killed, wounded and captured 3852 people, 888 soldiers from the eastern battalions and auxiliary police went over to the side of the forest soldiers. On July 8, 1943, the Wehrmacht operational headquarters summed up the preliminary results of efforts to “pacify” the occupied Soviet regions. They said that since the command did not have to count on a further significant increase in the forces allocated to fight the partisans, it was necessary to clearly understand that the pacification of the eastern regions as a result of subsequent measures could not be achieved. Therefore, in the future we will have to be satisfied only with measures vital to ensure combat operations. In fact, this was a recognition of the failure of the German occupation policy.
How the Germans fought the partisans
It was easier for the Germans to fight the partisans if they united into large groups. For this purpose, German special forces even distributed fake leaflets on behalf of the Soviet command. Corresponding refutations appeared in the partisan press. Thus, the Selyanskaya Gazeta newsletter on May 7, 1943 warned:
“Recently, the Nazis cooked up a leaflet and scattered it in some areas of Ukraine and Belarus. In this leaflet, supposedly on behalf of the Soviet military authorities, the partisans are asked to stop acting alone and in small detachments, unite into large detachments and carry out the order to act jointly with regular units of the Red Army. This order, says Hitler's fake, will follow as soon as the harvest is in the barns and the rivers and lakes are covered with ice again.
The purpose of this provocation is obvious. The Germans are trying to delay the actions of the partisans on the eve of the decisive spring-summer battles. The Nazis want the partisans to stop fighting and take a wait-and-see attitude.”
During the first two years of the war, the Germans and police, as a rule, shot captured partisans on the spot after a short interrogation. Only on October 5, 1943, a special order “Treatment of Captured Bandits” was issued, according to which captured partisans and defectors should henceforth be considered not only as a source of intelligence information and manpower for Germany, but also as a possible replenishment of the increasingly thinning collaborationist formations. In July 1943, the Western headquarters of the partisan movement was forced to admit that the lives of the partisans captured during combat operations were preserved, and more or less tolerable living conditions were created:
“The command of the fascist army provides the families of partisans with horses for cultivating their estates. At the same time, these partisan families are given the responsibility to ensure that their father, son or brother, etc. return to the house, leave the partisan detachment...
This tactic Nazi invaders has some influence on fragile partisans. There are isolated cases of partisans going over to the enemy’s side.”
“Instead of the usual executions on the spot, they (the Nazis. - B. C.) a partisan who is captured or goes over to their side is enlisted as a police officer, given rations for a family, even given a cow for 2-3 families. Those newly captured or transferred are placed separately. They are not even allowed to communicate with the policemen who went over to serve the Nazis in the winter. From such they create separate groups and are sent to catch small groups of partisans.
The Nazis specifically send partisan wives into the forests so that they can persuade their husbands and bring them to the Germans, promising them good rations. This fascist propaganda and the method of their struggle had some influence on the morally unstable cowards, who, due to isolation from the command of the detachments, weak educational work, being in small groups and alone, went over to the side of the enemy.
For the month of May from the detachments of Gukov and Kukharenko, which until the end of the month were in the triangle (Vitebsk - Nevel - Polotsk. - B.S.) and were subjected to continuous raids by fascists and police, up to 60 people went over to the side of the enemy, mostly former Zelenists (“greens” or “wild partisans” who had not previously obeyed Moscow. - B.S.) and deserters from the Red Army...
In description German actions, which was given by the command of the Okhotin brigade, one can feel respect for the formidable enemy that the Wehrmacht was:
“German tactics in a surprise attack on partisans always boiled down to one thing: shelling with all types of available weapons, followed by an attack. But the enemy never used relentless pursuit tactics. Having achieved success from the first attack, he stopped there. This was one of the weaknesses of German tactics.
When defending in cases of partisan attack, the enemy turned around quickly and, turning around, taking a battle formation, fought very stubbornly, always almost to the point of complete exhaustion of his forces (loss of people and expenditure of ammunition). This was one of the strengths the enemy, but this led him to large losses in people.
There was not a single case where the enemy did not accept the battle imposed on him. Even when he ran into a partisan ambush, he never fled in panic, but, retreating in battle, took his dead, wounded and weapons. In such cases, the enemy did not take losses into account, but did not abandon his dead and wounded.
The weakness of German tactics was that the Krauts were afraid of the forest. They set up ambushes on partisans only in populated areas. There was not a single case of the Germans ambushing partisans in the forest.
The strength of German tactics was defensive tactics. Wherever the Germans went, and if they had to stop at least for a short time, then they always dug in, which the partisans never used against themselves.”
The enemy began to use partisan methods of fighting (hidden concentration of forces in the forest at night in order to attack the partisans by surprise at dawn, ambushes, mining of partisan roads, etc.) only in Lately.
In addition, since August 1943, continuous bombing of the partisan zone by aircraft began. “There is almost not a single village left in the Ushachi and Lepel regions occupied by partisans that has not been raided by fascist vultures. German uchlegs (student pilots) also practiced in this field. B. WITH.)".
Indeed, according to German sources, for the last year and a half of the war, the Luftwaffe used the Eastern Front as a kind of training ground for flight school graduates. Freshly trained pilots had to get comfortable in the air and gain experience in fighting a weaker enemy in the form of the Soviet Air Force, before entering into mortal combat with a much more formidable enemy - the Anglo-American “flying fortresses”. The partisan zones provided an ideal target for training. The partisans, of course, had neither fighters nor anti-aircraft guns, and it was possible to shoot down a plane with a rifle or machine gun only at a very low altitude. Young German pilots were hardly worried about the fact that their bombs fell primarily on the heads of peaceful inhabitants of villages and towns, who, by the will of fate, found themselves on the territory of the partisan region. However, the pilots of the “flying fortresses” also did not think about the life and death of the German burghers, dropping a bomb load on the cities of Germany...
In the struggle in the occupied territory, all sides widely used traditional methods of guerrilla warfare, including masquerading as the enemy. Thus, on June 16, 1944, the order for the 889th German security battalion noted: “Recently, the partisans have been trying to capture more prisoners (a few days remained before the start of the general Soviet offensive in Belarus - Operation Bagration." B.S.). WITH for this purpose they travel to German uniform in trucks along the main highways and, picking up German soldiers who ask for a ride, deliver the latter to their camp. A similar incident took place on June 2, 1944 on the Bobruisk - Starye Dorogi highway. All soldiers are advised of the dangers of driving unfamiliar vehicles. Drivers are prohibited from taking unknown soldiers with them.”
The Germans also resorted to masquerade, in particular, they created false partisan detachments of policemen or Vlasovites dressed in Red Army uniforms or civilian dress. They came into contact with small groups or individual partisans, encouraged them to join the detachment, and then, waiting for the right moment, destroyed or captured them. The Germans even introduced special distinctive headdresses for their partisans. Such false detachments often robbed the population in order to then blame the real partisans. However, the latter also sometimes thoroughly robbed the population, dressed in German or police uniforms.
But it happened that false partisan detachments turned into real ones. This happened, for example, with a detachment of 96 people led by ROA officers captain Tsimailo and senior lieutenant Golokoz. The latter, instead of fighting the partisans, established contact with Zakharov’s brigade operating in the Vitebsk region and revealed the truth to him. As a result, on July 17, 1943, 55 false partisans led by Golokoz joined the real ones, having previously killed the Germans who were with them - two radio operators and a captain. The remnants of the detachment, together with Tsimailo, managed to escape.
Sometimes false underground centers were created, with the help of which the secret field police caught real underground workers. According to this scheme, a “military council” operated in Minsk, consisting of German agents- former commanders of the Red Army Rogov and Belov (he was eventually killed by partisans) and the former secretary of the Zaslavl district party committee Kovalev, who “part-time” was also a member of the real Minsk underground committee. At first, the "war council" was a real underground organization, which was headed by commanders and commissars of the Red Army, unfortunately not familiar with the rules of secrecy. The organization had grown too much; almost half of Minsk knew about its activities. It got to the point that sentries were openly posted at the house where the headquarters of the “military council” was located, who checked the documents of ordinary underground fighters who came there. Very quickly the Minsk GUF found out about the organization. The leaders of the “military council” were arrested and bought their lives at the cost of betrayal. Now under the control of the Gestapo, they sent underground members supposedly to a partisan detachment; on the way, the police stopped the trucks, and their passengers ended up in a concentration camp. As a result, hundreds of underground fighters were arrested and shot and several partisan detachments were defeated.
Sometimes pseudo-partisan detachments were created by local residents themselves - after their liberation by the Red Army. The goal here was one and rather mundane - to receive an indulgence for being under occupation, and at the same time “legally” profit from the goods of former German collaborators. The history of one such detachment, discovered by the Special Department of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps in the Konyshevsky district Kursk region, said the head of the Special Department of the Central Front, L.F. Tsanava, in a letter to Ponomarenko dated March 13, 1943: “The organizer and “commander” of this false partisan detachment was the teacher of the village of Bolshoye Gorodkovo, Konyshevsky district, Vasily Ivanovich Ryzhkov, born in 1915, a native and resident of B Gorodkovo, non-partisan, with secondary education, former junior commander of the 38th separate battery of the 21st Army headquarters, who voluntarily surrendered to the Germans in October 1941. The “commissar” of this detachment was a resident of the village of Maloye Gorodkovo, Summin Tikhon Grigorievich, a former soldier of the Red Army, who returned to the village after it was occupied by the Germans. Ryzhkov V.I. March 2nd Special Correspondent (Special Department of the Corps. - B.S.) arrested. Summin T.G. disappeared and is currently wanted.
The investigation into the Ryzhkov case and the detachment’s activities established the following. By units of the Red Army, B. Gorodkovo and M. Gorodkovo were liberated from the Germans on February 8, 1943; Ryzhkov and Summin organized the false partisan detachment on February 12, 1943. This detachment, under the guise of fighting German accomplices, carried out raids and searches in adjacent settlements, seized property and livestock from some former elders and police officers. Part of what was selected was distributed to those passing by military units, and part was appropriated.
Hiding behind the name of the commander of the partisan detachment, Ryzhkov contacted the advancing units, misleading them with the fictitious actions of the “partisan detachment.”
11/20/43 Ryzhkov and Summin gathered members of the detachment and, threatening with weapons, offered to go to the regional center - Konyshevka, with the aim of allegedly organizing Soviet power there and heading the body of Soviet power in the region... There are signals about the existence of several more similar detachments " .
I don’t know whether the security officers managed to find Summin and what was Ryzhkov’s further fate - execution, penal battalion or the Gulag.
Often the Germans defeated the partisans using their own methods of struggle. Thus, the commander of the Osipovichi partisan unit, which included several partisan brigades, Hero Soviet Union Major General Nikolai Filippovich Korolev testified in the final report: “In Bobruisk, Mogilev, Minsk and other cities, “volunteer” battalions “Berezina”, “Dnepr”, “Pripyat” and others began to be formed, which were intended to fight the partisans. To replenish these battalions and to train command personnel, the “Eastern Reserve Regiment” was created in Bobruisk.
It must be said that some of these “volunteers,” who completely sold out to the Germans, actively fought against the partisans. Using guerrilla tactics, they penetrated forest areas in small groups and organized ambushes on partisan roads. So, in March 1943, one of the battalions organized an ambush at the site of partisan camps in the Zolotkovo forest, which was attacked by the headquarters group of the partisan brigade “For the Motherland.” During the battle, the commander of this brigade, Major Alexey Kandievich Flegontov, died (I note that Flegontov was not a simple major, but a state security major, which was equivalent to the army general rank. - B. WITH.)…
Subsequently, with the liberation by the Soviet Army of a significant part of the Soviet territory occupied by the enemy, police and renegade garrisons were transferred to our area from the areas liberated by the Soviet Army. In October 1943, a regiment under the command of the former Dorogobuzh landowner and White emigrant Bishler arrived in the village of Vyazye (was it not this Bishler who wrote the text of the leaflet about partisan cannibalism, which will be discussed below? - B. WITH). This regiment then took an active part in blocking the partisans of the Pukhovichi, Cherven and Osipovichi regions at the end of May 1944.”
Korolev also wrote about the “treasonous battalion” of Major Buglai, which arrived in the Osipovichi region to fight the partisans and “settled in villages located in, close proximity to the partisan zone. Its personnel were well trained in methods of fighting partisans and skillfully took advantage of the tactical mistakes of individual detachments. He waged an active struggle through ambushes in forest areas, on partisan roads and at river crossings, through surprise attacks on partisan outposts in villages..."
The paradox was that as the Red Army successfully advanced to the west, the position of the partisans did not improve, but, on the contrary, worsened. The partisan regions now fell into the operational zone, and later into front line Wehrmacht The partisans increasingly had to engage in battle with regular army units, which were superior to them in both weapons and combat training. Collaborationist formations that fled from the areas liberated moved to ever-shrinking occupied territories. Soviet troops. In these formations there were now people who, as a rule, vehemently hated the communists, did not count on mercy for the Red Army soldiers and partisans, and had extensive experience in fighting the latter. At the same time, many other collaborators, hoping to earn forgiveness, joined the partisans in hundreds and thousands. It is no coincidence that at the time of joining the Soviet troops in the partisan brigades of Belarus, from a third to a quarter of the fighters were former police officers, Vlasovites and Wehrmacht “volunteers”. However, in practice, the sharp increase in numbers did not strengthen, but weakened partisan detachments and formations. After all, they were no longer supplied with ammunition, and the expanded detachments became, as mentioned, less maneuverable and more vulnerable to attacks from the air and on the ground.
Another circumstance complicated the situation. As stated in the report of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (late 1942), “using the remnants of anti-Soviet formations and individuals whose interests were infringed by Soviet power, the German command is trying to impose a Civil War on us, forming from the garbage human society combat military units..." Indeed, in the occupied territories in 1941–1944 there was a real civil war, complicated by acute interethnic conflicts. Russians killed Russians, Ukrainians killed Ukrainians, Belarusians killed Belarusians. Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians fought with Russians and Belarusians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians - with Poles, Chechens and Ingush, Karachais and Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Kalmyks - with Russians, etc. The Germans were, in principle, happy with this situation, because it allowed them to spend fewer of its own troops and police to fight various partisans.
How many people in total participated in the Soviet partisan movement? After the war, the figure often appeared in the works of historians was more than a million people. However, familiarity with wartime documents makes it necessary to reduce it by at least half.
Ponomarenko and his staff kept statistics, but the data received was not always accurate. The commanders of partisan brigades and formations sometimes had no information about the number of individual detachments, and sometimes, we repeat, they deliberately inflated it, hoping to get more weapons and ammunition. True, very soon they realized that supplies from the center were limited by such objective factors as weather, the availability of landing sites that were convenient and inaccessible to enemy fire, as well as the number of transport aircraft. Therefore, they often began to underestimate the number of detachments in order to accordingly underestimate the losses incurred and more freely report on the successes achieved.
In 1944, after the liberation of the republic, the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement compiled a final report, according to which there were a total of 373,942 people in the ranks of the partisans here. Of these, 282,458 people were in combat formations (brigades and individual partisan detachments), and
79,984 people were used as scouts, messengers, or were employed in guarding partisan zones. In addition, about 12 thousand people were members of the underground anti-fascist committees, especially in the western regions of the republic. In total, there were more than 70 thousand people in the underground in Belarus, as it turned out after the war, of which over 30 thousand were considered liaisons and intelligence agents for the partisans.
In Ukraine, the scope of the partisan movement was much smaller. Although after the war Khrushchev claimed that by the beginning of 1944 there were more than 220 thousand Soviet partisans operating here, this figure looks completely fantastic. After all, by that time the entire Left Bank of the Dnieper, where the most numerous partisan formations operated, had been liberated from the Germans. And on March 5, 1943, Ponomarenko, in a report to Stalin, estimated the total number of 74 partisan detachments in Ukraine at 12,631 people. Almost all of these units belonged to large connections Kovpak, Fedorov, Naumov and others. In addition, as the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement pointed out, on the Right Bank and in the not yet liberated regions of Left Bank Ukraine there were partisan reserves and detachments with which contact was lost, total number over 50 thousand people. During subsequent raids, the formations of Kovpak, Saburov and others increased two to three times due to local reinforcements, but in any case, the number of Soviet partisans on the Right Bank was three to four times lower than the figure mentioned by Khrushchev. As noted in the certificate prepared on February 15, 1976 by the Institute of Party History under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, there. unlike other republics and regions, there were no registration cards at all, either for 220 thousand or for any smaller number partisan
The relatively weak development of the pro-Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine compared to Belarus and the occupied regions of the RSFSR is explained by a number of factors. Historically, Ukrainian lands have always been richer than Belarusian ones, which means the population is more prosperous. For this reason, it suffered more severely during the revolution, and later from collectivization and the famine it caused. The famine in Ukraine turned out to be worse than in Belarus, also because Agriculture the creation of collective farms was undermined here more thoroughly. But by the beginning of World War II it had partially recovered and, thanks to the best climatic conditions, still surpassed Belarusian agriculture in productivity. During the war, the latter had to supply Army Group Center - the largest of all German groups armies in the East. That's why food supplies for the occupiers here they caused especially strong discontent. In addition, the natural conditions of Belarus, covered with forests and swamps, were ideal for guerrilla warfare.
Thanks to this, many more encircled Red Army soldiers settled in the Belarusian forests than in the Ukrainian steppes, which also created a mass base for the pro-Soviet partisan movement.
It should also be taken into account that Western Ukraine The most influential among local residents was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Nationalist organizations in Belarus have never been so popular, although here, as in Ukraine, intense confrontation with Polish population. If in Galicia and Volyn the Ukrainians relied on the OUN and UPA in this confrontation, then in Belarus Orthodox Belarusians (as opposed to Catholic Belarusians) saw Soviet partisans their comrades in the fight against the Poles.
In other occupied union republics the scope of the partisan movement was even smaller than in Ukraine. By April 1, 1943, throughout the territory occupied by the Germans, there were 110,889 partisans, located mainly in Belarus, Ukraine, Crimea, as well as in the Smolensk and Oryol regions. At that time, there were three sabotage groups of 46 people operating in Estonia, 13 groups with a total of 200 people in Latvia, and 29 groups with 199 people in Lithuania. The population of the Baltic states in the overwhelming majority did not have any sympathy for the Soviet system and looked at the German occupation as a lesser evil. And in Moldova, out of 2892 partisans, there were only seven ethnic Moldovans, and the bulk were Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. The song about “a dark-skinned Moldavian woman gathering a Moldavian partisan detachment” is nothing more than a poetic fantasy. The Moldovans clearly preferred to return to Romania after a year of Soviet domination.
The total number of participants in the Soviet partisan movement, if we assume that on other lands there were approximately the same number of partisans as in Belarus, can be estimated at approximately half a million people (only in combat units).
I note that there were much more collaborators among prisoners of war and residents of the occupied territories than partisans and underground fighters. According to various estimates, from one to one and a half million former Soviet citizens served in the Wehrmacht alone, in the military and police formations of the SS and SD. In addition, several hundred thousand people each belonged to the local auxiliary police and peasant self-defense units, on the one hand, and served as elders, burgomasters and members of local councils, as well as doctors and teachers in discovered by the Germans schools and hospitals, on the other hand. True, it is difficult to say to what extent those who had to work in occupation institutions in order not to die of hunger can be considered collaborators.
Now about irreversible losses. By January 1, 1944, they amounted to individual republics and regions (without Ukraine and Moldova): Karelo-Finnish SSR - 752 killed and 548 missing, and a total of 1300 (of this number, only 1086 had the names and addresses of relatives known); Leningrad region - 2954.1372.4326 (1439); Estonia - 19, 8, 27; Latvia –56, 50.106 (12); Lithuania - 101.4.115 (14); Kalinin region - 742,141, 883 (681); Belarus - 7814, 513, 8327 (389); Smolensk region- 2618, 1822, 4400 (2646); Oryol region - 3677, 3361, 7038 (1497); Krasnodar region - 1077, 335, 1412 (538); Crimean ASSR - 1076, 526, 1602 (176); total - 20,886, 8680, 29,566 (8487). These figures are certainly incomplete, but they fairly well illustrate the comparative intensity of partisan combat activity in different regions.
To this we must add that in the seven months remaining until the end of the partisan movement, the Soviet partisans suffered the greatest casualties caused by large-scale attacks against them. punitive operations with the participation of army units. In Belarus alone, the partisans then lost 30,181 people killed, missing and captured, that is, almost four times more than in the previous two and a half years of war. The total irretrievable losses of Soviet partisans until the end of the war can be estimated at at least 100 thousand people.
From the book What Soviet People Fought For author Dyukov Alexander ReshideovichVIII. “Fight against partisans” The Germans exterminated hundreds of thousands of our civilians in the areas they captured. Like medieval barbarians or the hordes of Attila, German villains trample fields, burn villages and cities... I. Stalin, November 6, 1943 When in the spring of 1943 the partisans
From the book 1993. Shooting of the “White House” author by Armstrong JohnCounter-Guerrilla Fighting 1. Infiltration Post-war experience, particularly in Malaya and the Philippines, has shown that one of the most effective methods of fighting guerrillas is to use small units of well-trained soldiers to infiltrate
From the book Soviet Partisans. Legend and reality. 1941–1944 by Armstrong JohnRumors spread by the partisans An intermediate link between the large-scale campaign carried out by the partisans psychological warfare and spontaneous transmission of information received by the majority of the population through oral communication are diverse, not subject to strict
From the book Viktor Suvorov is lying! [Sink the Icebreaker] author Verkhoturov Dmitry NikolaevichHow the Bolsheviks fought against hunger Unlike Hitler, who kept his people on starvation rations quite consciously and persistently recommended that the Germans eat less, the Bolsheviks always resolutely fought against hunger and its consequences, no matter how small they were
From the book Our Prince and Khan author Mikhail WellerWhat they fought for In the likeness of the grandmother, the Battle of Kulikovo was not fought by all of Russia, but only by the Grand Duchy of Vladimir and Moscow, the forces of its appanages and small allies. The overwhelming majority of Russian principalities in that situation of “war of all against
From the book 1st Russian SS Brigade “Druzhina” author Zhukov Dmitry Alexandrovich“Rodionovtsy” in the fight against partisans The measures to deploy the “Druzhina” into a regiment and then into a brigade took place against the background of incessant battles with partisans. It should be noted that by the spring of 1943 the situation in the rear areas of Army Group Center, as well as in areas controlled
From book Russian state behind German lines author Ermolov Igor Gennadievich by Armstrong JohnThe fight against partisans The presence of large partisan forces in the area of Yelnya and Dorogobuzh undoubtedly worried the Germans. Their first attempts to change the situation were small-scale operations against partisans, which turned out to be poorly prepared and widely
From the book Guerrilla Warfare. Strategy and tactics. 1941-1943 by Armstrong JohnFighting Partisans 1. Protection of Communication Lines Protection of main railway lines, highways and warehouses was a priority task for the German security forces in the rear areas. To carry it out, the Germans created a system of strong points located through certain
From the book Alexander Nevsky. Savior of the Russian Land author Baimukhametov Sergey TemirbulatovichPatriotism: why didn’t they fight? For some reason, it so happened that supporters of the “yoke theory” classify themselves as patriots, call themselves patriots. Although, in fact, everything turns out the other way around! Namely: to talk about the yoke means to slander the Russian people. After all, what
From the book The Renaissance author Lunin Sergey I. From the book Makhno and his time: About Great Revolution and the Civil War of 1917-1922. in Russia and Ukraine author Shubin Alexander Vladlenovich9. What did they fight for? Other centers of insurgency in Ukraine gradually faded away. By the fall of 1921, most of the rebel detachments were defeated. The last attempt to spark a civil war in Ukraine was the “second winter campaign” of the Petliurists led by Yu. Tyutyunnik. Three
From the book The Shameful History of America. "Dirty Laundry" USA author Vershinin Lev RemovichWhat were they fighting for? They rarely remember, although they don’t make much of a secret, that the union of the republics of North America, which with French help (and only thanks to it) achieved independence from Great Britain in 1783, despite all the beautiful slogans of the Age of Enlightenment, was, to put it mildly, not
From the book The Big Draw [USSR from Victory to Collapse] author Popov Vasily PetrovichWhat were they fighting for? On February 9, 1946 (the reason was the next elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) Stalin gave a speech. He emphasized the advantages of the Soviet social order before the non-Soviet - a system that “withstood the tests in the fire of war and proved its full
From the book White House Shooting. Black October 1993 author Ostrovsky Alexander VladimirovichConclusion. What were they fighting for?
Guerrilla movement has proven its effectiveness more than once during wars. The Germans were afraid of Soviet partisans. The “people's avengers” destroyed communications, blew up bridges, took “tongues” and even made weapons themselves.
History of the concept
Partisan is a word that came into Russian from the Italian language, in which the word partigiano means a member of an irregular military detachment that enjoys the support of the population and politicians. Partisans fight using specific means: war behind enemy lines, sabotage or sabotage. Distinctive feature Guerrilla tactics include covert movement across enemy territory and good knowledge of the terrain. In Russia and the USSR, such tactics have been practiced for centuries. Suffice it to recall the War of 1812.
In the 1930s in the USSR, the word “partisan” acquired a positive connotation - only partisans who supported the Red Army were called that way. Since then, in Russia this word has been exclusively positive and is almost never used in relation to enemy partisan groups - they are called terrorists or illegal military formations.
During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet partisans were controlled by authorities and performed tasks similar to the army. But if the army fought at the front, then the partisans had to destroy enemy lines of communication and means of communication.
During the war years, 6,200 partisan detachments operated in the occupied lands of the USSR, in which approximately a million people took part. They were managed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, developing coordinated tactics for disparate partisan associations and guiding them towards common goals.
In 1942, Marshal of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, and they were asked to create a partisan army behind enemy lines - German troops. Despite the fact that partisans are often thought of as randomly organized detachments of the local population, the “people's avengers” behaved in accordance with the rules of strict military discipline and took the oath as real soldiers - otherwise they would not survive in the brutal conditions of war.
Life of a partisan
The worst time for the Soviet partisans, who were forced to hide in the forests and mountains, was in winter. Before this, not a single partisan movement in the world had encountered the problem of cold; in addition to the difficulties of survival, there was the problem of camouflage. The partisans left traces in the snow, and the vegetation no longer hid their shelters. Winter dwellings often harmed the mobility of partisans: in Crimea they built mainly ground dwellings like wigwams. In other areas, dugouts predominated.
Many partisan headquarters had a radio station, with the help of which they contacted Moscow and transmitted news to the local population in the occupied territories. Using radio, the command ordered the partisans, and they, in turn, coordinated airstrikes and provided intelligence information.
There were also women among the partisans - if for the Germans, who thought of women only in the kitchen, this was unacceptable, the Soviets did their best to encourage the weaker sex to participate in the partisan war. Female intelligence officers did not come under the suspicion of enemies, female doctors and radio operators helped during sabotage, and some brave women even took part in hostilities. It is also known about officer privileges - if there was a woman in the detachment, she often became “ camp wife"commanders. Sometimes everything happened the other way around and wives commanded instead of husbands and interfered in military matters - the highest authorities tried to stop such disorder.
Guerrilla tactics
The basis of the “long arm” tactics (as the Soviet leadership called the partisans) was the implementation of reconnaissance and sabotage - they destroyed railways, through which the Germans delivered trains with weapons and food, broke high-voltage lines, and poisoned water pipes or wells behind enemy lines.
Thanks to these actions, it was possible to disorganize the enemy's rear and demoralize him. The great advantage of the partisans was also that all of the above did not require large human resources: sometimes even a small detachment and sometimes one person could implement subversive plans.
When the Red Army advanced, the partisans struck from the rear, breaking through the defenses and unexpectedly disrupting the enemy's regrouping or retreat. Before this, the forces of the partisan detachments were hidden in forests, mountains and swamps - in the steppe regions the activities of the partisans were ineffective.
The guerrilla war was especially successful in Belarus - forests and swamps hid the “second front” and contributed to their successes. That’s why the exploits of the partisans are still remembered in Belarus: it’s worth remembering at least the name of the Minsk football club of the same name.
With the help of propaganda in the occupied territories, the “people's avengers” were able to replenish the fighting ranks. However, partisan detachments were recruited unevenly - part of the population in the occupied territories kept their nose to the wind and waited, while other people, familiar with the terror of the German occupiers, were more willing to join the partisans.
Rail War
The “Second Front,” as the German invaders called the partisans, played a huge role in destroying the enemy. In Belarus in 1943 there was a decree “On the destruction of the enemy’s railway communications using the method of rail warfare” - the partisans were supposed to wage a so-called rail war, blowing up trains, bridges and damaging enemy tracks in every possible way.
During the operations " Rail War" and "Concert" in Belarus, train traffic was stopped for 15-30 days, and the enemy's army and equipment were destroyed. Blowing up enemy trains even with a shortage of explosives, the partisans destroyed more than 70 bridges and killed 30 thousand German soldiers. On the first night of Operation Rail War alone, 42 thousand rails were destroyed. It is believed that during the entire war, the partisans destroyed about 18 thousand enemy troops, which is a truly colossal figure.
In many ways, these achievements became a reality thanks to the invention of the partisan craftsman T.E. Shavgulidze - in field conditions, he built a special wedge that derailed trains: the train ran over a wedge, which was attached to the tracks in a few minutes, then the wheel was moved from the inside to the outside of the rail, and the train was completely destroyed, which did not happen even after mine explosions .
Partisan gunsmiths
Partisan brigades were mainly armed with light machine guns, machine guns and carbines. However, there were detachments with mortars or artillery. The partisans armed themselves with Soviets and often captured weapons, but this was not enough in the conditions of war behind enemy lines.
The partisans launched a large-scale production of handicraft weapons and even tanks. Local workers created special secret workshops - with primitive equipment and a small set of tools, however, engineers and amateur technicians managed to create excellent examples of weapon parts from scrap metal and improvised parts.
In addition to repairs, the partisans were also engaged in design work: “The partisans have a large number of homemade mines, machine guns and grenades original solution both the entire structure as a whole and its individual components. Not limiting themselves to “local” inventions, the partisans sent a large number of inventions and rationalization proposals to the mainland.”
The most popular homemade weapons were homemade PPSh submachine guns - the first of which was made in the “Razgrom” partisan brigade near Minsk in 1942. The partisans also made “surprises” with explosives and unexpected types of mines with a special detonator, the secret of which was known only to their own. The “People's Avengers” easily repaired even blown-up German tanks and even organized artillery divisions from the repaired mortars. Partisan engineers even made grenade launchers.
The Zuev Republic was a configuration of Old Believer self-government in German-occupied territory. The Zuevites fought off the partisans, the fascists, and the Estonian police, but then began to cooperate with the Reich.
Occupation of Belarus
P. Ilyinsky in his memoirs “Three years under German occupation in Belarus” describes how Belarusians collaborated with the German government. Whether the occupation was always the same as it was presented in Soviet history textbooks is a controversial question.
Historian A. Kravtsov believes that “that occupation was different. It so happened that they went to the Germans for help. For bread, for shelter. Sometimes even for weapons. We have the right to call some of those collaborators. But do you have the right to condemn?
In Belarus, as in other regions of the USSR, various partisan formations emerged, speaking both for and against the Red Army.
Republic of Zueva
Describing the partisan movement in occupied Belarus, Ilyinsky talks about one of the newly formed republics during the war - the Republic of Zuev. From the studies of D. Karov and M. Glazk back in Soviet time became widely known about other republics - democratic republic Rossono, consisting of Red Army deserters, and fought both against the Germans and against the Red Army, as well as about the so-called Lokot self-government- a republic the size of Belgium, located in the Bryansk region and on parts of modern Kursk and Oryol region, with a population of 600 thousand people. However, much less has been written about the mysterious Republic of Zuev. Where did it come from and how long did it last?
Zuev's motives
In the book “Partisanism: Myths and Realities,” V. Batshev describes that since Polotsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk were taken by the Germans at the very beginning of the war, they needed their own people in the newly formed government of the occupied territories.
The burgomaster in the village of Zaskorka near Polotsk was the Old Believer Mikhail Zuev, who had recently been imprisoned for anti-Soviet activities. He was loyal to the German occupiers - two of his sons were exiled by the NKVD to Siberia, and had long had scores to settle with the Soviet authorities, so he met the Germans with great enthusiasm: “In the 1930s, he was imprisoned twice for anti-Soviet activities (5 and 3 years, respectively), and only in 1940 he returned from the dungeons of the NKVD to his village. His two sons were also arrested by the NKVD for armed struggle against Soviet power. One son eventually died in Stalin's camps, the second managed to leave for Australia in the early 1960s.”
Ilyinsky says that at that time about three thousand Old Believers lived in the village, and it was located in swamps and forests, far from any road. According to D. Karov (who wrote the book “The Partisan Movement in the USSR in 1941-1945”), under the leadership of Zuev and with the support of the German government, the Old Believers lived quite calmly, enjoying self-government, the return of private property and the opening of Old Believer churches - but then something happened .
Zuev's War
In November 1941, seven partisans came to Zaskorka and asked for support. Among them was an NKVD worker known to Zuev, who made a splash with his cruelty. Having given the partisans shelter and food for camouflage, the village council soon secretly killed them and took away their weapons: “Zuev settled the new arrivals in one hut, supplied them with food, and he himself went to consult with the old people on what to do. At the council, the old men decided to kill all the partisans and hide their weapons.” When a new group of partisans soon arrived in the village, Zuev gave them food and asked them to leave their territory. When the partisans came again, Zuev sent Old Believers armed with rifles to meet them. At night, the partisans returned again - only to retreat, encountering unexpectedly powerful resistance from the sleepless and armed Zuevites.
After these attacks, Mikhail Zuev allowed the organization of special paramilitary units in his own and neighboring villages. They were armed with captured partisan weapons, organized vigils at night and repelled attacks. Until 1942, the Zuevites, according to Ilyinsky, repelled 15 partisan attacks. The most important problems began after - at the end of December, the Old Believers ran out of ammunition. Zuev had to go to the German commandant - and after the New Year, one of the German generals, taking advantage of the disagreements between the Old Believers and the Soviet government, decides to arm Belarusian villages, controlled by Zuev, with fifty Russian rifles and cartridges. Zuev was ordered not to say where he got the weapon from, and was denied machine guns, apparently for security reasons. Neighboring villages themselves sent their representatives to Zuev, asking for protection - this is how his “republic” expanded.
Counteroffensive
In 1942, Zuev and his troops launched a counter-offensive and drove out the partisans from the surrounding villages, and then brought them into his republic. In the spring, he takes out four more machine guns (according to different versions - he buys them from the Hungarians, from the Germans, or gets them in battles with partisans) and introduces the most severe discipline: for serious offenses they were shot based on the vote of the Old Believers.
In the winter of 1942-1943, Zuev fought off serious partisan attacks, and they began to stay away from his republic. He also drove out of his region the Estonian police, who were looking for partisans and wanted to live in his village on this basis: “Zuev answered the Estonian officer that there were no partisans in the area. And consequently, the police have nothing to do here. While the matter was limited to words, the Estonian insisted, but as soon as Zuev’s own detachment approached the house and Mikhail Evseevich firmly stated that he would use force if the police did not leave, the Estonians obeyed and left.” Zuev supplied Polotsk with resources - game, firewood, hay, and was very convenient for the German government, since he regularly paid the food tax. They didn’t even look into the Republic of Zuev and had no influence on internal self-government.
Cover of the Republic of Old Believers
Soon the German army retreated to the west. Zuev retreated after them: as historian B. Sokolov writes, “Zuev with a share of his people went to the West. Other Old Believers remained and began partisan warfare against the Red Army. For this target, the Germans supplied them with weapons and food. Partisan groups stayed in the forests near Polotsk until 1947.”
Ilyinsky writes that all the people cried when leaving their native villages, carried the most valuable things on carts, and saved ancient books and supplies. The German commandant, leaving the encircled Polotsk, allowed us to get through to Zuev in order to leave the encirclement with him - only his people knew the forest like the back of their hand. With the help of Zuev German armies and the Old Believers walking with them (from one to two thousand - information varies) managed to go to Poland, and from there to East Prussia. A number of people actually remained in their native lands and began to fight with the Red Army. The few hundred remaining are taken to the camps, while sometimes the Old Believers who left with the Germans leave for South America from Hamburg in 1946 (some of them later, in the sixties, moved to the USA - where Ilyinsky, the author of the memoirs, also lived).
In Prussia, Zuev's group broke up. He himself went to A. Vlasov and began to fight in the Russian Liberation Army. Further, traces of him are lost - according to various sources, Zuev either went to France, and from there he went to Brazil in 1949, or fell to the British in 1944. No one knows what happened to him next. There is no reliable information left about him, and there is not even a photograph of the ruler of the Old Believers republic. Thus ended the century of the Republic of Zuev.
Is the material useful?
Guerrilla movement