The main operation of the summer campaign of 1944 took place in Belarus. Belarusian offensive, carried out from June 23 to August 29, 1944, became one of the largest military operations in all of mankind. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812 P.I. Bagration. During the “fifth Stalinist strike”, Soviet troops liberated the territory of Belarus, most Lithuanian SSR, as well as eastern Poland. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses German troops were defeated in the area of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Mogilev, and Orsha. In total, the Wehrmacht lost 30 divisions east of Minsk, about half a million soldiers and officers killed, missing, wounded and captured. The German Army Group Center was defeated, and Army Group North in the Baltic States was cut in two.
Situation at the front
By June 1944, the line of the Soviet-German front in the northeast reached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. At the same time, in the southern direction the Red Army reached huge success- everything was freed Right Bank Ukraine, Crimea, Nikolaev, Odessa. Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR and began the liberation of Romania. Conditions were created for the liberation of all of Central and South-Eastern Europe. However, by the end of spring 1944, the Soviet offensive in the south slowed down.
As a result of successes in the southern strategic direction, a huge protrusion was formed - a wedge facing deep into the Soviet Union (the so-called “Belarusian Balcony”). The northern end of the ledge rested on Polotsk and Vitebsk, and the southern end on the Pripyat River basin. It was necessary to eliminate the “balcony” in order to exclude the possibility of a flank attack by the Wehrmacht. Besides German command transferred significant forces to the south, the battles became protracted. Headquarters and the General Staff decided to change the direction of the main attack. In the south, the troops had to regroup their forces, replenish units with manpower and equipment, and prepare for a new offensive.
The defeat of Army Group "Center" and the liberation of the BSSR, through which passed the shortest and most important routes to Poland and large political, military-industrial centers and food bases (Pomerania and East Prussia) Germany, had a huge military-strategic and political significance. The situation in the entire theater of military operations changed radically in favor of the Soviet Union. Success in Belarus the best way provided our subsequent offensive operations in Poland, the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Romania.
Column of Su-85 on Lenin Square in liberated Minsk
Operation plan
In March 1944 Supreme Commander invited Rokossovsky and reported on the planned major operation, inviting the commander to express his opinion. The operation was called “Bagration”, this name was proposed by Joseph Stalin. According to General Headquarters, the main actions of the summer campaign of 1944 were to unfold in Belarus. To carry out the operation, it was planned to attract the forces of four fronts: the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. TO Belarusian operation Dneprovskaya was also involved military flotilla, long-range aviation and partisan detachments.
At the end of April Stalin accepted final decision regarding the summer campaign and the Belarusian operation. Boss Operational management and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Alexey Antonov received instructions to organize work on planning front-line operations and begin concentrating troops and material resources. Thus, the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Ivan Bagramyan received the 1st tank corps, 3rd Belorussian Front of Ivan Chernyakhovsky - 11th Guards Army, 2nd Guards Tank Corps. In addition, the 5th Guards Tank Army (Stavka reserve) was concentrated in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The 28th Army, 9th Tank and 1st Guards Tank Corps, 1st Mechanized Corps and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps were concentrated on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front.
In addition to Antonov, only a few people, including Vasilevsky and Zhukov, were involved in the direct development of the plan for Operation Bagration. Substantive correspondence, telephone conversations or telegraphs were strictly prohibited. One of the primary tasks in preparing the Belarusian operation was its secrecy and misinformation of the enemy regarding the planned direction of the main attack. In particular, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front Army General Rodion Malinovsky received instructions to conduct a demonstrative concentration of troops behind the right flank of the front. The commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Colonel General Ivan Maslennikov, received a similar order.
Alexey Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, leading developer of the plan for the Belarusian operation
On May 20, Vasilevsky, Zhukov and Antonov were summoned to Headquarters. The plan for the summer campaign was finally approved. First hit in the area Karelian Isthmus should have applied Leningrad Front(). Then in the second half of June they planned to launch an offensive in Belarus. Vasilevsky and Zhukov were responsible for coordinating the actions of the four fronts. Vasilevsky was entrusted with the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, Zhukov - the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. At the beginning of June they left for the troops.
According to the memoirs of K.K. Rokossovsky, the offensive plan was finally worked out at Headquarters on May 22-23. The considerations of the command of the 1st Belorussian Front about the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Lublin direction were approved. However, the idea that the troops on the right flank of the front should launch two main attacks at once was criticized. Members of the Headquarters believed that it was necessary to apply one main blow in the direction of Rogachev - Osipovichi, so as not to disperse forces. Rokossovsky continued to stand his ground. According to the front commander, one blow had to be delivered from Rogachev, the other from Ozarichi to Slutsk. At the same time, the enemy’s Bobruisk group fell into the “cauldron”. Rokossovsky knew the terrain well and understood that the movement of the armies of the left flank in one direction in heavily swampy Polesie would lead to the offensive stalling, the roads would be clogged, and the front troops would not be able to use all their capabilities, since they would be introduced into the battle in parts. Convinced that Rokossovsky continued to defend his point of view, Stalin approved the operation plan in the form proposed by the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. It must be said that Zhukov refutes this story by Rokossovsky. According to him, the decision to launch two strikes by the 1st Belorussian Front was made by Headquarters on May 20.
On May 31, front commanders received a directive from Headquarters. The goal of the operation was to cover two flank attacks and destroy the enemy group in the Minsk region. Particular importance was attached to the defeat of the most powerful enemy flank groups that held the defense in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. This provided the possibility of a rapid offensive by large forces in converging directions towards Minsk. The remaining enemy troops were supposed to be thrown back to an unfavorable area of operations near Minsk, cut off their communications, encircle and destroy them. The Stavka plan provided for the delivery of three strong blows:
Troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts attacked general direction to Vilnius;
- the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, advanced in the direction Mogilev - Minsk;
- formations of the 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Bobruisk - Baranovichi.
At the first stage of the operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts were supposed to defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk group. Then introduce mobile formations into the breakthrough and develop an offensive to the west towards Vilnius - Kaunas, covering the Borisov-Minsk group of the Wehrmacht with the left flank. The 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to destroy the enemy’s Mogilev group and advance in the Minsk direction.
At the first stage of the offensive, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to destroy the enemy’s Zhlobin-Bobruisk group with the forces of its right flank. Then introduce tank-mechanized formations into the breakthrough and develop an offensive towards Slutsk - Baranovichi. Part of the front's forces were supposed to cover the enemy's Minsk grouping from the south and south-west. The left flank of the 1st Belorussian Front struck in the Lublin direction.
It should be noted that initially the Soviet command planned to strike to a depth of 300 km, defeat three German armies and reach the line Utena, Vilnius, Lida, Baranovichi. The tasks for the further offensive were set by Headquarters in mid-July, based on the results of the identified successes. At the same time, at the second stage of the Belarusian operation, the results were no longer so brilliant.
Fighting for Belarus
Preparing the operation
As Zhukov noted in his memoirs, to support Operation Bagration, it was necessary to send up to 400 thousand tons of ammunition to the troops, 300 thousand tons fuels and lubricants, up to 500 thousand tons of provisions and fodder. It was necessary to concentrate in given areas 5 combined arms armies, 2 tank and one air army, as well as units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army. In addition, 6 tank and mechanized corps, more than 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, more than 210 thousand marching reinforcements and over 2.8 thousand guns and mortars were transferred to the fronts from the Headquarters reserve. It is clear that all this had to be translated and transported with great precautions so as not to reveal the plan for a grandiose operation to the enemy.
Special attention camouflage and secrecy were also emphasized during the immediate preparation of the operation. The fronts switched to radio silence. At the forefront, excavation work was carried out, which imitated the strengthening of the defense. Concentrations of troops and their transfer were carried out mainly at night. Soviet planes even patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, etc.
Rokossovsky in his memoirs pointed to big role reconnaissance at the forefront and behind enemy lines. The command paid special attention to air, military of all types and radio reconnaissance. More than 400 searches were carried out in the armies of the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front alone, Soviet intelligence officers captured more than 80 “languages” and important enemy documents.
On June 14-15, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front conducted classes on the upcoming operation at the headquarters of the 65th and 28th armies (the right wing of the front). Representatives of the Headquarters were present at the headquarters game. Corps and division commanders, artillery commanders and commanders of the army branches were involved in the drawing. During the classes, issues of the upcoming offensive were worked out in detail. Particular attention was paid to the nature of the terrain in the offensive zone of the armies, the organization of the enemy’s defense and ways to quickly break through to the Slutsk-Bobruisk road. This made it possible to close the escape routes for the Bobruisk group of the enemy’s 9th Army. In the following days, similar classes were held in the 3rd, 48th and 49th armies.
At the same time, extensive educational and political preparation of Soviet troops was carried out. During the classes, fire missions, attack tactics and techniques, and offensive operations in cooperation with tank and artillery units, with aviation support, were practiced. The headquarters of units, formations and armies worked out issues of control and communications. Command and observation posts were moved forward, a surveillance and communication system was created, the order of movement and control of troops during the pursuit of the enemy was clarified, etc.
Soviet Valentine IX tanks move into combat positions. 5th Guards tank army. Summer 1944
The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement provided great assistance in preparing the offensive operation. A close connection was established partisan detachments With Soviet troops. The partisans received with " big land» instructions with specific tasks, where and when to attack the enemy, which communications to destroy.
It should be noted that by mid-1944, partisan detachments were operating in most of the BSSR. Belarus was a real partisan region. There were 150 operating in the republic partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments with a total number of an entire army - 143 thousand bayonets (already during the Belarusian operation almost 200 thousand partisans joined the Red Army units). The partisans controlled vast territories, especially in wooded and swampy areas. Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote that the 4th Army, which he commanded from the beginning of June 1944, found itself in a huge forested and swampy area that extended to Minsk and this area was controlled by large partisan formations. German troops were never able to completely clear this territory in all three years. All crossings and bridges in this inaccessible area covered with dense forests were destroyed. As a result, although German troops controlled everything big cities and railway junctions, up to 60% of the territory of Belarus was under the control of Soviet partisans. It still existed here Soviet authority, regional and district committees of the Communist Party and the Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union) worked. It is clear that partisan movement could only hold out with the support of the “mainland”, from where experienced personnel and ammunition were transferred.
Offensive Soviet armies was preceded by an attack of unprecedented scale partisan formations. On the night of June 19-20, the partisans began massive actions to defeat the German rear. The partisans destroyed the enemy's railway communications, blew up bridges, set up ambushes on the roads, and disabled communication lines. On the night of June 20 alone, 40 thousand enemy rails were blown up. Eike Middeldorf noted: “In the central sector of the Eastern Front, Russian partisans carried out 10,500 explosions” (Middeldorf Eike. Russian campaign: tactics and weapons. - St. Petersburg, M., 2000). The partisans were able to carry out only part of their plans, but this was enough to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. As a result, the transfer of German operational reserves was delayed for several days. Communication along many highways became possible only during the day and only accompanied by strong convoys.
Strengths of the parties. Soviet Union
Four fronts connected 20 combined arms and 2 tank armies. A total of 166 divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 7 fortified areas and 21 separate brigade. About one-fifth of these forces were included in the operation in its second stage, approximately three weeks after the start of the offensive. At the start of the operation, Soviet troops numbered about 2.4 million soldiers and commanders, 36 thousand guns and mortars, more than 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and over 5.3 thousand aircraft.
The 1st Baltic Front of Ivan Bagramyan included: 4th shock army under the command of P. F. Malyshev, the 6th Guards Army of I. M. Chistyakov, the 43rd Army of A. P. Beloborodov, the 1st Tank Corps of V. V. Butkov. The front was supported from the air by the 3rd Air Army of N.F. Papivin.
The 3rd Belorussian Front of Ivan Chernyakhovsky included: the 39th Army of I. I. Lyudnikov, the 5th Army of N. I. Krylov, the 11th Guards Army of K. N. Galitsky, the 31st Army of V. V. Glagolev, the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of A. S. Burdeyny, the horse-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky (it included the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps). From the air, the front troops were supported by the 1st Air Army of M. M. Gromov.
The 2nd Belorussian Front of Georgy Zakharov included: the 33rd Army of V. D. Kryuchenkin, the 49th Army of I. T. Grishin, the 50th Army of I. V. Boldin, the 4th Air Army of K. A Vershinina.
1st Belorussian Front of Konstantin Rokossovsky: 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, 48th Army of P.L. Romanenko, 65th Army of P.I. Batov, 28th Army of A.A. Luchinsky, 61- I Army of P. A. Belov, 70th Army of V. S. Popov, 47th Army of N. I. Gusev, 8th guards army V. I. Chuikov, 69th Army V. Ya. Kolpakchi, 2nd Tank Army S. I. Bogdanov. The front also included the 2nd, 4th and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, the 9th and 11th Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Tank Corps, and the 1st Mechanized Corps. In addition, the 1st Army of the Polish Army Z. Berling and the Dnieper Military Flotilla of Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev were subordinate to Rokossovsky. The front was supported by the 6th and 16th air armies F. P. Polynina and S. I. Rudenko.
Member of the military council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin (left) and front commander General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky at the map in command post front
German forces
The Soviet troops were opposed by Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Ernst Busch (from June 28 Walter Model). The army group included: the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of Colonel General Georg Reinhardt, the 4th Army of Kurt von Tippelskirch, the 9th Army of Hans Jordan (he was replaced by Nikolaus von Forman on June 27), the 2nd Army of Walter Weiss (Weiss ). Army Group Center was supported by aviation from the 6th Air Fleet and partly from the 1st and 4th air fleets. In addition, in the north, Army Group Center was joined by the forces of the 16th Army of Army Group North, and in the south by the 4th Tank Army of Army Group Northern Ukraine.
Thus, the German forces numbered 63 divisions and three brigades; 1.2 million soldiers and officers, 9.6 thousand guns and mortars, over 900 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources 1330), 1350 combat aircraft. The German armies had good developed system railways and highways, which allowed troops to maneuver widely.
German command plans and defense system
The “Belarusian balcony” blocked the road to Warsaw and further to Berlin. The German group, when the Red Army went on the offensive in the northern and southern directions, could launch powerful flank attacks on Soviet troops from this “balcony”. The German military command was mistaken about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign. While Headquarters had a fairly good idea of the enemy forces in the area of the proposed offensive, the German command believed that the Red Army could only deliver an auxiliary blow in Belarus. Hitler and the High Command believed that the Red Army would again launch a decisive offensive in the south, in Ukraine. The main blow was expected from the Kovel area. From there, Soviet troops could cut off the “balcony”, reaching the Baltic Sea and encircling the main forces of Army Group Center and North and pushing Army Group Northern Ukraine back to the Carpathians. In addition, Adolf Hitler feared for Romania - the oil region of Ploiesti, which was the main source of “black gold” for the Third Reich.” Kurt Tippelskirch noted: “Army groups Center and North were predicted to have a “quiet summer.”
Therefore, in total there were 11 divisions in the reserves of Army Group Center and army reserves. Of the 34 tank and motorized divisions that were available on the Eastern Front, 24 were concentrated south of Pripyat. Thus, in the Army Group “Northern Ukraine” there were 7 tank and 2 tank-grenadier divisions. In addition, they have been strengthened 4 separate battalions heavy Tiger tanks.
In April 1944, the command of Army Group Center proposed shortening the front line and withdrawing the armies to more convenient positions across the Berezina River. However, the high command, as before, when it was proposed to withdraw troops to more convenient positions in Ukraine or withdraw them from Crimea, rejected this plan. The army group was left in its original positions.
German troops occupied a well-prepared and deeply echeloned (up to 250-270 km) defense. The construction of defensive lines began back in 1942-1943, and the front line was finally formed during stubborn battles in the spring of 1944. It consisted of two stripes and was based on a developed system of field fortifications, resistance nodes - “fortresses,” and numerous natural lines. Thus, defensive positions usually ran along western shores numerous rivers. Their crossing was made difficult by wide swampy floodplains. The wooded and swampy nature of the area and the many bodies of water seriously worsened the ability to use heavy weapons. Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha Mogilev, Bobruisk were turned into “fortresses”, the defense of which was built taking into account the possibility of all-round defense. The rear lines ran along the Dnieper, Drut, Berezina rivers, along the line Minsk, Slutsk and further to the west. For the construction of field fortifications, they widely attracted local residents. The weakness of the German defense was that the construction of defensive lines in the depths was not completed.
In general, Army Group Center covered the strategic East Prussian and Warsaw directions. The Vitebsk direction was covered by the 3rd Tank Army, the Orsha and Mogilev direction by the 3rd Army, and the Bobruisk direction by the 9th Army. The front of the 2nd Army passed along Pripyat. The German command paid serious attention to replenishing the divisions with manpower and equipment, trying to bring them to full strength. For each German division accounted for approximately 14 km of front. On average, there were 450 soldiers, 32 machine guns, 10 guns and mortars, 1 tank or assault gun per 1 km of front. But these are average numbers. They differed greatly in different sectors of the front. Thus, in the Orsha and Rogachev-Bobruisk directions, the defense was stronger and more densely saturated with troops. In a number of other areas that the German command considered less important, the defensive formations were much less dense.
Reinhardt's 3rd Panzer Army occupied a line east of Polotsk, Bogushevskoe (about 40 km south of Vitebsk), with a front length of 150 km. The army included 11 divisions (8 infantry, two airfield, one security), three brigades of assault guns, battle group“von Gottberg”, 12 separate regiments (police, security, etc.) and other formations. All divisions and two regiments were in the first line of defense. There were 10 regiments in reserve, mainly engaged in protecting communications and counter-guerrilla warfare. The main forces defended the Vitebsk direction. As of June 22, the army numbered more than 165 thousand people, 160 tanks and assault guns, more than 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns.
The 4th Army of Tippelskirch occupied the defense from Bogushevsk to Bykhov, having a front length of 225 km. It consisted of 10 divisions (7 infantry, one assault, 2 tank-grenadier - 25th and 18th), a brigade of assault guns, 501st heavy tank battalion, 8 separate regiments and other units. Already in progress Soviet offensive The tank-grenadier division "Feldherrnhalle" arrived. There were 8 regiments in reserve, which performed tasks of protecting rear areas, communications and fighting partisans. The most powerful defense was in the Orsha and Mogilev directions. As of June 22, the 4th Army had more than 168 thousand soldiers and officers, about 1,700 field and anti-aircraft guns, 376 tanks and assault guns.
Jordan's 9th Army defended itself in the zone south of Bykhov to the Pripyat River, with a front length of 220 km. The army included 12 divisions (11 infantry and one tank - the 20th), three separate regiments, 9 battalions (security, sapper, construction). The first line consisted of all divisions, the Brandenburg regiment and 9 battalions. The main forces were located in the Bobruisk area. There were two regiments in the army reserve. By the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the army had more than 175 thousand people, about 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns, 140 tanks and assault guns.
The 2nd Army took up defensive positions along the Pripyat River. It consisted of 4 divisions (2 infantry, one Jaeger and one security), a corps group, a tank-grenadier brigade, and two cavalry brigades. In addition, the 2nd Army was subordinate to the Hungarian 3 reserve divisions and one cavalry division. The army group command's reserve included several divisions, including security and training divisions.
The Soviet command was able to maintain preparations for a major offensive operation in Belarus until its very beginning. German aviation and radio intelligence usually noticed large transfers of forces and concluded that an offensive was approaching. However, this time the Red Army’s preparations for the offensive were missed. The secrecy mode and disguise did their job.
Destroyed tanks of the 20th division in the Bobruisk area (1944)
To be continued…
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The General Staff of the Red Army developed a plan for delivering powerful attacks by the forces of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts in the direction of the cities of Vitebsk and Orsha. The operation was named "Bagration", in honor of the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, General P.I. Bagration. The offensive plan was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 30, 1944.
The general plan of the operation included the defeat of German formations in Belarus, the liberation of Minsk and access to state border THE USSR.
In 1944, the initiative on the Soviet-German front was held by the Red Army, whose command developed strategic operations only of an offensive nature. The German leadership set defensive tasks for its troops, with the possibility of secondary counterattacks.
Large stripe summer offensive The Red Army covered more than 500 kilometers from east to west and about 450 kilometers from north to south. In military-strategic terms, this area was the shortest to the most important industrial and administrative centers Germany, the capture of which could have a serious impact on the outcome of the war.
Since the spring of 1944, the Soviet troops launched enhanced combat training in connection with the upcoming offensive.
During these exercises, offensive combat techniques and issues of interaction were practiced various genera troops, capture strong points enemy. Much attention paid attention to methods of overcoming water obstacles, moving through swampy areas, taking into account the peculiarities natural landscape area of upcoming hostilities.
The regrouping of the Red Army formations took place under conditions of the strictest camouflage; the movement of troops was carried out, as a rule, at night. During the day, false maneuvers were carried out with dummies of military equipment, imaginary crossings were prepared, and the concentration of large formations in secondary directions was simulated.
By the beginning of the offensive, the troops of the four Soviet fronts numbered about 2.4 million soldiers and officers, more than 5 thousand tanks, 36 thousand guns and about 5 thousand aircraft.
On the territory of occupied Belarus, the German military command began to create fortified positions and defense strongholds back in 1942-1943. Army Group Center, under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush, was inferior to the Soviet troops in numbers by two times, in tanks by almost six times, and in guns and aircraft by four times.
Naturally, it was impossible to completely hide such large-scale preparations for an offensive operation. However, the German command believed that the main attack of the Red Army would follow to the south, in Ukraine, in the direction of the Romanian oil fields, a secondary blow was expected in the Belarusian direction.
On June 23, 1944, Operation Bagration began. Unprecedented in firepower, artillery fire from more than thirty thousand guns and mortars shook German defensive positions for two hours.
On the first day of the offensive, Soviet troops managed to wedge into German defense in some places up to thirteen kilometers. Overcoming fierce resistance, the Red Army steadily advanced to the West.
On June 25, five German divisions, numbering up to 35 thousand people, were surrounded in the area of the city of Vitebsk, the capture of which was completed a few days later.
The twenty-sixth of June 1944 was liberated city Orsha is the strategic center of German defense. The successful actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front led to the encirclement of six German divisions in the area of the city of Bobruisk.
The airspace was Soviet aviation and the actions of the pilots caused serious damage to the enemy.
The Red Army actively used the tactics of concentrated attacks by tank formations and subsequent advances to the rear of German troops. Tank raids guards corps destroyed the enemy's rear communications, disorganized the defense system, blocked retreat routes and completed his encirclement.
On July 2, as a result of a swift attack by troops of the 1st and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, the capital was liberated Belarus - city Minsk. East of the city A 150,000-strong German group found itself surrounded. By July thirteenth, the liquidation of the encircled troops was completed and about thirty-five thousand German soldiers and officers were in Soviet captivity.
By the end of August 1944, the Red Army troops, having carried out an offensive with a front of up to 1100 kilometers, advanced 500-600 kilometers into westward. Soviet Belarus was almost completely liberated from the invaders. Army Group Center was defeated, German troops lost more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers.
Soviet losses amounted to about 700 thousand people killed, wounded and missing.
The liberation of Belarus, a significant part of the Baltic states, and the entry of the Red Army to the border with East Prussia opened up strategic prospects for the further defeat of the enemy and successful completion war.
By the summer of 1944 the situation on Soviet-German front turned out in favor of the Red Army, which held the strategic initiative. The plan for the defeat of the Nazi Army Group “Center” was developed at Headquarters and approved at the end of May 1944. This operation went down in history under the name “Bagration”, which consisted of two stages. According to the plan, it was planned to break through the defense of the German armies in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, dismember Army Group Center into parts and defeat them separately.
“Belarusian Balcony” - the front line to the east from Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk along the Pripyat River to Kovel, a ledge facing east, occupied by Army Group Center. Realizing the vulnerability of the “balcony,” the German command suggested that Hitler evacuate the Dnieper bridgehead, but the Fuhrer was against another retreat. The Soviet side in this operation was opposed by Army Group Center (Field Marshal Ernst Busch, then from June 28 Field Marshal Walter Model), two army groups North and Northern Ukraine. The total number of enemy troops was about 1.2 million soldiers. It was armed with 9,500 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, and 1,350 combat aircraft. On the territory of Belarus, the Nazis created a strong, deeply echeloned defense in depth called “Vaterland” (“Fatherland”), emphasizing that the fate of Germany depended on it.
Troops from four fronts were involved in Operation Bagration. The 1st Baltic Front (commanded by Army General I. Bagramyan) advanced from the area north-west of Vitebsk, the 3rd Belorussian Front (commanded by Colonel I. Chernyakhovsky) - south of Vitebsk to Borisov. The 2nd Belorussian Front (commanded by Army General G. Zakharov) operated in the Mogilev direction. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (commanded by Army General K. Rokossovsky) were aimed at Bobruisk and Minsk. Their actions were coordinated by Marshals G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The total number of Soviet armies was 2.4 million soldiers, 36.4 thousand guns and mortars, 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units and 5.3 thousand aircraft. In addition, 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments with a total number of more than 143 thousand people operated behind enemy lines.
Stage I - June 23 - July 4, 1944. As a result of the operation, Vitebsk was liberated on June 26, Orsha on June 27, Mogilev on June 28, Bobruisk on June 29, and Minsk on July 3. The tank of junior lieutenant D. Frolikov of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was the first to burst into Minsk. Following him, the main forces of the Guards Tank Corps, commanded by Major General A. Burdeyny, literally burst into Minsk. 16 tankers became Heroes of the Soviet Union for their exploits during the liberation of the capital of Belarus. Private Suvorov from the 1315th Infantry Regiment planted the state flag over the Government House. By the end of July 3, 1944, there were no armed German soldiers in Minsk.
Some of the German troops ended up in “cauldrons” near Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk (a 105-thousand group of German troops). With the liberation of Minsk, the first stage of Operation Bagration ended. The main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.
Stage II - July 5 - August 29, 1944. The territory of Belarus was completely liberated from German - fascist troops: July 7 Baranovichi, July 14 Pinsk, July 16 Grodno, July 28 Brest. During the implementation of the second stage of the Belarusian operation, Army Group Center was completely destroyed, which became no less a disaster for the Nazis than the defeat at Stalingrad. Total losses The German armies and their allies amounted to about 500 thousand soldiers and officers. The damage on the Soviet side was also significant. The Red Army lost 765,815 soldiers and officers (of which 178,507 were killed - 7.6% of the personnel).
As a result of Operation Bagration, the Red Army liberated Belarus, part of Lithuania and Latvia, Poland (reached the Warsaw suburb of Prague) and approached the borders of East Prussia.
Over 1,600 soldiers in the battles for the liberation of Belarus were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In memory of the heroic deeds of soldiers of four fronts, the majestic Mound of Glory (opened in 1969) was erected at the 21st kilometer of the Minsk-Moscow highway.
Operation Bagration is considered one of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.
It represents the third stage " Rail War", which took place in June and August 1944 on the territory of Belarus.
During this operation, the German troops were dealt such a strong blow that they could no longer recover from it.
Prerequisites
At that time, the Germans were advancing on several fronts. On the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, Soviet troops managed to accomplish the unprecedented: liberate almost the entire territory of the republic and destroy a huge number of Nazi troops.
But on Belarusian territory the Red Army was unable to organize a successful breakthrough to Minsk for a long time. The German forces were lined up in a wedge directed towards the USSR, and this wedge stood at the line Orsha - Vitebsk - Mogilev - Zhlobin.
Belarusian operation photo
At the same time, part of the troops was transferred to Ukraine, which the Wehrmacht still hoped to recapture. Therefore, the General Staff and the Supreme High Command decided to change the direction of action and concentrate efforts on the liberation of Belarus.
Strengths of the parties
The offensive in Belarus was organized on four fronts. Soviet troops were opposed here by four German armies:
- 2nd Army of the “Center”, located in the area of Pinsk and Pripyat;
- 9th Army of the “Center”, located in the Berezina area near Bobruisk;
- 4th Army of the “Center” - the space between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers and between Bykhov and Orsha;
- 3rd Tank Army of the “Center” - there, as well as Vitebsk.
Progress of the operation
Operation Bagration was very large-scale and was carried out in two stages. At the first stage, actions were carried out on Belarusian territory, and at the second - on the territory of Lithuania and Eastern Poland.
On June 22, 1944, reconnaissance in force began to clarify the precise location of enemy guns. And on the morning of June 23, the operation itself began. Soviet troops surrounded a group of five divisions near Vitebsk and liquidated it on June 27. Thus the main defensive forces The "Center" armies were destroyed.
In addition to the actions of the Red Army, Operation Bagration was accompanied by unprecedented partisan activity: during the summer of 1944, almost 195 thousand partisans joined the Red Army.
Soviet troops in attack photo
Eike Middeldorf noted that “Russian partisans” carried out more than ten thousand explosions on railways and other communications, which delayed the movement of German troops for several days. On the other hand, partisan actions made it easier offensive actions Soviet army.
The partisans planned to carry out many more explosions - up to forty thousand, however, what was done was enough to cause German side crushing blow.
Polish Committee of National Liberation
At the height of Bagration, Soviet troops entered Polish territory. There they formed a provisional government, which many experts regard as a puppet government. The provisional government, called Polish Committee national liberation, did not take into account the emigrant Polish government and consisted of communists and socialists. Subsequently, some of the emigrants joined the Committee, but the rest decided to remain in London.
Result of the operation
Operation Bagration exceeded all expectations Soviet command. The Red Army showed the superiority of its military theory and demonstrated careful organization and consistency of action. Many believe that the defeat of the Germans Belarusian front- the largest in the history of World War II.
What is Operation Bagration? How was it carried out? We will consider these and other questions in the article. It is known that 2014 marked the 70th anniversary of this operation. During it, the Red Army was able not only to liberate the Belarusians from occupation, but also, by destabilizing the enemy, accelerated the collapse of fascism.
This happened thanks to the extraordinary courage, determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet partisans and soldiers of Belarus, many of whom died in the name of victory over the invaders.
Operation
The Belarusian offensive Operation Bagration was a large-scale campaign of the Great Patriotic War, carried out in 1944, from June 23 to August 29. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of Georgian origin P.I. Bagration, who gained fame during the Patriotic War of 1812.
Campaign Value
The liberation of Belarus was not easy for Soviet soldiers. During the above extensive offensive, Belarusian lands, part of the Baltic states and eastern Poland, the German group of detachments “Center” was almost completely defeated. The Wehrmacht suffered impressive losses partly due to the fact that A. Hitler forbade retreat. Subsequently, Germany was no longer able to restore troops.
Campaign Background
The liberation of Belarus was carried out in several stages. It is known that by June 1944, in the east, the front line approached the Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin line, establishing an impressive protrusion - a wedge directed deep into the USSR, called the "Belarusian Balcony".
In Ukraine, the Red Army was able to achieve a series of tangible successes (many Wehrmacht soldiers died in the chain of “cauldrons”, almost all the lands of the Republic were liberated). If we wanted to break through in the winter of 1943-1944 in the direction of Minsk, successes, on the contrary, were very modest.
Along with this, by the end of the spring of 1944, the invasion in the south had stalled, and the Supreme Command decided to change the course of efforts.
Strengths of the parties
The liberation of Belarus was quick and inevitable. Information about opponents' strengths different sources vary. In accordance with the publication “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War,” 1 million 200 thousand soldiers (not including rear units) took part in the campaign from the USSR. On the German side - as part of the group of detachments "Center" - 850-900 thousand souls (plus about 400 thousand rear soldiers). In addition, in the second phase, the left wing of the “Northern Ukraine” group of troops and the right wing of the “North” group of troops took part in the battle.
It is known that four Wehrmacht regiments resisted the four Soviet fronts.
Campaign preparation
Before the liberation of Belarus, the Red Army soldiers intensively prepared for the operation. At first, the Soviet leadership thought that the Bagration campaign would be identical Battle of Kursk- something like “Rumyantsev” or “Kutuzov”, with a colossal consumption of ammunition with a subsequent modest movement of 150-200 km.
Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into the operational depth, with persistent, long-term battles in the tactical defense area to the point of attrition - required a colossal amount of ammunition and small volume fuel for mechanical parts and small capacities for the revival of railway tracks, the actual evolution of the campaign was unexpected for the Soviet leadership.
In April 1944, the General Staff began to develop an operational scheme for the Belarusian operation. The command intended to crush the flanks German group“Center”, encircle its base forces east of Minsk and completely liberate Belarus. The plan was extremely large-scale and ambitious, since during the war the simultaneous defeat of an entire group of troops was planned extremely rarely.
Significant personnel moves have been made. Direct preparations for the Belarusian operation began at the end of May. On May 31, private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command containing specific plans were delivered to front commanders.
The Red Army soldiers organized a thorough reconnaissance of enemy positions and forces. Information was obtained from various directions. For example, reconnaissance teams of the 1st Front of Belarus were able to capture about 80 “tongues”. Human agents and active acoustic reconnaissance were also conducted, enemy positions were studied by artillery observers, and so on.
The headquarters sought to achieve extreme surprise. The army commanders personally gave all orders to the military commanders of the units. It was forbidden to talk on the phone about preparations for an offensive, even in coded form. The fronts preparing for the operation began to observe radio silence. Troops concentrated and regrouped mainly at night. It was necessary to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, so General Staff officers were specially assigned to patrol the area.
Before the offensive, commanders at all levels, down to companies, carried out reconnaissance. They assigned tasks to their subordinates on the spot. To improve cooperation, Air Force officers and artillery spotters were sent to tank units.
It follows that the campaign was prepared very carefully, while the enemy remained in the dark about the impending assault.
Wehrmacht
So, you already know that the Red Army thoroughly prepared for the liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders. The leadership of the Red Army was perfectly aware of the enemy grouping in the area of the future attack. The General Staff of the ground forces of the Third Reich and the military leaders of the Group of Forces Center were in the dark about the plans and forces of the Red Army.
The High Command and Hitler thought that a major offensive should still be expected in Ukraine. They hoped that the Soviet garrisons would strike from the area south of Kovel towards Baltic Sea, cutting off groups of troops “Center” and “North”.
The General Staff of the Third Reich assumed that the Red Army wanted to mislead German military leaders regarding the course of the most important strike and withdraw reserves from the region between Kovel and the Carpathians. The situation in Belarus was so calm that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the campaign.
Progress of hostilities
So, the Great Patriotic War was going on. The liberation of Belarus played a decisive role in this tense confrontation. The preliminary phase of the campaign symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union - June 22, 1944. The most significant battle site was the Berezina River, as during the Patriotic War of 1812.
To liberate Belarus, the commanders used all their skills. Soviet troops of the 2nd, 1st, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, with the support of partisans, broke through the defenses of the German group of forces “Center” in many areas. The Red Army soldiers surrounded and destroyed impressive enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Vilnius, Bobruisk, Brest and east of Minsk. They also liberated the territory of Belarus and its capital Minsk (July 3), a significant part of Lithuania and Vilnius (July 13), eastern regions Poland. Soviet soldiers were able to reach the lines of the Vistula and Narev rivers and the Rubicons of East Prussia. It is noteworthy that the Soviet troops were commanded by Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, General G. F. Zakharov, General K. K. Rokossovsky, and the German troops were commanded by Field Marshal General E. Bush, later - V. .Model.
The operation to liberate Belarus was carried out in two steps. The first step was taken from June 23 to July 4 and included the following offensive front operations:
- Mogilev operation;
- Vitebsk-Orsha;
- Minsk;
- Polotsk;
- Bobruiskaya.
- Osovets operation;
- Kaunasskaya;
- Vilnius;
- Bialystok;
- Siauliai;
- Lublin-Brestskaya.
Partisan actions
So, you already know that the liberation of Belarus during the Second World War played a significant role. Before the offensive, a guerrilla action of unprecedented proportions took place. In Belarus at that time there were many active partisan formations. The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement recorded that 194,708 supporters joined the Red Army troops in the summer of 1944.
Soviet commanders successfully linked military operations with the actions of partisan groups. Taking part in the Bagration campaign, the partisans first disabled the enemy’s communications, and later prevented the withdrawal of the defeated Wehrmacht troops.
They began to destroy the German rear on the night of June 19-20. Russian partisans in the central region of the eastern front carried out 10,500 explosions. As a result, they were able to delay the transfer of enemy operational reserves for a couple of days.
The partisans planned to carry out 40 thousand various explosions, that is, they managed to fulfill only a quarter of their intentions. And yet, they were able to briefly paralyze the rear of the Center group of forces.
At the end of June 1944, on the night before the general attack of the Russians in the zone of the Center group of troops, the partisans carried out a powerful raid on all important roads. As a result, they completely deprived the enemy troops of control. During this one night, the partisans managed to install 10.5 thousand mines and charges, of which only 3.5 thousand were discovered and neutralized. Due to the activities of partisan detachments, communication along many routes was carried out during the day and only under the cover of an armed convoy.
Railways and bridges became the main targets for partisan forces. In addition to them, communication lines were also actively disabled. This activity greatly facilitated the Red Army's offensive at the front.
Results of the operation
The liberation of Belarus in 1944 turned history back. The success of the Bagration campaign exceeded all expectations Soviet leaders. Having attacked the enemy for two months, the Red Army soldiers completely cleared Belarus, recaptured part of the Baltic states, and liberated the eastern regions of Poland. Overall, on a front 1100 km long soviet soldiers were able to advance to a depth of 600 km.
The operation also left the North group of troops stationed in the Baltic states defenseless. After all, they managed to bypass the “Panther” line, a carefully constructed border. In the future, this fact significantly facilitated the Baltic campaign.
The Red Army also captured two large bridgeheads south of Warsaw across the Vistula - Pulawski and Magnuszewski, as well as a bridgehead at Sandomierz (recaptured by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Sandomierz-Lvov campaign). With these actions they created the groundwork for the upcoming Vistula-Oder operation. It is known that the offensive of the 1st Front of Belarus, which stopped only at the Oder, began in January 1945 from the Pulawy and Magnushevsky bridgeheads.
The military believes that the liberation of Soviet Belarus contributed to the large-scale defeat of the German Armed Forces. Many are confident that the Battle of Belarus can safely be called “the largest defeat of the German Armed Forces in the Second World War.”
On the scale of the German-Soviet front, the Bagration campaign became the greatest in the long annals of offensives. She is a sensation Soviet theory military mastery thanks to the superbly coordinated movement of all fronts and the operation carried out to deceive the enemy about the location of the fundamental assault that began in the summer of 1944. It destroyed German reserves, seriously limiting the invaders' ability to fend off both the Allied advance in Western Europe and other attacks on the Eastern Front.
So, for example, the division " Greater Germany“The German command transferred from the Dniester to Siauliai. As a result, she was unable to take part in repelling the Iasi-Kishinev campaign. The Hermann Goering division had to abandon its positions in mid-July in Italy near Florence, and was thrown into battle on the Vistula. When Goering units attacked the Magnushevsky sector in vain in mid-August, Florence was liberated.
Losses
The human losses of the Red Army are known quite accurately. In total, 178,507 military personnel died, went missing, or were captured; 587,308 people were injured or fell ill. Even by World War II standards, these losses are considered high. In absolute numbers, they significantly outnumber the victims not only in successful but also in many unsuccessful campaigns.
So, for comparison, the defeat near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943 cost the Red Army a little more than 45 thousand dead, and Berlin operation- 81 thousand. This disruption was due to the duration and scope of the campaign, which was carried out on complex terrain against a competent and energetic enemy who occupied superbly prepared defensive lines.
Scientists still debate about the human losses of the Wehrmacht today. Western professors estimate that the Germans had 262,929 captured and missing, 109,776 wounded and 26,397 dead, for a total of 399,102 soldiers. These data were obtained from ten-day reports compiled by the fascist troops.
Why, in this case, is the number of those killed small? Yes, because many of the dead were recorded as missing in action, and sometimes this status was given to the entire division’s personnel.
However, these figures have been criticized. For example, the US historian of the Eastern Front D. Glantz discovered that the difference between the number of military personnel of the Center group of troops before and after the campaign is much larger number. D. Glantz stated that the information from the ten-day reports gives the situation minimum score. When Russian investigator A.V. Isaev spoke on the Ekho Moskvy radio, he stated that the Nazis’ losses amounted to about 500 thousand souls. S. Zaloga claims that before the surrender of the 4th Army, 300-500 thousand Germans died.
It is also necessary to emphasize that in all cases the losses of the “Center” group of forces were calculated, without taking into account the victims of the “North” and “Northern Ukraine” regiment groups.
It is known that the Sovinformburo published Soviet information, according to which German troops from June 23 to July 23, 1944 lost 631 aircraft, 2,735 self-propelled guns and tanks, 57,152 vehicles, 158,480 people were captured, 381,000 soldiers were killed. Perhaps these data are quite exaggerated, as is usually the case with claims for enemy losses. In any case, the question of the Wehrmacht’s human losses in Bagration is not yet closed.
The Germans, captured near Minsk in the amount of 57,600 people, were marched through Moscow - a column of prisoners of war walked through the streets of the capital for about three hours. In this way, the meaning of success was demonstrated to other powers. After the march, every street was cleared and washed.
Memory
We still honor the year of the liberation of Belarus today. In honor of this event, the following memorial signs were created:
- Memorial “Campaign “Bagration” near the village of Rakovichi (Svetlogorsk district).
- Mound of Glory.
- In 2010, April 14, National Bank The Republic of Belarus issued and put into circulation a series of coins “Campaign “Bagration”.
Awards
Subsequently, anniversary awards appeared in Belarus in the form of the medal “For the Liberation of Belarus.” In 2004, a memorial was introduced Chest sign“60 years of liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders.” Later, anniversary medals were issued for the 65th and 70th anniversaries of the liberation of Belarus.
There is no re-awarding of the anniversary medal. If you have lost your medal or certificate for it, you will not be given a duplicate. They can only allow the wearing of the established version of the bar.