At the end of the spring of 1944, relative calm reigned on the Soviet-German front. The Germans, having suffered major defeats during the winter-spring battles, strengthened their defenses, and the Red Army rested and gathered strength to deliver the next blow.
Looking at a map of the fighting of that time, you can see two vast protrusions of the front line. The first is on the territory of Ukraine, south of the Pripyat River. The second, far to the east, is in Belarus, with a border along the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin. This protrusion was called the “Belarusian balcony,” and after a discussion that took place at the end of April 1944 at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was decided to attack it with the full might of the Red Army troops. The operation to liberate Belarus received the code name “Bagration”.
The German command did not foresee such a turn. The area in Belarus was forested and swampy, with a large number of lakes and rivers and a rather poorly developed road network. The use of large tank and mechanized formations here, from the point of view of Hitler's generals, was difficult. Therefore, the Wehrmacht was preparing to repel the Soviet offensive on the territory of Ukraine, concentrating much more impressive forces there than in Belarus. Thus, the Northern Ukraine Army Group was subordinate to seven tank divisions and four battalions of Tiger tanks. And Army Group Center is subordinate to only one tank, two panzer-grenadier divisions and one Tiger battalion. In total, Ernst Busch, commander of the Central Army Group, had 1.2 million people, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9,500 guns and mortars and 1,350 aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet.
The Germans created a fairly powerful and layered defense in Belarus. Since 1943, the construction of fortified positions was carried out, often based on natural obstacles: rivers, lakes, swamps, hills. Some cities at the most important communication hubs were declared fortresses. These included, in particular, Orsha, Vitebsk, Mogilev, etc. Defensive lines were equipped with bunkers, dugouts, and replaceable artillery and machine-gun positions.
According to the operational plan of the Soviet High Command, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, as well as the 1st Baltic Front, were supposed to defeat enemy forces in Belarus. The total number of Soviet troops in the operation was approximately 2.4 million people, more than 5,000 tanks, and about 36,000 guns and mortars. Air support was provided by the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 16th Air Armies (more than 5,000 aircraft). Thus, the Red Army achieved significant, and in many aspects, overwhelming superiority over enemy troops.
In order to keep the preparations for the offensive secret, the command of the Red Army prepared and carried out a great deal of work to ensure the secrecy of the movement of forces and to mislead the enemy. The units moved to their original positions at night, observing radio silence. During daylight hours, the troops stopped, settling in the forests and carefully camouflaging themselves. At the same time, a false concentration of troops was carried out in the Chisinau direction, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the zones of responsibility of the fronts that did not take part in Operation Bagration, and entire trains with mock-ups of military equipment were transported from Belarus to the rear. In general, the events achieved their goal, although it was not possible to completely hide the preparations for the Red Army’s offensive. Thus, prisoners captured in the zone of operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front said that the command of the German troops noted the strengthening of the Soviet units and expected active actions from the Red Army. But the time the operation began, the number of Soviet troops and the exact direction of the attack remained unclear.
Before the start of the operation, the Belarusian partisans became more active, committing a large number of sabotages on the Nazis’ communications. Over 40,000 rails were blown up between July 20 and July 23 alone. In general, the actions of the partisans created a number of difficulties for the Germans, but still did not cause critical damage to the railway network, as even such an authority in reconnaissance and sabotage as I. G. Starinov directly stated.
Operation Bagration began on June 23, 1944 and was carried out in two stages. The first stage included the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk operations.
The Vitebsk-Orsha operation was carried out by troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The 1st Baltic Front of Army General I. Bagramyan, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies, struck at the junction of Army Groups “North” and “Center” in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The 4th Shock Army was supposed to attack Polotsk.
The 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel General I. Chernyakhovsky, attacked Bogushevsk and Senno with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies, and on Borisov with units of the 11th Guards and 31st armies. To develop the operational success of the front, the horse-mechanized group of N. Oslikovsky (3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps) and the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov were intended.
After artillery preparation, on June 23, the front troops went on the offensive. During the first day, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front managed to advance 16 kilometers into the depths of enemy defenses, with the exception of the Polotsk direction, where the 4th Shock Army met fierce resistance and did not have much success. The width of the breakthrough of Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack was about 50 kilometers.
The 3rd Belorussian Front achieved significant successes in the Bogushevsky direction, breaking through the German defense line more than 50 kilometers wide and capturing three serviceable bridges across the Luchesa River. For the Vitebsk group of Nazis there was a threat of the formation of a “cauldron”. The commander of the German troops requested permission to withdraw, but the Wehrmacht command considered Vitebsk a fortress, and the retreat was not allowed.
During June 24-26, Soviet troops surrounded enemy troops near Vitebsk and completely destroyed the German division that was covering the city. Four more divisions tried to break through to the west, but, with the exception of a small number of disorganized units, they failed to do so. On June 27, the surrounded Germans capitulated. About 10 thousand Nazi soldiers and officers were captured.
On June 27, Orsha was also liberated. The Red Army forces reached the Orsha-Minsk highway. On June 28, Lepel was released. In total, at the first stage, units of the two fronts advanced a distance of 80 to 150 km.
The Mogilev operation began on June 23. It was carried out by the 2nd Belorussian Front under Colonel General Zakharov. During the first two days, Soviet troops advanced approximately 30 kilometers. Then the Germans began to retreat to the western bank of the Dnieper. They were pursued by the 33rd and 50th armies. On June 27, Soviet forces crossed the Dnieper, and on June 28 they liberated Mogilev. The German 12th Infantry Division defending in the city was destroyed. A large number of prisoners and trophies were captured. German units retreated to Minsk under attacks from front-line attack aircraft. Soviet troops were moving towards the Berezina River.
The Bobruisk operation was carried out by troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by Army General K. Rokossovsky. According to the plan of the front commander, the attack was delivered in converging directions from Rogachev and Parichi with a general direction towards Bobruisk with the aim of encircling and destroying the German group in this city. After the capture of Bobruisk, the development of an offensive against Pukhovichi and Slutsk was planned. The advancing troops were supported from the air by about 2,000 aircraft.
The offensive was carried out in a difficult forested and swampy area crossed by numerous rivers. The troops had to undergo training to learn how to walk on swamp shoes, overcome water obstacles using improvised means, and also build gatis. On June 24, after powerful artillery preparation, Soviet troops launched an attack and by mid-day they had broken through enemy defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. The timely introduction of mechanized units into the battle made it possible to achieve a breakthrough depth of up to 20 km in some areas.
On June 27, the Bobruisk German group was completely surrounded. There were about 40 thousand enemy soldiers and officers in the ring. Leaving part of the forces to destroy the enemy, the front began to develop an offensive towards Osipovichi and Slutsk. The surrounded units attempted to break through to the north. A fierce battle took place near the village of Titovka, during which the Nazis, under the cover of artillery, regardless of losses, tried to break through the Soviet front. To contain the onslaught, it was decided to use bombers. More than 500 planes continuously bombed a concentration of German troops for an hour and a half. Abandoning their equipment, the Germans tried to break through to Bobruisk, but were unsuccessful. On June 28, the remnants of the German forces surrendered.
By this time it was clear that Army Group Center was on the verge of defeat. German troops suffered huge losses in killed and captured, and a large amount of equipment was destroyed and captured by Soviet forces. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops ranged from 80 to 150 kilometers. Conditions were created to encircle the main forces of Army Group Center. On June 28, Commander Ernst Busch was removed from his post and Field Marshal Walter Model took his place.
The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the Berezina River. In accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, they were ordered to cross the river and, bypassing the Nazi strongholds, develop a rapid offensive against the capital of the BSSR.
On June 29, the forward detachments of the Red Army captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the Berezina and in some areas penetrated 5-10 kilometers into enemy defenses. On June 30, the main forces of the front crossed the river. On the night of July 1, the 11th Guards Army from the south and southwest broke into the city of Borisov, liberating it by 15:00. On the same day Begoml and Pleschenitsy were liberated.
On July 2, Soviet troops cut off most of the enemy’s retreat routes for the Minsk enemy group. The cities of Vileika, Zhodino, Logoisk, Smolevichi, and Krasnoye were taken. Thus, the Germans found themselves cut off from all main communications.
On the night of July 3, 1944, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I. Chernyakhovsky, gave the order to the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. Rotmistrov, in cooperation with the 31st Army and the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, to attack Minsk from the northern and in a northwestern direction and by the end of the day on July 3rd to completely capture the city.
On July 3 at 9 a.m., Soviet troops broke into Minsk. The battles for the city were fought by the 71st and 36th Rifle Corps of the 31st Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army and tankmen of the Tatsin Guards Corps. From the southern and southeastern outskirts, the attack on the Belarusian capital was supported by units of the 1st Don Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front. By 13:00 the city was liberated.
As mentioned above, Polotsk became a big obstacle for the Soviet troops. The Germans turned it into a powerful defense center and concentrated six infantry divisions near the city. The 1st Baltic Front, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 4th Shock Armies, along converging directions from the south and northeast, was supposed to encircle and destroy the German troops.
The Polotsk operation began on June 29. By the evening of July 1, Soviet units managed to cover the flanks of the German group and reach the outskirts of Polotsk. Fierce street fighting ensued and continued until July 4th. On this day the city was liberated. The forces of the left wing of the front, pursuing the retreating German units, marched another 110 kilometers to the west, reaching the border of Lithuania.
The first stage of Operation Bagration brought Army Group Center to the brink of disaster. The total advance of the Red Army in 12 days was 225-280 kilometers. A gap about 400 kilometers wide opened up in the German defense, which was already very difficult to fully cover. Nevertheless, the Germans tried to stabilize the situation by relying on individual counterattacks in key directions. At the same time, Model was building a new line of defense, including through units transferred from other sectors of the Soviet-German front. But even those 46 divisions that were sent to the “catastrophe zone” did not significantly affect the situation.
On July 5, the Vilnius operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front began. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were on the outskirts of the city and began to envelop it. On July 8, the Germans brought reinforcements to Vilnius. About 150 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated to break through the encirclement. A significant contribution to the failure of all these attempts was made by the aviation of the 1st Air Army, which actively bombed the main centers of German resistance. On July 13, Vilnius was taken and the surrounded group was destroyed.
The 2nd Belorussian Front developed an offensive towards Bialystok. The 3rd Army of General Gorbatov was transferred to the front as a reinforcement. During the five days of the offensive, Soviet troops, without experiencing strong resistance, advanced 150 kilometers, liberating the city of Novogrudok on July 8. Near Grodno, the Germans had already gathered their forces, the Red Army units had to repel a number of counterattacks, but on July 16, this Belarusian city was cleared of enemy troops. By July 27, the Red Army liberated Bialystok and reached the pre-war border of the USSR.
The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to defeat the enemy near Brest and Lublin with blows bypassing the Brest fortified area and reach the Vistula River. On July 6, the Red Army took Kovel and broke through the German defensive line near Siedlce. Having traveled more than 70 kilometers by July 20, Soviet troops crossed the Western Bug and entered Poland. On July 25, a cauldron formed near Brest, but the Soviet soldiers failed to completely destroy the enemy: part of Hitler’s forces was able to break through. By the beginning of August, the Red Army captured Lublin and captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula.
Operation Bagration was a grandiose victory for the Soviet troops. Within two months of the offensive, Belarus, part of the Baltic states and Poland were liberated. During the operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people killed, wounded and prisoners. 22 German generals were captured alive, and 10 more died. Army Group Center was defeated.
A “lunar landscape” of shell craters of various calibers, fields surrounded by barbed wire, deep and branched trenches - this is exactly what the front line looked like in the western direction in the spring of 1944.
"Iron" of the great battle Heavy bomber He-177 (Germany)
The picture was more reminiscent of the Somme or Verdun of 1916, with only the charred remains of tanks indicating the change of eras. It would be a big mistake to believe that positional battles are forever a thing of the past, on the fields of the First World War. The Second World War was simply more diverse, combining positional meat grinders and fast-moving maneuver battles.
While Soviet troops were successfully advancing in Ukraine in the winter of 1943-1944, the front line on the approaches to Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk remained almost motionless. A giant “Belarusian balcony” was formed. The offensive operations undertaken by the Western Front failed over and over again. Things were somewhat better for the 1st Baltic and 1st Belorussian fronts, but they also achieved only limited success; the directives of the Headquarters remained unfulfilled.
Army Group Center was the toughest nut to crack - for three whole years it held back the offensive impulses of the Red Army. When in the south, in the steppe zone, the war was already rolling towards the borders of the USSR, fierce positional battles took place in the forests and swamps in the western direction.
Impregnable shaft of fire
This happened due to the fact that in the fall of 1943 the Germans managed to stabilize the front, gain a foothold in advantageous positions and bring up artillery, including the heaviest - captured 280-mm French mortars. The short delivery period to Belarus from Germany, the increase in the production of shells within the framework of the declared total war, allowed the troops of the Civil Aviation Center "Center" to literally drown out Soviet offensives in a barrage of artillery fire, with the consumption of up to 3000 tons of ammunition per day. For comparison: during the assault on Stalingrad, less than 1000 tons per day were consumed at its peak. Thousands of shells from heavy guns caused heavy losses to the advancing Soviet units.
In addition, in the wooded and swampy terrain of Belarus, the Germans managed to realize the technical advantage of Tiger tanks, which fired at fashion shows and roads from long distances, knocking out Soviet T-34−76s. According to German data, Tigers accounted for almost half of the destroyed Soviet tanks at the beginning of 1944. The situation seemed hopeless, the command changed the direction of attacks, attempts to break through were made by different armies, but the result was invariably unsatisfactory.
The goal of Operation Bagration was to destroy the so-called “Belarusian balcony” hanging over the right flank of the Soviet troops advancing in Ukraine. In just two months, Army Group Center was defeated. On the Soviet side, the operation was attended by troops of the 1st Baltic Front (commander - Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General G . F. Zakharov), 1st Belorussian Front (Army General K.K. Rokossovsky). On the German side - 3rd Panzer Army (Colonel General G. H. Reinhardt), 4th Army (Infantry General K. von Tippelskirch), 9th Army (Infantry General H. Jordan), 2nd Army ( Colonel General V. Weiss).
A series of failures in the western direction led to an investigation by the GKO (State Defense Committee) commission in April 1944, as a result of which the commander of the Western Front, V.D., was removed. Sokolovsky, commander of the 33rd Army (which was often placed in the direction of the main attack) V.N. Gordov and some other persons from the front headquarters. G.K. Zhukov and A.M. were sent to Belarus as representatives of Headquarters. Vasilevsky, who were in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front during the winter campaign of 1943-1944. The first was assigned to coordinate the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and the second - the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic. In general terms, offensive plans were worked out to the level of General Headquarters directives by the end of May 1944. The operation received the code name “Bagration”.
Wehrmacht mistake
Zhukov and Vasilevsky partially made the task of storming the “Belarusian balcony” easier for themselves with their own successes against Army Groups “South” and “A”. On the one hand, after the successful liberation of Crimea in May 1944, several armies were released - they were loaded into trains and sent to the western direction. On the other hand, by the beginning of summer, the overwhelming majority of German tank divisions, a most valuable reserve in defense, were pulled south. There was only one 20th tank division left in the Center Civil Aviation Division near Bobruisk. Also, the army group was left with the only battalion of “Tigers” (in winter there were two). To characterize the GA “Center” in relation to the equipment of tank forces, it is enough to cite one fact: the largest German formation on the Eastern Front did not have a single “Panther” tank, although Pz. V have been in production for over a year now! The basis of the armored vehicle fleet of the GA "Center" was approximately 400 assault guns.
In the photo, the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, and the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov. The 1st Baltic Front took part in three Bagration operations - Vitebsk-Orsha, Polotsk and Siauliai. His troops marched from the eastern regions of Belarus to the coast of the Gulf of Riga, from which, however, they had to retreat under the pressure of a German naval landing.
To patch up the front of the army groups “Northern Ukraine” and “Southern Ukraine” they also seized approximately 20% of the RGK artillery and 30% of the assault gun brigades. By the beginning of the summer of 1944, the German high command considered the most likely Soviet offensive in the GA zone “Northern Ukraine”, in the development of winter and spring successes. It was assumed that a powerful blow would be delivered through Poland to the Baltic Sea, cutting off the GA “Center” and GA “North” from Germany. Therefore, large forces of tank troops were assembled in the GA “Northern Ukraine”, and it was headed by the “genius of defense” and the Fuhrer’s favorite Walter Model. The opinion that the main attack would not take place in the Center GA zone was also shared by the commanders of the armies in Belarus. They were convinced that there would be pinning offensives with limited objectives on the central sector of the front by their own defensive successes in the winter campaign. They were convinced: after a series of failures, the Red Army would change the direction of its attack. If offensives are undertaken with limited objectives, they will be repelled just as successfully as in the winter of 1943-1944.
Bet on wings
On the contrary, the Soviet command decided to focus efforts on the liberation of Belarus. An error in assessing the plans of the Red Army to a large extent predetermined the collapse of the German front in the summer of 1944. However, the task of the Soviet troops in the western direction remained difficult. The new offensive of the Red Army could still be drowned in a barrage of artillery fire, just like the winter operations. To combat enemy artillery, in addition to strengthening traditional counter-battery warfare, it was decided to use aviation. The situation for the large-scale use of aviation in the summer of 1944 in Belarus could not have been more favorable.
At the beginning of 1944, German Tigers posed a serious problem for the Red Army: Soviet T-34−76s became victims of their long-range guns. However, by the time Operation Bagration began, most of the Tigers had been redeployed to the south.
At that time, the 6th Air Fleet, under the command of Luftwaffe Colonel General Robert von Greim, operated in the interests of GA Center. By the beginning of the summer of 1944, its composition was quite unique. In total, 15% of combat-ready Luftwaffe aircraft of all types in all theaters of military operations were located in Belarus. Moreover, as of May 31, 1944, out of 1051 combat-ready single-engine fighters in the Luftwaffe as a whole, only 66 aircraft, or 6%, were in the 6th Air Fleet. These were the headquarters and two groups of the 51st Fighter Squadron. There were 444 of them in the Reich Air Fleet, and 138 in the neighboring 4th Air Fleet in Ukraine. In total, the 6th Air Fleet at that time had 688 combat-ready aircraft: 66 single-engine fighters, 19 night fighters, 312 bombers , 106 attack aircraft, 48 night bombers, 26 long-range reconnaissance aircraft, 67 short-range reconnaissance aircraft and 44 transport aircraft.
Shortly before the start of the Soviet offensive, the number of fighters in Belarus decreased and as a result, by June 22, 1944, only 32 Bf.109G-6 fighters based in Orsha remained in the 6th Air Fleet. For the almost 1000-kilometer front of the Civil Aviation Center “Center”, this number can hardly be called anything other than ridiculous. The abnormality of the situation can be illustrated by another fact: there were a comparable number of Messerschmitts as photo reconnaissance aircraft (modifications Bf.109G-6 and Bf.109G-8) subordinate to the 6th Air Fleet - 24 combat-ready vehicles on May 31, 1944. This, on the one hand, shows the Germans’ attention to aerial reconnaissance, and on the other, demonstrates the catastrophic decline in the number of German fighter aircraft in Belarus. By the way, it was the photo reconnaissance officers of the GA “Center” who revealed the concentration of Soviet artillery in the direction of the main attacks of four fronts, and they were not a secret to the Germans by June 22, 1944.
At the initial stage of Operation Bagration, Soviet bomber aircraft were engaged in suppressing German artillery positions. Then artillery began to suppress the enemy’s defenses. Subsequently, the Germans noted the increased quality of artillery fire control on the part of our troops.
At the same time, the 6th Air Fleet could boast of a very impressive number of bombers. Three hundred, mostly He-111s, were intended for night strikes against targets in the Soviet rear. If the fighter group was weakened in June 1944, the bomber fist of the 6th Air Fleet, on the contrary, strengthened. Three groups of He-177s from the KG1 squadron landed at the airfields in Königsberg. They numbered about a hundred heavy aircraft - quite an impressive force. Their first task was to attack the railway junction in Velikiye Luki. The Luftwaffe command was very late in realizing the prospects of strategic air strikes against the rear of the Soviet Union. However, these ambitious plans were not destined to come true, and soon the He-177s were used to attack completely different targets.
Heavy bombers were also massing on the other side of the front. By the spring and early summer of 1944, long-range aviation (LRA) of the Red Army Air Force was a serious force, capable of solving independent problems. It consisted of 66 air regiments, united in 22 air divisions and 9 corps (including one corps in the Far East). The ADD aircraft fleet has reached an impressive figure of 1000 long-range bombers. In May 1944, this impressive air force was aimed at Army Group Center. Eight ADD corps were relocated to the areas of Chernigov and Kyiv, which made it possible to strike at the “Belarusian Balcony” hanging over Ukraine. The fleet of long-range aviation at that time consisted mainly of twin-engine aircraft: Il-4, Lend-Lease B-25 and Li-2 transport aircraft converted into bombers. The first ADD attacks in the western strategic direction followed in May 1944, when the transport network in the rear of the GA “Center” was attacked.
On July 17, 1944, a column of 57,000 German prisoners of war was marched through Moscow, after which the streets were ostentatiously swept and washed. The Wehrmacht suffered a severe defeat, but the losses of the Red Army were also very high - almost 178,500 killed.
Reconnaissance in force
The task set by the command to defeat the German defense was significantly different from the usual ADD attacks on railway junctions and other targets of this kind deep behind enemy lines. A serious problem was the threat of defeat of one's own troops, who were preparing to attack, at the slightest navigational errors, which were inevitable at night. To prevent this from happening, a complex system of light designation of the leading edge was thought out. Searchlights were used to indicate the direction of attack, fires and even... trucks. They lined up in the near rear parallel to the front line and shined their headlights towards the rear. From the air at night this row of headlights was clearly visible. Additionally, the front edge was marked by artillery fire; flashes of shots were also clearly observed from above. The ADD crews received clear instructions at the slightest doubt about identifying the front line to go to a reserve target in the depths of the enemy’s defense.
Much of June 1944 was spent in preparation for the summer battles. The German High Command believed that a new Soviet offensive would begin on June 22, 1944, the anniversary of the start of the war. However, in reality, on June 22, reconnaissance in force began on the right wing of the Soviet troops in Belarus. The Germans habitually met it with a barrage of artillery fire, and Soviet artillery reconnaissance spotted the firing batteries.
280 mm French mortar used by the Wehrmacht.
At this moment, the heavenly office unexpectedly intervened in the plans of the front command: the weather worsened, and the very use of aviation was called into question. Low clouds hung over the ADD airfields in Ukraine and Belarus. Showers and thunderstorms began. However, the ADD had a sufficient number of experienced crews capable of flying in difficult weather conditions. Therefore, with a decrease in the number of aircraft involved, there was no refusal to complete the mission.
On the night of June 22-23, 1944, heavy air bombs with a caliber of up to 500-1000 kg fell on German positions in the direction of the main attacks of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. The relatively low accuracy of bombing from horizontal flight was compensated by the power of the bombs and the massive impact in a small space. As the pilots dryly wrote in one of the reports, “bomb explosions were located throughout the entire target area.”
Crush the defense
On the morning of June 23, after night raids by long-range aviation, Soviet artillery fell on German positions. Subsequently, the chief of staff of the German 4th Army outlined the reasons for the “stunning successes” of the Red Army as follows:
Soviet attack aircraft Il-2
“Enemy artillery activity—primarily the amount of ammunition expended and the duration of the hurricane fire—was significantly higher than in previous battles. Control of enemy artillery fire became more maneuverable, and more attention was paid to suppressing German artillery than before.”
Soon the Soviet Air Force also had their say. At the beginning of Bagration, the four fronts had about 5,700 aircraft. However, not all of this mass could be used for attacks against German artillery and infantry positions. Since the morning of June 23, Soviet aviation almost did not fly, but as weather conditions improved, activity increased due to the actions of the most experienced crews. Despite heavy pouring rain and poor visibility, not exceeding 500 m, small groups of Ilovs searched for enemy batteries and showered them with bombs, including anti-tank PTABs, which acted as highly effective fragmentation bombs. The 337th Infantry Division, which found itself in the direction of the main attack of the 2nd Belorussian Front, lost ¾ of its artillery in two days. A similar picture was observed in all directions of the main attack. This persistence brought the expected success. A report on the actions of the German 9th Army, written hot on the heels of the events, noted:
“Especially noteworthy was the use of superior aviation forces, which operated on a previously unknown scale and suppressed our artillery for hours... Thus, the main defense weapon was put out of action at the decisive moment.”
Heavy bomber He-177 (Germany).
The Soviet command managed to find the key to the German positional front. The massive impact on the German artillery silenced it and opened the way for the Soviet infantry. Rifle formations also significantly improved their combat training during the spring lull. In the rear, life-size sections of the German positions that were to be attacked were built, with real barbed wire entanglements and marked minefields. The soldiers trained tirelessly, bringing their actions to automaticity. It must be said that in the winter of 1943-1944 there was no such practice of training on mock-ups. Good preparation allowed the attacking units to quickly break into the enemy trenches and prevent the Germans from gaining a foothold in the following positions.
Major disaster
The collapse of the positional front in several directions at once - near Vitebsk, Mogilev and Bobruisk - became fatal for the armies of the Civil Aviation Center "Center". They consisted primarily of infantry divisions and were in dire need of mobile reserves. The only mobile reserve was used extremely ineptly, torn apart between two Soviet attacks.
This made the collapse of the entire army group inevitable and rapid. First, the 3rd Tank Army near Vitebsk and the 9th Army near Bobruisk were surrounded. Through two gaps punched in the place of these “boilers”, Soviet tank units rushed towards Minsk. The meeting of two fronts near Minsk on July 3, 1944 formed another “cauldron” for the German 4th Army. By that time, the retreating German divisions had almost lost their combat effectiveness under the continuous attacks of Il-2 attack aircraft on forest roads and at crossings. The Germans failed to organize any significant supply by air, and this led to the rapid collapse of the “cauldrons”, which were left without ammunition and even food. GA "Center" turned into an unorganized crowd with small arms with a minimum amount of ammunition. Later, the prisoners captured in Belarus were driven out in a “march of the vanquished” through Moscow on July 17, 1944. The losses of GA “Center” as a whole can be estimated at 400–500 thousand people (an exact calculation is difficult due to the loss of documents). |photo-9|
To contain the advance of Soviet mechanized formations, the Germans even sent heavy He-177 bombers into battle. In fact, the situation in 1941 was mirrored, when Soviet DB-3 bombers flew against tank groups, regardless of losses. Already in the first attacks on Soviet tanks, KG1 lost ten aircraft. The huge, unarmored He-177s were extremely vulnerable to fire from anti-aircraft guns and even small arms fire. At the end of July 1944, the remnants of the squadron were withdrawn from the battle.
The Germans managed to stop the Soviet offensive only on the Vistula and on the approaches to East Prussia, including through the transfer of tank reserves from the Northern Ukraine Civil Aviation Authority and from the reserve. The defeat of the Civil Aviation Center "Center" became the largest disaster of the German army in its entire history. It is all the more impressive because the armies that had held a strong positional front for many months were defeated.
The article “Operation Bagration: Blitzkrieg to the West” was published in the magazine “Popular Mechanics” (No. 5, May 2014).
During the course, several large-scale military offensive campaigns by Soviet troops were carried out. One of the key ones was Operation Bagration (1944). The campaign was named after the Patriotic War of 1812. Let us next consider how Operation Bagration (1944) took place. The main lines of advance of the Soviet troops will be briefly described.
Preliminary stage
On the third anniversary of the German invasion of the USSR, the Bagration military campaign began. year was carried out on the Soviet troops managed to break through the German defenses in many areas. The partisans provided them with active support in this. The offensive operations of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts were intensive. The military campaign "Bagration" - operation (1944; leader and coordinator of the plan - G.K. Zhukov) began with the actions of these units. The commanders were Rokossovsky, Chernyakhovsky, Zakharov, Bagramyan. In the area of Vilnius, Brest, Vitebsk, Bobruisk and east of Minsk, enemy groups were surrounded and eliminated. Several successful offensives were carried out. As a result of the battles, a significant part of Belarus was liberated, the capital of the country - Minsk, the territory of Lithuania, and the eastern regions of Poland. Soviet troops reached the borders of East Prussia.
Main front lines
(operation of 1944) involved 2 stages. They included several offensive campaigns by Soviet troops. The direction of Operation Bagration of 1944 at the first stage was as follows:
- Vitebsk.
- Orsha.
- Mogilev.
- Bobruisk.
- Polotsk
- Minsk.
This stage took place from June 23 to July 4. From July 5 to August 29, the offensive was also carried out on several fronts. At the second stage, operations were planned:
- Vilnius.
- Siauliai.
- Bialystok.
- Lublin-Brestskaya.
- Kaunasskaya.
- Osovetskaya.
Vitebsk-Orsha offensive
In this sector, the defense was occupied by the 3rd Panzer Army, commanded by Reinhardt. Its 53rd Army Corps was stationed directly near Vitebsk. They were commanded by Gen. Gollwitzer. The 17th Corps of the 4th Field Army was located near Orsha. In June 1944, Operation Bagration was carried out with the help of reconnaissance. Thanks to her, Soviet troops managed to break into the German defenses and take the first trenches. On June 23, the Russian command dealt the main blow. The key role belonged to the 43rd and 39th armies. The first covered the western side of Vitebsk, the second - the southern. The 39th Army had almost no superiority in numbers, but the high concentration of forces in the sector made it possible to create a significant local advantage during the initial stage of the implementation of the Bagration plan. The operation (1944) near Vitebsk and Orsha was generally successful. They quickly managed to break through the western part of the defense and the southern front. The 6th Corps, located on the southern side of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Over the following days, the commanders of the divisions and the corps itself were killed. The remaining units, having lost contact with each other, moved in small groups to the west.
Liberation of cities
On June 24, units of the 1st Baltic Front reached the Dvina. Army Group North tried to counterattack. However, their breakthrough was unsuccessful. Corps Group D was surrounded in Beshenkovichi. Oslikovsky's horse-mechanized brigade was introduced south of Vitebsk. His group began to move quite quickly to the southwest.
In June 1944, Operation Bagration was carried out quite slowly in the Orsha sector. This was due to the fact that one of the most powerful German infantry divisions, the 78th Assault Division, was located here. It was much better equipped than the others and was supported by 50 self-propelled guns. Units of the 14th Motorized Division were also located here.
However, the Russian command continued to implement the Bagration plan. The 1944 operation involved the introduction of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Soviet soldiers cut the railway from Orsha to the west near Tolochin. The Germans were forced to either leave the city or die in the “cauldron”.
On the morning of June 27, Orsha was cleared of invaders. 5th Guards The tank army began advancing towards Borisov. On June 27, Vitebsk was also liberated in the morning. A German group defended itself here, having been subjected to artillery and air strikes the day before. The invaders made several attempts to break through the encirclement. On June 26, one of them was successful. However, a few hours later, about 5 thousand Germans were surrounded again.
Breakthrough results
Thanks to the offensive actions of the Soviet troops, the German 53rd Corps was almost completely destroyed. 200 people managed to break through to the fascist units. According to Haupt's records, almost all of them were wounded. Soviet troops also managed to defeat units of the 6th Corps and Group D. This became possible thanks to the coordinated implementation of the first stage of the Bagration plan. The 1944 operation near Orsha and Vitebsk made it possible to eliminate the northern flank of the “Center”. This was the first step towards further complete encirclement of the group.
Battles near Mogilev
This part of the front was considered auxiliary. On June 23, effective artillery preparation was carried out. The forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began to cross the river. I'll get through it. The German defensive line passed along it. Operation Bagration in June 1944 took place with the active use of artillery. The enemy was almost completely suppressed by it. In the Mogilev direction, sappers quickly built 78 bridges for the passage of infantry and 4 heavy 60-ton crossings for equipment.
A few hours later, the strength of most of the German companies decreased from 80-100 to 15-20 people. But units of the 4th Army managed to retreat to the second line along the river. Basho is quite organized. Operation Bagration in June 1944 continued from the south and north of Mogilev. On June 27, the city was surrounded and taken by storm the next day. About 2 thousand prisoners were captured in Mogilev. Among them was the commander of the 12th Infantry Division, Bamler, as well as Commandant von Ermansdorff. The latter was subsequently found guilty of committing a large number of serious crimes and was hanged. The German retreat gradually became more and more disorganized. Until June 29, 33 thousand German soldiers and 20 tanks were destroyed and captured.
Bobruisk
Operation Bagration (1944) assumed the formation of a southern “claw” of a large-scale encirclement. This action was carried out by the most powerful and numerous Belorussian Front, commanded by Rokossovsky. Initially, the right flank took part in the offensive. He was resisted by the 9th Field Army of General. Jordana. The task of eliminating the enemy was solved by creating a local “cauldron” near Bobruisk.
The offensive began from the south on June 24. Operation Bagration in 1944 assumed the use of aviation here. However, weather conditions significantly complicated her actions. In addition, the terrain itself was not very favorable for an offensive. Soviet troops had to overcome a fairly large swampy swamp. However, this path was chosen deliberately, since the German defenses on this side were weak. On June 27, roads from Bobruisk to the north and west were intercepted. Key German forces were surrounded. The diameter of the ring was approximately 25 km. The operation to liberate Bobruisk ended successfully. During the offensive, two corps were destroyed - the 35th Army and the 41st Tank. The defeat of the 9th Army made it possible to open the road to Minsk from the northeast and southeast.
Battles near Polotsk
This direction caused serious concern among the Russian command. Bagramyan began to fix the problem. In fact, there was no break between the Vitebsk-Orsha and Polotsk operations. The main enemy was the 3rd Tank Army, the forces of the “North” (16th Field Army). The Germans had 2 infantry divisions in reserve. The Polotsk operation did not end in such a defeat as at Vitebsk. However, it made it possible to deprive the enemy of a stronghold, a railway junction. As a result, the threat to the 1st Baltic Front was removed, and Army Group North was bypassed from the south, which implied an attack on the flank.
Retreat of the 4th Army
After the defeat of the southern and northern flanks near Bobruisk and Vitebsk, the Germans found themselves sandwiched in a rectangle. Its eastern wall was formed by the Drut River, the western by the Berezina. Soviet troops stood from the north and south. To the west was Minsk. It was in this direction that the main attacks of the Soviet forces were aimed. The 4th Army had virtually no cover on its flanks. Gene. von Tippelskirch ordered a retreat across the Berezina. To do this we had to use a dirt road from Mogilev. Using the only bridge, German forces tried to cross to the west bank, experiencing constant fire from bombers and attack aircraft. The military police were supposed to regulate the crossing, but they withdrew from this task. In addition, partisans were active in this area. They carried out constant attacks on German positions. The situation for the enemy was further complicated by the fact that the transported units were joined by groups from defeated units in other areas, including from near Vitebsk. In this regard, the retreat of the 4th Army was slow and accompanied by heavy losses.
Battle from the southern side of Minsk
The offensive was led by mobile groups - tank, mechanized and cavalry-mechanized formations. Part of Pliev quickly began to advance towards Slutsk. His group reached the city on the evening of June 29. Due to the fact that the Germans suffered heavy losses before the 1st Belorussian Front, they offered little resistance. Slutsk itself was defended by formations of the 35th and 102nd divisions. They put up organized resistance. Then Pliev launched an attack from three flanks simultaneously. This attack was successful, and by 11 am on June 30, the city was cleared of Germans. By July 2, Pliev’s cavalry-mechanized units occupied Nesvizh, cutting off the group’s path to the southeast. The breakthrough happened quite quickly. Resistance was provided by small unorganized groups of Germans.
Battle for Minsk
Mobile German reserves began to arrive at the front. They were withdrawn mainly from units operating in Ukraine. The 5th Panzer Division arrived first. She posed quite a threat, considering that she had seen almost no combat over the past few months. The division was well equipped, rearmed and reinforced by the 505th Heavy Battalion. However, the enemy's weak point here was the infantry. It consisted either of security divisions or divisions that had suffered significant losses. A serious battle took place on the northwestern side of Minsk. Enemy tankers announced the destruction of 295 Soviet vehicles. However, there is no doubt that they themselves suffered serious losses. The 5th Division was reduced to 18 tanks, and all the Tigers of the 505th Battalion were lost. Thus, the formation lost the ability to influence the course of the battle. 2nd Guards On July 1, the corps approached the outskirts of Minsk. Having made a detour, he burst into the city from the northwestern side. At the same time, Rokossovsky's detachment approached from the south, the 5th Tank Army from the north, and combined arms detachments from the east. The defense of Minsk did not last long. The city was heavily destroyed by the Germans already in 1941. While retreating, the enemy additionally blew up structures.
Collapse of the 4th Army
The German group was surrounded, but still made attempts to break through to the west. The Nazis even entered into battle with knives. The command of the 4th Army fled to the west, as a result of which actual control was carried out by the head of the 12th Army Corps, Müller, instead of von Tippelskirch. On July 8-9, the German resistance in the Minsk “cauldron” was finally broken. The cleanup lasted until the 12th: regular units, together with partisans, neutralized small groups of the enemy in the forests. After this, military operations in the east of Minsk ended.
Second phase
After the completion of the first stage, Operation Bagration (1944), in short, assumed the maximum consolidation of the achieved success. At the same time, the German army tried to restore the front. At the second stage, Soviet units had to fight with German reserves. At the same time, personnel changes took place in the leadership of the army of the Third Reich. After the expulsion of the Germans from Polotsk, Bagramyan was given a new task. The 1st Baltic Front was supposed to carry out an offensive to the north-west, towards Daugavpils, and to the west - to Sventsyany and Kaunas. The plan was to break through to the Baltic and cut off communications between Army North formations and the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. After flank changes, fierce fighting began. Meanwhile, German troops continued their counterattacks. On August 20, the attack on Tukums began from the east and west. For a short period, the Germans managed to restore communication between the “Center” and “North” units. However, the attacks of the 3rd Tank Army at Siauliai were unsuccessful. At the end of August there was a break in the fighting. The 1st Baltic Front completed its part of the offensive Operation Bagration.
Operations at the final stage of the war, when the strategic initiative completely passed into the hands of the Soviet command. As a result, the territory of the USSR and a number of European countries was liberated and Nazi Germany was defeated.
The end of the siege of Leningrad.
At the very beginning of 1944, Soviet troops seized the initiative and never let it go. The winter campaign of 1944 was marked by major victories of the Red Army. Of the 10 strikes (referred to as “Stalinist” in Soviet historiography), the first was struck against the enemy near Leningrad and Novgorod in January. As a result of the Leningrad-Novgorod operation, Soviet troops, having broken through the enemy’s defenses at a front of up to 60 km, threw him back 220-280 km from Leningrad, and to the south of Lake. Ilmen - 180 km, the 900-day blockade of the hero city was completely lifted. The troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts (commanders L. Govorov, K. Meretskov, M. Popov), in cooperation with the Baltic Front, cleared the western part of the Leningrad region from the enemy, liberated Kalininskaya, entered Estonia, marking the beginning of liberation from the occupiers Baltic republics. The defeat of Army Group North (26 divisions were defeated, 3 divisions were completely destroyed) undermined the position of Nazi Germany in Finland and the Scandinavian Peninsula.
Liberation of Right Bank Ukraine.
The second blow represented a series of major offensive operations carried out in February-March in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area and on the Southern Bug, brilliantly carried out by troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. During this operation, the entire Right Bank of Ukraine was liberated. The results far exceeded its initial goals, capturing up to half of all enemy tank and more than two-thirds of the enemy air forces operating in Right Bank Ukraine. The troops of two Ukrainian fronts not only destroyed a large enemy grouping “South” under the command of Field Marshal E. Manstein (55 thousand killed, over 18 thousand prisoners), but also defeated another 15 divisions, incl. 8 tanks operating against the outer front of the encirclement. Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR with Romania and took up positions favorable for subsequent deep penetration into the southeastern regions of Europe - into the Balkans against Romania and against Hungary. On the night of March 28, troops crossed the border Prut River.
Liberation of Odessa, Sevastopol and Crimea.
As a result of the third strike in April-May, Odessa, Sevastopol and the entire Crimea were liberated. An attempt by Nazi troops to evacuate from Odessa by sea was thwarted by Soviet aviation, torpedo boats and submarines. On the evening of April 9, units of the 5th Shock Army broke into the northern outskirts of Odessa, and the next day the city was completely liberated. A further offensive was already developing in the Crimean direction. Particularly fierce fighting took place in the Sapun-Gora, Karavan area. On May 9, Soviet troops broke into Sevastopol and liberated it from the invaders. The remnants of the defeated Nazi 17th Army retreated to Cape Chersonesos, where 21 thousand soldiers and officers, a large amount of equipment and weapons were captured. In connection with the liquidation of the Crimean enemy group, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander F.I. Tolbukhin) were released, which made it possible to strengthen the strategic reserves of the Headquarters, improving conditions for the offensive of Soviet troops in the Balkans and the liberation of the peoples of South-Eastern Europe.
Liberation of Karelia.
The fourth blow (June 1944) was delivered by the forces of the Leningrad (commander L.A. Govorov) and Karelian fronts (commander K.A. Meretskov) against enemy bridgeheads on the Karelian Isthmus and in the area of Ladoga and Onega lakes, which led to the liberation of more parts of Karelia and predetermined Finland’s exit from the war on the side of Germany. On September 19, Finnish President K. Mannerheim signed an armistice agreement with the USSR. On March 3, 1945, Finland entered the war with Germany on the side of the Allies. The official end of the war was the Paris Peace Treaty, signed in 1947. In this regard, an extremely unfavorable situation developed for German troops in the Arctic.
Liberation of Belarus.
The fifth strike is the Belarusian offensive operation (“Bagration”), carried out from June 23 to August 29 against Army Group Center, one of the largest in this war. The armies of four fronts took part in it: the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian (commanders K. Rokossovsky, G. Zakharov, I. Chernyakhovsky), the 1st Baltic (commander I. Bagramyan), the forces of the Dnieper military flotilla, the 1st Army Polish troops. The width of the combat front reached 1,100 km, the depth of troop advance was 550-600 km, the average daily rate of attack was 14-20 km. Due to the successes of the Ukrainian fronts in the winter of 1943/44, the German high command expected that in the summer of 1944 Soviet troops would deliver the main blow in the southwestern sector between Pripyat and the Black Sea, but would not be able to attack simultaneously along the entire front. Even when the Army Command Center became aware of the concentration of significant Soviet forces in Belarus, the German General Staff still believed that the Russians would strike primarily at Army Group Northern Ukraine. Shackled by defenses in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the Germans no longer counted on transferring divisions from unattacked sections of the front to help. Soviet troops and partisans coped with all tasks brilliantly. 168 divisions, 12 corps and 20 brigades took part in Operation Bagration. The number of troops at the beginning of the operation was 2.3 million. As a result, one of the most powerful enemy groups, “Center,” was destroyed.
The final liberation of the territory of the USSR. The beginning of fighting in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
In the second half of 1944, five more offensive operations were carried out - five powerful strikes against the enemy. During the sixth strike (July-August), the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (commander I. Konev) defeated Army Group “Northern Ukraine” (commander Colonel General J. Harpe) in the Brody - Rava - Ruska - Lvov area and formed behind the Vistula , west of Sandomierz, a large bridgehead. The enemy pulled 16 divisions (including 3 tank divisions), 6 brigades of assault guns, and separate battalions of heavy tanks (T-VIB “Royal Tiger”) into this area and launched a series of strong counterattacks in order to eliminate the bridgehead. Fierce fighting broke out near Sandomierz. As a result of the fighting, Army Group “Northern Ukraine” was defeated (out of 56 divisions, 32 were defeated and 8 were destroyed). The Red Army liberated the western regions of Ukraine, the southeastern regions of Poland, seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula, creating favorable conditions for the subsequent offensive and expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia and Romania and for the decisive campaign against Berlin. Soviet and Polish partisans provided significant assistance to the front troops.
As a result of the seventh strike (August), troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts (commanders R.Ya. Malinovsky and F.I. Tolbukhin) defeated German-Romanian troops in the Chisinau-Iasi region, eliminated 22 enemy divisions and entered the central regions of Romania . They captured 208.6 thousand prisoners, over 2 thousand guns, 340 tanks and assault guns, about 18 thousand vehicles. Moldova was liberated, Romania and Bulgaria capitulated. By the end of October, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, together with the Romanian units that opposed Germany, completely liberated Romania. On September 8, the Red Army entered the territory of Bulgaria. The loss of the Ploestina oil region was, from an economic point of view, a heavy defeat for Germany. The next blow in this direction was the Belgrade operation, during which Soviet and Bulgarian troops, together with units of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (led by I.B. Tito), cut the main communication line between Thessaloniki and Belgrade, along which the fascist German command was withdrawing its troops from the south of the Balkan Peninsula.
Liberation of the Baltic states.
The eighth blow was struck against the enemy in September - October in the Baltic states by the forces of the Leningrad Front (commander K.A. Meretskov) together with the Baltic Fleet (commander Admiral V.F. Tributs). Having liberated Estonia and most of Latvia, our troops inflicted a major defeat on the German Army Group North: 26 divisions were defeated, 3 of them were completely destroyed, the rest were completely blocked along the coast in Courland, in the Memel (Klaipeda) region. The path to advance into East Prussia was open. The resistance of German troops on this section of the front was particularly fierce. By regrouping forces and counterattacks, they managed to close the gap near the Angerapp River and even recapture Goldap. No longer relying on the morale of German soldiers, the High Command of the German Armed Forces strengthened measures “to combat defectors” in December 1944. From now on, those who went over to the enemy were sentenced to death, and their families were responsible for the criminal with “property, freedom or life.”
Battle of Budapest.
In October - December, offensive operations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (commander R.Ya. Malinovsky), associated with the ninth strike, unfolded between the Tissa and the Danube. As a result, Germany actually lost its last ally - Hungary. The battles for Budapest continued until February 13, 1945. It was not possible to take the capital of Hungary on the move, so a special Budapest group of troops was created from the formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and Hungarian volunteers. The battles ended with the liquidation of 188 thousand enemy groups and the liberation of Budapest. The human losses of the Red Army in this operation (October - February 1945) amounted to about half of the participating troops. The troops lost 1,766 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 4,127 guns and mortars, and 293 combat aircraft.
Petsamo-Kirkenes operation of the Soviet troops.
The tenth blow was made by the troops of the Karelian Front (commander K. Meretskov) and the Northern Fleet (commander Vice Admiral A.G. Golovko) against the troops of the 20th German Army in the Petsamo (Pecheneg) area. From the 2nd half of September 1941 to June 1944, the troops of the Karelian Front were on the defensive at the turn of the river. Zap. Litsa (60 km west of Murmansk), along a system of rivers and lakes (90 km west of Kanadalaksha). In three years, the Nazis created a powerful three-lane defense, full of long-term structures, up to 150 km deep. In this area, the 19th Mountain Rifle Corps (53 thousand people, over 750 guns and mortars) of the 20th Nazi Mountain Army (led by Colonel General L. Rendulic) defended. It was supported by aviation (160 aircraft) and significant naval forces based in the ports of Northern Norway. During the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, Soviet troops liberated the Petsamo area and the northern regions of Norway. The enemy lost about 30 thousand people killed. The Northern Fleet sank 156 enemy ships. Aviation destroyed 125 enemy aircraft. Our successes limited the actions of the German fleet, and supplies of nickel ore were interrupted. War came to German soil. On April 13, the center of East Prussia, Koeningsberg, was taken.
As a result of military operations in 1944, the state border of the USSR, treacherously violated by Germany in June 1941, was restored all the way from the Barents to the Black Sea. The losses of the Red Army during this period of the war amounted to about 1.6 million people. The Nazis were expelled from Romania and Bulgaria, from most areas of Poland and Hungary. The Red Army entered the territory of Czechoslovakia and liberated the territory of Yugoslavia.
The main operation of the summer campaign of 1944 took place in Belarus. The Belarusian offensive operation, carried out from June 23 to August 29, 1944, became one of the largest military operations in all of mankind. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812 P.I. Bagration. During the “fifth Stalinist strike,” Soviet troops liberated the territory of Belarus, most of the Lithuanian SSR, as well as eastern Poland. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, German troops were defeated in the area of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Mogilev, and Orsha. In total, the Wehrmacht lost 30 divisions east of Minsk, about half a million soldiers and officers killed, missing, wounded and captured. The German Army Group Center was defeated, and Army Group North in the Baltic States was cut in two.
Situation at the front
By June 1944, the line of the Soviet-German front in the northeast reached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. At the same time, in the southern direction the Red Army achieved enormous success - the entire Right Bank of Ukraine, Crimea, Nikolaev, Odessa was liberated. Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR and began the liberation of Romania. Conditions were created for the liberation of all of Central and South-Eastern Europe. However, by the end of spring 1944, the Soviet offensive in the south slowed down.
As a result of successes in the southern strategic direction, a huge protrusion was formed - a wedge facing deep into the Soviet Union (the so-called “Belarusian Balcony”). The northern end of the ledge rested on Polotsk and Vitebsk, and the southern end on the Pripyat River basin. It was necessary to eliminate the “balcony” in order to exclude the possibility of a flank attack by the Wehrmacht. In addition, the German command transferred significant forces to the south, and the fighting became protracted. Headquarters and the General Staff decided to change the direction of the main attack. In the south, the troops had to regroup their forces, replenish units with manpower and equipment, and prepare for a new offensive.
The defeat of Army Group Center and the liberation of the BSSR, through which the shortest and most important routes to Poland and large political, military-industrial centers and food bases (Pomerania and East Prussia) of Germany passed, had enormous military-strategic and political significance. The situation in the entire theater of military operations changed radically in favor of the Soviet Union. Success in Belarus was best ensured by our subsequent offensive operations in Poland, the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Romania.
Column of Su-85 on Lenin Square in liberated Minsk
Operation plan
In March 1944, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief invited Rokossovsky and reported on the planned major operation, inviting the commander to express his opinion. The operation was called “Bagration”, this name was proposed by Joseph Stalin. According to General Headquarters, the main actions of the summer campaign of 1944 were to unfold in Belarus. To carry out the operation, it was planned to attract the forces of four fronts: the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The Dnieper military flotilla, long-range aviation and partisan detachments were also involved in the Belarusian operation.
At the end of April, Stalin made the final decision regarding the summer campaign and the Belarusian operation. The Head of the Operations Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Alexey Antonov, was ordered to organize work on planning front-line operations and begin concentrating troops and material resources. Thus, the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Ivan Bagramyan received the 1st Tank Corps, the 3rd Belorussian Front under Ivan Chernyakhovsky received the 11th Guards Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. In addition, the 5th Guards Tank Army (Stavka reserve) was concentrated in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The 28th Army, 9th Tank and 1st Guards Tank Corps, 1st Mechanized Corps and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps were concentrated on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front.
In addition to Antonov, only a few people, including Vasilevsky and Zhukov, were involved in the direct development of the plan for Operation Bagration. Substantive correspondence, telephone conversations or telegraphs were strictly prohibited. One of the primary tasks in preparing the Belarusian operation was its secrecy and misinformation of the enemy regarding the planned direction of the main attack. In particular, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Army General Rodion Malinovsky, was ordered to conduct a demonstrative concentration of troops behind the right flank of the front. The commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Colonel General Ivan Maslennikov, received a similar order.
Alexey Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, leading developer of the plan for the Belarusian operation
On May 20, Vasilevsky, Zhukov and Antonov were summoned to Headquarters. The plan for the summer campaign was finally approved. First, the Leningrad Front () was supposed to strike in the area of the Karelian Isthmus. Then in the second half of June they planned to launch an offensive in Belarus. Vasilevsky and Zhukov were responsible for coordinating the actions of the four fronts. Vasilevsky was entrusted with the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, Zhukov - the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. At the beginning of June they left for the troops.
According to the memoirs of K.K. Rokossovsky, the offensive plan was finally worked out at Headquarters on May 22-23. The considerations of the command of the 1st Belorussian Front about the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Lublin direction were approved. However, the idea that the troops on the right flank of the front should launch two main attacks at once was criticized. Members of the Headquarters believed that it was necessary to deliver one main blow in the direction of Rogachev - Osipovichi, so as not to disperse forces. Rokossovsky continued to stand his ground. According to the front commander, one blow had to be delivered from Rogachev, the other from Ozarichi to Slutsk. At the same time, the enemy’s Bobruisk group fell into the “cauldron”. Rokossovsky knew the terrain well and understood that the movement of the armies of the left flank in one direction in heavily swampy Polesie would lead to the offensive stalling, the roads would be clogged, and the front troops would not be able to use all their capabilities, since they would be introduced into the battle in parts. Convinced that Rokossovsky continued to defend his point of view, Stalin approved the operation plan in the form proposed by the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. It must be said that Zhukov refutes this story by Rokossovsky. According to him, the decision to launch two strikes by the 1st Belorussian Front was made by Headquarters on May 20.
On May 31, front commanders received a directive from Headquarters. The goal of the operation was to cover two flank attacks and destroy the enemy group in the Minsk area. Particular importance was attached to the defeat of the most powerful enemy flank groups that held the defense in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. This provided the possibility of a rapid offensive by large forces in converging directions towards Minsk. The remaining enemy troops were supposed to be thrown back to an unfavorable area of operations near Minsk, cut off their communications, encircle and destroy them. The Stavka plan provided for the delivery of three strong blows:
Troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts attacked in the general direction of Vilnius;
- the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, advanced in the direction Mogilev - Minsk;
- formations of the 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Bobruisk - Baranovichi.
At the first stage of the operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts were supposed to defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk group. Then introduce mobile formations into the breakthrough and develop an offensive to the west towards Vilnius - Kaunas, covering the Borisov-Minsk group of the Wehrmacht with the left flank. The 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to destroy the enemy’s Mogilev group and advance in the Minsk direction.
At the first stage of the offensive, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to destroy the enemy’s Zhlobin-Bobruisk group with the forces of its right flank. Then introduce tank-mechanized formations into the breakthrough and develop an offensive towards Slutsk - Baranovichi. Part of the front's forces were supposed to cover the enemy's Minsk grouping from the south and south-west. The left flank of the 1st Belorussian Front struck in the Lublin direction.
It should be noted that initially the Soviet command planned to strike to a depth of 300 km, defeat three German armies and reach the line Utena, Vilnius, Lida, Baranovichi. The tasks for the further offensive were set by Headquarters in mid-July, based on the results of the identified successes. At the same time, at the second stage of the Belarusian operation, the results were no longer so brilliant.
Fighting for Belarus
Preparing the operation
As Zhukov noted in his memoirs, to support Operation Bagration, it was necessary to send up to 400 thousand tons of ammunition, 300 thousand tons of fuel and lubricants, and up to 500 thousand tons of provisions and fodder to the troops. It was necessary to concentrate in given areas 5 combined arms armies, 2 tank and one air armies, as well as units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army. In addition, 6 tank and mechanized corps, more than 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, more than 210 thousand marching reinforcements and over 2.8 thousand guns and mortars were transferred to the fronts from the Headquarters reserve. It is clear that all this had to be translated and transported with great precautions so as not to reveal the plan of the grandiose operation to the enemy.
Particular attention was paid to camouflage and secrecy during the immediate preparation of the operation. The fronts switched to radio silence. At the forefront, excavation work was carried out, which imitated the strengthening of the defense. Concentrations of troops and their transfer were carried out mainly at night. Soviet planes even patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, etc.
Rokossovsky in his memoirs pointed to the great role of reconnaissance at the front line and behind enemy lines. The command paid special attention to air, military of all types and radio reconnaissance. More than 400 searches were carried out in the armies of the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front alone; Soviet intelligence officers captured more than 80 “languages” and important enemy documents.
On June 14-15, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front conducted classes on the upcoming operation at the headquarters of the 65th and 28th armies (the right wing of the front). Representatives of the Headquarters were present at the headquarters game. Corps and division commanders, artillery commanders and commanders of the army branches were involved in the drawing. During the classes, issues of the upcoming offensive were worked out in detail. Particular attention was paid to the nature of the terrain in the offensive zone of the armies, the organization of the enemy’s defense and ways to quickly break through to the Slutsk-Bobruisk road. This made it possible to close the escape routes for the Bobruisk group of the enemy’s 9th Army. In the following days, similar classes were held in the 3rd, 48th and 49th armies.
At the same time, extensive educational and political preparation of Soviet troops was carried out. During the classes, fire missions, attack tactics and techniques, and offensive operations in cooperation with tank and artillery units, with aviation support, were practiced. The headquarters of units, formations and armies worked out issues of control and communications. Command and observation posts were moved forward, a surveillance and communication system was created, the order of movement and control of troops during the pursuit of the enemy was clarified, etc.
Soviet Valentine IX tanks move into combat positions. 5th Guards Tank Army. Summer 1944
The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement provided great assistance in preparing the offensive operation. A close connection was established between the partisan detachments and the Soviet troops. The partisans received instructions from the “mainland” with specific tasks, where and when to attack the enemy, which communications to destroy.
It should be noted that by mid-1944, partisan detachments were operating in most of the BSSR. Belarus was a real partisan region. There were 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments operating in the republic with a total number of an entire army - 143 thousand bayonets (already during the Belarusian operation almost 200 thousand partisans joined the Red Army units). The partisans controlled vast territories, especially in wooded and swampy areas. Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote that the 4th Army, which he commanded from the beginning of June 1944, found itself in a huge forested and swampy area that extended to Minsk and this area was controlled by large partisan formations. German troops were never able to completely clear this territory in all three years. All crossings and bridges in this inaccessible area covered with dense forests were destroyed. As a result, although German troops controlled all major cities and railway junctions, up to 60% of the territory of Belarus was under the control of Soviet partisans. Soviet power still existed here, regional and district committees of the Communist Party and the Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union) worked. It is clear that the partisan movement could only hold on with the support of the “mainland”, from where experienced personnel and ammunition were transferred.
The offensive of the Soviet armies was preceded by an unprecedented scale attack by partisan formations. On the night of June 19-20, the partisans began massive actions to defeat the German rear. The partisans destroyed the enemy's railway communications, blew up bridges, set up ambushes on the roads, and disabled communication lines. On the night of June 20 alone, 40 thousand enemy rails were blown up. Eike Middeldorf noted: “In the central sector of the Eastern Front, Russian partisans carried out 10,500 explosions” (Middeldorf Eike. Russian campaign: tactics and weapons. - St. Petersburg, M., 2000). The partisans were able to carry out only part of their plans, but this was enough to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. As a result, the transfer of German operational reserves was delayed for several days. Communication along many highways became possible only during the day and only accompanied by strong convoys.
Strengths of the parties. Soviet Union
Four fronts connected 20 combined arms and 2 tank armies. A total of 166 divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 7 fortified areas and 21 separate brigades. About one-fifth of these forces were included in the operation in its second stage, approximately three weeks after the start of the offensive. At the start of the operation, Soviet troops numbered about 2.4 million soldiers and commanders, 36 thousand guns and mortars, more than 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and over 5.3 thousand aircraft.
The 1st Baltic Front of Ivan Bagramyan included: the 4th Shock Army under the command of P.F. Malyshev, the 6th Guards Army of I.M. Chistyakov, the 43rd Army of A.P. Beloborodov, the 1st Tank building of V.V. Butkov. The front was supported from the air by the 3rd Air Army of N.F. Papivin.
The 3rd Belorussian Front of Ivan Chernyakhovsky included: the 39th Army of I. I. Lyudnikov, the 5th Army of N. I. Krylov, the 11th Guards Army of K. N. Galitsky, the 31st Army of V. V. Glagolev, the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of A. S. Burdeyny, the horse-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky (it included the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps). From the air, the front troops were supported by the 1st Air Army of M. M. Gromov.
The 2nd Belorussian Front of Georgy Zakharov included: the 33rd Army of V. D. Kryuchenkin, the 49th Army of I. T. Grishin, the 50th Army of I. V. Boldin, the 4th Air Army of K. A Vershinina.
1st Belorussian Front of Konstantin Rokossovsky: 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, 48th Army of P.L. Romanenko, 65th Army of P.I. Batov, 28th Army of A.A. Luchinsky, 61- I Army of P. A. Belov, 70th Army of V. S. Popov, 47th Army of N. I. Gusev, 8th Guards Army of V. I. Chuikov, 69th Army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi, 2 1st Tank Army of S.I. Bogdanov. The front also included the 2nd, 4th and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, the 9th and 11th Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Tank Corps, and the 1st Mechanized Corps. In addition, the 1st Army of the Polish Army Z. Berling and the Dnieper Military Flotilla of Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev were subordinate to Rokossovsky. The front was supported by the 6th and 16th air armies of F.P. Polynin and S.I. Rudenko.
Member of the military council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin (left) and front commander, Army General Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky at the map in the front command post
German forces
The Soviet troops were opposed by Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Ernst Busch (from June 28 Walter Model). The army group included: the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of Colonel General Georg Reinhardt, the 4th Army of Kurt von Tippelskirch, the 9th Army of Hans Jordan (he was replaced by Nikolaus von Forman on June 27), the 2nd Army of Walter Weiss (Weiss ). Army Group Center was supported by aviation from the 6th Air Fleet and partially from the 1st and 4th Air Fleets. In addition, in the north, Army Group Center was joined by the forces of the 16th Army of Army Group North, and in the south by the 4th Tank Army of Army Group Northern Ukraine.
Thus, the German forces numbered 63 divisions and three brigades; 1.2 million soldiers and officers, 9.6 thousand guns and mortars, over 900 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources 1330), 1350 combat aircraft. The German armies had a well-developed system of railways and highways, which allowed troops to maneuver widely.
German command plans and defense system
The “Belarusian balcony” blocked the road to Warsaw and further to Berlin. The German group, when the Red Army went on the offensive in the northern and southern directions, could launch powerful flank attacks on Soviet troops from this “balcony”. The German military command was mistaken about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign. While Headquarters had a fairly good idea of the enemy forces in the area of the proposed offensive, the German command believed that the Red Army could only deliver an auxiliary blow in Belarus. Hitler and the High Command believed that the Red Army would again launch a decisive offensive in the south, in Ukraine. The main blow was expected from the Kovel area. From there, Soviet troops could cut off the “balcony”, reaching the Baltic Sea and encircling the main forces of Army Group Center and North and pushing Army Group Northern Ukraine back to the Carpathians. In addition, Adolf Hitler feared for Romania - the oil region of Ploiesti, which was the main source of “black gold” for the Third Reich.” Kurt Tippelskirch noted: “Army groups Center and North were predicted to have a “quiet summer.”
Therefore, in total there were 11 divisions in the reserves of Army Group Center and army reserves. Of the 34 tank and motorized divisions that were available on the Eastern Front, 24 were concentrated south of Pripyat. Thus, in the Army Group “Northern Ukraine” there were 7 tank and 2 tank-grenadier divisions. In addition, they were reinforced by 4 separate battalions of Tiger heavy tanks.
In April 1944, the command of Army Group Center proposed shortening the front line and withdrawing the armies to more convenient positions across the Berezina River. However, the high command, as before, when it was proposed to withdraw troops to more convenient positions in Ukraine or withdraw them from Crimea, rejected this plan. The army group was left in its original positions.
German troops occupied a well-prepared and deeply echeloned (up to 250-270 km) defense. The construction of defensive lines began back in 1942-1943, and the front line was finally formed during stubborn battles in the spring of 1944. It consisted of two stripes and was based on a developed system of field fortifications, resistance nodes - “fortresses,” and numerous natural lines. Thus, defensive positions usually ran along the western banks of numerous rivers. Their crossing was made difficult by wide swampy floodplains. The wooded and swampy nature of the area and the many bodies of water seriously worsened the ability to use heavy weapons. Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha Mogilev, Bobruisk were turned into “fortresses”, the defense of which was built taking into account the possibility of all-round defense. The rear lines ran along the Dnieper, Drut, Berezina rivers, along the line Minsk, Slutsk and further to the west. Local residents were widely involved in the construction of field fortifications. The weakness of the German defense was that the construction of defensive lines in the depths was not completed.
In general, Army Group Center covered the strategic East Prussian and Warsaw directions. The Vitebsk direction was covered by the 3rd Tank Army, the Orsha and Mogilev direction by the 3rd Army, and the Bobruisk direction by the 9th Army. The front of the 2nd Army passed along Pripyat. The German command paid serious attention to replenishing the divisions with manpower and equipment, trying to bring them to full strength. Each German division had approximately 14 km of front. On average, there were 450 soldiers, 32 machine guns, 10 guns and mortars, 1 tank or assault gun per 1 km of front. But these are average numbers. They differed greatly in different sectors of the front. Thus, in the Orsha and Rogachev-Bobruisk directions, the defense was stronger and more densely saturated with troops. In a number of other areas that the German command considered less important, the defensive formations were much less dense.
Reinhardt's 3rd Panzer Army occupied a line east of Polotsk, Bogushevskoe (about 40 km south of Vitebsk), with a front length of 150 km. The army included 11 divisions (8 infantry, two airfield, one security), three brigades of assault guns, the von Gottberg battle group, 12 separate regiments (police, security, etc.) and other formations. All divisions and two regiments were in the first line of defense. There were 10 regiments in reserve, mainly engaged in protecting communications and counter-guerrilla warfare. The main forces defended the Vitebsk direction. As of June 22, the army numbered more than 165 thousand people, 160 tanks and assault guns, more than 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns.
The 4th Army of Tippelskirch occupied the defense from Bogushevsk to Bykhov, having a front length of 225 km. It consisted of 10 divisions (7 infantry, one assault, 2 tank-grenadier - 25th and 18th), a brigade of assault guns, the 501st heavy tank battalion, 8 separate regiments and other units. Already during the Soviet offensive, the Feldherrnhalle tank-grenadier division arrived. There were 8 regiments in reserve, which performed tasks of protecting rear areas, communications and fighting partisans. The most powerful defense was in the Orsha and Mogilev directions. As of June 22, the 4th Army had more than 168 thousand soldiers and officers, about 1,700 field and anti-aircraft guns, 376 tanks and assault guns.
Jordan's 9th Army defended itself in the zone south of Bykhov to the Pripyat River, with a front length of 220 km. The army included 12 divisions (11 infantry and one tank - the 20th), three separate regiments, 9 battalions (security, sapper, construction). The first line consisted of all divisions, the Brandenburg regiment and 9 battalions. The main forces were located in the Bobruisk area. There were two regiments in the army reserve. By the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the army had more than 175 thousand people, about 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns, 140 tanks and assault guns.
The 2nd Army took up defensive positions along the Pripyat River. It consisted of 4 divisions (2 infantry, one Jaeger and one security), a corps group, a tank-grenadier brigade, and two cavalry brigades. In addition, the Hungarian 3 reserve divisions and one cavalry division were subordinate to the 2nd Army. The army group command's reserve included several divisions, including security and training divisions.
The Soviet command was able to maintain preparations for a major offensive operation in Belarus until its very beginning. German aviation and radio intelligence usually noticed large transfers of forces and concluded that an offensive was approaching. However, this time the Red Army’s preparations for the offensive were missed. The secrecy mode and disguise did their job.
Destroyed tanks of the 20th division in the Bobruisk area (1944)
To be continued…
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