Mamontov general of the White Army. Cossack leaders

Guerrilla warfare. Strategy and tactics. 1941-1943 Armstrong John

Guerrilla warfare

Guerrilla warfare

Preparations for the formation of partisan detachments were carried out by the Soviet High Command before the Germans approached the area, and the first attempts at operations were made by the partisans in August and September 1941, when the front temporarily passed along the western border of the area. These operations basically boiled down to transporting people by land across the front line and by air to organize large quantity small partisan groups, which could subsequently provide assistance to the Red Army. German offensive in October disrupted this process and at the same time inadvertently provided additional human resources, which later made it possible to form a large-scale partisan movement. A large number of surrounded Red Army soldiers were hiding in the area, but attempts by the Germans to conduct raids were unsuccessful. German units, lacking the time and enthusiasm to thoroughly comb the area, captured only those who were willing to surrender voluntarily, but many of them fled soon after becoming acquainted with German methods of treating prisoners. At the same time, many lower-level employees of party and state bodies, as well as the NKVD bodies, also went into hiding, and thus the small partisan groups that existed in the last three months found reliable leaders in them.

Over the course of two and a half months, from mid-January to the end of March 1942, there was a rapid growth of the partisan movement, in which small groups of five to thirty people were replaced by large and well-organized formations, whose total number reached 10,000 people . How was this achieved? The growth of the partisan movement was mainly due to the large number of Red Army soldiers who were surrounded after the battles of 1941. Most of them were hiding in villages, some, huddled in small groups, were engaged in looting. These people were quickly mobilized by the organizers of the partisan movement who were on the spot or brought here. The people present here were the above-mentioned party workers and government agencies and the NKVD bodies. Many of them already had small groups of followers and with their help began to recruit able-bodied men - mainly those who found themselves surrounded by Red Army soldiers - into partisan detachments. As the number of such detachments grew, their organizers rose in rank and position; the initial group of followers became the first company of the battalion, and later the regiment. Thus, in a few months a simple organizer could turn from the commander of a small group into a regiment commander; but the rank and file probably had little prospect of attaining a position higher than that of squad leader. The organizers, who were usually brought here by air, but sometimes by land across the front line, either occupied positions in the headquarters of already formed detachments, or began to form their own detachments.

Available materials about this mass mobilization indicate that the main emphasis was on the re-conscription of Red Army soldiers who found themselves surrounded. Most of them joined the partisans without much objection, but some, apparently, found themselves in the service only under the threat of force. Conscription of residents living in the area before the war was more difficult, and, with the exception of a few ardent supporters of the Soviet regime, people could only be induced to join the partisans by threats. Since the regular army units, cut off by the Germans, suffered heavy losses, some of the conscripts at the beginning of 1942 were sent to replace the dead in such units, and not directly to the partisan detachments.

What were partisan detachments? Perhaps up to 75 percent of their members were former Red Army soldiers who either managed to elude the German purges of 1941 or escaped from prisoner-of-war camps. The units were organized along the lines of military units—formal divisions into squads, platoons, companies, battalions, and regiments were often forced upon loosely knit guerrilla units. Significant differences were observed in the number of battalions included in the regiment, the number of which could range from three to seven. This, apparently, is the only confirmation that the prevailing situation and the qualities of individual commanders played big role in determining the size of partisan detachments in the first year of the war. In one case, probably in early April, two partisan divisions were formed, one of which had three and the other five regiments. But the main combat unit in most cases was the regiment.

As already noted, it was mainly Red Army soldiers who found themselves surrounded who were recruited into partisan detachments. When the influx of Red Army soldiers dried up, they began to resort to conscription of the local population, with special emphasis on re-examining those who were exempt from military service for health reasons. Due to the fact that the local population of this area consisted almost entirely of representatives of Russian nationality, it can be assumed that local conscripts were mainly Russian. The materials available on this issue indicate that this also applied to the majority of conscripted Red Army soldiers. According to the age division, there is also a predominance of Red Army soldiers; the bulk were people aged from eighteen to thirty years. Most of the command cadres were representatives of the primary level of the party and government apparatus. The political affiliation of the partisans is more difficult to determine. The extremely scant information indicates that the percentage of communists was slightly higher than in the Red Army after the 1941 mobilization. Training did not pose much of a problem, since most partisans had previously undergone something like basic military training. A ten-day course was considered sufficient to familiarize partisans with the basics of military affairs.

The management of partisan detachments was threefold. At all levels, starting with the department, there were career officers. There were political workers at the company level. At the regimental level, and in some cases at the battalion level, there was a Special Department of the NKVD. This triple control sometimes created confusion, since many of the occupants of military command posts were former party workers and NKVD officers, and political commissars were often responsible for conducting combat operations. In addition, in a number of cases, the positions of commander and commissar or commissar and representative of the NKVD were combined by one person. Military and political officials had enormous power over their subordinates, and there is evidence that in a number of cases they committed serious abuses of this power.

The triple system of internal control repeated the control mechanism that controlled the partisan movement from the outside. The chain of command above the regimental level is quite obvious. Regimental commanders received orders from General P. Belov, commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, which broke into the area in January 1942. Orders came to regiments directly or through divisional headquarters, which were apparently created to facilitate the control of lower units. Belov himself, once in this area, began to obey the command Western Front, formed from the army group of Marshal Zhukov in the center of the front. The external control functions of the NKVD were performed by special departments at each level above the partisan regiment. The order of subordination of the commissars was similar, but it was complicated by the intervention of territorial party authorities. The regional party committee also had some power (it is highly likely that one of the partisan regiments was formed by the Smolensk regional party committee). Although the available information is extremely scanty, it can be argued that the party dealt with issues of discipline and strictly ensured that the activity of the partisans was maintained at the proper level; but the leadership of military operations was carried out only by military command structures.

Strict discipline was observed in the detachments. Of the documents at our disposal, most of them touch on the factors that influenced the morale of the partisans. They can be divided into two main categories: differences morale separate groups participants in the partisan movement and the influence of special situations and events on the morale of the partisans. Important differences in morale can be noted among local residents, former Red Army soldiers and command cadres who were called up to join the partisans. Locals for the most part they had no desire to join the partisan movement, served without any enthusiasm and were prone to desertion when the opportunity arose. Former Red Army soldiers were less likely to evade conscription; it seems that many of them joined the partisans out of a sense of duty and without much pressure. Those who escaped from German captivity were least eager to desert and often tried to instill similar attitude other members of your squad. At the same time, a large number of former Red Army soldiers were not enthusiastic about their service in the partisans and remained in the detachments for fear of punishment by the commanders or for fear of mistreatment in captivity by the Germans. The morale of the command cadres was the highest. They largely identified themselves with the Soviet regime, and whatever their personal preferences, they understood that the Germans would in any case identify them and destroy them if given the opportunity.

Although it is not stated directly, it can be assumed that the early successes of the partisans in this area and their subsequent increased strength were important factors in increasing the morale of the partisans in the first half of 1942. But there were also a number of circumstances that negatively affected him; This primarily includes constant difficulties with supplies, individual cases of abuse of power by commissars and high level losses.

The operations of the partisans in this area were determined by the specific situation created when they, together with units of the regular army, took control of large areas of the territory. To protect such an area from enemy attacks, conventional small arms were clearly not enough. Additional weapons - artillery and tanks - became extremely important. The partisan units managed to collect a large number of guns, in particular 45 mm anti-tank guns and 76 mm guns. Tanks abandoned in the area during the 1941 fighting were repaired and used, aided by Soviet air deliveries of spare parts and fuel. The use of tanks to support partisan counterattacks was noted with some surprise in German reports.

The partisans paid great attention intelligence. The work of collecting intelligence information was widely organized, carried out energetically and brought noticeable success. The partisans in this area, apparently, were not involved in obtaining information of a political nature for the Soviet leadership. This is most likely explained by the fact that in the vast area that came under the control of the partisans, the system of Soviet administration, including the NKVD, was completely restored, as will be discussed below.

Captured German soldiers In some cases, the partisans shot them, but many were interrogated and sent to the prison in Dorogobuzh. Some of the prisoners who ended up there were used as auxiliary workers; others remained in prison, and their fate is unknown; at least one of the German radio operators was airlifted out.

The military actions of the partisans were primarily limited to the defense of the area they controlled. For this purpose, great efforts were made to build field fortifications. Rare counterattacks and skirmishes undertaken by the partisans by German troops in many ways resembled the actions of regular troops.

The territory controlled by the partisans was restored Soviet authority. Collective farms, some of which were dissolved by the peasants themselves, were organized again under the leadership of new chairmen. Officials were appointed and the district administration was restored. Those who collaborated with the Germans were severely punished: some were executed, others were sent to prison, but some collaborators were called up to serve in partisan detachments. Much indicates that, on the one hand, the punishment for cooperation with the enemy was determined taking into account careful attention to evidence of such cooperation, on the other hand, the punishments of individual collaborators varied in the degree of cruelty and were often unpredictable, which, apparently, was done intentionally.

The attitude of the population towards the Germans and the partisans is difficult to assess unambiguously. The defeats of the Germans in the winter of 1941/42 undoubtedly played a role important role. By that time, the population, as at least evidenced by its behavior, was inclined to side with the Germans, although this did not at all prevent residents from helping individual escaped prisoners and Red Army soldiers separated from their units. When did the population realize the scale? German defeats, the attitude towards the Germans has changed noticeably, which to some extent explains the motivation for the friendly reception they had previously given to the Germans. The attitude of the population became more wary. Being peasants civilians They still disapproved of the Soviet regime that had imposed the collective farm system on them, but now they had to consider the possibility of its return, and this possibility became a reality for several months in the first half of 1942. In areas controlled by the partisans, the population sought to support them. In general, it seems that, thanks to their previous negative experiences, the population adapted to the government that existed at one time or another.

The very presence of partisans in this area constituted a powerful propaganda factor, which they used in psychological warfare. Available materials indicate the confidence of the partisans that the presence of their significant numbers and the restoration of the Soviet system on the territory they controlled was in itself a clear proof of the power and invincibility of the Soviet regime and a sufficient incentive for the population to necessary assistance partisan forces.

The Germans, for their part, made significant efforts to increase desertion from the partisan units, linking their propaganda operations with the various moods existing within the partisan units. In the spring of 1942, they began to make a distinction between deserting partisans and other prisoners and, in contrast to their previous practice of shooting both, they promised deserters normal treatment. Having realized that the most vulnerable point of partisan detachments are conscripts from the local population who find themselves in the partisan movement against their own will, all kinds of means - leaflets, posters, appeals, letters from deserters - began to be used to convince these people that forced conscription into the ranks of the partisans will not be held against them. Realizing that the methods used in the past for treating prisoners greatly complicated the approach to former Red Army soldiers, German propaganda especially emphasized that deserters could expect normal treatment, work and land. By that time, the Germans also realized that by destroying all political workers who were captured, they were doing a huge service to the Soviet High Command. Such a policy significantly increased the morale of the partisans, as well as the regular troops, since the people who played a very important role in maintaining high morale of the partisans knew what fate awaited them if they fell into the hands of the Germans. Trying to solve this problem, Hitler even agreed to cancel the order to execute political workers as an experiment; The Germans first began to pursue such a policy during the offensive operation to clear the Yelnya and Dorogobuzh area from partisans. For the first time, the Germans' appeals were addressed to political workers, whose lives they promised to save. There is evidence that, despite all the efforts made within the partisan units to counter German propaganda, a significant number of partisans deserted. Among the deserters were representatives of all groups that were part of the partisan movement, but the absolute majority were conscripts from the local population.

One of the most important problems that all partisan detachments faced was supply. In this area, in the highly developed organizational system of the partisan movement, there was a special structure that dealt with the problem of supply. The main source of food and clothing was the area of ​​partisan operations itself. Replenishment of weapons and ammunition mainly occurred through their collection at the battlefields of 1941. The local administration, restored under the partisans, played an important role in ensuring food supplies to the local population.

It was done pretty well medical service. In the western part of the area, about which there is greatest number According to reports, there were at least five field hospitals. They had a small permanent staff of medical personnel; each hospital could accommodate from five to twenty-five partisans. In addition, partisan detachments, starting from the company level, had medical battalions. The complete absence of complaints about medical care most likely indicates that it was at the proper level.

Air support from Soviet aviation for the partisans in the area was particularly impressive. The rapid mobilization and significant reinforcement of the partisan movement in the first months of 1942 would have been impossible without the help of officers and commissars delivered by air. The fact that many guerrilla groups were organized by airlifted men or included airlifted officers to serve as headquarters was extremely important for the control of the guerrilla movement. What existed between the partisans and Soviet side The “courier” message also facilitated communication and control.

In addition to transporting personnel replenishment by plane, large quantities were delivered by air to the partisans material resources. The delivery of ammunition, weapons, mines and other military materials, of course, was important factor in the rapid armament of the large number of partisans mobilized at the beginning of 1942. To use abandoned tanks being repaired by partisans, spare parts and fuel delivered by Soviet aircraft were extremely important. Clothing and shoes, as well as small quantities of food, were regularly delivered by air. Food supplies by air were mainly limited to products such as sugar and, in all likelihood, sausage. The repeated references to tobacco deliveries by air perhaps indicate the importance recognized by the Soviet High Command of such supplies in maintaining morale partisan

Other important moral incentives were the supply of medical supplies by air and the evacuation of the wounded by air. The available material on the role of air support in other aspects - for example, providing air combat support to partisans - cannot be generalized. A number of interesting details were discovered regarding technical side air support, which can be used to generally characterize the support of the partisan movement.

From the book Geopolitics and Geostrategy author Vandam Alexey Efimovich

[GUERILLA WAR AND BOER TACTICS] ...In any army, loss of spirit is far from being a symptom of its decomposition. If, for some reason, the entire army ceased to exist, then even then from among the farmers there would be seven or eight thousand desperate “zealots” ",

From the book Principles of Warfare author Clausewitz Carl von

Guerrilla War People's war in general should be considered as a breakthrough of the military element from the old formal boundaries; expansion and intensification of the whole exciting process that we call war. System of requisitions, huge increase in the number of armies through

author Taras Anatoly Efimovich

Guerrilla warfare

From the book “Small War” [Organization and tactics of combat operations of small units] author Taras Anatoly Efimovich

Guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan Beginning of the warIn the sixties, in the kingdom of Afghanistan - an extremely backward semi-feudal country - was created communist party under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki. In 1967, this party split into two parts: Hulk (People)

From the book History of the Middle Ages. Volume 1 [In two volumes. Under general edition S. D. Skazkina] author Skazkin Sergey Danilovich

author Petrovsky (ed.) I.

L. Rendulic GUERILLA WAR The history of wars does not know a single example when the partisan movement would play as large a role as it played in the last world war. In terms of its size, it represents something completely new in the art of war. By

From the book Why Hitler Lost the War? German view author Petrovsky (ed.) I.

GUERILLA WAR IN RUSSIA The desire to make guerrilla warfare especially pronounced integral part throughout the war was expressed in Russia. Even at the Moscow Party Congress in 1928, there was talk about the urgent need to carry out such events that, in the event of

From the book Why Hitler Lost the War? German view author Petrovsky (ed.) I.

GUERILLA WAR IN POLAND During its centuries-old history, Poland so often had to defend itself against foreign invaders and foreign domination that the Pole over time became almost a born partisan. The struggle of Polish partisans in the past was reversed

From the book Why Hitler Lost the War? German view author Petrovsky (ed.) I.

GUERILLA WAR IN ITALY Even before Italy left the alliance with Germany, some serious measures were taken to organize partisan warfare in circles close to Marshal Badoglio. Soon after Italy seceded from the Axis on September 8, 1943 and

From the book History of the Middle Ages. Volume 2 [In two volumes. Under the general editorship of S. D. Skazkin] author Skazkin Sergey Danilovich

Guerrilla war in the Netherlands The bloody terror of the Duke of Alba frightened the faint-hearted, but in the hearts of brave patriots and aroused anger and a desire to take revenge on the enemies of the homeland. Flanders and Hainaut became a refuge for armed workers, artisans, and peasants. Their troops exterminated

From the book 1st Russian SS Brigade “Druzhina” author Zhukov Dmitry Alexandrovich

Changing priorities: SD and partisan warfare By the spring of 1942, partisan activity in German-occupied territory had assumed an extremely wide scope. As Wehrmacht Colonel General L. Rendulic noted in his memoirs, the partisans “represented a serious danger

From the book Guerrilla Warfare. Strategy and tactics. 1941-1943 by Armstrong John

Guerrilla warfare Preparations for the formation of partisan detachments were carried out by the Soviet High Command before the Germans approached the area, and the first attempts at operations were made by the partisans in August and September 1941, when the front was temporarily

From book Soviet Union V local wars and conflicts author Lavrenov Sergey

Guerrilla warfare according to Mao Zedong After the failure of the line to organize armed uprisings in major cities of China, which was recommended by Moscow, Mao began to develop the theory and practice of “people's revolutionary war" In May 1938, Mao Zedong writes a work

From the book Indochina: Ashes of Four Wars (1939-1979) author Ilyinsky Mikhail Mikhailovich

Chapter IX. Guerrilla warfare

From the book Cossacks against Napoleon. From Don to Paris author Venkov Andrey Vadimovich

GUERILLA WAR IN EUROPEAN CONDITIONS

From book Complete collection essays. Volume 14. September 1906 - February 1907 author Lenin Vladimir Ilyich

Guerrilla Warfare The question of partisan actions is of great interest to our Party and the working masses. We have already repeatedly touched upon this issue in passing and now intend to proceed to the more comprehensive presentation of our

Guerrilla movement 1812 (partisan war) - an armed conflict between Napoleon's army and detachments of Russian partisans that broke out during the times with the French.

The partisan troops consisted mainly of Cossacks and regular army units located in the rear. Gradually they were joined by released prisoners of war, as well as volunteers from the civilian population (peasants). Partisan detachments were one of the main military forces of Russia in this war and offered significant resistance.

Creation of partisan units

Napoleon's army moved very quickly into the country, pursuing Russian troops, who were forced to retreat. As a result of this, Napoleon's soldiers soon spread out over a large territory of Russia and created communication networks with the border through which weapons, food and prisoners of war were delivered. To defeat Napoleon, it was necessary to interrupt these networks. The leadership of the Russian army decided to create numerous partisan detachments throughout the country, which were supposed to deal with subversive work and prevent the French army from receiving everything it needs.

The first detachment was formed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel D. Davydov.

Cossack partisan detachments

Davydov presented to the leadership a plan for a partisan attack on the French, which was quickly approved. To implement the plan, the army leadership gave Davydov 50 Cossacks and 50 officers.

In September 1812, Davydov’s detachment attacked a French detachment that was secretly transporting additional additional troops to the camp of the main army. human strength, as well as food. Thanks to the effect of surprise, the French were captured, some were killed, and the entire cargo was destroyed. This attack was followed by several more of the same kind, which turned out to be extremely successful.

Davydov's detachment began to gradually be replenished with released prisoners of war and volunteers from the peasants. At the very beginning of the guerrilla war, peasants were wary of soldiers carrying out subversive activities, but soon they began to actively help and even participated in attacks on the French.

However, the height of the partisan war began after Kutuzov was forced to leave Moscow. He gave the order to begin active partisan activity in all directions. By that time, partisan detachments had already been formed throughout the country and numbered from 200 to 1,500 people. The main force consisted of Cossacks and soldiers, but peasants also actively participated in the resistance.

Several factors contributed to the success of guerrilla warfare. Firstly, the detachments always attacked suddenly and acted secretly - the French could not predict where and when the next attack would occur and could not prepare. Secondly, after the capture of Moscow, discord began in the ranks of the French.

In the middle of the war, the guerrilla attack was in its most acute stage. The French were exhausted by military operations, and the number of partisans had increased so much that they could already form their own army, not inferior to the troops of the emperor.

Peasant partisan units

Peasants also play an important role in the resistance. Although they did not actively join the detachments, they actively helped the partisans. The French, deprived of food supplies from their own, constantly tried to get food from the peasants in the rear, but they did not surrender and did not conduct any trade with the enemy. Moreover, peasants burned their own warehouses and houses so that the grain would not go to their enemies.

As the guerrilla war grew, the peasants began to participate more actively in it and often attacked the enemy themselves, armed with whatever they could. The first peasant partisan detachments appeared.

Results of the partisan war of 1812

The role of the partisan war of 1812 in the victory over the French is difficult to overestimate - it was the partisans who were able to undermine the enemy’s forces, weaken him and allow the regular army to drive Napoleon out of Russia.

After the victory, the heroes of the partisan war were duly rewarded.

Guerrilla warfare- a war waged by armed groups hiding among the local population, avoiding open and major clashes with the enemy.
Elements of guerrilla warfare
The following aspects can be distinguished in guerrilla tactics: Destruction of enemy infrastructure in any form ( rail war, destruction of communication lines, high-voltage lines, poisoning and destruction of water pipelines, wells, etc.)
Information warfare (the dissemination of correct and incorrect information in oral (rumours, radio broadcasts) or printed (leaflets, newspapers, networks) form in order to win over the local population and (less often) the enemy himself to one’s side).
Destruction of enemy personnel.
Terror against the enemy is the implementation of actions aimed at intimidation in any form (murder, throwing objects at enemy units with the inscription “It could have been a bomb,” etc.).

It is desirable (but not necessary) that the partisans in their struggle receive assistance from any state, organization, etc. The nature of assistance can be different - financial, assistance with equipment (weapons primarily), informational assistance (instructions, manuals and instructors) ).
Theory of guerrilla warfare
Mao Zedong called guerrilla warfare the most effective means of resistance to authorities (dictatorial, colonial or occupation) and put forward the basic idea of ​​guerrilla warfare: “The enemy advances - we retreat, the enemy stops - we harass, the enemy retreats - we pursue.” Guerrilla warfare implies the presence of a partisan base and a partisan area. Latin American guerrillas supplemented the theory of guerrilla warfare with tactics of isolating the region as a result of transport sabotage and defeating the enemy, deprived of the opportunity to receive outside help.
Story
The concept itself arose in the 18th century, and originally meant, according to ESBE, “independent actions of light detachments separate from the army, directed primarily to the rear and flanks of the enemy.” Such detachments, mainly cavalry, which were tasked with disrupting communications, bore the French name partie, hence the word “partisan”, and from it, in turn, “guerrilla warfare”. It is curious that in the 19th century in Russian they said “party” and not “partisan detachment” - the latter looked like a tautology.

However, already during the Napoleonic Wars, “partisans” also began to be called irregular detachments of civilians waging guerrilla warfare. At the same time, the Spanish designation for guerrilla warfare was born - “guerrilla” (Spanish guerrilla, “small war”).

Guerrilla warfare has a long history. The first in history to practice it were the Scythians in the war against the Persians in the 6th century. BC e. In modern times, guerrilla warfare has shown its effectiveness in the fight against French troops in Spain 1808-1814 and in Russia (Patriotic War of 1812). Guerrilla warfare methods were widely used by all sides during the Russian Civil War; Of the partisan commanders of that era, Nestor Makhno became the most famous. Guerrilla methods were also widely practiced during the Second World War, especially in the occupied territories of the USSR, where the partisan movement was organized and supplied from Moscow, as well as in Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, France, and at the last stage of the war - in Italy. In the post-war years, a wide partisan movement developed in the western regions of the USSR (see Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Forest Brothers). In the second half of the 20th century, guerrilla warfare methods were actively used radical movements in Third World countries, including: Angola
Vietnam
Guatemala
Iraq
Colombia - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - Army of the People (FARC-EP)
Cuba
Peru
Salvador
Türkiye - Kurdistan Workers' Party
Philippines

In Russia, partisan methods were used Chechen separatists in the First and Second Chechen wars. In a broad sense, all kinds of insurrectionary movements and wars of irregular groups (for example, tribal) with regular armies were of a partisan nature.
Legal aspect
Participants in the partisan movement initially do not meet the requirements for combatants by the Hague Convention “On the Laws and Customs of War on Land” of 1907, since when participating in hostilities they disguise themselves as civilians (they have neither uniform nor insignia, they carry weapons hidden) and force the occupation authorities to apply harsh measures to the entire population. In accordance with the Hague Convention, partisans, when captured, do not enjoy the rights of prisoners of war, and are also put on trial.

Guerrillas gained the status of legal combatants only with the adoption of the IV Hague Convention, which outlined 4 conditions under which a militia member would be considered a combatant and not a criminal, and would be subject to exactly the same privileges as regular army soldiers.

Firstly, they have at their head a person responsible for his subordinates

In order for a partisan to have the status of a combatant, he must belong to some kind of military-organized detachment, headed by a responsible person. Submission to the commander in a detachment is an important sign of the legitimacy of actions partisan detachment. It depends on the type of organization whether they should be treated as prisoners of war and enjoy the corresponding privileges. The responsibility of the commanders of partisan detachments may include responsibility before the law and jurisdiction of military courts. In a word, if a partisan wants to enjoy the privileges of a combatant, he must act as an integral part of a detachment that acts on behalf of the state, and not as an organ of the interests of the individuals composing it.

The meaning of this paragraph lies in the moral and legal right of a person to conduct military operations against enemy combatants. The subordination of a militia to a command associated with the government transfers the combatant from the scope of criminal law (for the use of weapons, murder, etc.) to the sphere of humanitarian law, that is, shifts this responsibility to the state of which he is a representative. And also the presence of a commander guarantees that the detachment subordinate to him will act within the framework of the laws and customs of war.

Secondly, they have a definite and clearly visible from afar distinctive sign

“Humanitarian law obliges the state to conduct fighting only against combatants, and for this it is necessary that the partisans be distinguished from the civilian population. By donning a uniform or insignia, the guerrilla renounces the privileges of the civilian population and becomes a combatant. Firstly, this gives him the right to take part in hostilities, and secondly, it allows the combatants to comply with the norms of humanitarian law, distinguishing partisans from the civilian population.”

It should also be noted that partisans cannot be placed in a worse position than a soldier of the regular army, therefore, there can be no question of a broad interpretation of the “clearly visible” distinctive sign; and also, a certain distinctive sign should not interfere with the camouflage of partisans, since in modern conditions careful camouflage of troops is one of essential principles waging war.

“The requirement for a distinctive sign and the open carrying of weapons in a number of cases would put the partisans in obvious worst conditions in relation to regular troops, since the very nature of partisan actions requires secrecy and the most careful camouflage. And if fulfilling these requirements in individual guerrilla operations turned out to be impossible, then this would be explained by the tactics of partisan operations, and not at all by the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Consequently, such failure would not deprive the partisan movement of its legal character, or the partisans themselves - the international legal status recognized by the conventions."

Third, openly carry weapons

Many people think that the badge is enough to consider him a combatant. And a person who openly carries a weapon, but does not have distinctive signs, does not necessarily belong to the partisan movement. It should also be borne in mind that partisans use the same methods of combat as combat units, and therefore can resort to cunning and camouflage. Subsequently, this clause was clarified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1978.

Fourth, observe the norms and customs of war

This point is extremely important. This point is not a sign, but an important condition, by fulfilling which the partisan receives the right to be called a combatant. This condition is aimed at humanizing military operations and in their actions the partisan is obliged to comply with the laws and customs of war. This condition is indisputable and the most important of all listed. Aimed at humanizing armed conflicts, the requirement that partisans comply with the laws and customs of war is aimed at suppressing attempts to turn the war into an orgy. At the same time, this requirement is in no way connected with the specifics of partisan warfare. It is also mandatory for other combatants, including members of the regular armed forces. It follows that violations of the laws and customs of war committed by individual partisans entail corresponding legal consequences only against the offender. But these violations do not in any way affect legal status partisan detachment as a whole.

It should be mentioned that for non-compliance with the laws, it is not the entire detachment that is responsible, but the person who broke the law.

Representatives of states whose peoples in the recent past participated in such (guerrilla) conflicts argued that in existing conditions the only chance for success of the resistance movement, compensating to some extent for the technical superiority of the enemy, was in non-compliance with some strict rules (primarily the second and third ) enshrined in the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.

A clearer definition of the status of guerrillas was given in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1978.

Second and third of traditional conditions were subject to compliance by persons wishing to be treated as combatants and, therefore, as prisoners of war in the event of capture. The conditions have become much more flexible. Instead of requiring a specific distinctive sign, it was stated “that combatants are required to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or military operation, which is a preparation for an attack” (First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1978, Art. 44(3)).

Regarding the duty to bear arms, it was recognized that “there are situations where, due to the nature of hostilities, an armed combatant cannot distinguish himself from the civilian population, he retains his status as a combatant, provided that in such situations he openly carries his weapon: in the time of each military clash; And
at a time when he is in full view of the enemy during deployment into battle formations preceding the start of an attack in which he must take part" (First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1978, paragraph 3, article 44)

To avoid these difficulties, another important article was adopted providing that, in case of doubt, the status of a prisoner of war, and therefore a combatant, is presumed. (First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1978, Article 45 (1,2)) The provisions of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war, as well as the sick and wounded, fully apply to partisans.

Along with the desire of the international community to protect partisans and participants in national liberation movements It is necessary to mention some of the problems that may arise in connection with granting the status of combatants to guerrillas.

First, it must be remembered that combatant status is not only a privilege. The status of a combatant implies that the person who possesses it is a direct object of hostilities, that is, violence can be applied to him during hostilities, up to and including physical destruction. And since the fact remains indisputable that partisans are visually more similar to the civilian population than to soldiers of the regular army, then confusion may arise, the victim of which may be the least protected persons in an armed conflict - the civilian population.

Secondly, according to many lawyers, there is also a problem that the partisans do not comply with international law. R. Bindschendler, discussing this topic, writes: “if one of the most industrially developed countries with the most modern weapons is drawn into a war with an underdeveloped state, then the latter, not having first-class weapons, resorts to guerrilla warfare. In order to compensate for material weakness during the war, the partisans abandon legal norms that limit the combatants. The other side, not remaining indifferent to these steps, takes the same actions, which leads to an escalation of violations of humanitarian law.”

“It must be emphasized that the legitimacy of partisan movements is closely related to the lawful, fair nature of the war of the state on whose side the partisans are acting. A completely different international legal assessment should be given to the actions of all kinds of irregular detachments that the aggressor may resort to, calling them “partisans”... in reality this is not a partisan movement, but one of the types of intervention, a gross violation of the generally accepted norms of modern international law.”
Literature
Alexander Tarasov. Chairman Mao's theory of guerrilla warfare. // Bumbarash-2017, 1998, No. 4.
Artsibasov I. N., Egorov S. A. Armed conflict: law, politics, diplomacy. Moscow 1992 “International Relations” pp. 113,114,110
Kozhevnikov. International law. Moscow 1981 “International Relations” p.417
Nakhlik Stnaislav E. Brief essay on humanitarian law. International Committee of the Red Cross 1993 pp. 23, 25
Kolesnik S. “Protection of human rights in conditions armed conflicts» 2005
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1978
IV Hague Convention

see also
Urban guerrilla
Guerrilla movements

, radio broadcasts) or printed (leaflets, newspapers, network) form in order to win over the local population and (less often) the enemy himself to his side);

  • Destruction of enemy personnel;
  • Terror against the enemy is the implementation of actions aimed at intimidation in any form (murder, throwing any objects at the location of enemy units with the inscription “It could have been a bomb,” and so on).

    • It is desirable (but not necessary) that the partisans in their struggle receive assistance from some state, organization, and so on. The nature of assistance can be different - financial, assistance with equipment (primarily weapons), informational assistance (instructions, guides and instructors, propaganda and ideas).

    Theory of guerrilla warfare

    One of major researchers topics, Professor of the Wilhelm University of Münster Werner Hahlweg, using the example of a series of partisan wars from the 18th century to the present, emphasizes that partisan, or small war, has always acted as an auxiliary in big war; the contingents that carried it out were always supported external forces.

    Story

    By the beginning of the 20th century, the concept guerrilla warfare has acquired its modern meaning - combat operations of formations (often irregular) hiding among the civilian population in territory occupied by the enemy.

    In the second half of the 20th century, partisan movements operated mainly in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In many of these countries (such as Tibet after its annexation by China), guerrilla warfare was fought for decades.

    In the second half of the 20th century, in the countries of the “Third World” the guerrillas won only where the tasks of the national liberation movement and social revolution were intertwined, that is, the guerrilla wars were people’s wars; the revolution itself cannot be won through guerrilla-terrorist tactics.

    see also

    Write a review of the article "Guerilla Warfare"

    Notes

    Literature

    • Davydov D.V. Military notes. Chapter "" - M.: Military Publishing House, 1982
    • Ernesto Guevara.
    • Ernesto Guevara.
    • Alexander Tarasov.
    • Artsibasov I. N., Egorov S. A. Armed conflict: law, politics, diplomacy. Moscow 1992 “International Relations” pp. 113, 114, 110
    • Kozhevnikov. International law. Moscow 1981 “International Relations” p. 417
    • Nakhlik Stanislav E. Brief essay on humanitarian law. International Committee of the Red Cross 1993 pp. 23, 25
    • Kolesnik S. “Protection of human rights in armed conflicts” 2005
    • First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1978
    • IV Hague Convention
    • // RUSSIA / RUSSIA. Vol. 3 (11): Cultural practices in ideological perspective. M.: OGI, 1999, p. 103−127
    • Popov A. Yu. NKVD and the partisan movement. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2003. ISBN 5-224-04328-X
    • C. O. Dixon, O. Heilbrunn. Communist guerrilla actions. M.: Publishing house of foreign lit., 1957
    • Crimea during the Great Patriotic War. 1941−1945. Collection of documents and materials. Simferopol, "Tavria", 1973.
    • Boris Kagarlitsky.
    • Schmitt K. Theory of the partisan web.archive.org/web/20120315080237/www.luxaur.narod.ru/biblio/2/tr/schmitt03.htm
    • Starinov I. G., Partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War., M., 1949.
    • Starinov I. G., Training of partisan personnel, M., 1964.
    • Manual on the organization and tactics of partisans, M., 1965.
    • Andrianov V.N. Organization and main methods of partisan warfare, M., 1969.
    • Andrianov V.N. The struggle of Soviet partisans during the Great Patriotic War, M., 1971.
    • Tsvetkov A.I., Fundamentals of organization and tactics of partisan warfare, M., 1973.
    • Starinov I. G. Sabotage and anti-sabotage protection, M., 1980.
    • Braiko P. E., Starinov I. G. Guerilla warfare. Fundamentals of the organization of partisan warfare, M., 1983-1984.
    • Andrianov V.N. Guerrilla struggle in modern wars and the participation of state security agencies in it, M., 1988.
    • Andrianov V. N. Fundamentals of guerrilla warfare: A manual for practical workers, M., 1989.
    • Andrianov V.N., Behind-the-front work of operational groups of state security agencies: A manual for practical workers, M., 1989.
    • Starinov I.G., “Training of partisan personnel”, M., 1989.
    • Boyarsky V.I. Partisan struggle during the Great Patriotic War and the participation of state security agencies and troops in it. Part 1 and 2, M., 1991.
    • Ryazanov O.// Bratishka: Monthly magazine of divisions special purpose. - M.: LLC “Vityaz-Bratishka”, 2008. - No. 1. - pp. 29-35.

    Excerpt characterizing Guerrilla warfare

    - No, why regret it? Having been here, it was impossible not to pay respects. Well, if he doesn’t want to, that’s his business,” said Marya Dmitrievna, looking for something in her reticule. - Yes, and the dowry is ready, what else do you have to wait for? and what’s not ready, I’ll send it to you. Although I feel sorry for you, it’s better to go with God. “Having found what she was looking for in the reticule, she handed it to Natasha. It was a letter from Princess Marya. - He writes to you. How she suffers, poor thing! She is afraid that you will think that she does not love you.
    “Yes, she doesn’t love me,” said Natasha.
    “Nonsense, don’t talk,” Marya Dmitrievna shouted.
    - I won’t trust anyone; “I know that he doesn’t love me,” Natasha said boldly, taking the letter, and her face expressed dry and angry determination, which made Marya Dmitrievna look at her more closely and frown.
    “Don’t answer like that, mother,” she said. – What I say is true. Write an answer.
    Natasha did not answer and went to her room to read Princess Marya’s letter.
    Princess Marya wrote that she was in despair over the misunderstanding that had occurred between them. Whatever her father’s feelings, Princess Marya wrote, she asked Natasha to believe that she could not help but love her as the one chosen by her brother, for whose happiness she was ready to sacrifice everything.
    “However,” she wrote, “don’t think that my father was ill-disposed towards you. He is a sick and old man who needs to be excused; but he is kind, generous and will love the one who will make his son happy.” Princess Marya further asked that Natasha set a time when she could see her again.
    After reading the letter, Natasha sat down at the desk to write a response: “Chere princesse,” [Dear princess], she wrote quickly, mechanically and stopped. “What could she write next after everything that happened yesterday? Yes, yes, all this happened, and now everything is different,” she thought, sitting over the letter she had begun. “Should I refuse him? Is it really necessary? This is terrible!”... And in order not to think these terrible thoughts, she went to Sonya and together with her began to sort out the patterns.
    After dinner, Natasha went to her room and again took Princess Marya’s letter. - “Is it really all over? she thought. Did all this really happen so quickly and destroy everything that was before”! She recalled with all her former strength her love for Prince Andrei and at the same time felt that she loved Kuragin. She vividly imagined herself as Prince Andrei’s wife, imagined the picture of happiness with him repeated so many times in her imagination, and at the same time, flushed with excitement, imagined all the details of her yesterday’s meeting with Anatole.
    “Why couldn’t it be together? sometimes, in complete eclipse, she thought. Then only I would be completely happy, but now I have to choose and without either of both I cannot be happy. One thing, she thought, to say what was meant to Prince Andrei or to hide it is equally impossible. And nothing is spoiled with this. But is it really possible to part forever with this happiness of Prince Andrei’s love, which I lived with for so long?”
    “Young lady,” the girl said in a whisper with a mysterious look, entering the room. - One person told me to tell it. The girl handed over the letter. “Only for Christ’s sake,” the girl was still saying when Natasha, without thinking, mechanical movement she broke the seal and read Anatole’s love letter, from which she, without understanding a word, understood only one thing - that this letter was from him, from the man she loves. “Yes, she loves, otherwise how could what happened happen? Could there be a love letter from him in her hand?”
    With shaking hands, Natasha held this passionate, love letter, composed for Anatoly by Dolokhov, and, reading it, found in it echoes of everything that it seemed to her that she herself felt.
    “Since last night, my fate has been decided: to be loved by you or to die. I have no other choice,” the letter began. Then he wrote that he knew that her relatives would not give her to him, Anatoly, that there was a reason for this secret reasons, which he alone can reveal to her, but that if she loves him, then she should say this word yes, and no human forces will interfere with their bliss. Love will conquer everything. He will kidnap and take her to the ends of the world.
    “Yes, yes, I love him!” thought Natasha, re-reading the letter for the twentieth time and looking for some special deep meaning in every word.
    That evening Marya Dmitrievna went to the Arkharovs and invited the young ladies to go with her. Natasha stayed at home under the pretext of a headache.

    Returning late in the evening, Sonya entered Natasha's room and, to her surprise, found her not undressed, sleeping on the sofa. On the table next to her lay open letter Anatoly. Sonya took the letter and began to read it.
    She read and looked at the sleeping Natasha, looking on her face for an explanation of what she was reading, but did not find it. The face was quiet, meek and happy. Clutching her chest so as not to suffocate, Sonya, pale and trembling with fear and excitement, sat down on a chair and burst into tears.
    “How did I not see anything? How could it have gone this far? Has she really stopped loving Prince Andrei? And how could she let Kuragin do this? He is a deceiver and a villain, that much is clear. What will happen to Nicolas, sweet, noble Nicolas, when he finds out about this? So this is what her excited, determined and unnatural face meant the third day, both yesterday and today, thought Sonya; but it cannot be that she loves him! Probably, not knowing from whom, she opened this letter. She's probably offended. She can't do this!
    Sonya wiped away her tears and walked up to Natasha, again peering into her face.
    - Natasha! – she said barely audible.
    Natasha woke up and saw Sonya.
    - Oh, she’s back?
    And with the determination and tenderness that happens in moments of awakening, she hugged her friend, but noticing the embarrassment on Sonya’s face, Natasha’s face expressed embarrassment and suspicion.
    - Sonya, have you read the letter? - she said.
    “Yes,” Sonya said quietly.
    Natasha smiled enthusiastically.
    - No, Sonya, I can’t do it anymore! - she said. “I can’t hide it from you anymore.” You know, we love each other!... Sonya, my dear, he writes... Sonya...
    Sonya, as if not believing her ears, looked at Natasha with all her eyes.
    - And Bolkonsky? - she said.
    - Oh, Sonya, oh, if only you could know how happy I am! – Natasha said. -You don’t know what love is...
    – But, Natasha, is it really all over?
    Natasha big, with open eyes looked at Sonya, as if not understanding her question.
    - Well, are you refusing Prince Andrei? - said Sonya.
    “Oh, you don’t understand anything, don’t talk nonsense, just listen,” Natasha said with instant annoyance.
    “No, I can’t believe it,” Sonya repeated. - I don't understand. How did you love one person for a whole year and suddenly... After all, you only saw him three times. Natasha, I don’t believe you, you’re being naughty. In three days, forget everything and so...
    “Three days,” Natasha said. “It seems to me that I have loved him for a hundred years.” It seems to me that I have never loved anyone before him. You can't understand this. Sonya, wait, sit here. – Natasha hugged and kissed her.
    “They told me that this happens and you heard correctly, but now I have only experienced this love.” It's not what it used to be. As soon as I saw him, I felt that he was my master, and I was his slave, and that I could not help but love him. Yes, slave! Whatever he tells me, I will do. You don't understand this. What should I do? What should I do, Sonya? - Natasha said with a happy and frightened face.
    “But think about what you’re doing,” said Sonya, “I can’t leave it like that.” These secret letters... How could you let him do this? - she said with horror and disgust, which she could hardly hide.
    “I told you,” Natasha answered, “that I have no will, how can you not understand this: I love him!”
    “Then I won’t let this happen, I’ll tell you,” Sonya screamed with tears breaking through.
    “What are you doing, for God’s sake... If you tell me, you are my enemy,” Natasha spoke. - You want my misfortune, you want us to be separated...
    Seeing this fear of Natasha, Sonya cried tears of shame and pity for her friend.
    - But what happened between you? – she asked. -What did he tell you? Why doesn't he go to the house?
    Natasha did not answer her question.
    “For God’s sake, Sonya, don’t tell anyone, don’t torture me,” Natasha begged. – You remember that you cannot interfere in such matters. I opened it for you...
    – But why these secrets! Why doesn't he go to the house? – Sonya asked. - Why doesn’t he directly seek your hand? After all, Prince Andrei gave you complete freedom, if so; but I don't believe it. Natasha, have you thought about what secret reasons there could be?
    Natasha looked at Sonya with surprised eyes. Apparently, this was the first time she had asked this question and she didn’t know how to answer it.
    – I don’t know what the reasons are. But there are reasons!
    Sonya sighed and shook her head in disbelief.
    “If there were reasons...” she began. But Natasha, guessing her doubt, interrupted her in fear.
    - Sonya, you can’t doubt him, you can’t, you can’t, do you understand? – she shouted.
    – Does he love you?
    - Does he love you? – Natasha repeated with a smile of regret about her friend’s lack of understanding. – You read the letter, did you see it?
    - But what if he is an ignoble person?
    – Is he!... an ignoble person? If only you knew! - Natasha said.
    “If he is a noble man, then he must either declare his intention or stop seeing you; and if you don’t want to do this, then I will do it, I will write to him, I will tell dad,” Sonya said decisively.
    - Yes, I can’t live without him! – Natasha screamed.
    - Natasha, I don’t understand you. And what are you saying! Remember your father, Nicolas.
    “I don’t need anyone, I don’t love anyone but him.” How dare you say that he is ignoble? Don't you know that I love him? – Natasha shouted. “Sonya, go away, I don’t want to quarrel with you, go away, for God’s sake go away: you see how I’m suffering,” Natasha shouted angrily in a restrained, irritated and desperate voice. Sonya burst into tears and ran out of the room.
    Natasha went to the table and, without thinking for a minute, wrote that answer to Princess Marya, which she could not write the whole morning. In this letter, she briefly wrote to Princess Marya that all their misunderstandings were over, that, taking advantage of the generosity of Prince Andrei, who, when leaving, gave her freedom, she asks her to forget everything and forgive her if she is guilty before her, but that she cannot be his wife . It all seemed so easy, simple and clear to her at that moment.

    On Friday the Rostovs were supposed to go to the village, and on Wednesday the count went with the buyer to his village near Moscow.
    On the day of the count's departure, Sonya and Natasha were invited to a big dinner with the Karagins, and Marya Dmitrievna took them. At this dinner, Natasha again met with Anatole, and Sonya noticed that Natasha was saying something to him, wanting not to be heard, and throughout the dinner she was even more excited than before. When they returned home, Natasha was the first to begin with Sonya the explanation that her friend was waiting for.

    The question of partisan actions is of great interest to our party and the working masses. We have already touched upon this issue in passing several times and now intend to proceed to the more comprehensive presentation of our views that we have promised*.

    Start over. What basic requirements must every Marxist make when considering the question of forms of struggle? Firstly, Marxism differs from all primitive forms of socialism in that it does not associate movements with any one a certain form struggle. He recognizes the most diverse forms of struggle, and does not “invent” them, but only generalizes, organizes, and gives consciousness to those forms of struggle of revolutionary classes that arise by themselves in the course of the movement. Undoubtedly hostile to all abstract formulas, all doctrinaire recipes, Marxism requires careful attention to the ongoing mass a struggle that, with the development of the movement, with the growing consciousness of the masses, with the aggravation of economic and political crises gives rise to more and more new and more diverse methods of defense and attack. Therefore, Marxism certainly does not renounce any form of struggle. Marxism in no case

    * See Works, 5th ed., volume 13, p. 365. Ed.

    2 V. I. LENIN

    is not limited to what is possible and exists only in this moment forms of struggle, recognizing inevitability new, unknown to the figures of this period, forms of struggle against changes in this social situation. Marxism in this regard studies, so to speak, in mass practice, far from pretensions learn masses to forms of struggle invented by armchair “systematists.” We know, said Kautsky, for example, when considering the forms of social revolution, that the coming crisis will bring us new forms of struggle, which we cannot foresee now.

    Secondly, Marxism absolutely demands historical consideration of the issue of forms of struggle. To pose this question outside of a historically specific situation means not to understand the ABCs of dialectical materialism. At various moments of economic evolution, depending on various political, national-cultural, everyday conditions, etc., various forms of struggle come to the fore, become the main forms of struggle, and in connection with this, in turn, secondary ones change , side forms of struggle. Trying to answer yes or no to a question about certain means struggle without examining in detail the specific situation of a given movement at a given stage of its development means completely abandoning the soil of Marxism.

    These are the two main theoretical principles that should guide us. History of Marxism in Western Europe gives us a wealth of examples to confirm what has been said. European Social Democracy currently considers parliamentarism and the trade union movement to be the main forms of struggle; it recognized the uprising in the past and is quite ready to recognize it, with changes in the situation, in the future - contrary to the opinion of the liberal bourgeoisie, such as the Russian Cadets 1 and the Bezzachlavtsev 2. Social democracy denied the general strike in the 70s, as a social panacea, as a means of immediately overthrowing the bourgeoisie in a non-political way - but social democracy completely

    GUERILLA WAR 3

    recognizes the mass political strike (especially after the Russian experience in 1905) as one of the means of struggle necessary for famous conditions. Social democracy recognized street barricade fighting in the 40s years XIX century - rejected it on the basis of certain data at the end of the 19th century - expressed complete readiness to reconsider this last view and recognize the expediency of the barricade struggle after the experience of Moscow, which, according to K. Kautsky, put forward new barricade tactics.

    Having established the general principles of Marxism, let us move on to the Russian revolution. Let's remember historical development forms of struggle put forward by it. First, economic strikes of workers (1896-1900), then political demonstrations of workers and students (1901-1902), peasant riots(1902), the beginning of mass political strikes in various combinations with demonstrations (Rostov 1902, summer strikes 1903, January 9, 1905), an all-Russian political strike with local cases of barricade struggle (October 1905), mass barricade struggle and armed uprising (1905, December), parliamentary peace struggle (April - June 1906), military partial uprisings (June 1905 - July 1906), partial peasant uprisings (autumn 1905 - autumn 1906).

    This was the state of affairs by the fall of 1906 from the point of view of forms of struggle in general. The “response” form of struggle of the autocracy is the Black Hundred pogrom, starting from Chisinau in the spring of 1903 and ending with Sedlec in the fall of 1906 3 . During this entire period, the organization of the Black Hundred pogrom and beating of Jews, students, revolutionaries, class-conscious workers is increasingly progressing and improving, combining with the violence of the bribed mob the violence of the Black Hundred army, reaching the use of artillery in villages and cities, merging with punitive expeditions, punitive trains and so on.

    4 V. I. LENIN

    This is the main background of the picture. Against this background, what emerges, undoubtedly as something private, secondary, incidental, is the phenomenon to the study and assessment of which this article is devoted. What is this phenomenon? what are its forms? its reasons? time of occurrence and extent of spread? its meaning in general progress revolution? his attitude towards the struggle of the working class organized and led by social democracy? These are the questions to which we must now move from outlining the general background of the picture.

    The phenomenon we are interested in is armed struggle. It is led by individuals and small groups of individuals. Partly they belong to revolutionary organizations, partly (in some areas of Russia more partly) do not belong to any revolutionary organization. Armed struggle pursues two various goals that are needed strictly distinguish one from another; - namely, this struggle is aimed, firstly, at the murder of individuals, superiors and subordinates of the military police service; - secondly, for confiscation Money both from the government and private individuals. The confiscated funds are partly used for the party, partly specifically for arming and preparing the uprising, partly for the maintenance of persons leading the struggle we characterize. Large expropriations (Caucasian at more than 200 thousand rubles, Moscow 875 thousand rubles) 4 went specifically to the revolutionary parties in the first place, - small expropriations go primarily, and sometimes entirely, to support the “expropriators”. This form of struggle undoubtedly became widely developed and widespread only in 1906, i.e. after the December uprising. The aggravation of the political crisis to the point of armed struggle and in particular the aggravation of poverty, hunger strike and unemployment in villages and cities played a major role among the reasons that caused the described struggle. As a priority and even exceptional form social struggle, this form of struggle was adopted by the trampless elements of the population, the lumpen and the anarchists.

    GUERILLA WAR 5

    hist groups. Martial law, the mobilization of new troops, the Black Hundred pogroms (Sedlce), and courts-martial should be considered as a “response” form of struggle on the part of the autocracy.

    The usual assessment of the struggle under consideration boils down to the following: it is anarchism, Blanquism 5 , the old terror, the actions of individuals isolated from the masses, demoralizing the workers, alienating large sections of the population from them, disorganizing the movement, harming the revolution. Examples confirming this assessment can easily be found from events reported every day in newspapers.

    But are these examples conclusive? To check this, let's take an area with the largest development of the considered form of struggle - Latvian region. This is how the newspaper “Novoe Vremya” 6 (dated September 9 and 12) complains about the activities of the Latvian Social Democracy. Latvian Social Democratic workers' party(part of the RSDLP) correctly publishes its newspaper in 30,000 copies 7. The official department publishes lists of spies, the destruction of which is everyone’s responsibility. honest man. Those who assist the police are declared “opponents of the revolution” and are subject to execution, also answering with their property. Money for the Social-Democratic Party order the population to transfer only upon presentation of a stamped receipt. In the latest party report, among 48,000 rubles. Income for the year is listed as 5,600 rubles. from the Libau branch for weapons obtained through expropriation. - “New Time” is tearing up and rushing, of course, against this “revolutionary legislation”, this “formidable government”.

    To call this activity of the Latvian Social-Democrats anarchism, Blanquism, terrorism. no one will dare. But why? Because here clear the connection between a new form of struggle and the uprising that took place in December and which is brewing again. When applied to all of Russia, this connection is not so clearly visible, but it exists. Spreading

    6 V. I. LENIN

    The “partisan” struggle precisely after December, its connection with the aggravation of not only the economic, but also the political crisis, is undeniable. Old Russian terrorism was the work of an intellectual conspirator; now he is waging a partisan fight, according to general rule, a blue-collar militant or just an unemployed worker. Blanquism and anarchism easily come to mind for people prone to stereotypes, but in the situation of uprising, so clear in the Latvian region, the unsuitability of these memorized labels is striking.

    The example of the Latvians clearly shows the complete incorrectness, unscientific, unhistorical nature of our usual analysis of partisan warfare, regardless of the situation of the uprising. We must take this situation into account, think about the features of the intermediate period between major acts of uprising, we must understand what forms of struggle are inevitably generated in this case, and not get away with a memorized selection of words that are the same for both the cadet and the new time: anarchism, robbery, tramping!

    They say: partisan actions disorganize our work. Let us apply this reasoning to the situation after December 1905, to the era of Black Hundred pogroms and martial law. What disorganizes the movement more in such era: lack of resistance or organized partisan struggle? Compare central Russia with its western outskirts, with Poland and the Latvian region. There is no doubt that partisan warfare is much more widespread and highly developed on the western outskirts. And it is also certain that revolutionary movement in general, Social-Democrats movement in particular more disorganized in central Russia than in its western outskirts. Of course, it does not occur to us to conclude from this that the Polish and Latvian Social-Democrats. traffic is less disorganized thanks to guerrilla warfare. No. It only follows from this that guerrilla warfare is not to blame for the disorganization of the Social-Democrats. labor movement in Russia in 1906.

    Here they often refer to the peculiarities of national conditions. But this link shows especially clearly

    GUERILLA WAR 7

    weakness of walking argumentation. If it’s a matter of national conditions, then it’s not a matter of anarchism, Blanquism, terrorism - the sins of all Russia and even specifically Russian ones - but of something else. Take it apart for something else specifically, gentlemen! You will see then that national oppression or antagonism does not explain anything, for they have always been on the western outskirts, and only this one gave birth to partisan struggle. historical period. There are many places where there is national oppression and antagonism, but there is no partisan struggle, which sometimes develops without any national oppression. A specific analysis of the issue will show that the issue is not national oppression, but the conditions of the uprising. Guerrilla warfare is an inevitable form of struggle at a time when mass movement In fact, it has already come to the point of an uprising and when more or less large intervals occur between the “big battles” in the civil war.

    It is not partisan actions that disorganize the movement, but the weakness of the party, which cannot pick up these actions. That is why the usual anathemas among us Russians against partisan actions are combined with secret, random, unorganized partisan actions that really disorganize the party. Powerless to understand what historical conditions give rise to this struggle, we are powerless to paralyze its bad sides. But the struggle continues nonetheless. It is caused by powerful economic and political reasons. We are unable to eliminate these causes and eliminate this struggle. Our complaints about the partisan struggle are complaints about our party weakness in the uprising.

    What we said about disorganization also applies to demoralization. It is not guerrilla warfare that demoralizes, but disorganization, disorderliness, non-partisanship of partisan actions. From this most undoubted Condemnations and curses against partisan uprisings do not relieve us one bit from demoralization, for these condemnations and curses are absolutely powerless to stop the phenomenon caused by deep economic and political reasons. They will object: if we

    8 V. I. LENIN

    are powerless to stop an abnormal and demoralizing phenomenon, then this is not an argument for transition parties to abnormal and demoralizing means of struggle. But such an objection would be purely liberal-bourgeois, and not Marxist, because to consider at all An abnormal and demoralizing civil war or guerrilla war, as one of its forms, a Marxist cannot. The Marxist stands on the basis of the class struggle, not the social world. In certain periods of acute economic and political crises, class struggle develops into direct civil war, i.e., armed struggle between two parts of the people. In such periods the Marxist must stand on the point of view of the civil war. Any moral condemnation of it is completely unacceptable from the point of view of Marxism.

    In the era of civil war, the ideal of the party of the proletariat is warring party. This is absolutely undeniable. We fully admit that from the point of view of the civil war it is possible to prove and prove impracticality various forms of civil war at one time or another. Criticism of various forms of civil war from the point of view military expediency we fully recognize and unconditionally agree that the decisive vote in like this the issue belongs to social-democratic practitioners. each individual locality. But in the name of the principles of Marxism, we unconditionally demand that the analysis of the conditions of the civil war not get away with hackneyed and template phrases about anarchism, Blanquism, terrorism, so that the senseless methods of guerrilla action used by such and such a Pepes organization 8 at such and such a moment are not put forward as a bogeyman on the question of the very participation of the Social-Democrats. in guerrilla warfare in general.

    References to the disorganization of the movement by guerrilla warfare must be taken critically. Any a new form of struggle, associated with new dangers and new victims, inevitably “disorganizes” organizations unprepared for this new form of struggle. Our old circles of propagandists were disorganized by the transition to agitation. Our committees are disorganized

    GUERILLA WAR 9

    there was a subsequent transition to demonstrations. Any military action in any war introduces a certain disorganization into the ranks of the combatants. It cannot be concluded from this that we should not fight. From this we must deduce that it follows learn fight. That's all.

    When I see Social Democrats proudly and smugly declaring: we are not anarchists, not thieves, not robbers, we are above this, we reject guerrilla warfare, then I ask myself: do these people understand what they are saying? Throughout the country there are armed skirmishes and fights between the Black Hundred government and the population. This phenomenon is absolutely inevitable at this stage of development of the revolution. The population is spontaneous, unorganized - and that is why often in unsuccessful and bad forms - also reacts to this phenomenon with armed clashes and attacks. I understand that, due to the weakness and unpreparedness of our organization, we can refuse the party leadership in this area and at this moment this spontaneous struggle. I understand that this issue must be resolved by local practitioners, and that reworking weak and unprepared organizations is not an easy task. But when I see in a theoretician or publicist of Social Democracy not a feeling of sadness about this lack of preparation, but a proud complacency and narcissistically admiring repetition of phrases memorized in early youth about anarchism, Blanquism, terrorism, then I feel offended for the humiliation of the most revolutionary doctrine in the world .

    They say: guerrilla warfare brings the class-conscious proletariat closer to the degenerate drunkards and tramps. It's right. But it only follows from this that the party of the proletariat can never consider guerrilla warfare the only or even the main means of struggle; that this means must be subordinated to others, must be proportionate to the main means of struggle, ennobled by the educational and organizing influence of socialism. And without this last conditions All, absolutely all means of struggle in bourgeois society bring the proletariat closer to various

    10 V. I. LENIN

    non-proletarian strata above or below him and, being left to the spontaneous course of things, are worn out, perverted, prostituted. Strikes, left to the spontaneous course of things, are distorted into “Alliances” - agreements between workers and employers against consumers. Parliament is being turned into a brothel, where a gang of bourgeois politicians sell wholesale and retail “people's freedom,” “liberalism,” “democracy,” republicanism, anti-clericalism, socialism and all other marketable goods. The newspaper is being perverted into a public procurer, into an instrument of corruption of the masses, of crude flattery to the base instincts of the crowd, etc., etc. Social democracy does not know universal means of struggle, such as would fence off the proletariat with a Chinese wall from the strata standing a little higher or slightly below it. Social democracy in different eras applies various means, always structuring their use strictly certain ideological and organizational conditions*.

    The forms of struggle in the Russian revolution are extremely diverse compared to the bourgeois revolutions of Europe. Kautsky partly predicted this when he said in 1902 that the future revolution (he added: with the exception of Maybe perhaps Russia) will be not so much a struggle between the people and the government, but rather a struggle between two parts of the people. In Russia

    * Bolshevikov Social-Democrats often accused of a frivolous and biased attitude towards partisan actions. It is therefore worth recalling that in the draft resolution on partisan actions (No. 2 of Party News 9 and Lenin’s report on the 10th Congress) Part The Bolsheviks, which defends them, put forward the following conditions for their recognition: “exes” of private property were not allowed at all; “Exes” of state property were not recommended, but only were allowed under condition batch control and circulation of funds for the needs of the uprising. Guerrilla actions in the form of terror recommended against government rapists and active Black Hundreds, but under the following conditions: 1) take into account the mood of the broad masses; 2) take into account the labor traffic conditions of the given area; 3) take care that the forces of the proletariat are not wasted in vain. The practical difference from this draft resolution, which was adopted at the Unification Congress, is exclusively the fact that “exes” of state property are not allowed.

    GUERILLA WAR 11

    and we see, undoubtedly, a broader development of this second struggle than in bourgeois revolutions West. The enemies of our revolution among the people are few in number, but they are becoming more and more organized as the struggle intensifies and receive the support of the reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie. It is completely natural and inevitable, therefore, that in such era, in the era of nationwide political strikes, insurrection will not be able to result in the old form of individual acts limited to a very short period of time and a very small area. It is completely natural and inevitable that the uprising takes on higher and complex shapes a long civil war covering the entire country, that is, an armed struggle between two parts of the people. Such a war cannot be imagined otherwise than as a series of few, separated by relatively large periods of time, major battles and a mass of small skirmishes during these intervals. If this is so - and this is undoubtedly so - then Social Democracy must certainly set as its task the creation of organizations that would be most capable of leading the masses and. in these major battles and, if possible, in these minor skirmishes. Social democracy, in an era of class struggle that has intensified to the point of civil war, must set as its task not only participation, but also a leading role in this civil war. Social democracy must educate and prepare its organizations to truly act as belligerent, not missing a single opportunity to cause damage to enemy forces.

    This - difficult task, I have no words. It cannot be solved immediately. Just as the entire people is re-educated and learns in the struggle during the civil war, so our organizations must be educated, must be rebuilt on the basis of experience in order to meet this task.

    We have not the slightest pretension to impose on the practitioners some form of concocted struggle, or even to decide from the office

    12 V. I. LENIN

    the question of the role of certain forms of guerrilla warfare in the general course of the civil war in Russia. We are far from thinking of seeing a question in a specific assessment of certain partisan actions. directions in social democracy. But we see our task as helping, to the best of our ability, the right theoretical assessment of new forms of struggle put forward by life; - is to fight mercilessly against stereotypes and prejudices that prevent class-conscious workers from correctly establishing a new and difficult question, to approach its resolution correctly.

    Published according to the text of the newspaper “Proletary”



    © 2024 netdenegnakino.ru - No for twos. Chemistry. Physics. Spelling. Geography