Who in 1932 for the first time. What happened? Can such companies be trusted?

Such a phenomenon as mass sabotage (resistance) of peasants to collectivization. Showed the statistics of mass slaughter of livestock and the mention of this phenomenon in Prishvin’s diaries. Now let us turn to the climatic, natural causes of the crop failure of 1932, which caused the mass famine of 1933. For starters, Prishvin:

August 8 (1932). It's hot. Forests are burning everywhere. You can't breathe in Moscow.
10th of August. Huge forest fires. Hunting ban.

This is the Moscow region, i.e. Central Russia. Judging by this description, the summer of 1932 was similar to the recent summer of 2010, with its prolonged drought and forest fires. Let me remind you that in the dry summer of 2010 we harvested 60 million tons, and last year 104 million tons. The difference is almost double. The drought is still a drought. Exactly the same picture was in the Volga region in 1932, only the droughts there were hotter and more prolonged. This is confirmed by documents of that time:

Date August 21, 1932. So let’s write down that the Volga region, Bashkiria, and Orenburg are engulfed in drought. The result is a large-scale crop failure like in 2010.

And here is what the official writes, contrary to these facts: Russian history represented by the historian Kondrashin, who glorified the theme of the Russian Holodomor:
In 1932, there was no drought in the USSR, although some local manifestations did occur. Moreover, during the harvesting campaign of 1932, it rained in the North Caucasus and Lower Volga. According to experts, 1932 can be characterized as “favorable for the harvest of all field crops”...
In 1932, the atmospheric aridity index showed no drought. The aridity index indicated a mild drought in 1933 in the Orenburg area...
Even more The weather was favorable in 1932 on the Don, Kuban and Ukraine....
Thus, the natural climatic factor could not become the main cause of famine due to crop failure...
Summarizing what has been said, we can conclude that the weather factor cannot be ignored when explaining the reasons for low yields in the main grain-growing regions of the USSR in the early 30s. But the main cause of the famine was not him, the famine was the result agricultural policy Stalin's regime.
Kondrashin V.V. Grain procurement policy during the first five-year plan and its results (1929-1933) M. ROSSPEN, 2014 Page. 38, 40, 41

I boldly highlighted the outright lies and delusions of Mr. Kondrashin.

Firstly, rains during harvesting do not contribute to high yields. Rain during harvesting contributes to slower harvesting and lower yields, combining all this with poor drying of the grain, which makes it easily susceptible to fungi and diseases in the future. Any person more or less familiar with agriculture will tell you this. Read about the rains here.

Secondly, in the Volga region and Central Russia there was a drought, which is confirmed by both the documents presented and even Prishvin’s diary.

Thirdly, Ukraine had its own problems: the winter was harsh and the winter crops froze, and in the spring the peasants were in no hurry to replant spring crops instead of frozen winter crops, and in the summer they were in no hurry to harvest.

Based on all this, it is clear that Mr. Kondrashin is openly lying and creating entities beyond what is necessary, attributing the blame for the famine and crop failure to Stalin’s policies in the presence of much more serious and real reasons in the form of natural factors that caused crop failure and peasant sabotage, which aggravated it.

Well, to follow up with reports from the field about the causes of crop failure and famine from direct witnesses:

Difficult to set value individual reasons which led to a sharp decline in crop prospects in July. There is no doubt that the filling of grain was affected by poor management of collective and state farms (late sowing, lack of crop rotation, poor cultivation of fields), which resulted in enormous weediness and thinning of grain, but there were also special natural conditions(“fuse”, “stack”, “rust”, “fog”, etc., as agronomists and practitioners call these phenomena), which sharply reduced the harvest of grain crops, and in some areas came to naught (Georgievsky, Vorontsovo-Alexandrovsky , Mozdoksky, formerly Prokhladnensky, etc.). Finally, the harvesting conditions (rains for a month and a half) have also already led to some losses (germination).

In several areas we have complete death of wheat, and in any case, the remaining wheat is not suitable for seeds.

In addition to personal negotiations, I consider it my duty to report the following: the grain procurement plan for the region, together with state farms, garnets and the return of semssens, amounts to 35 million poods. (572,800 tons) against the plan and actual implementation last year of 36 million poods. When drawing up and communicating the plan to districts and villages (collective farms), we proceeded from last year’s average yield of 9.3 centners per hectare. However, a number unfavorable conditions this year (prolonged sowing, long rains, floods, frosts) led to a significant decrease in yield, which, after repeated testing of the UNHU, is determined to be 7.9 c per hectare. Thus, the gross harvest for the collective farm and peasant sector, which this year is determined at 74.7 million poods, will be 13.4 million poods. lower than last year (88.1 million poods). The yield on grain state farms is even lower - 7.6 centners per hectare, and from 22 thousand hectares there will be no grain at all (dead and unripe)

Burkov: 18.5 million poods. One important circumstance should be noted: this year the sowing was carried out not by plowed land, but by spring plowing. At the same time, the seeding rate was insufficient due to the lack of seeds; from an agrotechnical point of view, this rate was not maintained.

Another equally important circumstance was that as a result of heavy rains, weeds appeared and began to choke out the crops. These two main circumstances greatly reduced the yield. Finally, the third circumstance related to cleaning. We removed 72% with loboheaters instead of removing 70% with combines and only 30% with loboheaters. Why did we have to harvest not with combines, but mainly with lobe heaters? The main reason is that the fields are very clogged and we could not run combine harvesters on these clogged fields.

Transcript of the speech by the director of Soyuzzernotrest of Ukraine and Crimea A. Burkov at a meeting of directors at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the grain delivery plan. November 2, 1932 http://istmat.info/node/26760

Grain procurement in October and especially in November is very intense. The reason for the strain on grain procurements in the Central Black Sea Region by the end of the campaign was a significant decrease in yields and gross harvests of oats and wheat. While there was an average yield for other grain crops, the yield for oats and wheat turned out to be significantly reduced, and we lost especially a lot for oats due to the dry wind and rust that engulfed us during filling. Several days of sharp dry winds at the beginning of August led to the fact that oats yielded a decrease in yield by 2 or even 3 times, and on some state farms they mowed oats for fodder, because... there was no point in threshing. Most regions cover oat procurement with other crops: rye and cereals.

AND Secretary General Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U S.V. Kosiora:

The main cause of hunger is poor management and unacceptable attitude towards public goods (losses, theft and waste of bread) this year appears more prominently and sharply before the masses. For, in most of the starving regions, an insignificant amount of bread was taken according to the provisions, and it is in no way impossible to say that “the bread was taken.” This must be said in relation to most districts even in the Dnepropetrovsk region, especially since it sticks out, for example, in the Kyiv region, where grain procurements this year were completely insignificant. Why are they starving in the Kyiv region, where we had almost no grain procurements in these main regions? In these areas in the spring there was a large shortage of spring crops, there was a large death of winter crops, and what was collected was eaten catering whoever wanted as much as they wanted, and those who didn’t work also took it away.

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The beginning of the famine of 1921-1922

In fact, the famine of 1921-1922 spread not only to the Volga region, but to most of the republics of the young Soviet state. It’s just that it was the Volga regions that suffered the most from it. Facts were the first sign mass starvation in villages back in 1920. And the latest facts were recorded in the summer of 1923.

35 provinces, almost 50 million people were involved in this process. But one should not think that the famine affected only Soviet Russia. A lot of border states also faced problems of malnutrition: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Finland, etc.

The beginning of the famine can be considered the crop failure of 1920. The grain harvested then was almost eight times less than usual. I had to eat up the seed fund. But nature did not rest on this. The summer of 1921 was marked by an unprecedented drought. And hordes of locusts have completed the process of destroying winter and spring crops.

The main causes of the famine in the Volga region of 1921-1922

IN last years It became fashionable to name the harsh food policy of the Soviet government as the main cause of the famine. But this is a one-sided value judgment.

Yes, since 1917, total food appropriation was carried out in the country. It wasn't just grain that was confiscated. Meat, milk and other products went to the needs of the Red Army and the urban population. The food detachments even took away the seed fund, since they often included people who knew absolutely nothing about agriculture.

And agricultural production itself fell into complete decline. And one should not blame only the Soviet authorities for this. The number of able-bodied men in the village began to decline since the First World War. Of course, the revolution and the Civil War also made their contribution.

There was often no one to plow, and by 1920 the supervisory authorities had not yet been properly formed. Plus, some of the land constantly changed hands. It was ruled by the Reds, the Whites, and the Greens. And everyone needed food and fodder.

Well, natural disasters completed what people started. As a result of the drought, crops in five regions were completely destroyed. Thus began the famine in the Volga region in 1921. This is one of the most terrible pages of our history.

Trying to survive

Everyone who had the strength and at least some opportunity tried to escape from the starving areas. Millions of refugees moved across the country in search of shelter. Flight became widespread in the autumn of 1921. Local authorities At first they tried to prevent this. But it was simply impossible to stop such an avalanche. Trains and stations were filled to capacity with fleeing people. Many did not really know where they were going. The main thing was to simply leave the hungry areas. Mass psychosis - that's it precise definition the situation.

Along with adults, children also experienced all the problems of the famine in the Volga region in 1921 (photos from those times are simply terrifying). Only many of them had it even worse. The revolution, wars and subsequent problems claimed the lives of a huge number of the working population. Adults died, and their children remained homeless. By 1923, according to the most conservative estimates, almost 6 million street children were scattered across the Russian expanses. It is clear that street children clung to those who helped them survive. Often these were gangs, brothels and other illegal associations.

It cannot be said that the problem of homeless children was completely left to chance. Children were placed in orphanages and trade union institutions. More than one and a half million of them were taken under the patronage of foreign organizations. But these measures helped only half of the disadvantaged children.

Famine in the Volga region: cannibalism

Facts of cannibalism in areas prone to severe famine for a long time domestic historians bypassed. It’s not that this information was particularly secret, but advertising such an unsightly appearance “ Soviet peasants"was not welcome.

But, sad as it may be, during the famine in the Volga region (1921) cannibalism was a reality. Mass Facts Eating people in the Volga region began to be recorded in September 1921. Guards had to be posted near fresh graves to prevent cannibals from digging up corpses. But they also hunted while alive. Especially small children. According to eyewitnesses, in many provinces it became commonplace that parents ate several of their children, so as not to suffer from hunger themselves and not torment their offspring. People were afraid to go out.

Local authorities and residents did not even touch these cannibals. They did not have enough strength, money, or time. After 1923, criminal cases began to be opened against cannibals. But again, according to eyewitnesses, the cannibals themselves did not live long. How to explain this fact? The society of cannibals still did not consider them people, they rejected them from themselves. Social isolation, illness, and maybe divine providence destroyed them, who knows...

By the beginning of the events described, the food picture of the entire Soviet Country was developing in the most depressing way. The surplus appropriations did not lead to the desired result. Food supply new government it wasn't at all. But there was hunger.

In the spring of 1921, Lenin issued an order to begin purchasing food abroad. But imported products turned out to be insufficient even for the needs of the army and workers. In June 1921, from the pages of the Pravda newspaper, the government appealed to citizens with a request for help in starving areas. It was then founded Special Commission assistance to the hungry, led by V. G. Korolenko. Its branches were opened at all Central Election Commissions of the republics and regions. These commissions were vested with extraordinary powers in the supply and distribution of food.

At the same time, Lenin made a proposal to take as many soldiers as possible into the army from densely populated starving areas. Military service allowed millions to escape hunger. For the supply of soldiers was still at a higher level.

Requests for help

In conditions of total famine, the government had no time for political disagreements. The priority task was to preserve the rapidly declining population. Therefore, it was decided to ask the international community for help. In July 1921, M. Gorky called on the leaders of European and American countries to help fight hunger and prevent millions of Russians from dying. The Patriarch of All Rus' Tikhon also asked for help; he sent his messages to the Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury and other religious figures.

Various political figures of the RSFSR turned to the communities of the proletariat of the European powers with requests for assistance more than once. But there was no answer for a very long time. Small progress began only in September 1921. And the main flow of food went to Soviet Russia only after the great polar explorer Nansen himself intervened in the matter of collecting food.

Help from foreigners

It is rightly said that a great man is great in everything. This statement can be fully attributed to the Norwegian scientist and polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen. This man was not indifferent to the suffering of starving people. He organized a very active public campaign to help. Under the auspices of the Red Cross, Nansen managed to unite public organizations nine European countries. Thanks to them, they managed to save the lives of more than one and a half million people. Nansen himself came to the Volga region and monitored the activities of the missionaries.

Another prominent figure who provided invaluable service to the starving people was Herbert Hoover, the future president of the United States. Under his leadership in the territory Soviet Russia The American Relief Administration (ARA) launched its activities. Tens of thousands of tons of food and medicine were brought to Russia. It was the doctors of the ARA who began to vaccinate in areas affected by epidemics of typhoid fever, cholera, tuberculosis, etc. Until 1923, the organization sent food parcels to residents who were least protected under the new Soviet system: representatives of the intelligentsia, large families, etc. .

In addition to food and sanitary aid, ARA employees helped restore the destroyed infrastructure. We repaired water intake systems, built bridges, renovated schools, hospitals and factories. In July 1923, the ARA curtailed its activities in Russia under pressure Soviet authorities, who were increasingly burdened by the presence of the Americans. In just two years, the ARA provided famine relief worth $78 million. It is a pity that this information was subsequently hushed up by Soviet historians.

Confiscation of property of the Russian Orthodox Church

Still, Lenin is outstanding political figure who knew how to turn any situation around for the benefit of interests Soviet idea. It's no secret that the property of the Russian Orthodox Church haunted the Bolsheviks since they came to power.

In 1922, after the issuance of decrees on the confiscation and liquidation of church property, local authorities began to confiscate items from churches. precious metals and precious stones. All of them were to be transferred to the Famine Relief Fund. It is clear that most of values simply settled in the apartments of the new party elite, and did not go to the needs of those suffering from hunger.

Results of the famine of 1921-1922

The most important sad result of the famine in the Volga region of 1921-1922. there was a huge population decline. According to conservative estimates, the famine claimed the lives of 5 million people. Epidemics increased mortality by 3, and in some regions by 5 times.

But the government finally realized that getting bread through surplus appropriation was not the best idea. But at what price did this understanding come!

Recurrence of hunger. 1932-1933

Less than ten years had passed, and Soviet residents again felt the bony hand of hunger reaching out to them. Moreover, this phenomenon still causes much more controversial judgments than the famine of the twenties. For a long time about the famine in the Volga region of 1932-1933. were not mentioned at all in any textbook. A number of researchers consider this famine to be the greatest social catastrophe Soviet Union. During the famine in the Volga region (1932-1933), the number of victims was 8 million people. It comes to the point that this famine is called a planned action of the Stalinist leadership. How was it really?

Causes of the famine of 1932-1933

Of course, the first main reason for the mass famine in the Volga region is the lack of bread. But where did he come from? There was no drought in Russia in 1932, which means that, in the opinion of many, there could not have been a crop failure. Therefore, large-scale grain procurements are cited as the main reason. But as documents show, in 1932 the amount of grain seized from peasants was an order of magnitude lower than in previous years. So perhaps there really was a crop failure. After all, no one kept such statistics during these years. And crop failure can be caused not only by drought, but also by heavy rainfall, and in the summer of 1932 this was recorded in many areas. Of course, you shouldn’t completely discount grain procurements. They really made the situation worse.

In addition to natural factors, the main reasons for crop failure include a decrease in the quantity and quality of livestock as a result of collectivization. In addition, in the 30s, a massive outflow of the working population from villages to cities began. In addition, the villages were poorly provided with agricultural machinery.

As a result, in the spring of 1932 the sowing campaign went extremely poorly. The sown areas were significantly reduced, and even those were depleted and massively infested with pests.

New tragedy

A new famine engulfed the territory of Ukraine, the Volga region, Siberia and North Caucasus. In total, more than 60 million people found themselves in the disaster zone, which significantly exceeded the figures of the 20s. Most of them were concentrated in villages, but there were also plenty of starving people in cities. These were mainly those who did not receive food rations at work.

With the advent of famine, all the horrors associated with it returned: cannibalism, disease, social and mental degradation of people. During the famine in the Volga region (1932-1933), the number of victims reached enormous numbers. Entire villages died out.

Government policy

The local leadership was declared the main culprit for the resulting famine. According to Stalin, in pursuit of industrialization, local leaders paid little attention to agriculture, carrying out total, equalizing grain procurements. In such conditions, it was decided to allocate large seed and cash loans to local peasant farms. But these measures did not suit the local collective farmers. They abandoned collective farms en masse and went around the country for a better life.

Then the government took measures to tighten control over the movement of peasants. Stalin tried at all costs to preserve the collective farm system and secure peasants in collective farms. He understood perfectly well that without centralized agriculture the country simply could not survive in those conditions. And the conditions were the most unfavorable. This was especially true for international affairs. Hitler's rise to power, aggressive military policy Japan, the hidden and obvious hostility of the European superpowers and the United States did not leave room for maintaining a center of resistance within the country. You can argue as much as you like about the causes of the new famine, but one thing remains indisputable - it helped Stalin extinguish the last pockets of resistance to the policies of Soviet power.

And of course, there was no talk of any kind of foreign assistance this time. But at least a decision was made to temporarily stop grain exports abroad. Plus, by order of Stalin, the principles of grain procurements were changed. Now local governments could not decide on the amount of grain to be harvested. All standards began to come down from above. Moreover, realizing the technical backwardness Soviet collective farms, launched a campaign technical modernization peasant farms.

Demographic crisis

The archives of the civil registry offices that remain intact make it possible to assess the full scale of the tragedy that has engulfed the country. In famine-stricken areas, mortality in 1932-1933 increased by 1.5-3.5 times. Moreover, from the records one can definitely conclude that people died precisely from exhaustion. In addition to mortality, there was also a significant drop in the birth rate.

Along with the famine, epidemics of already forgotten diseases returned: typhoid fever, cholera, malaria and others. Eating all kinds of surrogates led to widespread diseases of dysentery.

In recent years, it has become fashionable to talk about the national specifics of the famine of 1932-1933. Ukrainian historians are especially guilty of this, claiming that it was created centrally and aimed at destroying the Ukrainian people. Such reasoning has no evidence base. From hunger in the Volga region (photos of suffering, exhausted, hungry people are posted in the article) in equally Both Russians and citizens of other nationalities suffered. IN to a greater extent it depended on the territorial location and economic specialization district. Particularly affected were regions specializing in commercial grain production.

Scientists conducted a large-scale analysis of population census data from 1926 and 1937 and found that in Ukraine alone, between 3 and 3.5 million people died during the famine. And if we take into account that population growth during this period decreased by about one and a half million, it turns out that the total human losses fluctuated around 5 million people. And the demographic losses of the Volga region amounted to about 1 million people. Kazakhstan also accounted for 1 million people.

Modern methods of mathematical historical research help determine an approximate figure for overall demographic losses. It varies from 5 to 7 million people. Of these, Russia accounted for approximately 2.5 million.

Famine of 1933: agrarian chaos and government policy

The peak of the famine in the Volga region in 1933 occurred in February. At this time, 1,300,000 tons of grain were sent to areas in need for food needs, including sowing work. But such a quantity was not enough. And the aid itself was intended only for members of collective farms. But they also stopped issuing it to collective farmers if they did not fulfill the norms for agricultural work.

Thus it was completely disbanded usual way of life life of the Russian village, in which, in case of hunger, the peasants hoped for the help of wealthy fellow villagers. Now the collective farm was the guarantor of survival. It became impossible to leave the village without special permission, thereby stopping migration from agricultural zones.

Conclusion

The famine in the Volga region of 1932-1933 was primarily a result of the agrarian policy of the Soviet leadership and only secondarily a consequence natural disasters. But there is no point in talking about any national or social genocide within the framework of famine.

What happened in 1932? Let me remind you that the famine of 1932-1933 was preceded by a number of important events. Cold and snowless winters in Ukraine have been repeated for two years in a row. They ended with “almost complete destruction of winter crops.” Then there was a bad harvest in 1931. The 1932 sowing campaign was carried out exceptionally poorly. According to various estimates, the sown area in 1932 decreased by 14-25% compared to 1931. M. Tauger71 gives a figure for under-seeding of 9%. In addition, the fields were sown with less grain per hectare than normal. In some cases, the amount of unsown grain per hectare reached 40%. The sowing campaign went on for an unprecedentedly long time - with average duration for about a week in 1932 in the North Caucasus it lasted 35-40 days72. There is a lot of talk about how the USSR government allegedly forcibly raked grain from the peasants. However, this was not the case at all. When information came from the field about the poor conduct of spring field work, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, by a decree of May 6, 1932, reduced the procurement plan73. The procurement plan was approved for collective farms and individual farmers (the USSR as a whole) at 18.5 million, i.e. 10% lower. At the same time, grain procurement plans for state farms were increased from 1.7 to 2.5 million tons74. The Central Committee not only lowered the procurement plan, but also allowed collective farms and peasants to trade grain on the market based on market prices75. Many even thought that the May 6 decree meant the introduction of a new NEP, since it allowed free trade. Then, for Ukraine, by the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated July 6, 1932, the grain procurement plan from the 1932 harvest was set at 356 million poods (5.7 million tons). On October 22, 1932, the procurement plan was reduced by another 70 million poods. In November 1932, when it became clear that the harvest was very low, the procurement plan was reduced again. For example, for the North Caucasus the plan was reduced from 2.18 million tons to 1.55 million tons76. On January 14, 1933, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine adopted a resolution in which it again reduced the plan - by 29.4 million poods (0.47 million tons). After the official completion of procurement on February 5, 1933, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U S.V. Kosior in his report77 indicated that the total plan for collective farms and individual farmers was reduced from 356 million poods (5.7 million tons) to 218 million poods (3.5 million tons). This is indirectly confirmed by the Chairman of the Council for the Study of the Productive Forces of Ukraine A.G. Shlikhter in his speech at the 17th Congress of the CPSU(b)78,79. Thus, original plan grain procurements in the USSR by January 1933 “was reduced by 17% to 17.045 million tons”80.81. In total, the state “took” no more than 248 million poods (4 million tons) of grain from the Ukrainian peasants from the 1932 harvest until July 1, 1933. To obtain grain from peasants in 1932, the government used several methods, such as contracts with producers, market exchange and non-market measures, which were actually called the term “procurement”82. Supporters of the hypothesis that the peasants' grain was raked clean forget an important psychological point. They forget that the peasants are not fools and would not allow everything to be raked away from them so that there would be nothing left for food and sowing, if the remaining norm were lower than the hunger norm. They already had experience of the famine of 1920, experience of working with food detachments. The harvesters would simply be killed, as the peasants did in 1918, when food detachments tried to take more than the starvation norm. Therefore, it is impossible to rake everything out - they simply wouldn’t let it. However, one should not understand the matter to mean that everything was done without errors. As always in Rus', local excesses were a widespread phenomenon. The grain collection situation can be judged from the minutes of the REC meeting dated November 18, 1932, “On measures to strengthen grain procurements in the region.” Due to the fact that the deadline for completing grain procurements ended on December 1, 1932, the REC decided: “Village councils should organize the confiscation of stolen grain from individual collective farmers and individual farms (here it is, confirmation of total theft. - Author) on collective farms. Confiscation should be carried out primarily from quitters, grabbers and declassed elements who have a small number of workdays... Impose a fine on the Jewish collective farm named after. K. Liebknecht by additional change meat to the state." When collecting food, according to eyewitnesses, local executors committed excesses - they took all the food. A. Kolpakidi and E. Prudnikova write in their book about Stalin “Double Conspiracy”83. “Sholokhov told us what livestock harvesting looked like on the Don. “There was a real war going on in the farmsteads—farmers and others who came for the cows were beaten with whatever they could, mostly women and children (teenagers) were beaten; the collective farmers themselves rarely got involved, and where they got involved, it ended in murder.” As for bread, in July 1932 grain procurements amounted to only 55% of the already low plan. Now the collective farms had declared a “grain strike,” refusing to hand over grain at extremely low purchase prices, virtually for nothing, and Kaganovich’s method was spreading everywhere, according to which villages and stanitsa that did not pay taxes were “forbidden to sell their products.” The secret resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated December 14, 1932 “On grain procurements in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Western Region,” signed by V. Molotov and I. Stalin, determined exactly how to punish “organizers of sabotage of grain procurements” (including those who had a party card) - deportation, arrest, imprisonment in a concentration camp for a long time, execution - the resolution “suggested” the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U and the Council of People’s Commissars of Ukraine “to pay serious attention to correct execution Ukrainization, eliminate its mechanical implementation, expel Petliura and other bourgeois-nationalist elements from the party and Soviet organizations, carefully select and educate Ukrainian Bolshevik cadres, ensure systematic party leadership and control over the implementation of Ukrainization”84. There was also plenty of idiocy on the ground. Individual farmers especially did not want to hand over grain, so local leaders asked for permission to carry out threshing jointly “under the control of the Council”85. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Belarus of Ukraine ordered the application of natural fines in the form of establishing additional tasks for meat procurement in the amount of a 15-month norm86. Is it any wonder that cows and oxen were slaughtered? The plans went down “by district.” If you did it, well done, if you didn’t do it, they might shoot you. In the region, the vast majority of farms FAILED TO COMPLETE the plan. Question: where will they go to “earn interest”? Naturally, anywhere. And they will rake it out to the skin. Part of the above-plan procurement was imposed on well-functioning collective farms. However, on January 19, 1933, above-plan procurement was prohibited by a decision of the Party Central Committee87. Directives about how many “kulaks” and “sub-kulaks” there are in which province and how they should be dealt with were sent from Moscow through the OGPU, and not through the party line88. If we remember that at that time the country was actually ruled by the NKVD (or rather, Yagoda) and that a conspiracy within the NKVD was later discovered, then the manner in which collectivization was carried out could well have been designed to create conditions for a social explosion. On November 6, 1932, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued the following resolution: “Due to the shameful failure of the grain harvesting campaign in some regions of Ukraine, the Council People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Party of Ukraine orders local party and governing bodies to put an end to the sabotage of grain, which was organized by counter-revolutionary and kulak elements. It is necessary to brand those communists who led this sabotage and completely eliminate the passive attitude towards it on the part of some party organizations. Council of People's Commissars and Central Committee jointly decided to take note of all those areas in which criminal sabotage was carried out and apply the following penalties to them: - suspend all deliveries of goods of state trade and the cooperative network to these areas. Close all government and cooperative retail outlets. Remove all available goods; - ban the sale of main types food products, which were previously managed by collective farms and private owners; - suspend the issuance of all loans to these localities and immediately cancel previously issued loans; - carefully examine the personal files of management and business organizations in order to identify hostile elements; - carry out similar work on collective farms in order to identify all the hostile elements that took part in the sabotage.” The decree provided for the compilation of blacklists of those villages that were found guilty of sabotage and sabotage. Initially, these lists included 6 villages; by December 15, 1932, it included 88 districts out of 358 into which Ukraine was divided. Here's just one example. “Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6)U on the blacklisting of villages that maliciously sabotage grain procurements” “The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee decide: For the obvious disruption of the grain procurement plan and malicious sabotage organized by kulak and counter-revolutionary elements, the following villages are blacklisted: With. Verbka, s. Gavrilovka, Dnepropetrovsk region village. Lyutenki, s. Stone Streams, Kharkov region, With. Svyatotroitskoe, village Sands, Odessa region. In relation to these villages, carry out the following measures: 1. Immediate cessation of the supply of goods, complete cessation of cooperative and state trade on the spot and removal of all available goods from the corresponding cooperative and state shops. 2. Complete cessation of collective farm trade for both collective farms, collective farmers, and individual farmers. 3. Termination of all types of lending, early collection of loans and other financial obligations.” Regional authorities were additionally included on the “black boards” lower level 380 collective farms and 51 villages89. Please note that the resolution does not say anything about the forcible seizure of bread. Villages that do not hand over bread are punished mainly economically. Meanwhile, these measures did not help. Blacklisting villages where trade was limited did not have an effect, since the villages were saturated with manufactured goods and everything needed could be obtained in the regional center90. There are facts that the country's leaders did not want any excesses. Thus, Molotov corrected the zealous procurers. In a letter to the secretary of the All-Union Communist Party of Belarus of Ukraine, Khataevich, he writes: “The Bolshevik, on reflection... must prioritize meeting the needs of the proletarian state. On the other hand, one cannot go to the opposite opportunistic extreme: “take any grain anywhere, without being counted, etc.”91. The food situation deteriorated sharply at the end of 1932 and especially in the first half of 1933. In the fall of 1932, food supply standards even for Kyiv workers were reduced from 3 pounds to 1.5 pounds, and for white collar workers (workers not engaged in manual labor) from 1 to 0.5 pounds92. Therefore, some sources claim that the beginning of the famine dates back to the end of the summer of 1932. This is unlikely. As long as there is no snow cover, in the countryside you can find food in forests and rivers. Yes, food difficulties began back in 1932. In 44 regions of Ukraine there was a shortage of food, famine began, but by the summer everything had more or less returned to normal. Actually, the famine began in the winter at the end of 1932, but it became widespread in the spring of 1933. On March 15, Kosior reported to Stalin: “In total, according to the registration of the GPU in Ukraine, 103 districts are affected by famine”93. According to the recollections of most eyewitnesses, the peak of the famine occurred in the early spring of 1933, and its end in the early summer of 1933. So, in the winter of 1932/33 there was a severe famine. Contrary to claims Ukrainian nationalists, there was famine not only in Ukraine, but practically throughout the USSR. The Soviet scientist V.V. Kondrashin94 documented that there was famine not only in Ukraine, but also in the Volga region. Western historian Werth95 also admits that the famine affected many areas outside of Ukraine, including the Moscow and even Ivanovo regions. The whole country was starving, including Moscow. It would not hurt to remember that Transcaucasia was also starving (in Baku, for example, schoolchildren received 70 g of bread a day), the North-East of the European part of the USSR was starving, Ivanovo region, Kuzbass, Northern region, Western region, Far East, Gorky region, Ural96. Here is one of the documents proving the fact of famine in the Urals. Special message from the SPO OGPU about food difficulties in the DCK and Ural region. April 3, 1933 “Troitsky district of the Ural region. On the collective farm. Stalin Mikhailovsky village council, the corpses of cattle killed by glanders, drenched in carbolic solution, are taken away from the cattle burial ground by national collective farmers and Russians and used for food. Due to labor difficulties, sharp negative sentiments are noted among collective farmers: “Did I think that in the summer I worked until I dropped, ragged, naked, barefoot, so that now I could sit without bread and swell from hunger, because I have seven of them and everyone sits and shouts: “Give me some bread!” - how can a mother bear this? I’ll go lie down under the tractor, I can’t bear this suffering.” Beginning SPO OGPU Molchanov. Pom. beginning SPO OGPU Lyushkov." However, the famine had different intensity in different regions of the USSR. This is evidenced by at least the map of mortality rates presented on Wikipedia97. In Ukraine, the mortality rate was especially high in the Kyiv region98, as well as in the Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk regions, where the Russian population was very high, which speaks against the assertion that the government starved only Ukrainians. But even within the same region, mortality, and therefore famine, had different intensities. Ukrainian emigrants testified that remote villages suffered more from hunger than those located closer to the city99. According to M. Tauger100, the main reason for the differences in the intensity of hunger is the result of the presence of a large city near the village. For example, according to Tauger himself, the famine was most intense in the villages around Kyiv, then the largest city in Ukraine. Likewise, having more industrial centers The east of Ukraine was more susceptible to famine than the west of Ukraine, where there are not very many large cities. Kyiv region almost never suffered from droughts and suddenly it was there that the most high mortality rate from the famine of 1932-1933 (based on the mortality map published on Wikipedia in 1933 in Ukraine). This circumstance is related to the law established by I.G. von Thunen101, the famous German specialist in economic geography, which more than a hundred years ago proved that around large cities there are those industries that produce perishable products, as well as types of agricultural crops that have a significant volume and weight in relation to their value. In the area closest to the city, horticulture and vegetable farming in combination with dairy farming are developing most profitably and intensively. As you move away from the city, those products are produced that are cheaper to transport relative to their cost. Peasants in areas close to the city exchange their products for goods from the city and for grain, which is produced in areas more distant from the city. Under the conditions of 1932-1933, bread was delivered to the city in limited quantities. Therefore, the peasants of the villages nearby the city were unable to stock up on grain, and by the end of winter they had nothing to eat, since the products they produced, usually perishable, had run out. But if the village was starving, then the cities in 1932-1933 lived from hand to mouth, with a rationed distribution of food. E.A. Osokina in her book “Hierarchy of Consumption. About people's lives under Stalin's supply conditions. 1928-1935." talks in detail about the supply of the urban population in the early 30s102. In 1931, the government reduced rations for many categories of people and excluded entire groups of workers and even entire cities from the food supply system. Even greater restrictions were introduced in 1932. As M. Dolot testifies103, “to city residents, food was distributed via grain cards in such small quantities that the peasants could not count on their help.” The fact that the famine also affected the cities is evidenced by the increase in mortality of the urban population in 1932-1933. Thus, from January to July 1932, the mortality rate among the urban population of Kyiv increased by 70%. It grew by a third at this time even in Moscow104. According to Central Administration national economic accounting (TSUNHU), in 1933 for the urban population negative natural increase was equal to 374.6 thousand people. In 1933, the total number of deaths in the cities of the RSFSR and Ukraine was higher than in the more prosperous previous and subsequent years. The reason for this situation is hunger in the cities due to decreased supply standards. In 1932, food shortages severely weakened workers and forced many of them to leave their places in search of food. Famine struck even Dneprostroy. In many industries, labor turnover exceeded 100% within a few months, and production levels fell to 1928 levels. Workers stood in huge lines for bread, often in work time. Many demands for increased supplies, coming from regions where there was a high priority industry, were left without consequences105. Smallpox, typhus, tuberculosis spread...106 The famine even affected workers who performed priority work of extremely high importance for the state, and soldiers of the Red Army107, since at the end of May 1932 food supplies for the military were reduced by 16%108. It remains to add that in 1933 the situation was even more difficult. Failure to comply with even the above standards has become not the exception, but the rule. Not to mention the workers in the Holodomor regions. Note that this is about those places where they were supposed to eat bread collected, as stated, “for genocide.” That is, the cities of the USSR in 1932-1933. They also experienced severe food shortages.