Which European conflict ended with the Paris Treaty. The struggle for the abolition of restrictive articles of the Paris Peace Treaty

The agreement that completed Crimean War 1853 56. Having signed in Paris on March 18 (30) it will conclude. meeting of the Congress of Powers by representatives of Russia (A. F. Orlov and F. I. Brunnov), Austria (K. Buol, I. Gübner), France (A. Valevsky, F. Bourkene), ... ... Soviet historical encyclopedia

Treaty that ended the Crimean War of 1853 56 (See Crimean War of 1853 56). Signed in Paris on March 18 (30) at the final meeting of the Congress of Powers by representatives of Russia (A. F. Orlov, F. I. Brunnov), France (A. Valevsky, F. Burkene) ...

Treaty of Paris, Treaty of Paris: Treaty of Paris (1259) between English and French kings about the former’s renunciation of claims to Normandy, Maine and other French territories lost by England under John the Landless, but... ... Wikipedia

The Paris Peace Treaty (treaty) was signed on March 18 (30), 1856. Its discussion took place at the congress that opened on February 13 (25), 1856 in the capital of France. Russia, France, England, Austria, Turkey and Sardinia took part in the congress... Wikipedia

The preliminary agreement that completed the Russian Turkish war 1877 78. Signed on February 19 (March 3) in San Stefano (now Yesilkoy, near Istanbul) on the Russian side by Count N.P. Ignatiev and A.I. Nelidov, with the Turkish Safvet... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

Treaty of Paris, Treaty of Paris, Peace of Paris: Treaty of Paris (1229) between Count Raymond VII of Toulouse and King Louis IX of France, graduated from Albigensian crusade. Treaty of Paris (1259) between... ... Wikipedia

Treaty of Paris (1259) between the English and French kings on the former's renunciation of claims to Normandy, Maine and other French territories lost by England under John the Landless, but preserving Guienne. The agreement was one of the reasons... ... Wikipedia

In the name of God almighty. Their Majesties the Emperor of All Russia, the Emperor of the French, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of Sardinia and the Ottoman Emperor, prompted by the desire to put an end to the disasters of the war and at the same time prevent the resumption of the misunderstandings and difficulties that gave rise to it, decided to enter into an agreement with E.V. the Austrian Emperor regarding the grounds for the restoration and establishment of peace, ensuring the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire by mutual valid guarantee. To this end, Their Majesties were appointed as their representatives (see signatures):

These plenipotentiaries, upon the exchange of their powers, found in due order, decreed the following articles:

From the day of the exchange of ratifications of this treatise, there will be forever peace and friendship between E.V. the All-Russian Emperor with one, and E.V. the Emperor of the French, her century. the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, H.V. the King of Sardinia and H.I.V. the Sultan - on the other hand, between their heirs and successors, states and subjects.

As a result of the happy restoration of peace between their Majesties, the lands conquered and occupied by their troops during the war will be cleared by them. Special conditions will be established regarding the procedure for the movement of troops, which must be carried out as soon as possible.

ARTICLE III

E.v. The All-Russian Emperor undertakes to return to E.V. Sultan the city of Kars with its citadel, as well as other parts of the Ottoman possessions occupied by Russian troops.

Their Majesties the Emperor of the French, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of Sardinia and the Sultan undertake to return to E.V. the All-Russian Emperor the cities and ports: Sevastopol, Balaklava, Kamysh, Evpatoria, Kerch-Yenikale, Kinburn, as well as all other places occupied allied forces.

Their Majesties the Emperor of All Russia, the Emperor of the French, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of Sardinia and the Sultan grant full forgiveness to those of their subjects who were guilty of any complicity with the enemy during the continuation of hostilities. At the same time, it is decided that this general forgiveness will be extended to those subjects of each of the warring powers who during the war remained in the service of another of the warring powers.

The prisoners of war will be immediately returned from both sides.

ARTICLE VII

E.V. Emperor of All Russia, E.V. Emperor of Austria, E.V. Emperor of the French, her century. The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, H.V. the King of Prussia and H.V. the King of Sardinia announce that Sublime Porte is recognized as participating in the benefits of common law and the union of European powers. Their Majesties undertake, each for their part, to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, ensure with their joint guarantees the exact observance of this obligation and, as a result, will consider any action in violation of it as a matter relating to general rights and benefits.

ARTICLE VIII

If any disagreement arises between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other powers that have concluded this treaty, which could threaten the preservation of friendly relations between them, then both the Sublime Porte and each of these powers, without resorting to the use of force, have the right to deliver to the other contracting parties the opportunity to prevent any further conflict through its mediation.

E.I.V. Sultan, in constant concern for the welfare of his subjects, granted a firman, by which their lot is improved without distinction of religion or tribe, and his magnanimous intentions regarding the Christian population of his empire are confirmed, and wishing to give new proof of his in this regarding feelings, he decided to communicate to the contracting powers the said firman, issued at his own prompting. The contracting powers recognize the high importance of this message, understanding that in no case will it give these powers the right to interfere, jointly or separately, in the relations of E.V. the Sultan with his subjects and in the internal administration of his empire.

The Convention of July 13, 1841, which established the observance of the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire regarding the closing of the entrance to the Bosporus and Dardanelles, was subjected to a new consideration by common consent. An act concluded by the high contracting parties in accordance with the above rule is attached to this treaty and will have the same force and effect as if it formed an inseparable part thereof.

The Black Sea is declared neutral: entry into the ports and waters of all nations, open to merchant shipping, is formally and forever prohibited to military vessels, both coastal and all other powers, with the only exceptions that are stipulated in Articles XIV and XIX of this treaty.

ARTICLE XII

Trade in the ports and on the waters of the Black Sea, free from any obstacles, will be subject only to quarantine, customs, and police regulations, drawn up in a spirit favorable to the development of trade relations. In order to provide all the desired benefits to the benefits of trade and navigation of all peoples, Russia and the Sublime Porte will admit consuls to their ports on the shores of the Black Sea, in accordance with the rules of international law.

ARTICLE XIII

Due to the declaration of the Black Sea as neutral on the basis of Article XI, there cannot be a need to maintain or establish naval arsenals on the shores of it, as they no longer have a purpose, and therefore E.V. the All-Russian Emperor and E.I.V. Sultan undertake not to establish or leave no naval arsenal on these shores.

ARTICLE XIV

Their Majesties the All-Russian Emperor and the Sultan concluded a special convention defining the number and strength of light ships that they allow themselves to maintain in the Black Sea for the necessary orders along the coast. This convention is annexed to this treaty and will have the same force and effect as if it formed an integral part thereof. It can neither be destroyed nor changed without the consent of the powers that have concluded this treaty.

The contracting parties, by mutual consent, decide that the rules established by the Act of the Congress of Vienna for navigation on rivers separating or flowing through different possessions will henceforth be fully applied to the Danube and its mouths. They declare that this resolution is henceforth recognized as belonging to the general national European law and is confirmed by their mutual guarantee. Navigation on the Danube will not be subject to any difficulties or duties other than those specifically defined in the following articles. As a result of this, no payment will be collected for the actual navigation on the river and no duty will be charged on goods constituting the cargo of ships. Police and quarantine rules necessary for the safety of states along this river must be drawn up in such a way that they are as favorable as possible to the movement of ships. Apart from these rules, no obstacles of any kind will be established to free navigation.

ARTICLE XVI

To put into effect the provisions of the previous article, a commission will be established, in which Russia, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey will each have their own deputy. This commission will be entrusted with designing and carrying out the work necessary to clear the Danube arms, starting from Isakchi and the adjacent parts of the sea, from sand and other obstacles blocking them, so that this part of the river and the mentioned parts of the sea become completely convenient for navigation. To cover the costs necessary both for this work and for establishments aimed at facilitating and ensuring navigation on the Danube arms, constant duties will be established on ships, commensurate with the need, which must be determined by the commission by a majority vote and with the indispensable condition, that in this respect and in all others, perfect equality will be observed regarding the flags of all nations.

ARTICLE XVII

A commission will also be established consisting of members from Austria, Bavaria, the Sublime Porte and Wirtemberg (one from each of these powers); they will also be joined by the commissioners of the three Danube principalities, appointed with the approval of the Porte. This commission, which should be permanent, has: 1) draw up rules for river navigation and river police; 2) remove all obstacles of any kind that still arise in the application of the provisions of the Vienna Treaty to the Danube; 3) to propose and carry out the necessary work along the entire course of the Danube; 4) upon the abolition of the general provisions of Article XVI of the European Commission, to monitor the maintenance of the Danube arms and the parts of the sea adjacent to them in a state appropriate for navigation.

ARTICLE XVIII

The General European Commission must fulfill everything entrusted to it, and the Coastal Commission must complete all the work indicated in the previous article, Nos. 1 and 2, within two years. Upon receipt of news of this, the powers that have concluded this treaty will decide on the abolition of the common European Commission, and from now on the power that has hitherto been vested in the common European Commission will be transferred to the Permanent Coastal Commission.

ARTICLE XIX

In order to ensure the implementation of the rules that will be established by common consent on the basis of the principles set out above, each of the contracting powers will have the right to maintain at any time two light seagoing vessels at the Danube estuaries.

In return for the cities, ports and lands indicated in Article 4 of this treatise, and to further ensure freedom of navigation along the Danube, E.V. the All-Russian Emperor agrees to draw a new border line in Bessarabia. The beginning of this boundary line is set at a point on the Black Sea coast at a distance of one kilometer east of the salt lake Burnasa; it will join perpendicularly to the Akerman road, along which it will follow to Trajanova Val, go south of Bolgrad and then up the Yalpuhu River to the heights of Saratsik and to Katamori on the Prut. From this point up the river, the previous border between the two empires remains unchanged. The new boundary line must be marked in detail by special commissioners of the contracting powers.

ARTICLE XXI

The expanse of land ceded by Russia will be annexed to the Principality of Moldova under supreme power The Sublime Porte. Those living in this area of land will enjoy the rights and benefits assigned to the Principalities, and for three years they will be allowed to move to other places and freely dispose of their property.

ARTICLE XXII

The principalities of Wallachia and Moldova will, under the supreme authority of the Porte and with the guarantee of the contracting powers, enjoy the advantages and benefits that they enjoy now. None of the sponsoring powers is granted exclusive protection over them. No special right to interfere in their internal affairs is allowed.

ARTICLE XXIII

The Sublime Porte undertakes to maintain independent and national government in these Principalities, as well as complete freedom religion, legislation, trade and shipping. The laws and regulations currently in force there will be revised. For a complete agreement regarding this revision, a special commission will be appointed, on the composition of which the high contracting powers will agree. This commission must meet in Bucharest without delay; the Commissioner of the Sublime Porte will be with her. This commission has the task of examining the present situation of the Principalities and proposing the basis for their future structure.

ARTICLE XXIV

E.V. Sultan promises to immediately convene a special sofa in each of the two regions, which should be composed in such a way that it can serve as a faithful representative of the benefits of all classes of society. These divans will be tasked with expressing the wishes of the population regarding the final structure of the principalities. The relationship of the commission to these sofas will be determined by special instructions from Congress.

ARTICLE XXV

Having taken the opinion presented by both Divans into due consideration, the Commission will immediately report to the present conference venue the results of its own labors.

The final agreement with the supreme power over the Principalities must be approved by a convention, which will be concluded by the high contracting parties in Paris, and Hati-Sherif, who agrees with the provisions of the convention, will be given the final organization of these areas with the general guarantee of all the signatory powers.

ARTICLE XXVI

The Principalities will have a national armed force to maintain internal security and ensure border security. No obstacles will be allowed in the event of emergency measures of defense which, with the consent of the Sublime Porte, may be taken in the Principalities to repel invasion from without.

ARTICLE XXVII

If the internal tranquility of the Principalities is endangered or disturbed, the Sublime Porte will enter into an agreement with the other contracting powers on the measures necessary to preserve or restore legal order. Without prior agreement between these powers there can be no armed intervention.

ARTICLE XXVIII

The Principality of Serbia remains, as before, under the supreme authority of the Sublime Porte, in agreement with the imperial Khati-Sherifs, who affirm and define its rights and advantages with the general joint guarantee of the contracting powers. Consequently, the said Principality will retain its independent and national government and complete freedom of religion, legislation, trade and navigation.

ARTICLE XXIX

The Sublime Porte retains the right to maintain a garrison, determined by previous regulations. Without prior agreement between the High Contracting Powers, no armed intervention in Serbia can be allowed.

ARTICLE XXX

E.V. the All-Russian Emperor and E.V. Sultan maintain intact their possessions in Asia, in the composition in which they were legally located before the break. In order to avoid any local disputes, the boundary lines will be verified and, if necessary, corrected, but in such a way that no damage to land ownership can result from this for either side. To this end, immediately after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Russian court and the Sublime Porte, a commission composed of two Russian commissioners, two Ottoman commissioners, one French commissioner and one English commissioner will be sent to the place. She must complete the task entrusted to her within eight months, counting from the date of exchange of ratifications of this treaty.

ARTICLE XXXI

The lands occupied during the war by the troops of Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the King of Sardinia, on the basis of the conventions signed at Constantinople on March 12, 1854, between France, Great Britain and the Sublime Porte, on June 14 of the same year between Sublime Porte and Austria, and on March 15, 1855, between Sardinia and the Sublime Porte, will be cleared after the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, as soon as possible. To determine the timing and means of fulfilling this, an agreement must follow between the Sublime Porte and the powers whose troops occupied the lands of its possessions.

ARTICLE XXXII

Until the treaties or conventions that existed before the war between the warring powers are renewed or replaced by new acts, mutual trade, both import and export, must be carried out on the basis of the regulations that had force and effect before the war, and with the subjects of these powers in all In other respects, we will act on a par with the most favored nations.

ARTICLE XXXIII

The convention concluded on this date between E.V. the Emperor of All Russia on one side, and Their Majesties the Emperor of the French and the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on the other hand, regarding the Aland Islands, is and remains attached to this treatise and will have the same force and effect. action, as if it constituted an inseparable part of it.

ARTICLE XXXIV

This treaty will be ratified and ratifications thereof will be exchanged in Paris within four weeks, and if possible, earlier. In assurance of what, etc.

In Paris, on the 30th day of March 1856.

SIGNED:
Orlov [Russia]
Brunnov [Russia]
Buol-Schauenstein [Austria]
Gübner [Austria]
A. Valevsky [France]
Bourquenay [France]
Clarendon [UK]
Cowley [UK]
Manteuffel [Prussia]
Hatzfeldt [Prussia]
C. Cavour [Sardinia]
De Villamarina [Sardinia]
Aali [Türkiye]
Megemed Cemil [Türkiye]

Collection of treaties between Russia and other states. 1856−1917. M., 1952. P. 23−34.

The main task Russian foreign policy 1856 - 1871 there was a struggle for the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris Peace, which prohibited Russia from keeping military ships and building fortresses on the Black Sea. Russia could not put up with a situation in which it was black sea border remained unprotected and open to military attack. The economic and political interests of the country, as well as the security interests of the state, required the cancellation of the neutralization of the Black Sea. But this task had to be solved in conditions of foreign policy isolation and military-economic backwardness not through military means, but through diplomacy, using the contradictions of the European powers. This explains such a major role of diplomacy in these years.

Relations of Russia with other states in 1856 - 1871. were determined by their position on the issue of revising individual articles of the Paris Treaty. France, given the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, hoped for Russian support in the Austro-French conflict over lands in Northern Italy. Russia, in turn, hoped for this to receive the help of France in solving eastern question.

Even at the Paris Congress, there was a rapprochement between Russia and France, which did not stop until 1863. Both states acted in concert at the Paris Conference of 1858, which discussed the situation of the Danube principalities. Decision accelerated the formation of a unified Romanian state in 1859. In March 1859, a secret agreement was concluded between Russia and France, according to which Russia promised benevolent neutrality in the event of a war between France and Austria.

As a result of the Austro-French War of 1859, France, having received Nice and Savoy, signed a peace treaty with Austria. After the victory over Austria, Napoleon IIIlost interest in an alliance with Russia. He strengthened friendly relations with England.

Russian-French relations deteriorated sharply over time Polish uprising 1863, when France and England demanded that the tsar convene a pan-European congress to resolve the Polish issue. On the contrary, Prussia, afraid of losing Polish lands, supported the policies of the Russian autocracy. Solidarity with tsarism in Polish question led to the restoration of friendly Russian-Prussian relations, broken during the Crimean War. Prussia tried to use the improvement in relations with Russia to solve the main issue for it - the reunification of Germany. In the outbreak of the Danish-Prussian war of 1864 over Schleswig and Holstein, which were subordinate to Denmark, and in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. Tsarism maintained a position of benevolent neutrality towards Prussia.

The defeats of Denmark and Austria strengthened Prussia's military power and influence in Europe, which posed a particular danger to France as a border state. The struggle for hegemony in Western Europe inevitably led these states to war. In August 1870, France declared war on Prussia. In September 1870 french army was defeated at Sedan, and NapoleonIIIsurrendered. In March 1871, power in Paris passed into the hands of the working class. After 72 days Paris Commune was strangled by the combined efforts of European reaction.

As a result of Prussia's military victories over European states in the 60s and 70s, the capture of Alsace and Lorraine was created German Empire, standing on long years hotbed of wars in Europe.

The Franco-Prussian War created for Russia a new, in the words of V.I. Lenin, “extraordinarily profitable international situation..." Defeated France was losing its leading position in Europe and the Middle East; Austria, having been defeated in the Austro-Prussian War, also did not pose much of a threat. The prospect of eliminating the restrictive articles of the Paris Peace was becoming quite real.

Even during the Franco-Prussian War, on October 19 (31), 1870, the Russian government published in the Government Gazette a circular dispatch from A. M. Gorchakov, which spoke of the violation of the Treaty of Paris by the European powers and indicated that Russia, due to this no longer considers itself bound by the articles that limit its rights in the Black Sea, and refuses to comply with them. A. M. Gorchakov’s circular dispatch aroused opposition from the Western powers. The British government even resorted to a military threat. But the situation in Europe did not allow matters to come to war. England had no allies; France was at war with Prussia; Russian troops were at the borders of Austria; Italy was busy fighting for the reunification of the country. Therefore, European governments accepted the proposal of Prussian Chancellor Bismarck to convene a conference inviting the countries that signed the Treaty of Paris.

The conference, convened in London in January 1871, ended its work in March, repealing the articles prohibiting Russia from maintaining a navy and building military fortifications on the Black Sea. She confirmed the principle of closing the Black Sea straits to all foreign warships, including Russian ones.

The cancellation of the neutralization of the Black Sea was diplomatic victory Russia, which strengthened its position in the Middle East and Europe.

After Franco-Prussian War and the London Conference of 1871, the balance of power in Europe changed, new stage in Russian foreign policy, which was characterized by the intensification of its actions in the Balkans and Central Asia. Due to the increase the role of militaristic Germany and the weakening of the position of France, tsarism sought, through a loyal policy towards Germany, to prevent the possibility of its action against Russia, as well as to achieve its neutrality in the event of complications in the Middle East and Central Asia. The Russian-German rapprochement under the conditions of a united Germany entailed the strengthening of Austro-Russian relations. The Austro-Russian-German alliance was especially needed by Russia during the period of acute struggle in the Balkans and the brewing Anglo-Russian conflict in Central Asia. Under these conditions, Russia hoped to use Austria and Germany to neutralize the actions of England.

In August 1872, a congress of three emperors took place in Berlin, and in April 1873, German Emperor Wilhelm was greeted with unprecedented solemnity in St. Petersburg I. On April 24 (May 6), 1873, a military-defensive convention was signed between Russia and Germany, according to which both states, in the event of an attack by a third power, pledged to assist each other with an army of 200,000. Austria also joined this convention, but with less specific obligations. So in 1873 the “Union of Three Emperors” was created. By signing the agreement, all three states viewed the union as a barrier against the revolution and national liberation movements. But the agreement signed in 1873 did not eliminate Russian-Austrian contradictions in the Balkans; Russia could not allow a second defeat of France, which was what Germany was striving for. As a result active actions Russia in favor of France in 1875, with the diplomatic support of England, Germany was forced to abandon the attack on France, which could not but affect the weakening of the Russian-Prussian alliance.

Libmonster ID: RU-13400

The outcome of the Crimean War changed the balance of power in Europe, opening a new stage in Russian foreign policy. The Austro-Russian-Prussian alliance, which for 40 years had served as a stronghold of European reaction, collapsed; The so-called “Crimean system” emerged, the basis of which was the Anglo-French bloc directed against Russia. The latter lost her leadership role in international affairs, losing it to France. “Supremacy in Europe has passed from St. Petersburg to Paris,” 1 wrote K. Marx.

In conditions of political isolation and economic backwardness, Russia needed to “heal its wounds.” Therefore, the task of internal reorganization of the country came to the fore. Minister of Foreign Affairs A. M. Gorchakov reported to Alexander II: “When current situation of our state in Europe in general, Russia’s main attention must be persistently directed to the implementation of the cause of our development, and all foreign policy must be subordinated to this main task" 2 .

The most difficult conditions of the Treaty of Paris for Russia were the articles on the neutralization of the Black Sea, on the prohibition of keeping warships there and building fortifications on its coast. These articles deprived Russia, a Black Sea state, of the opportunity to defend its southern borders during an attack by an enemy who could appear in the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus (neutralization did not apply to the straits). In addition, they slowed down the development of foreign trade through the Black Sea ports, delaying the development southern regions countries. The central problem of Russian foreign policy after the Crimean War was the struggle to eliminate the restrictive conditions of the Paris Treaty. Developing Russian capitalism needed new markets, expansion of southern trade, and restoration of lost positions in the Balkans. The political and economic interests of the state, the protection of its security, required the abolition of the neutralization of the Black Sea. But this task, given financial and military weakness, could only be solved diplomatically, using the contradictions of the states of Western Europe. It is no coincidence that the role of diplomacy was especially significant during these years.

Russia's struggle to eliminate the restrictive clauses of the Paris Treaty, despite the importance of the problem, has not been the subject of special study. In general works on the Eastern Question and the history of international

1 K. Marx and F. Engels. Op. T. X, p. 599.

2 "Red Archive", 1939, vol. 2 (93), p. 108.

people's relations 3 scientists, as a rule, limited themselves to a brief mention of the results of the London Conference of 1871, which abolished the articles on the neutralization of the Black Sea. At the same time, they often made erroneous judgments related to both overall assessment Russia's foreign policy and the nature of the decisions of the London Conference.

Of the works of Russian pre-revolutionary historians, the issue of canceling the neutralization of the Black Sea is most thoroughly covered in the book by S. Goryainov, written in historical and legal terms, mainly based on the reports of the Russian ambassador in London F.I. Brunnov, which needs strict verification. The author did not study the internal springs of the state’s foreign policy actions at all. M. N. Pokrovsky, who correctly revealed the class orientation of the policy of the Russian autocracy, when covering specific foreign policy issues, allowed objectivism in his assessment historical facts. Thus, regarding the decisions of the London Conference of 1871, he reduced the success of Russian diplomacy only to the moral factor - satisfying the pride of Alexander II for the “offense inflicted on Russia by the Treaty of Paris” 4. In S.K. Bushuev's brochure "A.M. Gorchakov" 5, dedicated to the life and work of one of the prominent diplomats of Tsarist Russia, the problem of interest to us also did not receive detailed coverage.

Among foreign scientists, the works of the French historian E. Driot are widely known, who saw the main reason Russian-Turkish war 1877 - 1878 in canceling the neutralization of the Black Sea 6. Drio devoted a small paragraph to the London conference in the chapter on “the war in the Balkans of 1877-1878.” He focused his main attention on proving the thesis about Russia as the main aggressive power of the East and France - the “savior” of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire. The author justifies the Treaty of Paris, seeing in the neutralization of the Black Sea the basis of “balance” in the East, and condemns A. M. Gorchakov’s note dated October 19 (31), 1870. However, Drio was forced to admit that the Paris Peace “hurt Russia’s ambitions” 7 . In a slightly different aspect, but no less biased, A. Debidur wrote about Russian politics. The author's attention was primarily drawn to European politics states, and in particular the “guilt” of governments in the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War. Regarding the London Conference of 1871, Debidur is interested not so much in the balance of power at the conference and the activities of the delegates at the meetings, but in the negotiations related to the invitation of France to the conference. He assessed the conference decisions themselves as a victory for Russia, weakened by European diplomatic intervention 8 .

A different view of Russian foreign policy and the nature of the Paris Treaty is contained in the work English historian Moss. Unlike Driot, he believes that the Treaty of Paris “humiliated the national sovereignty of Russia” and was “imposed on Russia not in order to prevent its aggression in the East, but to eliminate its influence there.”

3 S. Zhigarev. Russian policy in the Eastern question. T. I - II. M. 1896; S. Goryainov. Bosphorus and Dardanelles. St. Petersburg. 1907; E. Driault. Le question d"Orient depuis ses origines jusgu"a la Grand Guerre. P. 1917; A. Debidur. Diplomatic history Europe. T. II. M. 1947; P. Renouvin. Histoire des relations Internationales. F. 5 - 6. P. 1954 - 1955; A. Taylor. The struggle for dominance in Europe. M. 1958; W. Mosse. The Rise and Fall of the Crimean system. 1855 - 1871. L. 1963; M. Anderson. The Eastern Question. N. Y. 1966.

4 M. N. Pokrovsky. Diplomacy and royal wars Russia XIX V. Ptgr. 1923, p. 243.

5 S.K. Bushuev, A.M. Gorchakov. M. 1960.

6 E. Driault. Op. cit., p. 206; E. Driault et G. Monot. Histoire politique et sociale. P. 1914, p. 359.

7 E. Driault. Op. cit., pp. 183 - 184.

8 A. Debidur. Decree. cit., p. 412.

The author claims that A. M. Gorchakov in 1870 “had the full legal and moral right to raise the issue of revising the treaty of 1856,” and that this right arose from repeated violations of the Peace of Paris by other states 9 . Moss saw the reasons for these violations in the fragility of the system created as a result of the Crimean War. The same idea about the fragility of the legal order established at the Paris Conference of 1856 is developed by the modern American scientist M. Anderson. Although he justifies the “demilitarization of the Black Sea,” which supposedly opened up a free path for trade for “merchants of all nations,” he is forced to admit that not a single state (with the exception of Germany at Versailles in 1919) was limited in its sovereignty as much as Russia on the Black Sea in 1856. Anderson, like Moss, writes about violations by European powers of the terms of the Treaty of Paris, which made Russia's demand to abolish its restrictive conditions legitimate.

This article highlights the policy of the Russian government aimed at canceling the neutralization of the Black Sea. In this regard, the circumstances that prompted the St. Petersburg Cabinet in 1866 to resume negotiations with France and Prussia regarding the elimination of the restrictive conditions of the Paris Peace and the reasons that did not allow Russia to resolve this issue in its favor are considered.

Relations of Russia with other states in 1856 - 1871. were determined by how one or another country treated its desire to revise certain articles of the Paris Treaty. Austria and England could not support Russia on this issue. Its victories in the Middle East interfered with the implementation of England's plans for the economic and political enslavement of Turkey and created a threat to Austria's possessions in the Balkans. That left Prussia and France. The first, busy with the reunification of Germany, showed no interest in the affairs of the East during these years. She verbally promised to support Russia, counting on its help in the fight against Austria for the reunification of Germany. As for France, given the Austro-Russian rivalry in the East, it hoped for Russian help in the Austro-French conflict over lands in Northern Italy. Russia, in turn, expected to receive French assistance in resolving the eastern issue in return. “On the eastern question, we are drawing closer to France, considering it as a counterweight to our opponents,” 11 Gorchakov wrote in 1856. In an alliance with France, the Russian government hoped to weaken England, revive Russia's former influence, and restore "European balance."

Considerations about the possibility of a Russian-French agreement were based on the conviction that the East for Napoleon III “is only a trifle (en appoint), which he is ready to sacrifice for the sake of his European interests"12. The validity of these assumptions was confirmed by Napoleon III's program to seize Italian lands and expand French territory to the Rhine, which would inevitably strain relations between France and Austria and speed up the emperor's appeal to Russia for help. However, it was impossible not to take into account the fact that the creators of the post-war system were England and France. The latter, in particular, at the Paris Congress proposed an article on the neutralization of the Black Sea, which Russia sought to abolish. Both countries, despite the differences that divided them, showed unity in opposing Russia's demands. Napoleon III, giving advances to St. Petersburg, constantly looked back at London. "Thoughts of Louis Napo-

9 W. Mosse. Op. cit., pp. 6, 203 - 204.

10 M. Anderson. Op. cit., pp. 144, 147.

11 Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (hereinafter referred to as AVPR), f. Office. Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for 1856, fol. 26.

12 Ibid. Foreign Secretary's Report for 1867, fol. 27.

Leon,” wrote the Russian minister in 1856, “came down to linking England with a Franco-English alliance, using naval forces England to maintain a prominent role in the affairs of the East. Napoleon's actions aimed at an agreement with Russia did not yet indicate his intention to abandon the alliance with England." 13 The existence of Anglo-French contradictions, especially acute in the Asian and African possessions of Turkey, did not interfere with England until approximately the 90s of the 19th century. see Russia as the main enemy and willingly support any combinations aimed at weakening it. Having occupied a dominant position in the Turkish economy since the 40s of the 19th century, pushing Russia out of the Turkish markets, the English bourgeoisie advocated the inviolability of international agreements concerning the Ottoman Empire 14. Support for the status quo allowed ruling class Great Britain maintained a leading role in the economy and politics of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the restoration of Russian positions in the East and the development of the national liberation struggle in the possessions of Turkey met with fierce opposition from England. "These countries (Russia and England. - N. TO.), - wrote F. Engels, “there are and will always be antagonists in the East” 15.

Russian government tried to use the French-English differences to get closer to France. Russian public opinion supported this new foreign policy course. Although Alexander II was more accustomed to traditional dynastic ties with Prussia, he was forced to reckon with the new balance of power in Europe. Grand reception provided in St. Petersburg and Moscow French Ambassador Morny in 1856 was the first step towards Russian-French rapprochement. A continuation of personal contacts was the trip of the leader. book Konstantin Nikolaevich to Paris in the spring of 1857 at the invitation of Napoleon III. The final stage of personal negotiations between the reigning persons was the meeting of the emperors in Stuttgart in September 1857, at which the Russian government tried to justify the need to revise some articles of the Treaty of Paris, and the French government tried to obtain Russia’s consent to help in the future Austro-French war. Both emperors avoided, however, some obligations. Nevertheless further move events led to the signing of a secret Russian-French agreement on February 19 (March 3), 1859, which was of a very vague nature in the part where it dealt with the revision of “currently existing treaties” 16 . This last circumstance, along with France’s position on the Polish issue, led in subsequent years to a deterioration in Russian-French relations and a rapprochement between Russia and Prussia. The latter, successfully carrying out the reunification of Germany on a militaristic basis, in 1864 - 1866. captured the territories of Schleswig and Holstein, and after the defeat of Austria, liquidated the German Confederation of States, which was a direct violation of the treaties of 1815.

The fragility of international treaties also revealed itself in the Ottoman Empire. In April 1866, the population of Moldavia and Wallachia, at an assembly in Bucharest that met to elect the head of state, confirmed the unification of the principalities, proclaimed in 1859, and elected Karl Hohenzollern as the Romanian prince. The Porte and the European cabinets at the Paris Conference, convened in May 1866 specifically to discuss this issue, agreed with the opinion of the assembly 17. Re-

13 Ibid. Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia for 1856, pp. 8 - 9.

14 On Anglo-Russian contradictions, see: V. Puryear. International Economies and Diplomacy in the Near East. L. 1935.

15 K. Marx and F. Engels. Op. T. 9, p. 13.

16 For more details, see: A. Feigina. From the history of Franco-Russian relations. Collection "Centuries". Ptgr. 1924.

17 For more details, see: V. P. Vinogradov. Russia and the unification of the Romanian principalities. M. 1961; him. Powers and unification of the Danube principalities. M. 1966.

The decisions of the Paris Conference, which ultimately recognized the legality of the unification of the principalities and the election of a foreign prince to the Romanian throne, were formally a violation of the terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the conference of 1858, which approved the separate existence of the principalities and the election of people of local origin to the rulers 18.

The liquidation of the German Confederation by Prussia and the latter’s territorial seizures, the weakening of Austria’s positions, the formation of the Kingdom of Italy and the Romanian state, the growth of the national liberation movement - all this changed political situation in Europe. Russia tried to use these changes to revise the restrictive conditions of the Paris Peace. "The French Cabinet can declare that the consequence of the German crisis is the liquidation political system, created in 1815 against France. With the same reason we can say,” Gorchakov wrote, “that these consequences eliminated the hostile alliances against Russia that resulted from the Crimean War: Austria is weakened, Prussia is territorially enlarged, France is isolated, England is busy with its own affairs. All this makes it impossible today to repeat the situation of 1854, when two European powers (France and England. - N.K.) were against us." Unlike the time of the Crimean War, when the Eastern question united all powers against Russia, in the 60s "all forces were thrown into the West." "This situation must be used for our vital interests in the East,” wrote Gorchakov. “They boil down only to the restoration of Russia’s fair demands.” 19 They were talking about canceling the neutralization of the Black Sea.

The Russian government unofficially, through its ambassadors abroad, tried to find out the attitude of the European powers and Turkey to the revision of certain articles of the Paris Peace. “We,” wrote A. M. Gorchakov to N. P. Ignatiev in Constantinople, “can benefit from violations of the Treaty of Paris in order to declare that this treaty has been liquidated.” In response to doubts expressed by Ignatiev about the timeliness of such a speech, the minister replied: “The act has been violated, we are tearing the veil off an agreement to which there is no point in being tied” 20 . Trying to interest the Turkish government in the Russian proposal, he wrote that a power that would support Russia in restoring its rights in the Black Sea “can be confident of our most active sympathies” 21 . In addition to Turkey, the St. Petersburg cabinet turned to France and Prussia. Negotiations with France, which were conducted in 1866 - 1867. in Paris and St. Petersburg, did not give positive results. Essentially, Napoleon III did not want to support Russia in its struggle to reverse the neutralization of the Black Sea. Russia, for its part, did not cooperate with France’s aspirations to seize Luxembourg and the Rhineland provinces. In parallel with negotiations with Russia, Napoleon III negotiated with Bismarck on compensation on the left bank of the Rhine for Prussia’s seizure of the North German states in 1866 - 1867. During these years, the Tuileries cabinet attached incomparable importance to the agreement with Prussia higher value than rapprochement with Russia. However, history has shown the French emperor's calculations to be erroneous.

Russian-Prussian relations developed differently during these years. Both governments were interested in mutual support: Russia - in helping Prussia in the East, Prussia - in assisting Russia in Europe. General view both cabinets on the danger of the revolutionary movement

18 "Collection of treaties between Russia and other states." M. 1952, pp. 56 - 68.

19 AVPR, f. Office. Foreign Secretary's Report for 1866, pp. 95 - 96.

20 Ibid., no. 52, pp. 263, 269.

21 L. I. Narochnitskaya. Russia and the wars of Prussia in the 60s of the XIX century. for the unification of Germany "from above". M. 1960, pp. 142 - 143.

facilitated contacts between powers. In August 1866, while negotiations were still ongoing in Paris, General Manteuffel was sent from Berlin to St. Petersburg on a special mission, equipped with government instructions. The general had to convince the tsarist government of the conservative course of Prussian policy and the legality of Prussia's territorial seizures. Manteuffel was charged with obtaining Russian consent to these territorial demands of Prussia. As for Russia's desire to free itself from the articles of the Paris Peace on the neutralization of the Black Sea, the general was asked to support these plans of Russia, provided that the Russian government itself raises this issue 22. Prussian king in a letter to Alexander II, he wrote about his desire to find out (through Manteuffel) “Russian interests, the satisfaction of which could tighten even more closely the bonds that have bound us for a whole century” 23 . The Tsar conveyed to the Prussian king “this secret thought,” which boiled down to the intention to cancel the neutralization of the Black Sea. A. M. Gorchakov, a supporter of the Russian-French alliance, was reluctant to move closer to Prussia. On August 3, 1866 (before the start of negotiations with Manteuffel), in an instruction to the Russian ambassador in Berlin P. P. Ubri, he wrote: “France cannot be eliminated from political calculations. We are preserving it. I prefer three-way negotiations than tete-a-tete with Bismarck. We give preference to an agreement with Prussia ... but we continue to support the idea of \u200b\u200bgood relations with France" 24.

During these months England made great effort to thwart the plans of St. Petersburg: she tried to get closer to France, convinced the Turkish government not to accept Ignatiev’s arguments in favor of the expediency of both states (Russia and Turkey) to eliminate the neutralization of the Black Sea, and incited anti-Russian sentiments in Vienna. London's actions met with the approval of Western European powers: the “Crimean system” was still quite strong. Russia's probing regarding the position of the governments of Europe and Turkey convinced St. Petersburg that the time to cancel the neutralization of the Black Sea had not yet come 25. Russia was not ready to fight the coalition of European powers and Turkey. The internal state of the state, a huge deficit, incomplete reforms, the absence of allies and a fleet in the Black Sea did not allow Russia to realize its intentions. Under these conditions, the Russian government was forced to take a “defensive position.” Diplomats were instructed not to drag Russia into any complications, 26 but at the same time not to forget about protecting its interests.

The international situation that developed during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 - 1871 allowed the Russian government to cancel the restrictive articles of the Treaty of Paris. France, the initiator of the proposal to introduce neutralization of the Black Sea, was busy with the war and could not counteract Russia. Prussian King Wilhelm and Chancellor Bismarck assured Alexander II that Prussia “considers Russia’s claims to the 1856 treaty to be legitimate and speaks out in this sense” 27 . Austria-Hungary, fearing a new offensive by Prussia, was not inclined to get involved in a war with Russia. England has always avoided sole participation in European wars. Without a strong anti-Russian coalition, Türkiye could not act against Russia.

The Russian ambassador in Constantinople N.P. Ignatiev, who was not without reason called the “vice-sultan,” in August 1870 (without the sanction of the Russian government) resumed a conversation with the Grand Vizier Ali pa-

22 O. Bismark. Die Gesammelten Werke. Bd. VI. B. 1930, S. 104.

23 S. Goryainov. Decree. cit., p. 127.

24 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 33, l. 440.

25 Ibid., no. 52, l. 291.

26 Ibid. Foreign Secretary's Report for 1866, pp. 99 - 101.

27 Ibid. Foreign Secretary's Report for 1870, pp. 106 - 106 vol.

talk about the abolition of the restrictive conditions of the Paris Peace. He convinced the Turkish diplomat of the mutual interest of both Russia and Turkey in this act 28 . These conversations displeased Gorchakov, who argued that their contents became known in Europe and caused more noise than Russia wanted 29 . From the reports of the Russian ambassador (who could not be denied knowledge of the situation in the East) in St. Petersburg, an idea was formed about the rapid decline French influence in Turkey and the growth of Prussian authority, which at this stage was quite satisfactory for the Russian government. For all these reasons, it considered the situation favorable for resolving the main issue of the Middle Eastern policy of states, as well as for raising the question of the return of southern Bessarabia, separated from Russia under the treaty of 1856 30 .

On October 15, 1870, Alexander II convened a meeting of the Council of Ministers to discuss the advisability of abolishing the restrictive articles of the Treaty of Paris. While agreeing with the timeliness of such a decision, many ministers expressed fears that the consequence of Russia’s unilateral actions could result in a war, for which it is necessary to prepare. Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, supporting the government project, considered it possible “to limit ourselves to a statement about the abolition of the articles of the Paris Treaty relating only to the Black Sea, without touching on the territorial issue,” on the grounds that it could cause complications with neighboring states 31 . The Council of Ministers, headed by the Tsar, agreed with these arguments of Milyutin. Subsequently, the government did not raise the issue of the Danube part of Bessarabia 32. Only as a result of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877 - 1878. southern Bessarabia was returned to Russia.

Russia's decision to abolish the restrictive rules of the Paris Peace was set out in a circular by A. M. Gorchakov dated October 19 (31), 1870 and sent through Russian ambassadors abroad to the governments of all states that signed the Treaty of Paris of 1856. In addition, the St. Petersburg cabinet sent explanations to each of the Russian representatives abroad, which took into account the nature of the country and the peculiarities of its policy in the East; on November 3, 1870, the circular was published in the Government Gazette. The content of the document was to prove that the 1856 treaty had lost its force. Designed to preserve the “balance of Europe” and eliminate any possibility of clashes between states, as well as to protect Russia from a dangerous invasion by neutralizing the Black Sea, it turned out to be short-lived. The powers that signed the Paris Peace and repeatedly violated its terms proved that it exists purely theoretically. While Russia, a Black Sea state, disarmed in the Black Sea and did not have the opportunity to defend its borders against enemy invasion, Turkey retained the right to maintain naval forces in the archipelago and straits, and England and France in the Mediterranean Sea. In violation of the 1856 treaty, foreign powers had the opportunity in wartime, with the consent of Turkey, to conduct their warships through the straits into the Black Sea, which could be “an attack on the complete neutrality assigned to these waters” and left the shores of Russia open to attack 33 . Gorchakov gave examples of violations of government

28 Ibid., f. Chancellery, 34, l. 15.

29 S. Goryainov. Decree. cit., p. 134.

30 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 37, l. 254; TsGAOR USSR, f. 730. op. 1, no. 543, pp. 149 rev. - 150

31 Handwritten department State Library USSR named after V. I. Lenin, f. 169, cardboard 11, 1870, d. 18, l. 86 (rev).

32 AVPR, f. Office. Report of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for 1870, fol. 114.

33 See "Collection of treaties between Russia and other states", p. 106.

states that signed the 1856 treaty, its terms (in particular, the unification of the Danube principalities into single state and inviting a foreign prince there with the consent of Europe), In this situation, Russia could not consider itself more bound by the obligations of the treaty of March 18 (30), 1856. The circular stated that Russia did not intend to “raise the Eastern question”; it is ready to implement “the main principles of the 1856 treaty.” and enter into agreement with other states to confirm its provisions or to draw up a new treaty.

The content of the document, the form of presentation, which expressed not a request, but a demand, caused both approval and alarm in Russia. “This note,” wrote A.F. Tyutcheva, “produced here (in Moscow. - N. TO.) strong excitement. On the one hand, this bold act of the Russian government flatters the Russian political pride, which has suffered so much, on the other hand, there is war, everyone is afraid of war, for which we are probably not quite prepared." 34. M. N. Katkov admitted on the pages of Moskovskie Vedomosti the legality of Russia's refusal to neutralize the Black Sea in case of violation of the treaty by other states 35. The population of the coastal cities of southern Russia greeted Gorchakov's circular with great satisfaction. The Novorossiysk Governor-General wrote in an address addressed to Alexander II: “The Novorossiysk region and Bessarabia greet this great event with a sense of true joy: adjacent to the Black Sea, this region, generously endowed with the riches of nature, most felt the loss of the right, now restored." 36. The Moscow City Duma sent an address to Alexander II, compiled by I. S. Aksakov. Welcoming the government's decisions, this prominent Slavophile at the same time expressed wishes to the emperor regarding internal reforms in the country 37. The address displeased the government, which saw criticism of internal governance in the proposals of members of the Moscow City Duma. It was banned from publication and returned to the author.

All European cabinets, including Prussia, were dissatisfied with Gorchakov’s note. “Gorchakov’s circular dispatch produced a stunning effect in Europe. It drowned out the thunder of the terrible struggle, which until now had absorbed everyone’s attention,” 38 wrote Moskovskie Vedomosti. The note drew the sharpest criticism in London and Vienna. Both governments protested against Russia's actions, seeing them as a reason for war. Petersburg was especially worried about London's reaction. Therefore, the Russian government convinced the British cabinet that Russia was not going to threaten Turkey and the British squadrons “had no need to defend Porto against an attack from our side” 39 . It ordered its ambassador, Baron Brunnow, to convey to the London cabinet that Russia's decision was dictated by "feelings of dignity and the duty not to leave the entire space of our southern border depending on chance or whim. This is not about creating difficulties for the Porte or about the desire to achieve an exceptional advantage. This is only about the return of sovereignty rights, without which not a single great state can exist normally" 40 . Appealing to

34 A. F. Tyutcheva. At the court of two emperors. M. 1929, p. 205. A. F. Tyutcheva was the maid of honor of the Empress.

35 "Moscow Gazette", 1870, N 238, November 6.

36 TsGAOR USSR, f. 730, op. 1, d. 645, l. 2.

37 "Russian Archives", 1884, No. 6, p. 248. For more information about the reaction of Russian society to A. M. Gorchakov’s note, see S. A. Nikitin. A. M. Gorchakov’s note on the abolition of the terms of the Paris Peace and the Russian public. "Problems of socio-political history of Russia and Slavic countries." M. 1963.

38 "Moscow Gazette", 1870, N 239, November 7.

39 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 85, l. 120.

40 Ibid., l. 106 - 106 vol.

the authority of the late Palmerston, Gorchakov recalled his words spoken at the signing of the Paris Peace: “This agreement will last no more than 10 years.” Having become familiar with the circular, London refused to comment on it until it received reports that the note had been received in Constantinople, Vienna, and Berlin 41 .

Brunnov, using the Anglo-French differences and the Russian-English rapprochement that had emerged since the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, reminded British diplomats that the principle of neutralizing the Black Sea was proposed not by England, but by France, that in 1870 a situation had developed in Europe that was different from 1856, a change in which neither Russia nor England are to blame. Because of this, the ambassador said, the neutralization of the Black Sea, proclaimed by Napoleon as a guarantee of his political power, had come to its end. First Secretary for Foreign Affairs Lord Grenville, in a conversation with Brunnov, did not hide the “numbness” (la consternation) with which his colleagues learned about the Russian note, seeing in it a violation of the terms of the Paris Treaty. Brunnov's arguments about repeated violations of the Peace of Paris by other states did not impress the English minister. “The attitude of the English cabinet at the present time,” Brunnov wrote in conclusion, “is decidedly unfavorable towards us” 42. The London government protested about the form of the document, which confronted states with a fait accompli, and its content. Grenville called Gorchakov's note "a bomb thrown at the moment when England least expected it" 43 . He believed that if Russia had turned to England and other powers with a request to jointly revise the Treaty of Paris, the London cabinet would not have refused to do so. To this, the Russian government stated that even now there are no obstacles to discussing the issue at the meeting, but that Russia’s decision to refuse to neutralize the Black Sea is immutable. The British ambassador in Constantinople advised the Sultan “not to rush” with a response to St. Petersburg and promised “ material support"in the fight against Russia. England sought to delay the resolution of the issue until peace was concluded between Prussia and France in order to create a coalition of states directed against Russia. Articles were published in the English press calling on the government to intensify actions against Russia 44. The Times wrote: " But it was not only imperial France that waged the Crimean War: England also waged it. Russia has forgotten this" 45.

Austria-Hungary received the circular of the Russian government just as hostilely as England. In Russian government circles it was suggested that the Vienna cabinet, in order to incite the Porte's enmity towards Russia, communicated Gorchakov's note to Constantinople before its official receipt by the Turkish government 46 . The Austro-Hungarian press declared a “crusade” on Russia, considering the circular a “cause for war” 47 . In an effort to oust Russia from the Balkans and the Black Sea basin, Austria-Hungary saw war as a means of implementing this plan.

In deciding the issue of canceling the neutralization of the Black Sea, Turkey’s position was of no small importance. Gorchakov, handing over a Russian circular to Staal, the charge d'affaires in Turkey, asked to assure the Grand Vizier that he did not pose a threat to the Porte and was even beneficial to it. "The removal of restrictions imposed by the Paris Peace is offensive

41 Ibid., no. 82, l. 148.

42 Ibid., l. 165 rev.

43 Ibid., l. 166.

44 Ibid., l. 187; d. 83, l. 272.

45 Quoted. from: "Moskovskie Gazette", 1870, November 14.

46 AVPR, f. Office. Report of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for 1870, fol. 127.

47 Quoted. from: "Moskovskie Gazette", 1870, N 243, November 10.

for both powers, could be the starting point for good relations for Russia and Turkey,” 48, wrote the chancellor. Despite the preparatory work carried out by Russian diplomacy in Constantinople, Gorchakov’s circular disturbed the divan with its definiteness and categoricalness. Alipasha, in a conversation with Staal, noted, that the Porte expected from Russia a proposal to revise the treaty of 1856, but the form of the circular containing the final decision of the imperial government was unexpected for it.49 The Porte was the only power that signed the Treaty of Paris whose government did not officially respond to the Russian circular.It decided to find out the opinion of London. The British Ambassador Elliot, an outspoken opponent of Russia, categorically declared to the Grand Vizier that the British government would not allow the pan-European treaty to be canceled by one of the powers that signed it 50 .

According to a Russian military agent, the Porte called for redif (spare parts) Turkish army) under the pretext of pacifying rebellious Muslim tribes 51 . Ignatiev, returning to Constantinople on November 8 (20), 1870, found the situation in Turkey very alarming. “You are bringing us war,” 52 said Ali Pasha when meeting with Ignatiev. Although the Russian ambassador did not approve of the publication of the circular, considering it expedient to continue bilateral Russian-Turkish negotiations, he conscientiously carried out the instructions given to him about “seeking the Porte’s trust in Russia” and the need to establish direct relations between Turkey and Russia “in order to disavow foreign intrigues” 53. Ignatiev paid special attention to the activities of British diplomacy, believing that in Turkey “they would have accepted the circular more calmly if not for the machinations of the English representative in Constantinople.” In personal conversations with Elliott, Ignatiev drew attention English Ambassador on Russia's conscientious fulfillment of the terms of the Paris Peace and violation of the articles of the treaty by other states, in particular England, which sent its ship "Sunnet" into the Black Sea. Under these conditions, Ignatiev argued, Russia cannot make its fate dependent on the arbitrary decisions of other countries 54 . To divert England's attention from the Middle East, Ignatiev advised the Russian government “not to completely suspend our actions in Central Asia who her (England. - N.K.) are forced to give in to us in order to avoid big difficulties in India." In case it was necessary to repel the enemy, he proposed creating an armored naval squadron and finish construction railway, leading to Sevastopol 55 .

In conversations with the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, Ignatiev explained at length that Turkey's action against Russia could lead to Christian unrest directed against the Porte, while support for Russia's demands could lead to calm in the East. Trying to weaken the effectiveness of the influence of the London cabinet on the diva,” the Russian ambassador cited facts indicating that England had forgotten its allied obligations (in particular in relation to Denmark and France in the Danish-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars), and indicated that the same position was possible regarding Turkey. The Sultan assured Ignatiev: “Yes-

48 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 37, l. 44.

49 Ibid., no. 35, l. 32.

50 TsGAOR USSR, f. 730, op. 1, d. 543, l. 151 rev.

51 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 35, l. 76.

52 TsGAOR USSR, f. 730, op. 1, d. 543, l. 151. S. Goryainov believes that these words of Ali Pasha were addressed not to Ignatiev, but to Staal (S. Goryainov. Op. cit., pp. 167 - 168). Staal wrote to Gorchakov about the same thing on November 3 (15), 1870 (AVPR, f. Office, d. 35, l. 30 vol.).

53 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 37, l. 261.

54 Ibid., no. 35. pp. 80, 81.

55 Ibid., pp. 79, 89.

if I have 3 million soldiers, I will decide to go to war only if I am attacked by Russia." 56 The Russian ambassador managed to persuade the most authoritative person in Turkey - Ali Pasha - to side with Russia, "as opposed to the influence of England." Gorchakov noted "a certain easing of tension" in Constantinople in December and conveyed the Tsar's gratitude to Ignatiev for his activities.57 However, the stabilization of the situation in the East should not be attributed only to the Russian ambassador. It was not his activities, but the balance of power in Europe that was main reason peaceful action of the Turkish government. There was no real possibility of war in the East: England did not have strong allies; France was weakened by Prussia; Austria-Hungary, fearing Prussia, did not want to get involved in the war.

For the Porte, which has always focused on strong states, important had the position of Prussia. It was also of interest to England, France and Austria-Hungary. The Russian government, which attached considerable importance to Prussia’s attitude to the circular, informed it of its decision in a personal letter from Alexander II dated October 19 (31), 1870, addressed to Wilhelm I. The Emperor recalled that back in 1866, General Manteuffel conveyed a message to Alexander II king with the assurance that it is impossible for Russia to great power to remain endlessly under the pressure of the articles of the Paris Peace of 1856. Based on this fact, Alexander II expressed the hope that the king would not only support Russia, but would also use his influence on other governments to win them over to his side 58 . Although the Prussian government, busy ending the war with France, considered the appearance of the circular untimely, it took a position loyal to Russia 59 . Bismarck advised the Russian government not to aggravate relations with other states through polemics and diplomatic correspondence.

The British government, understanding important role, which Prussia began to play in Europe, in November 1870 sent second secretary for foreign affairs Odo Russell to its main apartment, Versailles, instructing him to negotiate only with Bismarck. In a conversation with Russell, Bismarck tried to show his disinterest in resolving the Eastern question. He drew the attention of the English diplomat to the fact that Prussia did not take part in the signing of a special treaty annexed to the Peace of Paris of April 15, 1856, which introduced a guarantee of the indivisibility of the Ottoman Empire, and did not consider itself obliged to express an opinion regarding Russia’s harassment. As for the personal view of the chancellor, he believed that the decrees of 1856 limited the rights of Russia and infringed on its sovereignty 60 . This trip did not have any positive results for England, because it became clear to the London cabinet that Prussia would not support England’s anti-Russian actions. The Russian government regarded Russell's mission as an indicator of England's desire to "play decisive role in current events" 61.

At the same time, Bismarck did not want to openly support Russia to restore England against Prussia; he also did not want an Anglo-Russian conflict, which could lead to a new war. Therefore, he very carefully followed the reports of the Prussian ambassador from London and gave him specific advice 62. In order to reconcile the parties, the

56 Ibid., l. 100.

57 Ibid., no. 37, l. 276.

58 "Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871 - 1914", Bd. II. B. 1922, N 216.

59 Ibid., N 217; AVPR, f. Chancellery, 20, l. 102.

60 "Die Grosse Politik...", Bd. II. N 222.

61 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 37, l. 270.

62 "Die Grosse Politik...". Bd. II, N 220, 223, 224, etc.

Lehr proposed convening in St. Petersburg a meeting of the authorized powers that signed the 1856 treaty. All states accepted this proposal. But the British government, agreeing to participate in the conference, objected to the location of the meeting, naming London instead of St. Petersburg. Russia and other countries did not object to the convening of the conference in the capital of England.

The timing of the conference and its nature have also been the subject of debate. The Russian ambassador in London, Brunnov, believed that it was necessary to postpone convening the conference until the end of the Franco-Prussian war, because while it continued, representatives of Prussia and France would not be present at the meeting, but would discuss such important question with representatives of the “second rank” is inappropriate. In addition, Russia needed Bismarck's support 63. In St. Petersburg, on the contrary, they believed that it was necessary to rush to convene a conference while the Franco-Prussian war was going on and all attention was focused on European events. Gorchakov believed that the conference in London should be “short and have a purely practical meaning” 64. At the same time, it was proposed to discuss only the circular on the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris Peace without raising other issues. Austria-Hungary, without objecting to the convening of the conference, tried to expand its agenda to include the issue of navigation on the Danube. Prussia, which avoided public conversation about the terms of the future Franco-Prussian treaty, supported the proposals of St. Petersburg. Giving instructions to Brunnov, who represented Russia at the conference, Gorchakov advised him to “observe moderation and caution, to draw the attention of the conference participants to the detrimental nature of the Paris Peace for the internal development of Russia, its Agriculture, industry and state security" 65. He did not foresee fierce debate at the meeting, since all parties wanted reconciliation. Brunnov was instructed to inform members of the delegations that the abolition of certain articles of the treaty presupposes the preservation of its foundations, as well as the preservation of the integrity of Turkey; in order to attract the latter to the side of Russia it was proposed to note the good relations between Russia and Turkey that have developed in last years. In full agreement with St. Petersburg, the Prussian government believed that the meeting should be short and of purely practical importance. The same view was held in Constantinople 66 . During the preparation of the conference, Grenville invited the representatives of Russia and Prussia to agree on the main decisions of the meeting 67 .

They decided not to discuss the issue of navigation on the Danube, since it did not affect the interests of all powers. As for the cancellation of the neutralization of the Black Sea, Grenville, seeking compensation for Western states, proposed opening the straits. He stated that this principle ensures peace for Turkey. But the Sultan, who was formally the owner of the straits, rejected this decision. Trying to interest Russia in opening the straits, Grenville said that the new regime of the straits would allow the Russian squadron freedom of entry into the Archipelago and the Mediterranean Sea 68 . The representative of Russia, although he received the consent of St. Petersburg to accept this proposal (as a concession to England), left the question open. The status of the Straits regime was not decided at the preliminary meetings.

The opening of the conference was delayed due to the silence of France. Grenville sought powers from the provisional French government

63 AVPR, f. Chancellery, no. 82, no. 234 - 235.

64 Ibid., no. 85, l. 170.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., no. 82, l. 264.

67 Ibid., l. 273.

68 Ibid., l. 291.

for the French chargé d'affaires in London, Tissa. But the French government was slow to respond, explaining its position, in addition to objective difficulties, by the fact that the proposal for a conference was made by Prussia, an enemy of France. The French cabinet proposed discussing not only business in London. East, but also the Franco-Prussian conflict. French Foreign Minister J. Favre considered it pointless and contrary to national feelings to talk about Eastern affairs at the conference when “issues related to the immediate interests of the country are not discussed” 69 . But the powers did not accept this request from France. The Prussian government announced that its representative would leave the conference if the question of peace between the two powers was raised at it. Only in December 1870 did the French government, realizing that without its participation the conference would still take place, appointed J. Favre as its plenipotentiary representative at it. However, to travel from Paris to London, a visa from the Prussian headquarters was required, the registration of which was delayed.

The Russian government was little concerned about the position of France. The behavior of England, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey caused great concern. The latter, knowing about the disagreements between Russia and England on Eastern affairs, hoped to use them to its advantage: “Among the statesmen of Turkey, the conference was viewed as a duel between England and Russia,” 70 wrote Ignatiev. Initially, the London cabinet intended to instruct its representative, Lord Grenville, to censure the form of the Russian government's circular, which contained not a request, but a decision. However, the Russian Ambassador categorically rejected the possibility of such a statement, noting that the circular of October 19, 1870 has the force of law in Russia and discussion on this issue is pointless. Otherwise, he refused to take part in the conference 71 . Grenville was forced to withdraw his proposal. He limited himself to composing a simple letter indicating that every power attempting to free itself from the terms of a treaty of international importance must communicate this intention to the other states that had signed it. Brunnov's preliminary negotiations with Grenville made it possible to develop general basics work of the meeting. “The English cabinet,” Brunnov wrote to Gorchakov, “shares your desire to hasten the opening of the conference (Brunnov himself was in favor of its postponement. - N.K.), simplify the form in order to reduce, as far as possible, the duration of the meetings." 72 However, the assumptions of the Russian government about the rapid progress of the conference did not materialize, because each power, agreeing with Russia's decision to cancel the neutralization of the Black Sea, sought to receive "compensation" for these concessions.

The conference of the powers that participated in the signing of the Treaty of Paris (without the representative of France, who arrived only for the last meeting) opened in London on January 5 (17), 1871. Russia was represented by the ambassador to England, Baron F.I. Brunnov, an experienced but slow diplomat in his decisions, Prussia by Count Bernstorff, England by Lord Grenville, Austria-Hungary by Count Apponi, Turkey by Mussyur Pasha, Italy by Count Cardona. The main subject of discussion at the conference was the issue of the regime of the Black Sea and the straits. Russia's decision to cancel the neutralization of the Black Sea did not raise any objections: even before the conference began, the futility of resisting Russia's demands became obvious to its opponents. Brunnov

69 Ibid., no. 118, l. 203.

70 Ibid., no. 35, l. 137.

71 Ibid., no. 82, l. 301.

72 Ibid., no. 310.

it was prescribed to take a firm position at the conference regardless of the behavior of representatives of Turkey and the West and at the same time maintain a good relationship with all powers, once again reminding their plenipotentiaries that refusal to neutralize the Black Sea does not mean eliminating the foundations of the Paris Treaty. Brunnov's task was to make Russia's unilateral decision international 73 .

Grenville, opening the meeting, stated that the decision to convene the conference was made by all the powers that signed the 1856 treaty in order to discuss the proposals “that Russia wishes to make to us regarding the required revision of the provisions of the said treaty regarding the neutralization of the Black Sea” 74 . The meeting participants signed a protocol regarding the method of change international treaties, proposed by the delegate of England. After opening speech Grenville was given the floor by the Russian Ambassador. Brunnov's speech (agreed with the representative of England) contained an explanation of the reasons that necessitated the need to cancel the neutralization of the Black Sea. To win over the Ports to Russia, he pointed out that the principle of neutralization was an infringement on the morals of not only Russia, but also Turkey as a Black Sea power. Prussian representative Bernstorff, supporting Brunnow, said that his government shared the view of the St. Petersburg cabinet on the need to abolish the articles of the 1856 treaty. After this, the Turkish delegate Müssyürüs Pasha asked for a break to consider Russia’s proposals. England, interested in delaying the conference until the arrival of the French representative, agreed to this proposal, which was supported by all delegates 75 .

The balance of power at the conference was as follows: the representative of England, the head of the conference, tried to keep the representatives of Turkey and Austria in sight; Prussia supported Russia, which significantly weakened the influence of England; Italy and France did not have a significant influence on the course of the conference. The behavior of Mussyur Pasha in London was somewhat at odds with the promises made by the Grand Vizier in a conversation with Ignatiev about supporting Russia’s demands. Speaking at the second meeting (January 12 (24), 1871), the representative of the Porte stated that Turkey does not consider the neutralization of the Black Sea as a violation of its sovereignty and seeks to maintain the terms of the Treaty of Paris as a guarantee of its security and peace. But, making a concession to Russia, Mussuryus Pasha said, Turkey is ready to discuss its proposals to revise certain articles of the Paris Treaty, so that in return the Porte would receive the necessary security guarantees 76 . The proposal to “reward” Turkey for canceling the neutralization of the Black Sea as a guarantee of its security was shared by all European states. On the question of the nature of these “guarantees” between Russia, on the one hand, and England and Austria-Hungary, on the other, differences emerged that made themselves felt during the development of resolutions.

At the third meeting of the conference on February 3 (15), 1871, a draft agreement was discussed, developed on January 22 - 26 (February 3 - 7) at a preliminary meeting of representatives of Russia and England in consultation with other states. New provisions were supposed to replace the terms of the Paris Peace on the neutralization of the Black Sea. The dispute unfolded over the second article, concerning the Sultan’s right to open

73 See S. Goryainov. Decree. cit., p. 187; AVPR, f. Office. Report of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for 1870, fol. 162.

74 "London Conference 1871". Protocols. St. Petersburg. 1871, p. 5.

75 Ibid., p. 15.

76 S. Goryainov. Decree. cit., pp. 218 - 219.

livs for other states. According to Russia, this right extended to all powers “friendly” to Turkey; according to England and Austria-Hungary, only to “non-coastal” states, which made it possible to exclude Russia as a country “coastal” to the Black Sea from general rule. The representative of Turkey, in solidarity with Russia, proposed replacing the expression “non-coastal powers” with the words “friendly powers,” seeing in the proposal Western countries infringement of the sovereign rights of the Sultan, limiting his ability to choose allies only to non-coastal states. This wording of the article not only narrowed the rights of the Sultan, but also isolated Russia as a coastal state and placed it in a special position in relation to Turkey. At the direction of Ali Pasha, Myussyuryus Pasha drew attention to the anti-Russian orientation of the article. He told the conference participants that its adoption would increase mistrust between neighboring states, which the Porte wanted to avoid. For these two reasons, the Turkish representative proposed to restore to the Ottoman Empire its ancient right to open the straits in time of peace, at the discretion of the Sultan, to the warships of friendly countries. Western states insisted on approving article two in their version. Clarifying the words “non-coastal powers,” the representative of Austria-Hungary, on the advice of his Prime Minister Beist, proposed adopting the formulation “non-coastal states of the Black Sea,” which had previously been rejected by the powers. This clarification directly pointed to Russia as a state coastal to the Black Sea, which would not be subject to the Sultan’s request for help. This addition was due to the fact that England’s wording, when read literally, did not place Russia in a special position compared to other states, since the latter was not a country coastal to the straits.

Brunnov, rejecting the addition of an Austro-Hungarian representative, supported the argument of Mussurus Pasha and proposed adopting Article Two, indicating “friendly powers” instead of “non-coastal ones”. Grenville, objecting to the amendments, tried to convince Mussurus Pasha that the original version of the article was more in line with the interests of Turkey and other powers than that proposed by the Porte. In addition, the British representative considered it expedient to adopt another additional article, also directed against Russia and recognizing the Black Sea as open to merchant shipping of all powers 77 . This proposal from England was supported only by the representative of Austria.

The activity of England and Austria-Hungary was so impressive (with the passive support of Russia by Prussia) that Brunnov was ready to accept England’s formulation of “non-coastal” states, motivating his position by the fact that the neutralization of the Black Sea ( main question for Russia) has been cancelled. But the St. Petersburg committee suggested that he seek an equalization of the parties, and only after the Russian ambassador reported that all means had been “exhausted” did he agree to sign the protocol in the English edition 78 . Brunnov explained his decision by the fact that if Russia disagreed with the English editors, there was real threat“to see the ships of Western powers in the Black Sea”; in addition, he sought not to delay the conference until the start of the parliamentary session in England. Defined value There was also Brunnov's distrust of the representative of Turkey and the passive position of Prussia: the reluctance of its representative to openly oppose the intentions of the Anglo-Austrian bloc. "Bismarck saw the London meeting as a way to gain time and divert public attention in order to end the war between France and

77 See London Conference 1871. Minutes, page 26.

78 S. Goryainov. Decree. cit., pp. 227 - 228.

tion and Germany without any foreign interference“79,” Brunnov wrote. However, Mussyuryus Pasha continued to insist on the Sultan’s right to decide for himself the issue of choosing a state to which he could turn for help.

Despite the apparent insignificance of the dispute (especially considering that power was on the side of the Western states), what is striking is the Porte’s rare tenacity, which testifies to its more independent and active position, compared to past international conferences, where Turkey’s voice was not taken into account by the European powers, and the presence of its delegates was purely formal. This position of the Porte was due to the fact that in the 60s of the XIX century. its economy saw noticeable successes, primarily related to railway construction. The development of capitalism in Turkey contributed to the formation of a national bourgeoisie, which declared its desire to play an independent role in the country. In addition, the very question posed at the conference was not the result of the war, but the result of Russia’s diplomatic demarche, which was impossible to resolve without Turkey.

On January 26 (February 7), 1871, the fourth meeting of the conference took place. The Turkish delegate agreed to approve three articles without the second, concerning the regime of the straits, which caused objections from the Western powers. The conference reached a dead end. A compromise proposed by the Italian ambassador in Constantinople and transmitted to London on behalf of the Italian government saved the situation. After the discussion, the conference participants adopted article two in the Italian edition, replacing the expression “non-coastal powers” with the words “friendly and allied”. The article on the straits approved by the delegates was formulated as follows: “The beginning of the closure of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, in the form in which it was established by a special convention on March 30, 1856, remains in force with the provision to the Sultan of the opportunity to open them in peacetime to military ships of friendly and allied powers in the event that this was considered necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris on March 30, 1856" 80. This edition, which removed the expression “non-coastal countries,” was greeted with satisfaction by Turkey, and the mention of the 1856 treaty found support among Western countries. Russia, interested in a speedy end to the conference, did not object to this wording of the article.

The last, fifth, meeting of the conference was postponed until the arrival of the French delegate, the Duke of Broglie, appointed to London instead of J. Favre, who was busy negotiating peace with Bismarck, and therefore took place only on March 2 (14), 1871. The presence of a representative of France had a purely procedural significance: to give the London Protocol legal force, the consent of all countries participating in the signing of the Paris Treaty was necessary. Presiding Grenville, flattering France's pride, publicly stated that the conference participants had done everything possible to ensure the necessary assistance from France in the work of the conference. This “assistance” was expressed in information about the progress of the conference, which was transmitted to the French charge d'affaires, and in the repeated postponement of its meetings. Broglie, thanking those present for their friendly disposition towards France, expressed the wish of his government to refrain from making decisions in the discussion of which the representative of France did not participate. But, fearing isolation, after some hesitation, Broglie agreed to sign the protocol. 3 (15)

79 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 68, l. 10 rev.

80 S. Goryainov. Decree. cit., pp. 252 - 253.

March, it was signed by all conference participants, but marked (for reasons unknown to us) March 1 (13), 1871 81.

The signing of the London Protocol concluded the work of the conference, which lasted about two months. It was a great diplomatic victory for Russia. The neutralization of the Black Sea, which infringed on the interests and dignity of Russia as a Black Sea power, was canceled while maintaining other articles of the Treaty of Paris. Russia received the right to maintain a navy in the Black Sea and build military fortifications on its coast. Russia's success was explained by a number of reasons: the Russian government's skillful use of the international situation associated with the Franco-Prussian War, which diverted the attention of European countries from events in the East; numerous violations of the terms of the Paris Peace by the powers that signed it; thoughtful actions of Russian diplomats abroad. Regarding the results of the conference, Brunnov wrote to St. Petersburg that its results exceeded all his expectations 82 .

The Turkish government was also pleased with the results of the conference: the rights of the Porte to the straits were recognized by all powers. After the London Conference there was some, albeit very short-term, improvement in Russian-Turkish relations. Russia's success at the conference strengthened its international and internal positions. The abolition of the restrictive conditions of the Paris Treaty, having secured the southern borders of the state, accelerated economic development southern Ukraine and contributed to the expansion of Russian foreign trade through the Black Sea. The restoration of Russia's rights in the Black Sea raised its prestige in the eyes of the Balkan peoples and Turkey.

81 "Collection of treaties between Russia and other states", pp. 107 - 110.

82 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 68, l. 61.

The main task of Russian diplomacy in the second half of the 50s - 60s years XIX c. - abolition of the restrictive conditions of the Paris Peace Treaty. The absence of a navy and bases on the Black Sea made Russia vulnerable to attack from the south, which actually prevented it from occupying active position in solving international problems.

The struggle was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince A. M. Gorchakov, a major diplomat with a broad political outlook. He formulated a program, the essence of which was the refusal to interfere in international conflicts, an energetic search for allies and the use of contradictions between powers to solve the main foreign policy problem. His historical phrase: “Russia is not angry, it is concentrating...” - figuratively expressed the basic principles of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy of that time.

Initially, Russia, changing its traditional course of relying on the German states, tried to focus on France. In 1859, a Russian-French alliance was concluded, which, however, did not lead to the result desired by Russia.

In this regard, its new rapprochement with Prussia and Austria began. Russia began to support Prussia in its desire to unite all German lands under its leadership, and in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. took a position of neutrality.

Taking advantage of the moment, in October 1870 A. M. Gorchakov sent out a “circular note”, notifying the great powers and Turkey that Russia did not consider itself bound by the obligation not to have a military fleet in the Black Sea. Prussia supported her in gratitude for her neutrality. England and Austria condemned the unilateral decision of the Russian government, and defeated France did not have the opportunity to protest.

The London Conference of the Great Powers in 1871 cemented the abolition of the neutralization of the Black Sea. Russia returned the right to have a navy, naval bases and fortifications on the Black Sea coast. This made it possible to recreate the defense line of the southern border of the state. In addition, foreign trade through the straits expanded, and the Novorossiysk Territory, the Black Sea region of the country, developed more intensively. Russia was again able to provide assistance to the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula in their liberation movement.

Union of Three Emperors. In the 70s of the XIX century. The international situation in Europe has undergone significant changes. France was greatly weakened after the Franco-Prussian War. A new state has emerged in the center of the European continent, strong economically and militarily. respect, - German empire. From the very beginning of its existence, it pursued an aggressive foreign policy, wanting to ensure dominant influence in Europe and create and expand its colonial possessions. A complex of contradictions has developed between Germany, on the one hand, and France and Great Britain, on the other. Austria-Hungary intensified its foreign policy in the Balkans.

Under these conditions, Russia, trying to avoid isolation and not relying on France, which had lost its international prestige, began to seek rapprochement with the Central European states. Germany willingly entered into an alliance with Russia in the hope of finally isolating France. In 1872, a meeting of the emperors and foreign ministers of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary took place in Berlin. An agreement was reached on the terms and principles of the future union. In 1873, a tripartite treaty was signed between Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary - the Alliance of Three Emperors. The three monarchs promised each other to resolve differences among themselves through political consultations, and if there was a threat of an attack by any power on one of the parties to the Union, they would agree on joint actions.

Germany, inspired by this diplomatic success, prepared to defeat France again. German Chancellor Prince O. Bismarck, who went down in history as a conductor of German militarism, deliberately escalated tensions in relations with France. In 1875, the so-called “war alarm” broke out, which could have caused a new European conflict. However, Russia, despite its alliance with Germany, came out in defense of France. Her