Results of the optimization stage of the army and navy. Military reform

1. The need, prerequisites and purpose of the reform of the Armed Forces Russian Federation.

The main objectives of the lesson are: in-depth study available documents and materials in order to provide moral and psychological support to personnel (especially officers) for the idea and plan of reform of the Armed Forces, to form an interested attitude towards its results, a sense of involvement and personal responsibility for its progress and outcome.

The Russian Federation is going through a difficult and responsible period of its development. The tasks of deep economic and democratic transformations are being solved.

Historical experience shows that at turning points in the life of our country, the Armed Forces have always been subject to deep reform. Their numbers, structure, recruitment methods, and military-technical equipment were brought into line with the realities of the time.

Currently, a large-scale and active work to reform the army and navy, giving them a modern appearance, mobility, high combat capability and combat readiness.

On July 16, 1997, the President of Russia signed the Decree “On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure.” It substantiates the objective necessity military reform, its stages, content, economic justification and timing are determined. The decree establishes proper control and responsibility for the implementation of planned military development measures. This document is a detailed and reasoned program for reform of the Armed Forces.

1. The need, prerequisites and goal of reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Since the creation of the Russian Armed Forces (May 7, 1992), there has been a lot of talk about their reform. In practice, things essentially did not move forward. Today in the country, in the military leadership, a clear and clear understanding of the objective necessity, goals, and ways of reforming the army and navy has formed.

What exactly are the patterns that determine the need for the ongoing reform? What is their essence and how do they influence military development?

One of the determining factors influencing the military development of the state is geostrategic position of the country, the nature and features of the military-political situation in the world. It's about to correctly, soberly and balancedly determine whether there is a military threat to the country, its sources, scale and nature, to give a correct assessment of the real military-political situation and the prospects for its development. The nature and direction of the military development of the state directly and directly depends on the answer to them.

After the end of the Cold War, the military-political situation in the world changed significantly. There was a lot in it positive changes. The former acute and dangerous military and ideological confrontation between the two systems has disappeared. There is no threat of large-scale war for our country at present and in the near future. It must be emphasized that a large-scale armed clash with the NATO bloc is also unlikely, despite its expansion to the East. In other words, at present and in the near future there is no visible serious external threat to the country. Russia, in turn, does not consider any state or people as its potential enemy.

But these changes do not mean the complete disappearance of the military danger. It now proceeds from the possibility of local wars and armed conflicts. Therefore, it is important to decide what kind of army Russia should have, based on the nature of modern regional wars and conflicts in which it may participate to one degree or another.

Today, the country's Armed Forces, not counting numerous other troops, number 1.7 million people. Their numbers are clearly inadequate to the existing military danger. There is a direct rationale for their reduction and reorganization. The country's leadership proceeds from this, putting forward the well-founded and long-overdue task of immediately carrying out reform of the Armed Forces.

The need for reform of the Armed Forces is also dictated by economic considerations. The country has been undergoing economic reform for 6 years now. It is being carried out in conditions of a severe crisis. The decline in production has not yet been overcome. In a number of key indicators, Russia seriously lags behind the main centers of power in the modern world. It accounts for only 2% of world economic output, but 4% of military spending. This means that the country's military spending is twice the world average. And one more indicator: in terms of gross domestic product per capita, we are in 46th place in the world.

Currently, up to 40% of the country's annual budget revenue is spent on maintaining the Armed Forces, other troops and law enforcement agencies. This holds back economic transformations and does not allow increasing capital investments in the development of industrial and agricultural production. Our economy, which is also in a crisis situation, is simply not able to withstand such a load. This is due to the underfunding of the army, especially in combat training and equipping with new weapons, delays in the payment of allowances and an increase in the number of homeless military personnel. These circumstances have an extremely negative impact on the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the army and navy. Life requires bringing the Armed Forces into line with the level of existing military danger and the economic capabilities of the state.

The need to reform the Armed Forces is also associated with a number of demographic restrictions . The decline in population is of serious concern to the Russian leadership. During 1996, the country's population decreased by 475 thousand people. The trends in 1997 are similar.

In recent years, despite the apparent sufficiency of human resources, only a quarter of conscripts enter military service. The rest enjoy benefits, deferments, etc. As a result, there is a large shortage of privates and sergeants, which reduces the level of combat readiness.

Today, every third young man cannot serve due to health reasons (in 1995 - only every twentieth). 15% of conscripts have a body deficit; the number of people prone to alcoholism has doubled (12%); 8% of young people recruited into the army are drug addicts.

The manning situation is aggravated by the presence of military formations in another 15 federal structures that also lay claim to the conscription contingent. Let's say the Ministry of Internal Affairs has about 540 thousand people, plus 260 thousand in the internal troops; Railway troops - 80 thousand; Border troops - 230 thousand; Ministry of Emergency Situations - 70 thousand; building structures - about 100 thousand people, etc. And from this point of view, the restructuring of the military organization is extremely necessary.

It is advisable to sharply reduce the number of federal departments with military formations and move more decisively to a mixed and then to a contract system of manning units. With the reduction of the Armed Forces, this prospect becomes quite real, allowing us to move to a professional army.

What is the goal of the reform under consideration? It is primarily designed to increase the country's defense capability and bring the troops into line with the requirements of the time.

“Modern Armed Forces,” noted in the Address of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin to Russian soldiers, “must be compact, mobile and equipped with modern weapons.” “At the same time, the reform,” said the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, “will radically improve social status and the material well-being of a person in uniform.” (Red Star, July 30, 1997).

As the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army I. D. Sergeev noted, these should be “highly equipped, with sufficient deterrence potential, a modern level of professional and moral-psychological training, combat-ready, compact and mobile Armed Forces of rational composition, structure, and numbers.” (“Red Star”, June 27, 1997)

2. Main stages and content of the reform.

Military reform is a national, national task. Being extremely complex, it is designed for a long period. During its course, they highlight two stages.

On the first (until 2000) The structure, combat strength and strength of the Armed Forces are being optimized.

During this period, a new military doctrine is being developed and approved, research and development work (R&D) on new generation weapons, combat control and communications equipment, and dual-use technologies is being actively carried out.

On the second (2000-2005) qualitative improvement of the reduced Armed Forces is ensured,

increasing their combat effectiveness, switching to a contract recruitment principle, and continues to develop models of weapons of the next generations. In short, over the next 8 years, the Russian Armed Forces will be completely reformed. And subsequently, large-scale rearmament of the army, navy and other troops will begin with models of equipment that will serve in the 21st century.

What are the specific priorities of military development at the first stage of the reform of the Armed Forces? They are outlined in the reform plan, approved by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces and approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

Army reform, despite insufficient budgetary allocations, has begun. We can say with satisfaction that it is gaining rapid momentum. Reasonable and rational directions for its implementation have been chosen.

In order to bring the military organization of the state into line with the needs of defense and security, as well as the economic capabilities of the country, the number of military personnel is being reduced.

Total in 1997 - 2005 Almost 600 thousand officers, warrant officers and midshipmen will be dismissed from the Armed Forces. Including over 175 thousand career military personnel in 1998, almost 120 thousand in 1999. The number of civilian personnel will decrease from 600 thousand people to 300 thousand people within a year and a half.

The number of military personnel in the army and navy as of January 1, 1999 was set at 1.2 million people. This size of the Armed Forces is quite optimal and will, without a doubt, ensure reliable defense of the Russian state.

However, the reduction of the army and navy is not the main thing in their reform. The main thing is to optimize the structure and combat strength, improve the controllability and equipment of the troops.

Therefore it is necessary major organizational restructuring of the Armed Forces. The merger will take place before January 1 of next year. Missile Forces strategic purposes, the Military Space Forces and the Air Defense Missile and Space Defense Forces. It will be high quality the new kind Armed Forces. It will retain the name "Strategic Missile Forces". This merger will allow us to eliminate unnecessary parallel links, as well as pool resources and get rid of excess financial expenses. The main thing is that related defensive functions are concentrated in one hand, and the cause of the country's security wins. As a result of this reorganization, the efficiency of the possible use of the Strategic Missile Forces increases by approximately 20%, and the economic effect will exceed 1 trillion rubles.

In the same year measures for radical optimization of controls, including - central office. Their numbers will be reduced by approximately 1/3. In particular, the Main Command Ground Forces is not only significantly reduced, but also transformed into the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces. It is reassigned to one of the Deputy Ministers of Defense and will focus mainly on issues of combat training of troops. The purpose of the reforms of management bodies is to improve the quality and efficiency of management, professionalism, and staff culture. In 1998, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces merged.. Based on their unification, a branch of the Armed Forces is created - the Air Force. But the process of this unification will be far from easy, given the different methods and methods of managing these types of Armed Forces, and most importantly, they have different tasks. During the unification, the combat strength of the Air Force and Air Defense will be optimized, and the problem of managing them under the new structure will be solved.

In connection with this transformation, the transition from a five-service to a four-service structure of the Armed Forces is being completed. Then a three-service structure is envisaged (according to the areas of use of troops: land, air, space and sea). And ultimately we must come to two components: the Strategic Deterrence Force (SDF) and the General Purpose Force (SON).

During the reform of the Navy changes will also occur, although its structure will generally remain the same. There will be 4 fleets left - the Baltic, Northern, Pacific and Black Sea, as well as the Caspian flotilla. But they will be more compact than the current groupings of forces and assets in strategically important ocean and sea areas. The fleet should retain ships of high combat effectiveness, strategic submarine cruisers, and support forces. Reducing the number of ships will increase the importance naval aviation coastal based. The fleet will carry out more limited combat missions than at present.

Ground troops - the basis of the Armed Forces. And yet the number of divisions in them will decrease. It is expected that 25 divisions will be retained. Some of them will be fully equipped and combat-ready in every strategic direction. They will be able to effectively solve relevant problems. Based on the remaining divisions, storage bases for weapons and military equipment will be created. The combat potential of the retained divisions will increase. They will be equipped with new weapons and control systems. Thanks to this, efficiency will almost double destructive actions divisions. Serious changes will also affect military districts.

Military districts are given the status of operational-strategic (operational-territorial) commands Armed forces of the Russian Federation in the relevant directions. Within the boundaries of their responsibility, military districts are entrusted with the functions of operational leadership of all military formations, regardless of their affiliation with various federal departments. This means that border, internal troops, units civil defense and other military formations are operationally subordinate to the operational-strategic command.

In connection with the planned transformations, the military system nationwide will undergo serious changes. It will acquire harmony and completeness, the ability to more effectively solve pressing issues of strengthening the country's defense.

As already mentioned, the reform of the Armed Forces is carried out under conditions of severe financial restrictions, when the defense budget not only does not increase, but is even cut. Therefore, it is important to persistently seek internal reserves and skillfully use them.

This thesis is rejected by a number of opponents and is strongly criticized by some media. Meanwhile, there are internal reserves. They are quite serious.

Already at the first stage of reform, it is necessary to get rid of unjustified and unproductive expenses that do not meet the interests of strengthening the country's defense capability. The Armed Forces must get rid of enterprises and organizations, objects and structures, without which their livelihoods would be virtually unaffected and they are quite capable of existing.

Currently already The process of withdrawing so-called support structures from the Armed Forces began. Some of them are significantly reorganized and corporatized. This will reduce the number of military and civilian personnel. At the same time, considerable funds will be received to replenish the defense budget and provide social protection.

A major reorganization of the military construction complex is underway. It is carried out on the basis of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, signed on July 8, 1997, “On the reform of state unitary enterprises that are part of the construction and quartering bodies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” More than 100 organizations of the military-construction complex, being withdrawn from the Armed Forces, will be transformed into joint stock companies. The number of military personnel will be reduced by 50 thousand people, and the controlling stake will remain in federal property. On this basis, considerable funds will be received. The Armed Forces temporarily retain 19 state enterprises that will be engaged in construction and industrial activities, as well as ensuring the livelihoods of remote garrisons.

On July 17, 1997, the President of the Russian Federation signed a Decree on the formation of the Federal Service for Special Construction of Russia . The reorganized Rosspetsstroy will provide the most important special construction works. At the same time, the number of military personnel will be reduced from 76 thousand to 10 thousand people. Also on July 17, 1997, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation The Federal Road Construction Administration was reorganized. It operated under the Ministry of Defense, and has now been transferred to the Federal Road Service of the country. At the same time, the number of military personnel of this department is reduced from 57 to 15 thousand people.

Thus, only according to the three mentioned decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, due to structural changes, it will be possible to reduce about 150 thousand military personnel. In general, as a result of the reform, the number of military construction workers will be reduced by 71%, and civilian personnel in military construction by 42%. Military construction planned to be conducted on a competitive basis. All this will significantly reduce the burden on the defense budget. Moreover, it will be significantly replenished due to numerous enterprises being withdrawn from the Armed Forces.

At the first stage of reform, such problems will have to be resolved. There are about 100 agricultural enterprises in the system of the Ministry of Defense. Many of them are unprofitable. They were created during a period of food shortages. Currently, their preservation in the same form is not justified everywhere. Therefore, their corporatization is envisaged. However, in a number of regions (Kola Peninsula, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Tiki, etc.) They still significantly meet the needs for essential food products.

The number of military representations at enterprises in which officers are involved is being reduced, numbering 38 thousand people. Moreover, representatives various types The Armed Forces sometimes perform overlapping functions. There is an urgent need to have a unified system of government representation at enterprises. It is also advisable to liquidate numerous hunting grounds, recreation centers, etc., for the maintenance of which subsidies and compensation are constantly increasing at the expense of the Ministry of Defense.

During the reform of the Armed Forces it is necessary transfer to organs local authorities social infrastructure facilities(parts of housing and communal services, kindergartens and nurseries, schools, household enterprises, etc.), which are on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense. These are tens of thousands of buildings and structures. The cost of maintaining social infrastructure sometimes reaches 30% of the cost of maintaining troops. Their transfer to local budgets will begin this year and end in 1999. This measure will provide annual savings of 2-3 trillion rubles. They will also be used to provide social guarantees for military personnel.

Has now started radical reorganization of military trade, which employs about 62 thousand people. The administrative apparatus is being restructured and reduced. Unprofitable enterprises are liquidated. The sale of the largest military trade objects in Moscow and large centers is underway, where they have lost their functional purpose. All this will allow us to almost halve the number of military trade personnel, including military personnel by 75%. More than a trillion rubles will be received from the corporatization of trading enterprises. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense retains a controlling stake. You can manage these businesses and earn income.

It should be especially noted that military personnel and their families will not suffer at all from the reorganization of the military trade system. After all, up to 70% of enterprises serve closed and remote garrisons.

During the reform, many military camps are being released. A large number of different weapons becomes redundant. Military property is being released.

The reform of the Armed Forces is intended to adjust the structure of the defense budget . Recently, an extremely unfavorable structure for financing the Armed Forces has emerged. Up to 70% of the allocated funds goes towards salaries for officers and salaries for civilian personnel. Moreover, in 1996, more than 7 trillion rubles were spent for these purposes in excess of budgetary funds. And combat training and the purchase of new equipment are actually not funded. At a meeting of the Federation Council on July 4 this year. Minister of Defense General of the Army I.D. Sergeev stated: “In the Armed Forces, with the exception of the Missile Forces and several formations of the Ground Forces, combat training is almost completely absent” (Krasnaya Zvezda, July 5, 1997). Almost no new ones enter the troops Combat vehicles and weapons. As a result, the level of combat and mobilization readiness of troops and their technical equipment are reduced. The reduction of the army and navy and their organizational transformations will make it possible to use approximately half of the defense budget for combat training and the acquisition of new weapons.

The most important problem determining the success of reform is financing. This is the "question of questions" today. As is already clear from the previous explanations, it is envisaged to have three sources of funding: 1) budget money for improving the combat training of troops, the daily provision of the entire structure of combat readiness (Today this figure is 1%, but in 1998 it will rise to 10%); 2) sale of surplus released military property and trade enterprises; 3) an item in the budget for social guarantees for military personnel being transferred to the reserve.

It will be decided in a completely new way issue of military personnel training. The task of reforming the military education system is to increase the level of personnel training and at the same time optimize training costs. Currently, the Ministry of Defense has 100 universities, incl. 18 military academies. Their number clearly exceeds the personnel requirements of the army and navy in the new conditions. It will be reduced, including through mergers. Let's say, at present, 17 military educational institutions are training aviation specialists for the Air Force, Air Defense and Ground Forces, incl. two academies (VVA Air Force and VA Air Defense). After their reorganization, there will be 8 aviation schools. The two academies will be merged into Military Academy Air Force and Air Defense, which will train command personnel. And the Military Technical Aviation University named after. NOT. Zhukovsky will focus on training engineering personnel for all branches of the Armed Forces.

During the military reform, it is necessary to solve such difficult task. It, of course, goes beyond the Ministry of Defense, but its experience in reorganizing the system of training military personnel will have to be used in every possible way. Now each power ministry and department has its own system for training military personnel. In addition to the Ministry of Defense, military universities operate in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (more than 30), in the Federal Border Service (7), etc. Unfortunately, the activities of numerous universities are not coordinated by anyone. There is an urgent need to create a unified (federal) system for training military personnel for all law enforcement ministries and departments. At the same time, the quality of personnel training will certainly increase. This will also be facilitated by increasing the professionalism of university teaching staff. In particular, filling a number of positions with trained civilian specialists, extending the service life of officer-scientists and specialists highly qualified etc.

Further - in the current state of affairs, primarily due to low prestige military service, many cadets of military schools break their contracts after completing the second year of training. At the same time, they are credited with a two-year period of military service and continue their studies in related civilian educational institutions from the 3rd year. As a result, the Ministry of Defense incurs huge costs and does not receive the required number of trained officers. This problem requires an optimal solution.

Practice shows that up to 40% of graduates leave the Armed Forces after graduating from college. The reasons are well known. All this leads to a shortage of young officers. Here we have to find the right and optimal solutions.

It is necessary to significantly reform the rear organs of the Armed Forces. They are brought into line with the new species structure army and navy. Their optimization and adaptation to market economic conditions are envisaged. The rear of the Armed Forces is called upon to be more economical and to use budget funds rationally. All this should help improve the nutrition of soldiers, their clothing allowance, and, in general, the logistics of the troops.

Thus, the reform of the Armed Forces is a truly large-scale and responsible matter, requiring great effort and significant material costs. The reform affects the fundamental interests of the country's national security. The success of its implementation depends on a number of conditions. First of all, from popular support for ongoing activities (material and moral support), from the level of state and military leadership of changes in the military sphere. No wonder the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin took the course of reform of the Armed Forces under his personal control.

3. The tasks of military personnel to ensure combat readiness, strengthen military discipline and law and order, and successfully implement the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The reform of the Armed Forces, their radical transformation, have a decisive influence on changes in the scale and nature of the tasks they solve.

It should be emphasized that even in the new conditions, as follows from the essence of the reform, the function of the Armed Forces was and remains the same. This is to ensure Russia's security from external threats its territorial integrity, sovereignty, economic and political interests.

Despite the low probability in modern conditions of large-scale aggression against our country, the task of ensuring external security still remains relevant. The main sources of military danger are local wars and regional conflicts in which Russia may be involved.

Under these conditions, there is a need for a certain adjustment of both general tasks and their individual types. And this will inevitably determine the content and direction of the entire process of combat training and military service. The Armed Forces are called upon to reliably deter any possible aggression, and at the same time have the ability and ability to prevent or fend off local wars and regional conflicts.

The main task of deterring aggression still rests with the Strategic Missile Forces. In connection with the reform, they acquire new fighting qualities. Carrying out decisive role in deterring aggression, they are also less expensive than other types of Armed Forces. Nuclear deterrence remains the core of Russia's national defense system. This is a reliable guarantee of the country’s security during a period of deep economic and political changes, including reform of the Armed Forces.

In terms of conventional Armed forces and weapons, Russia will have sufficient capabilities to successfully solve combat missions in local wars and regional conflicts. Ground forces will be small in number, compact and mobile. They will have transportation means for operations in various strategic directions. The Air Force will play an increasing role in local wars and regional conflicts. The combat power of the conventional Armed Forces will increase significantly over the years of reform as a result of equipping them with high-precision weapons systems.

The Navy, while maintaining mostly modern structure, will have the ability to solve problems in important ocean and maritime strategic areas, ensuring the state interests of the country. But the scope of these tasks may be limited due to positive changes in the military-political situation in the world.

The likelihood of local wars and armed conflicts will necessitate more active participation in international peacekeeping operations. They are organized by the UN, OSCE, CIS. This is a fundamentally new task for the Russian Armed Forces. To solve it, special military contingents may be required, as is happening, for example, now in Tajikistan.

As you can see, the reform of the Armed Forces, their deep transformation in no way relieves the army and navy of the task of ensuring the country's security. But the content of the tasks is being clarified and adjusted in connection with changes in the nature and scale of military dangers for the country.

The success of the reform of the Armed Forces and their implementation of the tasks of ensuring the security of our state directly depends on the activity and effectiveness of military labor personnel army and navy. The challenges of reform are complex. But any reforms are carried out by people - specific military personnel. And active participation in putting reforms into practice is our common patriotic duty.

The training leader must emphasize that the main efforts of personnel in the context of the reform should be aimed at maintaining high combat readiness, which is unthinkable without high training of military personnel, strong military discipline and law and order.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense considers the priority task at the stage of reforms to be the prevention of crimes and incidents, primarily related to the death and injury of people, manifestations of hazing, loss and theft of weapons, ammunition and military property. Such facts reduce the effectiveness of reforms and divert a lot of effort from solving the main tasks associated with reforming the army and navy.

The level of organization of personnel is very important; it is necessary that reorganization, mass dismissal of military personnel, withdrawal of supporting structures from the Armed Forces, etc., are carried out as planned, without any failures. The main thing is not to slacken attention to the tasks of increasing vigilance and combat readiness, because the modern world is not safe.

Under these conditions, the requirements for officers who organize the training and education of subordinates and guides increase immeasurably public policy in the army and navy. The quality of combat training and the level of military skill of soldiers and sergeants primarily depend on their professionalism, sense of responsibility, and initiative.

They are the bearers of high morale and discipline. Only their personal example in service, in compliance with Russian laws and military regulations serves as an effective means of establishing law and order and strong military discipline in the troops.

This is exactly what the Minister of Defense, General of the Army I.D., spoke about at a reception in honor of graduates of military academies on June 30, 1997. Sergeev: “We must not forget that the state of the army and navy is determined primarily by the state of the officer corps. It is the officers, true professionals, patriots devoted to their Fatherland, who with dignity bear their high title of defender of the Russian land” (“Red Star”, July 1, 1997 .).

During the period of reform, attention to the issues of social protection of soldiers cannot be weakened.

The guarantee of success is to maintain a healthy moral and psychological state in military teams in today's difficult times.

It is necessary to see in each of your subordinates not a robot, not a blind tool, but a person, a personality. However, humanity is not connivance, not coddling, but care combined with exactingness. The main thing is not to forget about the dignity of your subordinates, to always feel personal responsibility for their training and education, for their lives.

One of the most important tasks of the officer corps is to strengthen the patriotic, moral and military education of their subordinates.

It is important to achieve awareness among every warrior, every subordinate national significance the beginning of the reform of the Armed Forces, personal responsibility for maintaining high vigilance and combat readiness. Military personnel must deeply understand that the reduction of the army and navy should not weaken their combat power. It must be supplemented by the growth of the combat skill of each warrior, skillful use of military equipment and weapons, strengthening of military discipline, organization and military law and order.

During the period of reform, when individual units and divisions will be reduced, a careful and economical attitude to a variety of material resources is more important than ever.

And about one more problem. Today, when there is spiritual and political confrontation in society, various forces are trying to influence the army. Involving military personnel in political processes would lead to destabilization in military collectives and would be not only illegal, but in every sense, destructive for the cause of reforming the army and society. Skepticism and discrediting the ideas of military reform and reform of the Armed Forces can cause serious damage to the cause of ensuring the country's national security. But there is no turning back. Behind us is only the degradation and destruction of the army and navy. Ahead, on the path of reform, are the powerful Russian Armed Forces of the 21st century. Great Russia needs a strong, reformed army. Everyone should realize this.

In conclusion, we emphasize once again that the reform of the Russian Armed Forces is a major, historical event in the life of the people and their armed defenders, a big deal of national importance. It is objectively conditioned and natural. The reform will bring the Armed Forces into full compliance with the nature and characteristics of the modern military-political situation and the economic capabilities of the country. The army and navy, having reduced in quantity, will increase their combat effectiveness and combat readiness due to qualitative parameters.

One of the strategic objectives of the reform, as the President of the Russian Federation emphasizes, is to qualitatively improve the lives of military personnel, “... to return the military profession to its former prestige and respect of Russians.” (Red Star, July 30, 1997).

The reform will contribute to the economic and political stabilization of the country. The objectives of the reform cannot be solved without raising the level of combat readiness, without strengthening military discipline and law and order, without the interested attitude of each military personnel to its successful implementation.

Sample questions for the seminar (conversation):

What caused the need for such a radical reform of the country's Armed Forces?

What were the latest speeches by the leadership of the country and the army, and how were the goals and priorities of reform formulated?

Tell us about the main stages of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Personnel policy during reform.

Restructuring military education.

Tell us how the defense budget will be adjusted.

What needs to be done to improve the prestige of military service?

What sources of funding are provided to support the reform?

What measures are planned to be taken to ensure social protection of military personnel and members of their families?

Tell us about the tasks of the Armed Forces in modern conditions.

How do you imagine the tasks of your unit, division and your personal ones during the reform?

Literature

1. Constitution of the Russian Federation. - M., 1993.

2. Federal Law of the Russian Federation "On Defense". - M., 1996.

3. Address on national security of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. - Russian newspaper, 1997, March 7.

4. “Towards an active foreign policy and effective military reform.” From the message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. - Red Star, 1997, March 11.

5. Address of the President of the Russian Federation “To the soldiers of Russia.” - Red Star, 1997, March 28.

6. Answers of the President of the Russian Federation to questions from “Red Star” / “Towards a new look for the army.” - Red Star, 1997, May 7.

7. "Meeting of the Defense Council: the severity of the presidential assessments." - Red Star, 1997, May 23.

8. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure." - Red Star, 1997, July 19.

9. Answers from the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General I.D. Sergeev to questions from “Red Star” / “Reforms are our common concern.” - Red Star, 1997, June 27.

10. Sergeev I.D. Speech at a meeting of the Federation Council. - Red Star, 1997, July 5.

11. Sergeev I.D. The new look of the army: realities and prospects. - Red Star, 1997, July 22.

12. Text of radio address by B.N. Yeltsin dated July 25, 1997

13. Address of the President of the Russian Federation, Supreme Commander-in-Chief “To the soldiers of Russia.” - Red Star, 1997, July 30.

14. Sergeev I.D. New Russia, new army. - Red Star, 1997, September 19.

A radical transformation of the system of international relations, the adoption of a new military doctrine, a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, a focus on quality parameters in defense construction - these and many other factors dictate the need for military reform in Russia. Therefore, military reform became an imperative of socio-political practice in Russia after the end of "cold war". The need for military reform in the Russian Federation is due to geopolitical changes. It is geopolitical features that predetermine the significant scale of transformation that must be carried out in the context of large-scale socio-economic reforms.

The armed forces inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR were created as a means of confrontation in « cold war» and in many respects do not meet the requirements for modern armed forces. The Russian army is not sufficiently prepared for local and ethnic conflicts; technical equipment Russian army, insufficient professionalism of soldiers and officers. One of the main problems of the Russian army has been insufficient funding "human resource", as well as ineffective mechanisms for social protection of military personnel. All of these problems and many others cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army - to solve the numerous problems of the Russian armed forces, it is necessary to implement military reform as a comprehensive series of measures aimed at radically transforming the RF Armed Forces.

Military reform should not be identified with the reform of the Armed Forces, since the reform of the Armed Forces is considered as an integral part of the reform of the entire military development in the country. In this context, it should also be noted some other problems accompanying the implementation of the process of military reform in modern Russia, which, one way or another, require close study.

The crisis in the Russian army worsened in the late 1980s. By the end of the 80s. expenses for the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of a multimillion-dollar army aggravated the economic crisis. Underestimation of the factor of the Russian army's unpreparedness to repel threats to global, regional and national security has led to miscalculations in the military reform carried out in Russia. It should also be noted that all these factors create the prerequisites for the implementation of military reform in order to strengthen the combat capability of the Russian army.

The main negative factors that predetermined the decline in the combat readiness of the Soviet and then the Russian army, K. Tsirulis and V. Bazhanov indicate:
1. The irreconcilable contradiction of the corrupt caste with the rest of the officer mass;
2. Alienation between the generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers;
3. "Hazing", which created a tendency to criminalize the army and a system of ugly informal relationships;
4. Intensive development of equipment and weapons, which has exacerbated the contradiction between the need to increase the professionalism of personnel and outdated methods of combat training and its organization;
5. Decline in prestige military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation due to the involvement of military personnel of military specialties in economic work, which led to a decrease in combat readiness.

Unsatisfactory combat readiness is associated with a transition from the form of army organization inherent in the command-administrative system Soviet type to the form of army organization democratic state. However, events in the early 1990s prevented the rapid implementation of military reforms. In the 1990s. military reform was not implemented. The state policy of reducing military spending without reforming the Armed Forces led to the collapse of the army. The shortage of funding for the Armed Forces has led to the use of emergency reserves.

The military reform programs being developed had political significance, and military reform in practice meant a theoretical, methodological, organizational and legal framework. However, the successful implementation of military reform in the late 1990s. were hampered by insufficient funding, shortage of funds and lack of political will to implement the planned measures. During the military reform from 1992 to 2001, which can be called, in the words of L. Pevenya "a decade of missed opportunities", its main tasks were not completed:
- high combat readiness of troops is not ensured;
- effective measures for social security of military personnel have not been developed.

The aspect of the gradual transition of the Russian army to a contract basis for staffing positions deserves special attention. In the context of military reform in Russia, this process can be seen as affecting not only the organization of the Russian army, but also influencing Russian society. This determines efficient use contract workers the latest technology and improving the professionalism of military personnel and the Russian army as a whole. However, the initial cost of maintaining contract soldiers significantly exceeds the cost of conscript soldiers. The first experiments on the formation of military units from contract soldiers were carried out in the early 1990s. The first unsuccessful experiment to transfer the army to a contract system of recruiting privates and non-commissioned officers in Russia began in 1992. The peak of the unsuccessful experiment occurred in the summer - autumn of 1993 - the experiment failed due to insufficient funding and the lack of a social benefits package for contract workers.

However, even now material remuneration and social benefits for contract workers are minimal. It can be assumed that, provided favorable socio-economic conditions are provided for a significant part of conscripts, this type of service in the Armed Forces can become an attractive and prestigious type of public service. Positive advertising in the media can play an important role in increasing motivation to serve under a contract. Support for the transition to a professional army is significantly higher among groups with higher social resources and the potential for their implementation.

The introduction of the alternative civil service (ACS) became an important event in the socio-political life of the Russian Federation. Perhaps in the future the AGS Institute will be replenished a large number potential participants, the number of which can be measured in tens and hundreds of thousands. Jobs for those mobilized within the framework of the alternative civil service can be found in orphanages and homes, homes for the elderly, and people with disabilities. These jobs, as a rule, are characterized by relatively difficult working conditions and are not prestigious and unattractive for the majority of traditional workers, but the public demand for such work is increasing. Military reforms meet with support in Russian society, especially among those categories of conscripts and other social groups that receive social benefits or benefits as a result of the introduction of alternative civilian service. The problem of assessing the socio-economic consequences of staffing the alternative civil service is difficult to predict long-term. It should be assumed that many social groups will benefit from these innovations. However, in existing form these transformations cannot solve the main problem of the Russian army - the plight of soldiers (called up to carry conscript service) and officers.

Social aspects of military reform of the Russian Armed Forces

In post-reform Russia, complex, contradictory and often unpredictable social processes have a significant impact not only on certain social groups of Russian society, but also on military personnel and their families. Indeed, one of the main problems of the Russian army has been insufficient funding "human resource", ineffective mechanisms for social protection of soldiers and officers. All of these and many other problems cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army. Therefore, in order to solve numerous social problems of the Russian army, it is necessary to implement comprehensive measures, the purpose of which is to take targeted actions aimed at radically transforming the social protection system of Russian military personnel.

Low pay for military personnel and insufficient funding for the maintenance of the army have become one of the important problems requiring immediate solution. In this regard, economic measures of the Government have been adopted or planned to be adopted, the purpose of which is to replace the benefits of military personnel with monetary compensation. Calculated for 2002-2010. the State Housing Certificates program partially contributed to solving this problem. The functioning of the mortgage system for officers will solve the housing problem for many military personnel.

Having considered the main aspects of military reform and its impact social aspects on Russian society, we can come to the following conclusions:
1. Russia as great country, on which international security depends, must have a combat-ready army that meets the most modern requirements. The need to counter terrorist threats and repel the threats of potential aggressors obliges military personnel to constantly improve the military-technical equipment of the army.
2. In the modern Russian army there is a very negative social climate, very common cases "hazing". To increase public confidence in the army, hazing must be curbed. Frequent cases of violation of fundamental human rights in the army determine the negative attitude of many conscripts towards military service. Numerous illegal methods of evading military conscription are widespread.
3. Military reform, carried out in Russia for more than a century and a half, has become one of the key events in Russian socio-political life. It has a great influence on Russian society and affects the interests of many social groups and lobbies.
4. The most pressing problem of military reform has a rational, feasible solution for the Russian economy and society. Since 2001, it has entered the accelerated implementation process. The successful implementation of the military reform of the RF Armed Forces will make it possible to move to a new system of recruiting troops without compromising the combat capabilities of military units, to ensure the necessary number of trained reserves, and to eliminate many aspects social tension in society, which is characteristic of the current conscription system and ensure Russian society’s support for reforms.

Work with personnel

Referring to authoritative studies of domestic experts in the field of military construction and military management, B.L. Belyakov highlights the problems of educating personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and also focuses his research interest on the substantive characteristics of their influence. He points out that the problems of modern military education are determined by such a factor as the disintegration of the previously relatively effective and established system of educational work in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including the strengthening of military discipline, with military personnel of various ethnic groups and nations, along with introducing a religious factor into the army environment.

The slow and protracted phased creation of a new system of educational work, which does not meet the main goals and objectives of the concept of transition to a unitary system of educational work in military collectives of various branches of the Armed Forces. This slow process of transition to a unitary education system, in his opinion, also makes it difficult for more effective and coordinated work command and commanders of military formations, as well as the system of bureaucratic departments of educational work to unite and carry out educational work in multinational or multi-ethnic military collectives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the absence in the Armed Forces of a scientifically and conceptually based system and training program for humanities specialists (philologists, ethnologists and historians) specially trained to conduct socially oriented work (information, educational, etc.) with military personnel of various ethnic groups has a negative impact and nationalities inhabiting the Russian Federation.

In the 70s of the last century in the Soviet army there were no serious interethnic or interethnic conflicts, and in the system of social relations in army collectives the grandfather structure prevailed. Later, when solidarity in army collectives on a national, ethnic or compatriotic basis acquired a large-scale character, the compatriot-status system of social relations in many cases prevailed in army collectives over the traditional "grandfather's" and even destroy the latter. With the collapse of the USSR and the increased national homogeneity of the Russian army, the criminal system came to the fore.

In the modern Russian army, many commanders and their assistants in educational work need to work and act mainly in extraordinary conditions and with some elements of innovation and even, under certain conditions, risk solving actual problems and tasks of increased pedagogical complexity. At the same time, it is also necessary to take into account that some commanders have lost their previous ideological and moral values. traditional system educational work that developed in the Russian and Soviet armies, but new spiritual values ​​in educational activities were never formed. Failed search experiments national idea, ostentatious appeal to national and ethno-confessional sources, the decline in the standard of living of a significant number of the country's population led to social and legal vulnerability and uncertainty about the future among a significant number of military personnel. All these factors negatively affect the pedagogical activities of officers in the army to strengthen military discipline in military teams. It should also be noted that the solution to many of the above problems and challenges is possible by turning to theoretical, conceptual and practical methods of sociological science and involving professional sociologists in eliminating the consequences of these dysfunctional phenomena in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

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The main directions for improving the military organization of the state are determined by the general orientation towards increasing its effectiveness, strengthening the moral and psychological state, improving material, technical and social security and include:

optimization of the system of military command and control bodies, structure, composition and strength of the military organization, balanced development of its components;
minimizing the number of ministries and departments that are allowed to have troops and military formations;
improving strategic planning, bringing the scope and content of the tasks of a military organization in line with the real needs of defense and security of the Russian Federation, eliminating functions and tasks unusual for the military organization of the state;
improvement of combat and mobilization readiness systems, mobilization training in the military organization of the Russian Federation;
increasing the efficiency of the system of operational and combat training and education of military personnel;
transition to a unified system of orders for weapons and military equipment general use;
structural, technological and qualitative transformation of the material and technical base of the military organization and the defense industrial complex;
transition to a single, integrated and unified system of logistics support for all components of the state’s military organization;
promotion social status military personnel;
pursuing an active state policy to strengthen the authority of military service, as well as military-patriotic education of citizens and preparing them for military service;
improvement of regulatory legal framework development of the military organization, its legal relations with civil society and the state on democratic principles.

Despite the fact that Russia’s military security is ensured by the totality of the means at its disposal, a special place in solving this problem is given to the Armed Forces, whose combat power is aimed at deterring, suppressing and militarily eliminating any aggression.
The task of creating the Armed Forces as the main force support element military security confronted the Russian leadership with all its severity immediately after the collapse of the USSR. The role and place of our state in the international arena, its influence on the modern world, providing conditions for overcoming the economic crisis, stabilization depended on the correct and balanced approach to its solution. social situation in the country. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation form the basis of the country's defense. They are intended to repel aggression directed against the Russian Federation, for armed defense of the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as to carry out tasks in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the main role in “ordinary” armed conflicts and wars belongs to the General Purpose Forces.
The purpose and intention of the reform is to create highly equipped, combat-ready, compact and mobile Armed Forces with sufficient deterrence potential, meeting modern requirements for professional and moral-psychological training, with optimal composition, structure and strength, bringing them into line with modern military-political realities and capabilities states.
The main way to achieve the goal of building an effective military organization is to give it optimal characteristics: in terms of numbers, combat strength, organizational structure, management systems and all types of support. One of the indispensable conditions is cost optimization material resources and funds allocated to ensure military security, increasing the efficiency of their use on the basis of interconnected, coordinated reform of all components of the military organization of the state.
It is vital to do this. To solve this problem, doctrinal guidelines are aimed at uniform principles, priorities and directions for the construction and preparation of a military organization, on bringing the scope and content of its tasks, structure, composition and number of its components in accordance with the real needs of ensuring military security and the economic capabilities of the country.
Measures to improve strategic planning on the principles of unity of use of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation are subordinated to the same goal.
In the military sphere, it is necessary to determine the nature and direction of military development, the basic requirements for the Armed Forces to solve strategic problems in possible military conflicts, the basic principles of ensuring state security in the defense field, as well as the directions of their construction and development. It is obvious that the composition, structure and condition of the Armed Forces of the state must correspond to the volume and degree of complexity of the tasks assigned to them.
This will ensure systems approach to the construction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and to coordinate the efforts of power ministries and departments in matters of organizing defense.
The starting premises for the creation of the Armed Forces, as an effective means of ensuring military security, should be:

1. A clear formulation of the concept of "Armed Forces".
2. Determination of the main tasks solved by the Armed Forces.
3. Development of the optimal structure of the Armed Forces, based on the assigned tasks.

The consequences of these premises should be the solution of issues of financing, comprehensive support, development and, if necessary, reform of the Armed Forces.
It is obvious that the composition, structure and condition of the Armed Forces of the state must correspond to the volume and degree of complexity of the tasks assigned to them.
The Armed Forces will not be able to carry out tasks to the extent determined by the Military Doctrine if they are not equipped modern types weapons and military equipment. At the same time, the main directions for their improvement should be:

development of integrated systems and means of reconnaissance, situational illumination, control and communications, coordinate-metric and other types of support, creation of an integrated information environment and the development of a unified data storage and exchange system for the entire military organization of the state;
development of high-precision weapons as a component of all main systems and subsystems of weapons of the Armed Forces;
universalization, informatization, “intellectualization” of weapons and military equipment, their integration and integration to give them multifunctional properties;
creation of small-sized and ultra-small means based on microminiaturization, especially in the areas of intelligence, counterintelligence and combat control;
reduction of all types of visibility of weapons, military equipment and military facilities;
increasing the mobility and transportability of weapons and military equipment;
reduction of operating costs for weapons and military equipment based on the introduction of advanced means and methods Maintenance;
automation of control processes and logistics support of troops, creation of a single, integrated and unified system of logistics support for all components of the military organization.

We understand perfectly well that solving reform problems is only possible with appropriate financial and economic support. Therefore, the tasks of reforming the Armed Forces must be closely linked with the long-term macroeconomic forecast for the development of the state’s economy.
Absence for a long time common understanding in matters of national, political and, as a consequence, military security, it led to the fact that we had practically no potential opponents, there were only “truly devoted partners and well-wishers.” In such a situation, in conditions of an ever-progressing financial crisis, there is no need to have a strong army. It's too difficult to contain her. Only the US and NATO aggression against Yugoslavia forced our political leadership realize that similar scenario applicable to our country. Hence the new editions of the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine.
The main disadvantage existing approach to the issues of building the army is a subjective, voluntaristic approach to the issues of its construction, or rather the current “reform”.
Establishing the optimal number of personnel, weapons and military equipment should be made only after solving a number of problems:

1. Assessing the military-political situation, determining Russia’s place in the modern world.
2. Analysis of possible threats to Russia and assessment of the state of the armed forces of potential adversaries.
3. Determining the tasks of the Russian Armed Forces to repel possible external aggression.

The main “working background” should be such categories as the territory of Russia, its economic opportunities and demographic situation.
Having received answers to the questions posed, we can talk about the quantitative and qualitative composition of the Russian Armed Forces.
Structurally, the army should have two components: strategic nuclear forces(in the future it will be more convenient to use the concept of “deterrence force”) and general-purpose forces.

Photo: euromag.ru

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Seven years have passed since the beginning of the Serdyukov-Makarov military reform: this year the second stage of reforms ends. There are still five years ahead. Sankt-Peterburg.ru talks about what has already been done to reform the Armed Forces, what remains to be done and what the army of the future is like.

In short: the essence of the reform

Russia has experienced many military reforms. The most important for us today are those that were adopted under Peter the Great and after him: Petrovskaya, Potemkinskaya, Milyutinskaya, Frunzenskaya and others. The current transformations in the military sphere are called the “reform of Anatoly Serdyukov,” who was the country’s Minister of Defense from 2007 to 2012, but the changes that have already happened and are coming are associated not only with his name. Serdyukov’s authorship actually belongs to the ideas about a new look at military spending, about the humanization of military service, and about outsourcing consumer services for military personnel. However, changes in the structure of the Armed Forces were initiated by ex-chiefs General Staff RF Armed Forces: Nikolai Makarov and Yuri Baluevsky. Simply put, if Serdyukov was involved in the socio-economic side of the matter, then the “military” section of the reform was developed by Makarov, and before him by Baluevsky.




Nikolai Makarov (left) replaced Yuri Baluevsky in the General Staff

photo: svoboda.org

Serdyukov announced the start of a new military reform on October 14, 2008 at a meeting of the board of his department. 19.2 trillion rubles were allocated for the implementation of the new State Armament Program. Reform affects everything functional bases Armed forces of the Russian Federation: number of personnel, officer training system, structure central control, and also provides for the gradual equipping of the army with modern military equipment. Conventionally, the reform was divided into three stages. The first (2008-2011) announced the optimization of the number of personnel and management personnel, as well as the reform of military education. In the second (2012-2015) - increasing pay, providing housing, professional retraining and advanced training of military personnel. The third (2016-2020), the most expensive, involves rearmament.

The conceptual basis of the reform is research and development work, for the active development of which about 2 trillion rubles were allocated. The fundamental goal of the reform is to move from the Soviet system to a more modern device Armed forces. That is, a mass and mobilization army adapted for a global war (for example, with NATO) should be replaced by a more compact army, adequate to the current economic, social and territorial capabilities of the country and adapted to local regional conflicts, of constant readiness.

Of course, the matter will not be limited to scientific research. An equally priority area was the improvement of strategic nuclear weapons. In particular, the development of a ground-based missile force and the modernization of strategic aviation - Tu-95 and Tu-160 (the same amount of funds were allocated for these purposes as for scientific research - 2 trillion rubles) and the introduction of a heavy liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile to replace outdated ICBMs RS-18 and RS-20 and a promising long-range aviation complex.

"First Swallows"

The first stage plan (2008-2011), announced by Serdyukov in October 2008, implied a reduction in the size of the Russian Armed Forces to one million military personnel by 2012. At the same time, the officer corps should be optimized to 150 thousand people, which entailed a significant reduction: in 2008 it amounted to 355 thousand officer positions. In the Russian Air Force, from 2009 to 2012, it was planned to eliminate all aviation divisions and regiments, forming 55 air bases on their basis, and also to reduce over 50 thousand officer positions. The number of units of the Russian Navy was to be reduced from 240 to 123. The officer corps of the fleet was planned to be reduced by 2-2.5 times. And finally, the reorganization of the military education system involved the creation of 10 systemically important universities - three military educational and scientific center, six academies and one university - on the basis of the already existing 65 military educational institutions. What of the plans was implemented and how qualitative were the changes?

Introduction of operational-strategic commands

Before Serdyukov and Makarov, as discussed above, the foundations for reform had already been laid by Baluevsky. Thus, he came up with the idea of ​​​​creating operational-strategic commands. USCs are useful in that they unite power groups in a given territory (the exception is the Strategic Nuclear Forces) and make it possible to create a unified system of command and control, the same in conditions of both peace and war. In other words, if hostilities begin, there will be no need to waste time rebuilding the system: it will already be ready for use.

In the 1970-80s, USCs also existed in the USSR: then they were formed to control troops in foreign theaters of military operations and were liquidated after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact organization and the collapse of the USSR. From that moment on, troops on the territory of the Russian Federation began to be controlled through a system of military districts, founded by Dmitry Milyutin, Minister of Defense of the Russian Empire in 1861-1881. General Baluevsky began the introduction of the USC, Makarov continued his work and eliminated the system of districts. Today there are four USCs: “West” (general headquarters in St. Petersburg), “East” (Khabarovsk), “Center” (Ekaterinburg) and “South” (Rostov-on-Don). Today, USC is subordinate to all general-purpose forces, including air force/air defense and navy units. At the same time, the military districts became not six, but four.

Transfer of the Ground Forces to a brigade structure

Another change initiated by Baluev and brought to fruition by Makarov was the liquidation of divisions and the transfer of the Ground Forces to the structure of brigades, which became mobile components of groupings under the control of the operational command - army headquarters. The existing divisions were transformed into three types of brigades numbering 5-6.5 thousand people: “heavy”, “medium”, “light”. The “heavy” brigades include tank and most motorized rifle brigades. They are distinguished by increased impact force and survivability. “Medium” brigades are equipped with armored personnel carriers and are designed to conduct combat operations in specific conditions, both urban and natural, for example, in mountainous or wooded areas. “Light” brigades are distinguished by high maneuverability: they are equipped with appropriate vehicles.

"Unloading" of managers

The changes also affected the management corps. Firstly, commanders of military units and formations of permanent readiness no longer resolve economic issues, which allowed them to concentrate on their immediate work, and the responsibilities for providing rear services fell on the commanders training centers and universities.

Secondly, the General Staff has become a full-fledged strategic planning body, which organizes and manages the Armed Forces together with the Ministry of Defense.

Thirdly, within the Ministry of Defense, which for a long time remained the main command authority, two separate directions arose. The “military” branch of the Ministry of Defense, headed by the General Staff, deals exclusively with issues of combat training of the Armed Forces and command and control of troops. The “civilian” branch, which employs the relevant specialized departments, resolves all financial, housing, medical, and economic issues that arise in the rear, including the purchase of military equipment. Many experts believe that this measure helps reduce corruption in arms procurement and make the Ministry of Defense's cash management transparent.

New troop basing system

It involves the formation of 184 military camps, which will be able to accommodate personnel of the Armed Forces total number more than 700 thousand people. To optimize the Armed Forces' aviation basing system, the 31 air force bases of the Air Force were reduced to 8. Army aviation bases were created to increase the mobility and firepower of the troops.




photo: arms-expo.ru

Formation of officer and sergeant corps

The reduction of the army and its recruitment is the most painful point in the entire reform. In particular, the reduction officer corps. If in 2008 the number of officers (these are generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, senior lieutenants and lieutenants) was 365 thousand people, then in 2012 there were only 142 thousand left. The positions of warrant officer and midshipman were abolished. However, in the process of changes, the approach had to be adjusted: the Ministry of Defense decided to “rewind” and leave 220 thousand officers in the Armed Forces. The formal explanation for this change was the creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces as a separate structure, however, according to some experts, the main reason is that the 142,000-strong officer corps was ultimately considered insufficient to manage the Armed Forces. As a result, by decree of Dmitry Medvedev, the missing 80 thousand were returned to the Armed Forces.

Similar “throwing” accompanied the decision of the Ministry of Defense regarding the transfer of the army to a completely contract service. At first, the department increased the share of contract soldiers and rapidly reduced the number of conscripts. Then it again reduced the number of contract soldiers, explaining its actions by difficulties caused by the economic crisis. Finally, in 2011, the emphasis was again placed on “personnel officers” - they should now form the basis of the army.

This uncertainty, in turn, jeopardized the sergeant corps. After reforming the officer corps and eliminating the positions of warrant officers and midshipmen, it was decided that they should be replaced by sergeants and foremen. But in practice, it turned out that there is no place to train sergeants yet, and a sergeant’s salary is so low that it is almost impossible to collect the required number of employees. As a result, at the beginning of 2013, the positions of warrant officers were returned. Today, with an increase in pay and the gradual improvement of sergeant schools, the question of the formation sergeant corps It’s no longer so acute.

Reorganization of the military education system

In order for the new system to work without interruption, there was a need to improve the professional training of military personnel, new programs for their training and the creation of a modern network of military educational institutions. On September 1, 2011, military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense began training officers with higher military operational-tactical training and higher military operational-strategic training under additional professional education programs.




photo: unn.ru

The Ministry of Defense began to use common approaches for training in military and civilian schools: primary-level officers began to be trained under specialist training programs, and at branch academies and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - under additional professional education programs. Professional sergeants are now trained in training units and military units, in sergeant schools and in higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense under secondary vocational education programs. In 2009, such training was launched in six universities of the Russian Ministry of Defense, including the Sergeant Training Center (Ryazan), in 2010 - in 19 universities, in 2011 - in 24.

Second stage: humanization of the army

Changes in the army's infrastructure became the main task of the second stage of reforms (2011-2015). In recent years, it has been carried out under the auspices of the “Effective Army” program - a set of solutions in all areas of the Armed Forces. It made it possible to increase the pay of military personnel and launch targeted provision of housing for them. In addition, the program involves the construction of standard headquarters, barracks, gyms and canteens. This means that by the end of the reform, all military units will be equipped with the same infrastructure that works efficiently and smoothly.

Thus, by the beginning of the new decade, a one system logistics support for troops - unified logistics centers that manage all types of supplies and transportation throughout the military district. At the same time, a transition began to servicing technical parks at enterprises that repair weapons and military equipment. Most importantly, many functions to provide infrastructure for the troops were taken over by civilian enterprises. Service maintenance and repair of equipment, food for personnel, bath and laundry services, cargo transportation, refueling of Navy ships with fuel and motor oils, and comprehensive airfield operational services are now carried out on an outsourcing basis. aircraft, refueling vehicles via the network gas stations, operation of communal infrastructure.

Apartments

Due to dramatic changes in the size of the officer corps, the problem of housing shortages has worsened. The fact is that every officer who has served for more than 10 years and left service (not for discreditable reasons) has the right to an apartment at his chosen place of residence. Almost 170 thousand officers were laid off, and most of them needed housing for their families. A queue formed, but by the end of 2010 it had decreased to 120 thousand people, and in 2011 - to 63.8 thousand people. If we consider that in 2013, 21 thousand military personnel received official housing, and in 2014 - 47 thousand, then we can safely say that all officers who left the service received apartments. Most importantly, sq. meters began to provide those who are still in the service: at the beginning of 2015, almost 4 thousand Russian military personnel received housing. Housing issue for the military it turned out to be completely solvable, and current situation is noticeably different from what it was in the late 2000s.

Nutrition

Until 2010, the food system rested on the shoulders of the servicemen themselves, and in the literal sense: hot meals were prepared by the soldiers themselves, conscripts went through cook school, soldiers peeled potatoes in the kitchen. Another achievement of the military reform is that food was transferred to civilian companies, after which, according to reviews from servicemen, the quality of food increased sharply, and the soldiers were finally able to carry out their immediate duties - military service. Outsourcing companies provide the process from start to finish: delivery, delivery, storage, preparation, distribution, service according to standards. Civil services also began to maintain military camps, clean barracks and surrounding areas, sew uniforms, organize military transportation and repair of equipment and weapons.




photo: voenternet.ru

The outsourcing system was adopted from the armies of NATO countries. Since the 1990s, it has operated in the armies of the USA, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Bulgaria. Its introduction was associated with a sharp reduction in military budgets. The pioneers in outsourcing were countries where the private sector of the economy predominated - the USA, England, Australia. Outsourcing abroad has a very wide range of organizational forms; as a rule, it is a public-private partnership. Outsourcing came to Russia suddenly, and it should be introduced gradually: from simple projects (cleaning services and food supplies) to large and complex ones (technical support for military equipment).

Monetary allowance

The increase in pay is also associated with the intensification of the “Effective Army” program. Under this program, an automated material accounting system has been introduced and the development of military medicine, creation of a system for recording personal data of military personnel and civilian personnel. In particular, the amount of payments to military personnel is increasing: several years ago the average salary was 57.8 thousand rubles, and in 2014 it was already 62.1 thousand rubles. The pension of military personnel was indexed by 7.5% from October 1: now its average level is 21.5 thousand rubles.

In April 2015, the total budget of the Russian Ministry of Defense was fully agreed upon: it will amount to 3.6 trillion rubles. Expenditures on the army are primarily related to its re-equipment, which in turn guarantees investments in the military-industrial complex: guaranteed orders to military, metallurgical, chemical, electronic, textile and agricultural enterprises.

Elimination of hazing

The conditions for completing military service have changed dramatically over the past five years: in addition to shortening the term, the very essence has changed. Firstly, classic “hazing” has become a thing of the past as a format of hazing based on the “senior-junior” principle, which is reproduced with each call. The army still has problems with hazing, based on physical superiority combined with insufficient moral principles of individual soldiers, in fraternities, but there are prerequisites for them in civil life, the old “hazing” no longer exists in the army.

The principle of responding to soldiers' complaints has changed. If earlier cases of hazing and their consequences were tried to be hidden, now such a concealment can cost the commander who committed it more than the fact of hazing in the unit itself. Soldiers, having received the right to use a mobile phone, and often the Internet (sometimes from the same phone), began to inform their relatives in much more detail about how they live and serve.

Mobilization and humanization as the basis of the army of the future

The main and tangible achievement of the first stage of the reform is increasing the combat readiness and mobility of the Armed Forces. High combat readiness presupposes a more advanced army structure, which allows you to act immediately after receiving an order, spending up to several hours on preparation. Moreover, complete units are ready for independent active actions and combat missions. It was the transfer of the army to the system of battalions and brigades that made it possible to increase mobility and combat readiness Armed forces. If we add to this the results of the second stage—fundamental changes in the army’s infrastructure—then the picture emerges more than encouraging. During the reforms, firstly, the conservatism of the system was broken, and secondly, the mobilization and humanization of troops was introduced - there are strongholds of the new army, and it is thanks to them that the rearmament that is yet to come is possible.

All news in the section

Every year the modernization of the Russian Armed Forces is gaining momentum. New types of weapons are being approved, the infrastructure of the army is being improved, and the professional excellence military personnel. So today's question is Rearmament reforms of the Russian Armed Forces 2018 still remains open.

In certain circles, doubts arise that the military reform program of 2008-2020 will be completed on time. In view of the economic crisis and rapidly changing conditions in the country, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the reform.

The problem of the need for such a reform was voiced shortly before 2008 and was presented only as one of the possible directions for future reformation. A set of measures, divided into several stages, is designed to change and improve the structure, strength and composition of a strategically important military organization for the country - the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Stages of rearmament:

• Stage I – took place from 2008 to 2011 inclusive.
• Stage II - began in 2012 and ended in 2015.
• Stage III – planned for the period from 2016 to 2020 inclusive.

Organizational and staffing maneuvers

At the first stage, organizational and staffing measures were carried out aimed at improving management, optimizing numbers and carrying out military education reform.

One of the main directions of the first stage of the reformation was the transition from a system consisting of four links (that is, “military district - army - division - regiment”) to a system including only three links: “military district - operational command - brigade”.

The number of military districts was reduced, each of which established its own reserve command. During the rearmament reform, the number of military units was also reduced.

Reduction degree:

• Ground forces - 90%;
• Navy - by 49%;
• Air Force - by 48%;
• Strategic Missile Forces - by 33%;
• Airborne troops - by 17%;
• Space Forces - by 15%.

A significant part of the rearmament was the reduction in the number of military personnel. Officers were the most affected by the reformation: from approximately 300 thousand people, the number of officers was reduced by almost half.

It must be said that the optimization of numbers was determined to be unsuccessful. The actions of the military department led to complex problems: The professional part of the junior army command was completely destroyed. Experts, by the way, recognized the program to replace warrant officers with sergeants as a failure.

It is expected that the warrant officers will return to their units in the required composition. By the beginning of 2018, the military department plans to increase the size of the Russian army. So, total number officers will be 220 thousand people, warrant officers and midshipmen - approximately 50 thousand people, contract military personnel - 425 thousand people, conscripts - 300 thousand people. A significant number of conscripts testify to.

The reform of military education implies the reduction of some military institutes and universities, and instead of them, scientific centers were formed under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

Optimization of social security for military personnel

The second stage of the reformation, which included addressing social issues, was aimed at the following activities: providing housing, increasing material allowances, improving skills and professional retraining.

On this moment the number of military personnel without housing has decreased significantly compared to 2009. Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly. In the first years of the second stage, this issue was successfully resolved, but since 2012, the number of people who do not have their own apartment has grown inexorably.

The elimination of the queue for housing, according to the plan of the Ministry of Defense, was to be completed by 2013. However this process was not implemented for a number of serious reasons. In such conditions, the department made the only right decision to give those on the waiting list a one-time cash payment instead of housing.

The increase in material allowances for military personnel occurred in 2012. Salaries were increased almost 3 times, and military pensions also increased. All allowances and additional payments in force before the reformation were abolished, and completely new additional payments were introduced instead.

All contract servicemen, according to the professional retraining reform, were required to undergo special “survival courses” aimed at improving their skills. Retraining of officers is carried out when a serviceman is appointed to a position.

Rearmament reform at present

Currently, the third stage of the reform of the rearmament of the Russian Armed Forces is underway. As of 2016, the total share of new weapons in the Russian Military Forces was 47%, while, according to the plan, this figure should have been only 30%. For the army, this means receiving an additional number of modern tanks, small arms and other types of weapons.

The ultimate goal of the reform is to increase the number of modern weapons to 70% by 2020. Thus, the modernization of the army of the Russian Federation must be completed on time and in full.

In addition to technical improvements, the rearmament reform contributed to increasing the level of combat training of military personnel, conducting large-scale exercises, forming new military institutions and units, optimizing the structure of the Military Forces, etc.

Best estimate current state matters may be the opinion of our sworn “friends” from the West, who emphasize the ever-increasing military power of our country.