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In 1941, partisans entered the fight against fascism. The State Defense Committee issued a resolution on the organization of armed struggle in the rear of the Nazi occupiers. It spoke of the need to “create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step.”
The traditions of the partisan movement in Russia have existed since the Napoleonic War of 1812. But thanks to the decree of 1941, for the first time in history, partisans fought as part of the army, coordinating actions with the command of the Armed Forces.
During the Great Patriotic War, more than 6 thousand operated in the occupied territories partisan detachments and underground groups. More than a million people's avengers fought in them. The partisan underground has hundreds of feats to its name. Their troops blew up bridges and derailed trains. German soldiers called the partisans the “forest front” and often feared them more than the fighters from the main front.
Lively communication with the population made these detachments elusive, since local residents promptly informed about the enemy’s punitive actions. Popular support was provided to the partisan movement everywhere, and this was its strength and invincibility. For selfless and skillful actions, courage and heroism, more than 311 thousand partisans were awarded orders and medals, 248 of them became Heroes Soviet Union.
Few people know that the first partisan detachment during the Great Patriotic War was created in Pinsk by the evening of June 22, 1941. On June 28 he entered the battle. This day is considered the date of the first partisan shot in the Great Patriotic War. I had the opportunity to talk with a participant in that battle, later Major General of State Security Eduard Nordman. Here's what he said:
The creation of the first partisan detachment is associated with the name of the legendary partisan Vasily Zakharovich Korzh. In the twenties he was a partisan in Western Belarus, in the thirties - he headed the so-called partisan direction in the Slutsk district department of the NKVD. In addition to selecting and training partisan personnel, they were engaged in laying secret NZ bases in case of war. On the morning of June 22, 1941, Korzh turned to the first secretary of the regional committee, Avksentiy Minchenko, for permission to create a partisan detachment. He first answered in the spirit of pre-war propaganda: don’t panic, the Red Army will fight back on the Bug and we will fight on foreign territory. But by evening the estimates had changed dramatically. A small detachment was created from volunteers. The district military registration and enlistment office even found “extra” weapons. Nordman, according to his story, received a rifle made in 1896, 90 rounds of ammunition and a grenade.
“On June 28, the Germans occupied Minsk,” recalled Eduard Boleslavovich. “We found ourselves in the strategic rear. In the morning, Korzh alerted the detachment. We moved onto the Pinsk-Logishin highway. We set up an ambush. German light tanks appeared. The commander ordered them to be allowed to throw a grenade. Instructor City party committee Salokhin threw a bunch of grenades under the first tank. The partisans opened aimed fire at the viewing slots. The second tank turned back. The weapons were removed from the damaged tank, the crew was captured. During interrogation, the chief lieutenant could not believe that his car was hit by civilians. He said: “This is not according to the rules, I do not surrender to civilians. Take me to the military command."
In July-September 1941, the detachment could not fight with large military units. There were not enough weapons or ammunition. They acted from ambushes, attacking single cars and motorcycles. They destroyed communication lines and burned bridges. The blows were not strong, but important. Firstly, they caused panic in the enemy. Secondly, they lifted the spirits of those who remained in the occupied territories.
Goebbels's propaganda trumpeted daily: "The Red Army is defeated. Stalin fled the capital. The Greater Reich is invincible." The cowardly gave up, the vile and cowardly went into the service of the Nazis. Courageous, honest people, gritting their teeth and gathering their will into a fist, fought. The partisans not only fought with the enemies - they instilled hope in our victory.
Today, the bourgeois evil spirits are trying to portray the partisans as bandits who were feared by the civilian population. A participant in the partisan movement responds to such attacks as follows:
From the very beginning of the creation of our detachment, which later grew into a powerful unit, Komarov (partisan pseudonym Korzha) never tired of repeating: “Never offend a man. Ask for a piece of bread, but never take it by force. If you offend a man, the end of your partisan war ". In the summer of 1941, we even paid money for food. Or the receipts wrote, for example: “A pig weighing approximately 60 kilograms was seized from citizen N... for the needs of the Red Army. The cost is subject to reimbursement after the war. Komarov.” In 1945, peasants who presented such notes were given trophy cattle that had been driven from Germany.
Korzh was merciless to the looters. Actually, we almost didn’t have any of those. I remember only one case when in the winter of 1942 he shot a senior lieutenant in front of the formation because he had ruined the hives in a peasant’s apiary. Cruel? Yes. But this turned out to be enough so that no one else would even think of offending any villager.
Since January 1942, a partisan zone began to form at the junction of the Minsk, Pinsk and Polesie regions. Soon it grew to the size of a medium European state. The Nazis were never able to conquer this unique partisan republic. Partisan commandant's offices were formed in the zone, which ensured order in the villages. Without their permission, the partisans had no right to procure food, take horses, and so on. Collective farms worked under the protection of partisans, and children studied in schools. No anarchy.
Those scoundrels who these days are trying to label partisans as bandits should be reminded in whose footsteps they are following: on August 25, 1942, Hitler issued a directive prohibiting the use of the terms “partisans” and “partisan detachment.” Partisans were ordered to be called “bandits”, “bandit gangs”.
Walter Scott also wrote that trying to surround partisans is like carrying water in a sieve. Army officers will assess the situation on the map, and the local partisan is not looking for a road, but a path along which he can slip through unnoticed. That is why neither Napoleon nor Hitler with their powerful armies could cope with the partisans.
There are also examples that are closer to today. The United States was never able to cope with the Vietnamese guerrillas. They pushed them out of the country.
As for the Pinsk partisans, they showed maximum effectiveness during the war. By 1944, the Pinsk formation had eight brigades. They destroyed about 27 thousand Nazis, defeated more than 60 large enemy garrisons, derailed about 500 trains with manpower and military equipment, blew up 62 railway bridges and about 900 on highways. But the main achievement of the partisans is not even in inflicting losses on the enemy, but in diverting large forces of the regular army to themselves.
According to the German General Staff, as of October 1, 1943, 52 divisions were engaged in the fight against partisans. For comparison: after the opening of the second front, Hitler fielded up to 50 divisions against our allies. I would like to recall the assessment of the great Zhukov: “The command of the enemy troops actually had to create a second front in their rear to fight the partisans, which diverted large forces of troops. This seriously affected the general condition of the German front and, ultimately, the outcome of the war.”
Original taken from steissd Did the Germans have partisans?
They were not mentioned in Soviet sources. At least for the general public, and not for professional historians. They even recognized the existence of the post-war resistance of Bandera, the Forest Brothers in the Baltics and the Polish AK members, but not a word about the Germans. And it seemed like they weren’t there. And they were. Naturally, Nazi. True, most of them were Octobrists with ears.
In May 1945, Nazi Germany signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. The Second World War ended, but the troops of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition still suffered losses (and not for a year or two, but right up to the end of the 60s). Members of the underground Werewolf organization continued fighting.
Who and how got into the German partisan movement? Were these people fanatics, besotted with twelve years of Nazi propaganda, or unwitting participants who failed to choose a peaceful life? These and other questions are answered by the historian, author of the book “Werewolf. Fragments of the brown empire" Andrey Vasilchenko.
The article is based on material from the program “The Price of Victory” of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”. The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full at this link.
Until the fall of 1944, talking about the need to create some kind of base in order to defend against the troops that entered Germany was considered defeatism, almost a criminal offense. At best, all operations were viewed as minor sabotage attacks. When, by the end of 1944, it became clear that the entry of Allied troops into German territory was just a matter of time, chaotic attempts began to create some kind of sabotage army. As a result, the main task was entrusted to Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. He decided to entrust this task to police units, namely the Prützmann Bureau. During his time as SS Obergruppenführer Hans-Adolf Prützmann distinguished himself with similar bloody actions in occupied Ukraine. They believed that he understood the partisans better than others, since he fought with them himself.
At this time, saboteur No. 1 Otto Skorzeny developed a feeling of jealousy, and he did everything possible to sabotage the organization of the Werewolf movement, believing that at some point he himself would lead the sabotage army. All this discord led to the fact that the German partisan movement was not ready to meet the enemy: tactics were not developed, personnel were not trained, bases were created hastily.
But nevertheless, after May 1945, the “werewolves” continued to carry out their operations. What is this? Some kind of “wild army”, “wild army”? Several factors come together here. First of all, it's a reaction. local population, especially the national outskirts, which have wandered from country to country for centuries. These are Silesia, Sudetenland, Alsace, Lorraine. That is, when new authorities appeared, there was what is called a “wild eviction” of the Germans. That is, the Soviet authorities tried to create a certain barrier, the French did the same, and this caused discontent among the local population, who, naturally, willy-nilly tried to somehow resist, including by armed means.
The second component is the remains of Wehrmacht units. This was especially pronounced on the Western Front. The fact is that the Allies tried to capture as much territory as possible. As a result, they resorted to tactics that were very detrimental to them - they tried to repeat the blitzkrieg, tank wedges, but they did not have the required number of motorized infantry. As a result, huge gaps arose between tanks and infantry, almost tens of kilometers long. And in these gaps, the remnants of the parts felt quite calmly, at ease. Some wrote that at that moment the Wehrmacht on the Western Front generally turned into a bunch of small partisan detachments. What can we talk about if Wenck’s army calmly walked along the western rear. This is not a battalion, not a company - this is an entire tank army. As a result of this, the so-called “Kleinkrieg”, that is, a small guerrilla war, was also considered by the allies and our Soviet units to be part of the Wehrmacht.
Reichsjugendführer Arthur Axmann (left) and Hitler Youth graduates
And there was also a plan by Arthur Axman, the head of the Hitler Youth, which involved mobilizing young people to create a whole network of partisan detachments and sabotage groups. By the way, Axmann is the only one of all the Nazi bosses who, already in 1944, not only thought about the occupation of Germany, but began to actively prepare for it. Moreover, he even tried to get funding.
The fact is that the “werewolves” from youth environment, from the “Hitler Youth” (the militia included not only teenagers, there were also quite mature functionaries), received hefty funding amounting to millions of Reichsmarks, and after the establishment of the occupation power they had to create their own own business— transport companies, which would allow them to operate mobile. That is, in fact, a widely ramified underground organization was created, which had its own funding, and not some kind of conditional one, but quite large. And the failure of this organization was due to the fact that the economic wing, which at a certain point had become quite well established, began to fear the paramilitary wing of the youth “werewolves”, which, naturally, jeopardized their well-being. They did not at all want to end their days in prison or against the wall.
Concerning quantitative composition"Werewolf", then install exact number Militia is quite difficult. At least these are not dozens of people, we are talking about several thousand. The predominant effect is still Western and southern territory Germany. The bulk of the “werewolves” were concentrated in the Alps. The fact is that a plan was hatched to create an Alpine citadel, which the Allies (the Alps went mainly to the Americans) would take quite a long time. That is, in the end, the Alps served as the starting point for the creation, relatively speaking, of the Fourth Reich.
On the Eastern Front (meaning the territory of Germany), the “werewolves” acted in small groups of 10–15 people. Basically, these were sporadic, frivolous detachments that were quickly identified and cleared out. Here we cannot discount the experience of the NKVD, and, of course, the fact that we still had a continuous front, and not some wedges, like our Western allies.
Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler (left) and Obergruppenführer Hans-Adolf Prützmann. Ukraine, 1942
The Werwolf's first sortie took place in September 1944 against advancing Red Army units. In fact, it was a classic sabotage activity, no different from previous sabotage groups, except that it was already carried out within the framework of the Werewolf. As a result, two bridges were blown up. However, this group was quickly identified and eliminated. In this situation, the Soviet army had no sentimentality, however, neither did the Western allies.
By the way, the topic of the relationship between the local population and the occupation authorities, which, wittingly or unwittingly, is connected with the theme of “werewolves”, is also very interesting. We have already said that the national outskirts of Germany were swarming with detachments for a long time (let’s call them “werewolves”), but for the most part this was caused by tough politics. And the most paradoxical thing is that the Soviet occupation policy was not the most ruthless. If you look at what the Americans or the French did, the actions of the Red Army and the Soviet occupation authorities were not so terrible. By the way, this is due to the fact that in the Soviet zone of occupation the problem of “werewolves” was dealt with quite quickly, with the exception of a few cases, which, in particular, are associated with the Sudetenland and Silesia. The fact is that there was a massive eviction and deportation of Germans, and some of them raided back. The motivations were very different: personal revenge, the need to take property, and so on.
If we talk about the French, they generally find themselves in a very difficult situation. The fact is that France was one of the few victorious countries that, before that, still lost the war to Germany. Therefore, as a result, the French occupation authorities openly took revenge on the Germans, despite the fact that they did not know such atrocities as were, for example, in Belarus and Ukraine. Nobody hid this revenge and cruel actions. There were official hostages, which, by the way, did not exist in the Soviet occupation zone. And these actions caused discontent among the local population, which sooner or later led to the emergence of independent detachments that were automatically enrolled in the Werewolf.
As for East Prussia, there were no such large sabotage actions as in the western region of Germany. This is due to some effective civil policy measures. What was the difference between Western and Soviet troops when they entered German territory? In the official setting, albeit not always shared. Soviet troops liberated the German people from fascism, and the Western allies liberated the Germans. And in the second case, no distinction was made between social democrats, anti-fascists, or simply the civilian population who sympathized with the Nazis. You can give an example that may seem creepy today. In the summer of 1945 in Cologne, the Anglo-Americans quite harshly, even brutally, dispersed an anti-fascist demonstration of prisoners concentration camps. “They were simply afraid of any crowd of people,” many will think. The Allies were generally afraid of any activity from the Germans. A German is an enemy in any capacity, even if he is a communist or a social democrat.
And from this point of view, the Soviet occupation administration collaborated much more actively with the Germans. Both the creation of the GDR in 1949 and the actual transfer of power to the Germans in 1947, naturally under patronage, were simply unthinkable phenomena in the American and French occupation zone.
Commandant of Berlin Nikolai Berzarin talks with the Trümmerfrau, 1945
Since we have touched on the post-war page of history, we note that if at first the main activity of the “werewolves” was military confrontation, that is, in an attempt to stop the advancing Red Army, as well as the armies of the Allies (by the way, it is quite naive to believe that such small detachments could to do this), then somewhere in 1945-1946 these were small attacks, mainly boiling down to blowing up bridges, cutting communication lines, and killing individual policemen. There are interesting statistics that show that in 1946 - 1947 percentage Polish and Czech policemen suffered more at the hands of the “werewolves” than Soviet soldiers standing alone.
If we talk about some major actions at the end of the war and the post-war period, we should recall the murder of the burgomaster of Aachen, Franz Oppenhof, who was appointed to this post by the Americans. The whole paradox was that Oppenhoff insisted on actively involving Germans in the administration, even though they were members of the Nazi Party.
According to American and British sources, the murder of General Berzarin, the commandant of Berlin, is also nothing more than an action of the “Werewolf”; we have a car accident. Neither the first nor the second versions are excluded, but we still note that the ruins of Berlin, which it was in the summer of 1945, were simply created for sabotage attacks.
We have already said that “Werewolf” was directed not only against the Allied and Soviet troops, but also against the Germans themselves. One of the functions of the organization was to intimidate the local population. Here you can give a lot of examples of how alarmists and defeatists were dealt with in territory still controlled by the Nazis. There was one paradoxical case when in one small town the local burgomaster tried to hide from the advancing Soviet units and was caught by the “werewolves”, the very ones whom he himself recruited into the team, following orders from above.
As far as we know, during the creation of Werewolf, teenagers were actively armed with faust cartridges. There are records and evidence that young partisans caused quite a lot of headaches for our tank crews, and not only ours. Catch the “werewolf” soldier - he immediately had a dilemma: how to perceive him - as a child or still as a Nazi collaborator? Naturally, there were reprisals against such attackers (not only on our part, but also on the part of the allies), and attempts to break the stereotypes of young people regarding the new authorities, especially when it became clear that all this was not a chaotic movement, but that there were certain people behind it strength.
After the war, until about the end of 1946, the Werewolves operated in central Germany. On the outskirts, their forays continued for another year, until the end of 1947. And the longest where they existed was South Tyrol, a German-speaking territory that was transferred to Italy. Here the “werewolves” fought until the end of the 60s.
Few people know, but Soviet historiography sinned by significantly underestimating the degree of resistance on the part of the German population. But still, we should pay tribute to those who worked with the Soviet occupation administration. These people did not rely solely on violence; there were still some measures of social influence. In particular, working with German anti-fascists. With the exception of the British, the Americans, Canadians, and French were afraid to do this, suspecting that among the anti-fascists there were secret Werwolf agents who were trying to get into the new administration in order to use their position to continue sabotage and terror. By the way, there were examples of this. A certain “werewolf” Yarchuk, a Polish Volksdeutsche, was identified, who, due to his very loyal attitude, they even tried to appoint as burgomaster of a small city. But then it turned out that he, it turns out, was specially sent by the “Werewolf”. That is, the Western allies had a rather cautious attitude towards anti-fascists, because they saw German partisans in any attempt at social and political activity.
I remember a note that urged not to enter into relationships with German girls. This was motivated by the fact that women would deliberately infect American soldiers with syphilis in order to help the activities of the Werewolf, an organization in which her brother, her son, and so on are members. That is, the Americans and the British took this threat quite seriously. Why? Because they couldn’t oppose anything to her. They had no practice in waging guerrilla warfare or countering it. The French had some experience, but, again, this experience was associated with the urban environment, not with ruins. The French resistance operated under completely different conditions.
Adolf Hitler greets young men from the Hitler Youth. Berlin, 1945
As for the basic tactics of the “werewolves,” it was terribly primitive: the partisans dug into a bunker (whether it was a forest guardhouse, a cave, or some other shelter), let the advanced units of the “enemy” troops forward and then struck in the rear. Naturally, under these conditions they were quickly identified and eliminated.
But the “werewolves” were supplied with weapons centrally. The only thing that the German authorities managed to do was create huge secret warehouses, which were revealed almost until the mid-50s. At the last moment, when the Nazis already realized that everything would soon collapse, they stockpiled so many supplies that they could supply more than one army. Therefore, in May 1945, the “werewolves” had toxic substances, several types of explosives, and special cylinders for poisoning water sources. And there was simply no need to talk about machine guns, grenades, small arms.
Well, and finally, a few words about the fate of the Werewolf. Most of the saboteurs were caught, and since they did not fall under the Geneva Convention and were not prisoners of war, they were shot on the spot. And only in special cases, as already mentioned, with teenagers, did they still try to carry out some kind of work.
They were not mentioned in Soviet sources. At least for the general public, and not for professional historians. They even recognized the existence of the post-war resistance of Bandera, the forest brothers in the Baltic states and the Polish AK members, but not a word about the Germans. And it seemed like they weren’t there. And they were. Naturally, Nazi. True, most of them were Octobrists with ears.
In May 1945, Nazi Germany signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. The Second World War ended, but the troops of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition still suffered losses (and not for a year or two, but right up to the end of the 60s). Members of the underground Werewolf organization continued fighting.
Who and how got into the German partisan movement? Were these people fanatics, besotted with twelve years of Nazi propaganda, or unwitting participants who failed to choose a peaceful life? These and other questions are answered by the historian, author of the book “Werewolf. Fragments of the brown empire" Andrey Vasilchenko.
The article is based on material from the program “The Price of Victory” of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”. The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full at this link.
Until the fall of 1944, talking about the need to create some kind of base in order to defend against the troops that entered Germany was considered defeatism, almost a criminal offense. At best, all operations were viewed as minor sabotage attacks. When, by the end of 1944, it became clear that the entry of Allied troops into German territory was just a matter of time, chaotic attempts began to create some kind of sabotage army. As a result, the main task was entrusted to Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. He decided to entrust this task to police units, namely the Prützmann Bureau. During his time as SS Obergruppenführer Hans-Adolf Prützmann distinguished himself with similar bloody actions in occupied Ukraine. They believed that he understood the partisans better than others, since he fought with them himself.
At this time, saboteur No. 1 Otto Skorzeny developed a feeling of jealousy, and he did everything possible to sabotage the organization of the Werewolf movement, believing that at some point he himself would lead the sabotage army. All this discord led to the fact that the German partisan movement was not ready to meet the enemy: tactics were not developed, personnel were not trained, bases were created hastily.
But nevertheless, after May 1945, the “werewolves” continued to carry out their operations. What is this? Some kind of “wild army”, “wild army”? Several factors come together here. Firstly, this is the reaction of the local population, especially the national outskirts, which for centuries have walked from country to country. These are Silesia, Sudetenland, Alsace, Lorraine. That is, when new authorities appeared, there was what is called a “wild eviction” of the Germans. That is, the Soviet authorities tried to create a certain barrier, the French did the same, and this caused discontent among the local population, who, naturally, willy-nilly tried to somehow resist, including by armed means.
The second component is the remains of Wehrmacht units. This was especially pronounced on the Western Front. The fact is that the Allies tried to capture as much territory as possible. As a result, they resorted to tactics that were very detrimental to them - they tried to repeat the blitzkrieg, tank wedges, but they did not have the required number of motorized infantry. As a result, huge gaps arose between tanks and infantry, almost tens of kilometers long. And in these gaps, the remnants of the parts felt quite calmly, at ease. Some wrote that at that moment the Wehrmacht on the Western Front generally turned into a bunch of small partisan detachments. What can we talk about if Wenck’s army calmly walked along the western rear. This is not a battalion, not a company - this is an entire tank army. As a result of this, the so-called “Kleinkrieg”, that is, a small guerrilla war, was also considered by the allies and our Soviet units to be part of the Wehrmacht.
Reichsjugendführer Arthur Axmann (left) and Hitler Youth graduates
And there was also a plan by Arthur Axman, the head of the Hitler Youth, which involved mobilizing young people to create a whole network of partisan detachments and sabotage groups. By the way, Axmann is the only one of all the Nazi bosses who, already in 1944, not only thought about the occupation of Germany, but began to actively prepare for it. Moreover, he even tried to get funding.
The fact is that the “werewolves” from the youth environment, from the “Hitler Youth” (the militia included not only teenagers, there were also quite mature functionaries), received a fair amount of funding, amounting to millions of Reichsmarks, and after the establishment of occupation power they had to create their own business transport companies, which would allow them to operate mobile. That is, in fact, a widely ramified underground organization was created, which had its own funding, and not some kind of conditional one, but quite large. And the failure of this organization was due to the fact that the economic wing, which at a certain point had become quite well established, began to fear the paramilitary wing of the youth “werewolves”, which, naturally, jeopardized their well-being. They did not at all want to end their days in prison or against the wall.
As for the quantitative composition of the Werewolf, it is quite difficult to establish the exact number of the militia. At least these are not dozens of people, we are talking about several thousand. The predominant effect is still the western and southern territories of Germany. The bulk of the “werewolves” were concentrated in the Alps. The fact is that a plan was hatched to create an Alpine citadel, which the Allies (the Alps went mainly to the Americans) would take quite a long time. That is, in the end, the Alps served as the starting point for the creation, relatively speaking, of the Fourth Reich.
On the Eastern Front (meaning the territory of Germany), the “werewolves” acted in small groups of 10 - 15 people. Basically, these were sporadic, frivolous detachments that were quickly identified and cleared out. Here we cannot discount the experience of the NKVD, and, of course, the fact that we still had a continuous front, and not some wedges, like our Western allies.
Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler (left) and Obergruppenführer Hans-Adolf Prützmann. Ukraine, 1942
The Werwolf's first sortie took place in September 1944 against advancing Red Army units. In fact, it was a classic sabotage activity, no different from previous sabotage groups, except that it was already carried out within the framework of the Werewolf. As a result, two bridges were blown up. However, this group was quickly identified and eliminated. In this situation, the Soviet army had no sentimentality, however, neither did the Western allies.
By the way, the topic of the relationship between the local population and the occupation authorities, which, wittingly or unwittingly, is connected with the theme of “werewolves”, is also very interesting. We have already said that the national outskirts of Germany were swarming with detachments for a long time (let’s call them “werewolves”), but for the most part this was caused by tough politics. And the most paradoxical thing is that the Soviet occupation policy was not the most ruthless. If you look at what the Americans or the French did, the actions of the Red Army and the Soviet occupation authorities were not so terrible. By the way, this is due to the fact that in the Soviet zone of occupation the problem of “werewolves” was dealt with quite quickly, with the exception of a few cases, which, in particular, are associated with the Sudetenland and Silesia. The fact is that there was a massive eviction and deportation of Germans, and some of them raided back. The motivations were very different: personal revenge, the need to take property, and so on.
If we talk about the French, they generally find themselves in a very difficult situation. The fact is that France was one of the few victorious countries that, before that, still lost the war to Germany. Therefore, as a result, the French occupation authorities openly took revenge on the Germans, despite the fact that they did not know such atrocities as were, for example, in Belarus and Ukraine. Nobody hid this revenge and cruel actions. There were official hostages, which, by the way, did not exist in the Soviet occupation zone. And these actions caused discontent among the local population, which sooner or later led to the emergence of independent detachments that were automatically enrolled in the Werewolf.
As for East Prussia, there were no such large sabotage actions as in the western region of Germany. This is due to some effective civil policy measures. What was the difference between Western and Soviet troops when they entered German territory? In the official setting, albeit not always shared. Soviet troops liberated the German people from fascism, the Western allies - from the Germans. And in the second case, no distinction was made between social democrats, anti-fascists, or simply the civilian population who sympathized with the Nazis. You can give an example that may seem creepy today. In the summer of 1945 in Cologne, the Anglo-Americans quite harshly, even brutally, dispersed an anti-fascist demonstration of concentration camp prisoners. “They were simply afraid of any crowd of people,” many will think. The Allies were generally afraid of any activity from the Germans. A German is an enemy in any capacity, even if he is a communist or a social democrat.
And from this point of view, the Soviet occupation administration collaborated much more actively with the Germans. Both the creation of the GDR in 1949 and the actual transfer of power to the Germans in 1947, naturally under the patronage, in the American and French zone of occupation were simply unthinkable phenomena.
Commandant of Berlin Nikolai Berzarin talks with the Trümmerfrau, 1945
Since we have touched on the post-war page of history, we note that if at first the main activity of the “werewolves” was military confrontation, that is, in an attempt to stop the advancing Red Army, as well as the armies of the Allies (by the way, it is quite naive to believe that such small detachments could to do this), then somewhere in 1945 - 1946 these were small attacks, mainly boiling down to blowing up bridges, cutting communication lines, and killing individual policemen. There are interesting statistics that show that in 1946 - 1947, in percentage terms, Polish and Czech policemen suffered more at the hands of “werewolves” than Soviet soldiers standing alone.
If we talk about some major actions at the end of the war and the post-war period, we should recall the murder of the burgomaster of Aachen, Franz Oppenhof, who was appointed to this post by the Americans. The whole paradox was that Oppenhoff insisted on actively involving Germans in the administration, even though they were members of the Nazi Party.
According to American and British sources, the murder of General Berzarin, the commandant of Berlin, is also nothing more than an action of the “Werewolf”; we have a car accident. Neither the first nor the second versions are excluded, but we still note that the ruins of Berlin, which it was in the summer of 1945, were simply created for sabotage attacks.
We have already said that “Werewolf” was directed not only against the Allied and Soviet troops, but also against the Germans themselves. One of the functions of the organization was to intimidate the local population. Here you can give a lot of examples of how alarmists and defeatists were dealt with in territory still controlled by the Nazis. There was one paradoxical case when in one small town the local burgomaster tried to hide from the advancing Soviet units and was caught by the “werewolves”, the very ones whom he himself recruited into the team, following orders from above.
As far as we know, during the creation of Werewolf, teenagers were actively armed with faust cartridges. There are records and evidence that young partisans caused quite a lot of headaches for our tank crews, and not only ours. Catch the “werewolf” soldier - he immediately had a dilemma: how to perceive him - as a child or still as a Nazi collaborator? Naturally, there were reprisals against such attackers (not only on our part, but also on the part of the allies), and attempts to break the stereotypes of young people regarding the new authorities, especially when it became clear that all this was not a chaotic movement, but that there were certain people behind it strength.
After the war, until about the end of 1946, the Werewolves operated in central Germany. On the outskirts, their forays continued for another year, until the end of 1947. And the longest where they existed was South Tyrol - a German-speaking territory that went to Italy. Here the “werewolves” fought until the end of the 60s.
Few people know, but Soviet historiography sinned by significantly underestimating the degree of resistance on the part of the German population. But still, we should pay tribute to those who worked with the Soviet occupation administration. These people did not rely solely on violence; there were still some measures of social influence. In particular, working with German anti-fascists. With the exception of the British, the Americans, Canadians, and French were afraid to do this, suspecting that among the anti-fascists there were secret Werwolf agents who were trying to get into the new administration in order to use their position to continue sabotage and terror. By the way, there were examples of this. A certain “werewolf” Yarchuk, a Polish Volksdeutsche, was identified, who, due to his very loyal attitude, they even tried to appoint as burgomaster of a small city. But then it turned out that he, it turns out, was specially sent by the “Werewolf”. That is, the Western allies had a rather cautious attitude towards anti-fascists, because they saw German partisans in any attempt at social and political activity.
I remember a note that urged not to enter into relationships with German girls. This was motivated by the fact that women would deliberately infect American soldiers with syphilis in order to help the activities of the Werewolf, an organization in which her brother, her son, and so on are members. That is, the Americans and the British took this threat quite seriously. Why? Because they couldn’t oppose anything to her. They had no practice in waging guerrilla warfare or countering it. The French had some experience, but, again, this experience was associated with the urban environment, not with ruins. The French resistance operated under completely different conditions.
Adolf Hitler greets young men from the Hitler Youth. Berlin, 1945
As for the basic tactics of the “werewolves,” it was terribly primitive: the partisans dug into a bunker (whether it was a forest guardhouse, a cave, or some other shelter), let the advanced units of the “enemy” troops forward and then struck in the rear. Naturally, under these conditions they were quickly identified and eliminated.
But the “werewolves” were supplied with weapons centrally. The only thing that the German authorities managed to do was create huge secret warehouses, which were revealed almost until the mid-50s. At the last moment, when the Nazis already realized that everything would soon collapse, they stockpiled so many supplies that they could supply more than one army. Therefore, in May 1945, the “werewolves” had toxic substances, several types of explosives, and special cylinders for poisoning water sources. And there was simply no need to talk about machine guns, grenades, small arms.
Well, and finally, a few words about the fate of the Werewolf. Most of the saboteurs were caught, and since they did not fall under the Geneva Convention and were not prisoners of war, they were shot on the spot. And only in special cases, as already mentioned, with teenagers, did they still try to carry out some kind of work.
How the Germans fought the partisans
It was easier for the Germans to fight the partisans if they united into large groups. For this purpose, German special forces even distributed fake leaflets on behalf of the Soviet command. Corresponding refutations appeared in the partisan press. Thus, the Selyanskaya Gazeta newsletter on May 7, 1943 warned:
“Recently, the Nazis cooked up a leaflet and scattered it in some areas of Ukraine and Belarus. In this leaflet, supposedly on behalf of the Soviet military authorities, the partisans are asked to stop acting alone and in small detachments, unite into large detachments and carry out the order to act jointly with regular units of the Red Army. This order, says Hitler's fake, will follow as soon as the harvest is in the barns and the rivers and lakes are covered with ice again.
The purpose of this provocation is obvious. The Germans are trying to delay the actions of the partisans on the eve of the decisive spring-summer battles. The Nazis want the partisans to stop fighting and take a wait-and-see attitude.”
During the first two years of the war, the Germans and police, as a rule, shot captured partisans on the spot after a short interrogation. Only on October 5, 1943, a special order “Treatment of Captured Bandits” was issued, according to which captured partisans and defectors should henceforth be considered not only as a source of intelligence information and manpower for Germany, but also as a possible replenishment of the increasingly thinning collaborationist formations. In July 1943, the Western headquarters of the partisan movement was forced to admit that the lives of the partisans captured during combat operations were preserved, and more or less tolerable living conditions were created:
“The command of the fascist army provides the families of partisans with horses for cultivating their estates. At the same time, these partisan families are given the responsibility to ensure that their father, son or brother, etc. return to the house, leave the partisan detachment...
This tactic of the Nazi invaders has some influence on the fragile partisans. There are isolated cases of partisans going over to the enemy’s side.”
“Instead of the usual executions on the spot, they (the Nazis. - B. C.) a partisan who is captured or goes over to their side is enlisted as a police officer, given rations for a family, even given a cow for 2-3 families. Those newly captured or transferred are placed separately. They are not even allowed to communicate with the policemen who went over to serve the Nazis in the winter. From such they create separate groups and are sent to catch small groups of partisans.
The Nazis specifically send partisan wives into the forests so that they can persuade their husbands and bring them to the Germans, promising them good rations. This fascist propaganda and the method of their struggle had some influence on the morally unstable cowards, who, due to isolation from the command of the detachments, weak educational work, being in small groups and alone, went over to the side of the enemy.
For the month of May from the detachments of Gukov and Kukharenko, which until the end of the month were in the triangle (Vitebsk - Nevel - Polotsk. - B.S.) and were subjected to continuous raids by fascists and police, up to 60 people went over to the side of the enemy, mostly former Zelenists (“greens” or “wild partisans” who had not previously obeyed Moscow. - B.S.) and deserters from the Red Army...
In the description of the German actions, which was given by the command of the Okhotin brigade, one can feel respect for the formidable enemy that was the Wehrmacht:
“German tactics in a surprise attack on partisans always boiled down to one thing: shelling with all types of available weapons, followed by an attack. But the enemy never used relentless pursuit tactics. Having achieved success from the first attack, he stopped there. This was one of the weaknesses of German tactics.
When defending in cases of partisan attack, the enemy turned around quickly and, turning around, taking a battle formation, fought very stubbornly, always almost to the point of complete exhaustion of his forces (loss of people and expenditure of ammunition). This was one of the enemy’s strengths, but it led him to heavy losses in people.
There was not a single case where the enemy did not accept the battle imposed on him. Even when he ran into a partisan ambush, he never fled in panic, but, retreating in battle, took his dead, wounded and weapons. In such cases, the enemy did not take losses into account, but did not abandon his dead and wounded.
The weakness of German tactics was that the Krauts were afraid of the forest. They set up ambushes on partisans only in populated areas. There was not a single case of the Germans ambushing partisans in the forest.
The strength of German tactics was defensive tactics. Wherever the Germans went, and if they had to stop even for a short time, they always dug in, which the partisans never did to themselves.”
The enemy began to use partisan methods of fighting (hidden concentration of forces in the forest at night in order to attack the partisans by surprise at dawn, ambushes, mining of partisan roads, etc.) only recently.
In addition, since August 1943, continuous bombing of the partisan zone by aircraft began. “There is almost not a single village left in the Ushachi and Lepel regions occupied by partisans that has not been raided by fascist vultures. German uchlegs (student pilots) also practiced in this field. B. WITH.)".
Indeed, according to German sources, for the last year and a half of the war, the Luftwaffe used the Eastern Front as a kind of training ground for flight school graduates. Freshly trained pilots had to get comfortable in the air and gain experience in fighting a weaker enemy in the form of the Soviet Air Force, before entering into mortal combat with a much more formidable enemy - the Anglo-American “flying fortresses”. The partisan zones provided an ideal target for training. The partisans, of course, had neither fighters nor anti-aircraft guns, and it was possible to shoot down a plane with a rifle or machine gun only at a very low altitude. Young German pilots were hardly worried about the fact that their bombs fell primarily on the heads of peaceful inhabitants of villages and towns, who, by the will of fate, found themselves on the territory of the partisan region. However, the pilots of the “flying fortresses” also did not think about life and death German burghers, dropping bomb loads on German cities...
In the struggle in the occupied territory, all sides widely used traditional methods of guerrilla warfare, including masquerading as the enemy. Thus, on June 16, 1944, the order for the 889th German security battalion noted: “Recently, the partisans have been trying to capture more prisoners (a few days remained before the start of the general Soviet offensive in Belarus - Operation Bagration. - B.S.). WITH For this purpose, they drive trucks in German uniforms along the main highways and, picking up German soldiers who ask for a ride, deliver them to their camp. A similar incident took place on June 2, 1944 on the Bobruisk - Starye Dorogi highway. All soldiers are advised of the dangers of driving unfamiliar vehicles. Drivers are prohibited from taking unknown soldiers with them.”
The Germans also resorted to masquerade, in particular, they created false partisan detachments of policemen or Vlasovites dressed in Red Army uniforms or civilian dress. They came into contact with small groups or individual partisans, encouraged them to join the detachment, and then, waiting for the right moment, destroyed or captured them. The Germans even introduced special distinctive headdresses for their partisans. Such false detachments often robbed the population in order to then blame the real partisans. However, the latter also sometimes thoroughly robbed the population, dressed in German or police uniforms.
But it happened that false partisan detachments turned into real ones. This happened, for example, with a detachment of 96 people led by ROA officers Captain Tsimailo and Senior Lieutenant Golokoz. The latter, instead of fighting the partisans, established contact with Zakharov’s brigade operating in the Vitebsk region and revealed the truth to him. As a result, on July 17, 1943, 55 false partisans led by Golokoz joined the real ones, having previously killed the Germans who were with them - two radio operators and a captain. The remnants of the detachment, together with Tsimailo, managed to escape.
Sometimes false underground centers were created, with the help of which the secret field police caught real underground workers. According to this scheme, a “military council” operated in Minsk, consisting of German agents- former commanders of the Red Army Rogov and Belov (he was eventually killed by partisans) and the former secretary of the Zaslavl district party committee Kovalev, who “part-time” was also a member of the real Minsk underground committee. At first, the “military council” was a real underground organization, headed by commanders and commissars of the Red Army, who, unfortunately, were not familiar with the rules of secrecy. The organization had grown too much; almost half of Minsk knew about its activities. It got to the point that sentries were openly posted at the house where the headquarters of the “military council” was located, who checked the documents of ordinary underground fighters who came there. Very quickly the Minsk GUF found out about the organization. The leaders of the “military council” were arrested and bought their lives at the cost of betrayal. Now under the control of the Gestapo, they sent underground members supposedly to a partisan detachment; on the way, the police stopped the trucks, and their passengers ended up in a concentration camp. As a result, hundreds of underground fighters were arrested and shot and several partisan detachments were defeated.
Sometimes pseudo-partisan detachments were created by local residents themselves - after their liberation by the Red Army. The goal here was one and rather mundane - to receive an indulgence for being under occupation, and at the same time “legally” profit from the goods of former German collaborators. The history of one such detachment, discovered by the Special Department of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps in the Konyshevsky district of the Kursk region, was told by the head of the Special Department Central Front L.F. Tsanava in a letter to Ponomarenko dated March 13, 1943: “The organizer and “commander” of this false partisan detachment was the teacher of the village of Bolshoye Gorodkovo, Konyshevsky district, Ryzhkov Vasily Ivanovich, born in 1915, native and resident of B. Gorodkovo, non-party, with a high school education. education, former junior commander of the 38th separate battery of the headquarters of the 21st Army, who voluntarily surrendered to the Germans in October 1941. The “commissar” of this detachment was a resident of the village of Maloye Gorodkovo, Summin Tikhon Grigorievich, a former soldier of the Red Army, who returned to the village after it was occupied by the Germans. Ryzhkov V.I. March 2nd Special Correspondent (Special Department of the Corps. - B.S.) arrested. Summin T.G. disappeared and is currently wanted.
The investigation into the Ryzhkov case and the detachment’s activities established the following. By units of the Red Army, B. Gorodkovo and M. Gorodkovo were liberated from the Germans on February 8, 1943; Ryzhkov and Summin organized the false partisan detachment on February 12, 1943. This detachment, under the guise of fighting German accomplices, carried out raids and searches in adjacent settlements, seized property and livestock from some former elders and police officers. Part of what was taken was distributed to passing military units, and part was appropriated.
Hiding behind the name of the commander of the partisan detachment, Ryzhkov contacted the advancing units, misleading them with the fictitious actions of the “partisan detachment.”
11/20/43 Ryzhkov and Summin gathered members of the detachment and, threatening with weapons, offered to go to the regional center - Konyshevka, with the aim of allegedly organizing Soviet power there and heading the body of Soviet power in the region... There are signals about the existence of several more similar detachments " .
I don’t know if the security officers managed to find Summin and what the further fate Ryzhkov - execution, penal battalion or Gulag.
Often the Germans defeated the partisans using their own methods of fighting. Thus, the commander of the Osipovichi partisan unit, which included several partisan brigades, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General Nikolai Filippovich Korolev, testified in the final report: “In Bobruisk, Mogilev, Minsk and other cities, “volunteer” battalions “Berezina”, “Dnepr” began to form, "Pripyat" and others, which were intended to fight partisans. To replenish these battalions and to train command personnel, the “Eastern Reserve Regiment” was created in Bobruisk.
It must be said that some of these “volunteers,” who completely sold out to the Germans, actively fought against the partisans. Using guerrilla tactics, they penetrated forest areas in small groups and organized ambushes on partisan roads. So, in March 1943, one of the battalions organized an ambush at the site of partisan camps in the Zolotkovo forest, which was attacked by the headquarters group of the partisan brigade “For the Motherland.” During the battle, the commander of this brigade, Major Alexey Kandievich Flegontov, died (I note that Flegontov was not a simple major, but a state security major, which was equivalent to the army general rank. - B. WITH.)…
Subsequently, with the liberation by the Soviet Army of a significant part of the Soviet territory occupied by the enemy, police and renegade garrisons were transferred to our area from the areas liberated by the Soviet Army. In October 1943, a regiment under the command of the former Dorogobuzh landowner and White emigrant Bishler arrived in the village of Vyazye (was it not this Bishler who wrote the text of the leaflet about partisan cannibalism, which will be discussed below? - B. WITH). This regiment then took an active part in blocking the partisans of the Pukhovichi, Cherven and Osipovichi regions at the end of May 1944.”
Korolev also wrote about the “treasonous battalion” of Major Buglai, which arrived in the Osipovichi region to fight the partisans and “settled in villages located in, close proximity to the partisan zone. Its personnel were well trained in methods of fighting partisans and skillfully took advantage of the tactical mistakes of individual detachments. He waged an active struggle through ambushes in forests, on partisan roads and at river crossings, and through surprise attacks on partisan outposts in villages...”
The paradox was that as the Red Army successfully advanced to the west, the position of the partisans did not improve, but, on the contrary, worsened. The partisan regions now fell into the operational zone, and later into the front line of the Wehrmacht. The partisans increasingly had to engage in battle with regular army units, which were superior to them in both weapons and combat training. Collaborationist formations that fled from areas liberated by Soviet troops moved to ever-shrinking occupied territories. In these formations there were now people who, as a rule, vehemently hated the communists, did not count on mercy for the Red Army soldiers and partisans, and had extensive experience in fighting the latter. At the same time, many other collaborators, hoping to earn forgiveness, joined the partisans in hundreds and thousands. It is no coincidence that at the time of joining the Soviet troops in the partisan brigades of Belarus, from a third to a quarter of the fighters were former police officers, Vlasovites and Wehrmacht “volunteers”. However, in practice, the sharp increase in numbers did not strengthen, but weakened partisan detachments and formations. After all, they were no longer supplied with ammunition, and the expanded detachments became, as mentioned, less maneuverable and more vulnerable to attacks from the air and on the ground.
Another circumstance complicated the situation. As stated in the report Central headquarters partisan movement (end of 1942), “using the remnants of anti-Soviet formations and individuals whose interests were infringed by Soviet power, German command trying to impose a Civil War on us, forming from garbage human society combat military units..." Indeed, in the occupied territories in 1941–1944 there was a real civil war, complicated by acute interethnic conflicts. Russians killed Russians, Ukrainians killed Ukrainians, Belarusians killed Belarusians. Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians fought with Russians and Belarusians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians - with Poles, Chechens and Ingush, Karachais and Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Kalmyks - with Russians, etc. The Germans were, in principle, happy with this situation, because it allowed them to spend fewer of its own troops and police to fight various partisans.
How many people in total participated in the Soviet partisan movement? After the war, the figure often appeared in the works of historians was more than a million people. However, familiarity with wartime documents makes it necessary to reduce it by at least half.
Ponomarenko and his staff kept statistics, but the data received was not always accurate. The commanders of partisan brigades and formations sometimes had no information about the number of individual detachments, and sometimes, we repeat, they deliberately inflated it, hoping to get more weapons and ammunition. True, very soon they realized that supplies from the center were limited by such objective factors as weather, the availability of landing sites that were convenient and inaccessible to enemy fire, as well as the number of transport aircraft. Therefore, they often began to underestimate the number of detachments in order to accordingly underestimate the losses incurred and more freely report on the successes achieved.
In 1944, after the liberation of the republic, the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement compiled a final report, according to which there were a total of 373,942 people in the ranks of the partisans here. Of these, 282,458 people were in combat formations (brigades and individual partisan detachments), and
79,984 people were used as scouts, messengers, or were employed in guarding partisan zones. In addition, about 12 thousand people were members of the underground anti-fascist committees, especially in the western regions of the republic. In total, there were more than 70 thousand people in the underground in Belarus, as it turned out after the war, of which over 30 thousand were considered liaisons and intelligence agents for the partisans.
In Ukraine, the scope of the partisan movement was much smaller. Although after the war Khrushchev claimed that by the beginning of 1944 there were more than 220 thousand Soviet partisans operating here, this figure looks completely fantastic. Indeed, by that time the entire Left Bank of the Dnieper, where the most numerous partisan units. And on March 5, 1943, Ponomarenko, in a report to Stalin, estimated the total number of 74 partisan detachments in Ukraine at 12,631 people. Almost all of these units belonged to large connections Kovpak, Fedorov, Naumov and others. In addition, as the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement pointed out, on the Right Bank and in the not yet liberated regions of Left Bank Ukraine there were partisan reserves and detachments with which contact had been lost, with a total number of over 50 thousand people. During subsequent raids, the formations of Kovpak, Saburov and others increased two to three times due to local reinforcements, but in any case, the number of Soviet partisans on the Right Bank was three to four times lower than the figure mentioned by Khrushchev. As noted in the certificate prepared on February 15, 1976 by the Institute of Party History under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, there. unlike other republics and regions, there were no registration cards at all, either for 220 thousand or for any smaller number partisan
The relatively weak development of the pro-Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine compared to Belarus and the occupied regions of the RSFSR is explained by a number of factors. Historically, Ukrainian lands have always been richer than Belarusian ones, which means the population is more prosperous. For this reason, it suffered more severely during the revolution, and later from collectivization and the famine it caused. The famine in Ukraine turned out to be worse than in Belarus, also because agriculture was more thoroughly undermined by the creation of collective farms. But by the beginning of World War II it had partially recovered and, thanks to better climatic conditions, still surpassed Belarusian agriculture in productivity. During the war, the latter had to supply Army Group Center, the largest of all German army groups in the East. That's why food supplies for the occupiers here they caused especially strong discontent. In addition, the natural conditions of Belarus, covered with forests and swamps, were ideal for guerrilla warfare.
Thanks to this, much more encircled Red Army soldiers settled in the Belarusian forests than in the Ukrainian steppes, which also created a mass base for the pro-Soviet partisan movement.
It should also be taken into account that Western Ukraine The most influential among local residents was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Nationalist organizations in Belarus have never been so popular, although here, as in Ukraine, intense confrontation with Polish population. If in Galicia and Volyn the Ukrainians relied on the OUN and UPA in this confrontation, then in Belarus Orthodox Belarusians (unlike Catholic Belarusians) saw the Soviet partisans as their comrades in the fight against the Poles.
In other occupied Soviet republics, the scope of the partisan movement was even smaller than in Ukraine. By April 1, 1943, throughout the territory occupied by the Germans, there were 110,889 partisans, located mainly in Belarus, Ukraine, Crimea, as well as in the Smolensk and Oryol regions. At that time, there were three sabotage groups of 46 people operating in Estonia, 13 groups with a total of 200 people in Latvia, and 29 groups with 199 people in Lithuania. Population Baltic states the overwhelming majority did not have any sympathy for the Soviet system and looked at the German occupation as a lesser evil. And in Moldova, out of 2892 partisans, there were only seven ethnic Moldovans, and the bulk were Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. The song about “a dark-skinned Moldavian woman gathering a Moldavian partisan detachment” is nothing more than a poetic fantasy. The Moldovans clearly preferred to return to Romania after a year of Soviet domination.
The total number of participants in the Soviet partisan movement, if we assume that on other lands there were approximately the same number of partisans as in Belarus, can be estimated at approximately half a million people (only in combat units).
I note that there were much more collaborators among prisoners of war and residents of the occupied territories than partisans and underground fighters. According to various estimates, from one to one and a half million former Soviet citizens served in the Wehrmacht alone, in the military and police formations of the SS and SD. In addition, several hundred thousand people each belonged to the local auxiliary police and peasant self-defense units, on the one hand, and served as elders, burgomasters and members of local councils, as well as doctors and teachers in schools and hospitals opened by the Germans, on the other hand. True, it is difficult to say to what extent those who had to work in occupation institutions in order not to die of hunger can be considered collaborators.
Now about irreversible losses. By January 1, 1944, they amounted to individual republics and regions (without Ukraine and Moldova): Karelo-Finnish SSR - 752 killed and 548 missing, and a total of 1300 (of this number, only 1086 had the names and addresses of relatives known); Leningrad region- 2954.1372.4326 (1439); Estonia - 19, 8, 27; Latvia –56, 50.106 (12); Lithuania - 101.4.115 (14); Kalinin region - 742,141, 883 (681); Belarus - 7814, 513, 8327 (389); Smolensk region- 2618, 1822, 4400 (2646); Oryol region - 3677, 3361, 7038 (1497); Krasnodar region - 1077, 335, 1412 (538); Crimean ASSR - 1076, 526, 1602 (176); total - 20,886, 8680, 29,566 (8487). These figures are certainly incomplete, but they fairly well illustrate the comparative intensity of partisan combat activity in different regions.
To this we must add that in the seven months remaining until the end of the partisan movement, the Soviet partisans suffered greatest victims caused by large-scale measures taken against them punitive operations with the participation of army units. In Belarus alone, the partisans then lost 30,181 people killed, missing and captured, that is, almost four times more than in the previous two and a half years of war. The total irretrievable losses of Soviet partisans until the end of the war can be estimated at at least 100 thousand people.
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