(1763-1826)

Arkady Minakov, Voronezh

Today marks the 242nd anniversary of the birth of Count F.V. Rostopchin - commander-in-chief of Moscow in 1812-1814, member State Council, an outstanding conservative of the first generation and ideologist of Russian nationalism

Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin was born on March 12, 1763 in the village of Livny, Oryol province. Family tradition of the Rostopchins considered the ancestor of their surname to be a direct descendant of Genghis Khan, Boris Davydovich Rostopcha, who left Crimean Horde to Rus' in early XVI V. under Grand Duke Vasily Ivanovich. Father F.V. Rostopchina, Vasily Fedorovich, was a wealthy landowner, owner of estates in the Oryol, Tula and Kaluga provinces. Rostopchina's mother, née Kryukova, died in 1766 after the birth of her second son. Rostopchin got good home education and education, knowledge of languages. At the same time, although his teachers were often replaced by foreigners, he still remained Russian in spirit, “remembering the teachings of priest Peter and the words of mother Gerasimovna”

In 1773, as a 10-year-old boy, Rostopchin was enlisted in the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment. In fact, his service began in 1782, when Rostopchin received the rank of ensign. In 1786-1788 he took a long trip abroad, visiting Germany, France and England. In Berlin, Rostopchin took private lessons in mathematics and fortification, and in Leipzig he attended lectures at the university. After Germany, Rostopchin spent some time in England, where he became close to Prince S. R. Vorontsov, with whom he subsequently was in constant correspondence and who contributed to the first steps of Rostopchin’s career. Returning to Russia in 1788 on the eve of the Russian-Swedish war of 1788-1790, he spent several months at the main headquarters of the Russian troops in Friedrichsham. In the summer of 1788, as a volunteer, Rostopchin went on a campaign against the Turks and participated in the assault on Ochakov, in the battles of Rymnik and Focsani. For about a year, Rostopchin served under the command of A.V. Suvorov, who, as a sign of his affection, presented him with a military camp tent. In 1790, Rostopchin took part in the Finnish campaign for the second time. Commanding a grenadier battalion, he was nominated for the Cross of St. George, which, however, he did not receive.

In 1791, Rostopchin, through the mediation of S.R. Vorontsov, became close to Chancellor A.A. Bezborodko. During the Iasi Conference, he was Bezborodko’s assistant and participated in the compilation of the journal and minutes of the conference. In February 1792, Rostopchin, on the recommendation of Bezborodko, upon his arrival in St. Petersburg, received the rank of chamber cadet with the rank of brigadier. He was received at court and entered into high society salons. Rostopchin acquired a reputation as a court wit, his jokes and witticisms were widely known. Since 1793, he was seconded to serve at the small court of Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich in the Gatchina Palace. Rostopchin was zealous about his official duties and was noticed by Pavel. In 1794, he married Ekaterina Petrovna Protasova, the niece of the maid of honor of Empress Catherine II, Countess A.S. Protasova. Soon, Rostopchin's career was cut short for a short time due to his conflict with his colleagues, which almost led to a duel. This conflict was caused by a conscientious attitude towards Rostopchin’s service. By order of Catherine II, Rostopchin was forced to leave St. Petersburg for a year and settle on his father’s estate in the Oryol province. This link played an important role in the fate of Rostopchin, since it attracted the favor and trust of Pavel Petrovich to him, who from that time began to consider Rostopchin a personally devoted person to him. Upon his return a year later from exile, Rostopchin became Paul’s favorite, necessary to him “like air.” A few days before the death of the empress, Rostopchin received the Order of Anna, 3rd degree, from the heir. It was he who first informed Paul about the death of Catherine II. Over the course of several next days After the death of the empress, Rostopchin's career took off sharply. He was appointed adjutant general of Paul I. In addition, he was awarded with orders St. Anna 1st and 2nd degree, in 1797 he received the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, and in 1798 - the rank of lieutenant general. Managing military unit, on behalf of the emperor, Rostopchin carried out the edition of the Military Charter according to the Prussian model.

At the beginning of 1798, there was an unexpected resignation of Rostopchin, who was forced to leave for his estate. The exile was the result of the machinations of the “German party” of Empress Maria Feodorovna and Paul I’s favorite E.I. Nelidova, with whom Rostopchin did not get along. In turn, Rostopchin took part in the intrigue, led by the chief of the horseman I.P. Kutaisov, the purpose of which was to protect Paul I from the influence of Maria Fedorovna and E.I. Nelidova, for which they contributed to the replacement of Nelidova with the new favorite A.P. Lopukhina.

The result of this intrigue quickly took its toll; the disgrace that had lasted for several months ended. Already in August 1798, Rostopchin was again accepted into service at court and showered with favors, including receiving the title of count and appointment as vice-chancellor. Although Rostopchin did not have the official title of “chancellor,” he actually performed his duties. In addition, Paul I granted Rostopchin during his reign a total of more than 3,000 souls in Oryol and Voronezh provinces and especially 33 thousand acres of land in the Voronezh province.

Rostopchin took an active part in signing a number of international treaties Russia, was in charge of the emperor’s correspondence with A.V. Suvorov, often serving as a buffer between the field marshal and Pavel. In September 1800, Paul I instructed Rostopchin to write proposals for foreign policy Russia. As a result, a note “On the Political State of Europe” appeared. Rostopchin proposed breaking the alliance with England, creating an alliance with Napoleonic France and dividing Turkey in 1799. England, Prussia and Austria were the winners, but not Russia. Giving a characterization of the leading countries of Europe, Rostopchin came to the conclusion that almost all of them “secretly harbor envy and malice” towards Russia; it is beneficial for it to take advantage of the contradictions between them. Rostopchin believed that an alliance with Napoleonic France would weaken England and carry out the division of Turkey, as a result of which France would receive Egypt. He proposed to involve Prussia and Austria in the division of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Russia was supposed to get Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Greece.

Thus, Rostopchin was one of the first to propose that foreign policy should be guided by the national interests of Russia, and not by subjective dynastic predispositions. The provisions of his note were partially implemented in the last months of the reign of Paul I: in September 1800, an embargo was introduced on English ships.

In addition, Rostopchin’s activities paved the way for Georgia’s annexation to Russia. He was the author of a note in which he proposed to include Georgia into the Russian Empire, giving it a certain autonomy.

Rostopchin's responsibilities were varied and were by no means limited to conducting foreign policy affairs. Thus, fulfilling the duties of director of the postal department, he contributed to the development of a network of postal stations in Russia. Along with this, from 1799 Rostopchin was in charge of marriage affairs. In addition, he contributed to the approval by the emperor of the Regulations for churches and monasteries catholic church in Russia, which dealt a significant blow to the activities of the Jesuits. Even earlier, he managed to achieve a ban on holding congresses of the Catholic clergy.

Despite all the indisputable merits of Rostopchin, disgrace followed again in February 1801, this time for a long time. The removal of Rostopchin was organized by P.A. Palen, who, preparing a conspiracy against Paul I, removed from the road those persons who could interfere with the implementation of his plans. Just before his death, Paul I sent Rostopchin a dispatch: “I need you, come quickly” before he could retire from the arena of state activities. He openly condemned Alexander I for the coup that led to the death of his father and categorically did not accept liberal reforms, related to the activities of the so-called Secret Committee and M.M. Speransky. Rostopchin lived these years for the most part on his estate Voronovo. In the village he became interested in the latest methods in agriculture: began to experiment in this area, use new tools and fertilizers, specially ordered purebred cattle, agricultural machines and agronomists from England and Holland, and created a special agricultural school. He managed to achieve significant success, for example, to develop a breed of horses called “Rostopchinskaya”. But gradually he became disillusioned with Western European farming methods and became a defender of traditional Russian agriculture. In 1806, Rostopchin published the brochure “The Plow and the Plow,” in which he tried to prove the superiority of cultivating the land with the help of the plow.

By 1806-1807 refers to a change in Rostopchin’s foreign policy sympathies. Russia at this time became a key participant in the unsuccessful anti-Napoleonic coalitions, which led to military defeats and the signing of the Peace of Tilsit, shameful for Russia (1807). If earlier he advocated an alliance with France, now he is becoming a categorical opponent of it, believing that in the changed conditions this is contrary to the national interests of Russia. In December 1806, he sent a letter to Alexander I, in which he called on the emperor to expel most of the French from Russia: “Heal Russia from the infection and, leaving only the spiritual, order to send abroad a host of cunning villains, whose harmful influence is destroying the minds and souls of our unthinking subjects " During this period, Rostopchin, along with A.S. Shishkov becomes one of the leaders in the fight against noble hallomania. In 1807, his famous pamphlet “Thoughts Out Loud on the Red Porch...” was published, which was a resounding success in society. It was a kind of manifesto of emerging Russian nationalism. The main idea of ​​this work was anti-French: “Lord have mercy? Will this ever end? How long will we have to be monkeys? Isn’t it time to come to your senses, come to your senses, say a prayer and, spitting, say to the Frenchman: get rid of the devil’s obsession! Go to hell or go home, it doesn’t matter - just don’t be in Rus'” com: “Look at what the damned ones have done in these twenty years! Everything was destroyed, burned and destroyed. First they began to speculate, then argue, scold, fight; nothing was left in place, the law was trampled, the authorities were destroyed, the temples were desecrated, the king was executed, but what a king! - father. Heads were chopped off like cabbage; everything was commanded - first by one villain, then by another. They thought that this was equality and freedom, but no one dared to open their mouth or show their nose, and the trial was worse than Shemyakin. There were only two definitions: either in a noose or under a knife. Few of them seemed to cut, shoot, drown, torture, fry and eat, they turned to their neighbors and began to rob and strangle,<…>saying: “Say thank you later.” And there appeared Bonaparte<…>shushed, and everything fell silent. He drove the Senate around, took everything into his hands, harnessed the military, the secular, and the spiritual, and began to drive all three. At first they began to grumble, then whisper, then shake their heads, and finally shout: “Sabbath republic!” Let's crown Bonaparte, and let him come. So he became the head of the French, and again everyone became free and equal, that is, to cry and groan; and he, like a mad cat, began to rush from corner to corner and is still in a fume. What a surprise: they heated it hot, but soon closed it. The revolution is a fire, France is a firebrand, and Bonaparte is a poker.”

Denouncing the gallomania of Russian society, Rostopchin, following Shishkov, pointed out the need to look for examples to follow in his own Russian national experience: “What don’t we have? Everything is or can be. A merciful sovereign, a generous nobility, a rich merchant class, and a hardworking people.<…>And what great people there (Russia - ed.) were and are! Warriors: Shuisky, Golitsyn, Menshikov, Rumyantsev, Orlov and Suvorov; saviors of the fatherland: Pozharsky and Minin; Moscow: Eropkin; heads of the clergy: Filaret, Hermogenes, Prokopovich and Plato; a great woman in deeds and mind - Dashkova; ministers: Panin, Shakhovskoy, Markov; writers: Lomonosov, Sumarokov, Kheraskov, Derzhavin, Karamzin, Neledinsky, Dmitriev and Bogdanovich. They all knew and know French, but none of them tried to know it better than Russian.”

Rostopchin’s “Thoughts...” were published in a circulation of seven thousand copies, unheard of at that time. The main ideas of Rostopchin's manifesto were developed in his other works: the story "Oh, the French!", the comedy "News, or Killed Alive", etc. The success of "Thoughts" prompted the writer and historian S.N. Glinka to start publishing the magazine "Russian Messenger", which became an influential organ of Russian patriots.In 1812, Glinka received 300 thousand rubles for publication from the emperor through Rostopchin.

Thanks to his literary activity, Rostopchin moved to the forefront of the so-called “Russian party” of the “guinea” (the expression of N.M. Karamzin) of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, who opposed the liberal aspirations of her royal brother and Speransky. After the publication of “Thoughts Out Loud...” Rostopchin became a welcome guest in her salon. Ekaterina Pavlovna set herself the task of bringing Rostopchin closer to the emperor. In November 1809, Alexander I visited his sister in Tver and had a long conversation with the count. The results of this conversation were immediate. On February 24, 1810, Rostopchin was appointed chief chamberlain and member of the State Council.

In 1811, Rostopchin prepared and, through Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, handed over to Emperor Alexander I a “Note on the Martinists.” Briefly outlining the history of Russian Freemasonry, Rostopchin argued that ordinary members Masonic lodges were victims of deception who “hoped to acquire the kingdom of heaven, where they would be led directly by their leaders, who preached to them fasting, prayer, alms and humility, e., appropriating their wealth for themselves, with the aim of purifying souls and detaching them from earthly goods” by the body of the Masons in the reign of Alexander I, according to Rostopchin, became M.M. Speransky, “who, not adhering to any sect in his soul, perhaps no religion (in this Rostopchin was mistaken - ed.), uses their services to direct affairs and keeps them dependent on himself” about “Napoleon, who directs everything to achieve his goals, patronizes them and someday will find strong support in this society, as worthy of contempt as it is dangerous” to bring about a revolution in order to play a prominent role in it, like the scoundrels who destroyed France and paid with their own lives for the unrest they stirred up in the world that its mystery should attract the attention of the government and encourage its new dissolution

Just before the start Patriotic War Ekaterina Pavlovna ensured that on May 29, 1812, Rostopchin was promoted to infantry general and was subsequently appointed as Moscow Governor-General. He was also given the title of Moscow Commander-in-Chief. Thus, Alexander I wanted to enlist the support of the “Russian party” at a critical moment for Russia. Rostopchin, along with everything else, was entrusted with the task of arousing patriotic sentiments in Moscow before the war: “to act on the minds of the people, arouse indignation in them and prepare them for all sacrifices to save the fatherland” - an unprecedented phenomenon and had a strong influence on the population. They got the name “posters” from the fact that they were distributed from house to house like theater posters. These were a kind of “thoughts out loud”, written in Rostopchin’s characteristic “folk” bright style. With them, the Moscow commander-in-chief wanted to calm the people, instill in them confidence in the Russian army, to show that “the Poles, Tatars and Swedes were more powerful than your French, but our old men pumped them out so much that to this day there are mounds around Moscow like mushrooms, and under their bones are mushrooms. Among the common people, among the bourgeoisie and merchants, they were read with delight: “his words were a thing dear to the hearts of the Russian people,” he wrote that Rostopchin was then “blamed in the public: the posters seemed like boasting, and their language seemed indecent.”

Rostopchin played a significant role in creating the people's militia and collecting donations for the needs of the army. He headed the committee for organizing the militia in Moscow and the nearest six provinces: Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Ryazan, Kaluga and Tula. In addition to the formation of the militia, Rostopchin was in charge of supplying the Russian army retreating to Moscow, placing and treating the wounded. Alexander I also instructed Rostopchin to take up the issue of building a “secret weapon” - the balloon of the adventurer Leppich, from which incendiary shells were supposed to be dropped on the French. This event turned out to be fruitless, although a lot of money was spent on it.

Rostopchin is usually accused of restraining the population leaving the city, of late and incomplete removal of state property, of irrational use transport. However, all these circumstances were caused primarily by the fact that M.I. Kutuzov, right up to September 1, 1812, assured Rostopchin of the impossibility of surrendering Moscow. On September 2, 1812, the day of the abandonment of Moscow, the merchant son M.N. was executed by order of Rostopchin. Vereshchagin, handed over to the crowd. Vereshchagin had previously been arrested for distributing “proclamations” translated into Russian: a letter from Napoleon to the Prussian king and a speech delivered by Napoleon to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine in Dresden. In six months, Napoleon would occupy both Russian capitals. During the investigation, Vereshchagin initially testified (he later recanted this testimony) that he received these materials from the son of the Moscow postal director of the prominent freemason F.P. Klyucharyov, in whom Rostopchin saw an extremely dangerous person. Rostopchin’s attempt to find out who could have given the foreign newspapers from which the translations were allegedly made to Vereshchagina finally convinced Rostopchin of Klyucharyov’s guilt: he not only did not allow the police chief sent by Rostopchin to clarify the circumstances into his office, but brought into his office the former police chief Vereshchagin, and talked with him for a long time. All this prompted Rostopchin to write to Alexander I about the danger posed by the Freemasons and Klyucharev and even threaten resignation if measures were not taken against them: “this sect cannot restrain its hatred of you and Russia and its devotion to the enemy... I dare to ask you , Sovereign, if you find it necessary to leave Klyucharyov here, send another in my place; because I consider myself unworthy to occupy him with the honor of Van as opponents of Rostopchin in order to compromise him in the eyes of the Tsar and noble society. It should be noted that Rostopchin actually significantly exceeded his powers, since the Senate sentenced Vereshchagin not to death penalty, and to punishment with a whip and exile to Siberia.

On September 3, after the French occupied Moscow, a huge fire broke out, lasting until September 8 and destroying nine-tenths of the city. Due to a number of circumstances, until the end of his life Rostopchin hid his decisive role in this event. Nowadays, most historians, of various directions and political beliefs, are inclined to believe that it was he who prepared all the necessary conditions for this action: he equipped a small team of police arsonists and removed all firefighting supplies from Moscow. The burning of Moscow had enormous strategic and moral significance and influenced the entire further course of the war. Napoleon could not find in the ancient capital either housing or food for his army, or a sufficient number of traitors and traitors to demoralize Russian society, the army and the people. This is the immortal merit of Rostopchin, making him as central a figure in the Patriotic War of 1812 as M.I. Kutuzov.

Private bussiness

Fedor Rostopchin

Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin (1763- 1826) Born in the village of Kosmodemyanskoye, Oryol province, in the family of a landowner, retired major Vasily Fedorovich Rostopchin. Together with younger brother Peter was educated at home.

At the age of ten or twelve he enlisted in the Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1782 he received the rank of ensign, in 1785 - second lieutenant.

He spent two years, from 1786 to 1788, in Europe. Visited Germany, England and Holland; attended lectures at the University of Leipzig. In London, he became addicted to boxing, went to fights of famous English boxers and even took lessons.

Returned to Russia at the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war. During the first year of the war, Rostopchin was at the main headquarters of the Russian troops in Friedrichsham, participated in the assault on Ochakov, after which he served for a year under the command of A.V. Suvorov; participated in the battle of Focsani and the battle of Ramnic.

After the end of the Turkish campaign, he took part in hostilities during the war with Sweden, during which he was with the Prince of Nassau for diplomatic correspondence: from that time he was noticed by Empress Catherine II, who “often deigned to have fun with his stories and honored him with the honor of participating in her selection society."

In 1790, Rostopchin's patron in the army, Prince Victor Amadeus of Anhalt-Bernburg, a distant relative of Catherine II and the general of her army, died. Around the same time, his only brother was killed in a naval battle. And the military career of Rostopchin, who commanded a grenadier battalion during the Swedish campaign, was not very successful. Rostopchin decided to leave military service and make your way to the courtyard.

As a protocolist, he took part in the Jassy Peace Conference, after which he was sent to St. Petersburg and in February 1792 nominated for the rank of chamber cadet “with the rank of brigadier.”

Count Panin, embittered with Rostopchin, subsequently said that he played the role of a buffoon at Catherine’s court; With the light hand of the empress, Rostopchin received the nickname “crazy Fedka.”

In 1793, he was seconded to the “small court” of the heir to the throne, Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich in Gatchina, with whom he was almost inseparable and whose favor he managed to win.

In February 1794, Rostopchin married Ekaterina Protasova, the niece of the maid of honor of the Empress Anna Protasova. In the same year, a conflict with colleagues from the Grand Duke’s entourage led to Rostopchin’s year-long exile to the family estate, where his first-born Sergei was born. This short disgrace endeared him even more to Pavel, who, in his own words, needed Rostopchin like air. In 1796, shortly before the death of Catherine II, he was awarded the Order of Anna, III degree.

After the death of Catherine II, Emperor Paul I, after ascending the throne in November 1796, appointed Rostopchin as aide-de-camp. Over the next few days, he was promoted to major general and awarded the Order of St. Anna of the 2nd, and then 1st degree. Among the instructions given to him by the new emperor was a new, Prussian-style, edition of the Military Regulations, to which he made a number of changes that, in particular, reduced the powers of field marshals by strengthening the role of troop inspectors - also one of his new responsibilities. In April of the following year, he received from Paul the Order of Alexander Nevsky and an estate in the Oryol province with more than 400 serfs.

Rostopchin fought against the party of Empress Maria Feodorovna with varying degrees of success. In March 1798, he suffered a temporary defeat in this struggle - he was deprived of all positions and exiled to his Voronovo estate near Moscow, but in August he returned to the capital with the rank of lieutenant general and headed the Military Department.

Within three next years he was made Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Actual Privy Councilor, third present in the College of Foreign Affairs, Count of the Russian Empire, Grand Chancellor of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, director of the postal department, first member of the board of foreign affairs and, finally, a member of the emperor's council.

Another opponent with whom Rostopchin waged a consistent struggle were the Jesuits, in relation to whom he passed several harsh laws through Paul.

Against his will, taking the place of the first present Foreign Collegium, Rostopchin contributed to the rapprochement of Russia with Republican France and the cooling of relations with Great Britain. His memorandum, confirmed by Paul on October 2, 1800, determined Russian foreign policy in Europe until the death of the emperor.

An alliance with France with the participation of Austria and Prussia, according to Rostopchin, was supposed to lead to the division of the Ottoman Empire, which he was the first to call “a hopeless patient.” To implement the naval embargo against Great Britain, Rostopchin was instructed to conclude a military alliance with Sweden and Prussia (later Denmark joined the alliance). He also paved the way for Georgia's annexation to the Russian Empire.

As chief director of the Postal Department, Rostopchin authorized the expansion of the network of postal stations in Russia; under him, new fees were introduced on postal items and the sending of money by mail abroad was established. From March 14, 1800, Rostopchin was a member of the Council under the Emperor.

In February 1801, Rostopchin was dismissed from service for the second time and went to Moscow. It is assumed that this disgrace was the result of the activities of Count Palen, who at that time was preparing a conspiracy against Paul, which culminated in the murder of Paul within three weeks.

Under the new Emperor Alexander I, Rostopchin, known for his personal devotion to Paul, could not continue his political career for a long time.

Only in 1809 did he attempt to return to the court, enlisting the support of Princess Dashkova and Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, sister of Alexander I. He was allowed to appear before the emperor, after which he received an order to conduct an audit of Moscow charitable institutions.

Produced a detailed report good impression, but Rostopchin’s request to allow him to return to active work was not satisfied: on February 24, 1810, he received the rank of chief chamberlain, but he was ordered to be listed as “on leave.”

Only the brewing war with the French led to the calling of Rostopchin as one of the ideologists of the “Old Russians” movement, especially influential in the old capital.

On May 24, 1812, Rostopchin was appointed military governor of Moscow, five days later he was promoted to infantry general and appointed commander-in-chief of Moscow.

In his new post, he developed vigorous activities, including punitive ones, and even suspicion was enough for repressive measures. Under him, secret supervision was established over the Moscow Freemasons and Martinists, whom he suspected of subversive activities. In general, however, during the period of his rule, a carefully guarded calm reigned in Moscow.

After the publication of the July 6 manifesto on the convening of the people's militia, Rostopchin personally supervised the gathering of the provincial militia, which took place not only in Moscow, but also in six neighboring provinces. From the emperor he received only general instructions to strengthen Moscow and to evacuate state valuables from it if necessary.

In just 24 days, Rostopchin formed 12 regiments in the First District total number almost 26 thousand militias.

Rostopchin received information about the advance of Napoleonic troops into the interior of the country through his representative at the headquarters of Barclay de Tolly starting on August 2. It was he who came up with the idea of ​​issuing and distributing printed leaflets, reports and propaganda proclamations in Moscow, written in simple folk language. Rostopchin's leaflets were carried home and pasted on walls like theater posters, for which they were nicknamed "posters" - and remained in history under this name.

When the French came close to Moscow, Rostopchin began evacuating state property. In the last ten days of August, in just ten days, the property of the courts, the Senate, the Military Collegium, the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the treasures of the Patriarchal Sacristy, the Trinity and Resurrection Monasteries, and the Armory Chamber were taken to Vologda, Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod. 96 guns were also removed. However, the evacuation began too late, and some of the valuables did not have time to be removed. When convoys with the wounded began to arrive in Moscow, Rostopchin ordered the barracks in the former Golovinsky Palace to be used as a hospital and a staff of doctors and paramedics to be formed. Kutuzov, who led the Russian army, pinned his hopes on the second wave of the militia, the so-called Moscow squad, which Rostopchin was going to organize, but never had time due to the mass flight of the population from the city. Rostopchin himself sent alarming letters to Kutuzov, inquiring about his plans for Moscow, but received evasive answers, which continued even after the Battle of Borodino, when it became clear that he was not going to defend Moscow. After this, Rostopchin finally expelled his family from Moscow.

Having received the next day from Kutuzov an official notification of the impending surrender of Moscow, Rostopchin continued the evacuation of the city: an order was given for the police and fire brigade to leave the city and for the removal of the three miraculous icons of the Mother of God that were in Moscow - Iveron, Smolensk and Vladimir.

Five thousand carts were used to evacuate 25 thousand wounded in Moscow. Nevertheless, from two (according to Rostopchin himself) to ten (according to French eyewitnesses) thousand wounded remained in the city who could not be taken out. Many of them died in the Moscow fire, for which contemporaries and some historians tend to blame Rostopchin.

Before leaving, Rostopchin went out to the residents remaining in Moscow, who had gathered in front of the porch of his house, to hear from him personally whether Moscow would really be surrendered without a fight. By his order, two prisoners were brought to him: the merchant son Vereshchagin, arrested for distributing Napoleonic proclamations, and the Frenchman Mouton, already sentenced to be beaten with batogs and exiled to Siberia. Rostopchin accused the former of treason, announced that the Senate had sentenced him to death and ordered the dragoons to cut him down with sabers. Then the wounded but still alive Vereshchagin, according to eyewitnesses, was thrown to be torn to pieces by the crowd. Rostopchin released the Frenchman, ordering him to go to his own people and tell him that the executed man was the only traitor among the Muscovites.

The Russian Biographical Dictionary suggests that with these actions he simultaneously fueled Muscovites’ hatred of the invaders and made it clear to the French what fate might await them in occupied Moscow. However, later Emperor Alexander, generally satisfied with Rostopchin’s actions on the eve of the fall of Moscow, considered the bloody reprisal against Vereshchagin unnecessary: ​​“Hanging or shooting would be better.”

On September 2, 1812, units of the imperial army of Napoleon Bonaparte entered Moscow, abandoned without a fight by Kutuzov. Remaining with the army after the fall of Moscow, Rostopchin continued to compose leaflets and personally traveled to villages, speaking to the peasants and calling for a full-scale guerrilla warfare. Passing his Voronovo estate during the army's movements, he disbanded the serfs and burned his house along with the horse farm.

Immediately after the French left Moscow, Rostopchin returned to the devastated city to establish police protection to prevent the looting and destruction of the few surviving property. He also had to deal with the issues of delivering food and preventing epidemics in the burned city, for which emergency removal and destruction of corpses of people and animals were organized. Over the winter, more than 23,000 corpses were burned in Moscow alone, and more than 90,000 human and horse corpses were burned on the Borodino field. Work began to restore the city's buildings and, in particular, the Kremlin, which the departing French tried to blow up.

At the suggestion of Rostopchin, a Commission for the construction was created in Moscow, to which five million rubles were allocated. Previously, the treasury allocated two million rubles for the distribution of benefits to the victims, but this amount was not enough, and the Moscow commander-in-chief became the object of accusations and reproaches from the deprived. These complaints, as well as the widespread opinion that he was the culprit of the Moscow fire, outraged Rostopchin, who felt that his merits were unfairly forgotten and everyone remembered only his failures.

He began to have health problems, which already manifested themselves in September 1812 in repeated fainting spells. He suffered from a bilious disorder, became irritable, lost weight and went bald. Alexander I, returning from Europe, accepted Rostopchin’s resignation at the end of July 1814.

In May 1815, he left Russia to undergo treatment for hemorrhoids in Carlsbad, but ended up spending eight years abroad until the end of 1823. While abroad, he was granted audiences with the kings of Prussia and England. Since 1817, Rostopchin settled in Paris, periodically traveling to Baden for treatment, as well as to Italy and England.

Life abroad did not bring joy. The eldest son led a wild life in Paris, even ending up in a debtor's prison, and Rostopchin had to pay his debts. His wife, Ekaterina Petrovna, converted to Catholicism and converted her daughters to this faith, and the youngest daughter Elizaveta became seriously ill. All these circumstances forced Rostopchin to return to his homeland.

Having sent his daughter to the rebuilt Voronovo, Rostopchin himself stayed in Lemberg, where he underwent another course of treatment, and returned to Moscow in September 1823. Upon his return, he submitted a request for full resignation, which was granted in December. He retired with the rank of chief chamberlain.

On March 1, 1825, Rostopchin’s daughter, his favorite Elizaveta, died in Moscow from consumption. This grief completely undermined the father’s health: in addition to hemorrhoids and bile spillage, he developed asthma. On December 26 he was struck by paralysis; he almost lost the ability to move and could not speak, although he remained fully conscious. He lived for almost another month, drawing up a new will, in which he disinherited his wife in favor of his younger children and son.

What is he famous for?

Fyodor Rostopchin is a famous Russian statesman, a favorite of Emperor Paul and the head of his foreign policy, and later a Moscow mayor and governor-general of Moscow during the Napoleonic invasion.

It is Rostopchin who is considered the organizer of the Moscow fire of 1812. Supposedly, during his first meeting with Kutuzov, he proposed to him a plan to burn Moscow instead of surrendering it to the enemy. He repeated the same idea to Prince Eugene of Württemberg and General Ermolov.

On the very first night after the capture of Moscow by Napoleon's troops, fires began in the city, which by the third day engulfed it in a continuous ring. At first, the French were inclined to blame their own looters for this, but after several Russian arsonists were caught, and it was discovered that all fire-fighting equipment had been taken from Moscow, the opinion of the French command changed.

Napoleon, realizing that he would be the first to be blamed for the burning of Moscow, in his proclamations took care to avert suspicion from himself by accusing Rostopchin, whom he called Herostratus, of the arson, of an arsonist and a madman. By September 12, the commission he appointed had prepared a conclusion finding the Russian government and the Moscow commander-in-chief personally guilty of the arson. This version gained popularity both abroad and in Russia, although Rostopchin himself at first publicly denied his involvement in the arson, including in letters to Emperor Alexander and to his own wife. Later, however, he stopped denying it, although he did not confirm it, since this point of view surrounded him with the aura of a hero and martyr. Only in his essay “The Truth about the Moscow Fire”, published in 1823 in Paris, did he again categorically reject the version linking his name with this event.

What you need to know

Fyodor Rostopchin is also known as a writer and publicist of a patriotic nature, who, following Fonvizin, ridiculed gallomania.

In addition to the already mentioned posters, he owns a number of literary works, many of which were written during the period of disgrace and forced inactivity after the death of Paul I. At the same time, Rostopchin did not consider himself a professional writer and composed casually. It is known that while living on his Voronovo estate and in Moscow, he wrote a large number of satirical comedies, which he personally destroyed after reading them with close friends.

As a publicist, he gained great fame thanks to the success of his pamphlet “Thoughts Out Loud on the Red Porch” (1807), which contained sharp criticism of the Russian penchant for Frenchmania and glorified the original Russian virtues.

Rostopchin’s most famous works are “The Truth about the Moscow Fires”, “The Last Days of the Life of Empress Catherine II and the First Day of the Reign of Paul I”, the comedy “News or Killed Alive” and the long story “Oh the French!”

The latter was published in Otechestvennye zapiski in 1842 and had the goal of depicting an ideal Russian family, built on old Testament national principles as opposed to fashionable hobbies and French loose morals.

Rostopchin's extensive correspondence with Emperor Alexander I, Bantysh-Kamensky, Vorontsov, Rumyantsov and many other figures of that era has also been preserved.

Direct speech

About Me:“Straight in heart, stubborn in mind, well done in practice.”

CatherineII about Fyodor Rostopchin:“This young man has a big forehead, big eyes and a big mind!”

From an article about Rostopchin in ESBE:“Undoubtedly, R. was an intelligent person, well aware weak sides passion for everything French in the then Russian society and seeing the shortcomings of the policies of Alexander I after 1815; but at the same time, he was an extreme conservative and a zealous defender of serfdom, often resorting to violent, hardly excusable measures, and was passionate and vindictive.”

Historian M.V. Gornostaev about Rostopchin: “Rostopchin’s vigorous patriotic activity during the Napoleonic invasion could have become a model of zealous service for the good of the Fatherland, but it was negatively assessed by domestic historians and has been practically forgotten to this day.”

5 facts about Fyodor Rostopchin

• In the “Works of Rostopchin” published by Smirdin in 1853, the year of his birth was indicated as 1765. The year 1763 is engraved on the tombstone at the Pyatnitskoye cemetery.
• Among the preparations for defense, Moskvystopchin financed Leppich’s project to build a combat controlled balloon, intended for bombing enemy troops and landing troops. However, despite the large funds - more than 150 thousand rubles - spent on the project, it turned out to be untenable.
• Leaving Moscow, Rostopchin deliberately left his Moscow property worth about half a million rubles to be plundered by the French, fearing accusations of pursuing personal interests. According to his own recollections, he left the city with 130,000 rubles of government money and 630 rubles of his own. He also managed to take out portraits of his wife and Emperor Paul and a box of valuable papers.
• Rostopchin was happily married. He married 19-year-old maid of honor Ekaterina Protasova, the daughter of the Kaluga governor, who was left an orphan at an early age. They had eight children - 4 sons and 4 daughters. The marriage was happy until the moment when Rostopchin’s wife secretly converted to Catholicism from him and contributed to the transition to Catholicism youngest daughter Elizabeth. “You only hurt me twice,” Rostopchin wrote to his wife shortly before his death. Both cases concerned the change of religion of a wife and daughter.
• Before his death, Rostopchin ordered that he be buried next to his daughter Elisaveta. He wanted to be placed in a coffin in a simple dress without orders, so that his grave would be completely simple and that it would be covered with a marble plaque with a carved name, without designation of ranks. On his gravestone it is written “Among my children I rest from people.”

Materials about Fyodor Rostopchin

Of all the Moscow governors-general, active, idle, lazy, stupid and educated, Muscovites most often remember Count Rostopchin, who, having served as the military governor of Moscow for two years, left behind extremely strong memories.

Characteristics of F.V. There are very different types of Rostopchin, some talk about his passionate and manic nature, others - about vanity and bile, others - about courage and honesty, but essentially they have one thing in common: they all highlight the speed and sharpness of his mind, as well as a certain “duality” his nature - he was both Russian and French at the same time, moreover, coming from a Tatar family. P.A. Vyazemsky in his memoir notes describes Rostopchin as follows: “He was a native Russian, a true Muscovite, but also a born Parisian. The spirit, valor and prejudices were from the temperament from which the Pozharskys and Minins could appear at a given moment; With his mentality and wit, he was a real Frenchman. He hated the French and scolded them in purely French...”

Moreover, the same P.A. Vyazemsky cites the following dialogue that took place between Paul I and Rostopchin: the emperor asked why Rostopchin, although of Tatar origin, was not a prince. To which the latter replied: “But because my ancestor moved to Russia in the winter. The tsars granted princely dignity to the famous Tatar newcomers in summer, and fur coats to winter ones.” Under one of his portraits, Rostopchin left an inscription in French:
I was born a Tatar
And he wanted to become a Roman;
The French made me a barbarian
And the Russians - Georges Dandin.

As always, the caustic historian E.V. Tarle gives Rostopchin an unflattering description: “He was a man of a quick and undisciplined mind, a wit (not always successful), a loud joker, a fanfare, proud and self-confident, without any special abilities or calling for anything.”

Posters
Of course, most known part The activity of the new governor-general was the distribution of leaflets with appeals to the people, the full title of which sounded like “Posters of 1812, or friendly messages from the commander-in-chief in Moscow to its residents.” In the summer of 1812, Rostopchin began distributing posters (they were hung on the streets). The frequency of publication of posters depended on the severity of the political moment: most often they appeared immediately before the surrender of Moscow, full of pathos that the capital must be protected and under no circumstances surrender it to the enemy. After the surrender of Moscow, Rostopchin released a poster intended for residents of the Moscow province, but then a long forced silence ensued due to the long absence of most of the audience of this periodical.

The very first poster set the tone for the entire enterprise: before us is a popular print of a certain “Moscow tradesman who was in the warriors, Karnyushka Chikhirin,” a collective image, falling out of a tavern in a drunken state and threatening the French from there. The comedy lies in the fact that this supposedly common drunken talk is composed by Rostopchin, who, according to Tarle’s caustic remark, at home with his wife, a French Catholic, “speaked only French, he also spoke French with his friends, he did not know Russian literature at all.” , and although he died in 1826, there is no sign that he suspected, for example, the existence of Pushkin or Zhukovsky.” Tarle continues the passage with the remark that these “ridiculous posters” did not make the slightest impression on the people. It must be said that the Russian people, according to Tarle, paid little attention to anything at all. For example, the story of the hot air balloon, the appearance of which Rostopchin foreshadows in one of his posters, also amazingly “passed by” Muscovites.

Before the surrender of Moscow, Rostopchin writes posters every day, or even several times a day, reporting peculiar reports from the battlefields, according to which for one killed Russian there are at least 600 killed Frenchmen, and also very peculiarly calming and encouraging the townspeople, for example, with the following maxims : “His Serene Highness says that he will defend Moscow to the last drop of blood and is ready to fight even in the streets. You, brothers, don’t look at the fact that the offices have been closed: things need to be tidied up; and we will deal with the villain in our court!”

In addition to publishing posters, Rostopchin also invented another seemingly effective means: he took the habit of walking around Moscow, talking to people. True, he himself wrote about the failure of his enterprise: “You have to be very careful with these people, because no one has a large supply common sense, as a Russian person, and they often made such comments and questions that would complicate even a diplomat, the most experienced in verbal disputes.”

The poster, published after the surrender of Moscow and addressed to the residents of the Moscow province (dated September 20), by its existence refutes Tarle’s words that Rostopchin knew nothing about Russian literature. This poster is written in a completely different style, not “popular”, it is imbued with patriotic pathos - to create this effect, Rostopchin seems to be turning to the rhetoric of the then fashionable work “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign,” discovered and published by Musin-Pushkin at the turn of the century. By the way, the original “Lay” burned in that very fire in Moscow, which gave researchers reason to doubt the authenticity of the work. The epithets used by Rostopchin (“let his warriors loose like fierce beasts,” “bitter tears will be poured out to the fierce wolf”), the rhetorical image of the enemy (“the villainous Frenchman is an unbaptized enemy”) - all refer to the speech features of the Lay. Here's a revealing quote:
“We will destroy the enemy’s strength, we will bury them in Holy Rus', we will begin to beat them wherever we meet. There are very few of them left, and there are forty million of us people, flocking from all sides like a flock of eagles. We will exterminate the overseas reptile and give their bodies to the wolves and crows; and Moscow will be decorated again.”

“The Vereshchagin Case” and flight from Moscow
Of course, for the information war a demonstrative case was needed, it was the Vereshchagin case: a merchant son who was friends with the son of postal director Klyucharev, allegedly looking through secret documents, intended for the government, “translated into Russian two newspaper reports about Napoleon, namely: a letter to the Prussian king and Napoleon’s speech to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine in Dresden.” In fact, Napoleon did not write this letter and did not make such a speech; it was not a political, but rather a literary action, since the authorship of the documents belongs to Vereshchagin himself. This, however, did not prevent Governor General Klyucharev from being expelled from the capital, and Vereshchagin being accused of treason and imprisoned for the time being.

Count Rostopchin and merchant son Vereshchagin in the courtyard of the governor's house in Moscow. Hood. A. Kivshenko. 1893

Fyodor Vasilyevich remembered the unfortunate Vereshchagin at a critical moment for himself - when he needed to appease the angry crowd that did not let the governor-general out of the house. Karolina Pavlova, from the words of her father K. Janisch, wrote about this: “The embittered mob rushed to the governor-general’s house, shouting that they had deceived them, that Moscow was being betrayed to the enemy. The crowd grew larger, became more and more enraged and began to call the Governor-General to account. A loud cry arose: “Let him come to us!” Otherwise we’ll get to him!” Rostopchin went out to the people, who “met him with angry exclamations.” Surprisingly, this critical moment indirectly proves the popularity of Rostopchin’s posters, a certain mocking success of his information war, refuting Tarle’s words that no one paid “the slightest attention” to the posters. In order to divert the attention of the crowd from his own person, Rostopchin ordered Vereshchagin and the Frenchman Mouton to be brought from prison, ordering the first to be hacked to death with sabers and thrown half-dead to the crowd, later presenting this murder as a popular reprisal against a “villain”, and the second to be released “so that he could tell the French how it is with us.” deal with traitors." The act is completely Machiavellian.

The story of the fire
Another dark spot on Rostopchin’s biography is the story of the burning of Moscow after the French entered the city. Many French memoirists assured that the Russians, on orders from the Governor General, deliberately launched incendiary rockets from the outskirts. How they knew this is a secondary question, but in any case the accusation is very serious.

Count Rostopchin (watching the fire of Moscow): “Everything is going like clockwork” (English caricature)

Three weeks before the French entered Moscow, Rostopchin wrote to Bagration the following: “I cannot imagine that the enemy could come to Moscow. Whenever it happens that you retreat to Vyazma, then I will begin the administration of all state things and will give everyone the freedom to get out, and the people here, out of loyalty to the sovereign and the fatherland, will decisively die at the walls of Moscow, and if God does not help them in their good enterprise, then, following the Russian rule: do not get it from the villain, he will turn the city into ashes, and Napoleon will receive instead of booty the place where the capital was. It’s not a bad idea to let him know about this, so that he doesn’t count millions and stores of bread, for he will find coal and ash.” Here Rostopchin directly expresses his intention to set fire to Moscow so that it does not fall to the enemy. However, whether the city was really set on fire on Rostopchin’s orders, and if this is true, whether he expected the effect to be produced, remains completely unclear. It should be noted that Fyodor Vasilyevich himself completely denied his guilt, placing it on the French and... M.I. Kutuzov, who actually ordered the removal of fire fighting equipment from Moscow before the retreat.

After the War of 1812, Rostopchin would repeatedly return to the topic of leaving Moscow, painstakingly collecting all the evidence about the fire that happened and pedantically, point by point, refuting them. He even created a table of refutations of Napoleon's bulletins issued during his stay French army in Moscow, in which a retaliatory information war was waged against Rostopchin. We can say that both managed to win this information war - each for their own audience. Rostopchin became convinced of the effectiveness of his posters when the people did not allow him to flee Moscow, but he was convinced of the effectiveness of Napoleon’s bulletins throughout his subsequent life, forced, while living in Paris, to write constant excuses.

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Chronicle of the day: Napoleon offers peace

The main forces of the Russian troops continued to move west and reached Podolsk.

Meanwhile the avant-garde Great Army crossed the Moscow River at Borovsky Perevoz and followed Cossack brigade Efremov, whom he mistook for the rearguard of the Russian army. Only when they reached Bronnitsy did the French reveal the deceptive maneuver, but the direction of withdrawal of the main Russian forces still remained a mystery to them.

Napoleon, still in Petrovsky Castle, through the head of the Moscow Orphanage, General I.A. Tutolmina turned to Alexander I with proposals for peace. For the next few days, the French emperor will wait for an answer, but it will never come.

Person: Fedor Vasilyevich Rostopchin

Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin (1763-1826)
The biography of Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin (otherwise - Rastopchin) shows us a typical nobleman-careerist, using family, friendly and official connections to get closer to the court.

Fyodor Vasilyevich was born into the family of an Oryol landowner and captain Vasily Fedorovich Rostopchin, received a good education at home, was enrolled in the Preobrazhensky Regiment at the age of 12, and received the rank of ensign at the age of 19. In his youth, Fyodor Rostopchin traveled extensively throughout Europe, attended lectures at the University of Leipzig, and visited Great Britain and Holland.

Since 1788, thanks to the efforts of his patron, Prince of Schaumburg, he was under A.V. Suvorov, participated in the assault on Ochakov, the battle of Focsani, the battle of Rymnik, and was promoted to captain-lieutenant. In 1790, Rostopchin and his brother went to the Swedish war, but setbacks haunted him: the command remained dissatisfied with him, and his patron died, moreover, during the Swedish campaign, his younger brother also died in a naval battle.

Seeing the futility of his attempts to do military career, Fyodor Rostopchin tries to get into the court, at first also unsuccessfully. As a result, he becomes one of the secretaries at the Iasi Peace Conference with Turkey (1792) with the rank of brigadier and the rank of chamber cadet. This allowed the young nobleman to appear at the empress’s court, from where he, however, was quickly “exiled” to Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich, whose favor Rostopchin managed to win.

After the death of Catherine, Paul I made Fyodor Vasilyevich an aide-de-camp, then a major general and gave him several orders and a large estate in the Oryol province. At court, Rostopchin led with varying degrees of success protracted war with the party of Empress Maria Feodorovna on one side and the strengthened Jesuits on the other.

The peak of Rostopchin's career came in 1798-99, when he received the rank of lieutenant general and the post of first head of the Military Department, and then cabinet minister for foreign affairs. In the foreign policy field, it was through the efforts of Fyodor Vasilyevich that Paul I inclined towards an alliance with republican France against England, as well as the creation of a continental trade union.

After palace coup 1801 Rostopchin was dismissed and lived on his estate near Moscow, where he studied literature. In 1809, with the support of Princess Dashkova and the Emperor’s sister F.V. Rostopchin returned to the court and in 1812 received an appointment as governor general in Moscow.

Under Paul I, Fyodor Vasilyevich became a minister; after Paul’s death, Rostopchin was retired for the first ten years of Alexander’s reign; his return to service occurred shortly before the war - in 1810 he became chamberlain and then governor-general of Moscow. He remained in this position until 1814, after which he went to travel around “ new Europe", in order to heal severely damaged health.

Fyodor Vasilyevich lived with his family abroad for eight years and only in 1823 returned to Russia. However, Rostopchin’s health did not allow him to engage in government affairs. In 1825, the beloved daughter of the former governor died, which was a terrible blow for him. F.V. Rostopchin died in early 1826 in Moscow, paralyzed and unable to even speak.

September 1 (13), 1812
Military Council in Fili
Person: Leonty Leontievich Bennigsen
Military Council in Fili: “one hour decides the fate of the fatherland”


GORNOSTAYEV M. V.

GOVERNOR GENERAL OF MOSCOW

F. V. ROSTOPCHIN:

PAGES OF THE HISTORY OF 1812.

MOSCOW – 2003.

UDC882

Governor General of Moscow:

pages of history of 1812. - M.: IKF “Catalog”,

The book offered to the reader reveals some pages of the life of Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin, the Governor-General of Moscow in 1812, one of the most interesting and controversial characters in Russian history. Rostopchin’s vigorous patriotic activity during the Napoleonic invasion could have become a model of zealous service for the good of the Fatherland, but it was negatively assessed by domestic historians and is practically forgotten today. Intended for all those interested in the history of Russia.

1. short biography. …………………………5

2. Relationships and interaction

and in 1812. ……………………………………..8

3. Organization of evacuation of government institutions

from Moscow in 1812. …………………………………………..24

4. and the fire of Moscow in 1812. ………………..35

Notes……………………………………………………..52

Human memory is inconsistent. The heroes of bygone days become, in the eyes of their descendants, figures who do not deserve attention, and sometimes even scoundrels. Public opinion forms a negative stereotype, and writers and scientists soon provide an appropriate basis for it. All this is also true of Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin, a talented writer and popular publicist, Pavlov’s favorite and head of the foreign board, friend and, finally, Moscow Governor-General in 1812, who became famous for his active patriotic activities and fiery hatred of the enemy, embodied in the grandiose fire of Moscow, which disrupted Napoleon’s plans. The traditionally critical attitude in Russian historiography towards the role of Rostopchin in the events of the Patriotic War of 1812 is known, which developed in the mid-19th century and has survived to this day. If D. Buturlin compared Rostopchin with ancient Roman heroes, then such pre-revolutionary researchers as, and considered him a man of low abilities, moral qualities and an incapable official who interfered with his plans to defeat Napoleon. Later, this assessment, only now strengthened, was repeated by Soviet authors. wrote about Rostopchin: “He was a man of a quick and undisciplined mind, a wit (not always successful), a loud joker, a fanfare, proud and self-confident, without any special abilities or calling for anything.” in the article “Kutuzov and the Fire of Moscow” he called Rostopchin “a liar and a coward.” He went the furthest, not shy in epithets, calling the count either “who considered himself a great politician and commander, the tsar’s favorite and careerist,” then “an inveterate serf owner and self-lover,” then “the Tsar’s noisy favorite,” then “a crafty courtier” and even “a traitor and coward."

Today, historians have an opportunity to reconsider established assessments regarding certain characters in Russian history. This fully applies to Rostopchin, whose activities remain largely unknown and unexplored, but studying them will more fully reveal the picture of the events of our past and especially the heroic pages of 1812.

The volume of the publication, unfortunately, does not allow us to fully present the material accumulated by the author about the state and social activities Therefore, only some of the most important issues will be discussed on the pages of this book.

1. BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF F. V. ROSTOPCHIN

Blessed are those who have not witnessed shame

Russia. Blessed are those who will avenge the Fatherland.

Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin was born on March 12, 1763 in the city of Livny, Oryol province. His family was ancient, but not noble. According to legend, the Rostopchins descended from the Crimean Tatar prince Davyd Rabchak, a distant descendant of Genghis Khan, who lived in the 15th century. However, the descendants of Genghisid, who served the Moscow sovereigns since 1432, did not occupy high positions and the history is practically unknown. According to the rules of that time, Rostopchin was enlisted in the Preobrazhensky Guards Regiment from early childhood and therefore already had the rank of second lieutenant by the age of twenty-two. The young officer was smart, talented, and most importantly, he had a great thirst for action. But, having no noble patrons, he was forced to settle for a modest army career. Although Rostopchin participated in the Russian-Swedish war of 1788-90, in the siege of Ochakov during the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-91, he did not even receive St. George's Cross, to whom he was presented for the Finnish campaign. However, unexpectedly in Iasi, fate brought him together with the count, who arrived to conduct peace negotiations with Ottoman Empire. Rostopchin, who took a direct part in drawing up the protocols, was sent to St. Petersburg with the news of the conclusion of peace. This event marked the beginning of his court career; on February 14, 1792, he received the rank of chamber cadet. But even at court, the ambitious Rostopchin did not want to be content with modest assignments. At this time, he tried in every possible way to attract the attention of Catherine II, not only earning the description of a witty participant in her salons, but also marrying the niece of the maid of honor and the Empress’s favorite, Ekaterina Petrovna Protasova. But neither his brilliant mind nor his marriage contributed to his career, and the desperate Rostopchin was about to resign when chance helped him again. As a chamber cadet, he was supposed to be on duty at the small court of Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich. However, other chamber cadets, trying to please the empress, performed this duty in bad faith, often not coming to serve the heir. Therefore, the conscientious Rostopchin often remained to replace his less responsible comrades, but his patience had limits and he sent a letter to the chief chamberlain, in which he spoke about his comrades in a rather insulting manner. The letter received publicity and caused a scandal. Rostopchin was challenged to a duel by several courtiers, but the empress calmed everyone down by sending him to the village. However, this incident, having destroyed hopes for a career, made Rostopchin a hero in the eyes of the heir to the throne. Several years passed, and when on November 5, 1796, news of the critical situation of the Empress spread throughout St. Petersburg, Rostopchin was among the few people who were completely confident in their future. From this day his brilliant rise began. Count of the Russian Empire, Grand Chancellor of the Order of Malta, holder of many higher orders, director of the postal department, first present in the board of foreign affairs, and finally, the richest man in Russia, Rostopchin, considered by everyone as a favorite, still did not turn into a temporary worker. He received the salary of the third person present on the board, and pointedly refused the princely title and some higher positions. At the court of the wayward emperor, who did not spare even his favorites, Rostopchin was the only person who was not afraid to express own opinion. However, otherwise the count acted in the spirit of the times, organizing intrigues, eliminating rivals, and, in the end, he himself fell victim own actions. He was dismissed on February 20, 1801, and already on March 1, Paul I, having lost his most faithful servants Rostopchin and Arakcheev, was killed.

2. INTERACTION AND RELATIONSHIP

F.V. ROSTOPCHIN AND M.I. KUTUZOV IN 1812

The question of the direct culprit for the abandonment of Moscow by the Russian army in 1812 is one of the most pressing in Russian historiography. Such acuity arises because the facts and logic of reasoning often contradict the conclusions of historians and thereby create a new and very difficult problem Rostopchin’s personal guilt in the death of the ancient capital, multi-million dollar losses of government and private property.

Rostopchin, as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Moscow, from the very beginning of the war, carefully monitored the possibility of military danger for the city. The primary source of such conclusions for him were reports of military operations, personal correspondence with Barclay de Tolly and Bagration. But, realizing the danger of such one-sided information, the count at the end of July sent titular adviser Voronenko to the army, one of the main goals of whose activity was to collect information about the true state of affairs. Thus, the totality of information received from various sources allowed Rostopchin, even on August 12, not to assume the possibility of the enemy approaching the capital. However, caution did not fail him, and that same day he wrote to Bagration about his intention to begin the evacuation of government property if the Russian army retreated to Vyazma. The events of the following days changed his assessment. Although Kutuzov's appointment strengthened Rostopchin's hope for a happy continuation of the war for Russian weapons, the retreat continued. Kutuzov immediately after arriving at the army wrote to Rostopchin about his intention to defend the capital.

Knowing virtually nothing about the plans of the new commander-in-chief, on August 18 the Governor-General gave orders to begin preparations for the evacuation of some government departments, stipulating that the removal of property should begin after special orders. But, for clearer and more consistent actions, Rostopchin needed to know for sure about the fate of the subordinate city. On August 17, Kutuzov wrote to the count from Gzhatsk: “In my opinion, the loss of Moscow is connected with the loss of Russia.” Of course, such a statement could reassure many, but not Rostopchin, especially since from the moment the Russian army entered the Moscow province, he fell directly under the military command. However, there were still great hopes for a general battle. On the eve of it, on August 21, the commander-in-chief writes to Rostopchin: “All movements until now have been directed towards this single goal and towards the salvation of the capital city of Moscow - may the Almighty bless these enterprises of ours...”. As can be seen from the correspondence, Kutuzov diligently avoided the question of the fate of Moscow, limiting himself only to expressing his intentions. No instructions were given regarding the evacuation of government property.

Rostopchin himself most likely already had strong doubts about the commander-in-chief’s intention to defend the ancient capital, about which he wrote to the Nizhny Novgorod governor on August 24. There was no certainty even after the end of the Battle of Borodino. On the evening of August 26, Kutuzov sent a letter to the Governor General, informing him of his intention to continue the battle the next day and asking for reinforcements. In general, this day can be called a turning point in the relationship between Kutuzov and Rostopchin. It was from August 26 that the commander-in-chief’s demands on the governor-general took on a mocking tone. In this letter, Kutuzov not only did not warn Rostopchin about his intention to retreat, but also demanded the immediate sending of reinforcements, which, even if they immediately left Moscow, would not have reached the troops before the last days of August.

Ambiguity and uncertainty in such an issue as the security of Moscow had no right to exist, and therefore the Governor-General demanded that Kutuzov give him clear instructions in this regard. Kutuzov’s answer cannot be called definite: “Your thoughts about preserving Moscow are sound and must be presented.”

Meanwhile, after, according to the commander-in-chief, victory over Napoleon, the Russian army retreated to Moscow, although this retreat was more like a flight. This is supported by the speed of movement - 110 kilometers in 5 days and the terrible disorder that reigned in the troops. As Barclay de Tolly recalled, during these days the units retreated chaotically, without any disposition, without commanders, obeying general direction movements. The chaos reached such a scale that it was impossible to find even Main Headquarters. Every day, thousands of soldiers left their location to indulge in robbery, as evidenced by the correspondence between Kutuzov and Rostopchin, who took all possible measures to stop it. On August 30, the demoralized Russian army approached the capital. The Moscow governor-general immediately went to the field marshal. Kutuzov’s orderly, the prince, described their meeting in the village of Mamonovo as follows: “After various mutual compliments, they talked about the defense of Moscow. It was decided to die, but to fight under its walls. The reserve was supposed to consist of the Moscow squad with crosses and banners. Rastopchin left with admiration and in his delight, no matter how smart he was, but he did not understand that there was a hidden meaning in these assurances and orders of Kutuzov. Kutuzov could not have discovered ahead of time under the walls of Moscow that he would leave her, although he hinted in a conversation to Rostopchin.” From the memoirs of a person close to Kutuzov, we can find out another oddity in the field marshal’s behavior. Even in these critical days for Moscow, he did not inform his plans to its governor-general, that is, an official from whom, on the contrary, nothing could be hidden, since the military success of the army largely depended on his personal participation.

This oddity was repeated on September 1, when Kutuzov, contrary to the opinion of his generals, did not invite Rostopchin to the military council. Moscow Governor-General, Commander-in-Chief of Moscow, Infantry General, and finally, the man who did the most for the defense of the city and still has great opportunities providing assistance to the army, both financially and by convening armed Muscovites, was simply ignored by the commander-in-chief. Moreover, the idea of ​​gathering citizens for battle near the city walls, often taken by historians as one of the fantastic plans of the Moscow governor-general, was seriously considered not only by him. Bagration also completely agreed with Rostopchin. Even Kutuzov initially accepted the count’s proposal to arm the Muscovites with enthusiasm, which he wrote about on August 17 to Rostopchin. It should be noted that in this case, Kutuzov probably misunderstood the promises of the Moscow governor-general, who really counted on the eighty thousand militia formed under his leadership in neighboring provinces, and, separately, on the enthusiasm of several thousand townspeople who were to be convened immediately before the battle at the city walls, but not before. ABOUT real assessment of his forces, Rostopchin reported to Kutuzov on August 22: “...with the exception of the unknown number of residents of Moscow and its environs, I have up to 10,000 uniformed and more than a half trained recruits."

It is worth remembering one more accusation against Rostopchin: the accusation of inconsistency, inconsistency of statements and real action. The count, who had been toying with the idea of ​​a people’s battle for so long, according to Glinka, on August 30, while composing his famous “Appeal to the Three Mountains,” declared: “We will have nothing on the three mountains.” In the mentioned poster, Rostopchin called on Muscovites to defend the ancient capital and the entire Russian land. “...Arm yourself with what you can, both horse and foot; take only bread for three days; go with the cross; take the banners from the churches and with this sign gather immediately on the Three Mountains; I will be with you, and together we will destroy the villain.”

However, the count himself did not appear at the Three Mountains, which subsequently made the Muscovites very unhappy. This can be reflected in the anecdote cited by Dmitriev about an alleged conversation between the Governor General and Prince Shalikov. Soon after the French left, Rostopchin called him to his place to find out why he remained in Moscow? Shalikov’s answer was insulting: “How could I leave! Your Excellency announced that you will defend Moscow on the Three Mountains with all the Moscow nobles; I came there armed; but not only didn’t I find any nobles there, I didn’t find your Excellency either!” More serious evidence was left by the Moscow official Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who on August 31 found himself near the Presnenskaya outpost, where the road to the Three Mountains began. "My God! With what heartfelt tenderness I looked at the Orthodox Russian people, my compatriots, who were striving with weapons in their hands, bought dearly from self-interested merchants; others walked with pikes, pitchforks, axes to the Three Mountains suburb to save Moscow, the cradle of Orthodoxy and the tombs of their forefathers, from the advancing enemy, and with the spirit true patriotism shouted: “Long live our father Alexander!” The slightest support for this patriotic explosion, and God knows whether the enemy would have entered Moscow? The people numbered several tens of thousands, so it was difficult, as they say, for an apple to fall, in a space of 4 or 5 square miles, which from the rising of the sun to the setting did not disperse in anticipation of Count Rostopchin, as he himself promised to lead them; but the commander did not appear, and everyone, with bitter despondency, went home.”

What were Rostopchin’s motives in this case? It is strange that, already assuming the sad fate of the capital, and with full confidence that there would be no battle, he, nevertheless, convened Muscovites to help the army. However, this decision can be explained quite simply: firstly, there were still hopes for a battle near Moscow, in which case the Moscow governor-general undertook what he had long promised, thereby providing real support to the army; secondly, the expression of popular enthusiasm could have a moral impact on military leadership when choosing further actions.

We should also reject the opinion about the duplicity of the Moscow governor-general, who allegedly wrote his “Appeal to the Three Mountains” and called the people to battle in pursuit of popularity and to create a false patriotic effect, thereby deceiving the Muscovites, since he himself did not plan any popular battle I didn't intend to participate in it. This was mainly supported by the Count’s words mentioned by Glinka: “There will be nothing on our three mountains.” But this version is correct only if the researcher has previously accepted, as the basis for conclusions, the thesis about Rostopchin’s low moral qualities. If we consider the Moscow Governor-General, at a minimum, as a figure who really assesses the situation, then it becomes clear that these words express his There are great doubts about the field marshal’s intention to use the help of the townspeople. The Count understood perfectly well that under any circumstances, without the support of the army, the patriotic initiative of Muscovites could only lead to a bloodbath, and this could explain his failure to appear at the Three Mountains. Rostopchin did not want to encourage those gathered with his appearance, because it was him, as Bestuzhev-Ryumin testifies, that the Muscovites saw as a leader. The Governor-General did not appear, the Muscovites dispersed, and perhaps this circumstance saved many of their lives. And it’s not Rostopchin’s fault that Kutuzov neglected the patriotic feelings of the townspeople and did not take advantage several tens of thousands of armed people, determined to die at the walls of the holy city.

Rostopchin was notified of Kutuzov's decision to leave Moscow to the enemy late in the evening of September 1. The Governor-General immediately sent the already mentioned Voronenko to Fili to report the beginning of the movement of enemy troops. In the meantime, he ordered that all available carts be used to remove the wounded. The police were tasked with breaking barrels of wine. Then, outraged by Kutuzov’s treachery, he sent a letter to the emperor, from which Alexander I learned about the abandonment of the city.

So, the ancient capital of Russia was abandoned by the Russian army. Although subsequent events showed that it was on its ruins that a grave was prepared for Napoleonic plans, nevertheless, the very fact of the surrender of Moscow was considered by contemporaries and later authors as the most difficult episode in Russian history. The question is, how did it happen that the French captured one of the two largest political, economic, cultural and military centers of the Russian Empire, moreover, located at a considerable distance from state border was considered by most authors writing about the Patriotic War of 1812. It should be noted that this problem usually considered in two planes, in search of other options for the development of events, and in search of a specific culprit. The latter, however, is not without logic, since the Moscow governor-general and commander-in-chief of the Russian army were directly involved in the fall of Moscow, with the exception of Napoleon.

Soviet historiography proceeded from the assumption that Kutuzov had a counteroffensive plan. According to him, the Russian army, which had significantly bled the enemy troops in the Battle of Borodino, was supposed to retreat to Moscow, there to unite with militia units armed with Muscovites and newly formed regiments and, after gaining an advantage in manpower, give a new battle to the enemy. In this case, the battle near the walls of Moscow should have ended with the inevitable defeat of Napoleon and given rise to a brilliant counter-offensive of the Russian army. But Kutuzov’s plans were not destined to come true, since officials did not prepare the necessary reserves. The field marshal, who was about to give a decisive battle near the walls of Moscow, discovered that he had neither the support of the people's militia, nor the armed citizens, nor the army regiments. Moreover, the city was not ready for defense. All this forced Kutuzov to take the only the right decision- leave the ancient capital to preserve the army. The main culprits for this situation, according to Beskrovny and Zhilin, were Alexander I and Rostopchin, and the latter, due to his direct participation in these events, was more involved in the tragedy.

Such an interpretation of events cannot but be considered one-sided. After all, as you know, Rostopchin acted as a decisive opponent of the surrender of the city, and the corresponding decision was made by Kutuzov at a military council, to which the governor-general was not even invited. All this gives grounds for detailed analysis all the circumstances of leaving Moscow.

The first of these is the assumption that Rostopchin did an unsatisfactory job of organizing the people's militia and did not provide Kutuzov with the promised support of armed Muscovites at the city walls. It is known that the Moscow Governor-General took all possible measures to quickly gather and prepare militia units. Moscow and the Moscow province, directly under the leadership of Rostopchin, showed unparalleled patriotism, and already on August 26, about 25 thousand warriors were at the disposal of the Russian army, at least 19 thousand of whom took direct part in the Battle of Borodino. By the end of August, the capabilities of the Moscow province were practically exhausted. By September 1, the militia regiments of the neighboring provinces were already on their way to Moscow or were at points designated by the military command.

The conclusion that Rostopchin is afraid to arm the townspeople is also not entirely justified. It is known that on August 18 he publicly announced the free sale of weapons from the arsenal. Moreover, the price for it was significantly (30-40 times!) lower than the market price. Thus, any Muscovite who wanted to arm himself could do so freely. The Moscow governor-general, however, by organizing the sale rather than the distribution of weapons, deliberately created an obstacle to the arming of the poorest sections of the population, from whom in this case he could expect not an outburst of patriotic feelings, but an attempt to take advantage of the chaos and disorder of these days for robbery and disturbances. The price set in the arsenal made guns and sabers affordable to working Muscovites and small owners, but not to beggars and brothel dwellers. In any case, one cannot idealize moral qualities these layers of townspeople, even in conditions of military danger, as many authors did, but take into account the factor that the risk of disturbances in the rear of the Russian army was too great not to establish a protective property barrier on the way of those wishing to arm themselves.

It is also impossible to perceive the armed Muscovites as a real existing military unit, fully combat-ready and well organized, as was done by Kutuzov, who proposed sending them to Zvenigorod, and many authors. It is in the method of organization and preparedness that they fundamentally differ from the previously formed Moscow militia, which, by the way, is also considered by many critics of Rostopchin as an inferior combat unit. However, the warriors underwent short-term training, were equally armed, equipped, and, most importantly, divided into units. Muscovites were considered by the Governor-General as an emergency aid to the army, an element capable of diverting several tens of thousands of enemy soldiers to themselves in a deadly battle that decides the fate of not only their hometown, but also Russia, albeit through their own death, which, undoubtedly, help Russian troops. The battle near Moscow was supposed to be precisely people's battle , a battle of unity between patriotic citizens and the army. Because of this, the convening of Muscovites should have taken place not in advance, but directly on the critical day, which was done by Rostopchin on August 30. The opinion that this poorly organized and armed, spontaneous mass of people could independently, without the help of regular troops, compete with the battle-hardened French army can be called amateurism.

One of the misconceptions that migrates from publication to publication is the conclusion that Rostopchin promised Kutuzov to provide eighty thousand new militias, residents of the city and province, near Moscow. In a letter to the Governor-General dated August 30, the field marshal calls them “the Moscow squad,” and even earlier, on August 17, he writes: “The call of eighty thousand over the militia of voluntarily armed sons of the fatherland is a feature that proves the spirit of the Russian and the trust of the residents of Moscow to their commander, who revives them.” . These letters gave the authors grounds to claim allegedly boastful behavior and even the deception of Rostopchin, on the basis of whose false statements Kutuzov incorrectly assessed the capabilities of the defense of Moscow, which gave the field marshal the moral right to subsequently ignore the governor-general when making the most important decisions. The first to mention the figure of eighty thousand in the document was Alexander I, who believed after a conversation with Rostopchin that Moscow and the province would field additional militia. Later, this figure was repeated several times, by authors, both positive and negative, relating to the Governor-General, and was never questioned. However, in this case there was a banal confusion of concepts. Rostopchin, the Tsar and Kutuzov, speaking about the “Moscow squad”, put completely into this term different meanings. For the head of the first district of the people's militia, which included, in addition to Moscow, a whole series of surrounding provinces, the Tver, Ryazan, and Vladimir militias were nothing more than Moscow military force , which, according to rough calculations, could number, with the exception of the Moscow zemstvo army itself, no less than eighty thousand warriors, which Rostopchin confidently reported to both the emperor and later Kutuzov. But for both Alexander I and the future field marshal, the term “Moscow » meant formed directly in Moscow and the capital province. Therefore, the promises of Rostopchin, who knew better than others the true capabilities of the province, and the bewilderment of Kutuzov, who believed that under the walls of the ancient capital he would find eighty thousand armed Muscovites, can be considered as completely true.

The second argument of Rostopchin’s critics was the thesis about the Moscow Governor General’s alleged failure to supply the army, despite numerous requests from Kutuzov. The approach of the Russian army to the ancient capital required particularly close cooperation between the Moscow administration and the military command. The primary task for the Governor-General was to provide the troops with everything they needed, especially since Kutuzov communicated with him personally on all issues. Requests were sent daily, and the Governor General fulfilled them to the best of his ability.

So on August 20, the field marshal asked to send extra stock crackers. On August 21, he demanded an entrenching tool. On August 26, at the height of the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov sent Rostopchin an order: “...immediately send from the arsenal for 500 guns complete charges, more than battery ones.” On the evening of the same day, the commander-in-chief sent a letter in which he announced his intention to continue the battle the next day and asked for reinforcements to be delivered. On August 27, he announced his intention to retreat to Moscow and asked: “...Everything that Moscow can give in terms of troops, an increase in artillery, shells and horses and other things that can be expected from the faithful sons of the fatherland, all this would be added to the army waiting to fight with the enemy." On the same day he demanded another 500 horses for artillery.

Rostopchin regularly supplied the army. On August 22, he wrote to Kutuzov: “At the notice of Your Lordship, I immediately began making crackers and can bake and produce for one month with delivery for 120 thousand, that is, 30 thousand quarters of flour.” The count later recalled that during the thirteen days of August, every morning 600 carts loaded with crackers, cereals and oats were sent to the army. On August 25, he reported that entrenching tools for workers had been purchased and shipped. On August 27, the count ordered artillery charges in boxes to be urgently sent to Mozhaisk. 3-4 horses were allocated for this, and the shipment was taken under the personal control of the count. On August 29, Rostopchin sent 26,000 shells for cannons to the army. On the same day, two regiments marched to Mozhaisk, and another one on the thirtieth. At the same time, 500 horses for artillery, four battery companies, shells, 4,600 people under the command of Major General Miller, 100 artillerymen from the militia and a supply of crackers for ten days were sent to the active army.

However, the army experienced a serious shortage of weapons and provisions, which gave reason to suspect the Moscow governor-general of deliberately disrupting supplies and delaying the execution of Kutuzov’s requests. Let's look at these charges. So on August 23, Kutuzov ordered 1000 carts to be placed at each postal station from Mozhaisk to Moscow. A total of 4,000 carts were required. [a] And although on August 25 Rostopchin reported on the execution, on August 27 Kutuzov wrote with dissatisfaction that he had not found a single cart in Mozhaisk. It should be noted that in this case the guilt of the Governor General is not obvious. On August 22, Ivashkin sent out a circular order to private bailiffs demanding that they show diligence in collecting carts. Hiring a large number of carts for the army, in a situation when spontaneous evacuation began from Moscow, was extremely difficult, since cab drivers preferred speculative prices offered by Muscovites to government tariffs However, this problem was solved, and the carts left the city on August 25. Considering the distance to Mozhaisk is 105 kilometers, the carts were supposed to arrive and arrived on the evening of August 27. Some of Kutuzov's requests should be called, at least, strange, taking up time and money. So the demand from August 27, that is, when the battle was already over, to send an entrenching tool is meaningless if the field marshal did not intend to give a new battle at the walls of Moscow and strange otherwise, because then it would be more reasonable to prepare the tool in the city and deliver it directly to the site of the future battle.

or Rastopchin(1763-1826) - famous Russian statesman. From the age of 10 he was enrolled in the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment; in 1792 he received the rank of chamber cadet, “with the rank of foreman.” In 1786-88. R. traveled abroad and attended lectures at the University of Leipzig; in 1788 he took part in the assault on Ochakov; in 1791 he traveled with A. A. Bezborodko to Turkey to negotiate peace. Under Catherine II, he did not occupy a high position, but he rose amazingly quickly under Paul I; within three years (1798-1800) he was made Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs, third present in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, Count of the Russian Empire, Grand Chancellor of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, director of the postal department, first member of the board of foreign affairs and, finally, a member of the emperor's council. At the same time, Paul I very often rewarded him with money and populated estates.

From 1801 to 1810 R. lived in Moscow in retirement; in 1810 he was appointed chief chamberlain, and two years later, renamed general of infantry, commander-in-chief in Moscow. He contributed greatly to the recruitment and equipment of 80,000 volunteers for the campaign; encouraged nobles and merchants to donate; He maintained cheerfulness and trust among the people, addressing them with his famous posters or announcements written in common language, very vividly and accurately. He tried to make the French look contemptuous, praised “simple Russian virtues,” exaggerating the news of the victories of our troops, and denied rumors about the successes of the enemy invasion. Partly with the intention of hiding the truth, partly due to ignorance of Kutuzov’s true plans, even on the eve of the Battle of Borodino he spoke in his posters about the impossibility of the French approaching Moscow and restrained those who wanted to leave it. When, after the Battle of Borodino and the council in Fili, it was necessary to cleanse Moscow, R. worked a lot in transporting government property and residents, but at the same time he contributed a lot to the destruction of Moscow by fire, not wanting it to go untouched to the French. Living, during Napoleon's stay in Moscow, either in Vladimir or in the village of Krasnaya Pakhra, R. with his messages raised the peasants against the French. After Napoleon left, he did a lot for the organization of the capital and its inhabitants. On August 30, 1814, he was dismissed from the rank of commander-in-chief and appointed a member of the State Council, but lived mostly in Paris and only in 1823 settled in Moscow. Embittered against R., Napoleon called him igniter And crazy; contemporaries said that “he has two minds, Russian and French, and one harms the other.” He wrote to himself: “straight in heart, stubborn in mind, well done in practice.”

Undoubtedly, R. was an intelligent person who was well aware of the weaknesses of the passion for everything French in the then Russian society and saw the shortcomings of the policies of Alexander I after 1815; but at the same time, he was an extreme conservative and a zealous defender of serfdom, often resorted to violent, hardly excusable measures, and was passionate and vindictive (for example, in relation to M. M. Speransky). In addition to the mentioned posters, of which more than 16 are known and which were published by A. S. Suvorin in 1889, R. owns a number of literary works; many of them were published by Smirdin in 1853; in 1868 M. Longinov compiled full list R.'s works, along with those not included in the Smirda edition. Major works R. "Matériaux en grande partie inédits, pour la biograpbie future du C-te Th. R." (Brussels, 1864; Russian translation in the second book of “The Nineteenth Century” by Bartenev. “Notes” were written long after the incidents described, as a result of which the view expressed in them often does not fit with reality), “The Truth about the Moscow Fires” (P., 1827), "The last days of the life of Empress Catherine II and the first day of the reign of Paul I" ("Readings of the Moscow General History and Antiquities", 1860, book III), "News or killed alive" (comedy), "Oh the French!" (story, in "Notes of the Fatherland", 1842, book 10; both the comedy and the story were written with the aim of arousing the national feeling of the Russians), "About Suvorov" ("Russian Bulletin", 1808, No. 3), "Travel to Prussia" ("Moscowite", 1849, book I), "Note on the Martinists", presented in 1811 to Grand Duchess Catherine Pavlovna" ("Russian Archive", 1875, No. 9), "Poetic autobiography" (ib., 1873, No. 5), etc. R.’s extensive correspondence with Emperor Alexander I, Bantysh-Kamensky, Vorontsov, Rumyantsov and many others was published in the “Russian Archive” (mostly for 1873 and 1875), “Archive of Prince Vorontsov”, “Archive historical and practical information about Russia" by Kalachov, "Russian Antiquity" (1893 - correspondence with Alexander I), etc. R. had an extensive library and archive, which he allowed many scientists to freely use.

About R., see the “Notes” of A. Broker, A. Bulgakov, F. F. Vigel, S. Glinka, M. A. Dmitriev, E. Komarovsky, O. Mertvoy, K. K. Pavlova and others; A. Broker, "F.V. Rostopchin. Biographical sketch" ("Russian Antiquity", 1893, I); Ségur, “Vie du comte Rostopchine, gouverneur de Moscou en 1812” (P., 1872); M. Longinov, “Materials for a biography and a list of works by Count Rostopchin” (Russian Archive, 1868, No. 4-5); Dubrovin, "Moscow and Count Rostopchin in 1812." (“Military Collection”, 1863, Nos. 7 and 8); Oreus, "1812 in the notes of R." ("Russian Antiquity", vol. LXIV); M. Bogdanovich, “History of the reign of Emperor Alexander I” (vol. III, 1869); Schilder, "Alexander I".

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General of Infantry Rostopchin Fedor Vasilievich (1763 or 1765–1826)

From the book 100 Great Heroes of 1812 [with illustrations] author Shishov Alexey Vasilievich

General of the Infantry Rostopchin Fedor Vasilyevich (1763 or 1765–1826) Came from an old, wealthy noble family. Received a good home education. In 1775, Fyodor Rostopchin (Rastopchin) was enlisted as a sergeant in the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment. And at the same time

Field Marshal Count Ivan Vasilyevich Gudovich

From the book Commanders of Ukraine: battles and destinies author Tabachnik Dmitry Vladimirovich

Field Marshal Count Ivan Vasilyevich Gudovich In 1797, Emperor Paul I granted the then General Chief Gudovich and all his descendants the dignity of count. The imperial decree also contained a detailed description of the assigned family coat of arms: “In the first and fourth

Chapter Ten COUNT ROSTOPCHIN - TWO OPPOSITE POINTS OF VIEW

From the book Pack Theory [Psychoanalysis Great Controversy] author Menyailov Alexey Alexandrovich

Chapter Ten COUNT ROSTOPCHIN - TWO OPPOSITE POINTS OF VIEW In the time of Fabius, the crowd adored people like Varro. Superleader Hannibal also rejoiced at the arrival of this sub-leader into the army. Has anything changed by the time of the Patriotic War of 1812?