The Moscow District Military Court (MoVS) continues the trial of treason and desertion against former deputy Head of the Department of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) of Russia Colonel Alexander Poteev, who handed over the Russian intelligence network to the US intelligence services (as a result of this betrayal, ten Russian illegals were discovered and expelled from the States last summer, including the “sexy spy” Anna Chapman). The process takes place behind closed doors. Not only are journalists not allowed to attend, but even the judges, prosecutors and lawyers taking part in the hearings are classified. But this case has other equally interesting intrigues.
Whose scout?
The information that appeared in the media in connection with the trial makes us ask a “paradoxical” question: whose intelligence officer was Colonel Poteev - Russian or American? According to some reports, he is now under 60 years old, of which three dozen were given to the special service. The first voyage abroad took place in the late 70s of the last century - as part of the special group of the KGB of the USSR "Zenith" to Afghan territory. Subsequently, as an employee of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, Poteev acted in different countries of the world under the guise of a diplomatic worker. In 2000, he returned to Moscow and after some time rose to the rank of deputy head of the so-called “American” department of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which oversees the work of illegal intelligence officers abroad.
Apparently, already at that time Colonel Poteev, his wife and children decided to move to the United States, and in order to implement this plan, the head of the family had to cooperate with the American intelligence services. By turning over the illegal intelligence officers under his control, as some experts believe, the officer earned himself the status of a political emigrant, and, of course, money for a future comfortable life.
The implementation of the “Escape” plan began back in 2002. First of all, it was necessary to send the family abroad. And in 2002, almost immediately after graduating from university, his daughter left for the United States, concluding a contract with one of the consulting firms. Two years later, the intelligence officer’s wife, a housewife, also settled in America, and at the beginning of 2010, his adult son, an employee of Rosoboronexport, fled there. All this time, the leadership of the SVR showed a strange complacency: the colonel’s family “flowed” to the United States, and he was encouraged and trusted with the most important state secrets. Poteev was even given full-favoured treatment for his own escape to the United States in June last year - he went on official leave to “visit his relatives”, from which he did not return.
As soon as the “valuable personnel” arrived in the States, US President Barack Obama publicly announced the arrest of ten Russian illegal immigrants, who different years Poteev passed. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who worked for a long time in the KGB and FSB, immediately competently declared that “retribution awaits the traitor.” And here the main intrigue of the ongoing trial is revealed.
Possible options
What kind of retribution awaits Poteyev if the trial of the former intelligence officer is taking place in absentia: he now lives in the USA under someone else’s name and clearly has no intention of returning to his homeland under any circumstances? Theoretically, of course, this circumstance cannot be an obstacle for the intelligence services. History knows many examples when sentences in absentia were carried out strictly.
The first such case in Soviet times occurred in 1925. Soviet resident in Austria Vladimir Nesterovich(Yaroslavsky) decided to break with the GRU and left for Germany. There he contacted representatives of British intelligence, for which he was sentenced to capital punishment in the USSR. In August 1925, Nesterovich (Yaroslavsky) was poisoned in one of the cafes in Mainz.
Large Soviet intelligence officer Ignatius Stanislavovich Poretsky(Nathan Markovich Reiss, "Ludwig") in 1937 decided to break with the Soviet Union. This became known in Moscow. It is not clear whether the intelligence officer was tried in absentia, but a liquidation group arrived in Paris, where Poretsky was then located. At first, his wife's friend Gertrude Schildbach tried to poison him, but she could not overcome friendly feelings. The Poretsky couple was shot at point-blank range in Switzerland by members of the liquidation group.
An employee of the illegal station of Soviet foreign intelligence, lieutenant colonel Reino Heihanen(“Vic”) worked in Finland from 1951, then in the USA. He spent 5 thousand dollars and during his next trip to France he turned himself in to the local American embassy. There he spoke about one of the most famous Soviet agents, Abel (Fischer). In 1964, he died under strange circumstances: apparently, a group of liquidators caused him a car accident.
There are more recent examples. In January 2001, it became known that our intelligence officer had surrendered to American intelligence services. Sergey Tretyakov, worked under diplomatic cover. He revealed the secrets of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear field, to which he had wide access. Together with Tretyakov, his wife and children remained in the United States.
In 2003, the 53-year-old double agent died suddenly of an alleged heart attack. Some experts believe that he was “helped” to pass away.
True, in the history of intelligence there are many cases of another kind when traitors were sentenced to death in absentia, but the sentence could not be carried out. For example, foreign intelligence captain Oleg Lyalin in 1971 he began working for British intelligence MI5. He handed over to the British the plans for the Soviet station in London and completely revealed the intelligence network in England. In the USSR he was sentenced to death. However, he lived quietly with his wife in England for 23 years and died in 1995 by his own death.
In modern Russia, it happens that traitors sentenced in absentia even laugh at their sentences. For example, June 26, 2002 former KGB general Oleg Kalugin was sentenced to 15 years in a maximum security colony. This sentence was pronounced by the Moscow City Court in the absence of the accused, who was abroad. The FSB sent him a subpoena demanding him to appear to testify; Kalugin mockingly promised to hand it over to the espionage museum. There are probably explanations for Kalugin’s frivolous attitude towards the trial and the verdict, since he has already undergone a similar procedure twice. In 1990, the prosecutor's office accused him of disclosing state secrets, and USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov were stripped of both his title and awards. After August 1991, the title and awards were returned to Kalugin, and the criminal case was dropped. The Main Military Prosecutor's Office opened a second criminal case in March 2001. But the verdict again hung in the air.
What awaits Poteev
In modern Russia, betrayal is becoming less and less punishable. If 15 years ago you were threatened with punishment for this, now you face sentences, often comparable to the punishment for stealing, say, a bag of flour.
On April 20, 1998, the court of the Moscow Military District sentenced a GRU officer Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Tkachenko to three years in prison. He was part of a group of GRU officers that sold about 200 secret documents to the Israeli intelligence service Mossad. Previously, another member of the group, Lieutenant Colonel, received two years of probation. Gennady Sporyshev. And the organizer of the trade in secrets is a retired GRU colonel Alexander Volkov, from whose home detectives seized $345 thousand, generally appeared in court only as a witness.
In 2002, the Moscow District Military Court sentenced a career Russian intelligence officer to eight years in prison for espionage. Colonel Alexander Sypachev. He was accused of giving the CIA information constituting state secrets. During the investigation, it was established that in February Sypachev, on his own initiative, contacted the US Embassy and offered to transfer secret information known to him. The motives are purely material.
Judging by modern judicial practice, despite the difficult Russian intelligence the consequences of the crime committed by Poteev, the maximum that he faces is a certain prison term, and even then purely formally. After all, no matter what sentence the judges pass in absentia, it will still not be possible to carry it out, since the ex-intelligence officer and all members of his family live in the United States under false names, having received housing, financial assistance and new documents under the witness protection program. Russia, apparently, will not even try to demand the extradition of the traitor, much less carry out any special operations against him.
In any case, during the TV show “Conversation with Vladimir Putin,” the Russian Prime Minister assured Russians that Russian intelligence services abandoned the practice of physically eliminating traitors: “In Soviet times there were special units. These were combat units, but they were also involved in eliminating traitors. But these units themselves were liquidated long ago.”
So, it seems that Poteev can sleep peacefully, unless, of course, he carries out self-punishment, which is what he wishes for him Russian authorities represented by the Prime Minister.
From the "SP" dossier
Crimes of “werewolves in intelligence” that have received publicity in the press
1922
An employee of the Intelligence Directorate in Finland, Andrei Pavlovich Smirnov, is one of the first Soviet illegal immigrants abroad. At the beginning of 1922, he learned that his younger brother had been shot for belonging to an organization of “economic saboteurs,” and his mother and second brother fled to Brazil. After which he went to the Finnish authorities and handed over all the agents known to him in Finland. A Soviet court sentenced Smirnov to death. Finnish authorities gave him two years in prison. Collaborated with Finnish counterintelligence. After his imprisonment, in 1924 Smirnov went to Brazil to visit his relatives. Died under unclear circumstances. Possibly eliminated by Soviet intelligence services.
1930
The Soviet resident in the Middle East, Georgiy Sergeevich Agabekov, fell in love with a 20-year-old Englishwoman, Isabel Streeter, from whom he took English lessons. In January 1930, Agabekov came to the military attache of the British embassy and asked him for political asylum. At the same time, he gives his real name and position, and also offers the British secret information about Soviet intelligence. Having not received a definite answer, a few weeks later he resumed contacts with the British intelligence services, but again without success. Only in May 1930 did the British ask Agabekov to give them his autobiography and service record. But by this time his “beloved” was forced to leave for France, from where she corresponded with him. In June 1930, Agabekov himself went there on the same ship. In Paris, he openly declared his break with the Soviet regime and the OGPU in the émigré and French press.
In 1931, his book “OGPU: Russian Secret Terror” was published in New York. After some time, the Russian version of the book was published in Berlin. As a result of these publications, more than 400 people were arrested in Iran in 1932, four of them were shot, and 27 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.
In Moscow, a decision was made to physically eliminate him. The first Soviet intelligence operation to eliminate the traitor failed. The repeated attempt to kidnap him in 1934 also failed. During this time, Agabekov managed to break up with I. Streeter, his financial situation deteriorated sharply. In September 1936, Agabekov sent a letter to the Soviet authorities repenting of treason and offering services in order to make amends to the Motherland.
In Moscow, apparently, there were reasons not to trust his repentance. The operation to eliminate him has resumed. In 1938, using his adventurous inclinations and his constant need for money, NKVD agents brought Agabekov to Paris to a safe house, where he was liquidated. According to the version spread in the West, he was thrown into the abyss on the Franco-Spanish border.
1937
The illegal resident of the INO in Holland, Walter Germanovich Krivitsky (Samuel Gershevich Ginzberg, “Walter”) declared himself a defector in 1937. A special group was sent from Moscow to eliminate him. But the French authorities, where Krivitsky fled, assigned guards to him. In 1938 he left for the USA. In 1941, Krivitsky's body was found in a hotel room with a bullet through the head.
1945
An agent of the Red Chapel group, R. Bart (“Beck”), was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942 and converted. He worked for the Germans in the occupied territory of Western Europe. Sentenced in absentia to death. In the spring of 1945, he came to the Americans, and they handed him over to the NKVD. In 1945, "Beck" was shot.
1949
Employee military intelligence translator of the intelligence department of the Central Group of Forces, senior lieutenant Vadim Ivanovich Shelaputin, in 1949 in Austria, contacted American intelligence, to which he handed over agents known to him. In the Union he was sentenced to death in absentia. At the end of the 50th year he began working for the British intelligence service SIS. In December 1952, he received English citizenship, documents in the name of Victor Gregory, moved to London and got a job at the Russian service of BBC Radio, and then at Radio Liberty. He retired in the early 90s.
1953
Military intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Semenovich Popov began collaborating with the CIA in 1953 and was the first CIA agent in the USSR intelligence services - a “mole.” In 1951, Popov worked in Vienna and fell in love with an Austrian woman. This love was too costly for Popov, and he decided to surrender to the CIA. Popov worked for the CIA until 1958. During this time, he conveyed information to the Americans about the Austrian GRU agents, about Soviet policy in Austria and East Germany. In December 1958, Popov was arrested by Soviet intelligence services. They tried to force him to continue contacts with the CIA, but he managed to warn the Americans about his arrest. In January 1960 he was tried and sentenced to death penalty.
1962
An employee of the 7th Department of the 2nd Main Directorate of the KGB, Captain Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, remained in Switzerland in 1962, and since 1964 he has worked for the United States. He turned over several major double agents, and also confirmed information about listening devices at the US Embassy. In 1963, CIA officers took Nosenko to Germany, and in the USSR he was sentenced to death in absentia. He worked as a consultant for the CIA until the late 1980s and then retired.
1965
Military intelligence officer, Major General Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov, in 20 years he passed 19 Soviet intelligence officers-illegal immigrants, 150 foreign agents and approximately 1,500 GRU and KGB officers in the USSR. He spoke about the Sino-Soviet differences, allowing the Americans to improve relations with China. He provided the Americans with data on the Soviet Army's new weapons, which helped the Americans destroy the weapons when they were used by Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. He was surrendered by the most famous American defector, Aldridge Ames, in 1985. Polyakov was arrested at the end of 1986 and sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out in 1988. US President Ronald Reagan asked for Polyakov at a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. But Gorbachev replied that the person for whom the American president was asking for was already dead. It is Polyakov, and not Penkovsky, that the Americans consider their most successful spy.
1974
Foreign intelligence colonel Oleg Antonovich Gordievsky began working against Soviet intelligence in 1974, being an employee of the USSR foreign intelligence station in Denmark. He conveyed information to SIS about plans for terrorist attacks and the upcoming political campaign accusing the United States of violating human rights. In 1980 he was recalled to Moscow. He was tasked with preparing documents on the history of PSU operations in England, Scandinavian countries and the Australian-Asian region, which gave him the opportunity to work with the secret archives of PSU. During Gorbachev's visit to Great Britain in 1984, he personally supplied him with intelligence information. True, Margaret Thatcher received them even earlier. Ames gave him away in 1985. While in Moscow, under the strictest surveillance of the authorities checking him, Gordievsky managed to escape during his morning jog - in shorts and with a plastic bag in his hands. Lives in London.
1978
An employee of the legal military intelligence station, Captain Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun (Suvorov), has worked in the station in Geneva since 1974. In 1978, he disappeared from home with his wife and little son. It soon became known that all this time Rezun had been working for SIS. Never hid behind ideological motives. Today, Viktor Suvorov is known as a “historian writer”, the author of the acclaimed books “Icebreaker”, “Aquarium”, etc.
1979
Foreign intelligence officer Major Stanislav Aleksandrovich Levchenko worked in the GRU station in Tokyo since 1975. In 1979 he was recalled to Moscow. But he stayed in Japan and then moved to the USA. Turned himself in to KGB agents in Japan. In 1981, he was sentenced to death in the USSR. Levchenko has published several books in the USA and today works for the American newspaper “New Russian Word”.
1982
Foreign intelligence officer Major Vladimir Andreevich Kuzichkin began working as an illegal immigrant in Tehran in 1977. In 1982, on the eve of the arrival of the commission from PSU, he suddenly did not find secret documents in his safe, got scared and decided to flee to the West. The British granted him political asylum. On a tip from Kuzichkin, the Tudeh party, which collaborated with the KGB, was defeated in Iran. Kuzichkin was sentenced to death in the USSR. In 1986, they tried to kill him. At the same time, Kuzichkin’s wife, who remained in the USSR, received a death certificate from the KGB about her husband’s death. But in 1988, Kuzichkin “resurrected”. He wrote petitions for pardon to Gorbachev, people's deputies, and in 1991 to Yeltsin. His requests remained unanswered. At the end of 1990, Kuzichkin wrote a book that did not become popular in the West.
1985
Foreign counterintelligence officer Vitaly Sergeevich Yurchenko, while in Italy, in 1985 made contact with CIA officers in Rome. Was transported to the USA. Provided information about new technical means of Soviet intelligence, and extradited 12 KGB agents in Europe. Unexpectedly, that same year he escaped from the Americans and showed up at the USSR Embassy in Washington. He said that he was kidnapped in Rome, and in the USA under the influence psychotropic drugs pumped out information. Moscow was very surprised and took Yurchenko to the Union. At home he was awarded the “Honorary Security Officer” badge and in 1991 he was solemnly sent into retirement. This story is still not completely clear. It is possible that Yurchenko was a double agent and played a major role in covering up the KGB's most valuable source in the CIA, Ames. And perhaps for the sake of Ames, the KGB sacrificed a dozen of its agents in Europe.
1987
Foreign intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Gennady Varenik began working in Bonn in 1982 under the guise of a TASS correspondent. In 1987, he spent 7 thousand dollars and turned to the CIA with a proposal for cooperation. Gave the CIA information about three Soviet agents in the German government. In 1985 he was recalled to East Berlin and was arrested. In 1987, Varennik was shot.
1992
In 1992, GRU lieutenant colonel Vyacheslav Maksimovich Baranov was arrested. In 1985, he was sent to work in Bangladesh. In 1989, he was recruited by the CIA and accepted a recruitment offer from the Americans on the terms of paying him a one-time remuneration of $25,000, as well as $2,000 monthly. Received the pseudonym "Tony". Told the CIA about the composition and structure of the GRU and about the residents of the GRU and PGU in Bangladesh. Then he returned to Moscow and since 1990 has been looking for information for the Americans about bacteriological preparations at the disposal of the GRU. Tried to leave the country using a false passport to Vienna. In August 1992, during the passage border control was arrested. During interrogations he confessed. During the investigation he said that all the secrets he gave out were long outdated. In 1993, he was sentenced to 6 years in prison. Released early in 1999.
1998
On July 4, 1998, Foreign Ministry employee Valentin Moiseev was detained on suspicion of treason. The detention occurred during an undercover meeting with Cho Seong Woo, Counselor of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Moscow, who was the official representative of the South Korean intelligence services in the Russian Federation.
On August 14, 2001, the Moscow City Court rendered a verdict in the case of Moiseev, who was found guilty of high treason in the form of espionage for South Korea and sentenced to 4.5 years in prison to serve the sentence in a maximum security colony and confiscation of property.
2006
On August 9, 2006, the Moscow District Military Court sentenced Russian special services colonel Sergei Skripal to 13 years in prison.
According to the investigation, in the second half of the 90s, while on a long-term business trip abroad, he began collaborating with the British intelligence service MI6. These contacts did not stop even when Skripal returned to his homeland and left the service. He met regularly with his handler from MI6 and received cash fees for his reports.
(According to the Interregional Public Fund for the Promotion of Strategic Security, FSSB.SU)
Starting the story about traitors in the ranks of Soviet military intelligence, it is necessary to make several preliminary remarks.
Firstly, it should be noted that betrayal and espionage always went hand in hand, and therefore it should not be surprising that there were traitors among the employees of Soviet military intelligence.
Secondly, betrayal, no matter what clothes it is dressed in, always remains betrayal, that is, the most disgusting thing that exists in the world. Therefore, those traitors who are trying to present themselves as fighters against the “totalitarian communist regime” are simply wishful thinking.
Thirdly, in order to make the reasons that pushed some military intelligence officers to betrayal more clear, I would like to quote an excerpt from a CIA document dating back to the late 1960s - early 1970s:
“Soviet citizens are a highly disciplined group of people, intensely indoctrinated, vigilant and extremely suspicious. Russians are very proud by nature and extremely sensitive to any manifestations of disrespect. At the same time, many of them are prone to a variety of adventures, strive to break out of existing restrictions, and crave understanding and justification on our part. The act of betrayal, be it espionage or escape to the West, is in almost all cases explained by the fact that it is committed by those who are unstable in moral and psychologically People. Betrayal by its very nature is atypical for Soviet citizens. This can be seen at least from the hundreds of thousands of people who have visited abroad. Only a few dozen of them turned out to be traitors, and of this number, only a few worked for us as agents. Such actions in peacetime undoubtedly indicate abnormalities in the mental state of certain individuals. Normal, mentally stable persons connected with their country by deep ethnic, national, cultural, social and family ties cannot take such a step. This simple principle is well confirmed by our experience with Soviet defectors. They were all alone. In all the cases that we encountered, they had one or another serious behavioral deficiency: alcoholism, deep depression, psychopathy of one kind or another. Such manifestations in most cases were the decisive factor that led them to betrayal. It may be only a slight exaggeration to say that no one can consider himself a real operative, an expert on Soviet affairs, unless he has had the terrible experience of holding the heads of his Soviet friends over the sink, into which the contents of their stomachs are poured out after five days of continuous drinking.
The following conclusion follows from this: our operational efforts must be directed mainly against weak, unstable objects from among the members of the Soviet colony.
Regarding normal people, we should pay special attention to middle-aged people. The appearance of various emotional and mental disorders occurs most often in people of middle age. The period of life from thirty-seven years of age onwards includes greatest number divorce, alcoholism, adultery, suicide, embezzlement and possibly infidelity. The reason for this phenomenon is quite clear. At this time, the descent from the physiological peak begins. Once children, now grown up and suddenly faced with the acute awareness that their lives are passing, the ambitions and dreams of youth have not come true, and sometimes their complete collapse. At this time, there comes a moment of turning point in one’s career; every person faces the gloomy and imminent prospect of retirement and old age. Many men at this time often completely reconsider their views on life, religion and moral ideas. This is the time when a person seems to take a closer look at himself and, as a result, often rushes to extremes.
From an operational point of view, the forties storm period is of extreme interest.”
And fourthly. There were quite a lot of traitors in the ranks of the GRU. So it is not possible to talk about everyone, and there is no need for this. Therefore, in this essay we will talk about P. Popov, D. Polyakov, N. Chernov, A. Filatov, V. Rezun, G. Smetanin, V. Baranov, A. Volkov, G. Sporyshev and V. Tkachenko. As for the “traitor of the century” O. Penkovsky, so many books and articles have been written about him that talking about him again would be a waste of time.
Petr Popov
Pyotr Semenovich Popov was born in Kalinin, into a peasant family, and fought in the Great Patriotic War, during which he became an officer. At the end of the war, he held the position of entruster under Colonel General I. Serov and, under his patronage, was sent to the GRU. Short, nervous, thin, without any imagination, he kept himself to himself, was very secretive and did not get along well with other officers. However, as his colleagues and superiors later said, there were no complaints about Popov’s service. He was efficient, disciplined, had good characteristics and actively participated in all social events.
In 1951, Popov was sent to Austria as a trainee at the legal Viennese residency of the GRU. His task included recruiting agents and working against Yugoslavia. Here, in Vienna in 1952, Popov began an affair with a young Austrian woman, Emilia Kohanek. They met in restaurants, rented hotel rooms for several hours, trying to keep their relationship secret from Popov's colleagues. Of course, such a lifestyle required significant expenses from Popov. And if we take into account the fact that he had a wife and two children in Kalinin, then financial problems soon became the main ones for him.
On January 1, 1953, Popov approached the US Vice-Consul in Vienna and asked to arrange access for him to the American CIA office in Austria. At the same time, Popov handed him a note in which he offered his services and indicated the meeting place.
Acquiring an agent locally, within the walls of the GRU, was a big event in the CIA. To provide support for operations with Popov, a special unit was created within the Soviet department, called SR-9. Popov's on-site manager was George Keiswalter, who was assisted (with a break from late 1953 to 1955) by Richard Kovacs. Popov’s operational pseudonym became “Gralspice,” and Kaiswalter acted under the surname Grossman.
At the first meeting with CIA employees, Popov said that he needed money to settle things with one woman, which was met with understanding. Kaiswalter and Popov established a rather relaxed relationship. Kaiswalter's strength with the new agent was his ability to gain Popov's trust through long hours of drinking and talking together. He was not at all disgusted by Popov’s peasant simplicity, and their drinking after successful operations was well known to CIA officers who knew about Popov. Many of them had the impression that Popov considered Kaiswalter his friend. At that time, there was a joke going around the CIA that in one Soviet collective farm the department had its own cow, since with the money given by Kaiswalter, Popov bought a heifer for his brother, a collective farmer.
Having begun to cooperate with the CIA, Popov passed on information to the Americans about the personnel of the GRU in Austria and its methods of work. He provided the CIA with important details about Soviet policy in Austria and later about policy in East Germany. According to some, most likely very exaggerated, data, Popov, in the first two years of cooperation with the CIA, gave Kaiswalter the names and codes of about 400 Soviet agents in the West. Anticipating the possibility of recalling Popov to GRU headquarters, the CIA launched an operation to select hiding places in Moscow. This task was assigned to Edward Smith, the first CIA man in Moscow, sent there in 1953. However, Popov, having visited Moscow on vacation and checked the hiding places chosen by Smith, found them worthless. According to Kyswalter, he said, “They suck. Are you trying to destroy me? Popov complained that the hiding places were inaccessible and using them would be tantamount to suicide.
In 1954, Popov was recalled to Moscow. Perhaps this was caused by his acquaintance with P. S. Deryabin, a KGB officer in Vienna, who fled to the United States in February 1954. But neither the GRU nor the KGB had any suspicions about Popov’s loyalty, and in the summer of 1955 he was sent to Schwerin in the north of the GDR. The transfer to Schwerin cut off Popov’s connection with his operator Kaiswalter, and he sent a letter through a pre-agreed channel.
In response, Popov soon received a letter placed under the door of his apartment, which said:
“Hello, dear Max!
Greetings from Grossman. I'm waiting for you in Berlin. There are all the opportunities to have as good a time here as in Vienna. I am sending a letter with my person, with whom you should meet tomorrow at 8 o’clock in the evening near the photo showcase, near the House of Culture. Gorky in Schwerin, and give him a letter.”
Contact with Popov in Schwerin was established with the help of a German woman named Inga, and was subsequently maintained by CIA agent Radtke. During the investigation, 75-year-old Radtke said that their meetings always took place four weeks later. At each of them, Radtke received a package from Popov for Kaiswalter and gave Popov a letter and an envelope with money.
While Popov was in Schwerin, despite all his efforts, he could not personally meet with Kaiswalter. This opportunity came to him in 1957, when he was transferred to work in East Berlin. Their meetings took place in West Berlin at a safe house, and Kaiswalter changed the name under which he worked from Grossman to Scharnhorst.
In Berlin,” Popov said during the investigation, “Grossman took on me more thoroughly. He was interested in literally every step I took. For example, after returning from a vacation that I spent in the Soviet Union, Grossman demanded the most detailed report on how I spent my vacation, where I was, who I met, and demanded that I talk about the smallest details. He came to each meeting with a questionnaire prepared in advance and during the conversation he assigned me specific tasks for collecting information.
The temporary cessation of communication with Popov after his recall from Vienna alarmed the CIA. To protect against such surprises, the conditions for contacts with Popov were worked out in case he was recalled from Berlin. He was equipped with secret writing tools, encryption and decryption notebooks, a radio plan, detailed instructions for using codes and addresses by which he could notify the CIA from the USSR about his position. To receive radio signals, Popov was given a receiver, and at one of the meetings with Kaiswalter, he listened to a tape recording of the signals that he was supposed to receive while in the USSR. The instructions given to Popov stated:
“A plan in case you stay in Moscow. Write in secret writing to the address: Family of V. Krabbe, Schildov, st. Franz Schmidt, 28. Sender Gerhard Schmidt. In this letter, provide all the information about your situation and future plans, as well as when you will be ready to receive our radio broadcasts. The radio plan is next. The broadcasts will be on the first and third Saturdays of each month. The transmission time and wave are indicated in the table...”
In addition, in the spring of 1958, Keiswalter introduced Popov to his possible contact in Moscow - the attaché of the US Embassy in the USSR and CIA officer Russell Augustus Langelli, who was specially summoned to Berlin for this occasion and received the pseudonym “Daniil”. At the same time, Keiswalter assured Popov that he could always go to the USA, where he would be provided with everything he needed.
In mid-1958, Popov was tasked with bringing an illegal immigrant to New York - a young woman named Tairova. Tairova traveled to the United States using an American passport that belonged to a hairdresser from Chicago, which she “lost” during a trip to her homeland in Poland. Popov warned the CIA about Tyrova, and the Agency, in turn, informed the FBI. But the FBI made a mistake by surrounding Tairova with too much surveillance. She, having discovered the surveillance, independently decided to return to Moscow. During the analysis of the reasons for the failure, Popov blamed Tairova for everything, his explanations were accepted and he continued to work in the central apparatus of the GRU.
On the evening of December 23, 1958, Popov called the apartment of the US Embassy Attaché R. Langelli and with a prearranged signal invited him to a personal meeting, which was to take place on Sunday, December 27, in the men's restroom of the Central Children's Theater at the end of the first intermission of the morning performance. But Langelli, who came to the theater with his wife and children, waited in vain for Popov at the appointed place - he did not come. The CIA was concerned about Popov's failure to communicate and made a mistake that cost him his life. According to Kaiswalter, CIA recruit George Payne Winters Jr., who was working as a State Department representative in Moscow, misunderstood instructions to send a letter to Popov and mailed it to his home address in Kalinin. But, as defectors Nosenko and Cherepanov later showed, KGB officers regularly sprayed a special chemical on the shoes of Western diplomats, which helped trace Winters’ path to the mailbox and seize the letter addressed to Popov.
In light of the above, we can confidently say that M. Hyde in his book “George Blake the Super Spy,” and after him K. Andrew, are mistaken when they attribute the exposure of Popov to J. Blake, an SIS officer recruited by the KGB in Korea in the fall of 1951. M. Hyde writes that after his transfer from Vienna, Popov wrote a letter to Kaiswalter, explaining his difficulties, and handed it to one of the members of the British military mission in East Germany. He passed the message to the SIS (Olympic Stadium, West Berlin), where it was placed on Blake's desk along with instructions to forward it to Vienna for the CIA. Blake did so, but only after he read the letter and transmitted its contents to Moscow. Upon receiving the message, the KGB placed Popov under surveillance, and when he arrived in Moscow, he was arrested. Blake, in his book “No Other Choice,” rightly refutes this assertion, saying that the letter handed by Popov to an employee of the British military mission could not have reached him, since he was not responsible for relations with this mission and the CIA. And then, if the KGB knew back in 1955 that Popov was an American agent (this would have happened if Blake had reported the letter), then he would not have been kept in the GRU, and even more so, they would not have believed his explanations about Tairova’s failure.
Having followed Winters’ path and learned that he had sent a letter to a GRU officer, KGB counterintelligence took Popov under surveillance. During the observation, it was established that Popov met twice - on January 4 and 21, 1959 - with the attache of the US Embassy in Moscow Langelli, and, as it turned out later, during the second meeting he received 15,000 rubles. It was decided to arrest Popov, and on February 18, 1959 he was detained at suburban ticket offices Leningradsky station, as he prepared for another meeting with Langelli.
During the search at Popov's apartment, secret writing tools, a code, and instructions were seized, which were stored in caches equipped in a hunting knife, a spinning reel, and a shaving brush. In addition, a secret written report prepared for transmission to Langelli was discovered:
“I’m answering your number one. I accept your instructions to guide my work. I’ll call you by phone for the next meeting before leaving Moscow. If it is impossible to meet before leaving, I will write to Crabbe. I have a carbon copy and tablets, I need instructions on the radio. It is advisable to have an address in Moscow, but a very reliable one. After I leave, I will try to go to meetings in Moscow two or three times a year.
... I am sincerely grateful to you for caring about my safety, this is vitally important to me. Thank you very much for the money too. Now I have the opportunity to meet with numerous acquaintances in order to obtain the necessary information. Thank you very much again."
After interrogating Popov, it was decided to continue his contacts with Langelli under the control of the KGB. According to Kaiswalter, Popov managed to warn Langelli that he was under KGB surveillance. He deliberately cut himself and put a note in the form of a strip of paper under the bandage. In the toilet of the Agavi restaurant, he took off his bandage and handed over a note in which he reported that he was being tortured and that he was under surveillance, as well as how he was captured. But this seems unlikely. If Langelli had been warned about Popov's failure, he would not have met with him again. However, on September 16, 1959, he made contact with Popov, which occurred on the bus. Popov discreetly pointed to the tape recorder to let Langelli know about the observation, but it was too late. Langelli was detained, but thanks to diplomatic immunity he was released, declared persona non grata and expelled from Moscow.
In January 1960, Popov appeared before the Military Collegium Supreme Court THE USSR. The verdict of January 7, 1960 read:
“Popov Pyotr Semenovich was found guilty of treason and on the basis of Art. 1 of the Law on Criminal Liability to be shot, with confiscation of property.”
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that Popov was the first traitor from the GRU, about whom the West wrote that, as a warning to other employees, he was burned alive in the furnace of the crematorium.
Dmitry Polyakov
Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov was born in 1921 into the family of an accountant in Ukraine. In September 1939, after graduating from school, he entered the Kiev Artillery School, and entered the Great Patriotic War as a platoon commander. He fought in the Western and Karelian fronts, was a battery commander, and in 1943 was appointed artillery reconnaissance officer. During the war years he was awarded with orders Patriotic War and the Red Star, as well as many medals. After the end of the war, Polyakov graduated from the intelligence department of the Academy. Frunze, General Staff courses and was sent to work in the GRU.
In the early 1950s, Polyakov was sent to New York under the guise of being an employee Soviet mission UN. His task was to provide intelligence services to illegal immigrants from the GRU. Polyakov’s work on his first mission was considered successful, and in the late 50s he was again sent to the United States to serve as deputy resident under the cover of a Soviet employee of the UN Military Staff Committee.
In November 1961, Polyakov, on his own initiative, came into contact with FBI counterintelligence agents, who gave him the pseudonym "Tophat." The Americans believed that the reason for his betrayal was disappointment in the Soviet regime. CIA officer Paul Dillon, who was Polyakov's operator in Delhi, says the following about this:
“I think his motivation goes back to World War II. He compared the horrors, the bloody carnage, the cause for which he fought, with the duplicity and corruption that, in his opinion, were growing in Moscow.”
Polyakov’s former colleagues do not completely deny this version, although they insist that his “ideological and political degeneration” took place “against the backdrop of painful pride.” For example, former first deputy chief of the GRU, Colonel General A. G. Pavlov says:
“At the trial, Polyakov declared his political degeneration, his hostile attitude towards our country, and he did not hide his personal self-interest.”
Polyakov said the following about himself during the investigation:
“The basis of my betrayal lay both in my desire to openly express my views and doubts somewhere, and in the qualities of my character - a constant desire to work beyond the limits of risk. And the greater the danger became, the more interesting my life became... I got used to walking on the edge of a knife and couldn’t imagine any other life.”
However, to say that this decision was easy for him would be wrong. After his arrest, he said the following words:
“Almost from the very beginning of my cooperation with the CIA, I understood that I had made a fatal mistake, a grave crime. The endless torment of my soul that continued throughout this period exhausted me so much that I was more than once ready to confess myself. And only the thought of what would happen to my wife, children, grandchildren, and the fear of shame, stopped me, and I continued the criminal relationship, or silence, in order to somehow delay the hour of reckoning.”
All of his operators noted that he received little money, no more than $3,000 a year, which was given to him mainly in the form of Black and Decker electromechanical tools, a couple of overalls, fishing gear and guns. (The fact is that in his free time Polyakov loved to do carpentry and also collected expensive guns.) Moreover, unlike most others Soviet officers, recruited by the FBI and CIA, Polyakov did not smoke, hardly drank and did not cheat on his wife. So the amount he received from the Americans over 24 years of work can be called small: according to a rough estimate by the investigation, it amounted to about 94 thousand rubles at the 1985 exchange rate.
One way or another, but from November 1961, Polyakov began to transmit information to the Americans about the activities and agents of the GRU in the USA and other Western countries. And he began to do this from the second meeting with FBI agents. Here it is worth quoting again the protocol of his interrogation:
“This meeting again was mainly devoted to the question of why I decided to cooperate with them, and also whether I was a setup. In order to cross-check me, and at the same time strengthen my relationship with them, Michael in conclusion invited me to name the employees of Soviet military intelligence in New York. Without hesitation, I listed all the persons known to me who worked under the cover of the USSR Representation.”
It is believed that at the very beginning of his work for the FBI, Polyakov betrayed D. Dunlap, a staff sergeant at the NSA, and F. Bossard, an employee of the British Air Ministry. However, this is unlikely. Dunlap, recruited in 1960, was led by an operator from the GRU's Washington station and his connection to Soviet intelligence was discovered accidentally when his garage was searched after he committed suicide in July 1963. As for Bossard, in reality the FBI intelligence department misled MI5 by attributing the information received to “Tophat.” This was done in order to protect another source from among the GRU employees in New York, who had the pseudonym “Niknek”.
But it was Polyakov who betrayed the GRU illegal in the United States, Captain Maria Dobrova. Dobrova, who fought in Spain as a translator, after returning to Moscow began working in the GRU, and after appropriate training was sent to the United States. In America, she acted under the guise of the owner of a beauty salon, which was visited by representatives of high-ranking military, political and business circles. After Polyakov betrayed Dobrov, the FBI tried to recruit her, but she chose to commit suicide.
In total, during his time working for the Americans, Polyakov handed over to them 19 Soviet illegal intelligence officers, more than 150 agents from among foreign citizens, and revealed the affiliation of about 1,500 active intelligence officers to the GRU and KGB.
In the summer of 1962, Polyakov returned to Moscow, supplied with instructions, communication conditions, and a schedule for carrying out hiding operations (one per quarter). The hiding places were selected mainly along the route he took to and from work: in the Bolshaya Ordynka and Bolshaya Polyanka areas, near the Dobryninskaya metro station and at the Ploshchad Vosstaniya trolleybus stop. Most likely, it was this circumstance, as well as the lack of personal contacts with CIA representatives in Moscow, that helped Polyakov avoid failure after another CIA agent, Colonel O. Penkovsky, was arrested in October 1962.
In 1966, Polyakov was sent to Burma as the head of the radio interception center in Rangoon. Upon returning to the USSR, he was appointed head of the Chinese department, and in 1970 he was sent to India as a military attaché and GRU resident. At this time, the volume of information transmitted by Polyakov to the CIA increased sharply. He gave out the names of four American officers recruited by the GRU and handed over photographic films of documents indicating a deep divergence in the positions of China and the USSR. Thanks to these documents, CIA analysts concluded that the Soviet-Chinese differences were long-term. These findings were used by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and helped him and Nixon improve relations with China in 1972.
In light of this, the assertions of L.V. Shebarshin, then deputy resident of the KGB in Delhi, that during Polyakov’s work in India the KGB had certain suspicions about him seem at least naive. “Polyakov demonstrated his complete disposition towards the security officers,” writes Shebarshin. - but it was known from military friends that he did not miss a single the slightest possibility turn them against the KGB and secretly persecute those who were friends with our comrades. No spy can avoid mistakes. But, as often happens in our business, it took more years for the suspicions to be confirmed.” Most likely, behind this statement there is a desire to show off one’s own insight and a reluctance to admit unsatisfactory in this case the work of the KGB military counterintelligence.
It should be said that Polyakov was very serious about ensuring that the GRU leadership formed an opinion of him as a thoughtful, promising worker. To do this, the CIA regularly provided him with some classified materials, and also framed two Americans whom he presented as being recruited by him. For the same purpose, Polyakov sought to ensure that his two sons received higher education and had a prestigious profession. He gave his employees in the GRU a lot of trinkets, such as lighters and ballpoint pens, creating the impression of himself as a pleasant person and a good comrade. One of Polyakov’s patrons was the head of the GRU personnel department, Lieutenant General Sergei Izotov, who had worked in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee for 15 years before this appointment. Polyakov’s case involves expensive gifts he made to Izotov. And for the rank of general, Polyakov presented Izotov with a silver service purchased specifically for this purpose by the CIA.
Polyakov received the rank of Major General in 1974. This provided him with access to materials beyond the scope of his direct duties. For example, to the list of military technologies that were purchased or obtained through intelligence in the West. Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan, said it took his breath away when he learned of the existence of 5,000 Soviet programs that used Western technology to build up military capabilities. The list provided by Polyakov helped Pearl persuade President Reagan to push for tighter controls on the sale of military technology.
Polyakov's work as a CIA agent was distinguished by audacity and fantastic luck. In Moscow, he stole from a GRU warehouse a special self-exposing photographic film “Mikrat 93 Shield”, which he used to photograph secret documents. To convey information, he stole fake hollow stones, which he left in certain places where CIA operatives picked them up. To give a signal about the laying of the cache, Polyakov, driving public transport past the US Embassy in Moscow, activated a miniature transmitter hidden in his pocket. While abroad, Polyakov preferred to pass information from hand to hand. After 1970, the CIA, in an effort to ensure Polyakov's safety as fully as possible, equipped him with a specially designed portable pulse transmitter with which information could be printed, then encrypted and transmitted to a receiving device at the American embassy in 2.6 seconds. Polyakov conducted such programs from different places in Moscow: from the Inguri cafe, the Vanda store, Krasnopresnensky baths, the Central House of Tourists, from Tchaikovsky Street, etc.
By the end of the 1970s, CIA officers, they said, already treated Polyakov more as a teacher than as an agent and informant. They left up to him the choice of the place and time of meetings and the laying of hiding places. However, they had no other choice, since Polyakov did not forgive them for their mistakes. So, in 1972, the Americans, without Polyakov’s consent, invited him to an official reception at the US Embassy in Moscow, which actually put him in danger of failure. The GRU leadership gave permission, and Polyakov had to go there. During the reception, he was secretly given a note, which he destroyed without reading. Moreover, he stopped all contacts with the CIA for a long period of time until he was sure that he did not fall under the suspicion of the KGB counterintelligence.
At the end of the 70s, Polyakov was again sent to India as a GRU resident. He remained there until June 1980, when he was recalled to Moscow. However, this early return was not associated with possible suspicions against him. It’s just that another medical commission forbade him to work in countries with hot climates. However, the Americans became worried and invited Polyakov to leave for the United States. But he refused. According to a CIA officer in Delhi, in response to a wish to come to America in case of danger, where he was expected with open arms, Polyakov replied: “Don’t wait for me. I will never come to the USA. I'm not doing this for you. I'm doing this for my country. I was born Russian and I will die Russian.” And when asked what awaits him if he is exposed, he answered: “Mass grave.”
Polyakov looked into the water. His fantastic luck and career as a CIA agent came to an end in 1985, when a career CIA officer, Aldrich Ames, came to the KGB PGU station in Washington and offered his services. Among the KGB and GRU employees named by Ames who worked for the CIA was Polyakov.
Polyakov was arrested at the end of 1986. During a search carried out at his apartment, at the dacha and in his mother's house, material evidence of his espionage activities was discovered. Among them: sheets of cryptographic carbon paper produced by printing and inserted into envelopes for gramophone records, cipher pads camouflaged in the cover of a travel travel bag, two attachments for a small-sized Tessina camera for vertical and horizontal shooting, several rolls of Kodak film designed for special development , ball pen, the clamp head of which was intended for applying cryptic text, as well as negatives with the terms of communication with CIA employees in Moscow and instructions for contacts with them abroad.
The investigation into the Polyakov case was led by KGB investigator Colonel A. S. Dukhanin, who later became famous in the so-called “Kremlin case” of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Polyakov's wife and adult sons served as witnesses, since they did not know or guess about his espionage activities. After the end of the investigation, many generals and officers of the GRU, whose negligence and talkativeness Polyakov often took advantage of, were brought to administrative responsibility by the command and dismissed from retirement or into the reserve. At the beginning of 1988, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced D.F. Polyakov to death with confiscation of property for treason and espionage. The sentence was carried out on March 15, 1988. And officially the execution of D. F. Polyakov was reported in Pravda only in 1990.
In 1994, after the arrest and exposure of Ames, the CIA admitted that Polyakov had collaborated with him. It was stated that he was the most important of Ames' victims, far surpassing all the others in importance. The information he passed on and photocopies of classified documents fill 25 boxes of CIA files. Many experts familiar with Polyakov’s case say that he contributed much more important contribution, than the more famous defector from the GRU, Colonel O. Penkovsky. This point of view is shared by another GRU traitor, Nikolai Chernov, who said: “Polyakov is a star. And Penkovsky is so-so...” According to CIA Director James Woolsey, of all the Soviet agents recruited during the Cold War, Polyakov "was a real diamond."
Indeed, in addition to the list of interests of scientific and technical intelligence data on China, Polyakov provided information about new weapons of the Soviet Army, in particular about anti-tank missiles, which helped the Americans destroy these weapons when they were used by Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991 . He also transferred to the West more than 100 issues of the secret periodical “Military Thought”, published by the General Staff. As Robert Gates, director of the CIA under President Bush, notes, Polyakov's stolen documents provided insight into the use of military force in the event of war, and helped to draw the firm conclusion that Soviet military leaders did not believe it was possible to win a nuclear war and were seeking to avoid it. According to Gates, familiarization with these documents prevented the US leadership from making erroneous conclusions, which may have helped avoid a “hot” war.
Of course, Gates knows better what helped to avoid a “hot” war and what Polyakov’s merit was in this. But even if it is as great as the Americans are trying to convince everyone of it, this does not in the least justify his betrayal.
Nikolay Chernov
Nikolai Dmitrievich Chernov, born in 1917, served in the operational and technical department of the GRU. In the early 60s, he was sent to the United States to serve as an operational technician at the New York station. In New York, Chernov led a rather unusual lifestyle for a Soviet employee in foreign countries. He often visited restaurants, nightclubs, and cabarets. And all this required corresponding financial expenses. Therefore, it is not surprising that one day, in 1963, together with KGB Major D. Kashin (surname changed), he went to the wholesale base of an American construction company located in New York to buy materials for the renovation of premises at the embassy, and persuaded the owner of the base issue documents without reflecting a trade discount for a wholesale purchase. Thus, Chernov and Kashin received $200 in cash, which they divided among themselves.
However, when Chernov arrived at the base the next day to pick up construction materials, he was met in the owner’s office by two FBI agents. They showed Chernov photocopies of payment documents, which showed that he had embezzled $200, as well as photographs of him in New York entertainment venues. Stating that they knew that Chernov was an employee of the GRU, the FBI agents invited him to begin cooperation. Blackmail had an effect on Chernov - in those years, for visiting entertainment establishments, one could easily be sent to Moscow and banned from traveling abroad, and this is not to mention the embezzlement of government money.
Before he left for Moscow, Chernov, who was given the pseudonym “Niknek” by the FBI, held a number of meetings with the Americans and gave them secret writing tablets used by the GRU and a number of photocopies of materials that GRU operational officers brought to his laboratory for processing. At the same time, the Americans demanded from him photocopies of those materials that were marked: NATO, military and top secret. Just before Chernov left for the USSR at the end of 1963, FBI employees agreed with him about contacts during his next trip to the West and handed over 10,000 rubles, Minox and Tessina cameras, as well as an English-Russian dictionary with secret writing. As for the money Chernov received from the Americans, during the investigation on this matter he said the following:
“I calculated that the next time I’ll come abroad will be in five years. I need ten rubles every day for drinking. In total, about twenty thousand. That’s what I asked for.”
The materials transferred by Chernov were very valuable for American counterintelligence. The fact is that when retaking documents received by the GRU station from agents, Chernov passed on to FBI employees their names, photographs of title pages and document numbers. This helped the FBI identify the agent. For example, Chernov was processing the secret “Album of US Navy Guided Missile Projectiles” received from the GRU agent “Drona”, and handed over copies of these materials to the FBI. As a result, in September 1963, “Drone” was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. Also, based on a tip received from Chernov, GRU agent “Bard” was arrested in England in 1965. He turned out to be Frank Bossard, an employee of the British Ministry of Aviation, recruited in 1961 by I.P. Glazkov. Accused of passing information to the USSR about American missile guidance systems, he was sentenced to 21 years in prison. The importance of the Niknek agent for the FBI is evidenced by the fact that the FBI intelligence department misled MI5 by attributing the information about Bossard that it received from Chernov to another source - “Tophat” (D. Polyakov).
In Moscow, Chernov worked in the operational and technical department of the GRU in the photo laboratory of the 1st special department until 1968, and then moved to the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee as a junior assistant. While working in the GRU photographic laboratory, Chernov processed materials received by the Center and sent to the residencies, which contained information about the agents. He handed over these materials, totaling over 3,000 frames, to FBI employees in 1972 during a foreign business trip through the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Having a diplomatic passport in hand, Chernov easily took the exposed films abroad in two packages.
This time the FBI's catch was even more significant. According to an excerpt from Chernov’s court case, in 1977, it was his fault that the commander of the Swiss air defense forces, Brigadier General Jean-Louis Jeanmaire, was sentenced to 18 years in prison for spying for the USSR. He and his wife were recruited by the GRU in 1962 and worked actively until their arrest. “Moore” and “Mary” were identified on the basis of information received by Swiss counterintelligence from one of the foreign intelligence services. Moreover, as noted in the press, the information came from a Soviet source.
In Great Britain, with the help of materials obtained from Chernov, Air Force junior lieutenant David Bingham was arrested in 1972. He was recruited by GRU officer L.T. Kuzmin in early 1970 and for two years gave him secret documents to which he had access at the naval base in Portsmouth. After his arrest, he was accused of espionage and sentenced to 21 years in prison.
The GRU intelligence network in France suffered the greatest damage from Chernov's betrayal. In 1973, the FBI transferred information concerning France received from Chernov to the Office of Territory Protection. As a result of investigative activities carried out by French counterintelligence, a significant part of the GRU intelligence network was exposed. On March 15, 1977, 54-year-old Serge Fabiev, a resident of the intelligence group, recruited in 1963 by S. Kudryavtsev, was arrested. Along with him, Giovanni Ferrero, Roger Laval and Marc Lefebvre were detained on March 17, 20 and 21. The court, held in January 1978, sentenced Fabiyev to 20 years in prison, Lefebvre to 15 years, Ferrero to 8 years. Laval, who began to experience memory loss during the investigation, was placed in a psychiatric hospital with a diagnosis of dementia and did not appear at the trial. And in October 1977, another GRU agent, Georges Bofis, a longtime member of the PCF, who had worked for the GRU since 1963, was arrested by the Territorial Protection Directorate. Considering his military background and participation in the Resistance movement, the court sentenced him to 8 years in prison.
After 1972, Chernov, according to him, ended his relations with the Americans. But this is not surprising, since at that time he began to drink heavily and was kicked out for drunkenness and for suspicion of losing a secret directory, which contained information about all illegal communist leaders, from the CPSU Central Committee. After this, Chernov started drinking heavily and tried to commit suicide, but remained alive. In 1980, having quarreled with his wife and children, he went to Sochi, where he managed to pull himself together. He went to the Moscow region and, settling in a village, began farming.
But after the arrest of General Polyakov in 1986, the KGB Investigation Department became interested in Chernov. The fact is that during one of the interrogations in 1987, Polyakov said:
“During a meeting in 1980 in Delhi with an American intelligence officer, I learned that Chernov transferred secret writings and other materials to the Americans to which he had access due to the nature of his service.”
However, it may well be that information about Chernov’s betrayal was received from Ames, who was recruited in the spring of 1985.
One way or another, from that time on Chernov began to be checked by military counterintelligence, but no evidence of his contacts with the CIA was found. Therefore, none of the KGB leadership found the courage to sanction his arrest. And only in 1990, the deputy head of the KGB Investigation Department V.S. Vasilenko insisted to the Main Military Prosecutor's Office on the detention of Chernov.
At the very first interrogation, Chernov began to testify. The fact that he decided that he had been betrayed by the Americans most likely played a role here. When Chernov told everything a few months later, investigator V.V. Renev, who was in charge of his case, asked him to provide material evidence of what he had done. Here is what he himself recalls about this:
“I noticed: give me the evidence. This will count towards you in court.
It worked. Chernov remembered that he had a friend, a captain of the 1st rank, a translator, to whom he gave an English-Russian dictionary. The same one that the Americans gave him. In this dictionary, on a certain page there is a sheet that is saturated with cryptographic substance and is a cryptographic carbon copy. The friend's address is such and such.
I immediately called the captain. We met. I explained all the circumstances and waited impatiently for an answer. After all, if he said that he burned the dictionary, the conversation would be over. But the officer answered honestly, yes, he gave it. I don’t remember whether I have this dictionary at home or not, I’ll have to look it up.
The apartment has a huge shelf with books. He took out one dictionary - it did not fit the one described by Chernov. The second one is exactly him. With the inscription “Chernov’s gift.” 1977“
On title page dictionary - two lines. If you count the letters in them, you will determine on which sheet the cryptographic carbon copy is on. When the experts checked it, they were surprised: this was the first time they had encountered such a substance. And although thirty years had passed, the carbon copy was completely usable.”
According to Chernov himself, during the investigation the KGB had no material evidence of his guilt, but what actually happened was the following:
“They told me: ‘Many years have passed. Share your secrets about the activities of American intelligence agencies. They say that the information will be used to train young employees. And we won’t bring you to court for this.” So I made things up, fantasized about things I once read in books. They were delighted and blamed me for all the failures that had occurred in the GRU over the past 30 years... There was nothing valuable in the materials I handed over. The documents were filmed in a regular library. And in general, if I wanted, I would destroy the GRU. But I didn't do it."
On August 18, 1991, Chernov's case was brought to court. At the trial of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Chernov pleaded guilty and gave detailed testimony about the circumstances of his recruitment by the FBI, the nature of the information given to him, and the methods of collecting, storing and transmitting intelligence materials. He said about the motives for betrayal: he committed the crime out of selfish motives, enmity towards state system I haven't experienced it. On September 11, 1991, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Chernov N.D. to imprisonment for a period of 8 years. But 5 months later, by Decree of Russian President B. N. Yeltsin, Chernov, as well as nine other people convicted at different times under Article 64 of the Criminal Code - “Treason,” were pardoned. As a result, Chernov actually escaped punishment and calmly returned home to Moscow.
Anatoly Filatov
Anatoly Nikolaevich Filatov was born in 1940 in the Saratov region. His parents were raised from peasants, his father distinguished himself in the Great Patriotic War. After graduating from school, Filatov entered an agricultural technical school, and then worked for a short time as a livestock technician on a state farm. Having been drafted into the army, he began to quickly advance in his career, graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy and was sent to serve in the GRU. Having proven himself well on his first business trip to Laos, Filatov, who by that time had received the rank of major, was sent to Algeria in June 1973. In Algeria, he worked under the “roof” of an embassy translator, whose duties included organizing protocol events, translating official correspondence, processing local press, and purchasing books for the embassy. This cover allowed him to actively move around the country without arousing unnecessary suspicion.
In February 1974, Filatov came into contact with CIA officers. Later, during the investigation, Filatov will testify that he fell into a “honey trap.” Due to a car breakdown, he was forced to travel on foot. Here is how Filatov himself spoke about it in court:
“At the end of January - beginning of February 1974, I was in the city of Algeria, where I looked in bookstores for literature about the country on ethnography, life and customs of the Algerians. When I was returning from the store, a car stopped near me on one of the city streets. The door opened slightly and I saw an unfamiliar young woman who offered to take me to my place of residence. I agreed. We got to talking, and she invited me to her home, saying that she had literature that interested me. We drove up to her house and went into the apartment. I chose two books that interested me. We drank a cup of coffee and I left.
Three days later, I went to the grocery store and again met the same young woman driving a car. We greeted each other, and she suggested we stop by for another book. The woman's name was Nadi. She is 22–23 years old. She spoke French fluently, but with a slight accent.
Entering the apartment, Nadi put coffee and a bottle of cognac on the table. Turned on the music. We started drinking and talking. The conversation ended in bed."
Filatov was photographed with Nadia, and these photographs were presented to him a few days later by a CIA officer who introduced himself as Edward Kane, the first secretary of the special American mission of the US Interest Protection Service at the Swiss Embassy in Algeria. According to Filatov, he, fearing being recalled from his business trip, succumbed to blackmail and agreed to meet with Kane. The fact that the Americans decided to blackmail Filatov with the help of a woman is not surprising, since back in Laos he was not distinguished by his choosiness in his relations with them. Therefore, the version of the beginning of Filatov’s contacts with the CIA, put forward by D. Barron, author of the book “KGB Today,” looks completely implausible and absolutely unsubstantiated. He writes that Filatov himself offered his services to the CIA, fully aware of the risk he was taking, but not seeing how he could harm the CPSU in any other way.
In Algeria, Filatov, who received the pseudonym “Etienne,” held more than 20 meetings with Kane. He gave him information about the work of the embassy, about the operations carried out by the GRU in Algeria and France, information about military equipment and the participation of the USSR in the preparation and training of representatives of a number of third world countries in methods of conducting guerrilla warfare and sabotage activities. In April 1976, when it became known that Filatov was to return to Moscow, another CIA officer became his operator, with whom he worked out safe methods of communication on the territory of the USSR. To transmit messages to Filatov, encrypted radio transmissions were made twice a week from Frankfurt to German. It was stipulated that combat transmissions would begin with an odd number, and training transmissions with an even number. For camouflage purposes, radio broadcasts began to be transmitted in advance, before Filatov returned to Moscow. For feedback, the use of cover letters supposedly written by foreigners was supposed to be used. As a last resort, a personal meeting was envisaged with a CIA operative in Moscow near the Dynamo stadium.
In July 1976, before leaving for Moscow, Filatov was given six cover letters, a carbon copy for cryptography, a notebook with instructions, a cipher pad, a device for setting up the receiver and spare batteries for it, a ballpoint pencil for cryptography, a Minox camera and several spare ones. cassettes for it, inserted into the stereo headphone lining. In addition, Filatov was given 10,000 Algerian dinars for his work in Algeria, 40 thousand rubles and 24 gold coins of royal minting worth 5 rubles each. In addition, a pre-agreed amount in dollars was transferred monthly to Filatov’s account in an American bank.
Returning to Moscow in August 1976, Filatov began working in the central apparatus of the GRU and continued to actively transfer intelligence materials to the CIA through hiding places and through letters. Since his arrival, he himself has received 18 radio messages from Frankfurt. Here are some of them:
“Don’t limit yourself to collecting the information you have about your job. Gain the trust of close acquaintances and friends. Visit them at their place of work. Invite you to visit your home and restaurants, where, through targeted questions, you will find out secret information to which you yourself do not have access...”
“Dear “E”! We are very pleased with your information and express our deep gratitude to you for it. It is a pity that you do not yet have access to secret documents. However, we are not only interested in what is marked “Secret”. Provide details about the institution where you now work. By whom, when, for what purpose was it created? Departments, sections? Character of subordination up, down?
It’s a pity that you were unable to use the lighter: its expiration date has expired. Get rid of it. It is best to throw it into a deep place in the river when no one will be looking at you. You will receive a new one through the cache."
Filatov did not forget about himself, purchasing a new Volga car and spending 40 thousand rubles in restaurants, which his wife did not know about. However, as in the case of Popov and Penkovsky, the CIA did not fully take into account the KGB's ability to spy on foreigners and its own citizens. Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1977, KGB counterintelligence, as a result of surveillance of US embassy employees, established that CIA station officers began to conduct secret operations with an agent located in Moscow.
At the end of March 1977, Filatov received a radiogram in which it was reported that instead of the “Friendship” cache, another one located on Kostomarovskaya embankment and called “River” would be used to communicate with him. On June 24, 1977, Filatov was supposed to receive a container through this hiding place, but it was not there. There was no container in the cache on June 26 either. Then on June 28, Filatov, using a cover letter, informed CIA officers about what had happened. In response to this alarm signal After some time, Filatov received the following response:
“Dear “E”! We were unable to deliver at “Reka” on June 25, since our man was being followed and it is clear that he did not even approach the place. Thank you for the “Lupakova” letter (cover letter - author).Warm greetings. J."
... If you used some of the cassettes for operational photography, they can still be developed. Save them for your transfer to us at the “Treasure” place. Also in your package for the "Treasure" please tell us which camouflage device, excluding lighters, you prefer for the mini-device and cassettes that we may want to give to you in the future. As was the case with the lighter, we again want you to have a camouflage device that hides your device and at the same time functions correctly...
New schedule: Fridays 24.00 on 7320 (41 m) and 4990 (60 m) and Sundays at 22.00 on 7320 (41 m) and 5224 (57 m). To improve the audibility of our radio broadcasts, we highly recommend using the 300 rubles in this package to purchase a “Riga-103-2” radio, which we have carefully tested and believe that it is good.
... In this package we have also included a small plastic transfiguration table with which you can decipher our radio broadcasts and encrypt your secret script. Please handle and store it carefully...
Meanwhile, KGB surveillance officers, as a result of surveillance of V. Crocket, an employee of the Moscow CIA station, who was listed as a secretary-archivist, established that he uses hiding places to communicate with Filatov. As a result, it was decided to detain him at the moment of placing the container in the cache. Late in the evening of September 2, 1977, during a stash operation on Kostomarovskaya embankment, Crocket and his wife Becky were caught red-handed. A few days later they were declared persona non grata and expelled from the country. The arrest of Filatov himself took place somewhat earlier.
Filatov's trial began on July 10, 1978. He was accused of committing crimes under Article 64 and Article 78 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (treason and smuggling). On July 14, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Colonel of Justice M.A. Marov, sentenced Filatov to death.
However, the sentence was not carried out. After Filatov filed a petition for clemency, the death penalty was commuted to 15 years in prison. Filatov served his sentence in correctional labor institution 389/35, better known as the Perm-35 camp. In an interview with French journalists who visited the camp in July 1989, he said: “I made big bets in life and lost. And now I'm paying. It’s quite natural.” Upon his release, Filatov turned to the US Embassy in Russia with a request to compensate him for material damage and to pay the amount in currency that was allegedly supposed to be in his account in an American bank. However, the Americans at first avoided answering for a long time, and then informed Filatov that only US citizens have the right to compensation.
Vladimir Rezun
Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun was born in 1947 in an army garrison near Vladivostok in the family of a serviceman, a front-line veteran who went through the entire Great Patriotic War. At the age of 11, he entered the Kalinin Suvorov Military School, and then the Kiev General Command School. In the summer of 1968, he was appointed to the position of tank platoon commander in the Carpathian Military District. The unit in which he served, together with other troops from the district, took part in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. After the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia, Rezun continued to serve in units of first the Carpathian and then the Volga military districts as commander of a tank company.
In the spring of 1969, Senior Lieutenant Rezun became a military intelligence officer in the 2nd (intelligence) directorate of the headquarters of the Volga Military District. In the summer of 1970, as a promising young officer, he was called to Moscow to enter the Military Diplomatic Academy. He successfully passed the exams and was enrolled in the first year. However, already at the beginning of his studies at the academy, Rezun received the following characteristics:
“Strong-willed qualities, little life experience and experience working with people are insufficiently developed. Pay attention to developing the qualities necessary for an intelligence officer, including willpower, perseverance, and willingness to take reasonable risks.”
After graduating from the academy, Rezun was sent to the central office of the GRU in Moscow, where he worked in the 9th (information) department. And in 1974, Captain Rezun was sent on his first foreign business trip to Geneva under the cover of the position of attaché of the USSR Mission to the UN in Geneva. His wife Tatyana and daughter Natalya, born in 1972, came to Switzerland with him. In the Geneva residency of the GRU, Rezun’s work at first was not at all as successful as can be judged from his book “Aquarium”. This is the description the resident gave him after his first year abroad:
“He is very slow in mastering the methods of intelligence work. Works scatteredly and unfocused. Life experience and horizons are small. It will take considerable time to overcome these shortcomings.”
However, later, according to the testimony of the former deputy resident of the GRU in Geneva, Captain 1st Rank V. Kalinin, his affairs went successfully. As a result, he was promoted in diplomatic rank from attaché to third secretary with a corresponding increase in salary, and, as an exception, his tour of duty was extended for another year. As for Rezun himself, Kalinin speaks of him like this:
“In communication with comrades, and in public life[he] gave the impression of an arch-patriot of his homeland and armed forces, ready to lie with his chest on the embrasure, as Alexander Matrosov did during the war. In the party organization, he stood out among his comrades for his excessive activity in supporting any initiative decisions, for which he received the nickname Pavlik Morozov, of which he was very proud. Service relations were developing quite well... At the end of the business trip, Rezun knew that his use was planned in the central apparatus of the GRU.”
This was the state of affairs until June 10, 1978, when Rezun, along with his wife, daughter and son Alexander, born in 1976, disappeared from Geneva under unknown circumstances. The station officers who visited his apartment found a real mess there, and neighbors said that they heard muffled screams and children crying at night. At the same time, valuable things did not disappear from the apartment, including a large collection of coins, which Rezun was fond of collecting. The Swiss authorities were immediately notified of the disappearance of the Soviet diplomat and his family, with a simultaneous request to take all necessary measures to search for the missing. However, only 17 days later, on June 27, the Swiss political department informed Soviet representatives that Rezun and his family were in England, where he asked for political asylum.
The reasons that forced Rezun to commit betrayal are spoken about differently. He himself claims in numerous interviews that his escape was forced. Here's what, for example, he told journalist Ilya Kechin in 1998:
“The situation with leaving was as follows. At that time, Brezhnev had three advisers: comrades Alexandrov, Tsukanov and Blatov. They were called “Assistant Secretary Generals.” Whatever these “Shuriks” brought to him to sign, he signed. The brother of one of them - Boris Mikhailovich Aleksandrov - worked in our system, received the rank of major general, without ever going abroad. But in order to move further up the career ladder, he needed a record in his personal file that he had gone abroad. Of course, immediately as a resident. Moreover, the most important residency. But he never worked either in support, or in obtaining, or in processing information. To successfully continue his career, it was enough for him to be a resident for only six months, and in his personal file he would have an entry: “He was a Geneva resident of the GRU.” He would return to Moscow, and new stars would rain down on him.
Everyone knew it would be a failure. But who could object?
Our resident was a man! One could pray to him. Before he left for Moscow, he gathered us all... The whole station had a good drink and snack, and at the end of the drinking session the resident said: “Guys!” I'm leaving. I sympathize with you, the one who will work in support of the new resident: he will receive agents, a budget. I don't know how this will end. I sympathize, but I can’t help.”
And now three weeks have passed since the arrival of the new comrade - and a terrible failure. Someone had to set it up. I was the scapegoat. It is clear that over time the people at the top would sort it out. But at that moment I had no choice. There is only one way out - suicide. But if I did this, they would later say about me: “What a fool!” It’s not his fault!’ And I left.”
In another interview, Rezun emphasized that his flight was not connected with political reasons:
“I never said that I was running for political reasons. And I don’t consider myself a political fighter. I had the opportunity in Geneva to examine the communist system and its leaders from a minimal distance. I quickly and deeply hated this system. But there was no intention to leave. That’s what I write in Aquarium: I stepped on my tail, that’s why I’m leaving.”
True, all of the above is little consistent with the nickname Pavlik Morozov and the prospects for future career growth. However, the statements of a certain V. Kartakov that Rezun fled to the West because he cousin stole ancient coins of historical value from one of the Ukrainian museums, and he sold them in Geneva, which became known to the competent authorities, looks, to put it mildly, unconvincing. If only because V. Kalinin, who was personally involved in the Rezun case, claims that regarding him “no signals were received from the 3rd Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (military counterintelligence) and the Directorate “K” of the KGB of the USSR (counterintelligence of the PGU). Therefore, the version of the same V. Kalinin can be considered the most probable:
“As a person who is well acquainted with all the circumstances of the so-called “Rezun Case” and who knew him personally, I believe that the British intelligence services were involved in his disappearance... One fact speaks in favor of this statement. Rezun knew an English journalist, editor of a military-technical magazine in Geneva. We showed operational interest in this person. I think that counter-development was carried out by the British intelligence services. An analysis of these meetings shortly before Rezun’s disappearance showed that the forces in this duel were unequal. Rezun was inferior in all respects. Therefore, it was decided to prohibit Rezun from meeting with the English journalist. Events showed that this decision was made too late, and further development events are out of our control."
On June 28, 1978, English newspapers reported that Rezun and his family were in England. Immediately, the Soviet embassy in London received instructions to request a meeting with him from the British Foreign Office. At the same time, letters to Rezun and his wife, written by their parents at the request of the KGB officers, were transferred to the English Foreign Ministry. But there was no answer to them, nor a meeting between Soviet representatives and the fugitives. The attempt by Rezun’s father, Bogdan Vasilyevich, who came to London in August to meet his son, also ended in failure. After this, all attempts to achieve a meeting with Rezun and his wife were stopped.
After Rezun’s escape, the Geneva station took emergency measures to localize the failure. As a result of these forced measures, more than ten people were recalled to the USSR, and all operational connections of the residency were mothballed. The damage caused to the GRU by Rezun was significant, although it certainly cannot be compared with what was inflicted on Soviet military intelligence, for example, by GRU Major General Polyakov. Therefore, in the USSR, Rezun was tried in absentia by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and sentenced to death for treason.
Unlike many other defectors, Rezun repeatedly wrote to his father, but his letters did not reach the addressee. The first letter that Rezun Sr. received came to him in 1990. More precisely, it was not a letter, but rather a note: “Mom, dad, if you are alive, answer me,” and a London address. And the son’s first meeting with his parents took place in 1993, when Rezun turned to the authorities of the now independent Ukraine with a request to allow his parents to visit him in London. According to his father, his grandchildren, Natasha and Sasha, are already students, and “Volodya himself, as always, works 16–17 hours a day. He is helped by his wife Tanya, who keeps his file cabinet and correspondence.”
Once in England, Rezun took up literary activity, speaking as writer Viktor Suvorov. The first books published from his pen were “Soviet Military Intelligence”, “Special Forces”, “Stories of the Liberator”. But his main work, he said, was “Icebreaker,” a book dedicated to proving that the second world war began Soviet Union. According to Rezun, the idea of this first came to him in the fall of 1968, before the start of commissioning Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia. Since then, he methodically collected all kinds of materials about the initial period of the war. His library of military books by 1974 numbered several thousand copies. Once in England, he again began collecting books and archival materials, as a result of which in the spring of 1989 the book “Icebreaker” appeared. Who started the Second World War? Published first in Germany, and then in England, France, Canada, Italy and Japan, it instantly became a bestseller and caused extremely controversial reviews in the press and among historians. However, covering the debate regarding whether the writer Suvorov is right or wrong is not the purpose of this essay. For those who are interested in this issue, we can recommend the collection “Another War. 1939–1945", published in Moscow in 1996, edited by academician Yu. Afanasyev.
In Russian, “Icebreaker” was first published in 1993 in Moscow; in 1994, the same publishing house released the continuation of “Icebreaker” “Day-M”, and in 1996 the third book - “The Last Republic”. In Russia, these books also caused a great resonance, and at the beginning of 1994, Mosfilm even began filming a feature-documentary-journalistic film based on Icebreaker. In addition to the above, Suvorov-Rezun is the author of the books “Aquarium”, “Choice”, “Control”, “Cleansing”.
Gennady Smetanin
Gennady Aleksandrovich Smetanin was born in the city of Chistopol into a working-class family, where he was the eighth child. After the eighth grade, he entered the Kazan Suvorov School, and then the Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command School. After serving in the army for some time, he was sent to the Military Diplomatic Academy, where he studied French and Portuguese, after which he was assigned to the GRU. In August 1982, he was sent to Portugal to the Lisbon GRU station under the guise of being an employee of the military attache's office.
All of Smetanin’s colleagues noted his extreme selfishness, careerism and passion for profit. All this taken together pushed him onto the path of betrayal. At the end of 1983, he himself came to the CIA station and offered his services, demanding a million dollars for it. Amazed by his greed, the Americans resolutely refused to pay that kind of money, and he moderated his appetite to 360 thousand dollars, declaring that this was exactly the amount he had wasted from government money. However, this statement by Smetanin aroused suspicion among CIA officers. However, they paid him the money, not forgetting to take a receipt from him with the following content:
“I, Smetanin Gennady Aleksandrovich, received from American government 365 thousand dollars, which I sign and promise to help him.”
During recruitment, Smetanin was tested on a lie detector. He passed this test “worthily” and was included in the CIA intelligence network under the pseudonym “Million”. In total, from January 1984 to August 1985, Smetanin held 30 meetings with CIA employees, at which he provided them with intelligence information and photocopies of secret documents to which he had access. Moreover, with the help of Smetanin, the Americans recruited his wife Svetlana on March 4, 1984, who, on instructions from the CIA, got a job as a secretary-typist at the embassy, which allowed her to gain access to secret documents.
Moscow learned about Smetanin’s betrayal in the summer of 1985 from O. Ames. However, even before this, some suspicions arose regarding Smetanin. The fact is that during one of the receptions at the Soviet embassy, his wife appeared in outfits and jewelry that clearly did not correspond to her husband’s official income. But in Moscow they decided not to rush things, especially since Smetanin was supposed to return to Moscow on vacation in August.
On August 6, 1985, Smetanin met in Lisbon with his CIA operator and said that he was going on vacation, but would return to Portugal long before the next meeting, scheduled for October 4. Arriving in Moscow, he, along with his wife and daughter, went to Kazan, where his mother lived. Following him, a KGB task force went, formed from employees of the 3rd (military counterintelligence) and 7th (external surveillance) departments, which included fighters from group “A”, whose task was to apprehend the traitor.
Arriving in Kazan and visiting his mother, Smetanin and his family suddenly disappeared. Here is what the commander of one of the units of Group “A” who worked on this case says about this:
“One can imagine what, intellectually speaking, numbness gripped everyone who was “tied” to this man.
For several days we, as they say, dug the ground, “plowing” Kazan in all conceivable and inconceivable directions, exhausting ourselves and driving local employees into a sweat. I can still lead thematic tours around Kazan. For example, this one: “Kazan passage yards and entrances.” And a few more of the same kind.”
At the same time, all suspicious persons who ordered air or train tickets for August 20–28 were monitored. As a result, it was established that someone took three tickets for August 25 for train No. 27 Kazan-Moscow from Yudino station. Since Smetanin’s relatives lived in Yudino, it was decided that the tickets were purchased for him. And indeed, the passengers turned out to be Smetanin, his wife and schoolgirl daughter. No one wanted to take any more risks, and an order was given for the arrest of Smetanin and his wife. KGB officer of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Colonel Yu. I. Shimanovsky, who participated in the capture of Smetanin, says the following about his arrest:
“Suddenly, an object came out of the observed compartment and headed towards the toilet farthest from me. A few seconds later, our employee came out behind him. There was no one in the corridor. All the doors to the compartment were closed. Everything went so quickly that I only saw how our operative, the one who was following, grabbed Smetanin from behind in a professional manner, lifted him up, the second one, who was at his post, grabbed him by the legs and practically ran, they carried him to the rest compartment of the conductors. A woman and a man (employees of group “A” - the authors) quickly left this compartment and headed to where Smetanin’s wife and his daughter were. All this happened almost without a sound.”
After the arrest, Smetanin and his wife were presented with an arrest warrant, after which their personal belongings and luggage were searched. During the search, a case with glasses was found in Smetanin’s briefcase, which contained instructions for communicating with the CIA and a code pad. In addition, an ampoule with instant poison was hidden in the temple of the glasses. And during a search of Smetanin’s wife, 44 diamonds were found in the lining of a leather strap.
During the investigation, the guilt of Smetanin and his wife was completely proven and the case was sent to court. At the trial, Smetanin stated that he did not feel hostility towards the Soviet social and state system, but committed treason against his Motherland out of dissatisfaction with his assessment as an intelligence officer. On July 1, 1986, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR found the Smetanins guilty of treason in the form of espionage. Gennady Smetanin was sentenced to death with confiscation of property, and Svetlana Smetanina was sentenced to 5 years in prison.
Vyacheslav Baranov
Vyacheslav Maksimovich Baranov was born in 1949 in Belarus. After finishing the 8th grade of school, he chose military career and entered the Suvorov School, and then the Chernigov Higher Military Flight School. Having received officer's shoulder straps, he served in the army for several years. At this time, in an effort to make a career, he read a lot, learned English and even became secretary of the party organization of the squadron. Therefore, when the aviation regiment in which Baranov served received an order for a candidate to enter the Military Diplomatic Academy, the command settled on him.
While studying at the academy, Baranov successfully completed all courses, but in 1979, just before graduation, he committed a serious offense, grossly violating the secrecy regime. As a result, although he was sent for further service in the GRU, he was “restricted from traveling abroad” for five whole years. And only in June 1985, when the so-called perestroika began and people began to talk about “new thinking” everywhere, Baranov went on his first foreign business trip to Bangladesh, where he worked in Dhaka under the “roof” of the head of a group of technical specialists.
In the fall of 1989, at the end of a four-year assignment, CIA operative in Dhaka Brad Lee Bradford began to “pick up the keys” to Baranov. One day, after a volleyball match between the USSR and USA teams near the Embassy, he invited Baranov to dinner at his villa. Baranov rejected this proposal, but did not report it to his superiors. A few days later, Bradford repeated his invitation, and this time Baranov promised to think about it.
On October 24, 1989, Baranov called Bradford from the Lin Chin restaurant and arranged a meeting for the next day. During the conversation, Bradford inquired about the financial situation of Soviet foreign workers during perestroika, to which Baranov replied that it was tolerable, but added that no one minded earning more. At the same time, he complained about the cramped conditions of his Moscow apartment and his daughter’s illness. Of course, Bradford hinted to Baranov that all this could be corrected and suggested that they meet again.
The second meeting between Baranov and Bradford took place three days later, on October 27. Going to her, Baranov was fully aware that they were trying to recruit him. But perestroika was in full swing in the USSR, and he decided to insure himself for the future by working for two masters for some time. Therefore, the conversation between Bradford and Baranov was completely specific. Baranov agreed to work for the CIA, making it a condition that he and his family be transported from the USSR to the USA. Here is the testimony about the second meeting that Baranov gave during the investigation:
“At the second meeting with Bradford in Dhaka, I asked what awaited me in the West. Bradford replied that after quite a long and painstaking work with me (meaning, of course, the survey), I and my whole family would be granted a residence permit, assistance in finding a job, finding housing in a selected area of the United States, changing my appearance, if necessary. required.
I asked: “What will happen if I refuse the survey?” Bradford, who had previously tried to speak softly and kindly, answered rather sharply and dryly, saying the following: “No one will force you. But in this case, our help will be limited to granting you and your family refugee status in the United States or in one of the European countries. For the rest, you will be left to your own devices."
Baranov’s final recruitment occurred during the third meeting, which took place on November 3, 1989. It was attended by CIA resident in Dhaka V. Crocket, who at one time was an operator of another traitor from the GRU - A. Filatov - and in 1977 was expelled from Moscow for actions incompatible with the status of a diplomat. During the meeting, the conditions under which Baranov agreed to work for the Americans were agreed upon: $25,000 for immediate agreement, $2,000 monthly for active work, and $1,000 for forced downtime. In addition, the Americans pledged to take him and his family out of the USSR if necessary. True, Baranov received only 2 thousand dollars.
From that moment on, the new CIA agent, who received the pseudonym “Tony,” began to earn his money and first of all told Crocket and Bradfrod about the structure, composition and leadership of the GRU, area of responsibility operational departments, the composition and tasks of the GRU and PGU KGB residencies in Dhaka, used by Soviet intelligence officers in cover positions. In addition, he spoke about the location of the premises of the GRU and KGB residencies in the building of the Soviet embassy in Dhaka, the procedure for ensuring their security, and the consequences of the Americans’ recruiting approach to one of the employees of the KGB PGU station in Bangladesh. At the same meeting, the terms of Baranov’s communication with CIA officers in Moscow were agreed upon.
A few days after being recruited, Baranov returned to Moscow. Having taken his allotted leave, he began work in a new place - under the “roof” of one of the divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. And on June 15, 1990, he gave a signal to the Americans about his readiness to begin active work: in telephone booth near the Kirovskaya metro station, he scrawled a pre-agreed non-existent number on the phone - 345-51-15. After that, he went out three times on the agreed days to the meeting place agreed upon with Crocket with his Moscow operator, but to no avail. And only on July 11, 1990, Baranov met with the deputy resident of the CIA in Moscow, Michael Salik, which took place on the Malenkovskaya railway platform. During this meeting, Baranov was given instructions in two packages for maintaining communications, an operational task concerning the collection of data on bacteriological preparations, viruses and microbes at the GRU’s disposal, and 2 thousand rubles for the purchase of a radio receiver.
Baranov diligently completed all the tasks, but sometimes he was haunted by bad luck. So, once, after he had planted a container with intelligence data in his hiding place, construction workers paved the site of the plant and his work went to waste. Moreover, the Americans still did not contact him, but broadcast the message as many as 26 times by radio. It said that the “Peacock” signal, meaning Baranov’s readiness for a personal meeting, was recorded by them, but they were not able to conduct it due to the fire that took place on March 28, 1991 in the US Embassy building in Moscow.
Baranov’s next and last meeting with a CIA officer took place in April 1991. There, he was advised, if possible, not to use hiding places anymore, to take instructions over the radio, and was paid 1,250 rubles to repair his personal Zhiguli car, which he crashed in an accident. After this meeting, Baranov realized that his hopes of escaping from the USSR with the help of the CIA were unrealistic. Here's what he said about it during the investigation:
“Neither the conditions, nor the methods and timing of the possible removal of me and my family from the USSR were discussed with the Americans and were not communicated to me by them. In response to my question about a possible export scheme, in both cases, both in Dhaka and Moscow, I received assurances of a general nature. Let's say that an event of this kind is very difficult and requires some time and effort to prepare. Like, such a scheme will be communicated to me later... Pretty soon I had serious doubts that such a scheme would ever be communicated to me, and now... my doubts turned into confidence.”
By the end of the summer of 1992, Baranov’s nerves could not stand it. Considering that he should have about 60 thousand dollars in his Austrian bank account, Baranov decides to leave the country illegally. Taking three days off from work on August 10, he bought a ticket for a Moscow-Vienna flight, having previously obtained a fake foreign passport through a friend for $150. But on August 11, 1992, while passing border control at Sheremetyevo-2, Baranov was arrested, and at the very first interrogation by military counterintelligence, he fully admitted his guilt.
There are several versions of how counterintelligence reached Baranov. The first was proposed by counterintelligence and boiled down to the fact that Baranov was identified as a result of surveillance of CIA employees in Moscow. According to this version, surveillance officers in June 1990 noticed the interest of CIA operatives in Moscow in a telephone booth near the Kirovskaya metro station and, just in case, took control of it. After some time, Baranov was recorded in the booth, performing actions very similar to setting a conditioned signal. Some time later, Baranov reappeared at the same booth, after which he was taken into operational development and was detained at the time of his attempt to illegally leave the country. According to the second version, Baranov came to the attention of counterintelligence after he sold his Zhiguli for 2,500 Deutschmarks, which in 1991 fell under Article 88 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Next version it boils down to the fact that the border guards, convinced that Baranov’s international passport was fake, detained the offender, and during interrogation by counterintelligence he simply chickened out and split. But greatest attention deserves the fourth, simplest version: Baranova was passed by the same O. Ames.
After Baranov’s arrest, a long and scrupulous investigation began, during which he tried in every possible way to downplay the damage he had caused. Thus, he persistently convinced the investigators that all the information transferred to him by the CIA were “open secrets,” since they had long been known to the Americans from other defectors, including D. Polyakov, V. Rezun, G. Smetanin and others. However, investigators did not agree with him. According to the head of the FSB press service A. Mikhailov, during the investigation it was established that “Baranov surrendered the intelligence network of his native GRU on the territory of other countries”, “surrendered quite a lot of people, mainly associated with the GRU, as well as agents”, “seriously undermined work of his department." Because of Baranov’s activities, many agents were excluded from the existing intelligence network and work with proxies, studied and developed, with which he maintained contact. In addition, the operational work of the GRU officers known to him, who were “deciphered” by the Americans with his help, was limited.
In December 1993, Baranov appeared before the Military Collegium of the Court of the Russian Federation. As the court established, some of the information provided by Baranov to the CIA was already known to him and, as was especially emphasized in the verdict, Baranov’s actions did not entail the failure of persons known to him. Taking into account these circumstances, the court, chaired by Major General of Justice V. Yaskin, on December 19, 1993, handed down an extremely lenient sentence to Baranov, assigning him a punishment below the permissible limit: six years in a maximum security colony with confiscation of the currency confiscated from him and half of his property. In addition, Colonel Baranov was not deprived of his military rank. Baranov served his sentence in the Perm-35 camp.
Alexander Volkov, Gennady Sporyshev, Vladimir Tkachenko
The beginning of this story should be sought in 1992, when the decision of the acting. Russian Prime Minister E. Gaidar and Defense Minister P. Grachev, the GRU Space Intelligence Center was allowed to sell slides made from films shot by Soviet spy satellites in order to earn foreign currency. The high quality of these photographs was widely known abroad and therefore the price for one slide could reach 2 thousand dollars. One of those involved in the commercial sale of slides was the head of the department of the Space Intelligence Center, Colonel Alexander Volkov. Volkov, who served in the GRU for more than 20 years, was not involved in operational work. But in the field of intelligence space technology was considered one of the leading experts. Thus, he had more than twenty patents for inventions in this area.
Among those to whom Volkov sold the slides was a career employee of the Israeli intelligence service MOSSAD in Moscow, who was involved in coordinating the activities of Russian and Israeli intelligence services in the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking, Ruven Dinel, who was officially considered an adviser to the embassy. Volkov met with Dinel regularly, each time receiving permission from management to meet. The Israeli bought from Volkov unclassified slides of photographs of the territory of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Israel, authorized for sale, and he deposited the money received into the Center’s cash desk.
In 1993, Volkov resigned from the GRU and became one of the founders and deputy director of the Sovinformsputnik commercial association, which is still the official and sole intermediary of the GRU in the trade of commercial photographs. However, Volkov did not interrupt contacts with Dinel. Moreover, in 1994, with the help of the former senior assistant to the head of the department of the Space Intelligence Center, Gennady Sporyshev, who by that time had also left the GRU, he sold Dinel 7 secret photographs depicting the cities of Israel, including Tel Aviv, Beer Sheva, Rehovot , Haifa and others. Later, Volkov and Sporyshev connected another current employee of the Center to their business - Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Tkachenko, who had access to a secret film library. He gave Volkov 202 secret slides, of which he sold 172 to Dinel. The Israelis did not remain in debt, and gave Volkov more than 300 thousand dollars for the sold slides. He did not forget to pay his partners, giving Sporyshev 1600, and Tkachenko - 32 thousand dollars.
However, in 1995, the activities of Volkov and his partners attracted the attention of the FSB military counterintelligence. In September, Volkov’s phone was tapped, and on December 13, 1995, at the Belorusskaya metro station, Volkov was detained by FSB officers at the moment when he was handing over the next 10 secret slides of the territory of Syria to Dinel.
Since Dinel had diplomatic immunity, he was declared persona non grata, and two days later he left Moscow. At the same time, Tkachenko and three other officers from the Space Intelligence Center who made the slides were arrested. Sporyshev, who tried to escape, was arrested a little later.
A criminal case was opened against all detainees for treason. However, the investigation failed to prove the guilt of Volkov and the three officers who helped make the slides. They all claimed that they did not know about the secrecy of the photographs. At the request of the investigator, he deposited the 345 thousand dollars found during the search of Volkov’s house into the account of the state company Metal Business, which is a center for retraining officers established by the Ministry of Defense and the Hammer and Sickle plant. And regarding the sale of photographs to Israel, he said: “Israel is our strategic partner, and Saddam is simply a terrorist. I considered it my duty to help his opponents." As a result, he and three other officers went this case witnesses.
As for Sporyshev, he immediately confessed to everything and provided all possible assistance to the investigation. Considering that he handed over slides of Israeli territory to MOSSAD and thus did not cause much damage to the country’s security, the court of the Moscow Military District sentenced Sporyshev to 2 years probation for disclosing state secrets (Article 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).
Tkachenko was the least fortunate. He was accused of selling 202 secret photographs to MOSSAD. During the investigation, he fully admitted his guilt, but at the trial, which began in March 1998, he recanted his testimony, saying: “The investigators deceived me. They said that they just needed to get Dinel out of the country, and I should help. I helped." The trial of Tkachenko lasted two weeks and on March 20 the sentence was announced - three years in prison.
Thus ended this rather unusual story. Its unusualness is not at all in the fact that three intelligence officers earned money from state secrets, but in their strange punishment - some were convicted, while others were witnesses in the same case. It is not for nothing that Tkachenko’s lawyers, after his sentencing, stated that their client’s case was full of white threads and that “the FSB, most likely, had the goal of covering up their man who was leaking disinformation to the MOSSAD.”
These are typical stories betrayals committed by GRU officers in 1950–1990. As can be seen from the above examples, only D. Polyakov, with great stretch, can be considered a “fighter against the totalitarian communist regime.” All the rest set out on this slippery slope for reasons that are very far from ideological, such as: greed, cowardice, dissatisfaction with their position, etc. However, this is not surprising, since people serve in intelligence, and, as you know, there are different. And therefore, we can only hope that there will be no people like those about whom the story was just told in Russian military intelligence.
Dmitry Polyakov is a hero of the Great Patriotic War, a retired GRU major general, who was an American spy for more than twenty years. Why did the Soviet intelligence officer betray the USSR? What prompted Polyakov to betray him, and who was the first to track down the mole? Unknown facts and new versions of the big story betrayal in the documentary investigation of the Moscow Trust TV channel.
Traitor in general's uniform
A retired general is arrested by members of Alpha, one of the best security forces in the world. The detention takes place according to all the rules of the special services. It is not enough to handcuff a spy; he must be completely immobilized. FSB officer, writer and intelligence service historian Oleg Khlobustov explains why.
“A harsh detention, because they knew that he could be supplied, say, with poison for self-destruction at the time of detention, if he preferred to take such a position. He was immediately changed, things were already prepared in advance to confiscate everything he had : suit, shirt, and so on,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
Dmitry Polyakov
But isn't it too much noise to detain a 65-year-old man? The KGB did not think so. There has never been a traitor of this magnitude in the USSR. The material damage caused by Polyakov over the years of espionage activities amounts to billions of dollars. None of the traitors reached such heights in the GRU, and no one worked for so long. For half a century, the veteran of the Great Patriotic War waged a secret war against his own people, and this war was not without human losses.
“He gave out one thousand five hundred, note this figure, GRU employees, and foreign intelligence too. This figure is huge, I don’t know what to compare it with,” says intelligence services historian Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Polyakov understands that for such crimes he faces execution. However, being arrested, he does not panic and actively cooperates with the investigation. Probably, the traitor expects that his life will be spared in order to carry out double play with the CIA. But the scouts decide differently.
“We had no guarantees that when the big game started, somewhere between the lines, Polyakov would put an extra dash. This would be a signal to the Americans: “Guys, I’m caught, I’m telling you misinformation, don’t believe it,” says the military man Victor Baranets.
"Rotten" initiative
The court sentences Polyakov to capital punishment and deprives him of his shoulder straps and orders. On March 15, 1988, the sentence was carried out. The case is closed forever, but remains main question: Why did Polyakov trample his name in the mud and cross out his entire life?
One thing is clear: he was rather indifferent to money. The traitor received about 90 thousand dollars from the CIA. If you divide them by 25 years, it’s not that much.
“The main and pressing question is what pushed him to do this, what inspired him? Why did such a metamorphosis occur in a man who, in general, began his life as a hero, and one might say was favored by fate,” argues Oleg Khlobustov.
October 30, 1961, New York. The phone rings in US Colonel Fahey's office. The person on the other end of the line is visibly nervous. He demands a meeting with the head of the American mission to the UN Military Staff Committee and gives his name: Colonel Dmitry Polyakov, military attaché at the Soviet embassy. That same evening, Fahey calls the FBI. Instead of the military, the feds will come to meet Polyakov, and this will suit him quite well.
“When, for example, someone comes to the embassy and says that “I have such intelligence capabilities, let me work for you,” what are the first thoughts of intelligence? That this is a provocation, that he is crazy, that he is a swindler, who wants to run what is called a paper mill, and this person is checked for a long time and carefully,” explains special services historian Alexander Bondarenko.
At first, the FBI does not believe Polyakov; they suspect him to be a double agent. But an experienced intelligence officer knows how to convince them. At the first meeting, he gives out the names of the cryptographers working at the Soviet embassy. These are the people through whom all secrets pass.
“They already had suspicions about a number of people who could be cryptographers. Here’s a check to see if he would name these names or would be bluffing. But he called true names, everything coincided, everything came together,” says KGB counterintelligence veteran Igor Atamanenko.
After the ransomware was issued, there is no longer any doubt. The FBI agents understand that this is an “initiative” in front of them. This is what intelligence calls people who voluntarily cooperate. Polyakov receives the pseudonym Top Hat, that is, “Cylinder”. Later, the feds will hand it over to their colleagues at the CIA.
“To prove that he is not a setup, that he is a sincere “initiator,” he crossed what is called the Rubicon. The Americans understood this, because he gave away the most valuable thing that is in military intelligence and the foreign intelligence service. The Americans then understood: yes , hand over the cryptographers – there is no going back,” explains Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Beyond foul
Having crossed the line, Polyakov feels a pleasant chill from the danger, from the fact that he is walking on the edge of a knife. Later, after his arrest, the general admits: “At the heart of everything was my constant desire to work on the verge of risk, and the more dangerous, the more interesting my work became.” KGB Lieutenant Colonel Igor Atamanenko has written dozens of books about intelligence. He studied Polyakov’s case thoroughly, and this motive seems quite convincing to him.
“When he worked, his first business trip, he was a bureaucrat, he was not an intelligence officer. He took the most risks when he pulled chestnuts out of the fire for the central intelligence agency. That’s when the risk appeared, that’s when the adrenaline, that’s when this drive, you know, what is called now,” says Atamanenko.
Indeed, in New York Polyakov works under the cover of the Soviet embassy. He is not in danger, unlike the illegal immigrants whom he supervises, and who, if they fail, will lose everything. But is Polyakov really not enough of a risk, because in case of danger, he is obliged to cover his employees, if necessary - at the cost of his own life.
In the meeting room of the XX Congress of the CPSU in the Kremlin. First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev speaks. Photo: ITAR-TASS
“This happened when they rescued agents, when they rescued illegal employees, so there is every risk in intelligence, and to think that he had an bureaucratic job, when he had to work with intelligence officers, in intelligence - this no longer stands up to criticism,” says Alexander Bondarenko.
Polyakov does exactly the opposite. He turns over illegal immigrants unknown to him to the FBI. For a whole hour, Polyakov calls the names of Soviet intelligence officers, trying to convince of his sincerity, he drops the phrase: “I have not been promoted in more than six years.” So maybe this is the motive for revenge?
“Still, there was terrible rot, there was envy of other people, there was, it seems to me, a misunderstanding of why I am only a general, but others are already there, or why I am only a colonel, and others are already here, and there was this envy ", says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Homecoming"
Six months after recruitment, Polyakov’s stay in the United States ends. American counterintelligence offers to continue his work in the USSR and he agrees. June 9, 1962, a recruited GRU colonel returns to Moscow. But at home he panics, he flinches at every sound, and thinks about confessing everything.
"There were people who, in general, emerged from such difficult situations with honor and dignity. life situations who found the courage to come and say: “Yes, I behaved wrongly, I found myself in such a compromising situation, but, nevertheless, here I am, declaring that there was a recruitment approach, that there was an attempt to recruit me ", to the point that people were exempted from criminal liability," says Oleg Khlobustov.
However, the FBI seems to be reading his thoughts. If he hopes for forgiveness, he is informed that Agent Macy committed suicide. This is GRU captain Maria Dobrova. Polyakov handed it over just before his departure, as a parting gift. The traitor understands: he has gone too far, and there is no turning back.
“Only after Polyakov was exposed, he said that “I, too, turned her in, and then the FBI and the Americans told me that it means she chose to commit suicide,” maybe in order to make such a sting, and vice versa, tie it directly with blood, the blood of a devoted intelligence officer,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
Polyakov returns to Moscow with spy equipment and a whole suitcase of expensive gifts. Entering the bosses' offices, he generously hands out gold watches, cameras, and pearl jewelry. Realizing that he is beyond suspicion, he again gets in touch with the CIA. As he passes the US Embassy, he sends encoded information using a tiny transmitter.
In addition, Polyakov arranges hiding places in which he leaves microfilms with secret documents copied on them. Gorky Cultural Park - one of the caches, called "Art", was located here. Having sat down supposedly to rest, the spy, with an imperceptible movement, hid a container disguised as a brick behind the bench.
“Here is a park of culture and recreation, a lot of people are relaxing, noisy and cheerful crowds - then they came there to drink beer, relax, ride on a wheel - a respectable man sits, and on the bench he falls off and puts his hand, and the Americans receive a report,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
A conventional signal that the container has been taken away should be a strip of lipstick on the notice board near the Arbat restaurant, but there is none. Polyakov is overcome with horror. And only after several days, looking through the New York Times, he sees an advertisement in the private column.
The encrypted message says the following: "Letter from Art received." The spy breathes a sigh of relief. And yet, for what purpose is all this risk, all this effort?
It's all Khrushchev's fault
“The version is that Polyakov was an ardent “Stalinist,” and after the well-known persecution of Stalin began, when Khrushchev, whose hands were not only up to the elbows, but up to the shoulders in blood after the Ukrainian executions, he decided this way to wash off on the image of Stalin, you know, and this supposedly became so powerful psychological blow, according to Polyakov’s political worldviews,” says Viktor Baranets.
When Polyakov called the enemy headquarters, Nikita Khrushchev was in power in the USSR. His impulsive actions strain relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Khrushchev intimidates the West with his catchphrase: “We make rockets like sausages on an assembly line.”
“Under Khrushchev, the so-called “nuclear diplomacy” began. This is the development of missile weapons, this is a transition, a refusal, as it were, from surface ships and a transition, reliance on submarines armed with nuclear weapons. And so a certain bluff of Khrushchev began, in the sense that the Soviet The Union has a very powerful nuclear potential,” says Natalia Egorova.
Nikita Khrushchev on the podium, 1960. Photo: ITAR-TASS
But few people realize that this is a bluff. Adding fuel to the fire are Nikita Sergeevich’s crazy speeches at the UN in October 1960, during which he allegedly knocked on the table with his shoe, expressing disagreement with one of the speakers.
Doctor of Historical Sciences Natalia Egorova heads the Center for the Study of the Cold War in Russian Academy Sci. Having studied the facts about Khrushchev’s speech, she came to the conclusion that there was no shoe on the table, but there was an international scandal, and not a small one at that.
“In general, there were fists, a watch, but since Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was sitting next to him, he did not know how to behave in this situation, he supported Khrushchev, so the knocking was powerful. Plus, Khrushchev shouted all sorts of words of indignation,” - says Natalia Egorova.
According to some reports, during this speech, Polyakov stood behind Khrushchev. At that time he was working at the UN Military Staff Committee. The world is on the brink of a third world war, and all because of the quarrelsome secretary general. Perhaps it was then that the future spy became imbued with contempt for Khrushchev.
But Nikita Sergeevich will be dismissed in just a few years, and the activities of the record-breaking mole will not stop there. What if Polyakov hates not so much Khrushchev, but the entire Soviet ideology.
Genetic aversion
Military journalist Nikolai Poroskov writes about intelligence. He met with many people who personally knew the traitor, and accidentally discovered a little-known fact of his biography, and talks about it for the first time.
“Most likely, there is unconfirmed information that his ancestors were wealthy, his grandfather was there, maybe his father. The revolution disrupted everything, he had a genetic hostility to the existing system. I think that he worked on an ideological basis,” Poroskov believes.
But even if so, this hardly explains the betrayal. Alexander Bondarenko is a writer and historian of special services, winner of the Foreign Intelligence Service Award. He studied in detail the various motives for betrayal and confidently declares that ideology has nothing to do with it.
Peter Ivashutin
"Sorry, he fought against specific individuals. Sufficiently, still prepared, educated person, who understands that the system, by and large, is neither cold nor hot. He ratted out specific people,” Bondarenko claims.
Continuing to spy for the CIA, Polyakov tries to get him sent abroad again. It will be easier to work there. However, someone is nullifying all his efforts, and this someone, apparently, is General Ivashutin, who led military intelligence in those years.
“Peter Ivanovich said that he didn’t like Polyakov right away, he said: “He sits, looks at the floor, doesn’t look him in the eye.” Intuitively, he felt that the person was not very good, and he transferred him from the sphere of intelligence strategic intelligence, transferred him first to the selection of civilian personnel. That is, there weren’t very many state secrets there, and therefore Polyakov was cut off from them,” says Nikolai Poroskov.
Polyakov, apparently, guesses everything, and therefore buys the most expensive and impressive gifts for Ivashutin.
“Polyakov once brought Pyotr Ivanovich Ivashutin, from India, two colonial English soldiers carved from rare wood. Beautiful figures,” says Poroskov.
Alas, the bribery attempt fails. The general is not there. But Polyakov instantly figures out how to turn the situation in his favor. He is seeking to be sent abroad again. He knocks out this decision bypassing Ivashutin.
“When Pyotr Ivanovich was somewhere on a long business trip, or on vacation, there was an order to transfer him, again, back. Someone took responsibility, and in the end Polyakov, after the US there was a long break, then he was sent resident in India,” explains Nikolai Poroskov.
Double game
In 1973, Polyakov went to India as a resident. There he again launches active espionage activities, convincing his colleagues that he is taking on the American diplomat James Flint, and is actually transmitting information through him to the CIA. At the same time, not only does no one suspect him, he also receives a promotion.
"And how? What kind of safe conduct does he have - 1419 days at the front. Wounds, military awards- medals and the Order of the Red Star. Plus, by that time, he had already become a general: in 1974 he was awarded the rank of general,” says Igor Atamanenko.
In order for Polyakov to receive the rank of general, the CIA had to spend a little money. The criminal case involves expensive gifts he made to the head of the personnel service, Izotov.
“This was the head of the personnel department of the entire GRU, named Izotov. Polyakov communicated with him, since promotions and so on depended on him. But the most famous gift that was discovered was the silver service. In Soviet times, this was God knows what. Well, a gun he gave it to him because he himself was fond of hunting, and Izotov seemed to be fond of it,” says Nikolai Poroskov.
The rank of general provides Polyakov with access to materials that are not related to his direct duties. The traitor receives information about three American officers working for the Soviet Union. And one more valuable agent - Frank Bossard, an employee of the British Air Force.
“There was a certain Frank Bossard - this is an Englishman. This is not an American, this is an Englishman who was involved in the implementation, testing of guided missiles. At one time, he handed over, again, not to Polyakov, he handed over to another officer of the main intelligence department, photographs technological processes“: how the tests are carried out - in short, he conveyed a set of secret information,” says Igor Atamanenko.
Polyakov retakes the photographs sent by Bossard and forwards them to the CIA. The agent is immediately identified. Bossard receives 20 years in prison. But Polyakov doesn’t stop there. He pulls out a list of military technologies that are being obtained through intelligence efforts in the West.
“In the late 70-80s, a ban was imposed on the sale to Russia, the Soviet Union, of all kinds of military technologies, of any kind. And even some small parts that fell under this technology were blocked by the Americans and were not sold. Polyakov said that there are five thousand directions that help the Soviet Union buy this secret technology from countries through dummies, through third states. And so it was, indeed, and the Americans immediately cut off the oxygen," says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Death of a son
What is Polyakov trying to achieve? To whom and for what does he take revenge? His career is going well: he has a wonderful family, a beloved wife, and a couple of sons. But few people know that this family experienced great pain.
In the early 50s, Dmitry Fedorovich works undercover in New York. During these years, his first child is born. But soon after birth, the boy finds himself near death. Only an urgent and expensive operation can save him. Polyakov turns to the station management for help. But no money is sent, and the child dies.
"And you understand, here it is clear that under the influence of these waters negative emotions the man himself decided: “You are like this with me, there is no money for the operation, which means there is no one to save. What kind of native organization is this, the main intelligence department, which cannot give me some crumbs, especially knowing the budget of this monster.” Of course, the indignation knew no bounds,” says Igor Atamanenko.
It turns out that, wanting to avenge his son, Polyakov offers his services to the American intelligence services. But the child died in the early 50s, many years before recruitment.
"Polyakov himself did not focus attention on this circumstance, and I think that it did not play a dominant role. Why? Because at the moment when he committed an act of betrayal at the age of 40, he already had two children, and probably he should have think about their future, about their fate, and probably, after all, this was not the dominant motive,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
In addition, he cannot help but understand the GRU's motives for refusal, which were far from ordinary greed. A well-known military observer, retired colonel Viktor Baranets, seriously studied the events of Polyakov’s first trip to the United States and drew his own conclusions.
“The situation developed that precisely at the time when Polyakov’s son’s illness reached its peak, Polyakov was leading one very important operation. And the need arose to either send him to the Soviet Union with his wife and child, and distract this work, or allow him to treat his son in the USA,” explains Baranets.
While the child is in serious condition, the Soviet intelligence agency is faced with a dilemma: to operate on the baby in Moscow or in the States. Both threaten to disrupt the intelligence operation in which Polyakov is participating. Most likely, the GRU calculated and prepared safe ways for him to save the child.
“And if you are treated in New York, it means that the father and mother will go to the New York clinic, and this means that contacts there are inevitable, there may be a substitute doctor there. You understand, everything needs to be calculated here, and so far Moscow has put up these subtle chess – time passed,” says Viktor Baranets.
Unfortunately, the child dies. However, Polyakov, apparently, understands very well that this death is a tribute to his dangerous profession. There is another important fact: in the 50s, having learned about the death of a boy, the FBI pursued Polyakov, trying to recruit him. He is under close surveillance. They create unbearable working conditions for him. Even the police issue huge fines for no reason.
“The first business trip was indicative. The Americans tried to make a recruiting approach to him. That’s why - it’s very difficult to say, because recruiting approaches are made only to those who gave the reason for recruitment. This is such an iron rule. That means they watched, that means they looked, that means They probably knew about the incident with their son,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
But then, in the 50s, Polyakov resolutely rejected recruitment attempts. He is forced to ask to be sent home, and in 1956 he leaves New York.
“Yes, his child died. Yes, someone didn’t give money for this. This is the official version, that is, all it takes is just one piece of paper to disappear from the boss’s desk or from the safe, and the boss could be very far away. Or a car accident , or anything, but you can come up with anything if you really want to take revenge. But to take revenge completely on those people who did nothing to you is clearly a different reason,” says Alexander Bondarenko.
Around and around
However, there is another equally significant question in this story: who and when first got on the trail of the “mole”? How and with what help was Polyakov managed to expose? There are many versions on this matter. The well-known historian of the special services, Nikolai Dolgopolov, is sure that Leonid Shebarshin was the first to suspect Polyakov; he was the deputy KGB resident in India just when Dmitry Fedorovich was working there.
“Their meeting took place in India, and in 1974, if Shebarshin’s remarks had been paid attention to then, perhaps the arrest would have occurred not in ’87, but much earlier,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
President of the Russian National Economic Security Service Leonid Shebarshin. Photo: ITAR-TASS
Shebarshin draws attention to the fact that in India Polyakov does much more than his position requires of him.
“A man of his profession, in fact, should be doing this - meeting with diplomats, and so on - but Colonel Polyakov had a lot of sources. There were a lot of meetings. Often these meetings lasted a very long time, and the PSU foreign intelligence paid attention to this ", explains Dolgopolov.
But this is not the only thing that worries Shebarshin. He notices that Polyakov does not like his colleagues from foreign intelligence, and on occasion tries to expel them from India. One gets the impression that they are somehow bothering him, but in public he is very friendly with them and loudly praises them.
“Another point that Shebarshin found rather strange (I’m not saying suspicious - strange) is that always and everywhere and with everyone, Polyakov, except his subordinates, tried to be a close friend. He literally imposed his relationship, he tried to show "that he is a kind and good person. Shebarshin could see that this was a game," says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Finally, Shebarshin decides to talk frankly about Polyakov with his leadership. However, his suspicions seem to hit a wall. They don’t even think of arguing with him, but no one is letting things move forward.
“Yes, there were people in the structures of the GRU, they occupied small positions there, majors, lieutenant colonels, who more than once came across certain facts in Polyakov’s work that raised doubts. But again, this damned self-confidence of the leadership of the then Main Intelligence Directorate, it often , I will emphasize this word - often forced the then leadership of the GRU to brush aside these suspicions,” says Viktor Baranets.
Unexpected puncture
So far it is impossible to expose Polyakov. He acts like a high-class professional and does not make mistakes. Instantly destroys evidence. He has ready answers to all questions. And who knows, perhaps he would have gotten away with it if not for the mistakes made by his masters in the CIA. At the end of the 70s, a book by counterintelligence director James Angleton was published in America.
James Angleton
“He suspected every person who worked in his department. He did not believe that there were people like Polyakov who did this out of absolutely some kind of conviction,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Angleton did not even consider it necessary to hide information about Polyakov, because he was sure: agent “Bourbon” - as the agent was called in the CIA - was a setup for Soviet intelligence. Naturally, Angleton’s literary opus is read to the gills at the GRU.
“He set up and, completely, I think, by accident, Polyakov, said that there was such an agent in the Soviet UN mission or there was such an agent, and there was another agent, that is, two agents at once. This, of course, could not but alarm people who such things should be read as a matter of duty,” explains Dolgopolov.
Was Angleton's book the last straw that overflowed the cup of patience, or rather trust? Or maybe the GRU received some more evidence against Polyakov? Be that as it may, in 1980 his prosperity ended. The traitor is urgently summoned from Delhi to Moscow, and here he is allegedly diagnosed with a heart disease, due to which foreign travel is contraindicated.
“It was necessary to somehow get Polyakov out of Delhi. They created a commission. This did not surprise him, because all the time those who work abroad are checked quite regularly. And he was also checked and found out that his health was not good. Polyakov immediately became suspicious something was wrong, and in order to return back to India, he passed another commission, and this alarmed people even more. He wanted to return so badly. And in fact, at that very moment, it was decided to part with him, "says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Polyakov is unexpectedly transferred to the Pushkin Institute of Russian Literature. His task is to take a closer look at the foreigners who study there. In fact, they simply decided to keep the spy away from state secrets.
“He is worn out, his nerves are strained to the limit. Every sneeze, whisper behind his back is already turning into the rattling of handcuffs. It already seems that they are handcuffs rattling. Well, then, when he was sent to the Institute of the Russian Language, well, everything became clear to him.” , says Igor Atamanenko.
And yet, there is not a single convincing evidence against Polyakov. He continues to work in the GRU as secretary of the party committee. Here the retiree can easily identify illegal intelligence officers who have gone on long business trips. They are absent from party meetings and do not pay dues. Information about such people is immediately sent to the CIA. Polyakov is sure that this time suspicions passed him by. But he is wrong. The State Security Committee is forced to intervene in the matter.
“In the end, it turned out that the documents ended up on the desk of the then head of the KGB, and he set the matter in motion. External surveillance was installed, all the counterintelligence services of all departments worked together. The technicians worked. And the “surveillance” discovered some things. I think that “It seems to me that some hiding places were also discovered in Polyakov’s country house, otherwise they would not have taken him so confidently,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
"Spy, get out!"
In June 1986, Polyakov noticed a chipped tile in his kitchen. He understands that the house was searched. After some time, in his apartment he hears phone call. Polyakov picks up the phone. The rector of the Military Diplomatic Academy personally invites him to speak to the graduates - future intelligence officers. The traitor breathes a sigh of relief. Yes, they looked for hiding places in his apartment, but they didn’t find anything, otherwise he wouldn’t have been invited to the academy.
"Polyakov immediately began to call back and find out who else had received an invitation. Because, who knows, maybe they are going to tie him up under this pretext. When he called several of his colleagues, among whom were also participants in the Great Patriotic War , and established that yes, they were all invited to the celebration at the Military Diplomatic Academy, he calmed down,” says Igor Atamanenko.
Detention of Dmitry Polyakov
But in the building of the military-diplomatic academy at the checkpoint, a capture group is waiting for him. Polyakov understands that this is the end.
“And they immediately took me to Lefortovo, and immediately put me in front of the investigator. This is what they call in Alpha - they call it “shock therapy”. And when a person is in such shock, he begins to tell the truth,” - says Atamanenko.
So what prompted Polyakov to commit a monstrous betrayal? None of the versions sounded convincing enough. The general did not seek to enrich himself. Khrushchev was, by and large, indifferent to him. And he hardly blamed his colleagues for the death of his son.
“You know, having spent a long time analyzing the origins of betrayal, the root causes of betrayal, these starting psychological platforms that force a person to betray his homeland, I came to the conclusion that there is one side to betrayal that has not yet been studied by either journalists or by the intelligence officers themselves, not by psychologists, not by doctors, and so on,” says Viktor Baranets.
Viktor Baranets carefully studied the investigation materials in the Polyakov case. In addition, based on personal observations, he was able to make an interesting discovery.
“It is the desire to betray, to have two faces, and to enjoy even this. Today you are in the service of such a gallant officer, a patriot. You walk among people, and they do not suspect that you are a traitor. And a person experiences the highest concentration of adrenaline in his consciousness, in general in the body. Betrayal is a whole complex of reasons, one of which serves as a small mental reactor, which turns on this vile complex of human actions that makes a person betray,” Baranets believes.
Perhaps this version explains everything: the thirst for risk, hatred of colleagues, and inflated self-esteem. However, even the most inveterate Judas can turn out to be a faithful and devoted family man. Over the years of his espionage activities, the general was repeatedly offered to flee to America, but Polyakov invariably refused Uncle Sam’s invitation. Why? This is another unsolved mystery.
It is clear that betrayals took place in the history of the USSR, and in this case I would like to talk specifically about subversive betrayal, which literally helped the enemy side win some victories during the Cold War. It is not necessary to talk about all such figures in this situation; we can focus on the main ones.
It is clear that there were other aspects: economic, political, social, which, it must be said, still played a significant role in the collapse of the USSR. But we should also not forget about the “subversives” who caused damage to the state through actions, and not through “ideologies” or “dissidence.”
Moreover, we will mainly talk about the period of “stability”, i.e. already since the 60s. Their subversive activities were indeed very dangerous for the state. On the one hand, this is technology, and on the other, intelligence of the USSR and the KGB.
Petr Semenovich Popov
Participant of the Great Patriotic War, later colonel of the Soviet army. There are two versions of why he began to cooperate with the CIA: 1) he himself contacted the CIA; 2) he was kidnapped by CIA agents and threatened that they would take him to the United States, and there he would be tried. So he was forced to cooperate.
It is difficult to say which version corresponds to reality, but the fact is that Popov began to actively collaborate since 1954. Moreover, his activities were very generously paid for in the USA, so the first version is much more plausible than the second.
Popov betrayed USSR agents who worked in Austria, as well as some secrets of general intelligence work. It should be noted that he simply did not have access to more information. Then he was sent back to Moscow. He did not enter into contact with the CIA on the territory of the USSR. Then he was sent on a business trip again, but this time to the GDR, where he immediately contacted the CIA. There, of course, he shared any possible information.
USSR intelligence became interested in Popov back in the GDR, as suspicious actions, including letters, were noticed. Therefore, he was recalled back to the USSR, and he was already under surveillance in his homeland.
Some CIA secretary, apparently stupidly, sent Popov a letter with instructions and money directly to his registration address in the USSR! The letter, naturally, was intercepted and there was no longer any doubt that Popov was an agent.
However, he was not immediately arrested, because they decided that he would lead to the trail of CIA officers or other agents. And for some time, some meetings were indeed recorded. However, at the beginning of 1959 he was arrested. He ratted out everyone he knew, trying to negotiate an acquittal, but the court ordered him to be shot.
Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky
Before the crime is solved - Colonel of the Main Intelligence Directorate! According to British intelligence historian Andrew, Penkovsky was:
"the largest British intelligence agent in the ranks of the Soviet intelligence services"
His business was incomprehensible to many, since his biography was quite ordinary, there were significant successes. Soviet military man, participant in the Great Patriotic War. He rose to an honorary title, but still ended up committing treason.
In reality, he was pursuing a commercial interest. In particular, he planned to work for several years for the British intelligence MI5 and the CIA, and then escape and live happily abroad. This is precisely the goal that Penkovsky initially pursued. Moreover, he was on friendly terms with the head of the GRU, Serov, which he also often took advantage of.
In 1960, Penkovsky met with Greville Wynne and offered his “services.” It is clear that Wynne, as an MI5 agent, happily accepted Penkovsky’s offer and promised to open an account in a UK bank, and also after a certain period to help escape from the USSR.
According to Gordievsky:
“Penkovsky returned from his first trip to London on May 6, 1961. He brought with him a miniature Minox camera and a transistor radio. He managed to transfer 111 Minox films to the West, on which 5,500 documents were shot with a total volume of 7,650 pages. During three business trips to London and Paris, he was interrogated for a total of 140 hours, the reports on which took up 1,200 pages of typewritten text. According to his tip, if you believe the documents published in the West, 600 Soviet intelligence officers were “burned”, 50 of them were GRU officers.”
Those. the damage from his actions was truly noticeable. But he was unable to engage in such activities for a long time. He did not take into account the fact that his signalmen were already under surveillance. It was one of the contacts that led to Penkovsky.
As a result, already in 1962, Penkovsky was arrested. By court decision he was sentenced to death.
Leonid Georgievich Poleshchuk
Also very interesting case. Poleshchuk entered the service of the USSR KGB in foreign intelligence in the early 70s. At first he was successful. However, subsequently he literally degenerated.
In particular, he had quite frequent business trips, where he soon began to abuse first alcoholic beverages, and then gambling, and it apparently reached the point of pathological addiction (“gambling addiction”).
It all got to the point that during another business trip to Nepal, Poleshchuk lost about 5,000 Nepalese rupees. This cannot be said to be an exorbitant amount (about $300), but the authorities would have noticed such waste, since Poleshchuk took the money from the station’s cash desk. It is obvious that if they are not convicted for this, they will be fired from the KGB.
He did not want to lose his job and therefore found contacts with US representatives. The US resident in Nepal, of course, immediately agreed to cooperate and, it seems, immediately allocated the required amount. Poleshchuk then betrayed all the USSR agents who worked in Nepal.
It’s interesting, but when Poleshchuk learned that his business trip was coming to an end, he told informants from the United States that from now on he would cease cooperation, i.e. flatly refused to give out information from the USSR. And indeed, for 10 years, while he was in the USSR, no information was received from him personally in the United States.
However, then, when he went on a business trip again, but this time to Nigeria, he contacted US residents and again offered his services. He probably decided to play there too. gambling, therefore, for a fee, he handed over to the CIA all the agents who worked in Nigeria.
However, this time he did not stay in place for long, and before heading back, he decided to cooperate with the intelligence services from the USSR. Apparently, he thought that it was safer now than at that time. However, he miscalculated. He was unable to cooperate in the USSR for a long time.
In fact, he spent several months as a CIA officer in the USSR. Counterintelligence quickly got on his trail. They probably learned about his adventures while on a business trip and began to follow him. In fact, he was caught on the spot when he wanted to take instructions and money from the cache. According to the verdict of the Supreme Court, he was shot.
Vladimir Ippolitovich Vetrov
This man managed to rise to the rank of lieutenant colonel of the first main directorate of the KGB of the USSR.
It is clear that even suspicion of such a person is in many ways impossible, and this is what allowed him to engage in subversive activities for some time.
The origins should be sought in France, where he was sent for the purpose of scientific and technical exploration. He had to look for scientists who were loyal to the USSR and find out about new developments. In fact, he contacted the scientist Jacques Prevost, but did not know that he was collaborating with the French intelligence services. So now Vetrov himself finds himself in the field of interest.
And he was an interesting subject, given his love for luxury, as well as alcoholic beverages. Soon he somehow crashes the official car, and asks Prevost for help so that the authorities do not find out. He agrees and believes that now Vetrov is, as they say, “in his pocket.” However, the car was repaired, but Vetrov’s business trip came to an end, and the French intelligence services were unable to take advantage of the fact that he was now in debt.
After this, Vetrov was sent to Canada, where he was able to completely compromise himself. Obviously, this was due to an addiction to alcohol, expensive things and cars, or he made some other mistake.
In general, now he remains in Russia, and in a fairly serious position. His tasks included the analysis of scientific and technical information that came from abroad. After all, the person had experience, so they decided to use it, but to control it.
In 1981, he was tired of such a boring life, and he decided to make a deal with French intelligence. He finds a representative of the French company Schlumberger and through him secretly transfers a letter to Jacques Prevost. It already says that he agrees, for a certain fee, to transfer secret information.
It is clear that the French agreed to a deal, and thus counterintelligence was carried out, not only in France, but also in many countries of the world. In total, Vetrov handed over about 4,000 secret documents to the intelligence services, including lists of USSR agents who were disguised as “diplomats” around the world.
Then Vetrov fully revealed the work scheme of scientific and technical intelligence of the USSR. And he named 70 names that were sources for Soviet intelligence in different countries of the world, i.e. foreign agents of the USSR, as well as 450 USSR intelligence officers.
After the information provided most of people who were on the lists were expelled from these countries. During his period of activity as an agent of France, Vetrov was never revealed.
But he did not act for very long in total; it even seems that less than a year. After all, already at the beginning of 1982, a strange incident occurred: Vetrov was drinking champagne in his car with his mistress, and he Windshield a KGB officer knocked. It’s difficult to understand what he told him, but Vetrov stabbed him with a knife. This was the kind of man he was.
He was detained immediately and then sentenced to 15 years with deprivation of military rank and awards. Two years later, it turned out that Mr. Vetrov was an employee of Western intelligence services. It was an information leak. As a result, his case was reclassified (“Treason to the Motherland”), and at a new trial he was sentenced to death.
Vladimir Alexandrovich Piguzov
Lieutenant Colonel of the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, as well as Secretary of the Party Committee of the Red Banner Institute of the KGB of the USSR named after Yu. V. Andropov. If you look at it this way, it seems that a person is impeccable, because all this must be earned.
However, he also betrayed him. But this case somewhat different from the others. At first, in Indonesia, where Piguzov was on a business trip, CIA agents tried to contact him. However, he rejected their offer and immediately reported to his superiors that they were trying to recruit him. After which he was quickly recalled from his business trip and transferred to long clerical work.
After some time, they began to send him on business trips again. This time in the USA.
An incomprehensible incident occurred there, which was the basis for blackmail by the intelligence services. It’s hard to say what’s contraindicated. The most common version is that Piguzov used the services of a prostitute, and the secret services filmed it all on video and blackmailed him.
He decided to accept the offer. During the course of espionage, he collected some information - primarily on agents and spies abroad, including future ones, since he was related to the institute. However, not very impressive when compared with other similar figures. As a result, already in the 80s, he was sent again on a business trip to the United States, where he conveyed information.
Soon he was betrayed by a secret agent of the USSR, who was formally a US agent.
Piguzov did not have time to do much, but he undoubtedly caused damage to intelligence. By court decision, he was shot in 1986.
Adolf Georgievich Tolkachev
Tolkachev is different from most of the spies cited. Most of them were directly related to KGB intelligence, but Tolkachev was an engineer in the field of radar and aviation, who had access to secret information.
It must be said that he received a salary quite high for a citizen of the USSR and even for a scientist - 350 rubles a month, and he lived in a high-rise building, right next to the US Embassy.
He tried to contact the United States for a long time, and when he finally got in touch, they did not believe him for a long time, and they believed that he was specially sent in order to discredit the United States. However, then Tolkachev gave the US representative an explanatory letter, where he presented himself as almost the most ardent opponent of the USSR, ready to fight for the idea.
However, in practice everything turned out differently. He received the highest fees for his activities (when compared with other informers), and also planned to flee to the United States.
He worked for the USA for about 6 years. He managed to transfer secret developments and technologies in the field of controlling the electronic systems of some Soviet aircraft, which caused quite a lot of damage to the USSR.
We found his trail completely by accident. Tolkachev's handler, Edward Lee Howard, was fired from the CIA for numerous thefts of property and drug addiction. Soon he defected to the USSR side and handed over all the agents known to him. Among them was Tolkachev. It is clear that on the basis of Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, Tolkachev was sentenced to death.
Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov
Perhaps Polyakov was the most important source for the CIA, since he, unlike most similar figures, had the most meaningful information, by virtue of his position (and Polyakov rose to the rank of Major General of the Main Intelligence Directorate).
And if other spies could only rat out their colleagues, Polyakov could rat out people he didn’t even need to meet directly. Because he had access to secret information.
Polyakov took part in the Great Patriotic War. For courage and heroism he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War and the Red Star. After the war, he graduated from the Frunze Academy and was then sent to the Main Intelligence Directorate.
Then he was sent to work in the USA. In those years, his son became seriously ill, and he needed money for an operation (in the USA). The GRU did not allocate the money, after which US representatives offered to pay for his treatment, but for “information.” Polyakov refused, and the child soon died.
A few years later, when Polyakov came to the United States again, he himself came and offered his services to the FBI. At the first meeting, he immediately revealed several encryption workers. At the next meeting, he already handed over 47 GRU and KGB officers who worked in the United States.
Then he began to consistently hand over a variety of agents of the USSR, including simply foreigners who were loyal to the regime and were potential people for recruitment. In fact, this made Polyakov one of the most valuable spies for the United States. Also, when it was known that Polyakov would soon leave the United States, he agreed to cooperate with the CIA and provide a variety of data already on the territory of the USSR.
No one in the USSR even suspected that Polyakov could be a traitor. In fact, he only grew up the career ladder. Soon after his arrival, he already becomes a senior officer of the 3rd Directorate of the GRU. His tasks included supervising agents of the GRU intelligence apparatus in New York and Washington. That is, as you can understand, he had important information for the United States in terms of intelligence.
Soon, Polyakov’s name was mentioned in the Los Angeles Times newspaper as an employee of the USSR GRU. It is clear that no one extradited him, it was simply said that he was working against the United States in the interests of the USSR as an intelligence officer, and therefore the USSR decided that he could no longer work through the United States, and sent Polyakov to work in the countries of Asia and Africa and the Middle East. Soon he became the head in this direction.
In fact, during all his active work, he was never caught. And in 1980, Polyakov retired “for health reasons,” but he became a civilian employee in the GRU personnel department, and received access to all personal files of employees.
True, in last years he was no longer working so actively. He was detained only in 1986. Moreover, during all this time, despite such destructive activities for USSR intelligence, no one suspected him that he could, in principle, work for the United States.
Moreover, when he was betrayed by an American CIA agent, they did not immediately believe him. We were only convinced during a search of the apartment, where instructions and even spy equipment were found. By decision of the court, Polyakov was shot.
In 1994, in one of the issues of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, I came across an article “Why is a spy laundered?” about former GRU general Dmitry Polyakov. According to the author of the article, General D. Polyakov long time collaborated with US intelligence services, after which CIA officer Aldrich Ames betrayed him to the Soviet KGB. The newspaper referred to the Times magazine and claimed that D. Polyakov entered the service of the Americans for ideological reasons.
Back in 1961, D. Polyakov worked under official cover at the UN Military Staff Committee in New York. But in fact he was the deputy resident of Soviet military intelligence in New York. During these years, D. Polyakov offered his services to the FBI.
According to his intelligence colleagues, D. Polyakov was a rude, hot-tempered, stubborn and extremely ambitious officer. Above all, he valued himself, so without any hesitation he “surrendered” those with whom he worked hand in hand, including an employee under the guise of the USSR representative office. In addition, D. Polyakov reported to the FBI all the information known to him about the Soviet illegal intelligence network in the United States. In total, during his life as a spy, he betrayed 19 illegal intelligence officers and more than 150 agents to the United States, and fully revealed the affiliation of about 1,500 officers to the Soviet military and foreign intelligence. Many of those whom he so mercilessly betrayed later ended up behind prison bars. There were even tragic outcomes, suicides and so on.
An example of this is the fate of Soviet military intelligence captain Maria Dobrova. In her younger years, she was an actress, fought in Spain, and after returning to the USSR she expressed a desire to work in intelligence. After graduating from intelligence school, she went to work illegally in the United States. In America, she bought a beauty salon, which was often visited by women of high-ranking military personnel and representatives of large business circles. From conversations with them, Maria Dobrova learned a lot of things that interested the GRU. In the end, D. Polyakov gave her away, and she committed suicide.
During one of the interrogations in a Soviet court, D. Polyakov said that he collaborated with the FBI almost from the very beginning. Being associated with the FBI, D. Polyakov did not take significant amounts of money, as he had learned the lessons of Soviet intelligence. A lot of money is a very serious suspicion, and the USSR counterintelligence will find out about it anyway.
According to Time magazine, D. Polyakov, as a rule, gave gifts to those people who informed him necessary information and assisted in his career advancement in the GRU. According to the same Time magazine, one of D. Polyakov’s patrons was the deputy chief of the GRU for personnel, Lieutenant General S.I. Izotov. Allegedly thanks to S.I. For Izotov and his “recruiters” from the CIA, Polyakov’s promotion proceeded quite quickly. Due to the nature of his service, he knew a lot about military and state secrets, and therefore the damage he caused to the USSR is immeasurable. CIA chief James Woolsey says of the former GRU general: “Of all the secret agents still recruited during the Cold War, Polyakov was the jewel in the crown.” And data on China’s relations with the USSR allowed the then US President R. Nixon to successfully pave the way to China.
Another well-known newspaper, Moskovsky Komsomolets, writes about the connections of GRU officers with the Israeli intelligence service Massad. The newspaper claims that GRU Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Tkachenko and several GRU colleagues actively collaborated with Israeli intelligence for two years. It began in 1995, and one day counterintelligence officers caught red-handed retired GRU colonel Volkov while he was handing over secret slides depicting the territory of Middle Eastern countries to Massad employee Reuen Dinel. Dinel was a legal representative of Massad in Moscow and had accreditation with the FSB and SVR. And naturally, he maintained contacts with many officers of our special services, including the GRU, including Colonel Volkov. However, the GRU leadership was aware of their relationship, since Volkov regularly received GRU approval for contact with Daniel.
Volkov in those years served in the Space Intelligence Center of the GRU of the General Staff, and in 1993 he retired from the GRU. Then Colonel Volkov got a job as deputy general director interindustry association "Sovinformsputnik". His new place of work attracted the interest of a representative of the Israeli intelligence service Massad, Daniel, who was ready to pay any money just to gain access to secret GRU materials. Volkov accepted the money offered by Daniel with pleasure. Over two years (1993–1995), Colonel Volkov sold Daniel 186 slides captured by space photographic equipment. They depicted the cities of the Middle East and Israel in great detail.
Volkov was helped by two of his former colleagues at the Space Intelligence Center - GRU lieutenant colonels Sporyshev and Tkachenko. These officers transferred to Massad a significant number of photographs taken by the GRU space reconnaissance forces. For his services, Volkov received several hundred thousand dollars, part of the money he paid to his accomplices - Sporyshev and Tkachenko.
When Volkov was arrested, the court was unable to prove his guilt because the slides did not have the necessary stamps that are placed on secret documents. Volkov stated in court that he did not know about their secrecy, and he transferred the money received for services from Massad to one of charitable foundations. Thus, Colonel Volkov got away unscathed. Two other intelligence officers had to take the rap for his deeds, who could not reject the obvious: that the slides were a state secret, and Tkachenko and Sporyshev were well aware. As for V. Tkachenko, he was accused of two counts: disclosure of state secrets and abuse of official powers. And the court made a fair decision, finding him completely guilty.
The interest of foreign intelligence services in space survey materials held by Russian departments will never disappear. Only in the last decade have the FSB stopped a number of attempts by foreign intelligence services to gain access to documents of this kind. For example, in March 1995, in the Pskov region, about 30 thousand secret topographic maps of the Russian General Staff were discovered in the Ikarus, traveling from Russia to Estonia. Counterintelligence officers detained Estonian Angs Kesk and stateless person Boris Nikonov, who admitted that they were supposed to deliver maps to the topographic service of the Estonian defense forces for US citizen Alexander Leismant. During the investigation, it was possible to establish that the cards were stolen from a military unit located in the Moscow region.
One more example. Senior staff officer of the Orenburg Army Missile Forces strategic purpose Igor Dudnik decided to sell information about the missile army control scheme. I. Dudnik valued his material at half a million dollars. Dudnik was arrested by our counterintelligence and appeared before a military tribunal. In Fig. 2.15 indicates some of the names of traitors and spies who worked in the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR and the Russian Federation.
In conclusion, I would like to name a number of US organizations that, to one degree or another, carried out military intelligence activities in the Soviet Union. The list of such organizations is indicated by the author in Fig. 2.26.