23. USSR in the Second World War. The history of homeland

23. USSR in World War II

The historiography of the war until the mid-1980s was extremely ideological, dogmatic and opportunistic. Standard formulations and assessments of events migrated from book to book. Sometimes they changed to please the ruling officials. Under Stalin, much was written about the generalissimo’s military genius; under Brezhnev, the events near Novorossiysk occupied almost the central place in the war. Documents and the names of government and military figures were falsified and suppressed. Although significant factual material on military history had been accumulated, there were serious works on the history of the war, the work of the rear, many problems remained outside the scope of scientific research. While in other countries participating in the Second World War, general works in dozens of volumes were created, losses of up to one soldier were calculated, and the history of almost every company was written.

Starting from the second half of the 80s, the situation with the study of the Great Patriotic War began to improve. New sources, works of foreign authors have been published, some memoirs of Soviet military commanders and economic leaders have been published without distortion, new and different approaches to the most important problems of this period have appeared: Soviet-German relations in the pre-war period, the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army at the first stage, the role of the allies and their supplies , sources of Victory, etc. There is a refusal of unambiguous assessments. Historians have paid attention to new problems - collaborationism, mass consciousness during the war, etc.

23.1. On the eve of the war

The causes and origins of the Great Patriotic War should certainly be sought in the complex tangle of international relations of the pre-war years, especially in the events of 1939, which culminated in the division of Poland and the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus (September 1939), the war with Finland (November 1939). - March 1940), inclusion of the Baltic states, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia into the USSR (summer 1940). All these actions clearly confirm Stalin's imperial aspirations during this period.

Among the arguments in favor of rapprochement with Germany, apparently, was the calculation of taking advantage of the contradictions in the camp of imperialism. Stalin hoped that the war between the two imperialist groups would lead to the weakening of both Germany and England and France, which the Soviet Union could take advantage of.

Thus, assessing the actions of the parties in 1939, it should be said: responsibility for the fact that the opportunity to create a system of collective security in Europe and thereby prevent the outbreak of the Second World War was missed falls on both England and France, and on the leadership of the Soviet Union . The relationship between the parties developed in an atmosphere of mistrust and secret plans. Each side tried to solve its problems at the expense of the other. As a result, the Nazi Reich was the winner, having avoided a war on two fronts and began to implement its plans for territorial conquests in Europe.

Of course, the Soviet leadership understood the inevitability of war with Germany and prepared the country for this war. The period of actual cooperation with the Nazi Reich was quite short. Already in November 1940, a gradual cooling of Soviet-German relations was observed. The USSR is making diplomatic moves (albeit very cautious) for the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, the entry of German troops into Romania and Finland and other similar actions.

The preparations for war are also evidenced by the internal policies of the Soviet leadership: tightening legislation in the field of labor relations, introducing criminal liability for violations in this area. Efforts were made to equip the army with modern technology; strengthening the officer corps (in 1940, 42 new military schools were created, the number of students at military academies was almost doubled, and numerous courses for training junior lieutenants were established).

In the spring of 1941, a wide stream of information flowed to the Soviet leadership about Germany’s preparations for an attack on the USSR. This was reported by Soviet intelligence officers from different countries, figures of the international communist movement, information about this went through diplomatic channels. Closer to the summer, the exact date of Germany's attack on the USSR even became known - June 22, 1941. But at the same time, a number of steps by Stalin and his entourage in the last pre-war months may cause bewilderment. Already having an idea of ​​​​Hitler's intentions, Stalin concludes a trade agreement with Germany on January 10, 1941, according to which he supplies it with food and strategic raw materials. Diplomatic representatives of Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia are expelled from Moscow. Thus, the Soviet Union seems to agree with the inclusion of these countries in the German Reich. And the most odious step:

TASS message dated June 14, 1941, which spoke of the invariably friendly relations of the USSR with Germany. The message published in the press clearly disoriented the population and was seemingly illogical on the eve of the inevitable war with Germany. This also includes permission for the Germans to “search for the graves” of German soldiers who died in the First World War and were buried on our territory. As a result, just before the war, groups of German intelligence officers walked around the rear of our troops under the guise of “searching for graves.” The air defense forces were forbidden to shoot down German planes that repeatedly violated our airspace and freely conducted reconnaissance.

The most common point of view explaining all these “oddities” is as follows. Stalin perfectly understood the country’s unpreparedness for war and wanted to delay it, to gain some more time to increase its defense capability. And for this it was decided to demonstrate friendliness towards Germany, so as not to give it a reason to start a war. Moreover, ultimately, the fear of provocations and the desire to avoid war in 1941 grew in Stalin into a manic confidence in the fulfillment of this desire, into “blinded stubbornness”, which comes into conflict with the arguments of the mind. As a result, Stalin, despite all the information that came to him in the last days and hours before the German attack and testified to the imminent outbreak of war, did not dare to take the only right step - to bring the army into full combat readiness and declare mobilization.

Recently, the theory of Germany's preventive war against the Soviet Union, set out in a number of books by V. Suvorov, has become widely circulated and has caused great controversy. According to this theory, Stalin really wanted to delay the time the USSR entered the war and was ready to pay the highest price for this. But he did not need this time to prepare the country for defense. Stalin hoped to strike Germany himself. This desire is actually a logical conclusion to the actions of the Soviet leadership in 1939-1940. By concluding a non-aggression pact in 1939, Stalin hoped that Germany and England and France would exhaust each other in a protracted war. And the Soviet Union will join the war at the final stage, defeating both weakened capitalist groups and realizing the long-standing Bolshevik dream of a world revolution in the Stalinist sense.

And in the spring of 1941, the Soviet leadership (or rather, Stalin personally) presumably decided to begin preparations for the USSR’s attack on Europe, weakened by the war. In making such an important decision, the ideas of Stalin and his entourage about the nature of the war and the prospects for its development allegedly played a role. It was assessed as imperialist, and it was predicted that it would inevitably develop into revolutionary, i.e. Stalin hoped that the working people of European countries, dissatisfied with the hardships of wartime, would oppose their governments and support the offensive of the Red Army. No wonder at the turn of 1940-1941. There is an intensification of the activities of the Comintern in the countries occupied by Germany.

A number of facts seem to indicate that the USSR is preparing for an offensive: the appointment in 1941 of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, the winner at Khalkhin Gol, who showed himself well during the January headquarters game, where options for offensive actions were practiced; increasing replenishment, but not yet in mobilization order, of units in the western districts; the movement of five armies from the interior of the country to the west; the creation in Ukraine of a strong operational force of 60 divisions, the formation of an airborne corps there, the reorganization of four rifle divisions of the Ukrainian district into mountain divisions (in mostly flat Ukraine); the construction of airfields near the western border, the movement of military warehouses to the border, which makes sense in preparation for an offensive; disarmament of fortified areas on the old border and neglect of their construction on the new one; Stalin’s speech on May 5, 1941 to graduates of military academies, in which the Soviet leader formulated the main task as follows: the time has come “to move from defense to a military policy of offensive actions.” After this speech in May-June 1941, steps were taken to change party and political propaganda among the population and in the Red Army. The essence of these changes is that the most serious enemy of the USSR is Germany, a military clash with it is not far off, and it is necessary to prepare for offensive actions. The only dissonance in this series is the mentioned TASS message of June 14, 1941; at the General Staff in May 1941, after Stalin’s speech on May 5, a plan for a “preemptive strike” of the Red Army was developed, according to which it was planned to deliver the main blow from the territory of Ukraine through Czechoslovakia, cutting off Germany from its southern allies and Romanian oil.

And it seems that this plan has begun to be implemented in practice. But to complete the preparation of the army, to complete the concentration of troops for the offensive in June 1941, some more time was required, perhaps several months. It was this time that Stalin wanted to win by demonstrating friendliness towards Germany. But all these facts have another explanation. Stalin did not intend to attack Germany first, but in the event of its aggression against the USSR, he planned to repel the first blow on the border and, with the help of powerful offensive actions, defeat the enemy on its territory.

In any case, in the summer of 1941, two large-scale plans collided, each of which carried enormous dangers for all of humanity. Hitler was only ahead of Stalin at the beginning of the implementation of his plan. Our troops turned out to be unprepared for either offensive or defensive actions.

23.2. Entry of the USSR into the Second World War. The first period of the Great Patriotic War

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the USSR. According to the “Barbarossa” plan (a plan for Germany’s attack on the USSR), the German command expected to capture the most important industrial and political centers of our country - Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and others - in a few months, defeat the main forces of the Red Army in the first battles and prevent their retreat inland. It intended to achieve its goals through coordinated actions of four groupings - the Finnish group, army groups “North”, “Center”, “South”, delivering powerful attacks with their tank and mechanized formations on the flanks and rear of the Red Army.

Germany and its allies concentrated on the borders of the USSR 164 divisions numbering 4,733,990 people, 41,293 artillery pieces and mortars, 3,899 tanks, 4,841 aircraft.

The Soviet Union in the border districts had 174 divisions numbering 2,780,000 people, 43,872 guns and mortars, 10,394 tanks (of which 1,325 were T-34 and KV) and 8,154 aircraft (of which 1,540 were new designs).

In border battles, Soviet troops suffered a crushing defeat and were forced to retreat. By mid-July, 28 Soviet divisions were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. The total human losses amounted to over 1 million people. In total, 3,468 aircraft, about 6 thousand tanks, more than 20 thousand guns, 30% of all ammunition reserves, 50% of all fuel and fodder reserves were lost. The troops of the Western Front suffered the greatest losses. By July 10, German troops advanced deep into Soviet territory: in the main, western direction by 450-600 km, in the north-west - by 450-500 km, in the south-west - by 300-350 km.

For comparison: German losses during the same period amounted to about 100 thousand people, 900 aircraft, less than 1 thousand tanks. What are the reasons for such a catastrophic start to the war for our country?

First of all, it is worth saying about the degree of readiness of the USSR for war, and real, and not according to the assessment of Soviet leaders. This, first of all, should include the combat readiness of the armed forces: their deployment, technical equipment, and combat training.

From the data presented it is clear that in quantitative terms the Germans had an advantage only in personnel, but in the main types of weapons there was either equality or even our advantage. At the same time, we can definitely talk about the qualitative superiority of only fascist aviation over Soviet aircraft of old brands. There were few new aircraft (Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3). In all other types of weapons, the Germans did not have a noticeable qualitative superiority. We were already armed with tanks such as the T-34 and KV, which in some respects were even superior to enemy tanks, and in sufficient quantity - 1325 against 1634 German medium tanks T-111, T-1U.

Thus, there was no great qualitative superiority of German technology. This means that the first place comes to the question of using the available forces of the Red Army, of the ability to properly dispose of them. This is the skill that our military-political leadership lacked. A number of major political mistakes and military-strategic miscalculations were made. Among such miscalculations and mistakes the following are traditionally named.

1. Miscalculation in determining the possible time of attack by Git-Yaer Germany. As a result, we fell behind in the concentration of troops and in the creation of powerful offensive groupings; the enemy achieved superiority in forces and means in the main directions.

2. Miscalculation in determining the direction of the enemy’s main attack. Stalin insisted that the Germans would concentrate their main forces in the south to capture Ukraine, Donbass - large agricultural and industrial areas. And that is why Soviet troops strengthened primarily the southern direction. However, the Germans delivered the main blow in the Smolensk-Moscow direction.

3. Another major mistake of a military-strategic nature was the Soviet command’s incorrect assessment of the initial period of the war. It was believed that during this period both sides would begin hostilities with only part of their forces, while the main forces would enter the war in two weeks, i.e. The Soviet command set limited goals at the first stage of the war. The Nazis immediately brought all available forces into battle in order to seize the strategic initiative and defeat the enemy.

4. The offensive mood also had an effect - they were going to beat the enemy on foreign territory, having stopped him in border battles, they immediately intended to go on the offensive. Therefore, the troops were not taught to defend themselves, they did not build sufficiently powerful defensive structures on the new border, and all this had an effect already in the first hours and days of the war.

Even if we accept the version that the USSR was preparing to attack Germany first, the listed mistakes and miscalculations did not make it possible to achieve success in 1941 in this case either. The Soviet military command made timid attempts to show Stalin the need to put troops on combat readiness, announce mobilization and other measures. However, Stalin categorically forbade this.

And here we come to the root of all troubles. Whether we accept the version that the Soviet Union is preparing offensive actions or adhere to the traditional point of view, in both cases the main sources of errors and miscalculations lie in the system of power that developed in the USSR in the 30s, in dictatorial autocracy, when the mistakes of the first person took on a fateful character for the country. Many decisions with far-reaching consequences were made by Stalin alone, and any fundamental disagreement with his views could quickly be regarded as “opposition”, “political immaturity” with all the ensuing consequences. The intimidation of the people, the affirmation of the stereotype about the genius of only one person, the need for mandatory approval of any decisions of Stalin practically did not allow the possibility of a multivariate analysis of the real situation, or the search for possible alternatives. Thus, the channels for receiving objective information, original proposals, and searching for non-standard solutions were blocked. The Secretary General, as a rule, was told what he wanted to hear. Often they tried to guess his wishes. Such a system of power demanded not intelligence, talent and independence, but the ability to please the authorities and quickly carry out his “brilliant” instructions. And, as a result, incompetence triumphed in all echelons of power.

It was this incompetence that fatally affected the combat training of the Red Army before the war. During the pre-war years, the People's Commissariat of Defense was headed by the amateur K.E. Voroshilov, his deputy was S.M. Budyonny. The head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the People's Commissariat was G.I. Sandpiper. All of them were awarded the rank of marshal, although none of them had military knowledge to the extent of a battalion commander. Under their leadership, shagism was introduced into the army; many simplifications and conventions were allowed in the training of troops, and all this significantly reduced the combat readiness of the army. S.K. Tymoshenko, who replaced Voroshilov as People's Commissar after the inglorious war with Finland, took measures to improve combat training, but it was impossible to make up for many years of lost time in a year. As a result, all this had to be learned on the battlefield, which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

The real crime of Stalin and his entourage against the country was the repressions of the 30s, which were an important tool in the establishment and functioning of dictatorial autocracy. They most directly affected the quality of the Red Army officer corps before the war. In 1937-1938 About 40 thousand officers were purged from the army. Repression continued in subsequent years, although its scope decreased. The senior command staff suffered especially hard. From 1937 to 1941, 9 deputy people's commissars of defense, 2 people's commissars of the Navy, 4 heads of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, 4 air force commanders, all fleet and district commanders and many others died. In total, about 600 senior officials were killed. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, 294 generals and admirals were killed or died from wounds over four years. The repression led to a huge turnover of personnel: tens of thousands of officers received new appointments every year. In the summer of 1941, in a number of military districts, up to half of the officers were in their positions from 6 months to one year. The level of their military education did not meet the requirements of the time. Only 7% of the commanders of the Red Army had a higher military education in 1941, and 37% did not even complete a full course of study at secondary military educational institutions. For high-quality training of mid-level officers, even in the presence of a well-organized training system, experience shows that it takes 5-10 years, not to mention the high command. The quality of training during that period decreased, since the works of the most prominent Soviet military theorists who were repressed during these years were removed from the training programs - M.N. Tukhachevsky, A.A. Svechina, A.I. Egorova and others.

The bloody purges also affected those officers who remained in the army. Many were afraid to take the initiative and make serious decisions, since if they failed, they could be accused of deliberate sabotage. In an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, careerists and demagogues quickly advanced through the ranks.

Public defamation of commanders undermined the confidence in them on the part of the Red Army soldiers. The most detrimental phenomenon for a military organization arose - distrust in command personnel, which again affected the level of combat training of units and formations.

All this manifested itself in the most terrible way during the difficult days of 1941 and became one of the main reasons for the defeats of our troops. The commanders were afraid to take the initiative, make independent decisions, waited for orders from above, the rank and file did not trust their commanders, did not know how to defend themselves, and were terrified of enemy aircraft. In conditions of a highly maneuverable war with the massive use of tanks and aircraft by the enemy, these factors led to the fact that Soviet troops were surrounded, and there were frequent cases of panic and flight.

The question arises: how could one prepare for some kind of offensive war given such a situation in the army? Apparently, this is again a consequence of complete incompetence and amateurism in the country's top political leadership. Did Stalin understand how difficult it was to train a regiment commander, much less an army or front commander? Did you understand that of the 29 mechanized corps that he spoke about in his speech on May 5, 1941, most had not yet become a real military force and were not fully equipped with equipment and people? Apparently not completely. Stalin was essentially an amateur in military matters, but nevertheless considered himself entitled to command. And his intervention in the conduct of hostilities during the war, as a rule, led to huge casualties and major defeats. The most famous case is his categorical ban on the retreat of Soviet troops from Kyiv in August-September 1941, which led to the encirclement and capture of more than 600 thousand of our soldiers.

The failures of the first months at the front led to the destabilization of local and military government in many areas and caused socio-political tension in the rear. In the first weeks and months of the war, there were repeated cases of desertion from the Red Army, evasion of mobilization, and surrender. There were especially many such cases with conscripts from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. In the rear, facts of negative sentiment and statements criticizing the actions of the regime were noted. For example, from a secret report from the NKVD about the mood in the Arkhangelsk region, we learn that there is talk among workers, peasants and even leading party officials: “Everyone said that we would beat the enemy on his territory. It turns out the other way around... Our government fed the Germans for two years, it would be better to stockpile food for its army and for the people, otherwise now we will all face hunger.” Similar statements were recorded by internal affairs and state security agencies in Moscow and other places. They said that there was no united rear in the country, and even predicted anti-Soviet uprisings. There was a defeatist mood. Some even had certain hopes for the arrival of the Germans. It was often repeated in such statements that the German occupation did not threaten the common people, only Jews and communists would suffer. They hoped that the Germans would abolish the collective farm system.

Of course, there is no point in talking about the widespread, mass character of such sentiments, especially defeatism. The predominance was patriotic statements, the desire of the Soviet people to defend their Motherland, as evidenced by the large number of volunteers who wanted to join the army ahead of schedule. However, the very fact of the existence of such sentiments, anti-Soviet statements, which are still not isolated, indicates the presence of crisis phenomena in the relationship between the ruling regime and the people. And this, again, was a consequence of the regime’s policies in the pre-war years. Throughout the 30s, the Stalinist leadership practically waged a war against its own people (collectivization, dispossession, mass repression), thereby not at all contributing to the unity of society.

To overcome the growing crisis of power, Stalin took the path of tightening repression. On August 26, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued Order No. 270, calling for deserters to be shot on the spot, and their families to be arrested if they are officers, and to be deprived of state benefits and assistance if they are Red Army soldiers. No less cruel was the resolution of the State Defense Committee of November 17, 1941, authorizing the NKVD to carry out capital sentences of military tribunals without their approval by the highest judicial authorities, and also authorizing the Special Meeting of the NKVD to impose appropriate penalties, up to and including execution, according to facts about counter-revolutionary crimes, especially dangerous acts of state. Moreover, almost any action could fit into this category during the war. Criminal liability was established for failure to fulfill government tasks, unauthorized departure from an enterprise was equated to desertion, etc.

At the front, NKVD troops were sent to the front line to combat panic and desertion, and barrage detachments were created. It is difficult to give an unambiguous assessment of all these decrees and measures. In conditions of disorganization, military defeats, and the presence of negative sentiments among the population, the regime was forced to take these brutal measures. And they yielded results, helping to reduce the number of negative moods. But we must not forget that it was the actions and inactions of the Stalinist regime in the pre-war years that led to the catastrophic situation in the first months of the war.

Along with tough measures to restore order in the army and rear, other measures were taken to transfer the country to a war footing. A reorganization of the administration of the army and the country was carried out: on June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command (later the Supreme High Command) was created under the chairmanship of Stalin. She was entrusted with the leadership of the Armed Forces during the war. On June 30, the State Defense Committee was formed - an emergency body in whose hands all power in the country was concentrated. Stalin also became the chairman of the State Defense Committee. Thus, there was a further concentration of power in the hands of one person - Stalin.

One of the most important tasks for the country was the restructuring of the economy on a war footing: the evacuation of enterprises, equipment, and livestock from the western regions; the fastest possible expansion of military production (especially in view of the huge losses of weapons and equipment in the initial period of the war); solving the problem of providing the national economy with workers (most of the male population was drafted into the army).

Already on June 24, 1941, the Evacuation Council was created, and on June 30, the Labor Distribution Committee was created. During the war, the final touches were made to the system of barracks economy with the mechanism of total mobilization, the foundations of which arose in the pre-war period. June 26, 1941 The decree allowed the establishment of mandatory overtime work lasting from 1 to 3 hours per day. The decree also provided for tougher penalties for leaving the enterprise. By January 1942, the number of people convicted of leaving the enterprise was about 311 thousand people. In February 1942, it was announced that the entire working-age urban population would be mobilized to work in production and construction. Other sources of replenishment of the national economy with labor were: military conscription for alternative service of reservists, unfit for military service for health reasons, but fit for physical labor, as well as the human resources of the NKVD Gulag. The presence of a large contingent of prisoners and the ease of managing the camp labor system made it possible to quickly create and expand specialized or independent enterprises. By the beginning of 1945, among the enterprises that manufactured F-1, RG-42 grenade bodies and parts for other grenades, there were 6 enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition and 9 factories of forced labor colonies of the NKVD Gulag. Prison labor was widely used in the construction of factories, railways, etc.

In agriculture, working conditions were also tightened. Since February 1942, the mandatory minimum workdays for collective farmers increased by 1.5 times. The minimum extended to children 12-16 years old, criminal penalties were introduced for failure to meet it, and even a simple list of relevant violators, certified by an accountant, could serve as the basis for prosecution. Mobilization of the population for agricultural work was practiced. Refusal to do so was again subject to criminal penalties. Moreover, the authorities were guided by the principle “it is better to over-bend than to under-bend.”

However, the tightening of labor relations was combined during the war years with incentives to complete tasks. Its methodology was based on the use of the low standard of living of the population with rationed rationing and difficult wage conditions. As incentives, they used food (additional rations, cold breakfasts, etc.), closed rationed trade in manufactured goods, and resorted to financial levers (bonus, piecework wages). The sale of alcohol was also used to stimulate labor. In the active army, the process of promotion in rank was accelerated, and the awarding of orders and medals was widely used as incentives.

Moreover, during the war, serious changes occur in the functioning mechanism of the state apparatus itself, economic policy, and ideology. Along with the strengthening of centralization, opposite processes also took place - the expansion of the powers of lower bodies and structures, the encouragement of initiative from below. On July 1, 1941, the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On expanding the rights of the People's Commissars of the USSR in wartime conditions” was adopted. They began to pay less attention to various bureaucratic procedures. In a critical situation for the country, and for the regime in particular, efficiency came first, rather than following instructions. During the war, at the front and in the rear, the demand for initiative, independence, and competence increased sharply. The criteria for the formation of command personnel in the army have changed especially noticeably.

During the war years, there was a more tolerant attitude of the authorities towards the personal farms of collective farmers and towards the sale of their products on the free market. The peasants did not die of hunger only thanks to their personal farming, since they received practically nothing on collective farms. At the same time, the free market was a very important source of food for the urban population: it provided up to 50% of the food consumption of city residents.

No less important changes have occurred in politics and ideology. There is a rejection of revolutionary, internationalist terminology in propaganda. The authorities are now appealing to traditional Russian patriotism, turning to the heroic past, which the revolution surrounded with contempt. In Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941, in his speech at the parade on November 7, 1941, there is a call to be inspired by the courageous images of our great ancestors - Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, Suvorov and Kutuzov. In line with these changes, there was also an expansion of the scope of the church’s activities during the war years, especially since 1943, permission to open new churches, and the restoration of the patriarchate. The explanation for these changes lies in the desire of the authorities to maximally mobilize the forces of the people to repel the enemy. In conditions of constant deprivation, for many Soviet citizens, religion gave strength for life and work.

23.3. A turning point during the war

Despite the truly catastrophic start of the war for the Soviet Union, it should be said that the plans of the German command were not fully implemented. The enemy hoped, having defeated the main forces of our troops in border battles, thereby demoralizing the population and army and moving towards Moscow without encountering much resistance. His calculations were not destined to come true. Having overcome the shock of border defeats, our units resisted the enemy with ever-increasing strength.

The decisive event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War was the Battle of Moscow, which took place from October 1941 to March 1942 and included two stages: defensive - until December

1941 and the counter-offensive of Soviet troops from December 6, 1941, as a result of which the enemy was thrown back 100-200 km from Moscow. This battle finally buried the hopes of the fascist command for a quick outcome of the war. The war became protracted. As a result of a successful counteroffensive, Soviet troops seized the strategic initiative. The victory near Moscow, naturally, affected the mood and morale of the Soviet people.

After the victory near Moscow, the strategic initiative passed to the Soviet Union. However, once again the influence of Stalin’s dictatorial autocracy took its toll. At his insistence, despite the protests of the command, in the spring of 1942, offensive operations were undertaken simultaneously in several directions - attempts to unblock Leningrad (April-June), offensives in the Crimea and near Kharkov (May). This led to a scattering of forces and resources. The consequences of miscalculations in the planning of these operations were severe defeats. The strategic initiative again passed to the German command. From the end of June 1942, it launched an offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. Again there were cases of escape, panic, again encirclement and captivity. By the autumn of 1942, the Wehrmacht reached the foothills of the Caucasus, German units entered Stalingrad. And again, to restore order, the authorities resort to repressive measures (the famous decree No. 227 “Not a step back”). And again, the courage and tenacity of an ordinary soldier, the growing tenacity of the resistance stopped the enemy, allowed the Soviet command to gather reinforcements and prepare a counter-offensive. As a result of the successful counter-offensive at Stalingrad (November 1942 - February 1943), the Germans lost up to 1.5 million people. The counteroffensive grew into a general offensive in many sectors of the Soviet-German front: fascist troops rolled back from the Caucasus, most of the Donbass was liberated, and the blockade of Leningrad was broken. The Battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the war. The completion of this turning point was the Battle of Kursk (July-August 1943), when the German command tried to once again seize the strategic initiative. But his plans were not destined to come true; the Germans suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the summer-autumn offensive of 1943, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper and liberated Kyiv and Novorossiysk. Until the end of the war, German troops no longer succeeded in major offensive operations.

In 1944, Soviet troops consistently carried out major strategic offensive operations along the entire front. In January, the blockade of Leningrad was finally lifted. At the same time, an offensive was launched in Ukraine. During the spring, Right Bank Ukraine, Crimea, and Moldova were liberated. In the summer, Soviet troops drove out the invaders from Belarus and the Baltic states, completely clearing Soviet land. In the fall, successful operations were carried out in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The Nazis were expelled from Romania, Bulgaria, large parts of Poland and Hungary. In January 1945, a new offensive of our units began in Poland, which ended with the Berlin operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945). The last battles took place on May 9 in Prague.

On May 8, 1945, under the chairmanship of G.K. Zhukov, representatives of all allied countries in the Berlin suburb of Karlhorst signed an act of unconditional surrender of Germany. The terrible war, which claimed millions of lives, destroyed thousands of settlements and industrial enterprises, has ended.

23.4. Origins of Victory

What allowed the Soviet Union, despite the severe defeats of the first stage of the war, to survive and win? For a long time, the same formulations circulated in our literature as the reasons for our Victory - about the unshakable friendship of peoples, the leading role of the party, the indestructible power of the socialist economy, the patriotism of the Soviet people. But the real picture, of course, was much more complicated. There is still a fairly widespread point of view that one of the conditions for Victory was the economic system that developed in the USSR back in the 30s - the barracks economy with its strict centralization and system of total mobilization. But this same economic system led to mistakes and miscalculations, which resulted in delays in the development and mass production of the latest types of weapons, including the famous Katyushas, ​​T-34 tanks, etc. Nevertheless, the Soviet economy allowed, albeit at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices on the part of the people, quickly concentrate material and human resources in key areas (which was especially important in conditions when industrial potential as a result of the loss of a huge territory decreased, and human reserves were limited). And already in 1943, the Soviet Union was able to surpass Germany in the production of military equipment, which was of enormous importance for the Second World War, the war of technology.

It should be noted that during the war years there were tendencies towards abandoning some features of this economy - formalism, excessive bureaucratization. Initiative and independence of lower-level structures are encouraged, without which it was simply impossible to evacuate industrial enterprises in such a short time and establish production in a new location. In addition, none of the countries that participated in the Second World War knew such imbalances between production and consumption, between the military and civilian sectors of the economy. And this further reduced the standard of living of the people. Of course, the decline in well-being during the war occurred in all countries, but, perhaps, nowhere as severely as in ours.

Of course, the effective functioning of such an economy was possible only if the people agreed to endure all these hardships and understood the need for military mobilization measures to achieve Victory. That is, the decisive role was played by the position of the people, their attitude towards the war, towards the enemy, towards the authorities. The policies of the Stalinist elite in the 30s did not contribute to the unity of society. The existence of socio-political opposition and separatist tendencies among a number of nationalities was manifested in the so-called “negative” sentiments of the population in the first months of the war, in a fairly significant number of people who collaborated with the fascists in the occupied territory. Suffice it to say that about 1 million former Soviet citizens fought on the side of the Germans. Perhaps for the first time since the internecine wars of the XII-XIV centuries. Russians fought on the side of the enemy against their own state (of course, not only for political reasons).

However, patriotism still prevailed in the mood of the overwhelming majority of the population. Another question is what kind of patriotism? What was the subject of patriotic loyalty, for which Motherland did the Soviet people fight and work? For some people, especially for those whose adult life fell in the 30s, the Motherland merged with the political regime of Stalin; they saw great advantages in the socio-political system of the USSR in the 30s; significant social gains were associated with it: free education, medical care, the absence of obvious unemployment, which they went to defend in the war.

But, apparently, traditional Russian patriotism, traditional popular readiness for courage and selfless defense of the Fatherland from an external enemy played a much larger role in people’s behavior. The top Soviet leadership understood this very well. According to the former special representative of the American President in the USSR, A. Harriman, in September 1941, Stalin told him: “We have no illusions that they (Russian people) are fighting for us. They are fighting for their mother Russia.” And the most striking confirmation of this is that at the most critical moments of the war, official propaganda resorted to heroic images and events of Russia’s past, appealed specifically to the national feelings of the population and practically did not use the term “socialist homeland.” Russian and Soviet patriotism could well be combined with a critical attitude towards the country's leadership. Among the negative statements there are quite a lot of critical characteristics of the country's leadership and its policies in the pre-war period, but the need to fight against the fascists is not questioned. For example, the words of a worker from the Kaluga region that he will go to defend Soviet land, but not those who sit in the Kremlin. The dominant people's attitude to the events were the following thoughts: a war is going on on our land, an enemy has attacked, cruel, merciless, who has set himself the goal of destroying our state, our culture, exterminating a significant part of the population, the enemy is pushing further and further, the country, our native land, your home needs to be protected, saved - what kind of disputes and conversations can there be? And the people stood up to defend the Motherland, as they stood up in the Patriotic War of 1812, as they stood up centuries earlier. Famous words of L.N. Tolstoy’s talk about the “club of the people’s war,” which nailed the French until the entire invasion was destroyed, can be fully attributed to the war of 1941-1945. It was truly a people's war, which was recognized by the political regime that existed in the USSR at that time. The authorities could only rely on the mass patriotism of the Soviet people, on their willingness to endure material hardships and deprivations, their willingness to sacrifice their lives to protect the Motherland and thereby save themselves.

The Stalinist regime took full advantage of these sentiments of the people, while not really trusting them, mediocrely squandering the fruits of mass patriotism. The government systematically withheld information from the people about the true situation in the war, and widely used the most brutal repressive methods of management, even when it was quite possible to do without them. The NKVD played no less a role during the war than before it. Just look at the fate of the people's militia, when in the summer and autumn of 1941 many qualified specialists, workers who were very necessary for the military economy, were sent to the front, poorly trained and equipped, in order to die there without much damage to the enemy. The Stalinist regime did not spare people in peacetime, and was even less willing to take care of human lives in wartime, saving its own existence. The principle of achieving goals at any cost triumphed. Time after time, units were sent into the bloody meat grinder of poorly organized battles to die there to the last man. Even at the last stage of the war, having a colossal advantage in technology and weapons, we often did not use this advantage. Infantry often attacked enemy defenses head-on without sufficient air and artillery support; the capture of cities was timed to coincide with the dates of revolutionary holidays, etc. The last major operation of the Soviet troops - Berlin - was carried out rather for political reasons - to prevent the Allies from getting ahead of the USSR and being the first to enter the German capital. As a result, more than 100 thousand were killed, victims that could have been avoided.

The formation of an anti-fascist coalition, in which the leading positions were occupied by the USSR, England, the USA and France, played a major role in the defeat of fascism. In the face of a terrible danger, ideological differences were temporarily forgotten. The Soviet people received significant support from supplies of equipment, weapons, and food from the allies, especially at a critical moment in the first period of the war; the diversion of German troops to conduct combat operations in other regions of the world also had an impact. The anti-fascist coalition was the basis of the post-war world order, which made it possible, despite all the difficulties, to avoid sliding into a new world war. But mutual distrust and ideological contradictions reappeared as soon as the final turning point in the war took place. The USSR's allies deliberately delayed the opening of a second front in Europe, which clearly prolonged the war. The motives of the Allies can be understood and explained, but they cannot be justified, since Soviet soldiers paid for this with millions of their lives.

The exact number of our losses during the Great Patriotic War is still unknown. The latest more or less reliable figure is 26.6 million total human losses directly from the fighting, who died of hunger and disease, who perished in captivity. Of these, the losses of the armed forces of the USSR were 11,944,100 people. The losses of the Wehrmacht and its allies on the Soviet-German front, according to various sources, ranged from 6 million to 8 million people. This unfavorable ratio of losses between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army is largely a consequence of the Soviet Union waging a war with “big blood.” And this is another crime of the Stalinist regime against the people.

Our people won the Great Patriotic War. It was his original patriotism, readiness for self-sacrifice, willingness to selflessly endure need and deprivation, ability to fight and work without thinking about himself that played a decisive role in the Victory. With their blood, the people paid for the mistakes and crimes of the Stalinist leadership in the pre-war and war years, but it was not this leadership that saved and saved, not Stalin and the Communist Party, but the Motherland and themselves.

It is not customary to talk much about the assistance of the USSR allies during the Second World War. However, it was there, and it was considerable. And not only within the framework of Lend-Lease. Soviet troops were supplied with food, medicine, and military equipment.

As you know, from love to hate there is only one step. Especially in politics, where it is quite permissible to smile at those whom yesterday you reviled as fiends of hell. Here we are, if we open the Pravda newspaper for 1941 (before June 22), we will immediately find out how bad the Americans and British were. They starved their own population and started a war in Europe, while the Chancellor of the German people, Adolf Hitler, was just defending himself...

Well, even earlier in Pravda one could even find the words that “fascism helps the growth of class consciousness of the working class”...

And then they became suddenly good...

But then came June 22, 1941, and literally the next day Pravda came out with reports that Winston Churchill promised military aid to the USSR, and the US President unfrozen Soviet deposits in American banks, frozen after the war with Finland. That's all! Articles about hunger among British workers disappeared in an instant, and Hitler turned from “Chancellor of the German People” into a cannibal.

Convoy "Dervish" and others

Of course, we don't know about all the behind-the-scenes negotiations that took place at that time; Even the declassified correspondence between Stalin and Churchill does not reveal all the nuances of this difficult period of our common history. But there are facts showing that the Anglo-American allies of the USSR began to provide assistance, if not immediately, then in a sufficiently timely manner. Already on August 12, 1941, the Dervish convoy of ships left Loch Ewe Bay (Great Britain).

On the first transports of the Dervish convoy on August 31, 1941, ten thousand tons of rubber, about four thousand depth charges and magnetic mines, fifteen Hurricane fighters, as well as 524 military pilots from the 151st Air Wing of two Royal Military Squadrons were delivered to Arkhangelsk. British Air Force.

Later, pilots even from Australia arrived on the territory of the USSR. There were a total of 78 convoys between August 1941 and May 1945 (although there were no convoys between July and September 1942 and March and November 1943). In total, about 1,400 merchant ships delivered important military materials to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program.

85 merchant ships and 16 warships of the Royal Navy (2 cruisers, 6 destroyers and 8 other escort vessels) were lost. And this is only the northern route, because the cargo flow also went through Iran, through Vladivostok, and planes from the USA were directly transported to Siberia from Alaska. Well, then the same “Pravda” reported that in honor of the victories of the Red Army and the conclusion of agreements between the USSR and Great Britain, the British were organizing folk festivals.

Not only and not so much convoys!

The Soviet Union received assistance from its allies not only through Lend-Lease. In the USA, the “Russia War Relief Committee” was organized.

“Using the money collected, the committee purchased and sent medicines, medical supplies and equipment, food, and clothing to the Red Army and the Soviet people. In total, during the war, the Soviet Union received assistance worth more than one and a half billion dollars.” A similar committee led by Churchill’s wife operated in England, and it also purchased medicines and food to help the USSR.

When Pravda wrote the truth!

On June 11, 1944, the Pravda newspaper published significant material on the entire page: “On the supply of weapons, strategic raw materials, industrial equipment and food to the Soviet Union by the United States of America, Great Britain and Canada,” and it was immediately reprinted by all Soviet newspapers, including local and even newspapers of individual tank armies.

It reported in detail how much had been sent to us and how many tons of cargo were floating by sea at the time the newspaper was published! Not only tanks, guns and planes were listed, but also rubber, copper, zinc, rails, flour, electric motors and presses, portal cranes and technical diamonds!

Military shoes - 15 million pairs, 6491 metal-cutting machines and much more. It is interesting that the message made an exact division of how much was purchased in cash, that is, before the adoption of the Lend-Lease program, and how much was sent after. By the way, it was precisely the fact that at the beginning of the war a lot of things were purchased for money that gave rise to the opinion that still exists today that all Lend-Lease came to us for money, and for gold. No, a lot was paid for with “reverse Lend-Lease” - raw materials, but the payment was postponed until the end of the war, since everything that was destroyed during hostilities was not subject to payment!
Well, why such information was needed at this particular time is understandable. Good PR is always a useful thing! On the one hand, the citizens of the USSR learned how much they supply us with, on the other hand, the Germans learned the same thing, and they simply could not help but be overcome by despondency.

How much can you trust these numbers? Obviously it is possible. After all, if they contained incorrect data, then only German intelligence would have figured it out, although according to some indicators, how could they declare everything else propaganda and, of course, Stalin, giving permission for the publication of this information, could not help but understand this!

Both quantity and quality!

In Soviet times, equipment supplied under Lend-Lease was usually criticized. But... it’s worth reading the same “Pravda” and in particular the articles of the famous pilot Gromov about American and British aircraft, articles about the same English Matilda tanks, to be convinced that during the war all this was assessed completely differently than after its end!

How can one appreciate the powerful presses that were used to stamp turrets for T-34 tanks, American drills with corundum tips, or industrial diamonds, which Soviet industry did not produce at all?! So the quantity and quality of supplies, as well as the participation of foreign technical specialists, sailors and pilots, was very noticeable. Well, then politics and the post-war situation intervened in this matter, and everything that was good during the war years immediately became bad with just the stroke of a leading pen!

Strengthening the country's defense capability on the eve of war
The Second World War, which began on September 1, 1939, forced the Soviet government to pay serious attention to strengthening the country's defense capability. The Soviet Union had every opportunity to solve this problem. Bolshevik modernization, carried out under the leadership of I.V. Stalin, turned the USSR into a powerful industrial power. By the end of the 30s. The Soviet Union took second place in the world and first in Europe in terms of total industrial production. As a result of the industrial market, in a short historical period (13 years), such modern sectors of the economy as aviation, automotive, chemical, electrical, tractor manufacturing, etc. were created in the country, which became the basis of the military-industrial complex.

Strengthening defense capability was carried out in two directions. The first is the build-up of the military-industrial complex. From 1939 to June 1941, the share of military expenditures in the Soviet budget increased from 26 to 43%. The output of military products at this time was more than three times faster than the general rate of industrial growth. In the east of the country, defense factories and backup enterprises were built at an accelerated pace. By the summer of 1941, almost 20% of all military factories were already located there. The production of new types of military equipment was mastered, some samples of which (T-34 tanks, BM-13 rocket launchers, Il-2 attack aircraft, etc.) were qualitatively superior to all foreign analogues. In June 1941, the army had 1,225 T-34 tanks (M.I. Koshkin Design Bureau) and 638 KV heavy tanks (Zh.Ya. Kotin Design Bureau). However, it took at least 2 years to completely re-equip the tank fleet.

On the eve of the war, Soviet aviation was also in the stage of rearmament. By this time, most of the aircraft that brought the country world fame and set 62 world records had already lost their superiority over foreign technology. It was necessary to update the aircraft fleet and create a new generation of combat vehicles. Stalin constantly monitored the development of aviation and met with pilots and designers.

The slightest changes in the design of production vehicles were made only with the permission of Stalin and were formalized by resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. From the beginning of 1941, the aviation industry completely switched to producing only new aircraft. By the beginning of the war, the army received 2.7 thousand of the latest aircraft: Il-2 attack aircraft (S.V. Ilyushin Design Bureau), Pe-2 bombers (V.M. Petlyakov Design Bureau), LaGG-3 and Yak-1 fighters (Design Bureau S A. Lavochkin, A. I. Mikoyan and Design Bureau A. S. Yakovlev). However, new types of aircraft accounted for only 17.3% of the USSR Air Force aircraft fleet. Only 10% of combat pilots managed to master the new machines. Thus, the process of rearmament of the Air Force was in full swing and required at least 1.5 years to complete it.

The second direction of strengthening the country's defense capability was the reorganization of the Red Army, increasing its combat capability. The army switched from a mixed to a territorial-personnel system of organizations, which was introduced in the 1920s to save money. in the personnel system. On September 1, 1939, a law on universal conscription was introduced. The number of armed forces from August 1939 to June 1941 increased from 2 to 5.4 million people. The growing army needed a large number of qualified military specialists. At the beginning of 1937, there were 206 thousand officers in the army. Over 90% of the command, military medical and military technical personnel had higher education. Among political workers and business executives, from 43 to 50% received military or special education. At that time this was a good level.

Tens of thousands of officers received new appointments every year. The personnel leapfrog had a negative impact on the level of discipline and combat training of the troops. There was a huge shortage of commanders, which grew from year to year. In 1941, the ground forces alone lacked 66,900 commanders at headquarters, and in the Air Force, the shortage of flight technical personnel reached 32.3%.

The Soviet-Finnish War (November 30, 1939 – March 12, 1940) revealed shortcomings in the tactical training of the Red Army. Stalin removes Voroshilov from his post as People's Commissar of Defense. The new People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko, analyzing the results of the war, in particular, noted that “our commanders and staffs, lacking practical experience, did not know how to truly organize the efforts of the military branches and close interaction, and most importantly, they did not know how to truly command "

The results of the Finnish war forced Stalin to take a whole range of measures aimed at strengthening the command staff of the Red Army. Thus, on May 7, 1940, new military ranks were introduced in the Soviet Union, and a month later over 1,000 people became generals and admirals. Stalin relied on younger military leaders. People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko was 45 years old, and Chief of the General Staff K.A. Meretskov is 43. The Navy was headed by 34-year-old Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, and the air force - 29-year-old General P.V. Leverages. The average age of regimental commanders at that time was 29 - 33 years, division commanders - 35 - 37 years, and corps commanders and army commanders - 40 - 43 years. The new nominees were inferior to their predecessors in terms of education and experience. Despite great energy and desire, they did not have time to master their responsibilities for leading troops in difficult conditions.

L. Trotsky, while in exile and actively fighting against Stalin, repeatedly publicly stated: “Not everyone in the Red Army is loyal to Stalin. They still remember me there.” Realizing this, Stalin began a thorough purge of his main support - the army and the NKVD - of all “unreliable elements.” Stalin's faithful ally V.M. Molotov told the poet F. Chuev: “1937 was necessary. Considering that after the revolution we fought left and right, we won, but remnants of enemies from different directions existed and in the face of the looming danger of fascist aggression they could unite. We owe it to 1937 that we did not have a “fifth column” during the war.

On the very eve of the Great Patriotic War, as a result of the implementation of the non-aggression pact with Germany, the Soviet Union moved its borders to the west by 400-500 km. The USSR included Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The population of the Soviet Union increased by 23 million people. As Tippelskirch noted, many leading German generals regarded this as a blunder by Hitler. In the spring of 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, together with the headquarters of the districts and fleets, developed the “Plan for the Defense of the State Border of 1941”, according to which the troops of the border districts were supposed to prevent the enemy from invading the territory of the USSR, and firmly cover mobilization, concentration and deployment with stubborn defense in fortified areas the main forces of the Red Army; active aviation operations will delay the concentration and disrupt the deployment of enemy troops, thereby creating the conditions for a decisive offensive. Covering the western border of the USSR, a length of 4.5 thousand km, was entrusted to the troops of 5 military districts. It was planned to include about 60 divisions in the first echelons of the covering armies, which, as the first strategic echelon, were supposed to cover the mobilization and entry into battle of the troops of the second strategic echelon. Despite the TASS statement of June 14, 1941, which denied rumors of an impending war, starting in April 1941, urgent measures were taken to increase the combat readiness of the army. A number of these measures were built taking into account the proposals of the General Staff dated May 15, 1941, according to which it was planned to defeat the main forces of the Nazi troops concentrated to attack the USSR (some historians, without sufficient grounds, believe that this document was “practical preparation on the instructions of Stalin pre-emptive strike against Germany").

In April-May, 800 thousand reservists were called up (under the guise of training camps) to replenish the troops of the western districts. In mid-May, the hidden transfer of second-echelon troops in the amount of 7 armies (66 divisions) from the internal districts to the western ones began, bringing them to full combat readiness. On June 12, 63 divisions of reserves from the western districts moved secretly to the border as part of the covering armies, in night marches. On June 16, 52 divisions began to be transferred from the places of permanent deployment of the second echelon of covering armies (under the guise of exercises) to the concentration areas of 52 divisions. Although Soviet troops were pulled up to the border, their strategic deployment was carried out without leading the covering troops to repel the preemptive strike of the aggressor. The mistake of the military-political leadership at the moment was an inadequate assessment of the state of the Armed Forces: the Red Army was unable to launch a counterattack and did not have real capabilities for defense. The plan for covering the border, developed by the General Staff in May 1941, did not provide for the equipping of defensive lines by troops of the second and third operational echelons.

In preparing for war against the USSR, the German leadership sought to hide its intentions. It saw the surprise of the attack as one of the decisive factors for the success of the war, and from the very beginning of the development of its plans and preparations, it did everything possible to disorient the Soviet government and command. The Wehrmacht leadership sought to hide all information about Operation Barbarossa from the personnel of its troops for as long as possible. In accordance with the instructions of the OKW headquarters dated May 8, 1941, the commanders of formations and units were to inform the officers about the upcoming war against the USSR approximately 8 days before the start of the operation, and the rank and file and non-commissioned officers - only in the very last days. The instructions required creating the impression among German troops and the population that the landing on the British Isles was the main objective of the Wehrmacht’s summer campaign in 1941, and that the activities in the East “are defensive in nature and aimed at preventing a threat from the Russians.” From the autumn of 1940 to June 22, 1941, the Germans managed to carry out a whole range of activities aimed at large-scale disinformation regarding England and the USSR. Hitler managed to drive a wedge of mistrust between Stalin and Churchill. The warnings of Soviet intelligence officers were contradictory and the country's leadership rightly refused to listen to them. In addition, there was a belief that Hitler would not risk a war on two fronts, and that a premature clash between Germany and the USSR was being provoked by England and the USA. According to Stalin’s calculations, Germany could only defeat England no earlier than the spring of 1942.

However, Stalin's iron logic did not take into account Hitler's adventuristic spirit. The famous West German historian of World War II G.-A. Jacobsen writes that for Hitler the following considerations had much greater weight in the decision to attack the USSR. “If the Soviet Union - England's last continental sword - is defeated, Great Britain will have scarcely any hope of future resistance. She would have to stop fighting, especially if she could get Japan to act against England and East Asia before the United States entered the war. If, despite all this, she continues to fight, Hitler decided, by capturing European Russia, to conquer new huge economically important areas, using the reservoir of which he, if necessary, will be able to withstand a longer war. Thus, his great dream was finally realized: Germany acquired in the East the living space that it claimed for its population. At the same time, no state in Europe could no longer challenge Germany’s dominant position... Not the least important role was played by the fact that the “final clash” of both systems - National Socialism and Bolshevism - would one day become inevitable anyway; this moment seemed to Hitler the most favorable for this, because Germany had strong, battle-tested armed forces and, in addition, was a country highly equipped for war.”

At a meeting at the Berghof on July 31, 1940, Hitler said the following: “If Russia is defeated, England’s last hope will fade away. Germany will then become the ruler of Europe and the Balkans... During this clash with Russia must be ended. In the spring of 1941... The sooner Russia is defeated, the better. The operation makes sense only if we defeat this state with one blow.” Another major historian, the Englishman A. Taylor, notes that “the invasion of Russia can be presented (and it will be presented by Hitler) as a logical consequence of the doctrines that he proclaimed for about 20 years. He began his political career as an anti-Bolshevik, set himself the task of destroying Soviet communism... He saved Germany from communism, as he himself claimed; now he will save the world. "Lebensraum" (living space) was Hitler's doctrine, which he borrowed from geopoliticians in Munich shortly after the First World War. Germany must have living space if it wants to become a world power, and it can only be mastered by conquering Russia.”

Traditionally, the history of the Great Patriotic War is divided into three main stages:
. the initial period of the war - from June 22, 1941 to November 19, 1942,
. the period of radical change during the war - from November 19, 1942 to the end of 1943,
. the period of the victorious end of the war - from the beginning of 1944 to May 9, 1945.

On the night of June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began without a declaration of war. Hitler's allies were Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Italy, which also sent their troops. Germany was actually supported by Bulgaria, Türkiye, and Japan, which formally remained neutral. The factor of surprise played a largely decisive role in the temporary failures of the Red Army. In the very first hours and days, Soviet troops suffered huge losses. On June 22, 1,200 aircraft were destroyed (800 of them at airfields). By July 11, about 600 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured. Within a month, German troops advanced 350 - 500 km, reaching the old border. Another important factor in the Red Army's failures was its lack of experience in modern warfare. German troops, who captured almost all of Europe, tested the latest battle tactics. In addition, as a result of the plunder of the occupied countries, the Nazis received various materials and property worth 9 billion pounds sterling, which was twice the pre-war national income of Germany. The Nazis had at their disposal weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles captured from 12 British, 22 Belgian, 18 Dutch, 6 Norwegian, 92 French and 30 Czechoslovak divisions, as well as weapons accumulated in the occupied countries and the current production of their defense enterprises. As a result, the German military-industrial potential by June 1941 was 2.5 times higher than the Soviet one. It should also be taken into account that the main attack of the German troops was expected in the south-west direction, towards Kyiv. In fact, the main blow of the German troops was delivered by Army Group Center in a westerly direction towards Moscow.

According to the Barbarossa plan, it was planned to destroy the main forces of the Red Army in 10 weeks. The result of the plan was to be the expansion of the eastern border of the Reich to the Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan line. To guide the country's defense, on June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created, headed by I.V. Stalin. On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces was formed (from July 10 - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command). Its members included A.N. Antonov, N.A. Bulganin, A.M. Vasilevsky (Chief of the General Staff from June 1942), N.G. Kuznetsov (People's Commissar of the Navy), V.M. Molotov, S.K. Timoshenko, B.M. Shaposhnikov (Chief of the General Staff in July 1941 - May 1942). Stalin became People's Commissar of Defense on July 19, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief on August 8, 1941. Back on May 6, 1941, Stalin became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Thus, all party, state and military power was now formally united in the hands of Stalin. Other emergency bodies were created: the Evacuation Council, the Committee for the Accounting and Distribution of Labor, etc.

The war that began was an unusual war. A war began, in which it was not only about the preservation of the social system or even statehood, but about the physical existence of the peoples inhabiting the USSR. Hitler emphasized that “we must wipe this country off the face of the earth and destroy its people.”

According to the Ost plan, after the victory, the dismemberment of the USSR, the forced deportation of 50 million people beyond the Urals, genocide, the destruction of leading cultural centers, and the transformation of the European part of the country into a living space for German colonists were envisaged. “The Slavs must,” wrote Nazi Party secretary M. Bormann, “work for us. If we don't need them, they can die. There is no need for a healthcare system. Slavic births are undesirable. They must use contraception and practice abortion, the more the better. Education is dangerous. As for food, they should not receive more than necessary." During the war years, 5 million people were deported to Germany, of which 750 thousand died as a result of cruel treatment.

The inhuman plans of the Nazis, their cruel methods of warfare strengthened the desire of the Soviet people to save their Motherland and themselves from complete extermination and enslavement. The war acquired a people's liberation character and rightly went down in history as the Great Patriotic War. Already in the first days of the war, units of the Red Army showed courage and resilience. From June 22 to July 20, 1941, the garrison of the Brest Fortress fought. Heroic defense of Liepaja (June 23-29, 1941), defense of Kyiv (July 7 - September 24, 1941), Odessa (August 5 - October 16, 1941), Tallinn (August 5-28, 1941), Moonsund islands (September 6 - October 22, 1941), Sevastopol (October 30, 1941 - July 4, 1942), as well as the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941) made it possible to disrupt the plan for a “blitzkrieg” - a lightning war . Nevertheless, in 4 months the Germans reached Moscow and Leningrad and captured 1.5 million square kilometers with a population of 74.5 million people. By December 1, 1941, the USSR had lost more than 3 million people killed, missing and captured.

In the summer and autumn of 1941, the State Defense Committee took a number of emergency measures. The mobilization was carried out successfully. Over 20 million people submitted an application to enlist in the Red Army as volunteers. At the critical moment of the struggle - in August - October 1941 - the people's militia, numbering about 2 million people, played a huge role in the defense of Moscow and Leningrad and other cities. In the vanguard of the fighting people was the Communist Party; By the end of the war, up to 80% of the members of the CPSU (b) were in the army. During the war, almost 3.5 million were accepted into the party. 3 million communists died in the battles for the freedom of the Motherland, which amounted to 3/5 of the pre-war membership of the party. Nevertheless, the number of the party grew from 3.8 to 5.9 million. The lower levels of the party played a big role in the first period of the war, when, by decision of the State Defense Committee, city defense committees were established in more than 60 cities, headed by the first secretaries of regional and city committees of the CPSU (b). In 1941, armed struggle began behind enemy lines. On July 18, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the organization of struggle in the rear of German troops,” which obliged party committees to deploy underground party and Komsomol committees behind enemy lines, to organize and lead the partisan movement.

On September 30, 1941, the battle for Moscow began. In accordance with the Typhoon plan, German troops surrounded five Soviet armies in the Vyazma area. But the encircled troops fought bravely, pinning down significant forces of Army Group Center, and helped stop the enemy at the Mozhaisk line by the end of October. From mid-November, the Germans launched a new offensive against Moscow. However, by the beginning of December the forces of the German group were completely exhausted. On December 5-6, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive. By mid-January 1942, the enemy was driven back 120-400 km. This victory of the Red Army had enormous military and political significance. This was the first major defeat of the Germans since the beginning of World War II. The myth of the invincibility of Hitler's army was dispelled. The plan for a lightning war was finally thwarted. The victory near Moscow significantly strengthened the international authority of our country and contributed to the completion of the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Under the cover of the Red Army, which was retreating in bloody battles, the most difficult work was unfolding in the country to mobilize the national economy. New people's commissariats were created for the operational management of key industries. Under the leadership of the Evacuation Council (chairman N.M. Shvernik, deputy N.A. Kosygin), an unprecedented transfer of industrial and other facilities to the East of the country took place. 10 million people, 1,523 large enterprises, and enormous material and cultural values ​​were taken there in a short period of time. Thanks to the measures taken, by December 1941 the decline in military production was stopped and from March 1942 its growth began. State ownership of the means of production and the strictly centralized economic management system based on it allowed the USSR to quickly concentrate all resources on military production. Therefore, while inferior to the aggressors in terms of the size of the industrial base, the USSR was soon far ahead of them in the production of military equipment. Thus, per one metal-cutting machine, the USSR produced 8 times more aircraft, and for every ton of steel produced, 5 times more tanks.

A radical change in the work of the Soviet rear predetermined a radical change in hostilities. From November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943, Soviet troops of three fronts: Stalingrad (commander A.I. Eremenko), Don (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Southwestern (N.F. Vatutin) - surrounded and destroyed fascist troops at Stalingrad. The Stalingrad victory was a radical turning point in the course of the war. It showed the whole world the strength of the Red Army, the increased skill of Soviet military leaders, the strength of the rear, which provided the front with a sufficient amount of weapons, military equipment and equipment. The international authority of the Soviet Union grew immeasurably, and the positions of Nazi Germany were seriously shaken. From July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk took place, which completed a radical change. From the moment of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops maintained the strategic initiative until the end of the war. During the period from November 1942 to December 1943, 50% of the occupied territory was liberated. The military leadership talent of G.K. played a huge role in the development of offensive operations of the Red Army. Zhukova, A.M. Vasilevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky.

The partisan movement provided significant assistance to the Red Army. In May 1942, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was created, the chairman of which was appointed the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Belarus (Bolsheviks) P. Ponomarenko. In Moscow in 1942, a meeting of commanders of the largest partisan formations was held (S.A. Kovpak, M.A. Naumov, A.N. Saburov, A.F. Fedorov, etc.). The partisan struggle acquired its greatest scope in the North-West, in Belarus, a number of regions of Ukraine, and in the Bryansk region. At the same time, numerous underground organizations operated, engaged in reconnaissance, sabotage, and informing the population about the situation at the fronts.

At the final stage of the war, the Red Army had to complete the liberation of the territory of the USSR and liberate the countries of Europe. In January - February 1944, the Leningrad-Novgorod operation was carried out. On January 27, the siege of heroic Leningrad, which lasted 900 days, was lifted. In April - May Odessa and Crimea were liberated. In the context of the opening of the second front (June 6, 1944), Soviet troops launched attacks in different directions. From June 10 to August 9, the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation took place, as a result of which Finland left the war. From June 23 to August 29, the largest summer offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the war took place - Operation Bagration for the liberation of Belarus, during which Belarus was liberated and Soviet troops entered Poland. The Iasi-Kishinev operation on August 20-29 led to the defeat of German troops in Romania. In the fall of 1944, Soviet troops liberated Bulgaria and Yugoslavia from the Nazis.

At the beginning of 1945, ahead of previously planned dates, at the request of the allies, who experienced difficulties due to the German offensive in the Ardennes, Soviet troops began the Vistula-Oder operation (January 12 - February 3, 1945), as a result of which Poland was liberated . In February - March 1945, Hungary was liberated, and in April, Soviet troops entered the Austrian capital, Vienna. On April 16, the Berlin operation began. The troops of three fronts: the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and the 1st Ukrainian (commanders - Marshals G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky and I.S. Konev) - within two weeks defeated the 1-million enemy sk group and on May 2 captured the capital of Nazi Germany. On the night of May 8–9, Germany's surrender was signed. From May 6 to May 11, 1945, Soviet troops carried out the Prague operation, coming to the aid of the rebel Prague and defeating German troops in Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union made a huge contribution to the victory over Japan. Within three weeks, from August 9 to September 2, the Soviet Army defeated the most combat-ready and powerful 1-million-strong Kwantung Army, liberating Manchuria, as well as South Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and North Korea. On September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered. The Second World War ended with the victory of peace-loving, democratic, anti-militarist forces over the forces of reaction and militarism. The Soviet people made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism. Heroism and self-sacrifice became a mass phenomenon. The exploits of I. Ivanov, N. Gastello, A. Matrosov, A. Maresyev were repeated by many Soviet soldiers. During the war, the advantage of Soviet military doctrine was revealed. Such commanders as G.K. became especially famous. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.S. Konev, A.M. Vasilevsky, R.Ya. Malinovsky, N.F. Vatutin, K.A. Meretskov, F.I. Tolbukhin, L.A. Govorov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, I.Kh. Bagramyan.

The unity of the peoples of the USSR stood the test. It is significant that representatives of 100 nations and nationalities of the country became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The patriotic spirit of the Russian people played a particularly important role in the victory in the war. In his famous speech on May 24, 1945: “I raise a toast to the health, first of all, of the Russian people,” Stalin recognized the special contribution of the Russian people. Created in the late 30s. the administrative-command system made it possible to concentrate human and material resources in the most important areas to defeat the enemy.

The historical significance of the USSR's victory in the war lies in the fact that the totalitarian, terrorist model of capitalism, which threatened world civilization, was defeated. The possibility of a democratic renewal of the world and the liberation of the colonies opened up. The Soviet Union emerged from the war as a great power.

Causes, nature, main stages of the Great Patriotic War
On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. Thus began the Second World War. England and France, bound to Poland by a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, declared war on Germany. During September, Poland was defeated. What the Anglo-French guarantees cost Poland was shown by the first month of the bloody war. Instead of 40 divisions, which the French headquarters promised the Polish command to throw against Germany on the third day of the war, only from September 9, separate parts of 9 divisions carried out an unsuccessful operation in the Saarland. Meanwhile, according to the Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff Jodl, the Allies had 110 divisions on the Western Front against 22 German divisions, as well as an overwhelming advantage in aviation. However, England and France, having the opportunity to conduct a major battle against the Germans, did not do so. On the contrary, Allied planes dropped leaflets over the German trenches calling for them to turn their arms against the Soviets. The so-called “Phantom War” began, when virtually no fighting took place on the Western Front until April 1940.

On September 17, 1939, when German troops reached Warsaw and crossed the line specified in the secret protocol, by decision of the Soviet government, the Red Army troops were ordered to “cross the border and take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.” The reunification of the peoples of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus with Russia into a single statehood was the end of their centuries-long struggle to restore historical justice, since the entire territory from Grodno, Brest, Lvov and the Carpathians are primordially Russian lands. For the majority of Ukrainians and Belarusians, the arrival of the Red Army in 1939 meant a truly historic deliverance from brutal national, social and spiritual oppression.

On September 28, 1939, an agreement “On Friendship and Border” was signed between Germany and the USSR. According to the agreement, the western border of the USSR now ran along the so-called Curzon Line, recognized at one time by England, France, the USA and Poland. One of the secret protocols of the treaty stipulated that a small part of Southwestern Lithuania remained with Germany. Later, according to a secret protocol dated January 10, 1941, this territory was acquired by the USSR for 31.5 million Reichsmarks ($7.5 million). At the same time, the USSR managed to solve a number of important foreign policy problems.

In the fall of 1939, the USSR concluded treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Baltic states. On their basis, garrisons of Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of these states. The purpose of this Soviet foreign policy action was to ensure the security of the Baltic states, as well as to prevent attempts to drag them into war. According to the agreement of October 10, 1939, the USSR transferred to Lithuania the city of Vilna and the Vilna region, which belonged to Belarus.

In the context of the aggravated military-political situation in Europe, ensuring the security of the northwestern approaches to Leningrad, the country's largest industrial center, became an urgent task for the USSR. Finland, which occupied pro-German positions, refused Soviet proposals to lease the port of Hanko to the USSR for 30 years for the construction of a military base, to transfer part of the Karelian Isthmus, part of the Rybachy Peninsula and several islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland - a total of 2761 km2 in exchange for 5529 km2 to the Soviet territories in Eastern Karelia. In response to Finland’s refusal, the USSR declared war on November 30, 1939, which lasted until March 12, 1940. Military assistance to Finland was provided by England, France, the USA, Sweden, Norway, and Italy. On December 14, 1939, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution to expel the USSR from its ranks. According to the peace treaty of March 12, 1940, Finland agreed to push back its border with the USSR. The USSR undertook to withdraw its troops from the Petsamo region, voluntarily ceded to them by Finland under the 1920 treaty. The new border was extremely beneficial for the USSR not only from a political (security of Leningrad), but also from an economic point of view: 8 large pulp and paper enterprises were located on Soviet territory , Rauhala hydroelectric station, railway along Ladoga.

Providing the USSR with a German loan in the amount of 200 million marks (at 4.5% per annum) allowed the USSR to strengthen the country's defense capability, because what was supplied was either just weapons (ship weapons, samples of heavy artillery, tanks, aircraft, as well as important licenses ), or what weapons are made on (lathes, large hydraulic presses, etc., machinery, installations for producing liquid fuel from coal, equipment for other types of industry, etc.).

By April 1940, the so-called “Phantom War” ended. The German army, having accumulated significant human and military-technical forces, launched an all-out offensive in Western Europe. On April 5, Germany invaded Denmark, and a few hours later the Danish government capitulated. On April 9, Oslo was captured, but Norway resisted for about 2 months. By May 10, 1940, Germany had already captured Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. France was next in line. As a result of Operation Gelb, France was defeated and resisted for only 44 days. On June 22, Petain's government signed a capitulation, according to which most of French territory was occupied.

Germany's quick victory over France significantly changed the balance of power in Europe, which required the Soviet leadership to adjust its foreign policy course. Calculations for mutual attrition of opponents on the Western Front did not materialize. In connection with the expansion of German influence in Europe, there is a real danger of blocking certain circles of the Baltic countries with Germany. In June 1940, the USSR accused Lithuania of anti-Soviet actions, demanding to change the government and agree to station additional military units in Lithuania. On June 14, such consent was received from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The measures taken by Moscow decisively influenced the further course of events in this regard: the people's diets of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia (State Duma) on July 21-24, 1940 adopted a declaration on the proclamation of Soviet power in their countries and accession to the USSR. In August 1940, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by its decision accepted Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the USSR.

In the summer of 1920, at the request of the USSR, Romania transferred Bessarabia to it, which was annexed to Moldova by the ASSR (1929 - 1940 Tiraspol). Thus, the USSR found itself in close proximity to the oil regions of Romania, the exploitation of which served the Reich as an “indispensable prerequisite for the successful conduct of war.” Hitler took retaliatory steps by concluding an agreement with the fascist government of General Antonescu on the transfer of German troops to Romania. The tension between the USSR and Germany escalated even more with the signing on September 27, 1940 in Berlin of a pact between Germany, Italy and Japan on the actual division of the world. Trip V.M. Molotov to Berlin on November 12-13, 1940 and his negotiations with Hitler and Ribbentrop did not lead to an improvement in the situation. An important achievement of the USSR's foreign policy was the conclusion of the Neutrality Treaty with Turkey (March 1941) and Japan (April 1941).

At the same time, right up to the start of the Great Patriotic War, economic and trade relations between the two countries intensively developed. According to Goebbels, Hitler assessed these agreements as a specifically Stalinist policy, designed to make the Reich economically dependent on the supply of industrial raw materials, which could be deprived of Germany at the right time. These are agricultural goods, petroleum products, manganese and chromium ores, rare metals, etc. The USSR received industrial products and weapons worth 462.3 million marks from German companies. These are metal-cutting machines, especially strong steel, technical equipment, and military equipment. At the same time, acutely scarce raw materials flowed into Germany from the United States or through branches of American corporations in third countries. Moreover, supplies of American oil and petroleum products were carried out until 1944. 249 US monopolies traded with Germany throughout the war.

Foreign policy of the USSR during the Second World War
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union was one of the factors of victory in the Great Patriotic War. Its main task was to create the best conditions in the international arena for victory over the enemy. The main goal also determined specific tasks:

1. To ensure that the “bourgeois” states that were at war with Germany and Italy became allies of the USSR.

2. To prevent the threat of an attack by Japan and neutral states being drawn into the war on the side of the fascist aggressors.

3. To promote liberation from the fascist yoke, restoration of sovereignty, and democratic development of countries occupied by aggressors.

4. Seek the complete elimination of fascist regimes and the conclusion of peace, excluding the possibility of a repetition of aggression.

The threat of enslavement imperiously demanded the unification of the efforts of all countries that fought against fascism. This determined the emergence of an anti-Hitler coalition of three great powers - the USSR, the USA and England. About 50 countries joined them during the war, including some of Germany's former allies. The international legal formalization of the coalition took place in several stages. The steps to its creation were the signing in Moscow on July 12, 1941 of the “Agreement between the governments of the USSR and Great Britain on joint actions in the war against Germany”, the conclusion of similar agreements of the USSR with the emigrant governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, the exchange of notes on August 2 between the USSR and the USA on the extension for year of the Soviet-American trade agreement and economic assistance from the United States to the Soviet Union.

An important stage in the formation and strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition was the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the three powers (September 29 - October 1, 1941), at which the USA and England committed from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 to supply us with 400 aircraft, 500 tanks, 200 anti-tank rifles, etc. The USSR was provided with an interest-free loan in the amount of 1 billion dollars. However, deliveries under Lend-Lease were carried out slowly and in small quantities during this period. To strengthen the alliance with England and the USA, on September 24, the USSR joined the Atlantic Charter, signed on August 14, 1941 at a meeting between W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt. For the USSR this was not an easy decision. In this document, the United States and England stated that they do not seek territorial acquisitions in this war and will respect the right of peoples to choose their own form of government. The legality of the borders that existed before the outbreak of World War II was emphasized. The USSR was not considered by the allies as a real force on the world stage, and therefore there was not a word in the text of the document either about it or about the Soviet-German front. Essentially, their charter was of a separate nature and expressed the claims of the two powers to maintain world domination. The USSR expressed its agreement with the basic principles of the charter in a special declaration, emphasizing that their practical implementation must be consistent with the circumstances...

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, located in the Hawaiian Islands, without declaring war. On December 8, the United States declared war on Japan. England did the same. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. The World War II zone expanded significantly. On January 1, 1942, in Washington, 26 states of the anti-fascist coalition, including the USSR, USA, England and China, signed a declaration under which they pledged to use all their military and economic resources to fight against the fascist bloc. These countries became known as the "United Nations".

On May 26, 1942, an agreement on alliance in the war and post-war cooperation was signed between England and the USSR. In June 1942, an agreement was signed between the United States and the USSR “On the Principles Applicable to Mutual Assistance and the Conduct of War against Aggression.” However, our allies were in no hurry to open a second front. During the London talks in May 1942, Churchill handed Molotov a note for Stalin that said: “We are not committed to action and cannot make any promise.” Churchill motivated his refusal by the lack of sufficient funds and forces. But in reality, political considerations played a major role. The British Minister of Aviation Industry M. Brabazon directly stated that “the best outcome of the struggle on the Eastern Front would be the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR, as a result of which England would be able to occupy a dominant position in Europe.” This thesis echoed the infamous statement of the future US President Henry Truman: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, we should help Germany, and thus let them kill like as much as possible." Thus, plans for future leadership in the world of sea powers were already based on the fight against fascism in the Second World War.

On June 12, 1942, the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqués were published, stating that "full agreement had been reached regarding the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942." However, not only 1942, but also 1943 passed, and the second front in Western Europe was never opened. Meanwhile, Allied forces launched major amphibious operations in North Africa and later in Sicily and Italy. Churchill even proposed replacing the second front with a strike “into the soft underbelly of Europe” - a landing in the Balkans in order to introduce Anglo-American troops into the countries of South-Eastern Europe before the Red Army advancing from the east approached, and thereby establish the dominance of the sea powers in this region, which played important geopolitical significance.

The victories of the Red Army at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk were of enormous international significance. They demonstrated to the whole world the increased power of the Soviet state. Heavy losses of Nazi Germany on the Soviet-German front sharply weakened both its armed forces and the German rear. The Resistance movement intensified - Stalingrad became the beginning of a new stage of this movement in France, Belgium, Norway and other occupied countries. Anti-fascist forces grew in Germany itself, and disbelief in the possibility of victory increasingly took hold of its population. Under the influence of the defeat of the Italian army on the Soviet front and Allied operations in the Mediterranean, Italy capitulated on September 3, 1943 and broke with Nazi Germany. Mussolini was overthrown. Soon Allied troops landed in Italy. The Germans responded by occupying the northern and central parts of the country. The new Italian government declared war on Germany.

In connection with the decisive successes of the Red Army by the end of 1943, the essence of the problem of the second front also changed. Victory over Germany was already a foregone conclusion; it could have been achieved by the forces of the USSR alone. The Anglo-American side was now directly interested in opening a second front in Western Europe. From October 19 to October 30, 1943, a conference of the foreign ministers of three states was held in Moscow. The conference adopted the “Declaration on the Responsibility of the Nazis for the Atrocities committed,” and also prepared the conditions for a meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and England. This was also facilitated by the dissolution of the Communist International in May 1943. In an interview with Reuters correspondent I.V. Stalin pointed out that the dissolution of the Comintern exposes the lie about Moscow's intention to Bolshevize other states, that the Communist parties do not act in the interests of their peoples, but on orders from outside. The dissolution of the Comintern was positively received by the leaders of the Allies, primarily the United States. Relations between Moscow and other communist parties have changed; greater emphasis was placed on bilateral contacts between the leadership of the CPSU (b), primarily I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, with the leaders of foreign communist parties.

On the eve of the Tehran meeting of allied leaders, US President F. Roosevelt said that “The United States must occupy North-West Germany... We must reach Berlin.” From the American point of view, Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, which was supported by the US government until mid-1943, had exhausted itself. A second front in the West gave America the opportunity to “keep the Red Army out of the vital areas of the Ruhr and Rhine, something that an offensive from the Mediterranean would never have achieved.” The growing American superiority in manpower and technology forced Churchill to accept their plan.

The Tehran Conference, at which I. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill met for the first time, took place from November 28 to December 1, 1943. The main issue of the conference was the question of opening a second front. Despite Churchill’s attempts to put forward his “Balkan” option for discussion, the Anglo-American side was forced to set a deadline for the start of the Overlord plan - May 1944 (in fact, the landing began on June 6). At the conference, the Allies put forward projects for the dismemberment of Germany. At the insistence of the USSR, the question of Anglo-American plans for the dismemberment of Germany was transferred for further study. The conference participants exchanged views on the issue of the borders of Poland, and the Soviet delegation proposed adopting the “Curzon Line” as the eastern border, and the “River Line” as the western border. Oder". Churchill agreed in principle with this proposal, hoping that it would be possible to return the emigrant “London government” to power in Poland. The conference adopted the “Three Power Declaration on Iran.” Soviet and British troops were sent to Iran in 1941 in order to prevent the violation of the sovereignty of this neutral country by the Germans. The declaration provided for the withdrawal of allied forces and the preservation of Iran's independence and territorial integrity after the war. The issue of war with Japan was also discussed. The USSR agreed to enter the war against Japan. However, no specific agreement was concluded. The first meeting of the Big Three was a success. Despite the presence of acute disagreements on certain issues, the leaders of the three great powers were able to develop agreed upon solutions. The results of the Tehran Conference were a great success for Soviet foreign policy.

The help of the allies was of great importance for the USSR at the final stage of the war. It was, from start to finish, a well-thought-out foreign policy strategy of Western countries or, as Western historians put it, “an act of calculated self-interest.” Until 1943 inclusive, assistance to the USSR was provided by the Americans in such a way as to prevent it from gaining a decisive advantage over Germany. The overall supply plan under Lend-Lease was estimated at $11.3 billion. Although the total volume of industrial supplies amounted to 4% of gross industrial production in the USSR during the war years, the size of deliveries for individual types of weapons was significant. So, cars - about 70%. 14,450 aircraft were delivered (since 1942, the USSR produced 40 thousand aircraft annually), 7 thousand tanks (with 30 thousand tanks produced annually), machine guns - 1.7% (of the USSR production level), shells - 0.6 %, pistols - 0.8%, mines - 0.1%. After the death of F. Roosevelt, the new US President G. Truman on May 11, 1945 issued a directive to stop supplies to the USSR for military operations in Europe, and in August an order to stop all supplies to the USSR from the moment the act of surrender of Japan was signed. The refusal of unconditional assistance to the USSR indicated a radical change in the position of the United States, and it should be noted that the USSR, repaying debts under Lend-Lease, was obliged to pay 1.3 billion dollars (for 10 billion loans), while England paid only 472 million dollars for a loan of 30 billion dollars.

From February 4 to February 11, 1945, the Crimean Conference of the leaders of the three great powers was held in Yalta. At the conference, its participants solemnly proclaimed that the purpose of the occupation and Allied control of Germany was “the destruction of German militarism and Nazism and the creation of a guarantee that Germany would never again be able to disturb the peace.” The agreements “On the Zones of Occupation of Germany and on the Administration of Greater Berlin” and “On the Control Mechanism in Germany” were adopted. At the insistence of the USSR, an occupation zone for French troops was added to the three occupation zones - Soviet, American and British. Also, at the insistence of the Soviet side, the issue of German reparations was considered. Their total amount was about 20 billion dollars, of which the USSR claimed half. Roosevelt supported the Soviet position on this issue. The Polish question was a hot topic at the conference. England and the United States pinned their hopes of influencing Poland on the return of the émigré government there. Stalin did not want this. Its post-war relations with the USSR depended on the composition of the government in Poland. In response to W. Churchill’s remark that for England Poland is “a matter of honor,” Stalin noted that “for Russia this is a matter of both honor and security.” The USSR managed to achieve a legal end to the Polish émigré government. The conference determined the conditions for the USSR to enter the war against Japan two to three months after the end of the war in Europe. It was decided to convene a United Nations conference in San Francisco on April 25, 1945 to adopt the text of the UN Charter. The Crimean Conference adopted the “Declaration of a Liberated Europe” and the final document “Unity in the organization of peace, as well as in the conduct of war.” Both documents outlined specific joint actions to destroy fascism and rebuild Europe on democratic principles.

The outcome of the joint actions of the USSR, USA and England in World War II was summed up by the Potsdam Conference (July 17 - August 2, 1945). The USSR delegation was headed by I.V. Stalin, USA - President G. Truman, Great Britain - first W. Churchill, and from July 29 the new Prime Minister K. Attlee. The main issue of the conference is the question of the future of Germany. In relation to it, the so-called “3-D plan” was adopted; demilitarization, denazification (liquidation of the Nazi party) and democratization of Germany. The issue of German reparations was settled. At the conference, the Allies confirmed their agreement to transfer the city of Königsberg and its surrounding areas to the USSR and came to an agreement on the western border of Poland. The Soviet delegation confirmed in Potsdam the agreement concluded in Yalta on the USSR's entry into the war against Japan at the agreed time. The Council of Foreign Ministers (CMFA) was also established, to which the Allies entrusted the preparation of a peace settlement, primarily the drafting of peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Confederation confirmed the intention of the Allied powers to bring Nazi criminals to justice.

Despite the agreed decisions, the Potsdam Conference showed that the maritime powers had their own program of action in Germany, different from both the Soviet proposals and the obligations they had assumed. During the conference, the first experimental explosion of an atomic bomb was carried out in the United States, which the Americans soon used in Japan, barbarously killing hundreds of thousands of people in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki without any military necessity. This was an attempt at threatening political influence on the USSR, a harbinger of the approaching Cold War era.

The history of homeland. Edited by M.V. Zotova. - 2nd ed., rev. and additional
M.: Publishing house MGUP, 2001. 208 p. 1000 copies

It is difficult to imagine what results the Second World War would have led to if not for the titanic and selfless work of millions of peasants and workers, engineers and designers, leading cultural and scientific figures who mobilized the people of the Soviet Union to defeat the aggressor.

The half-lost economic potential and the relocation of hundreds of industrial enterprises to the eastern part of the country, irreparable human losses and enormous destruction in the national economy at the very beginning of the war led to a significant reduction in industrial production. The USSR economy entered a period of decline. This was especially noticeable for the defense industries. At the end of 1941, the volume of gross output of Soviet industry decreased by half. Under the current conditions, the government of the country was forced to take the most severe measures to strengthen the rear. From the very beginning of the aggression on the part of the fascists, they began to carry out mass mobilizations of the civilian population to the labor fronts.

By April 1942, the scope of mobilization expanded to include residents of rural areas. Such measures primarily affected adolescents and women. For example, in 1942, half of the people employed in the national economy were women. The most problematic issue at that time was the selection of qualified personnel. No more than 27% of specialists and workers remained at the evacuated enterprises, so by the end of 1942 a special training plan was developed, designed to conduct short-term training courses for 400 thousand people. In total, 4.5 million people were trained in 1942. But, be that as it may, the number of workers fell to 18.4 million people, compared to 33.9 million in 1940.

The USSR at that time focused on providing military forces with military equipment and weapons. Even at the beginning of the war, due to significant losses, Soviet aviation was greatly weakened. The situation required the immediate release of new combat aircraft.

The tank industry launched mass production of combat vehicles of a new design.

Many efforts were made by engineers and workers to increase the number of weapons and ammunition produced, which were so lacking at the fronts.

But by the end of 1941, the needs of the navy and army for military equipment and weapons were not fully satisfied. To produce tanks, aircraft and other military equipment, a lot of high-quality steel was needed. Due to the relocation of the defense industry to Western Siberia in the Urals, changes had to be made to the system of organization and production technology at many metallurgical plants.

Agriculture suffered serious damage during the war years. Despite all the efforts made by agricultural workers in 1941, grain procurement and production of other products decreased significantly. The southeastern and eastern regions of the country, such as Siberia, the Volga region, Central Asia and Kazakhstan, became the production and raw material base. Be that as it may, by mid-1942 the Soviet Union had established a military economy that was able to ensure the production of military products.

Already in 1943, the USSR economy began to grow due to a general rise in production.

National income, industrial output, the state budget, and transport freight turnover have increased significantly. In mid-1943, the opportunity arose to speed up the rearmament of the navy and army with the latest military equipment.

Military production reached its highest point in 1944. Such heights were achieved thanks to the presence of a solid foundation for the continuous development of the main industries. The increase in the number of products occurred due to more efficient use of the capacities of existing factories, the introduction of new industrial enterprises and the restoration of factories and factories in the reclaimed territories. The economy of the USSR, and in particular the chemical industry, metalworking, mechanical engineering and the production of weapons and ammunition, significantly exceeded pre-war standards. There has also been an increase in agricultural output, capital investment and retail trade turnover.

The eastern regions of the country played a particularly important role in the production of heavy industry products. Metal production also increased in the southern and central parts of the USSR. As a result, by the end of hostilities, almost twice as much steel was smelted compared to 1943. The economy of the USSR received a significant impetus to development, thanks to an increase in the production of rolled products, non-ferrous metals and special steels. The fuel and energy base has expanded. The level of coal production has stabilized.

Experience has proven that the command system of production management, formed on the eve of the war, had significant opportunities for mobilizing the country's economic potential. It was especially characterized by agility and flexibility combined with repressive measures that played an important role in personnel and production management. All this was the reason that the economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War not only did not collapse, but also strengthened its position.

In the context of World War II, which began on September 1, 1939, the Soviet leadership set a course to expand its sphere of influence, and then its territory in Europe. Stalin believed that such a course contributed to strengthening the country's security.

In 1939-1940, the western parts of Belarus and Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, as well as Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were annexed to the USSR. Contradictions with Finland led to the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940), during which the USSR achieved only that the border was moved from Leningrad to Vyborg.

Under the cover of outwardly friendly relations, Germany and the USSR were preparing for a military clash. The initiative in deploying troops belonged to Germany. In December 1940, Hitler signed a directive to develop a plan for an attack on the USSR (“Barbarossa”).

On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began - an integral part of the Second World War. The Red Army suffered a crushing defeat in border battles. The USSR's unpreparedness for a defensive war and the better preparation of the German army allowed the aggressor to seize the strategic initiative in the first months of the war.

The outbreak of war caused a patriotic upsurge. Millions of people voluntarily came to recruiting stations and went to the front. Reserve units advanced from the depths of the country to meet the advancing German army. However, they also suffered heavy losses, since they did not have combat experience, support from tanks and aircraft, the bulk of which were lost in the border districts.

Soon after the attack, the restructuring of Soviet society on a war footing began. The entire life of the Soviet people was now subordinated to the task of ensuring victory over the enemy. On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (later headed by Stalin). The terrible blow that struck the USSR led to the undermining of the country's economy. By November 1941, production had fallen by half. However, a significant part of the equipment was transported to the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. One and a half thousand enterprises were dismantled, loaded onto trains, transported to new locations and started up again there. Beyond the Urals, a new industrial base was essentially created. During the war, the majority of the population lived according to the principle “Everything for the front! Everything for victory!

By mid-July, the slowdown in the pace of the German offensive showed that blitzkrieg was impossible. The USSR was more prepared for a protracted war than Germany.

The Nazis managed to occupy more than 40% of the territory of the Soviet Union with a population of about 80 million people; 6 million people were driven into slavery in Germany (half of them died during the war). The Gestapo, a security service, was active, arresting anyone it suspected of anti-fascist sentiments, torturing and exterminating them. Raids by “Einsatz teams” were carried out to exterminate Jews. Thus, in 1941-1943, about 100 thousand Soviet citizens, mostly Jews, died in Babi Yar (in the northern part of Kyiv).

Locally, the occupation administration recruited local collaborators to serve as headmen and policemen (policemen). Some people cooperated with the occupiers out of despair, considering the USSR defeated, some - wanting to make a career under the new regime, some - out of ideological considerations, hatred of the communist regime and sympathy for Nazi Germany. Ideological motives also dictated the behavior of that part of the Russian emigration that cooperated with Nazism. Some of the emigrant collaborators were Germanophile or pro-Nazi (P.N. Krasnov, A.G. Shkuro, etc.), and some hoped to play the role of a “third force” (People’s Labor Union). Life has proven the naivety of these hopes. Military collaborationist formations were also created, the largest of which was the Russian Liberation Army, led by General A. A. Vlasov.

In the territories occupied by the Germans, a partisan movement and an anti-fascist underground developed. In total, partisans controlled 200 thousand square kilometers in 1943.

After the victories of the Red Army near Moscow (December 1941), Stalingrad (November 1942 - February 1943) and Kursk (July - August 1943), a turning point came in the course of the war. In 1943, the blockade of Leningrad that began in September 1941 was broken, remaining in the patriotic tradition as a symbol of the courage of the civilian population.

In July 1944, with the capture of Pskov, the territory of the RSFSR was liberated from the enemy. In June - August 1944, Belarus was liberated during Operation Bagration. In October 1944, the liberation of Ukraine from the occupiers was completed.

In March 1944, Soviet troops crossed the USSR border with Romania. In 1944-1945, in cooperation with local resistance, they liberated the countries of Eastern Europe from the Nazis and occupied them. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and the eastern parts of Germany and Austria fell into the Soviet sphere of influence.

In February 1945, meeting in Yalta, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that it was necessary to achieve the unconditional surrender of Germany. Germany had to pay reparations to the victors. The USSR pledged to enter the war against Japan 2-3 months after the victory over Germany, for which it was supposed to get back the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur and regain control of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). The Allies recognized the new borders of the USSR, but agreed that coalition governments would be created in Eastern European countries with the participation of both communists and non-communist forces. The negotiators agreed to create the United Nations.