Text: Alexander Mikhailov
At two o'clock in the morning on February 23, 1944, the sky of Checheno-Ingushetia lit up with flares: a carefully thought-out operation under code name"Lentils". Patrols were placed everywhere, ambushes were set up on mountain roads, telephone communications and radio broadcasting stations were turned off. Submachine gunners in the uniform of the NKVD troops appeared at the doors of residents' houses. By five o'clock in the morning everything had been collected in the squares. male population villages, cities, towns. To avoid any misunderstandings, native language announced the government's decision to evict the Chechens and Ingush to the east of the USSR.
Having announced the government decision, the leaders of the operation began personal searches of all men and their disarmament, if required. And searches were already underway in the houses... The initial numbness gave way to rage. Today we can only guess how many curses and threats were heard against the perpetrators of this operation. However, who or what could resist the NKVD of that time? While the operation was underway, the management was summing up the first results.
A few hours later a telegram landed on Stalin’s desk: "Top secret. Telegram No. 6051 dated February 23, 1944 to Comrade Stalin. Today, February 23, at dawn, an operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush began. The eviction is proceeding normally. There are no noteworthy incidents. There have been six cases of attempts at resistance from outside individuals that were stopped by arrest or use of weapons. Of those targeted for seizure in connection with the operation, 842 people were arrested. As of 11 a.m., 94 thousand 741 people were taken out of populated areas, i.e. over 20 percent of those subject to eviction were loaded onto railway trains, of this number 20 thousand 23 people.”
Every six hours, Beria received information from the heads of four operational sectors: Vladikavkaz (Prigorodny, Nazran, Sunzha, Ochalup, Psedakh, Malkabeg districts - 18 percent of the evicted residents), Sleptsovsky (Nadterechny, Galashkinsky, Galanchozh, Achkhoy-Martan districts - 13 percent of the population) , Gudermes (Gudermes, Kurcheloevsky, Nozhai-Yurtovsky, Staro-Yurtovsky, Khasavyurtsky districts - 25 percent of the population). Grozny was the largest sector. In addition to the fortress city, it included Ataginsky, Vedensky, Urus-Martanovsky, Shalinsky, Cheberloevsky and other areas, where 43 percent of those subject to deportation lived. As if protesting against tyranny, snow fell on the mountains. But he was also powerless against the NKVD. However, that operation had its difficulties.
Wincing, Beria read: “In the Kurchaloi region, while providing armed resistance, legalized bandits Basayev Abu Bakar and Nanagaev Khamid were killed. A rifle, a revolver and a machine gun were confiscated from the dead.”
“During the eviction process, four vehicles with the entire contingent fell into the gorge, as a result of which thirty-one people were killed (apparently killed - A.M.). "
While the migrants were traveling to the Galanchozhsky district, the convoy was fired upon by a gang. The firefight lasted thirty minutes. Killed: Lieutenant Dreev and Private Medvedev. A woman was killed and a child was wounded in the convoy."
“During an attack on an operational group in the Shalinsky district, one Chechen was killed and one was seriously wounded. In the Urus-Martan district, four people were killed while trying to escape. In the Shatoevsky district, one Chechen was killed while trying to attack sentries. Two of our employees were slightly wounded (with daggers )".
27 railway stations The republics resounded with the cries of children, the screams of women, the curses of men, the clanging of shutters, the roar of locomotive whistles and the roar of railway couplings. Less than a day later, at 00 o'clock on February 24, 1944, 18 trains filled with human grief, rumbling at the junctions, set off into the depths of Russia. 107,431 people lost their homes and lost hope. 43,529 children were due to start new life at a new location... 39 trains were ready for departure, 32 were waiting for loading.
It took the NKVD leadership less than a week for Beria to report to Stalin: “I am reporting on the results of the operation to evict Chechens and Ingush.
By February 29, 478,479 people were evicted and loaded onto railway trains, including 91,250 Ingush and 387,229 Chechens. 177 trains were loaded, of which 159 were sent to the place of the new settlement.
6 thousand Chechens remained unevacuated due to heavy snowfall and poor roads; removal and loading will be completed in two days.
Cases of attempts to escape and hide from eviction were isolated and all, without exception, were stopped.
2,016 anti-Soviet elements were arrested, 20,072 firearms were seized, including 4,868 rifles, 479 machine guns and machine guns."
Today it is difficult to assess how objective the information was, but the fact remains. On November 9, 1943, Bogdan Kobulov, Deputy People's Commissar of State Security, State Security Commissioner of the 2nd rank, signed a memorandum addressed to Lavrentiy Beria “On the situation of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic”:
“There are 2,288 settlements in the republic. The population during the war decreased by 25,886 people and totals 705,814 people. Chechens and Ingush in the republic as a whole number about 450,000 people.
There are 38 sects in the republic, numbering over 20 thousand people. They conduct active anti-Soviet work, shelter bandits and German paratroopers.
When the front line approached in August-September 1942, 80 members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) quit their jobs and fled, incl. 16 heads of district committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 8 senior officials of district executive committees and 14 chairmen of collective farms.
Anti-Soviet authorities, having contacted German paratroopers, on the instructions of German intelligence, organized an armed uprising in October 1942 in the Shatoevsky, Cheberloevsky, Itum-Kalinsky, Vedeno and Galanchozhsky regions.
The attitude of the Chechens and Ingush towards Soviet power was clearly expressed in desertion and evasion of conscription into the Red Army. During the first mobilization in August 1941, out of 8,000 people subject to conscription, 719 people deserted.
In October 1941, out of 4,733 people, 362 evaded conscription.
In January 1942, when recruiting the national division, it was possible to recruit only 50 percent personnel.
In March 1942, out of 14,576 people, 13,560 deserted and evaded service, went underground, went to the mountains and joined gangs.
In 1943, out of 3,000 volunteers, the number of deserters was 1,870.
A group of Chechens under the leadership of Alautdin Khamchiev and Abdurakhman Beltoev covered the parachute landing of an officer of the German intelligence service Lange and transported him across the front line. The criminals were awarded knightly orders and transferred to the Chi ASSR to organize an armed uprising.
According to the NKVD and the NKGB of the Chisinau Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, there were 8,535 people on the operational register, including 27 German paratroopers; 457 people suspected of having links with German intelligence; 1410 members of fascist organizations; 619 mullahs and active sectarians; 2126 deserters. During September-October 1943, 243 people were liquidated and legalized. As of November 1, 35 gang groups are operating in the republic with total number 245 people and 43 lone bandits. Over 4,000 people took part in the armed uprisings of 1941-1942. - stopped active work, but weapons - pistols, machine guns, automatic rifles - are not surrendered, hiding them for a new armed uprising, which will be timed to coincide with the second German offensive in the Caucasus."
Operation Lentil, for all its immorality and cruelty, should, of course, be classified as a classic operation in operational terms. As already noted, its preparation took three months. Operational groups of the NKVD and NKGB, numbering 8-12 people, carried out titanic work in mountainous areas with a hostile population. They conducted a "census". And not only the population. 1,300 bandits hiding in the forests were brought out of hiding and partially disarmed. The traditional craving for weapons and the practical need to have one did not allow for complete demilitarization of the highlanders: handing over weapons is a shame for a highlander.
But let's get back to preparing the operation. The main factor, in addition to the human factor (who, how many, how), was the strategic factor. To carry out the operation, it was important not only to collect, but also to deliver all internees along mountain roads to the place where the trains were sent. What can we say about our roads? Especially about mountain roads! The German commander Guderian described them extremely succinctly: “In Russia there are no roads. There are directions...” It was these directions that needed to be studied in such a way that no emergency situations occurred. And each route was described in such detail that even a blind person could follow it without slipping. Every bump, every pothole and dangerous place were plotted on the diagram. Everything was provided for - down to such seemingly trifles as a pile of brushwood, straw, corn stalks, a pile of stones that could be used if the vehicle got stuck in the mud. Tractor parking was provided in front of the water in case of unexpected vehicle breakdowns.
Particular attention was paid to difficult to pass places where ambushes could be set up or unforeseen circumstances could arise. In a number of cases, the diagrams showed places through which trucks could only pass empty, and therefore it was necessary to set up a cordon. At the same time, sources of water were identified along the routes, which could be required for the special contingent.
No less important tasks charged with the Directorate of Convoy Troops of the NKVD of the USSR. Major General Bochkov was obliged to provide “security for the special contingent during loading and escort to the destination.” Railways(as opposed to just roads) have always been a source of pride in Russia.
There was more order, discipline, responsibility. IN in this case everything was provided for when transporting special forces.
“In total, to ensure the transportation of special contingents, create and send 152 routes of 100 cars each, with a total of 14,200 covered cars and 1 thousand platforms.
Echelons should be formed with 65 cars each according to the following scheme: place two cover cars (or 1 Pullman) at the head of the train, allocate the 33rd car for the convoy, and 34-1 for the medical isolator. ...Each human carriage should be equipped with military removable equipment according to the standard: 14 boards for upper bunks, 1 iron stove, 1 lantern; Close 3 hatches tightly, in one hatch with right side along the train, install an unbarred, glazed frame (hatches - small windows, 2 on each side of the car. - A.M.). Buckets will be issued only for isolation cars and convoys. Each passenger car is supplied with fuel at the rate for 3 days.
Ensure the shipment and dispatch of the following removable equipment and materials to the equipment points of human echelons: window frames - 12 thousand pieces; lanterns - 12 thousand pieces; buckets - 2 thousand pieces; roofing iron for stoves - 114.5 tons (2970 stoves were welded from it, another 2500 pieces were loaded ready-made); roofing iron for chimneys - 100 tons; glass in the amount of 2000 sq. m - 1 carriage; military planks in the amount of 7,300 cubic meters (292 cars or 219,000 pieces).
“To establish that the special contingent is provided with food for the entire route to the destination at the expense of personal resources for a period of 30 days. For luggage in each echelon, allocate 2 cover cars.
Provide for the organization of fuel supply points for trains along the route, the organization of providing trains with boiling water at junction stations...
Establish food stations everywhere with the People's Commissariat along the route of the trains to provide food if necessary..."
“To escort trains with special settlers, the Convoy Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR assigns a platoon of convoy troops (36-40 people) to each train...
Convoy troops accompany special settlers right up to their places of resettlement...
The commandant places the convoy at the head and tail of the train in such a way as to exclude the possibility of group escapes and successfully repel possible attempts by bandit elements to attack the train...
Each two-axle car must accommodate at least 40 special forces personnel. If necessary, a punishment cell will be set up in one of the baggage cars for persons violating the rules of movement...
The echelon commandant receives a special contingent from the operational staff, according to family cards drawn up for the head of the family...
The organization of meals for those resettled along the route is carried out by the commandant of the train at established points. Payment for food is made by the commandant of the echelon. Cash The train commandant receives food from a representative of the NKVD of the USSR. It is prohibited to give money to immigrants, except for the purchase of milk for children...
For medical care those resettled by the People's Commissariat of Health are allocated one doctor and two nurses...
The doctor must have the required amount of medicine with him. In each carriage, a senior carriage officer is appointed from among the special settlers, who is responsible for order in the carriage, recording and checking at least once a day all special settlers placed in the carriage, and distributing food. The senior officer must immediately report all incidents in the carriage (escape, death, etc.) to the train commandant...
For every 8-10 wagons, a senior is appointed from among the sergeants of the convoy, whose duties are to monitor the behavior of the settlers of this group of wagons...
For each echelon, one NKVD or NKGB operative is allocated for intelligence and operational services to those resettled along the route. The operative is obliged to establish contact with agents and information from among the special contingent and inform the commandant of the echelon to take measures against attempts by those evicted to engage in anti-Soviet actions and organized escape."
To support Operation Lentil, 17,698 operatives and 85,003 soldiers and officers of the NKVD and NKGB were involved in a timely manner.
In anticipation of the operation, everything was done to reassure the population as much as possible and to eliminate unwanted excesses at the preparation stage. Realizing the “role of the individual in history,” the leaders of the NKVD understood that without neutralizing the authorities and bandit leaders, operations could be accompanied by the shedding of a lot of blood.
At a meeting on February 7, 1944, that is, two weeks before “H” time, a decision was made regarding the socially harmful contingent.
The most dangerous legalized bandits should be seized in order to decapitate the gang-rebel elements before the operation.
Persons on whom there is sufficient incriminating material are to be submitted for consideration by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR.
Most of the legalized bandits should be seized before the start of the operation and escorted separately, under reinforced escort, to the loading station."
The topic of savings that the Chechens had occupied a special place. Despite the fact that many Chechens and their families had accumulated decent capital through speculation and often theft, a decision was made not to take away money and valuables: they had to settle down in new places. According to intelligence sources, some Chechens and Ingush had two or three million rubles (the cost of an airplane or T-34 tank).
Under these same conditions, by a secret decree of the State Defense Committee, 6 thousand tons of flour and 3 thousand tons of cereal were allocated to provide the settlers with food. As loans, the special settlers were supposed to receive (and received) 5 thousand rubles per family with installments up to 7 years. In addition, each family received one head of cattle to repay the debt for the cattle and grain left at home.
In the places of proposed resettlement, more than 75 thousand premises suitable for housing were prepared, including 60 thousand due to the densification of the local population. 60 percent gave land plots. 11 thousand baths were equipped for them, 2100 doctors were mobilized.
There were food points at 37 stations. Each settler received 6 rubles per day. In total, 5 thousand tons of bread and 500 tons of meat were consumed, that is, 10 kg of bread and 1 kg of meat for the duration of transportation. Slightly better provided operational staff. The daily ration included: bread - 300 g, crackers - 200 g, canned meat - 150 g, fish - 150 g, sugar - 25 g, tea - 2 g.
In total, Operation Lentil cost the country 150 million rubles.
And the wheels were knocking, and telegrams were sent to Moscow:
“From the train SK-381 at the Ufa station of the Kuibyshevskaya railway, 6 people with typhus and one person with pneumonia were removed and sent to the hospital. The carriage in which the patients were identified was uncoupled from the train and the special contingent is being sanitized.”
"The corpse of a deceased woman, 80 years old, was removed from train SK-397 at the Chelyabinsk station of the South Ural Railway. The corpse of a deceased man, 120 years old, was removed from train SK-344 at the Berdyaush station of the South Ural Railway."
"From train SK-349 at Kuibyshev station, the corpse of an 8-month-old child was removed; he died of exhaustion. From train SK-368, 4 corpses were removed, of which two newborns died; one due to old age (103 years) and one due to a decline in cardiac activity ".
There were some incidents.
"When the train SK-241 departs from the station. Yany-Kurgash Tashkent railway special settler Kadyev tried to escape from the train. During his arrest, Kadyev tried to hit Red Army soldier Karbenko with a stone, as a result of which a weapon was used. Kadyev was wounded by the shot and died in the hospital."
The conditions that were created during the eviction period are indicated by the following telegram addressed to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR B.Z. Kobulov:
“Based on the experience of transporting Karachais and Kalmyks, we have carried out some measures that have made it possible to significantly reduce the need for rolling stock and reduce the number of trains required.
Thus, according to the calculation of the number of special contingents, 15,232 cars were required to transport them (272 trains, counting, as before, 56 cars in each echelon). In fact, 12,480 wagons, or 192 trains (65 wagons each), were sent.
The need for wagons was reduced by 2,752 wagons, or 42 trains (65 wagons each).
“Condensing the loading of special forces from 40 to 45 people in a carriage with 40-50% of children present is quite advisable... Head of the 3rd Directorate People's Commissariat State Security of the USSR Milshtein. 03/18/1944"
In April 1944, at one of the closed sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the resettlement of Kalmyks, Chechens and Ingush was announced as a fait accompli.
However, the action continued. It covered Chechens and Ingush discharged from the Red Army (after February 1944). Special orders were issued on the fronts. The order addressed to the chairmen of the filtration commissions, signed by the head of the NKVD troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, I. Pavlov, proposed that “all Karachais, Chechens, Ingush and Balkars be sent to the disposal of the special settler departments of the NKVD of the Kazakh SSR Alma-Ata.”
Many commanders of the Red Army did not comply with this order. They sheltered their officers and soldiers, gave them other names and nationalities. So it was with Hero Soviet Union Mavlid Visaitov, the famous Ingush intelligence officer Abdulla Tsaroev and others. But many were never saved. 1
On March 14, 1944, Beria reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks about the “successfully carried out operation” to evict the Chechens, Ingush and other peoples. For this action, participants received government awards.
The following were awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree: General Commissioner of State Security Lavrentia Beria, Commissioner of State Security 2nd Rank Bogdan Kobulov, Commissioner of State Security 2nd Rank Sergei Kruglov, Commissioner of State Security 2nd Rank Ivan Serov.
Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree: Colonel General Arkady Apollonov, State Security Commissioner 1st Rank Vsevolod Merkulov, Major General Ivan Piyashev.
The Order of Suvorov 2nd degree was awarded to 13 people, the Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree - 17 people, the Order of the Red Banner - 79 people, the Order of the Patriotic War 2nd degree - 61 people, the Order of the Red Star - 120 people, the medal "For Courage" " - 259 people.
On the night of February 24, 1944, Operation Lentil began - the mass expulsion of Chechens and Ingush from the North Caucasus, which became one of the most serious crimes of the Stalinist regime.
Desertion
Until 1938, Chechens were not systematically drafted into the army; the annual draft was no more than 300-400 people. Since 1938, conscription has been significantly increased. In 1940-41 it was carried out in full accordance with the law "On General military duty", but the results were disappointing. During the additional mobilization in October 1941 of persons born in 1922, out of 4,733 conscripts, 362 people evaded reporting to recruiting stations. By decision of the State Defense Committee, in the period from December 1941 to January 1942, the Chi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed from the indigenous population 114th National Division. As of the end of March 1942, 850 people had already deserted from it. The second mass mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia began on March 17, 1942 and was supposed to end on March 25. The number of people subject to mobilization was 14,577 people However, by the appointed date, only 4887 were mobilized, of which only 4395 were sent to military units, that is, 30% of what was required according to the order.In connection with this, the mobilization period was extended until April 5, but the number of mobilized people increased only to 5543 people.
Uprisings
Policy Soviet power, primarily the collectivization of agriculture, caused mass discontent in the North Caucasus, which repeatedly resulted in armed uprisings.
From the moment of the establishment of Soviet power in the North Caucasus until the start of the Great Patriotic War, 12 major anti-Soviet armed uprisings took place in Checheno-Ingushetia alone, in which from 500 to 5,000 people took part.
But to speak, as has been done for many years in party and KGB documents, about the “almost universal participation” of Chechens and Ingush in anti-Soviet gangs, of course, is absolutely groundless.
OPKB and ChGNSPO
In January 1942, the “Special Party of Caucasian Brothers” (OPKB) was created, uniting representatives of 11 peoples of the Caucasus (but operating mainly in Checheno-Ingushetia).
IN program documents The OPKB's goal was to fight "Bolshevik barbarism and Russian despotism." The party's coat of arms depicted fighters for the liberation of the Caucasus, one of whom was killing a poisonous snake, and the other was cutting the throat of a pig with a saber.
Israilov later renamed his organization the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers (NSPKB).
According to the NKVD, the number of this organization reached five thousand people. Another large anti-Soviet group on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia was the Checheno-Gorsk National Socialist, created in November 1941. underground organization(ChGNSPO) under the leadership of Mairbek Sheripov. Before the war, Sheripov was the chairman of the Forest Industry Council of the Chi ASSR; in the fall of 1941, he opposed Soviet power and managed to unite under his command the detachments operating in the Shatoevsky, Cheberloevsky and part of the Itum-Kalinsky districts.
In the first half of 1942, Sheripov wrote a program for the ChGNSPO, in which he outlined his ideological platform, goals and objectives. Mairbek Sheripov, like Israilov, proclaimed himself an ideological fighter against Soviet power and Russian despotism. But among his loved ones, he did not hide the fact that he was driven by pragmatic calculations, and the ideals of the struggle for freedom of the Caucasus were only declarative. Before leaving for the mountains, Sharipov openly declared to his supporters: “My brother, Sheripov Aslanbek, in 1917 foresaw the overthrow of the Tsar, so he began to fight on the side of the Bolsheviks. I also know that Soviet power has come to an end, so I want to meet Germany halfway.”
"Lentils"
On the night of February 24, 1944, NKVD troops surrounded populated areas with tanks and trucks, blocking all exits. Beria reported to Stalin about the start of Operation Lentil.
The relocation began at dawn on February 23. By lunchtime, more than 90 thousand people were loaded into freight cars. As Beria reported, there was almost no resistance, and if it did arise, the instigators were shot on the spot.
On February 25, Beria sent a new report: “The deportation is proceeding normally.” 352 thousand 647 people boarded 86 trains and were sent to their destination. Chechens who fled into the forest or mountains were caught by NKVD troops and shot. During this operation, monstrous scenes occurred. The residents of the village of Khaibakh were driven into a stable by security officers and set on fire. More than 700 people were burned alive. The migrants were allowed to take with them 500 kilograms of cargo per family.
The special settlers had to hand over livestock and grain - in exchange they received livestock and grain from local authorities at their new place of residence. There were 45 people in each carriage (for comparison, the Germans were allowed to take a ton of property during deportation, and there were 40 people in each carriage without personal belongings). The party nomenklatura and the Muslim elite traveled in the last echelon, which consisted of normal carriages.
Heroes
The obvious excess of Stalin's measures is obvious today. Thousands of Chechens and Ingush gave their lives at the front and were awarded orders and medals for their military exploits. Machine gunner Khanpasha Nuradilov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. A Chechen-Ingush cavalry regiment under the command of Major Visaitov reached the Elbe. The title of Hero, to which he was nominated, was awarded to him only in 1989.
Sniper Abukhadzhi Idrisov destroyed 349 fascists. Sergeant Idrisov was awarded with orders Red Banner and Red Star, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
Chechen sniper Akhmat Magomadov became famous in the battles near Leningrad, where he was called the “fighter German occupiers" He has more than 90 Germans on his account.
Khanpasha Nuradilov destroyed 920 fascists at the fronts, captured 7 enemy machine guns and personally captured 12 fascists. For his military exploits, Nuradilov was awarded the Order of the Red Star and Red Banner. In April 1943, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the war years, 10 Vainakhs became Heroes of the Soviet Union. 2,300 Chechens and Ingush died in the war. It should be noted: military personnel - Chechens and Ingush, representatives of other peoples repressed in 1944 - were recalled from the front to the labor armies, and at the end of the war they, the “victorious soldiers,” were sent into exile.
In a new place
The attitude towards special settlers in 1944-1945 in places of settlement and at work was difficult and was characterized by injustice and numerous violations of their rights by local authorities. These violations were expressed in relation to the accrual wages, in refusal to issue bonuses for work. Work to improve the economic structure was hampered by bureaucratic delays. According to the North Kazakhstan Regional Department of Economic Development, as of January 1, 1946, there were special settlers from the North Caucasus in the region: “Chechen families 3,637, or 14,766 people, Ingush families 1,234, or 5,366 people, total families of special settlers in the region were 4,871, or 20,132 people
Return
In 1957, the peoples of the North Caucasus were able to return to their homeland. The return took place under difficult conditions; not everyone wanted to give their houses and household goods to the “old-timers.” Every now and then armed clashes broke out. The forced resettlement of Chechens and Ingush caused them not only enormous human losses and material damage, but also had Negative consequences on the national consciousness of these peoples. We can say that the deportation of 1944 became one of the reasons for the Chechen wars.
The operation took place under the code name "Lentil", which was personally led by Lavrentiy Beria. Books have been written about the reasons for the great migration of peoples during the war. scientific works. However, resettlement Caucasian peoples occupies a special place because their deportation was no longer of a preventive nature, but was a kind of action of “retribution” for crimes committed or not committed during the war against the Soviet state. The actions of “retribution” directly affected six peoples - Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Crimean Tatars. Today the reasons for them mass deportation seem far-fetched to many. And the idea of punishing entire nations is itself monstrous. Moreover, many call the deportation of these peoples genocide. However, let's look at the facts. In 1934, the Chechen Autonomous Region (AO) and the Ingush Autonomous Okrug were transformed into a single Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Okrug, and in 1936 into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This territory was practically not under occupation, so it was not easy to accuse its people of direct betrayal. Therefore, the official indictment was "active and almost universal participation in the terrorist movement" directed against the Soviets and the Red Army." In particular, the existence of a mass rebel organization "United Party of Caucasian Brothers" under the leadership of Kh. Israilov was asserted. In October 1943, the republic Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs B. Kobulov went to study the situation. In November, a meeting was held with the heads of the NKVD departments of those regions where Kalmyks were being deported. In particular, issues related to the planned operation "Lentil" (deportation of 500 thousand Vainakhs (Chechens and Ingush) ) It was planned to resettle 200 thousand people in the Novosibirsk region, 35-40 thousand - in the Altai Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory and Omsk Region. But these regions evaded, and in the plan presented by Beria to Stalin in mid-December 1943, there was a different dislocation, reminiscent of " Karachay". The highlanders were distributed between the regions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In particular, in Kazakhstan they settled in the Akmola, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, Karaganda, East Kazakhstan and Almaty regions. Those who were employed in the oil and gas sector were resettled in areas of the Guryev region. The leaders of the Chechen-Ingush Republic were used From Beria's letter to Stalin:“Preparation for the operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush is ending. After clarification, 459,486 people were registered as being subject to resettlement, including those living in the regions of Dagestan bordering Checheno-Ingushetia and in the city of Vladikavkaz.” On February 22, Beria met with the leadership of the republic and the highest spiritual leaders, warned them about the operation scheduled for early tomorrow morning, and proposed to carry out necessary work among the population. The work was done. But the elders, religious and party workers were deceived. Special folder. From Beria’s letter to Stalin, February 22, 1944:“It was reported to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Molaev about the government's decision to evict the Chechens and Ingush and about the motives that formed the basis of this decision. After my message, Molaev shed tears, but pulled himself together and promised to complete all the tasks that were given to him given in connection with eviction." Then in Grozny, together with him, 9 leading officials from the Chechens and Ingush were identified and convened, to whom the progress of the eviction of the Chechens and Ingush and the reasons for the eviction were announced." 24 districts were assigned to 40 other party workers, in them it was necessary to select from the local population of 2-3 people for campaigning. In the early morning of February 23, all men were given the command to gather for a gathering on the occasion of the celebration of the birthday of the Red Army. After it, part of the gathering was sent home to collect things, the rest were disarmed and taken to the loading places. In contrast from the previous ones (meaning the deportations of Koreans, Kalmyks, Germans and other peoples), one cannot say about this operation that it took place without incidents: there were 2,016 arrests and 20,072 firearms seized. In addition, the snow that fell in the mountains slowed down the eviction from the mountains districts. The last to leave their lands were representatives of the national political elite on February 29. In mid-March, 89,901 families (405,375 people) were resettled in Kazakhstan. Khazhbiker Akiev recalls: When we were evicted, I was 11 years old. A month before this, troops were brought into our village, this was the case everywhere, throughout Checheno-Ingushetia. Five or six people were standing at our house. Everyone thought that these were retreating troops. As it turned out later, these were NKVD troops. They lived with us for a month, and on the morning of February 23, 1944, they entered the yard and ordered us to pack up. Our family consisted of five children, a mother and a father. Father was at the meeting. They didn't even let us pack our things. We didn’t really understand everything in Russian either. Someone who understood explained that we were being evicted. What were you allowed to take with you? This was different for everyone: in one yard they might have allowed it, in another it might not. It depended on the will of the soldiers and officers. They didn't let us take anything. In our village of Bazorkino, now called Chermen (territory of Ossetia), there was a railway line. Everyone who was on the move was brought there. The fence was like a flock, there were machine guns around, soldiers lying with machine guns at the ready, they began to load us into the cars. The carriages were calfskin and full of holes. They crammed in as many people as possible. We rode sitting. There was no longer room for everyone to lie down. Some carriages were freer. They loaded us for a day: they waited until everyone was collected. At dawn on February 24th we left. People died along the way. From hunger, cold and...shame. There was a bucket in the corner of the carriage and I had to recover in front of everyone. Those who were shy (especially girls and old people) endured as long as they could. Many died from constipation and bladder rupture. They didn't allow me to bury him. If the soldiers found out about the death of someone, they threw out the corpse right on the move. Then people began to hide the corpses of their relatives. Someone managed to take the bodies to the final station. Along the way they not only died, but were also born. Women covered the area around the woman in labor with a sheet and delivered the baby. There was no water: the child was wiped with rags and wrapped in something warm. On March 18, we were already at Makina station, Akmola region. The train was unloaded there. We stopped at the school, then waited for representatives from the collective farms, they took as many as they could. And we stayed with Makinke, my father, his name was Yunus, he was a master craftsman. He was taken into the artel. Maryam Akieva remembers: My mother’s brother worked in the NKVD, so my family knew about this long before the resettlement. However, the families of the NKVD officers were strictly forbidden to talk about this to anyone. Even if information leaked out, people simply did not believe it. It seemed to them that this could not happen at all. My mother recalled that our family moved in more or less tolerable conditions: the train was covered with carpets so that there would be no wind through the cracks. There was water and food. But many people got lice on the road and died from cold and illness. People still remember this nightmare. My father was recalled from the front, meanwhile Soviet troops were already in Poland. Amanchi Gunashev, political scientist, publicist: When the deportation took place, I was 1 year old. Therefore, I can judge that time only from the memories of my fellow tribesmen. We lived in the Cheberloy district, the village of Khindoy. By that time I no longer had a father. My mother, my older sister and I ended up in the Almaty region. The older brother and his uncle were deported to Kustanayskaya. This was one of the tricks of the deportation policy - to separate representatives of the people from their relatives, so that they would not even know where to look for each other. Before the lifting of restrictions on movement, we did not know about each other’s fate. My uncle and brother, a 14-year-old teenager, worked in the mines. Both died without being able to meet their relatives after the restrictions were lifted. It must be said that the date - February 23 - was also not chosen by chance. The NKVD tried to attach the dates of deportation to holidays in order to isolate the men under the guise of a solemn meeting. The deportation took place without exception: people were recalled from the front. Old people and children were put into the carriages. There were facts when sick people were shot on the spot. Residents of the village of Khaibakh, about 700 people who were located far in the mountains, and whom the NKVD officers did not have time to send by train, were driven into a stable and set on fire. Those who tried to escape were shot with machine guns. Special folder. From Beria’s letter to Stalin, February 29, 1944“Today, trains with former executives and religious authorities of Checheno-Ingushetia, who were used during the operation, were sent. From some points of the Galanzhoi region, 6 thousand Chechens remained unevicted, due to heavy snowfall and impassable roads, the removal and loading of which will be completed in two days. The operation was completed organized and without serious cases of resistance or other incidents." Saved "cannibals" from death local population Khazhbiker Akiev: During the first few days, the local population was still afraid of us; a rumor was spread among them that the “cannibals” had arrived. A week passed, then another, people looked closely at each other. They shared bread and salt, clothes, everything. There was a war, people in the rear themselves were dying of hunger, sending everything to the front. Now, when I see white bread, I take it in my hands and kiss it. The Kazakhs welcomed us well, thanks to them many survived. At the age of 12 I already became a carpenter in an artel. I worked for two years, making chests of drawers, tables, stools, and collapsible beds. Then I became a shoemaker. I worked for eight years in Makinka, I lived there for 23 years, until 1968. They didn’t take me into the army; I applied many times. The most I could afford was to study at the Federal Educational Institution. This factory training. In fact, it was just hard labor in the mines and mines. At that time, did you understand why they did this to the Chechen-Ingush? I didn't understand then. My father arrived and lived in silence until 1947. Before his deportation, he had recently returned from the labor army. There were no abreks in our family - people who went to the mountains to fight the Soviet regime. I began to realize those events only later, as my life progressed. This was Beria’s idea: he had to liberate the lands, give them to the Ossetians, Dagestanis, and Georgians. Reference In place of the areas inhabited by Chechens, the Grozny Okrug was created as part of the Stavropol Territory. It included, however, less than 2/3 of the former territory of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; at the same time, the northeastern regions of the Stavropol Territory, inhabited by Nogais, Dargins, Kumyks (until 1937, these lands were part of Dagestan) and Russians, were added to its composition. Later, the Grozny district was transformed into the Grozny region (with the inclusion of the former Kizlyar district). Former Western and part southern regions, that is, Ingushetia itself, were transferred to Georgia and North Ossetia, and the eastern and southeastern ones were annexed to Dagestan. The lands “liberated” after the deportation are populated mainly by Ossetians from Georgia (in the Prigorodny district) and Russians (in Sunzhensky). Accordingly, all Ingush names were repressed and replaced with Ossetian or Russian ones. The regime tried to veil all its actions. Commented by Kaidar Aldazhumanov, candidate historical sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute of History and Ethnology named after Ch. Valikhanov. - The reasons why all peoples were deported during the war do not stand up to criticism today. They can only be explained by political motives and the need to strengthen the camp economy. Instead of using troops at the front, the regime used up to 100 thousand officers and soldiers of the NKVD troops and 19 thousand operational workers to evict the Chechens and Ingush alone. Belonging to one nation or another turned into a tragedy for hundreds of thousands of innocent people. At one time, at the suggestion of Beria, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 8, 1944, 714 NKVD employees and operational workers who carried out the resettlement of the indicated peoples of the North Caucasus "for exemplary performance special assignments" were awarded orders and medals, including the Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, and the Red Banner. Subsequently, 20 years later, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by Decree of April 4, 1964, canceled this decision, and all awarded awards were returned. All of its actions by the regime tried to carefully veil it. On January 29, 1944, Beria approved the “Instructions on the procedure for the eviction of Chechens and Ingush.” And on January 31, the State Defense Committee issued two resolutions at once dedicated to the Chechens and Ingush, without naming them by name: the first - “On measures to accommodate special settlers in within the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSR", the second - "On the procedure for accepting livestock and agricultural products in the North Caucasus." The operation itself began on February 23, and the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was dated only on March 7, 1944. On November 26, 1948, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was adopted Soviet of the USSR, which read: Germans, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush Balkars, Crimean Tatars and others resettled to remote areas forever; their unauthorized departure from their places of settlement is punishable by hard labor for up to 20 years. The evicted peoples suffered a lot of physical and moral suffering and humiliation, hunger, and many people died. As an example, we can cite the following fact: on May 24, 1945, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Kazakhstan considered the issue “On the mass mortality of migrants due to exhaustion in the Tsyurupa region Pavlodar region"(most people were evicted there large quantity Vainakhs). They say that people ate the roots of grass and trees out of hunger. We must pay tribute local authorities control: they gave great importance arrangement of special settlers locally: loans were issued for acquiring farms and livestock. One cow was given to two families. Great help was provided rural population republics. On July 16, 1956, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued, according to which Chechens, Ingush, Karachais and their families were deregistered as special settlements and released from the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the lifting of restrictions did not mean the return of property confiscated during eviction. And the way home was still booked. Khazhbiker Akiev: When the lifting of restrictions was announced, people rushed to run home. They reached Ulbach, where they were caught and returned to Kazakhstan. And it was motivated by the fact that there was a war there: the Ingush demanded that their lands be returned to them from Ossetia, the Chechens fought with the Dagestanis. The state had to return the fugitives so that there would be no conflict. Stalin wanted to drown the Vainakhs in the Caspian Sea There is still a myth among the Chechen-Ingush people about how, back in 1944, Stalin and Beria wanted to drown their people in the Caspian Sea. They say that a railway line was even built leading directly to the sea. According to one version, in response to such a proposal from Beria, Stalin replied: “You can’t skin the same sheep twice.”
To Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
Carrying out deportation
On January 31, 1944, Decree No. 5073 of the State Defense Committee of the USSR was adopted on the abolition of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the deportation of its population to Central Asia and Kazakhstan “for aiding the fascist occupiers.” The Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished, from its composition 4 districts were transferred to the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, one district was transferred to the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Grozny region was formed on the remaining territory
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.
- Operation Cerberus
- Operation Frequent Wind
See what “Operation Lentil” is in other dictionaries:
Operation Lentil- (February 23, 1944 March 9, 1944) operation to deport Chechens and Ingush from the territory of the Chi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Background In the Chi ASSR, during the first mobilization in August 1941, out of 8,000 people subject to conscription, 719 deserted... ... Wikipedia
Operation Lentil- Main article: Deportation of Chechens and Ingush Operation “Lentil” (February 23, 1944 March 9, 1944) an operation to deport Chechens and Ingush from the territory of the Chi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Contents 1 Carrying out deportation 2 Consequences ... Wikipedia
Lentils (disambiguation)- Lentils: Wiktionary has an entry for “lentils.” Lentils (lat. Lens) are a genus of herbaceous plants in the legume family. Lentils (lat. Ca ... Wikipedia
Operation Rhodope (1967)- Operation Rhodopes (May 1967) demonstration of the military presence of countries Warsaw Pact in the areas of Bulgaria bordering Greece, carried out in view of the military coup in Greece and framed as joint military exercises armed forces... ... Wikipedia
Behemoth (operation)- This term has other meanings, see Hippopotamus (meanings) ... Wikipedia
Deportation of Chechens- and the Ingush mass resettlement of the Chechen and Ingush people by the Soviet authorities, part of the general deportation of peoples to the USSR. After the liquidation of the Checheno Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, from February 23 to March 9, 1944, forced deportation Chechens... ... Wikipedia - Cette liste des opérations lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale recense les opérations militaires, coups de mains, raids, attaques militaires soudaines ou non des belligérants (classement par ordre alphabétique). L’URSS à aussi lancé beaucoup de… … Wikipédia en Français
At 2 a.m. on February 23, 1944, the most famous ethnic deportation operation began - the resettlement of residents of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, formed ten years earlier by uniting the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions.
There were deportations of “punished peoples” before this - Germans and Finns, Kalmyks and Karachais, and after - Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians living in Crimea, as well as Meskhetian Turks from Georgia. But Operation Lentil to evict almost half a million Vainakhs - Chechens and Ingush - became the largest.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR motivated the decision to deport Chechens and Ingush by the fact that “during the Great Patriotic War, especially during the actions Nazi troops in the Caucasus, many Chechens and Ingush betrayed their Motherland and went over to the side fascist occupiers, joined the ranks of saboteurs and intelligence officers thrown by the Germans into the rear of the Red Army, created armed gangs at the orders of the Germans to fight against Soviet power, and also taking into account that many Chechens and Ingush for a number of years participated in armed uprisings against Soviet power and during for a long time, not being engaged in honest work, they carry out bandit raids on collective farms in neighboring regions, rob and kill Soviet people.”
These two peoples had difficult relations with the authorities even before the war. Until 1938, there was not even a systematic conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the Red Army - no more than 300-400 people were conscripted annually.
Then the conscription was significantly increased, and in 1940-1941 it was carried out in full accordance with the law on universal conscription.
“The attitude of the Chechens and Ingush towards Soviet power was clearly expressed in desertion and evasion of conscription into the Red Army. During the first mobilization in August 1941, out of 8,000 people subject to conscription, 719 people deserted. In October 1941, out of 4,733 people, 362 evaded conscription. In January 1942, during the formation of the national division, only 50 percent of the personnel were recruited. In March 1942, out of 14,576 people, 13,560 deserted and evaded service, went underground, went to the mountains and joined gangs. In 1943, out of 3,000 volunteers, the number of deserters was 1,870,” wrote L.P. in a memo. Beria's deputy people's commissar, state security commissioner of the 2nd rank B.Z. Kobulov.
According to him, there were 38 sects in the republic, numbering over 20 thousand people. These were mainly hierarchical organized Muslim religious brotherhoods of murids.
“They are conducting active anti-Soviet work, sheltering bandits and German paratroopers. When the front line approached in August-September 1942, 80 members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) quit their jobs and fled, including 16 leaders of district committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 8 senior officials of district executive committees and 14 chairmen of collective farms,” wrote Bogdan Kobulov.
After the start of the war, the mobilization of the Chechens and Ingush was actually thwarted - “believing and hoping that the USSR would lose the war, many mullahs and teip authorities agitated for evasion military service or desertion,” says the collection of documents prepared by the international foundation “Democracy” “Stalin’s deportations. 1928-1953".
Due to mass desertion and evasion from service, in the spring of 1942, by order of the USSR NGO, the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army was canceled.
In 1943, the conscription of approximately 3 thousand volunteers was authorized, but two-thirds of them deserted.
Because of this, it was not possible to form the 114th Checheno-Ingush cavalry division- it had to be reorganized into a regiment, but even after that desertion was widespread.
According to data as of November 20, 1942, in the Northern group of the Transcaucasian Front there were all 90 Chechens and Ingush - 0.04%.
Heroes of War
At the same time, many Vainakhs who went to the front showed themselves with the best side and contributed to the victory Soviet people in Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945.
The names of three Chechens and one Ingush are immortalized in Memorial complex defenders Brest Fortress. But in heroic defense According to various sources, from 250 to 400 people from Checheno-Ingushetia participated in the Brest Fortress, which became a symbol of perseverance and courage. Together with other units of the Red Army, the 255th Chechen-Ingush Regiment and a separate cavalry division fought in Brest.
One of the last and staunch defenders of the Brest Fortress was Magomed Uzuev, but only in 1996, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, was he posthumously awarded the title of Hero Russian Federation. Magomed’s brother Visa Uzuev also fought in Brest.
Two defenders of the Brest Fortress are still alive in Chechnya - Akhmed Khasiev and Adam Malaev
Sniper Abukhaji Idrisov destroyed 349 fascists - an entire battalion. Sergeant Idrisov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star, and was given the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
Chechen sniper Akhmat Magomadov became famous in the battles near Leningrad, where he was called “the fighter of the German occupiers.” There are more than 90 Germans on his side.
Khanpasha Nuradilov destroyed 920 fascists at the fronts, captured 7 enemy machine guns and personally captured 12 fascists. For his military exploits, Nuradilov was awarded the Order of the Red Star and Red Banner. In April 1943, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
During the war years, 10 Vainakhs became Heroes of the Soviet Union. 2,300 Chechens and Ingush died in the war.
Anti-Soviet protests
With the beginning of the war, gangs in the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic became more active. In October 1941, two separate uprisings took place, covering the Shatoevsky, Itum-Kalinsky, Vedensky, Cheberloevsky and Galanchozhsky districts of the republic. At the beginning of 1942, the leaders of the uprisings, Khasan Israilov and Mairbek Sheripov, united, creating the “Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Checheno-Ingushetia.” In its statements, this rebel "government" viewed Hitler as an ally in the fight against Stalin.
As the front line approached the border of the republic in 1942, anti-Soviet forces began to act more actively. In August-September 1942, collective farms were dissolved in almost all mountainous regions of Chechnya, and several thousand people, including dozens of Soviet functionaries, joined the uprising of Israilov and Sheripov.
After the appearance of German landing forces in Chechnya in the fall of 1942, the NKVD accused Israilov and Sheripov of creating pro-fascist parties of the National Socialist Party Caucasian brothers" and "Checheno-Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization".
In the eight teams of fascist paratroopers with a total number of 77 people dropped onto the territory of the republic, the majority were recruited Chechens and Ingush. But there was no widespread participation of Chechens and Ingush in anti-Soviet gangs. The NKVD registered 150-200 gangs of 2-3 thousand bandits on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia. This is approximately 0.5% of the population of Chechnya. From the beginning of the war until January 1944, 55 gangs and 973 bandits were liquidated in the republic, 1901 bandits, fascists and their accomplices were arrested.
"Lentils"
Operation Lentil began preparations in October-November 1943. Initially, it was planned to relocate to Novosibirsk and Omsk region, to Altai and Krasnoyarsk region. But then it was decided to resettle the Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
On January 29, 1944, the head of the NKVD Lavrentiy Beria approved the “Instructions on the procedure for the eviction of Chechens and Ingush.” On February 1, the issue was discussed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Disagreements arose only over the timing of the start of the operation.
Beria personally led the operation. On February 17, 1944, he reported from Grozny that preparations were being completed and 459,486 people were to be evicted. The operation was designed to last eight days, and 19 thousand operatives of the NKVD, NKGB and SMERSH and about 100 thousand officers and soldiers of the NKVD troops were involved in it.
On February 22, Beria met with senior management republics and senior clergy and told them about the government’s decision and “the motives that formed the basis for this decision. After this message, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Mollaev “teared up, but promised to pull himself together and promised to fulfill all the tasks that would be given to him in connection with the eviction,” Beria reported to Stalin.
Beria suggested that the highest clergy of Checheno-Ingushetia “carry out the necessary work among the population through the mullahs and other local “authorities” associated with them.”
The influence of the mullahs was enormous. Their preaching, wrote the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs N.P. Dundorov in the mid-1950s, could improve labor discipline and even double labor productivity.
“Both the party-Soviet and clergy we employ have been promised some resettlement benefits (the norm of things allowed for export will be slightly increased),” Beria said.
The operation, according to his assessment, began successfully - 333,739 people were removed from populated areas within 24 hours, of which 176,950 were loaded onto trains. A faster eviction was prevented by heavy snow that fell on the afternoon of February 23.
Nevertheless, by February 29 (1944 was a leap year), 478,479 people were evicted and loaded into wagons, including 91,250 Ingush and 387,229 Chechens.
“177 trains have been loaded, of which 159 trains have already been sent to the place of the new settlement,” Beria reported the results of the operation.
During the operation, 2,016 “people of anti-Soviet element” were arrested, and more than 20 thousand firearms were confiscated.
“The population bordering Checheno-Ingushetia reacted favorably to the eviction of Chechens and Ingush,” said the head of the NKVD.
Residents of the republic were allowed to take with them 500 kilograms of cargo per family. The special settlers had to hand over livestock and grain - in exchange they received livestock and grain from local authorities at their new place of residence.
There were 45 people in each carriage (for comparison, the Germans were allowed to take a ton of property during deportation, and there were 40 people in each carriage without personal belongings). The party nomenklatura and the Muslim elite traveled in the last echelon, which consisted of normal carriages.
And just months later, in the summer of 1944, several spiritual leaders of the Chechens were summoned to the republic to help persuade the gangs and Chechens who had evaded deportation to stop resisting.
Incidents
The deportation did not take place without incidents - according to various sources, from 27 to 780 people were killed, and 6,544 residents of the republic managed to evade deportation. The People's Commissariat of State Security reported "a number of ugly facts of violation of revolutionary legality, arbitrary executions of old Chechen women who remained after the resettlement, the sick, the crippled, who could not follow."
According to a document published by the Democracy Foundation, in one of the villages three people were killed, including an eight-year-old boy, in another - “five old women”, in the third - “according to unspecified data” “arbitrary execution of the sick and crippled up to 60 people "
IN last years There were reports of the burning of from 200 to 600-700 people in the Galanchozhsky district. Two commissions were created to investigate the operation in this area - in 1956 and 1990, but the criminal case was never brought to an end. The official report of the 3rd rank State Security Commissioner M. Gvishiani, who led the operation in this area, spoke only of several dozen killed or died along the way.
As for the mortality of displaced persons, as the leadership of the NKVD convoy troops reported, 56 people were born on the way to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, “1,272 people died, which is 2.6 people per 1,000 transported. According to a certificate from the Statistical Directorate of the RSFSR, the mortality rate in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1943 was 13.2 people per 1,000 inhabitants.” The causes of death were "elderly and early age resettled", the presence of chronic diseases among those resettled", the presence of physically weak people.
Toponymic repressions
On March 7, 1944, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself was liquidated. In place of the areas inhabited by Chechens, the Grozny Okrug was created as part of the Stavropol Territory.
Part of the territory of the republic was divided between Georgia and North Ossetia. All Ingush place names were repressed - they were replaced with Russian and Ossetian names.
Opinion of historians
Despite a number of incidents, in general the eviction of the whole passed calmly and did not push the Chechens and Ingush into a terrorist war, although, according to historians, there were all the possibilities for this.
Some historians explain this by saying that the harsh punishment was at the same time gentle towards the people. According to the laws of war, desertion and evasion from military service deserved severe punishment. But the authorities did not shoot the men, “cut off the roots of the people,” but evicted everyone. At the same time, party and Komsomol organizations were not disbanded, and recruitment into the army was not stopped.
However, most historians consider it unacceptable to punish an entire people for the crime of some of its representatives. Deportations of peoples as repressions were extrajudicial in nature and were aimed not at a specific person, but at a whole group of people, and a very large one at that. Masses of people were torn out of their usual habitat, deprived of their homeland, and placed in a new environment, thousands of kilometers from the previous one. Representatives of these peoples were evicted not only from their historical homeland, but also from all other cities and regions, they were demobilized from the army.
Rehabilitation and return
The ban on returning to their homeland for Chechens and Ingush was lifted on January 9, 1957 by decree of the Presidiums Supreme Soviets USSR and RSFSR. These decrees restored Chechen-Ingush autonomy, and an Organizing Committee was created to organize repatriation.
Immediately after the decree, tens of thousands of Chechens and Ingush in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan quit their jobs, sold off their property and began to seek emigration to their previous place of residence. The authorities were forced in the summer of 1957 to temporarily suspend the return of Chechens and Ingush to their homeland.
One of the reasons was the tense situation developing in the North Caucasus - local authorities turned out to be unprepared for the massive return and conflicts between the Vainakhs and the settlers from Central Russia and land-poor regions of the North Caucasus.
The restoration of autonomy provided for a new, complex redrawing of the administrative-territorial division of the region. Outside the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the Prigorodny district, which remained part of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and at the end of the 1980s turned into a hotbed of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.
The authorities planned to return 17 thousand families to the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1957, but twice as many returned, and many sought to be placed in exactly the same villages and houses in which they lived before deportation. This led to ethnic confrontation. In particular, in August 1958, after a domestic murder, riots broke out, about a thousand people seized the regional party committee in Grozny and staged a pogrom there. 32 people were injured, including four employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, two civilians died and 10 were hospitalized, almost 60 people were arrested.
Most Chechens and Ingush returned to their homeland only in the spring of 1959.
The Chechens and Ingush were completely rehabilitated according to the RSFSR law of April 26, 1991 “On the rehabilitation of repressed peoples.” The law provided for “the recognition and implementation of their right to restore the territorial integrity that existed before the unconstitutional policy of forcibly redrawing borders, to restore the national-state entities that existed before their abolition, as well as to compensate for damage caused by the state.”
At the same time, the law provided that the rehabilitation process should not infringe on the rights and legitimate interests of citizens currently living in these territories.