Economic foundations of the Warsaw Pact. Warsaw Pact

The United States of America and the Soviet Union were the main but not the only participants cold war. Both superpowers were leaders of powerful military-political coalitions. The creation and activities of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO) fully reflect the content, nature and features of the era of global confrontation.

The allies - both the USA and the USSR - were by no means mere extras. All of them, although to varying degrees, contributed to the Cold War, and the role of each of the member states of the Western and Eastern blocs requires special study. Corresponding scientific work is actively carried out in numerous research centers the most different countries, not to mention independent scientists.

Within the framework of this section, however, we will not talk about the “contribution” of specific states to the Cold War (this is simply an impossible task for a review book), but about some aspects of the coalition confrontation. As is known, any system has qualities that cannot be reduced to the sum of the properties of its components, and NATO and the ATS are, of course, no exception to the rule. First post-war years The USSR and its allies opposed the organization of closed military-political blocs, for preserving the integrity of Europe and creating a system collective security throughout the European continent. However, the West preferred a different path.

The process of forming the North Atlantic Alliance, as discussed in detail above, did not end with the signing of the 1949 Treaty. And in the subsequent period, its strengthening and expansion seemed to be a priority policy in the West. By signing the Paris Agreements in the fall of 1954, the United States and its allies provided the opportunity West Germany and Italy to create its own armed forces and resume military production. The desire to achieve the unification of Germany through the absorption of the GDR was declared. Following this, in May 1955, in violation of the Potsdam Agreements, Germany was admitted to NATO, which received half a million German Bundeswehr at its disposal. The international situation has sharply deteriorated, and the military danger has increased. Under the new conditions, bilateral treaties between socialist countries no longer fully ensured their collective security.

An urgent need arose to reorganize military-political cooperation on a broader international legal basis, when the combined forces of Western countries would be opposed by the joint power of the Soviet Union and states of Eastern Europe. East European states(they were also called “people's democracies”) and the Soviet Union, starting from the first post-war years, pursued a policy aimed at establishing close and comprehensive partnerships. The basis for this was numerous bilateral agreements. Military contacts soon became one of the priority areas cooperation, especially since the treaty process coincided with the creation and establishment of new national armies in people's democracies.

It was widely practiced to supply the “brotherly armies” with modern (at that time) Soviet weapons and various military equipment, as well as to send military advisers to the command and technical profiles to provide assistance in mastering military equipment, organizing combat training of troops and training personnel. The practice of training national personnel in Soviet countries also became widespread. military educational institutions. The formation of the armies of the people's democratic countries was facilitated by their close ties with Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Romania. May 14, 1955 Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic(GDR), Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia signed an allied Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and mutual assistance, which went down in history as the Warsaw Pact. The new military-political commonwealth was organized on the principles of the unity of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the leading role in the states of communist-oriented parties, socialist internationalism and joint provision of their military security. The text of the Treaty, as well as the military doctrine adopted much later, noted that the Department of Internal Affairs was of a purely defensive nature. Of course, this did not exclude the decisive action of his combined armed forces in the event of aggression.

Moreover, in combat planning at one time the possibility of a pre-emptive strike against groups of troops of a potential enemy “prepared to attack” was even allowed. The countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw Forces created coalition leadership bodies, formed the corresponding allied armed forces and means of controlling them in peacetime and war, determined optimal forms and methods of military cooperation. This system was supplemented and improved throughout the entire period of its existence, until the spring of 1991. Supreme body The Department of Internal Affairs was a Political Consultative Committee (PAC), which was entrusted with resolving general fundamental issues related to defense capability and military development allied states, their armies and the United Armed Forces (JAF), which were headed by the Commander-in-Chief.

According to the established practice of the PAC, its meetings were held annually. Delegations led by top officials of the participating states took part in them. As a rule, the agenda included two issues: one of them was the report of the Commander-in-Chief on the state of the Allied Forces with the adoption of decisions on their further development, equipping them with military equipment and weapons, preparing infrastructure, etc.

The second issue was usually the consideration and adoption of political statements, for example on the problems of arms reduction or in connection with aggressive actions Western countries". The working bodies of the PAC were the Joint Secretariat, the Committee of Foreign Ministers (KMFA) and the Committee of Defense Ministers (KMO); the latter acted as the highest military coalition authority in the Department of Internal Affairs. The body of military-strategic control in Peaceful time was the Joint Command of the Armed Forces (then the United Armed Forces), consisting of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces and his deputies from each participating country (with the rank of deputy ministers of defense or chiefs of general staff located in their countries), as well as the Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces and the commander air defense troops of the department of internal affairs. Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in different time There were Marshals of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, A. A. Grechko, I. I. Yakubovsky, V. G. Kulikov and Army General P. G. Lushev. Under the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces as permanent bodies for leadership daily activities The Allied Forces Headquarters and the Allied Forces Technical Committee functioned. In addition, the Military Council and the Military Scientific and Technical Council of the Allied Forces worked on a temporary basis. The Allied Forces Headquarters and the Allied Forces Technical Committee were staffed from among generals, admirals and officers of all allied armies according to the principle of proportional representation, based on accepted standards financing of these bodies: Bulgaria - 7%, Hungary - 6%, East Germany - 6%, Poland - 13.5%, Romania - 10%, Soviet Union - 44.5% and Czechoslovakia - 13%. It is characteristic that, subject to these norms, most of the leadership positions in the named structures (chief of staff, his first deputy, chairman of the Technical Committee, heads of all departments and departments) were occupied by Soviet military personnel. In the Unified Command, except for the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces Soviet military leaders there were his deputies for the Air Force, Navy and Air Defense. Naturally, this practice ensured the implementation of the ideas and attitudes of, first of all, the Soviet political and military leadership, General Staff USSR Armed Forces, provisions of the Soviet military science and military doctrine. The Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces simultaneously held the positions of First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and First Deputy Chief of the General Staff (respectively).

These circumstances sometimes had a negative impact on the moral and psychological situation in the structures of the internal affairs bodies, especially since the actions Soviet leaders did not always fully take into account the interests, characteristics and real opportunities allies of the USSR. The representation of the allied armies in the Allied Forces Headquarters was limited to the presence of deputy chiefs of the Allied Forces Staff from the ministries of defense of all participating states with the rank of deputy chiefs of general (main) staffs.

These representatives worked at the Allied Forces Headquarters, constantly being in Moscow. The military command and control bodies were engaged in the development of proposals and recommendations on the problems of strengthening the defense capabilities of the allied countries, building national armed forces and coordinating the activities of the United Armed Forces in the interests of collective defense. Over the years of its existence, the Warsaw Treaty Organization has developed an effective mechanism for multilateral political and military cooperation, which has constantly developed and improved. His legal basis spoke both the Warsaw Pact itself and the bilateral agreements between its participants. Accordingly, cooperation in the most different areas activities were carried out both within the framework of the Department of Internal Affairs and on a bilateral basis. The most important direction The activities of the ATS was the cooperation of the participating states in the field of foreign policy.

There was also a mechanism for its coordination, the central link of which was the Political Consultative Committee. His important elements were Standing Commission for the development of recommendations on foreign policy issues, the Committee of Foreign Ministers and the Joint Secretariat. The leaders of the ATS countries also coordinated their foreign policy actions during scheduled and working meetings. Sometimes such contacts were worn closed character. Thus, when developing a common position for the socialist countries in the Berlin crisis of 1961, their leaders met in Moscow secretly. At this meeting, in particular, a decision was made to build a separation wall around West Berlin. Military-strategic interaction within the framework of the Warsaw Warfare was carried out by coordinating the efforts of the allied countries in strengthening defense, building national armies, increasing their combat effectiveness and combat readiness, as well as planning the joint use of joint forces in case of war.

It included the coordination of plans for the development of national armies, equipping them with weapons and military equipment, carrying out joint measures to improve the combat and mobilization readiness of troops and fleets, their field, air and naval training, operational training of commanders and staffs, operational equipment of the countries' territories as part of military theaters actions, joint development of plans combat use operational formations allocated from national armies in wartime.

Efforts were coordinated in personnel training, development and production of weapons and military equipment, joint (united) defensive and special systems, mutual assistance was provided in the development current problems military art, introduction into practice of uniform principles and methods of training troops and headquarters. Special place was involved in coordinating efforts government agencies, national ministries of defense, general (main) headquarters of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. It is known that the main form of any coalition military interaction is the coordination of joint use military force, in other words operational planning.

Unified operational-strategic planning for the use of the Joint Armed Forces in wartime in the activities of the Internal Affairs Directorate was higher form military integration. The methods, essence and goals of such work were constantly improved. The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces acted as the organizing link in planning the use of both the armed forces of the ATS states and the operational-strategic and operational formations created on their base in wartime. At the end of the Cold War era, the legal basis for such planning was the “Regulations on the Joint Armed Forces and Their Commanding Bodies in Wartime,” adopted by the heads of state of the Warsaw Pact on March 18, 1980.

In accordance with it, a single Supreme High Command was established for centralized leadership in wartime, the governing body of which was the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Thus, in wartime, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, along with performing the functions of the working body of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR Armed Forces, also became the governing body of the Supreme High Command of the United Armed Forces created during a special period (the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces was appointed as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the Warsaw Pact Organization ).

Therefore, the scope of activity of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, already in peacetime, included issues of military development, determining the plan for the use, planning and training of the armed forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact and their territories for the joint implementation of tasks in wartime. The basis for the preparation of planning documents were those developed by the Allied Forces Headquarters and the corresponding general (main) headquarters of each national army with the participation of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces “Protocols on the allocation of troops and forces of this state-participant in the United Armed Forces." They determined the main directions of development of the troops and forces of a given state, plans for equipping them with weapons and military equipment, the volume of accumulation of reserves, materials, as well as the number of formations and units of all types of armed forces allocated from the armed forces of this state to the United Armed Forces. As for the number of allocated troops, it was indicated in the corresponding List (appendix to the protocol), in which, in addition to indicating specific formations, units and institutions, their number was determined personnel, organizational structure, number of main types of weapons and military equipment.

The Protocols also indicated measures to prepare the territory of a given country in an operational sense. Planning for the use of troops (forces) in wartime (fronts, armies and fleets) allocated to the Allied Forces “was carried out by the Ministers of Defense and the General (Main) Staffs of the Warsaw Pact member states, taking into account the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces and proposals of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and if necessary, in cooperation with neighboring armies of other countries.” The general operational plans developed at the national headquarters were subject to approval by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces before they were signed by the ministers of defense and the commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces SVD.

As the main theater possible war for troop groups general purpose NATO and the Warsaw Department considered the European continent. In Europe, especially in its central part, the combined military power of the two military-political alliances was especially impressive. In total, more than 7.2 million people opposed each other here, armed with: more than 90 thousand tanks, 128.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 23 thousand combat aircraft and helicopters, 600 large surface ships and about 430 submarines. The armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and France consisted of the classic triad: general purpose forces, theater nuclear forces (medium and shorter range) and strategic nuclear forces. Because the long years The United States and NATO in a possible war relied on atomic weapons, priority in development was given to nuclear weapons.

However, at the end of the 80s, when the parity in strategic offensive weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union became more than obvious, and it became clear that there could be no winner in a world nuclear war, strategic concepts were clarified. For the first time, the armies of the bloc countries were given the task that they should have the ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations from the very beginning of the war. fighting using only conventional means of destruction. Thus, the role of general purpose forces increased significantly. The general purpose forces of the United States and its allies were: ground troops, tactical aviation of the Air Force and naval forces (without SSBNs). They were the most numerous and versatile component of the armed forces.

In accordance with the American strategic concept of “forward deployment,” the main groupings of general purpose forces were already deployed in peacetime and maintained outside US territory in likely theaters of military operations, most of them near the borders of the Soviet Union. The most powerful of them was stationed in Europe. It contained about 30% of the regular ground forces, in which there were

More than 75% of all available anti-tank weapons were in use. The US Tactical Air Force in Europe had 900 combat aircraft, of which 400 were medium-range fighter-bombers. The Americans also maintained the 6th and 2nd operational fleets in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic, which included about 200 warships, including 9 aircraft carriers and 900 combat aircraft of the Navy. To accommodate these colossal forces and assets, 188 large military bases and facilities were created in Germany alone. There were up to 60 American bases in Turkey, and dozens in Italy and Great Britain. In total, the Americans have deployed over 1,000 military installations in Western European countries, including more than 270 large ones.

In addition to the four US armored and mechanized divisions located in Germany, heavy weapons reserves were stored on its territory for four more divisions transported by air from the American continent during a special period. In total, US general purpose forces in Europe numbered 300 thousand people, 5,000 tanks, 3,100 field artillery pieces. Within 10 days from the time the decision on mobilization was made, in addition to the troops available in the Western European theater of operations, six more combined arms divisions and one brigade were deployed, and 60 air squadrons (16–18 aircraft each) were relocated. There are about 1000 aircraft in total.

In total, it was planned to transport up to 400 thousand American troops by air to Europe and short time increase the number of combined arms divisions by 2.5 times, and the aviation grouping by 3 times. Over 7,000 nuclear weapons were stationed in Europe for the general purpose forces of all NATO countries. Together with the troops of the Federal Republic of Germany (12 combat-ready tank and motorized infantry divisions), the group American troops was the main strike force of NATO, aimed against the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. The armed forces of NATO states in Europe (except France) constituted the bloc's Combined Armed Forces (JAF), which were territorially divided into three main commands: in the North European, Central European and South European theaters. The most powerful group of troops was located in the Central European Theater (CET). It included the armed forces of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, as well as formations and units of the USA, Great Britain and Canada in Europe located on German, Dutch and Belgian territories. A total of 23 divisions, up to 10 thousand tanks and 6 thousand units of field artillery, organized into eight army corps. In addition, two army corps France. A kind of forward base of NATO Allied Forces on the CET, extended to the east, was West Berlin with its military garrison of three Western powers (USA, Great Britain and France), numbering 12 thousand people, not counting 20 thousand West Berlin police.

In total, NATO, including France and Spain, had 94 combat-ready divisions in Europe. The size of the deployed American division was 16–19 thousand, and the German division was more than 23 thousand people, while the divisions of the armies of the VD countries numbered a maximum of 11–12 thousand people. All groups of NATO's first echelon troops in Europe were supported in high degree readiness to occupy the starting areas on the so-called forward defensive line, located at a distance of 10 to 50 km from the border with the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and for further actions in accordance with operational plans. Their weapons consisted of the most modern, mainly offensive, types of military equipment and weapons, the main of which were dual-use systems capable of using nuclear weapons in addition to conventional ammunition. In accordance with the strategic concept then existing in the USSR, it was considered necessary for the reliable security of the Soviet Union and its allies to have in Central Europe a powerful grouping of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states, the core of which were Soviet troops. The defense system of the Soviet Union and the entire Warsaw Pact was built by concentrating the main efforts primarily on the Western and Southwestern theater of operations, where the most combat-ready, equipped modern technology groupings of troops with appropriate supplies of material and technical means. Groups of Soviet troops on the territory of the GDR and Poland arose as a result of the defeat fascist Germany. In the eastern part of Germany, the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces was first created, then it was renamed the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG), and in 1989 - into Western group troops (ZGV). In Poland, Soviet troops, intended to protect communications and strengthen the Western Group of Forces, were represented by the Northern Group of Forces (SGV). In addition, in the GDR and Poland on the coast Baltic Sea was located at one Soviet base station Baltic Fleet. The presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, called first Central and then Southern group troops (YUGV), is associated both with post-war agreements and with the Soviet military action in the fall of 1956. The deployment of the Soviet Central Group of Forces (TsGV) in Czechoslovakia was considered expedient after the introduction of a group of troops of the Warsaw Warsaw countries there in 1968. Until 1958, the Soviet troops (Separate Mechanized Army) were also on the territory of Romania. In total, the four Soviet groups of forces of constant readiness in 1985 included eight combined arms and tank armies(over 30 fully deployed and ready for battle motorized rifle and tank divisions), as well as 10 aviation divisions. In total there are more than 600 thousand military personnel, 11 thousand tanks and over 1,600 combat aircraft.

These groups of Soviet ground forces, air force and navy, advanced 600 - 800 km to the West from the borders of the Soviet Union, together with the armies and navies of the Warsaw Pact allies, represented a powerful first operational echelon of the first strategic echelon of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. Allied USSR troops and forces in Europe were: National People's Army(NPA) GDR, Polish Army (VP), Czechoslovak People's Army (CHNA), Hungarian Defensive forces(VOS), Army Socialist Republic Romania (ASRR) and the Bulgarian People's Army (BNA), which included 13 combined arms armies and a number of associations and formations of other types of armed forces and branches of the military. It was believed that the presence of groups of troops (forces) constantly ready for action, in direct contact with NATO forces, ensures the necessary effectiveness common system defense and maintaining a comprehensive military-strategic balance between East and West in Europe. The troops of the first operational echelon, which included more than 60% of all available general purpose forces of the Warsaw Pact, were tasked with repelling aggression and defeating the invading enemy.

The second operational echelon consisted of troops of the western border military districts: Belarusian, Carpathian, Odessa and Kiev, partly Baltic, which mainly consisted of tank formations and formations and were ready in a short time for rapid advance (mainly in a combined march), and their air force - to relocation by air, to the West to areas of operational destination to enter the battle in order to complete the defeat of the enemy and develop the success of the troops of the first operational echelon. Organizationally, all troops and forces of the Warsaw Pact countries for the preparation and conduct of joint military operations in Europe were consolidated into the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Organization (AWS). Their composition in peacetime and wartime was different.

With the transition to martial law, all peacetime Allied Forces of the Internal Affairs Directorate, as well as other troops and forces, including those deployed under mobilization plans, were transformed into: - Allied Forces in the Western Theater of Internal Affairs; - Allied forces in the South-Western theater of operations; - Reserves Supreme High Command OVS ATS. These strategic groupings in the theater of operations, consisting of fronts (both national and coalition), separate combined arms armies, air armies, air defense armies and united fleets (in the West - the United Baltic, consisting of: the Baltic Fleet, the PPR Navy and the GDR Navy, and in the South-West - the United Black Sea Fleet: Black Sea Fleet, Bulgarian Navy and Romanian Navy) and other connected units and institutions were united by a single action plan (within strategic operations in the theater of operations) and centralized control by the main commands of the Allied Forces in the Western and South-Western theater of operations. In 1984, the Main Commands of Directional Troops were created in the USSR Armed Forces.

In particular, the Main Troop Commands were formed in Europe Western direction with headquarters in Legnica (Poland) and South-Western direction (Chisinau). In wartime, they were transformed into the Main Commands of the Allied Air Forces in the corresponding theaters of military operations and were intended to direct the actions of all troops and forces available there. Thus, almost all the available forces and means of armed struggle of the states participating in the Air Force (except for the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR Armed Forces), their command and control bodies, as well as the defensive and support systems and complexes created within the framework of the Military Organization of the Treaty constituted the United Armed Forces of the Air Force. In peacetime, the potential enemy was continuously monitored.

The main emphasis was on radio electronic intelligence, whose forward posts were deployed or permanently equipped along the entire border with Germany, Austria and Turkey, as well as mobile ones - at sea and in the air. Kept in constant readiness for action Single unified system air defense The Department of Internal Affairs, which was centrally controlled and united the air defense forces and means of the military groups of the participating countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the air defense troops of the Soviet border military districts and the air defense forces of the country (USSR). The duty assets of this system react to any air targets, so that if they violate airspace immediately stop the flight of violators already in the border areas. Thus, only in the Western Front, for the possible interception of air targets - potential violators of airspace - several duty fighter aircraft took to the air every day.

Troops of constant readiness - motorized rifle, tank, missile, artillery formations and units, as well as formations of other branches of the military, while engaged in daily activities, were able to completely leave military camps of permanent deployment in a few tens of minutes, go to designated areas (positions) and begin to carry out combat missions. Combat vehicles(tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns) were kept in parks with full ammunition for guns, machine guns and other small arms, tanks filled with fuel, transport vehicles- with loaded supplies of materiel, ready for movement and combat. IN combat vehicles Even hand grenades and signal cartridges were planted. The only weapons in the barracks were machine guns and pistols of crew commanders and driver mechanics.

Nuclear weapons for missile forces and artillery, front-line aviation, both for those included in the groupings of Soviet troops and the armies of other airborne forces countries, constituting the first operational echelon in the theater of operations, were stored at missile and technical repair bases located on the territory of airborne forces countries. These nuclear weapons were kept in readiness by special order for delivery and transfer to units and formations within a short time. Actions of each join and join Soviet groups troops and troops of the armies of the USSR allies for a special period were carefully planned in accordance with various possible options the beginning of the war. These plans were refined as the situation changed (the appropriate frequency and order of such work were established). The Allied Forces control system created in advance in theaters of military operations included a network of stationary protected (underground) and mobile control points (from the Allied Forces Main Command in the theater of operations up to and including formations), equipped modern means communications, automated control systems and life support systems, as well as a network of lines and communication centers, primarily cable, radio relay and tropospheric.

At most of the command posts of associations, formations and even units, combat duty was already organized and carried out in peacetime. In addition to the forces and means of command and control, reconnaissance and air defense since the mid-90s. in groups of forces, a certain number of strike assets (front-line and army aviation, missile forces and artillery) were put on combat duty for the immediate destruction of the so-called priority enemy targets.

The basis of the general purpose forces in the armies of the Internal Affairs Directorate has traditionally been the Ground Forces. IN post-war period in the Soviet Armed Forces they continued to develop as the second most important (after the Strategic Missile Forces) and as the largest type of Armed Forces in terms of numbers and diverse in combat composition. It was believed that the Ground Forces, possessing fire and striking power, high maneuverability and independence, would play important role when conducting combat operations both with and without the use of nuclear weapons. Their development proceeded in the following directions: increase combat personnel; improvement organizational structure associations, formations and governing bodies; re-equipment with new types of weapons and military equipment to increase firepower and striking force while simultaneously increasing mobility, maneuverability and survivability. Only during the reorganization carried out in 1980 - 1982, the number of artillery of motorized rifle and tank divisions was increased by 20 - 60%, new T-72, T-80 tanks and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles entered service. As a result, the combat capabilities of these combined arms formations increased by an average of 25%. In general, “conventional” types of weapons not only in the Ground Forces, but also in other branches of the Armed Forces were constantly being improved and qualitatively new weapon systems were created, having increasingly high destructive characteristics.

The state of tension in relations between the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Department and NATO was largely facilitated by the nature and content of military doctrines, the provisions of which each side was guided by. Official Doctrine The United States, regardless of the periodic change of its concepts and names: “massive retaliation”, “flexible response”, “realistic deterrence” and “direct confrontation”, has always provided for the possibility of launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike in the event that the American leadership comes to the conclusion that a perceived enemy intends to launch a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. And in relation to a war waged by conventional means, the United States and NATO have officially stated that, if necessary, they will use nuclear weapon first.

Doctrinal guidelines of the Warsaw Pact Organization for a long time were of a semi-formalized nature and were reflected mainly in statements, declarations and other similar documents of the Political Consultative Committee and individual participating states. The basis of the coalition doctrine was the provisions of the military doctrine of the USSR as the recognized political, economic and military leader of the socialist states. Characteristic feature The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact was defensive in orientation. Since the formation of this union, its military efforts have been aimed at protecting against possible attacks from the outside, including through provoking internal counter-revolution. The defensive nature of the coalition doctrine was primarily reflected in the combat composition, structure and purpose of the Allied Forces and armies of the participating states, the content of their training, and the selected and planned methods and forms of combat operations.

But the main and determining aspect of the military doctrine was its political side. It was determined by the policies of the ruling communist and workers' parties of the participating states and their Marxist-Leninist ideology in the field of war and defense. This ideology in the military sphere was based on the principles of “socialist internationalism” and “ class approach» to problems of military security, identification of military threats and potential adversaries, as well as allies. Outward expression Such a concept became, for example, the slogan widely known at that time: “Brothers in class are brothers in arms!” As part of the political side of the doctrine, it was recorded negative attitude ATS towards war as a phenomenon, with corresponding military-political tasks for each country and for the Organization as a whole to prevent war, strengthen the collective defense and military security of the “countries of the socialist commonwealth”.

Let us emphasize once again: both the Soviet military doctrine and the military doctrine of the Department of Internal Affairs never 1 provided for the proactive start of any war, especially a nuclear one, or even a local attack. But the groups of the Armed Forces were supposed to have such a composition, the order of their deployment, as well as the level of training and readiness, so that in the event of aggression from the United States, the NATO bloc, they would repel and stop the invasion, go on a counter-offensive, and then during deep offensive operations decisively defeat the enemy. This is partly why in the West the Soviet strategy was assessed as clearly offensive.

But was it sincere? Using propaganda clichés military power USSR and the Soviet military threat, as well as extremely broadly interpreting some Soviet foreign policy actions, the USA managed to convince the Western public opinion in the aggressiveness of the USSR and its allies. The Soviet side responded in kind in its propaganda, but was less convincing. By the mid-80s. The current Soviet military doctrine required revision in order to comply with the political course of the new Soviet leadership, to help intensify the negotiation process and reduce the military potentials of the parties. They decided to make issues of war prevention the content of not only foreign policy, but also military doctrine. Around the same time, the theory of a gradual escalation of a world war, the subsequent stages of which, it was believed, would definitely be nuclear, was replaced by the concept of an equal probability of a world war. nuclear war And conventional war(in the form of general or local).

The new Soviet military doctrine, the theory of which was developed at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, was primarily to be distinguished by its unambiguous defensive orientation. For the first time (and maybe even in last time) in history put her main goal not preparation for war, but its prevention, which now, a quarter of a century later, looks at least ambiguous.

Mixing military doctrine and foreign policy concepts may have a certain propaganda effect, but it also disorients the military organization of the state. At the end of 1986, new doctrinal guidelines were reviewed and approved by the USSR Defense Council. They formed the basis of the coalition military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states. A document entitled “On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States” was adopted at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of these countries in May 1987 and published. A comparison of the main provisions of the NATO military doctrine and the new ATS doctrine was carried out within the OSCE at two seminars in Vienna in 1990 and 1991. Political side The doctrine determined the tasks of reducing the danger of war and preventing it. The member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization stated that they would never, under any circumstances, be the first to begin military action against any state (union of states) unless they themselves became the target of an armed attack.

This fully applied to nuclear weapons. These statements were not mere declarations. They complied with the established procedure for developing a decision on the use of nuclear weapons, strictly certain ways delivering a nuclear strike, as well as the operating algorithm automated system management of Strategic nuclear forces USSR Armed Forces and other systems of command and control of troops and weapons. Thus, the use of Soviet strategic nuclear forces and operational-tactical nuclear weapons could only be carried out in the form of a retaliatory or retaliatory strike against the aggressor. A number of specially implemented organizational and technical measures at nuclear control points made a pre-emptive nuclear strike simply impossible. The doctrine contained a number of initiatives for real disarmament.

Bearing in mind that the most important and destructive of all types of offensive weapons is nuclear weapons, including in the theater of military operations, it was decided to start with them, and then continue this process in the field of reducing conventional weapons. Analysis of data on the composition and balance of general-purpose forces, as well as their nuclear weapons, indeed shows that mutual force deterrence was based on the parties maintaining their combined military potential at such high level, in which victory in the war became impossible. It is no coincidence that throughout the existence of the two blocs, the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO states did not allow even a small armed conflict between themselves. And there were more than enough reasons and reasons for this.

The overall goal of the reform was to create in Europe a military-political situation in which both NATO and the Warsaw Department of Internal Affairs, having reliably ensured their defense, would not have the means to launch a surprise attack on the other side. This is where the concept of “reasonable sufficiency for defense” arose, which meant the level of military power of a state or a coalition of states commensurate with the level of military threat, the nature and intensity of military preparations of a potential enemy.

It was determined by the needs of ensuring security at the minimum acceptable level when repelling aggression from land, air, sea and from outer space. Closely associated with the concept of “reasonable sufficiency for defense” is the concept of “forceful deterrence of aggression”, which includes a set of the most rational forms and methods to neutralize existing and potential military threats. “Forceful deterrence of aggression” was understood as a set of measures and actions of a coalition of states aimed at creating and maintaining a level of their total defense potential at which opposing side realizes that the possible benefits from its preventive actions will certainly be outweighed by the losses from the retaliatory actions of potential victims of aggression. The goal was to force the potential aggressor to abandon the idea that victory in the war would remain his. Compliance with the principle of sufficiency for defense required the parties not only to mechanically reduce troops, forces and their weapons, but also to deeply restructure their structure, deployment, and change in character military activities, building the armed forces.

Among other things, it was necessary to eliminate imbalances and asymmetries in the armed forces of the states of the two opposing military blocs. One more an important condition The implementation of the principle of achieving sufficiency for defense should have been the signing of an agreement to limit the creation of new types and systems of weapons (such as the US missile defense system). Thus, the Warsaw Pact Organization advocated maintaining military-strategic parity at an increasingly lower level, within the limits of reasonable sufficiency for defense, implying such a composition and structure of the armed forces of the parties when they are able to repel possible aggression, but do not themselves have the ability to carry out an attack and conduct large-scale offensive operations.

Revealing the military-technical side of the new Soviet military doctrine and its key question- preparation of the armed forces to repel aggression, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeev wrote in his memoirs: “In the event of aggression, we refused to go over to offensive actions- conducting offensive operations. It was decided to repel the attack only defensive operations while simultaneously seeking to eliminate the armed conflict. Intentionally giving strategic initiative in a war against the aggressor, we were ready to defend ourselves for several weeks. And only then, if the enemy’s invasion could not be stopped, was it planned to launch large-scale actions to defeat the aggressor.”

This approach testified to fundamental changes in Soviet military strategy, which acquired increasingly unrealistic, “Manilov-like” features. Moreover, the defensive nature of the doctrine should have been reflected not only in the selected and planned methods and forms of combat operations of the armed forces, but also in the direction of their preparation. It should be noted that many military leaders accepted these innovations with caution, viewing them as another manifestation of a policy of unilateral concessions. Time has shown that there was every reason for these fears. It’s hard to even imagine what sacrifices would be required practical implementation new doctrinal guidelines, if a large-scale war occurs.

Doctrinal guidelines of the Department of Internal Affairs of the late 80s. provided not only for a gradual reduction nuclear weapons and the elimination of other weapons mass destruction, but also a further reduction in conventional armed forces and weapons in Europe, the liquidation of military bases on the territory of other states, the withdrawal of troops within national borders, and the simultaneous dissolution of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. However, this program, as we know, turned out to be unrealistic. It must be said that the accumulated stockpiles of conventional weapons in Europe were indeed colossal. Of course it wasn't random occurrence. The basis for determining the number and combat strength of Soviet troops in the West, as well as the Allied Internal Affairs Forces in general, was the calculations of the Soviet General Staff about the need to initially create and maintain such a balance of forces and means with a potential enemy, which, in conditions where losses in the war would exceed the volume of the possible reproduction of weapons and military equipment will nevertheless ensure the fulfillment of the assigned tasks.

Negotiations between the Warsaw and NATO countries on the limitation of conventional armed forces and weapons in Europe, which have been sluggish since 1973, intensified only after the scope of their consideration was expanded in 1986 with Central Europe to the entire European continent: from the Atlantic to the Urals. It should be noted that the West has constantly stated the “overwhelming superiority” of the Warsaw Warsaw countries in general-purpose forces, especially in ground forces (it is here that significant disproportions and asymmetries allegedly existed not in favor of NATO). In reality, the actual balance in the field of general-purpose forces was far from easy to establish. The times when the forces of the parties were measured only by the number of available “bayonets” and “sabers” are a thing of the past.

In the 80s it was necessary to make an in-depth analysis of the real purpose, composition, level of training and capabilities of the parties' troop groups and their weapons as a whole, taking into account their qualitative characteristics, and not be limited to arithmetic comparisons of similar types of weapons. Thus, in the GSVG (ZGV), out of 6,700 available tanks, there are about 1,200 (almost 20% of total number) was intended to cover the state border with Germany and the Baltic Sea coast. These were mainly obsolete heavy tanks T-10 and self-propelled artillery installations ISU-152, SU-122. Organizationally, they were part of separate tank regiments and battalions stationed in the border zone. These included the 5th separate tank brigade on medium tanks, covering the sea coast of the GDR. All these units had the task of quickly occupying pre-selected firing positions and, by creating a dense anti-tank belt, repelling a sudden invasion. After completing this task, the listed tank units were withdrawn from the combat composition of the group of forces.

As you can see, a fifth of the tanks and self-propelled guns of the GSVG initially did not have offensive missions. This example confirms that it was indeed very difficult to make a reasonable calculation of the balance of forces due to the difference in the structures of the armed forces of the Warsaw Department and NATO, the wide variety of types and types of weapons, the difference in tasks, as well as the subjectivity of the parties’ approach. Some comparative data on the size of the military forces of the Warsaw Department and NATO in Europe, according to the estimates of the parties for 1989, are given in table. 6. Thus, assessing the ratio of the military potentials of the parties, taking into account the given data, we can make the following conclusions: a) with approximately equal numbers of ground forces and air forces, the North Atlantic Alliance was 2 times larger than the Internal Affairs Directorate in terms of the number of naval forces. NATO also surpassed the ATS in the number of front-line (tactical) and naval aviation, combat helicopters and anti-tank missile systems; b) on the side of the ATS there was superiority in tanks, interceptor aircraft of air defense forces, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as in artillery; c) by naval forces NATO was superior to the ATS in all respects except submarines, especially in the number of large surface ships (including aircraft carriers), as well as in naval aircraft. In general, in terms of conventional weapons, there was approximate parity between NATO and the Warsaw Division in Europe. The London Institute for Strategic Studies then concluded: “The overall balance of conventional weapons is such that neither side has sufficient combined power to guarantee victory.” At the aforementioned negotiations on conventional armed forces, NATO insisted on reducing only ground forces and their weapons (tanks, artillery and armored vehicles). They categorically did not want to cut their own Air Force and especially the Navy.

The Warsaw Warsaw agreement to exclude the Navy from the subject of negotiations on the reduction of armed forces in Europe was erroneous, primarily because it put the Warsaw Warfare countries in an inherently disadvantageous position. But under great pressure, they still managed to force the West to consider the problem of aviation at the negotiations, as well as to agree to subsequent negotiations on reducing the naval force. The day before the signing of the CFE Treaty, the final figures were agreed upon with great difficulty. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, had the goal of establishing military-strategic parity in conventional armed forces and weapons at the lowest possible level. For this purpose, limits were set for each group of countries. general levels, which were then clarified by the parties for individual states participating in the coalitions. On the way to agreeing on the parameters of this treaty, the Soviet Union and its allies, in addition to the above-mentioned Navy, made a number of other serious concessions. To somehow compensate for this, Soviet side at the final stage of signing the Treaty, she resorted to some “military tricks” in order to somewhat facilitate the fulfillment of her obligations under the Treaty: a) with the aim of artificially reducing total number Armed Forces subject to reduction in Europe was adopted legislative act on exclusion from the Armed Forces of the USSR Border Troops KGB, Internal troops Ministry of Internal Affairs, Railway troops, Civil Defense Troops, Government Communications Troops; b) using the ongoing regrouping of troops associated with the beginning of their withdrawal from the countries of Eastern Europe, the military-political leadership of the country decided to redeploy a significant part of the conventional weapons subject to reduction from the European part of the USSR to its Asian part, beyond the Urals, so that they would not be destroyed. The USA and others knew about this Western countries. S. F. Akhromeev in a letter to the US Presidential Assistant for national security General B. Scowcroft, reported that 16.4 thousand tanks (mostly more than modern types), 11.2 thousand armored combat vehicles, 25 thousand artillery systems and 1200 aircraft. Such a relocation was explained by the need to fill the shortage of such equipment in the troops in the East, as well as to replace outdated weapons. However, even before the official entry Treaty of Paris in force in 1992, the parity in conventional weapons it established was violated.

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Alliance began to outnumber the USSR in tanks and artillery by 1.5 times, and in airplanes and helicopters by 1.3 times. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO's superiority over Russia in tanks and artillery reached 3 times, in armored personnel carriers - 2.7 times. With the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO, the provisions of this Treaty finally deformed the security system in Europe and consolidated the overwhelming superiority of the alliance over Russia. It should be emphasized that, despite all the theoretical errors and practical failures, the very concept of reasonable sufficiency for defense has not lost its significance today. Many of her conceptual provisions still seem logical and reasonable. Overall story military organization The Warsaw Pact provides an instructive example of the creation and activity of a large military-political coalition, which, by concentrating the efforts of the allied countries, was able to resist the exceptionally powerful Western bloc, providing conditions in which the Soviet Union and its allies carried out a sovereign foreign policy, resolutely defending their state interests.

On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact was signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. This powerful structure provided a counterweight to NATO for 36 years, and was dissolved almost routinely. Mikhail Gorbachev did not even take part in the final meeting of the leadership of the Department of Internal Affairs.

Peacefulness involuntarily

Warsaw Pact was created 6 years after the emergence of NATO. After the end of World War II, the USSR was not at all as eager to export the revolution as our “Western partners” tried to imagine. It is a known fact that in the post-war years, the communists of France (then the most popular party in the country) were preparing to raise a general uprising and turned to Stalin with a request to support them in the event of intervention by the United States and Great Britain. What does Stalin need? supreme commander most powerful army peace at that time, responded with a categorical refusal. The reason for such peacefulness of the victors of Nazi Germany was mainly due to the enormous losses suffered by the Soviet and, above all, the Russian people. Stalin understood that the USSR most likely could not withstand another large-scale war (including nuclear weapons) with the West. It is no coincidence that the thesis became so widespread among our people for half a century: if only there was no war.

Forced alliance

However, it was impossible not to react at all to the growing US military presence in Europe. The last straw What forced the USSR to create a military interstate socialist organization in Europe was the entry of Germany into NATO, contrary to the initial post-war plans to transform a divided Germany into a demilitarized zone.

On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact (WTP) on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance was signed. Its participants were Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, USSR and Czechoslovakia. All these were countries where, after liberation from fascist occupation With the tacit support of the Soviet Union, socialist regimes were established.

OVD participants emphasized that the organization is strictly defensive in nature. And, as history has shown, by and large, this was the case. A Political Advisory Committee (PAC) was created to lead the bloc.

Well forgotten old

Conversations about collective security in Europe began more than half a century ago. Already at the first (Prague) meeting of the PKK (January 27-28, 1956), the states participating in the Warsaw Warsaw Division made proposals that provided for the replacement of existing military groups in Europe with a system of collective security, the establishment of zones of limitation and arms control, etc.

That is, the ideological-military confrontation in Europe was not at all in the interests of the leadership of the USSR, who well understood that the country, weakened by the war, should devote all its efforts to restoring its own industry and Agriculture, to save human potential.

On the shoulders of the USSR

Just as during World War II the USSR took over main blow Nazi Germany and bore the brunt of the war in 1941-1945, and in the Department of Internal Affairs Soviet Union had to play a “leading role.” This meant virtually full financing of the organization’s activities and the supply of weapons to participating countries.

The role of the USSR in the Department of Internal Affairs is shown at least by the fact that throughout the entire history of the organization, the commanders-in-chief of the United Armed Forces were exclusively Soviet marshals and generals.

Parity at a high price

NATO, which opposed the Warsaw Warsaw, initially included 12 countries, including such powers as the USA, Great Britain, and France. Before the collapse of the Department of Internal Affairs in North Atlantic Alliance 4 more states entered.

The Warsaw bloc, despite the fact that according to the charter it was open to the entry of new members, during its entire existence it did not increase, but, on the contrary, lost one of the participating countries - Albania. Thus, from the beginning of the 60s of the last century until 1991, a socialist bloc of 7 countries was opposed by a bloc of 15 “capital countries”. Even a rough comparison of the potential of these states, say, by total population, shows how much more advantageous NATO was in the position. Its member countries, relying on the support of the United States, which had become rich during the Second World War, felt quite comfortable in the bloc. Military expenses did not burden state budgets. The USSR, on the contrary, was forced “ best brains"and allocate huge amounts of money to defense. As a result, at a cost great effort parity between the ATS and NATO was created and maintained for several decades.

According to the data given in Valentin Varennikov’s book “Unique,” by the beginning of the 80s, NATO in Europe had a slight advantage in conventional weapons. The alliance had 94 combat-ready divisions at its disposal (including about 60 separate combat-ready brigades), while the Warsaw Pact had 78 divisions. At the same time, the size of the deployed American division was 16-19 thousand, and the German division was more than 23 thousand people, while the division of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries numbered a maximum of 11-12 thousand people. The ATS had a significant advantage in tanks. But NATO had significant big amount anti-tank weapons. In addition, the United States and its allies outnumbered the socialist bloc in combat aircraft by 1.2 times, and in helicopters by 1.8 times.

However, a comparison of all types of weapons, including nuclear ones, indicated an approximate equality of combat capabilities of the parties.

Parallels

Members of the ATS organization, when signing the agreement, “undertook to act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation in order to further development and strengthening economic and cultural ties among themselves, following the principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other and other states.”

However, in practice, the sovereignty of one of the participating countries was violated by ATS troops. We are talking about the famous entry of troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968. This episode is often cited to this day as proof of the aggressiveness of the USSR's policy. However, a few months before soviet tanks ended up on the streets of Prague, the leadership of the USSR already had information that activists of the so-called “Prague Spring” were ready to ask NATO to send alliance troops to Czechoslovakia. Several divisions were in full combat readiness air force USA. As during the recent Ukrainian events, the leadership of the USSR was faced with a choice: to let events take their course with unpredictable consequences, or to intervene, preventing Czechoslovakia from leaving the Warsaw Division, which would have been tantamount to a serious defeat in the Cold War.

Quiet liquidation

A little more than two decades passed and the new leadership of the USSR calmly, almost indifferently “surrendered” not only Czechoslovakia, but also all other countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, which, after the “quiet dissolution” of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, fell into the sphere of influence of NATO, and later 8 years 3 of them joined the bloc. In another 5 years everything former members The Warsaw Pact, in addition to the legal successor of the USSR - Russia, became members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

1. The Warsaw Pact was created 6 years after the emergence of NATO.

After the end of World War II, the USSR was not at all as eager to export the revolution as our “Western partners” tried to imagine. It is a known fact that in the post-war years, the communists of France (then the most popular party in the country) were preparing to raise a general uprising and turned to Stalin with a request to support them in the event of intervention by the United States and Great Britain. To which Stalin, the supreme commander of the most powerful army in the world at that time, responded with a categorical refusal. The reason for such peacefulness of the victors of Nazi Germany was mainly due to the enormous losses suffered by the Soviet and, above all, the Russian people. Stalin understood that the USSR most likely could not withstand another large-scale war (including nuclear weapons) with the West. It is no coincidence that the thesis became so widespread among our people for half a century: if only there was no war.

2. Forced union

However, it was impossible not to react at all to the growing US military presence in Europe. The last straw that forced the USSR to create a military interstate socialist organization in Europe was the entry of Germany into NATO, contrary to the initial post-war plans to transform divided Germany into a demilitarized zone.

On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact (WTP) on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance was signed. Its participants were Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, USSR and Czechoslovakia. All of these were countries where, after liberation from fascist occupation, socialist regimes were established with the tacit support of the Soviet Union.

3. Well forgotten old

4. On the shoulders of the USSR

Just as during the Second World War, the USSR took the main blow from Nazi Germany and bore the brunt of the war in 1941-1945, so the Soviet Union had to play a “leading role” in the Department of Internal Affairs. This meant virtually full financing of the organization’s activities and the supply of weapons to participating countries.

The role of the USSR in the Department of Internal Affairs is shown by the fact that throughout the entire history of the organization, the commanders-in-chief of the United Armed Forces were exclusively Soviet marshals and generals.

5. Parity at a high price

NATO, which opposed the Warsaw Warsaw, initially included 12 countries, including such powers as the USA, Great Britain, and France. Before the collapse of the Warsaw Division, four more states joined the North Atlantic Alliance.

The Warsaw bloc, despite the fact that according to the charter it was open to the entry of new members, during its entire existence it did not increase, but, on the contrary, lost one of the participating countries - Albania. Thus, from the beginning of the 60s of the last century until 1991, a socialist bloc of 7 countries was opposed by a bloc of 15 “capital countries”. Even a rough comparison of the potential of these states, say, by total population, shows how much more advantageous NATO was in the position. Its member countries, relying on the support of the United States, which had become rich during the Second World War, felt quite comfortable in the bloc. Military expenditures did not burden state budgets. The USSR, on the contrary, was forced to devote “the best brains” and huge funds to defense. As a result, at the cost of great effort, parity between the Warsaw Department and NATO was created and maintained for several decades.

According to the data given in Valentin Varennikov’s book “Unique,” by the beginning of the 80s, NATO in Europe had a slight advantage in conventional weapons. The alliance had 94 combat-ready divisions at its disposal (including about 60 separate combat-ready brigades), while the Warsaw Pact had 78 divisions. At the same time, the size of the deployed American division was 16-19 thousand, and the German division was more than 23 thousand people, while the division of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries numbered a maximum of 11-12 thousand people. The ATS had a significant advantage in tanks. But NATO had a significantly larger number of anti-tank weapons. In addition, the United States and its allies outnumbered the socialist bloc in combat aircraft by 1.2 times, and in helicopters by 1.8 times.

However, a comparison of all types of weapons, including nuclear ones, indicated an approximate equality of combat capabilities of the parties.

6. Parallels

Members of the ATS organization, by signing the agreement, “undertook to act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation in order to further develop and strengthen economic and cultural ties among themselves, following the principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other and other states.”

However, in practice, the sovereignty of one of the participating countries was violated by ATS troops. We are talking about the famous entry of troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968. This episode is often cited to this day as proof of the aggressiveness of the USSR's policy. However, several months before Soviet tanks appeared on the streets of Prague, the leadership of the USSR already had information that activists of the so-called “Prague Spring” were ready to ask NATO to send alliance troops to Czechoslovakia. Several divisions of the US Air Force were in full combat readiness. As during the recent Ukrainian events, the leadership of the USSR was faced with a choice: to let events take their course with unpredictable consequences, or to intervene, preventing Czechoslovakia from leaving the Warsaw Division, which would have been tantamount to a serious defeat in the Cold War.

7. Quiet liquidation

A little more than two decades passed and the new leadership of the USSR calmly, almost indifferently “surrendered” not only Czechoslovakia, but also all other countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, which, after the “quiet dissolution” of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, fell into the sphere of influence of NATO, and later 8 years 3 of them joined the bloc. After another 5 years, all former members of the Warsaw Pact, except for the legal successor of the USSR - Russia, became members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

One of the main features of the Cold War was the creation of competing military-political blocs that viewed each other as potential opponents. These blocs took shape in the 1950s - on the one hand, the USA led NATO, on the other, the USSR played key role in the creation and took a dominant position in the Warsaw Pact Organization. It was the disappearance of the Department of Internal Affairs in 1991 that became formal sign the end of the Cold War.

"Union of Peace and Socialism"

The Warsaw Pact was signed on May 14, 1955 in the Polish capital by representatives of eight states. Formally, the signing of this treaty and its entry into force on June 5, 1955, after which the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO) actually appeared, was a common international action. The participating countries of the Warsaw Warsaw Forces declared their commitment to the principles of the UN Charter, that is, the non-use of violence or the threat of it in relations with other states. But at the same time, a military alliance was created, the participants of which agreed on military and political cooperation, and in the event of aggression against one of the participating countries, all the others were obliged to provide the injured party with all possible assistance, including military assistance.

In fact, the creation of the Department of Internal Affairs was an initiative of the USSR and should have become a worthy counterbalance to NATO, since the Federal Republic of Germany had recently joined this military-political bloc.

Members of the ATS were the USSR, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. The duration of the Warsaw Pact was twenty years with the possibility of a simplified extension for ten years. In 1985, the treaty was renegotiated for another twenty years, but by that time Albania no longer participated in it: due to political differences, this country ceased its participation in the Warsaw Pact in 1962, and formally withdrew from it in 1968.

The special military-political status of the Department of Internal Affairs was illustrated by the creation of two governing bodies: a political advisory committee and a unified command of the armed forces. ATS played political role and is considered by historians, among other things, as a mechanism of control of the USSR over the socialist allied countries. However, in the military sphere, the ATS was also of considerable importance: in addition to regularly held large-scale exercises, the combined military forces of the Treaty carried out a joint “combat” operation: the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the suppression of the so-called “Prague Spring”. When political situation changed and under the conditions of perestroika the USSR abandoned the principle of the possibility of intervention in the internal affairs of the allies, the existence of the Warsaw Pact lost its significance and the Warsaw Pact was annulled in the summer of 1991.

Nuclear war scenarios

Professional historians have always paid attention great attention to the problem of the origin, functioning and disappearance of the Warsaw Pact Organization. But the significant one public interest This problem arose in 2006-2007 in connection with the decision of the Polish government to declassify part of the documents devoted to the activities of the Department of Internal Affairs (the organization’s documents were kept at the place of signing, in Warsaw). This government decision caused a fierce public and political debate in Poland about the advisability of publishing such data. Moreover, representatives of almost all political parties and organizations.

Be that as it may, even a small number of declassified Department of Internal Affairs documents was enough to reveal very interesting circumstances. Thus, it turned out that about 180 nuclear warheads were located in special storage facilities on Polish territory. The explosive power of the deadliest of them did not exceed 0.5 kilotons (for comparison, the bomb dropped in 1945 on Nagasaki had an explosion power of 21 kilotons), but their number implied striking multiple targets in Western Europe. disposed of nuclear charges soviet troops, special units which were guarded by secret warehouses, but in the event of the outbreak of hostilities with NATO countries, the charges were subject to rapid transfer to the Polish military, who were supposed to carry out the launch. Moreover, the scenario assumed that NATO would launch a retaliatory strike that would destroy several million civilians in Poland and up to half of the military contingent of the Internal Affairs Directorate.

Also interesting is the documentary evidence of the fact that the USSR actually transferred many of the principles of its own organization to the ATS countries.

The formal equality of members of the Organization, in which certain political and military decisions, according to the Charter, were made through equal voting, was only an appearance. Open Documents show that the USSR decided everything more or less important questions himself, and his relations with his allies were comparable to Moscow’s relations with the republics that were part of the Soviet Union. In addition, it is noteworthy that in the ATS countries a system was created in which the army was actually controlled by the services state security– the number of personnel of the latter invariably exceeded the number of military personnel. Finally, the structure itself armed forces of the participating countries of the Warsaw Warsaw Forces was such that it had relatively small elite units, and the rest were recruited, trained and maintained on a residual basis - in a possible war with NATO they were supposed to perform only auxiliary functions.

Alexander Babitsky

After World War II, the Warsaw Pact Organization came into existence. The year of its formation is 1955. It existed until 1991. On May 14, 1955, the Military Warsaw Pact was signed. The countries participating in this event thus responded to Germany's accession to NATO. This document was signed by socialist European states. The leading role among them then belonged to the Soviet Union. Let us consider further what the Warsaw Pact Organization was.

General information

The Warsaw Pact Organization was formed by Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Romania, Poland, the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania. The document signed by these states in order to ensure security and peace in Europe came into force on June 5, 1955. On April 26, 1985, due to its expiration, it was extended for another 20 years. However, 5 years later, transformations began in a number of countries in Eastern and Central Europe, and then in the USSR. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization took place on July 1, 1991. On this day, the Protocol on the complete termination of its operation was signed. The formation of the Warsaw Pact Organization was of particular strategic importance. It was an association consisting of quite strong countries striving for unity and security in the world.

Conditions

The agreement included a preamble and eleven articles. According to the terms of the document, as well as the UN Charter, the Warsaw Pact countries assumed obligations to refrain from the use of force or the threat of its use in international relations with other states. If an armed attack is carried out on any of the parties to the Agreement, the others must immediately provide assistance with all means at their disposal, including army forces.

Management

The Warsaw Pact formed a political advisory committee. Its tasks included consideration of all issues related to the implementation of the signed Agreement. The troops of the Warsaw Pact countries were under the general subordination of the OKVS (Unified Command). This body was supposed to ensure the interaction of the armed forces and strengthen the defense capabilities of the participating states.

Declarations

The first of them was adopted in Moscow, at a meeting of the PKK in 1958. In this Declaration, the Warsaw Pact invited NATO members to conclude a non-aggression pact. Next document was adopted in 1960, also in Moscow. The declaration adopted at this meeting approved the decision of the USSR to unilaterally refuse nuclear tests, if the rest Western states they will also not resume explosions. Allied powers also called for the formation favorable conditions to complete the implementation of the termination agreement experimental application weapons. In 1965, the Warsaw meeting took place. It discussed the situation that had arisen as a result of plans to form NATO's nuclear multilateral forces. The meeting also discussed protective measures in the event of the implementation of these programs. At the Budapest meeting in 1966, the Declaration on Strengthening Security and Peace in Europe was adopted.

Maneuvers and exercises

The Warsaw Pact Organization carried out joint events with the participation of armies. Maneuvers and command post exercises were conducted on the territories of all allied states. The largest events were the following:

"Quartet" (in 1963).
"October Assault" (in 1965).
"Rhodope" (in 1967).
"North" (in 1968).
"Brotherhood in Arms" (in 1970).
"West-81" (in 1981).
"Shield-82" (in 1982).

Intelligence operations

The Warsaw Pact Organization maintained constant coordination between the intelligence agencies of the allied states. In 1979, the global radio-electronic communication system (SOUD) began to function. It included funds space reconnaissance GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, USSR, as well as Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam, which were not part of the Agreement.

Allied Doctrine

The Warsaw Pact countries maintained a defensive position. In 1955-65. the doctrine boiled down to the Soviet strategy of warfare using a massive nuclear missile strike with a simultaneous lightning offensive to capture enemy territory, depriving him of the opportunity to continue the battle. The formation of the Warsaw Pact Organization, at its core, was a counterweight to NATO, and in particular, the United States. In accordance with the doctrine of this decade, the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes when a threat of a surprise attack is detected, similar to the American strategy of “massive retaliation”. Relevant tasks were distributed among the allied states. Thus, the USSR army was entrusted with carrying out strategic strikes using nuclear weapons. Battles in the World Ocean were to be fought by united fleets, and on the European continent by aviation and ground forces. At the same time, the participation of associations from the USSR Army was envisaged in the main areas.

1966-1980

During this period, the military doctrine of the Department of Internal Affairs provided for the gradual development of actions. It was supposed to start with the use of only conventional weapons, limited use of nuclear weapons, gradually moving, if necessary, to their massive introduction. Nuclear weapons could only be used if they were used by NATO. Still Special attention was aimed at carrying out a strategic offensive on enemy territory to quickly defeat his main forces and capture the most important economic regions. This doctrine was similar American program"flexible response"

Early 80s strategy

It is based on the principle of readiness to fight any kind of battle. In accordance with this doctrine, military operations were assumed both without nuclear weapons and with them. At the same time, a number of local battles using conventional weapons were envisaged. Preemptive nuclear strikes were not planned. At the same time, nuclear weapons were allowed to be used only if they were used by the enemy. Along with strategic offensives on enemy territories, large-scale defensive operations were also planned.

The meaning of Poland

In mid-October 1955, a Protocol of Agreements between the Soviet and Polish governments was signed in Moscow. In accordance with it, the Polish Armed Forces, in addition to the air defense forces, were supposed to send part of their operational troops, consolidated into the Primorsky Front from the air and three combined arms armies. These forces were to operate in the United Armed Forces of the allied states in the second strategic echelon in the auxiliary direction. Their task was to cover the right flank of the main strike force of the USSR, as well as the sea coast from possible landings of NATO troops.

KMO

The committee, consisting of the defense ministers of the allied states, developed plans for joint command and staff activities. These included, in particular, programs general exercises and maneuvers, cooperation in the training of soldiers and staffs, unification of charters, instructions, manuals, rules and other documents, as well as the introduction of new weapons and equipment, logistics support, and so on.

Technical Committee

This body was in charge of modernizing the equipment of the joint forces. The committee was developing programs to unify them, which would facilitate interaction during battles. In addition, it established specialization in the production of military equipment by certain participating states.

OBC

The armed forces of the Internal Affairs Directorate included assets from the armed forces of the allied states. The size of the armies was agreed upon by bilateral agreements between the Soviet government and the leadership of other countries. Documents were updated every 5 years. This was due to the development of programs for the development of the armed forces of individual states in the next five-year plans. During the peace period, only the most trained forces were present in the United Forces. In case of war, they were joined by operational units that were trained to fight on external fronts.

"Shield-79"

Operational-tactical maneuvers under this code name took place from May 12 to May 19, 1979. Troops and headquarters of the Hungarian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Soviet armies, as well as the Romanian Armed Forces. The head of operations was the Hungarian general Tsinege. During the exercises, issues on the conduct of combat operations by the combined efforts of the allied armies were worked out. The events demonstrated the increased level of operational and tactical training of officers, generals and staffs. The exercises contributed to the subsequent interaction of the armed forces of the allied states, as well as the strengthening of combat cooperation between them. The events involved mainly ground forces together with air force units and units.

Exercises "Brotherhood in Arms"

This was a combined arms event that took place on the territory of the GDR and the Baltic waters adjacent to it. The exercises were conducted according to the plans of the Joint Command. The head of operations was General German army Hoffman. During the exercises, the 234th Guards Parachute Regiment of the Red Banner Chernigov Division was deployed. Everyone who attended observation deck, were delighted with the training of the soldiers. All personnel received gratitude from the USSR Minister of Defense and an award - a Pennant for military valor and courage. It is worth saying that this was the first history of the Airborne Forces the release of 1,200 people from a four-hundred-meter height in difficult weather conditions. Marines of the Baltic Fleet also took part in the events. From the national army of the GDR, the 40th parachute battalion showed its skills. The exercises ended on September 12, 1980 with a parade in Magdeburg. Unlike previous events, Operation Brotherhood in Arms was more wide range tasks to be solved in operational training, larger numbers personnel, territorial scope. These exercises became a serious test for the United Army. The conclusions that were obtained during the maneuvers on issues of operational art and tactics had a significant impact on subsequent training of the Armed Forces.