The best submarines of the Second World War. German submarines of World War II

The starting point in the history of the German submarine fleet was 1850, when the two-seater Brandtaucher submarine, designed by engineer Wilhelm Bauer, was launched in the harbor of Kiel, which immediately sank when attempting to dive.

The next significant event was the launching of the submarine U-1 (U-boat) in December 1906, which became the ancestor of a whole family of submarines, which suffered the hard times of the First World War. In total, before the end of the war, the German fleet received more than 340 boats. Due to the defeat of Germany, 138 submarines remained unfinished.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was prohibited from building submarines. Everything changed in 1935 after the establishment of the Nazi regime and with the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, in which submarines ... were recognized as obsolete weapons, which lifted all bans on their production. In June, Hitler appointed Karl Doenitz commander of all submarines of the future Third Reich.

Grand Admiral and his "wolf packs"

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz is an outstanding figure. He began his career in 1910, entering the naval school in Kiel. Later, during the First World War, he showed himself to be a brave officer. From January 1917 until the defeat of the Third Reich, his life was connected with submarine fleet Germany. He had the main credit for developing the concept of underwater warfare, which boiled down to operating in stable groups of submarines, called “wolf packs.”

Main objects of "hunting" wolf packs"—enemy transport ships providing supplies to troops. The basic principle is to sink more ships than the enemy can build. Very soon such tactics began to bear fruit. By the end of September 1939, the Allies had lost dozens of transports with a total displacement of about 180 thousand tons, and in mid-October, the U-47 boat, quietly slipping into the Scapa Flow base, sent the battleship Royal Oak to the bottom. Anglo-American convoys were especially hard hit. Wolfpacks raged across a vast theater from the North Atlantic and Arctic to South Africa and the Gulf of Mexico.

What did the Kriegsmarine fight on?

The basis of the Kriegsmarine - the submarine fleet of the Third Reich - were submarines of several series - 1, 2, 7, 9, 14, 17, 21 and 23. At the same time, it is especially worth highlighting the 7-series boats, which were distinguished by their reliable design, good technical equipment, and weapons, which allowed them to operate particularly successfully in the Central and North Atlantic. For the first time, a snorkel was installed on them - an air intake device that allows the boat to recharge its batteries while underwater.

Kriegsmarine Aces

German submariners were characterized by courage and high professionalism, so every victory over them came at a high price. Among the submarine aces of the Third Reich, the most famous were captains Otto Kretschmer, Wolfgang Lüth (each 47 ships sunk) and Erich Topp - 36.

Deathmatch

Huge Allied losses at sea sharply intensified the search effective means fight against "wolf packs". Soon, anti-submarine patrol aircraft equipped with radars appeared in the sky, and means of radio interception, detection and destruction of submarines were created - radars, sonar buoys, homing aircraft torpedoes and much more. Tactics have been improved and cooperation has improved.

Destruction

The Kriegsmarine faced the same fate as the Third Reich - complete, crushing defeat. Of the 1,153 submarines built during the war, about 770 were sunk. Along with them, about 30,000 submariners, or almost 80% of the entire submarine fleet personnel, went down.


More than 70 thousand dead sailors, 3.5 thousand lost civil courts and 175 warships from the Allies, 783 sunken submarines with a total crew of 30 thousand people from Nazi Germany - the Battle of the Atlantic, which lasted six years, became the largest naval battle in the history of mankind. “Wolf packs” of German U-boats went hunting for Allied convoys from the grandiose structures erected in the 1940s on Atlantic coast Europe. Aviation in Great Britain and the United States tried unsuccessfully to destroy them for years, but even now these concrete colossi loom fearsomely in Norway, France and Germany. Onliner.by talks about the creation of bunkers where the submarines of the Third Reich once hid from bombers.

Germany entered World War II with only 57 submarines. A significant part of this fleet consisted of outdated Type II small boats, designed to patrol only coastal waters. It is obvious that at this moment the command of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) and the country's top leadership did not plan to launch a large-scale submarine war against their opponents. However, the policy was soon revised, and the personality of the commander of the submarine fleet of the Third Reich played no small role in this radical turn.

In October 1918, at the end of the First World War, during an attack on a guarded British convoy, the German submarine UB-68 was counterattacked and damaged by depth charges. Seven sailors were killed, the rest of the crew was captured. It included Chief Lieutenant Karl Doenitz. After being released from captivity, he did brilliant career, having risen by 1939 to the rank of rear admiral and commander of the Kriegsmarine submarine forces. In the 1930s, he concentrated on developing tactics that would successfully combat the convoy system, of which he fell victim early in his service.


In 1939, Doenitz sent a memorandum to the commander of the Third Reich Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, in which he proposed using the so-called Rudeltaktik, “wolf pack tactics,” to attack convoys. In accordance with it, it was planned to attack an enemy sea convoy in advance concentrated in the area of ​​its passage as much as possible. possible number submarine At the same time, the anti-submarine escort was dispersed, and this, in turn, increased the effectiveness of the attack and reduced possible casualties from the Kriegsmarine.


“Wolf packs,” according to Doenitz, were to play a significant role in the war with Great Britain, Germany’s main rival in Europe. To implement the tactics, the rear admiral assumed, it would be enough to form a fleet of 300 new type VII boats, capable, unlike their predecessors, of long ocean voyages. The Reich immediately launched a grand program for the construction of a submarine fleet.




The situation changed fundamentally in 1940. First, by the end of the year it became clear that the Battle of Britain, which was aimed at forcing the United Kingdom to surrender only through aerial bombing, was lost by the Nazis. Secondly, in the same 1940, Germany carried out a rapid occupation of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and, most importantly, France, gaining almost the entire Atlantic coast at its disposal continental Europe, and with it convenient military bases for ocean raids. Thirdly, the U-boat type VII required by Doenitz began to be introduced en masse into the fleet. Against this background, they acquired not just significant, but decisive importance in the desire to bring Britain to its knees. In 1940, the Third Reich entered into unrestricted submarine warfare and initially achieved phenomenal success in it.




The goal of the campaign, which was later called the “Battle of the Atlantic” at the instigation of Churchill, was to destroy the ocean communications that connected Great Britain with its allies overseas. Hitler and the Reich's military leadership were well aware of the extent of the United Kingdom's dependence on imported goods. The disruption of their supplies was rightly seen the most important factor to bring Britain out of the war, and the main role in this was to be played by the “wolf packs” of Admiral Doenitz.


For their concentration, the former Kriegsmarine naval bases on the territory of Germany proper with access to the Baltic and North Seas turned out to be not very convenient. But the territories of France and Norway allowed free access to the operational space of the Atlantic. The main problem was ensuring the safety of the submarines at their new bases, because they were within the reach of British (and later American) aviation. Of course, Doenitz was well aware that his fleet would immediately be subjected to intense aerial bombardment, survival of which became for the Germans a necessary guarantee of success in the Battle of the Atlantic.


The salvation for the U-boat was the experience of German bunker building, in which the Reich engineers knew a lot. It was clear to them that conventional bombs, which only the Allies possessed at the beginning of World War II, could not cause significant damage to a building reinforced with a sufficient layer of concrete. The problem with protecting submarines was solved in a costly, but quite simple way: ground bunkers began to be built for them.




Unlike similar structures designed for people, the U-Boot-Bunker was built on a Teutonic scale. A typical lair of “wolf packs” was a huge reinforced concrete parallelepiped 200-300 meters long, internally divided into several (up to 15) parallel compartments. In the latter, routine maintenance and repair of submarines was carried out.




Particular importance was attached to the design of the bunker roof. Its thickness, depending on the specific implementation, reached 8 meters, while the roof was not monolithic: concrete layers reinforced with metal reinforcement alternated with air layers. Such a multi-layer “pie” made it possible to better absorb energy shock wave in the event of a direct bomb hit on the building. Air defense systems were located on the roof.




In turn, thick concrete lintels between the internal compartments of the bunker limited possible damage even if the bomb does break through the roof. Each of these isolated “pencil cases” could contain up to four U-boats, and in the event of an explosion inside it, only they would become victims. Neighbors would suffer minimal or no harm at all.




First, relatively small bins for submarines began to be built in Germany at the old Kriegsmarine naval bases in Hamburg and Kiel, as well as on the Heligoland islands in the North Sea. But their construction gained real scope in France, which became the main location of Doenitz’s fleet. From the beginning of 1941 and over the next year and a half, giant colossi appeared on the Atlantic coast of the country in five ports at once, from which “wolf packs” began to hunt for Allied convoys.




The Breton city of Lorient in northwestern France became the Kriegsmarine's largest forward base. It was here that Karl Doenitz’s headquarters was located, here he personally met each submarine returning from a cruise, and here six U-Boot-Bunkers were erected for two flotillas - the 2nd and 10th.




Construction lasted a year, it was controlled by the Todt Organization, and a total of 15 thousand people, mostly French, participated in the process. The concrete complex in Lorient quickly showed its effectiveness: Allied aircraft were unable to inflict any significant damage on it. After this, the British and Americans decided to cut off communications through which the naval base was supplied. Over the course of a month, from January to February 1943, the Allies dropped tens of thousands of bombs on the city of Lorient itself, as a result of which it was 90% destroyed.


However, this did not help either. The last U-boat left Lorient only in September 1944, after the Allied landings in Normandy and the opening of a second front in Europe. After the end of World War II, the former Nazi base began to be successfully used by the French Navy.




Similar structures on a smaller scale also appeared in Saint-Nazaire, Brest and La Rochelle. The 1st and 9th Kriegsmarine submarine flotillas were located in Brest. Overall size This base was more modest than the “headquarters” in Lorient, but the largest single bunker in France was built here. It was designed for 15 compartments and had dimensions of 300x175x18 meters.




The 6th and 7th flotillas were based in Saint-Nazaire. A 14-penal bunker, 300 meters long, 130 meters wide and 18 meters high, was built for them, using almost half a million cubic meters of concrete. 8 out of 14 compartments were also dry docks, which made it possible to carry out major repairs of submarines.



Only one, the 3rd, Kriegsmarine submarine flotilla was stationed in La Rochelle. A bunker of 10 “pencil cases” with dimensions of 192x165x19 meters was enough for her. The roof is made of two 3.5-meter concrete layers with an air gap, the walls are at least 2 meters thick - in total, 425 thousand cubic meters of concrete were spent on the building. It was here that the film Das Boot was filmed - probably the most famous movie about German submariners during the Second World War.




In this series, the naval base in Bordeaux stands out somewhat apart. In 1940, a group of submarines, not German, but Italian, the main allies of the Nazis in Europe, was concentrated here. Nevertheless, here too, by order of Doenitz, the program for the construction of protective structures was carried out by the same “Todt Organization”. The Italian submariners could not boast of any particular success, and already in October 1942 they were supplemented by the specially formed 12th Kriegsmarine flotilla. And in September 1943, after Italy left the war on the side of the Axis, the base called BETASOM was completely occupied by the Germans, who remained here for almost another year.




In parallel with the construction in France, the command of the German Navy turned its attention to Norway. This Scandinavian country was of strategic importance for the Third Reich. Firstly, through the Norwegian port of Narvik, iron ore, vital for its economy, was supplied to Germany from the remaining neutral Sweden. Secondly, the organization of naval bases in Norway made it possible to control North Atlantic, which became especially important in 1942 when the Allies began sending Arctic convoys with Lend-Lease goods to the Soviet Union. In addition, they planned to service the battleship Tirpitz, the flagship and pride of Germany, at these bases.


Norway was given such close attention that Hitler personally ordered the local city Trondheim to one of the Festungen - “Citadels” of the Reich, special German quasi-colonies, with the help of which Germany could further control the occupied territories. For 300 thousand expatriates - settlers from the Reich, they planned to build a new town, which was to be called Nordstern (“North Star”). Responsibility for its design was assigned personally to the Fuhrer's favorite architect, Albert Speer.


It was in Trondheim that the main North Atlantic base for the deployment of the Kriegsmarine, including submarines and the Tirpitz, was created. Having begun the construction of another bunker here in the fall of 1941, the Germans unexpectedly encountered difficulties unprecedented in France. Steel had to be brought in; there was also nothing to produce concrete from on site. The extended supply chain was constantly disrupted by the efforts of the capricious Norwegian weather. In winter, construction was forced to stop due to snow drifts on the roads. In addition, it turned out that the local population was much less willing to work on great construction Reich, than, for example, the French did. Had to attract forced labor labor from specially organized nearby concentration camps.


The Dora bunker, measuring 153x105 meters into just five compartments, was completed with great difficulty only by the middle of 1943, when the successes of the “wolf packs” in the Atlantic began to quickly fade away. The 13th Kriegsmarine Flotilla with 16 Type VII U-boats was stationed here. Dora 2 remained unfinished, and Dora 3 was abandoned altogether.


In 1942, the Allies found another recipe for fighting the Dönitz Armada. Bombing bunkers with finished boats did not produce results, but shipyards, unlike naval bases, were much less protected. By the end of the year, thanks to this new goal the pace of submarine construction slowed down significantly, and the artificial decline of the U-boat, which was increasingly accelerated by the efforts of the Allies, was no longer replenished. In reply German engineers, it would seem, offered a way out.




In unprotected factories scattered throughout the country, it was now planned to produce only individual sections of boats. Their final assembly, testing and launching were carried out at a special plant, which was nothing more than the same familiar bunker for submarines. They decided to build the first such assembly plant on the Weser River near Bremen.



By the spring of 1945, with the help of 10 thousand construction workers - prisoners of concentration camps (6 thousand of whom died in the process), the largest of all U-Boot-Bunkers of the Third Reich appeared on the Weser. Huge building(426x97x27 meters) with a roof thickness of up to 7 meters, the inside was divided into 13 rooms. In 12 of them, a sequential conveyor assembly of the submarine from ready-made elements was carried out, and in the 13th, the already completed submarine was launched into the water.




It was assumed that the plant called Valentin would produce not just a U-boat, but a new generation U-boat - type XXI, another miracle weapon that was supposed to save Nazi Germany from imminent defeat. More powerful, faster, covered with rubber to impede the operation of enemy radars, with the latest sonar system, which made it possible to attack convoys without visual contact with them - it was the first truly underwater a boat that could spend the entire military campaign without a single rise to the surface.


However, it did not help the Reich. Until the end of the war, only 6 out of 330 were under construction and in varying degrees Ready submarines were launched, and only two of them managed to go on a combat mission. The Valentin plant was never completed, suffering a series of bomb attacks in March 1945. The Allies had their own answer to the German miracle weapon, also unprecedented - seismic bombs.




Seismic bombs were a pre-war invention of the British engineer Barnes Wallace, which found its application only in 1944. Conventional bombs, exploding next to the bunker or on its roof, could not cause serious damage to it. Wallace's bombs were based on a different principle. The most powerful 8-10-ton shells were dropped from the highest possible height. Thanks to this and the special shape of the hull, they developed supersonic speed in flight, which allowed them to go deeper into the ground or pierce even the thick concrete roofs of submarine shelters. Once deep within the structure, the bombs exploded, in the process producing small local earthquakes sufficient to cause significant damage to even the most fortified bunker.



Because of high altitude their accuracy decreased when dropped from a bomber, but in March 1945, two of these Grand Slam bombs hit the Valentin plant. Having penetrated four meters into the concrete of the roof, they detonated and led to the collapse of significant fragments of the building's structure. The “cure” for the Doenitz bunkers was found, but Germany was already doomed.


At the beginning of 1943, the “happy times” of successful hunting by “wolf packs” on allied convoys came to an end. The development of new radars by the Americans and the British, the decryption of Enigma - the main German encryption machine installed on each of their submarines, and the strengthening of convoy escorts led to a strategic turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic. U-boats began to die in dozens. In May 1943 alone, the Kriegsmarine lost 43 of them.


The Battle of the Atlantic was the largest and longest naval battle in human history. In six years, from 1939 to 1945, Germany sank 3.5 thousand civilian and 175 warships of the Allies. In turn, the Germans lost 783 submarines and three-quarters of all the crews of their submarine fleet.


Only with the Doenitz bunkers the Allies were unable to do anything. Weapons that could destroy these structures appeared only at the end of the war, when almost all of them had already been abandoned. But even after the end of World War II, it was not possible to get rid of them: too much effort and expense would have been required to demolish these grandiose structures. They still stand in Lorient and La Rochelle, in Trondheim and on the banks of the Weser, in Brest and Saint-Nazaire. Somewhere they are abandoned, somewhere they are turned into museums, somewhere they are occupied by industrial enterprises. But for us, the descendants of the soldiers of that war, these bunkers have, above all, a symbolic meaning.







In this note, I bring to your attention the firepower that the boats had. I again reviewed the topic briefly, without providing details and nuances, since with detailed coverage this issue You will need to write at least a large review article. To begin with, to make it clear how the Germans highlighted the issue of the need to have a gun on board and its use, I will give an excerpt from the “Manual for Submarine Commanders”, where the following is said about this:

"Section V Artillery weapons of submarines (submarine as a carrier of artillery)
271. The presence of artillery on a submarine is fraught with contradictions from the very beginning. The submarine is unstable, has a low-lying gun and surveillance platform, and is not equipped to conduct artillery fire.
All artillery installations on a submarine are poorly suited for an artillery duel, and in this respect the submarine is inferior to any surface ship.
In an artillery battle, a submarine, as opposed to a surface ship, must immediately bring all its forces into action, because even one hit in the strong hull of a submarine already makes it impossible for it to dive and leads to death. Therefore, the possibility of an artillery battle between a torpedo submarine and military surface ships is excluded.
272. For submarines used for torpedo attacks, artillery is, as it were, a conditional and auxiliary weapon, because the use of artillery over water contradicts the entire essence of a submarine, i.e., a sudden and covert underwater attack.
Based on this, it can be said that on a torpedo submarine, artillery is used only in the fight against merchant ships, for example, to delay steamships or to destroy unarmed or weakly armed ships (§ 305)."
(With)

Deck artillery
Caliber, Type, Shooting, Rate of fire, Elevation angle , Effect. range, Calculation

105 mm SK C/32U - U-boot L C/32U Single 15 35° 12,000 m 6 persons
105 mm SK C/32U - Marine Pivot L Single 15 30° 12,000 m 6 persons
88 mm SK C/30U - U-boot L C/30U Single 15-18 30° 11,000 m 6 people
88 mm SK C/35 - U-boot L C/35U Single 15-18 30° 11,000 m 6 people


Of all types German submarines, designed and built from 1930 to 1945, boats of the I, VII, IX and X series were armed with deck artillery with a caliber of over 88 mm. At the same time, only the VII series carried an 88-mm caliber gun; the rest of the indicated series of boats had a 105-mm gun. The cannon was located directly on the upper deck in front of the wheelhouse; the ammunition was stored partly there in the superstructure of the boat, partly inside the durable hull. Deck artillery was in the department of the second watch officer, who performed the duties of a senior gunner on the boat.
On the "sevens" the gun was installed in the area of ​​frame 54 on a pyramid specially reinforced in the superstructure, which was reinforced with longitudinal and transverse beams. In the area of ​​the gun, the upper deck was expanded to 3.8 meters in length, thereby forming a place for artillery crews. The standard ammunition for the boat was 205 shells - 28 of which were in special containers in the superstructure next to the gun, 20 shells in the wheelhouse, and the rest in the "weapons room" inside the durable hull in the second compartment from the bow.
The 105 mm gun was also mounted on a pyramid, which was welded to the pressure hull. Depending on the type of boat, the ammunition for the gun ranged from 200 to 230 shells, of which 30-32 were stored in the superstructure next to the gun, remaining in the “weapons room” located in the central control room and galley.
The deck gun was protected from water by a waterproof plug on the barrel side, and by a special plug sleeve on the breech side. A well-thought-out lubrication system for the gun made it possible to keep the gun in working condition at different temperatures.
I mentioned various cases of using deck guns And .
By the end of 1942, the command of the submarine forces came to the conclusion that the deck guns on boats that participated in the fighting in the Atlantic theater of operations should be dismantled. Thus, almost all “sevens” of type B and C lost such artillery. The guns were retained on Type IX submarine cruisers and Type VIID and X mines. But by the end of the war it was already difficult to find a German boat of any type that could carry deck artillery.

88 mm U29 and U95 guns. The waterproof plug is clearly visible.


Elevation angle of the 88 mm gun on the U46. It seems that it still exceeds those 30 and 35 degrees indicated in the technical characteristics. The gun had to be raised with its barrel up when loading torpedoes into the bow compartment. The photo below shows how this happened (U74 preparing to take a torpedo)



105 mm gun on the U26 "one"


105 mm guns U103 and U106


General view of the 105 mm gun with its mounts.

Gunners U53 and U35 prepare for practical shooting




Artillery crew U123 is preparing to open fire. A tanker is visible straight ahead. The target will be sunk by artillery fire. Completion of Operation Paukenschlag, February 1942.

But sometimes the tools were used for other purposes :-)
The pictures below show U107 and U156

Flak
Caliber, Type, Shooting, Rate of fire, Elevation angle , Effect. range, Calculation

37 mm SK C/30U - Ubts. LC 39 Singles 12 85° 2,500 m 3/4 persons
37 mm M42 U - LM 43U Automatic (8 rounds) 40 80° 2,500 m 3/4 persons
37 mm Zwilling M 42U - LM 42 Automatic (8 charges) 80 80° 2,500 m 3/4 persons
30 mm Flak M 44 - LM 44 Automatic (exact characteristics unknown. For type XXI submarines)
20 mm MG C/30 - L 30 Automatic (20 rounds) 120 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
20 mm MG C/30 - L 30/37 Automatic (20 rounds) 120 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
20 mm Flak C/38 - L 30/37 Automatic (20 rounds) 220 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
20 mm Flak Zwilling C/38 II - M 43U Automatic (20 rounds) 440 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
20 mm Flak Vierling C38/43 - M 43U Automatic (20 rounds) 880 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
13.2 mm Breda 1931 Automatic (30 rounds) 400 85° 1,000 m 2/4 persons

Quad units are highlighted in red, dual units are highlighted in blue.

Of the fire weapons that the German submarines had, the most interesting were anti-aircraft weapons. If deck guns were obsolete by the end of the war, then the evolution of anti-aircraft fire among the Germans is clearly visible from the above table.

By the beginning of the war, German submarines had only a minimum of anti-aircraft guns, since it was believed that the threat from the air was clearly underestimated by the fleet command. As a result, the designers in the projects included no more than one anti-aircraft gun on the boat. But during the war the situation changed and reached the point that some submarines were literally studded with anti-aircraft guns, such as “anti-aircraft boats” (flakboats).
The main weapons of the boats were initially recognized as 20-mm 20-round anti-aircraft guns, which were installed on all types of boats with the exception of the II series. On the latter they were also provided, but were not included in the standard armament of the boats.

Initially, on the first "sevens" in pre-war time The 20-mm anti-aircraft machine gun type MG C/30 - L 30 was supposed to be installed on the upper deck behind the wheelhouse. This is clearly seen in the example of U49. Behind the open hatch you can see the anti-aircraft gun carriage.

But already in wartime, the 20-mm anti-aircraft gun was moved to a site located behind the bridge. It is clearly visible in the photo. Alternately, anti-aircraft platforms U25, U38 (Karl Doenitz himself is on the bridge of the boat), U46





Depending on the type and purpose of the boat, "Dvoyki" received anti-aircraft weapons, both pre-war and during the war. The gun was located in front of the wheelhouse. Either a carriage was installed for it, or it was installed there on a waterproof container (in the form of a barrel) in which the machine gun was stored in a disassembled state).
U23 before the war


Waterproof "barrel", also known as a carriage on U9 (Black Sea)


Same thing on U145


And this is already in finished form. U24 (Black Sea)


Option for installing an anti-aircraft gun on a carriage. U23 (Black Sea)


The "Twos" operating in the Black Sea underwent some modification. In particular, the wheelhouse was modified in the direction of standard ocean boats by adding a platform for installing additional fire weapons. Boat armament of this type At the World Theater Championship, due to this, it increased to 2-3 barrels per submarine. The photo shows U19 in full armor. Anti-aircraft gun in front of the wheelhouse, twin guns on the platform behind the bridge. By the way, machine guns installed on the sides of the cabin are visible.

The growing threat from the air forced the Germans to take measures to increase anti-aircraft weapons. The boat received an additional platform for placing fire weapons, on which two pairs of 20-mm machine guns and one (or two) 37-mm machine guns could be placed. This site received the nickname "Winter Garden" (Wintergarten). Below are photos of boats that surrendered to the Allies U249, U621 and U234




As the pinnacle of the evolution of anti-aircraft weapons German boats quad anti-aircraft gun Flak Vierling C38/43 - M 43U, which was received by the so-called “anti-aircraft boats”. As an example U441.

In the Mediterranean, the "Sevens" received additional weapons by installing Italian "Breda" machine guns in the form of twin-arms. As an example U81

A special word worth mentioning is such a “miracle” weapon as the 37 mm SK C/30U - Ubts anti-aircraft gun. LC 39, which fired single shots. This gun was installed on later types submarine cruisers Type IX (B and C) and submarine tankers type XIV. The "cash cows" carried two guns of this type on either side of the wheelhouse. "Nines" had one installed behind the wheelhouse. Below are examples of such a weapon on the U103.


Since I did not set myself the task of conducting a complete and detailed description of anti-aircraft weapons, I omit such nuances as ammunition and other characteristics of this type of weapon. I once mentioned the training of anti-aircraft gunners on submarines. Examples of confrontation between submarines and aircraft can be found if you look at the topics in my tag.

Firearms and signal weapons
Caliber, Type, Shooting, Rate of fire, Elevation angle , Effect. range, Calculation

7.92 mm MG15 Automatic (50/75 rounds) 800-900 90° 750 m 1-2
7.92 mm MG34 Automatic (50/75 rounds) 600-700 90° 750 m 1-2
7.92 mm MG81Z Automatic (Tape) 2.200 90° 750 m 1-2
In addition, the submarine’s crew had at their disposal 5-10 Mauser 7.65 mm pistols, 5-10 rifles, MP-40 assault rifles, hand grenades and two flare guns.

MG81Z on U33

In general, I would like to note that German submarines had fire weapons that were quite modern at that time, which worked well during combat operations. In particular, the British noted after testing the artillery they captured U570 that, compared with the 3-inch gun of the 1917 model mounted on S-type boats, the 88-mm German gun was superior to the British one. The 20-mm anti-aircraft machine gun was recognized by them as an excellent and effective weapon, which, to their surprise, did not vibrate when fired and had a good magazine.

Photo resource used to illustrate the note http://www.subsim.com

As usual, Vladimir Nagirnyak pored over the analysis.

Almost 70 years have passed since the end of the Second World War, but even today we do not know everything about some episodes of its final stage. That is why, again and again, old stories about the mysterious submarines of the Third Reich that surfaced off the coast come to life in the press and literature. Latin America. Argentina turned out to be especially attractive to them.

GET FROM THE BOTTOM!

For similar stories, real or fictional, there were reasons. Everyone knows the role of German submarines in the war at sea: 1,162 submarines left the stocks of Germany during the Second World War. But it was not only this record number of boats that the German Navy could rightfully be proud of.

German submarines of that time were distinguished by the highest technical characteristics— speed, diving depth, unsurpassed cruising range. It is no coincidence that the most massive Soviet submarines pre-war period(series C) were built under a German license.

And when in July 1944 the German boat U-250 was sunk at a shallow depth in the Vyborg Bay, the Soviet command demanded that the fleet raise it at any cost and deliver it to Kronstadt, which was done despite the stubborn opposition of the enemy. And although the boats of the VII series, to which the U-250 belonged, were no longer considered the last word in German technology in 1944, there were many novelties in its design for Soviet designers.

Suffice it to say that after its capture, a special order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Kuznetsov to suspend the work begun on the project of a new submarine until a detailed study of the U-250. Subsequently, many elements of the “German” were transferred to Soviet boats of Project 608, and later Project 613, of which more than a hundred were built in post-war years. The XXI series boats, one after another going into the ocean since 1943, had especially high performance.

DOUBTABLE NEUTRALITY

Argentina, having chosen neutrality in the world war, nevertheless took a clearly pro-German position. The large German diaspora was very influential in this southern country and provided all possible assistance to their warring compatriots. The Germans owned many industrial enterprises, huge lands, fishing vessels.

German submarines operating in the Atlantic regularly approached the shores of Argentina, where they were supplied with food, medicine and spare parts. Nazi submariners were received as heroes by the owners of German estates, in large quantities scattered along the Argentine coast. Eyewitnesses said that for bearded men real feasts were held in naval uniforms - lambs and pigs were roasted, the best wines and kegs of beer were displayed.

But the local press did not report this. It is no wonder that it was in this country that after the defeat of the Third Reich, many prominent Nazis and their minions, such as Eichmann, Priebke, the sadistic doctor Mengele, the fascist dictator of Croatia Pavelic and others, found refuge and escaped from retribution.

There were rumors that they all ended up in South America on board submarines, a special squadron of which, consisting of 35 submarines (the so-called “Fuhrer Convoy”), had a base in the Canaries. To this day, dubious versions have not been refuted that Adolf Hitler, Eva Braun and Bormann found salvation in the same way, as well as about the secret German colony of New Swabia allegedly created with the help of a submarine fleet in Antarctica.

In August 1942 to the warring countries anti-Hitler coalition Brazil joined, taking part in battles on land, air and sea. She suffered her greatest loss when the war in Europe had already ended, and Pacific Ocean burning out. On July 4, 1945, 900 miles from its native shores, the Brazilian cruiser Bahia exploded and sank almost instantly. Most experts believe that his death (along with 330 crew members) was the work of German submariners.

SWASTIKA ON THE CONTROLHOUSE?

After waiting Time of Troubles, having made good money on supplies to both warring coalitions, at the very end of the war, when its end was clear to everyone, on March 27, 1945, Argentina declared war on Germany. But after this the flow of German boats seemed to only increase. Dozens of residents of coastal villages, as well as fishermen at sea, according to them, have more than once observed submarines on the surface, almost in wake formation, moving in a southerly direction.

The most keen-eyed eyewitnesses even saw a swastika on their deckhouses, which, by the way, the Germans never put on the deckhouses of their boats. The coastal waters and coast of Argentina were now patrolled by the army and navy. There is a known episode when in June 1945, in the vicinity of the city of Mardel Plata, a patrol came across a cave in which there were various products. To whom they were intended remains unclear. It is also difficult to understand where this endless stream of submarines allegedly observed by the population after May 1945 came from.

After all, on April 30, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, gave the order to conduct Operation Rainbow, during which all the remaining Reich submarines (several hundred) were subject to flooding. It is quite possible that some of these ships that were in the ocean or in ports different countries, the commander-in-chief’s directive did not reach, and some crews simply refused to carry it out.

Historians agree that in most cases, various boats, including fishing boats, dangling on the waves, were mistaken for submarines observed in the ocean, or the reports of eyewitnesses were simply a figment of their imagination against the background of general hysteria in anticipation of a German retaliatory strike.

CAPTAIN CINZANO

But still, at least two German submarines turned out to be not phantoms, but very real ships with living crews on board. These were U-530 and U-977, which entered the port of Mardel Plata in the summer of 1945 and surrendered to the Argentine authorities. When an Argentine officer boarded U-530 in the early morning of July 10, he saw the crew lined up on the deck and its commander, a very young chief lieutenant, who introduced himself as Otto Wermuth (later Argentine sailors called him Captain Cinzano) and declared that U- 530 and her crew of 54 surrender to the mercy of the Argentine authorities.

After this, the submarine's flag was lowered and handed over to the Argentine authorities, along with a list of the crew.

A group of officers from the Mardel Plata naval base, which inspected U-530, noted that the submarine did not have a deck gun and two anti-aircraft machine guns (they were dropped into the sea before being captured), and not a single torpedo. All ship documentation was destroyed, as was the encryption machine. Particularly noted was the absence of an inflatable rescue boat on the submarine, which suggested that it might have been used to land some Nazi figures (perhaps Hitler himself) ashore.

During interrogations, Otto Wermuth said that U-530 left Kiel in February, hid in the Norwegian fjords for 10 days, after which it cruised along the US coast, and on April 24 moved south. Otto Wermuth could not give any clear explanations regarding the absence of the bot. A search was organized for the missing bot, involving ships, planes and marines, but they did not yield any results. On July 21, the ships participating in this operation were ordered to return to their bases. From that moment on, no one looked for German submarines in Argentine waters.

TALE OF A PIRATE

Concluding the story about the adventures of German submarines in southern seas, one cannot fail to mention a certain Corvette captain Paul von Rettel, who, thanks to journalists, became widely known as the commander of U-2670. He, allegedly being in the Atlantic in May 1945, refused to sink his submarine or surrender and simply began piracy off the coast of Africa and South-East Asia. The newly minted filibuster allegedly amassed a huge fortune for himself. He replenished fuel for his diesel engines, water and food from his victims.

He practically did not use weapons, because few people dared to resist his formidable submarine. Journalists do not know how this story ended. But it is known for certain that the submarine number U-2670 was not listed in the German fleet, and von Rettel himself was not on the list of commanders. So, to the disappointment of lovers of sea romance, his story turned out to be a newspaper duck.

Konstantin RISHES

Type VII submarines

Historical data

Power plant

Armament

U-Boot Type VII- a series of medium-sized diesel-electric German submarines. They were in service with the Kriegsmarine. A total of 703 boats were built in seven modifications. They took an active part in the Second World War. In total, Type VII submarines sank 6 aircraft carriers (two were scrapped due to serious damage), 2 battleships, 5 cruisers, 52 destroyers and destroyer escorts, as well as dozens of other warships and thousands transport ships. A total of 546 boats were lost, not counting those sunk by their crews at the end of the war.

General information

History of creation

The strategy of warfare at sea was influenced by the use of submarines in the First World War. The damage caused to the commercial shipping of the Entente countries by German submarines was enormous. Due to attacks by German submarines, the Entente countries lost 12 million tons of transport tonnage. According to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was prohibited from having submarines, but in the mid-20s of the 20th century, the leadership of the Reichsmarine began building medium and small submarines. The plans were to use the most successful submarine designs of the First World War - type UB III, UC II and UB II.

In 1922, the companies Vulcan, Germany and Weser created design department under the leadership of G. Techel and a staff of 30 engineers. The task of this bureau is to create new types of submarines. The possibility of creating minelayers that would carry mines in addition to torpedoes was considered. Also, the construction of submarines with a displacement of 1,500 tons, floating workshops and boats with a Walter engine was considered. This list included a single-hull submarine with internal layout fuel tanks, this series was given the name VII. On January 10, 1935, an order for the development of a new submarine was approved. Characteristics of Type VII:

  • Surface displacement - 550 tons.
  • Immersion depth - 100 m.
  • Engines - 2 diesel engines, 1050 hp each.
  • Max. surface/underwater speed - 16-17/8-9 knots.
  • Cruising range surface/submarine - 6000 miles at 8 knots/75 miles at 4 knots.

Construction and testing

In mid-1935, two things happened at once. significant events On July 18, an Anglo-German agreement was signed and in January 1936 Karl Dönitz was appointed commander-in-chief of the submarine fleet. The construction of the German submarine fleet became legalized, but at the same time it was limited to no more than 45% of the tonnage of submarines in the British fleet.

Description of design

Modifications

Type VII submarines existed in seven modifications:

Submarine type Type VIIA Type VIIB Type VIIC Type VII/C 41 Type VII/C 42 Type VIID Type VIIF
Years of design 1933-1934 1934-1935 1937-1938 1941 1942-1943 1939-1940 n.d.
Years of construction 1935-1937 1937-1941 1938-1944 1941-1945 n.d. 1940-1942 1941-1943
Displacement t, surface/underwater 626/915 753/1040 769/1070 759/1070 999/1369 965/1285 1084/1345
Dimensions in m, length/width/draft 64,5/ 5,9/ 4,4 66,5/ 6,2/ 4,7 67,1/ 6,2/ 4,7 67,23/ 6,2/ 4,7 68,7/ 6,9/ 5,1 76,9/ 6,4/ 5 77,6/ 7,3/ 4.9
Robust housing, length/diameter in m. 45,5/ 4,7 48,8/ 4,7 49,4/ 4,7 49,4/ 4,7 50,9/ 5 59,8/ 4,7 60,4/ 4,7
Thickness of the robust housing in mm 16 16 18,5 21,5 28 20,5 20,5
Power in hp, diesel/electric motors 2320/ 750 2800/ 750 2800/ 750 2800/ 750 4400/ 750 2800/ 750 2800/ 750
Speed, surface/submarine 16/ 8 17/ 8 17/ 7,6 17/ 7,6 18,6/ 7,6 16/ 7,3 16,9/ 7,3
Immersion depth in m, working/maximum 100/ 100 100/ 100 100/ 165 120/ 200 300/ 300 100/ 100 100/ 100
Dive time in seconds, urgent/normal 30/ 50 30/ 50 30/ 50 30/ 50 30/ 50 30/ 50 30/ 50
Fuel reserve in t., normal/full 58,6/ 67 99,7/ 108,3 105,3/ 113,5 105,3/ 113,5 105/ 159 155,2/ 169,4 198,8/ -
Cruising range at cruising speed in miles 6200 8700 8500 8500 12 600 11 200 14 700
Crew, people 44 44 44 44 45 44 46

Armament

Artillery weapons

At the beginning of the war, the artillery armament consisted of an 88 mm SKC/35 cannon with a barrel length of 45 calibers and a single-barreled Flak 30 anti-aircraft gun on a C30/37 mount. The ammunition load for the SKC/35 consisted of 220 shells; the shells were fed onto the deck manually from the artillery magazine, along a chain. The Flak 30 ammunition consisted of 1,500 rounds.

In the first months of the war, when German submariners tried to act in accordance with prize rights, submarine artillery was actively used. But already on September 26, 1939, the British Admiralty announced plans to install artillery on all merchant ships. A month later, an instruction was introduced according to which the crew of the boat should not inspect the merchant ship, and after studying the papers delivered on the boat, if there was contraband, they should sink the stopped ship with a torpedo.

In addition, placing merchant ships in convoys deprived the gunners of showing their shooting skills. Subsequently, the use of artillery was one-time. The last such incident occurred on September 19, 1942. Off Cape Hatteras, U-701, in a fierce surface battle, sank the American armed trawler YP-389. On November 14, 1942, an order was received to dismantle the 88 mm guns.

This order was not carried out immediately and not in all flotillas. First of all, boats stationed in the West of France underwent modernization of anti-aircraft weapons with the removal of the deck gun. Many boats that were tested and operated in Norway retained their guns until the end of 19944. There is a known case when in August 1944, U-745 arrived from Kiel to operate in Gulf of Finland and she had to return to Gotenhafen to dismantle the deck gun.

Anti-aircraft weapons

The anti-aircraft armament of Type VII submarines was constantly expanded. In the first modifications, the anti-aircraft gun was located on the deck behind the wheelhouse, but already in the first months of the war it was raised beyond the wheelhouse fence. IN initial period During the war, Allied aviation did not pose a threat to German submarines; by the end of 1941, it was able to sink only 4 boats.

In connection with the start of air patrols of the Bay of Biscay by the British, in the summer of 1942 the first steps were taken to build up anti-aircraft weapons on submarines. A low additional platform was mounted behind the standard deckhouse fencing (it received the nickname from German submariners Wintergarten) to accommodate a paired Flak 30. The single-barrel gun on the top was replaced by a two-barreled 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun MG 151/22, it was distinguished by its smaller dimensions, initial speed and firing range.

But since December 1942, the Submarine Command, having become convinced of the ineffectiveness of the MG 151/20, ordered the installation of faster-firing 20 mm guns Flak 38. This design was called “cabinet 2” (“cabinet 1” was the name given to the scheme with single anti-aircraft guns Flak 30) at the same time, four conventional machine guns were mounted on the bridge railings MG 34 caliber 7.92 mm.

Already the first fights between submarines and aircraft showed that the abundance of small-caliber guns does not guarantee victory over a four-engine flying boat or bomber. New hopes were associated with the entry into service of 37 mm automatic guns, twin and quad guns Flak 38. In 1943, the composition of anti-aircraft weapons called “cabinet 4” was approved; it provided for the installation of two twin Flak 38s on the upper platform and Flakvierling 38 on the bottom.

On June 8, 1943, the U-758 boat with “wheelhouse 4” won the battle against eight aircraft from an American aircraft carrier, although the submarine was seriously damaged and 11 crew members were killed and wounded, the Americans were unable to either drive the boat under water or sink it. On June 30, the Submarine Fleet Command issued an order according to which only those submarines that received “wheelhouse 4” were released for the campaign.

While conventional submarines were awaiting conversion, it was decided to create special "anti-aircraft" decoy boats for airplanes. The first such decoy boat was U-441. She received two Flakvierling 38, in front and behind the wheelhouse and a 37 mm SKC/30 semi-automatic « winter garden» . On May 24, on the second boat of the trip, she fought with a British flying boat, and having lost one of the quadruple installations, she was able to shoot it down. After this, the boat went for a 2-month repair. And already on July 12, U-441 entered the Bay of Biscay; in a battle with British aircraft, the boat lost all its top watch personnel. At the end of 1943, the Submarine Fleet Command ordered the conversion of decoy boats into regular ones.

In the battles of the spring-summer of 1943, it became clear that 20 mm machine guns could cause fatal damage to a patrol aircraft, but not before its attack, which, if the pilot persisted, could become fatal for the submarine. In order to stop the attacking aircraft, longer-range weapons were required. And this weapon became an automatic 37 mm anti-aircraft gun Flak 42, it entered service in mid-1943.

By December 1, 1943, 18 submarines had replaced the Flakvierling with the Flak 42. The ammunition load for the 37 mm gun was 1,195 shells, and for the 20 mm, 4,260 shells. Further improvement of weapons ceased after the adoption of the snorkel. This ended the confrontation between submarines and aircraft. Best of luck In the fight against aircraft, U-333, U-648, which shot down 3 aircraft each, and U-256, which scored victories over 4 aircraft, achieved success.

Torpedo weapons

The main weapons of the Type VII submarines were torpedoes. To launch them, there were four bow and one stern torpedo tubes with a diameter of 533 mm each. Modification A boats had 6 torpedoes in reserve; on subsequent modifications, the supply of torpedoes increased due to the placement of one spare torpedo in the electric motor compartment and two more torpedoes in the superstructure, but they were abandoned at the beginning of 1943 due to their frequent damage as a result of attacks by Allied escort ships.

The torpedo tubes themselves had a number of interesting features. The torpedo was ejected from them using a special pneumatic piston, rather than compressed air; this greatly simplified the bubble-free firing system. Also, changing the depth of travel and rotation of the torpedo gyroscope could be carried out directly in the torpedo tubes through the PSA in the command room. Another feature of these torpedo tubes is the ability to lay non-contact mines from them.

The design of the device ensured the release of torpedoes at depths of up to 22 meters. Reloading the devices took relatively little time, only 10 to 20 minutes for torpedoes that were stored inside a durable hull.

Main modifications of Type VII submarine torpedoes

Name Date of entry into service Fuse Homing or maneuvering device Other changes
G7a T1 Early 20s KHB Pi1 (could be equipped with KHB Pi3 from October 1943 to October 1944) Could be equipped with PM FAT I (from November 1942) or LUT (from summer 1944) No
G7e T2 1929 KHB Pi1 No No
G7e T3 December 1942 KHB Pi2 Could be equipped with PM FAT II (from May 1943) No
G7e T3a Mid 1943 KHB Pi2 Could be equipped with PM with FAT II (from May 1943) or LUT (from May 1944) Cruising range 7.5 km at 29 knots
G7e T4 Falke February 1943 KHB Pi2 PS Weight 1937 kg. Cruising range 7.5 km at 20 knots.
G7e T5 Zaunkönig October 1943 KHB Pi4 PS "Amsel" Weight 1497 kg, explosive weight 274 kg. Cruising range 5.7 km at 24-25 knots.
G7e Т5b Early 1944 KHB Pi4 PS "Amsel" Cruising range 8 km at 22 knots
G7e T11 Zaunkönig II April 1944 KHB Pi4 Improved substation "Amsel" No

Shortwave was considered the most important because it provided communication with headquarters. It included an E-437-S receiver and two transmitters, a 200-watt S-400-S and a spare 40-watt 40-K-39a, and a retractable antenna in the left wing of the bridge fence; if the antenna was missing, then the role of antennas was performed by galvanized network taps , isolated from the body and tensioned with lanyards. The E-437-S receiver was also used to receive VHF signals.

Medium wave equipment was intended for communication between submarines. It consisted of an E-381-S receiver, a 150-watt Spez-2113-S transmitter and a small retractable antenna with a round vibrator in the right wing of the bridge. This same antenna was a direction finder for the CB range. An Enigma cipher machine was used for encoding and decoding.

Hydroacoustic equipment

The most important component of the sonar equipment of Type VII boats was the equipment GHG, which consisted of 11 and later 24 hydrophones, they were located in nose lung the hulls formed a semicircle around the stock of the bow horizontal rudders and were connected to the receiver in the second compartment of the submarine.

To increase the accuracy of direction finding, the KDB system was used at the beginning of the war; it consisted of a rotating T-shaped antenna with 6 hydrophones; the antenna was placed on the upper deck, but since it was not very durable, it was abandoned by the middle of the war. On some boats built in recent months During the war, the hydrophone placement scheme was improved. 24 hydrophones were placed on a round platform extendable from below in the bow. This scheme had greater accuracy direction finding of the noise source (it was even mechanically attached to the PSA) except for a narrow 60 degree area directly aft. But this scheme was not extended to Type VII, since it was developed for Type XXI boats.

Radar stations

The radars that entered the fleet, in very limited quantities, were primarily equipped with Type IX boats, so only a few Type VII boats received them. The first radar tested in Germany at the beginning of 1939 was the FuMO29 Gema.

The wavelength of the FuMO station is 29-80 cm, a special mast with a 2x3 m mattress-type antenna was placed in front of the wheelhouse, but they refused to install such a bulky radar on production boats. This idea was returned to in 1941; antenna dipoles were mounted on the wheelhouse itself in two rows of six dipoles, the top row being the receiving one, and the lower one transmitting. The detection range of a ship by the FuMO29 station is 6-8 km, an aircraft at an altitude of 500 m is up to 15 km.

In 1942, production of the FuMO-30, an improved version of the FuMO-29, began; it differed from the latter by a mattress-type antenna of 1x1.5 m, the antenna was located in the left wing of the cabin in place of the retractable HF antenna. In 1944, the FuMO-61 entered service, which was a naval version of the FuMG-200 Hohentwil night fighter radar. Having a slightly shorter wavelength of 54-58 cm and an antenna almost identical to the antenna of the FuMO-30 station, the station had a detection range of 8-10 km for ships and 15-20 km for aircraft.

Electronic intelligence stations

In the spring of 1942, an English patrol plane crashed on the territory of French Tunisia, and the Germans completely lost their doubts that the British could use radar to search for boats. In the wreckage of this aircraft, a slightly damaged set of the ASV I station was discovered. Increasing night attacks on boats by Coastal Command aircraft forced the Kriegsmarine Command to look for a way out.

By July 1942, the Germans received the first sample of the station electronic intelligence FuMB1, in honor of the French company that designed this station, it was called “Metox”. On August 26, the Kriegsmarine Command ordered all boats to be equipped with these stations.

“Metox” itself was a simple receiver; it recorded a signal with a wavelength of 1.3-2.6 meters. It connected to the in-boat communication system and the alarm signal was heard by the entire crew, a little later a screen appeared showing the direction to the radiation source. The antenna was rotated horizontally manually; moreover, the installation of this station was not initially envisaged, so the antenna was stored inside a durable housing and, upon ascent, was taken to the bridge and connected to the receiver by cable. The use of Methox made it possible to deprive the British anti-submarine line of effectiveness for six months.

On August 13, 1943, the Kriegsmarine Command banned the use of Methox because the new British ASV III radar detected the Methox radiation. At the same time, the FuMB9 Vanz station was put into production; the antenna of this station was a cylinder with a diameter of 20 cm and a height of 10 cm, it detected radiation in all directions. In November 1943, the second non-emitting modification of FuMB9, and the FuMB10 Borkum station, appeared. The operating range of the ASV III radar was closed by the FuMB7 Naxos station.

Subsequently, Naxos and Borkum (or Vanz) were installed on the boats. In April 1944 they were replaced by the FuMB 24 "Fleige". Due to the emergence of American flying boats with APS-3 and APS-4 radars, the FuMB25 “Mücke” station was created. In May 1944, the FuMB24 and FuMB25 stations were combined into the FuMB26 Tunis complex. But with the introduction of snorkels, the need for electronic intelligence stations disappeared.

Commanders

Submarine aces who fought on the Type VII and sank more than 100,000 tons of transport tonnage:

First Name Last Name Dates of combat activity Submarine Number of military campaigns Number of ships sunk/tonnage Ships damaged/tonnage
Otto Kretschmer U-99 16 40/ 208 954 5/ 37 965
Erich Topp June 1940 - August 1942 U-552 12 35/ 197 4/ 32 217
Heinrich Lehmann-Wilenbrock November 1939 - April 1942, September - November 1944 U-96, U-256 10 24/ 170 237 2/ 15 864
Herbert Schulze September 1939 - June 1942 U-48 8 26/ 169 709 1/ 9456
Gunter Prien September 1939 - March 1941 U-47 10 30/ 162 769 8/ 62 751
Joachim Schepke September 1939 - March 1941 U-100 14 36/ 153 677 4/ 17 229
Heinrich Bleichrodt September 1940 - January 1943 U-48 8 24/ 151 260 2/ 11 684
Robert Gisaye November 1940 - November 1943 U-98 8 24/ 136 266 1/ 2588
Hans Jaenisch February 1940 - November 1940 U-32 6 17/ 110 139 2/ 14 749

Famous boats

The most productive submarines Type VII:

Submarine Dates of combat activity Number of trips Total days at sea Total ships sunk/tonnage Ships damaged/tonnage
U-48 September 1939 - June 1944 12 314 51/ 306 875 3/ 20 480
U-99 June 1940 - March 1941 8 119 35/ 198 218 5/ 37 965
U-96 December 1940 - March 1943 11 414 27/ 181 206 4/ 33 043
U-552 February 1940 - April 1944 15 600 30/ 163 756 3/ 26 910
U-47 September 1939 - March 1941 10 228 30/ 162 769 8/ 62 751
U-94 November 1940 - August 1942 10 358 26/ 141 852 1/ 8022
U-100 August 1940 - March 1941 6 106 25/ 135 614 4/ 17 229
U-32 September 1939- November 1940 9 172 20/ 116 836 U-96