the most important categories politics and political science, characterizing the organic relationship and interdependence between consciously chosen methods, methods, actions and the results obtained through this. Throughout the entire political history of mankind, the question of the relationship between ends and means has been in the center of attention of politicians - practitioners and theorists. Some schools and concepts were replaced by others, formulas and principles like “to achieve the goal by any means” or “the end justifies the means” were put forward. However, the meaning of the real dependence existing here remained unclear. Only in modern times with the study of such theoretical problems How interest and idea, necessity and freedom, spontaneity and consciousness, science and social science came to the essence of the matter. It turned out that each goal has a strictly defined arsenal of means, the use of which can only lead to the chosen goal. Going beyond the means compatible with a given goal inevitably leads to the loss of the chosen goal itself and leads to unexpected results that are very divergent from the intended goal. The real mechanism of influence of the means used on progress towards the goal is determined by the interdependence that exists between genesis and result, between the becoming and the become. Everything that was in genesis is present in the result, in what has become there is only what was in the formation itself, and not only the material composition itself, but also the means of its organization are reflected in the result: incorrectly carried out smelting, despite all the good quality of the raw materials, will not give such a desired brand . The specificity of the relationship between goals and means in social development: the means of changing social conditions here are the people themselves, their actions, during which the participants in the events themselves become different, and, as the young Marx noted, a worthy goal here is achievable only by worthy means. Noting the profound change in socio-economic conditions in the 19th century, K. Marx, M. Weber and E. Bernstein pointed out the fundamental new role consciousness, conscious actions in history: reason became the main condition for the creation of social wealth, science - a direct productive force. A situation has arisen when, as a result of unsuitable means - delusions, social psychoses, manipulation of the consciousness of the masses, as well as unforeseen consequences of organized actions - human civilization itself can be directly destroyed (in the case of a deliberately organized nuclear missile conflict, an explosion due to the negligence or incompetence of a number of nuclear power plants such as Chernobyl, as a result of industrial destruction of the ozone layer around the Earth, or the foundations of human civilization may be destroyed ( ecological environment a habitat hereditary basis reproduction human race, mechanisms of natural historical progress, etc.). Because of this, all of humanity or a certain part of it, a country, a nation, a people may find itself in a socio-economic dead end or even a historical niche, from which to exit and return to common road Such a country or such a people will no longer be able to progress. This can be avoided by correctly balancing the means and the goal. Soviet society entered the post-October path in conditions when humanity was not yet aware of not only all, but even the main dangers that could become fatal during the transition to a period of predominantly conscious evolution. Already within the framework of the policy of “war communism” of 1918-1921, when they tried to achieve the goal by any means, a “cavalry attack” was launched on capital, the first disastrous attempt was made by inadequate means - “immediate orders of the state” - to achieve desired goal: “to establish government proceedings and state distribution of products in a communist manner in a small-peasant country.” (Lenin V.I. PSS, vol. 44, p. 151). Life forced me to admit that this was a mistake. This realization led to a decisive turn from “war communism” to “new economic policy” as an adequate means of advancing towards the socialist goal. But learning the lesson of history was not principled, but pragmatic: unrealistic “assault” means of achieving the socialist goal were replaced by mediating ones. The main thing was not understood: the presence of deep, organic connection between the goal and the means to achieve it. This concealed a huge danger, because a period of real “reversal” of the relationship between goals and means was approaching. Soviet history. The essence of socialism is to put the working man at the center public life, satisfy his needs and interests, make him the master of life. But this requires certain prerequisites: the level of development of the productive forces and well-being of the population, the culture of working people, democratic traditions, etc. All this is ensured by a highly developed capitalist society. But if the transition to socialism begins in a country that is not highly developed, then the very creation of the above-mentioned prerequisites or conditions, being essentially a means or even a condition for the liberation of the working person as the goal of socialism, practically for society becomes more or less long time a goal, or rather an intermediate goal, without achieving which it is impossible to achieve the main essential goal of socialism - to ensure the liberation of working people, the satisfaction of their needs and interests. Thus, life itself “inverted” the essential connections between the goal and the means, changed their places, gave the means an aura of purpose in people’s minds, assigned them central place. While the Leninist guard was still alive, she tried to explain the essence of the matter. Thus, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A. Rykov said in 1929: “Issues relating to things and technical issues quite rightly occupy a huge place in our lives, but we must not forget that all this exists for people - for workers and peasants.” The real reversal of the relationship between ends and means was, of necessity, long-lasting. Based on this objective-subjective premise, I. Stalin and his entourage made a second attempt to “build socialism at any cost”, taking the path of overreach, began to profess and implement the formula “the end justifies the means”, which was an open justification of subjectivism and voluntarism, official agreement with the impatience of the masses who, regardless of the conditions, wanted real opportunities and means, to achieve the ultimate goal - socialism, to receive the benefits associated with socialism, or rather, their propaganda image, because society did not yet have the means necessary for real socialism. This is how a monster society arose, or barracks pseudo-socialism, which swore to serve the working people, but was in fact the implementation of the social ideal of the party-state bureaucracy. Experience shows Soviet Union and not only that, if an attempt is made to build socialism at any cost and inhumane means that are incompatible with the nature of socialism are used, the goal will not be achieved. The use of means that are incompatible with the chosen goal changes the direction and nature of development itself and leads to very unexpected results. This is the whole destructiveness of inadequate means of solving revolutionary problems, achieving the socialist goal, those means that imposed Stalinism, Maoism, Polpotism, etc. on society. They destroyed something that should not have been destroyed, and created something different from what they promised. Goal and means. But what then is the real relationship between ethics and politics? Is it really true that, as has sometimes been said, there is nothing in common between them? Or, on the contrary, should it be considered correct that the “same” ethics is valid for political action as for any other? Sometimes it was assumed that these were two completely alternative statements: either one or the other was correct. But is it really true that any ethics in the world could put forward essentially identical commandments in relation to erotic and business, family and work relationships, relationships with a wife, a greengrocer, a son, competitors, a friend, defendants? Should it really be so indifferent to the ethical requirements of politics that it operates through a very specific means—power backed by violence? How, besides the personalities of despots and amateurism, does the domination of the workers' and soldiers' Soviets differ from the domination of any ruler of the old regime? How does the polemic of the majority of representatives of the supposedly new ethics against the opponents they criticize differ from the polemic of some other demagogues? Noble intentions! - follows the answer. Fine. But what we are talking about here is precisely the means, and the nobility of the final intentions is also claimed with complete subjective honesty by opponents who are wounded by enmity. If the conclusion of the acosmic ethics of love says: “Do not resist evil with violence,” then for a politician the exact opposite holds true: you must forcibly resist evil, otherwise you are responsible for the fact that evil will prevail... We must understand that any Ethically oriented action can be subject to two fundamentally different, irreconcilably opposed maxims: it can be oriented either to an “ethics of conviction” or to an “ethics of responsibility.” But in the sense that the ethics of conviction would be identical to irresponsibility, and the ethics of responsibility would be identical to unprincipledness. Of course, there is no question of this. But a deep contrast exists between whether one acts according to the maxim of ethics of conviction - in the language of religions: “A Christian does what he should, and for the result he trusts in God” - or whether one acts according to the maxim of responsibility: one must pay for the (foreseeable) consequences of one’s actions . The main means of politics is violence, and how important the tension between means and ends is from an ethical point of view - you can judge this by the fact that this side (revolutionary socialists - A.B.) morally rejects the “despotic politicians” of the old regime because their use of the same means, no matter how justified the abandonment of their ends may be. As for the sanctification of means by ends, here the ethics of persuasion in general seems to fail. Of course, logically she only has the ability to reject all behavior that uses morally dangerous means. True, in real world time and time again we encounter examples where a person professing an ethic of persuasion suddenly turns into a chiliastic prophet, such as those who, preaching in currently“love against violence”, in the next moment calls for violence - for the last violence, which would lead to the destruction of all violence, just as our military told the soldiers at every offensive: this offensive is the last, it will lead to victory and, therefore, , to the world. One who professes the ethics of conviction cannot tolerate the ethical irrationality of the world. He is a cosmic-ethical “rationalist”. Of course, each of you who knows Dostoevsky remembers the scene with the Grand Inquisitor, where this problem is stated correctly. It is impossible to put one cap on the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, or to ethically decree which end should sanctify which means, if any concessions are made to this principle at all. An ancient problem Theodicy is precisely the question: why was this force, portrayed as both omnipotent and good, able to create such an irrational world of undeserved suffering, unpunished injustice and incorrigible stupidity? Either it is not one thing, or it is not another; or life is governed by completely different principles of compensation and retribution, those that we can interpret metaphysically, or those that will forever be inaccessible to our interpretation. The problem of the experience of the irrationality of the world was driving force any religious development. The Indian doctrine of karma and Persian dualism, original sin, predestination and Deus absconditus all grew out of this experience. And the first Christians knew very precisely that the world is ruled by demons, that the one who associates with politics, that is, with power and violence as means, enters into a pact with the devilish forces and that in relation to his action it is not true that good can follow only good, and from evil only evil, but often vice versa. Whoever does not see this is politically really a child. Thus, the problem of political ethics is not posed by modern unbelief, born of the Renaissance cult of heroes. All religions have struggled with this problem with very different success, and because it was said, it could not be otherwise. It is the specific means of legitimate violence, exclusively as such, in the hands of human unions that determines the peculiarity of all ethical problems of politics. Whoever, for whatever purpose, blocks this means - and every politician does this - is also subject to its specific consequences. A fighter for faith, both religious and revolutionary, is especially susceptible to them. Let's take an open-minded look at a modern example. Anyone who wants to establish absolute justice on earth by force, needs a retinue for this: a human “apparatus”. He must promise him the necessary /internal and external/ reward - heavenly or earthly bribe - otherwise the “apparatus” does not work. So, in the conditions of modern class struggle the internal reward is the quenching of hatred and the thirst for revenge, first of all: Ressentimenta and the need for a pseudo-ethical feeling of unconditional rightness, reproach and blasphemy of opponents... Once the retinue of a fighter for the faith has achieved dominance, it is especially easy to degenerate into a completely ordinary retinue of owners warm places. Who wants to get involved in politics in general and make it theirs? the only profession, must be aware of these ethical paradoxes and his responsibility for what will come out of him under their influence. He, I repeat, is entangled with diabolical forces that lie in wait for him at every act of violence. The great virtuosos of acosmic love for man and kindness, whether they came from Nazareth, from Assisi or from Indian royal castles, did not “work” with the political means of violence, their kingdom was “not of this world,” and yet they acted and acted in this world, and the figures of Platon Karataev and Dostoevsky’s saints are still the most adequate constructions in their image and likeness. Whoever seeks the salvation of his soul and other souls does not seek it along the path of politics, which has completely different tasks - ones that can only be resolved with the help of violence. The genius or demon of politics lives in internal tension with the God of love, including the Christian God in his church manifestation - a tension that at any moment can erupt into an irreconcilable conflict. Indeed: politics is done, true with the head, but, of course, not only with the head. Here the ethicists are absolutely right. But whether one should act as one who professes the ethic of conviction or as one who professes the ethic of responsibility, and when to do this and when to act differently - this cannot be prescribed to anyone. Politics is a powerful, slow drilling of solid formations, carried out simultaneously with passion and a cold eye. The idea is generally correct, and all historical experience confirms that the possible could not be achieved if the world did not reach for the impossible again and again. But the one who is capable of this must be a leader; moreover, he must also be - in the very in a simple sense words - a hero. And even those who are neither one nor the other must arm themselves with that firmness of spirit that will not be broken by the collapse of all hopes; already now they must arm themselves with it, for otherwise they will not be able to accomplish even what is possible today. Only one who is confident that he will not flinch if, from his point of view, the world turns out to be too stupid or too mean for what he wants to offer him; Only the one who, in spite of everything, is able to say “and yet!”, is the only one who has a “professional calling” to politics.

The question of the goal and the means to achieve it has worried humanity since ancient times. Many writers, philosophers and public figures reflected on it and cited historical, life and literary arguments to prove your point. In the Russian classics, there were also many answers and examples that, as a rule, prove the statement that the paths of achievement must correspond in everything to what needs to be achieved, otherwise it loses all meaning. In this collection we have listed the brightest and illustrative examples from Russian literature for the final essay in the direction of “Goals and Means”.

1. In Pushkin's novel " Captain's daughter» main character always chose the right paths to achieve goals, however, no less noble. Thanks to this, from an unintelligent nobleman, Grinev turns into a sincere officer, ready to sacrifice his life in the name of duty. Having sworn allegiance to the empress, he honestly serves, defending the fortress, and even death at the hands of rebel robbers does not frighten him. Just as honestly, he sought Masha’s favor, and achieved it. The opposite of Pyotr Grinev in the novel - Shvabrin - on the contrary, uses any means to achieve the goal, choosing the most vile of them. Having set out on the path of betrayal, he pursues personal gain, demands reciprocity from Masha, without hesitating to denigrate her in the eyes of Peter. In choosing goals and means, Alexey is driven by spiritual cowardice and self-interest, because he is devoid of ideas about honor and conscience. Mary rejects him for this reason, because a good goal cannot be achieved by deception.
2. What should it be final goal, if the means to achieve it are cruelty, deception and human lives? In the novel by M.Yu. Lermontov's "Hero of Our Time" Grigory Pechorin's goals are momentary, encapsulated in the desire for momentary victories, to achieve which he chooses complex and sometimes cruel means. Hidden in his victories is a persistent search life meaning, which the hero is unable to find. In this search, he destroys not only himself, but also everyone who surrounds him - Princess Mary, Bela, Grushnitsky. To revive his own soul, he plays with the feelings of others, unwittingly becoming the cause of their misfortunes. But in the game with his own life, Grigory is hopelessly losing, losing those few people who were dear to him. “I realized that chasing lost happiness is reckless,” he says, and the goal, to achieve which so much effort and other people’s grief was put into, turns out to be illusory and unattainable.
3. In the comedy A.S. Griboedov’s “Woe from Wit”, the society in which Chatsky is forced to live lives according to market laws, where everything is bought and sold, and a person is valued not by his spiritual qualities, but by the size of his wallet and career success. Nobility and duty are nothing here compared to the importance of rank and title. That is why Alexander Chatsky turns out to be misunderstood and not accepted into a circle where mercantile goals dominate, justifying any means.
   He enters into a fight with Famus society, challenges Molchalin, who resorts to deception and hypocrisy in order to get a high position. Even in love, Alexander turns out to be a loser, because he does not defile the goal with vile means, he refuses to squeeze the breadth and nobility of his heart into the narrow framework of generally accepted and vulgar concepts with which Famusov’s house is replete.
4. A person is valuable by his deeds. But his deeds, even if subordinated to a high goal, do not always turn out to be good. In the novel by F.M. Dostoevsky's “Crime and Punishment” Rodion Raskolnikov decides for himself an important question from a moral point of view: does the end justify the means? Can he, according to his theory, dispose of people's lives at his own discretion?
   The answer lies in the title of the novel: mental anguish Raskolnikov, after the crime he committed, proves that his calculation was incorrect and his theory was erroneous. A goal based on unjust and inhumane means depreciates itself and becomes a crime for which sooner or later one must be punished.
5. In the novel M.A. Sholokhov " Quiet Don“The fate of the heroes is swept away by the revolutionary elements. Grigory Melekhov, who sincerely believes in a happy and wonderful communist future, is ready to give his life for the well-being and prosperity of his native land. But in the context of life, bright revolutionary ideas turn out to be untenable and dead. Gregory understands that the struggle between whites and reds, seemingly aimed at a “beautiful tomorrow,” in fact represents violence and reprisals against the helpless and dissenters. Brilliant slogans turn out to be deception, and behind the lofty goal hides the cruelty and arbitrariness of the means. The nobility of his soul does not allow him to come to terms with the evil and injustice that he observes around him. Tormented by doubts and contradictions, Gregory tries to find the only the right way, which will allow him to live honestly. He is unable to justify the numerous murders committed in the name of a ghostly idea that he no longer believes in.
6. A. Solzhenitsyn’s novel “The Gulag Archipelago” - a study related to political history The USSR, according to Solzhenitsyn, is an “experience of artistic research”, in which the author analyzes the history of the country - a utopia, building an ideal world on the ruins of human lives, numerous victims and lies disguised as humanitarian goals. The price for the illusion of happiness and peace, in which there is no place for individuality and dissent, turns out to be too high. The problems of the novel are diverse, since they include many questions of a moral nature: is it possible to justify evil in the name of good? What unites victims and their executioners? Who is responsible for mistakes made? Supported by a rich biographical, research material, the book leads the reader to the problem of ends and means, convincing him that one does not justify the other.
7. It is human nature to seek happiness as the main meaning of life, its highest goal. For her sake, he is ready to use any means, but does not understand that this is unnecessary. The main character of the story V.M. Shukshin “Boots” - Sergei Dukhanin - manifestations tender feelings are not at all easy, because he is not used to unjustified tenderness and is even ashamed of it. But the desire to please someone close to him, the desire for happiness, pushes him to spend a lot. The money spent on buying an expensive gift turns out to be an unnecessary sacrifice, because his wife only needed attention. Generosity and the desire to give warmth and care fill the somewhat coarsened but still sensitive soul of the hero with happiness, which, as it turns out, is not so difficult to find.
8. In the novel by V.A. Kaverin's "Two Captains" the problem of ends and means is revealed in the confrontation between two characters - Sanya and Romashka. Each of them is driven own goals, everyone decides what is really important to them. In search of solutions, their paths diverge, fate pits them against each other in a duel that determines the moral guidelines of each, proves the noble strength of one, and the vile baseness of the other. Sanya is driven by honest, sincere aspirations; he is ready to take a difficult but direct path to find out the truth and prove it to others. Chamomile is pursuing small targets, achieving them in no less petty ways: lies, betrayal and hypocrisy. Each of them is experiencing the painful problem of choice, in which it is so easy to lose yourself and those you truly love.
9. A person does not always clearly understand his goal. In the Roman L.N. Tolstoy's "War and Peace" Andrei Bolkonsky is in search of himself and his place in life. Its shaky life guidelines are influenced by fashion, society, and the opinions of friends and relatives. He is delirious about glory and military exploits, dreams of making a career in the service, but not just rising to high ranks, but gaining eternal glory winner and hero. He goes to war, the cruelties and horrors of which instantly showed him all the absurdity and illusory nature of his dreams. He is not ready, like Napoleon, to follow the bones of soldiers to glory. The desire to live and do wonderful life other people set new goals for Bolkonsky. Meeting Natasha instills love in his soul. However, in a moment that requires his perseverance and understanding, he gives in under the weight of circumstances and abandons his love. He is again tormented by doubts about the correctness of his own goals, and only before his death Andrei understands that the best moments of life, its great gifts are contained in love, forgiveness and compassion.
10. Character makes a person. He defines it life goals and landmarks. In “Letters about the good and the beautiful” D.S. Likhachev’s problem of the goal and the means to achieve it is considered by the author as one of the most important, forming the young reader’s concepts of honor, duty, and truth. “The end justifies the means” is a formula unacceptable to the author. On the contrary, every person should have a goal in life, but no less important are the methods that he uses to achieve what he wants. In order to be happy and in harmony with one’s own conscience, it is necessary to make a choice in favor of spiritual values, giving preference good deeds and wonderful thoughts.

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What is "GOAL AND MEANS"? How to spell given word. Concept and interpretation.

GOAL AND MEANS- problem expressed in famous maxim“The end justifies the means” and is associated with the value aspect of the relationship between C. and S. and, accordingly, with the choice and evaluation of means in expedient activities. Regarding the solution to this problem, the so-called antithesis has been formulated in popular literature. Jesuitism/Machiavellianism, etc. abstract humanism; and it is generally accepted that the Jesuits, as well as N. Machiavelli, preached the principle according to which the end (C.) unconditionally justifies the means (C), and abstract humanists (who included L.N. Tolstoy, M. Gandhi, A. Schweitzer) claimed that intrinsic value S. entirely determines the value of the results achieved. Good C. actually justifies S: from a pragmatic point of view. Anything practical, i.e. directly focused achievable result, the action, by the very meaning of its plan, determines the actions necessary to achieve it; achieving the target compensates (justifies) the inconveniences and costs required for this. Within practical activities efforts are recognized as means only in their relation to specific purpose and gain their legitimacy through the legitimacy of the C. In praxeological terms, the problem of coordinating the C. and C. is instrumental (the means must be adequate) and goal-oriented (the means must be optimal). In modern social sciences antithetical ideas have been formed, correlating with the praxeological approach to this problem, regarding the functional various types activities: a) in project activities it is recognized that goals are determined by means: technical capabilities presuppose their specific use (G. Schelsky) or available financial resources predetermine the planned results and scale of the project; b) technical means are being developed within the framework of targeted systems rational action, one does not develop separately from the other (J. Habermas). A demagogic-moralistic approach should be distinguished from a pragmatic one, in which the maxim “The end justifies the means” is used to justify obviously unseemly or criminal actions by reference to the “good goal.” Moreover, what is referred to as a “good goal” is either (in long-term plan) declaration, or (retrospectively) an event chronologically following committed actions, and the actions allegedly taken to achieve a “good goal”, taking into account the results obtained, did not really turn out to be a means, but were committed irresponsibly and willfully or for their own sake. Actually ethical problem arises in connection with the assumption that for the sake of a “good goal” it turns out to be morally permissible to commit any necessary actions, even if they are usually considered unseemly, morally unacceptable, and even downright criminal. Such a t.zr. is objectively relativistic: although not all actions are recognized as acceptable, but only those that actually lead to what is recognized as the highest goal, ultimately the choice of action turns out to be determined by the strategy and tactics of the activity. Significant clarifications into the very formulation of the problem of C. and S. were introduced by J. Dewey in a polemic with L.D. Trotsky. 1. The concept of C. has double meaning: a) C. as a plan and motive, focused on the final, all-substantiating C. and b) C. as an achieved result, or a consequence of the use of certain C; the achieved results themselves act as a S. in relation to the final goal. 2. The assessment of the S. should be carried out also from the point of view. the result achieved with the help of the applied C; This is the principle of the interdependence of C. and S. C. as the result itself depends on the C. used and is determined by them; but their assessment also depends on the C. as the result achieved. The scheme proposed by Dewey contains a real correlation between values ​​and values, which is not limited to the generally accepted position that achieved values ​​themselves become rules for subsequent goals. Following the principle of interdependence requires a scrupulous and critical study of the systems used in terms of how closely the results they lead to are as planned. 3. The actual unity of C. and S. can be ensured provided that C. are actually determined in accordance with the goals, and are not “derived,” as is often the case, from considerations external to the situation of choice, in otherwise it turns out that the C. is made dependent on the C. while the C. are not derived from the C. 4. The highest C. are moral C., ultimately this is an ideal, and its achievement in the sense of practical implementation is strictly speaking, impossible; so in activities oriented towards an ideal, it is all the more necessary to take into account the principle of interdependence of S. and C. as the practical consequences of the use of S. The question of what actions should be related to - with immediate results or general principles- and what, accordingly, should be the criteria for their assessment, in a different ideological and methodological context, was the subject of controversy between representatives of action utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism (see UTILITARIANISM).

A way or method of achieving a goal is external shape implementation of activities. And it must be adequate to the purpose. The correspondence of the methods and methods to the obtained result is a qualitative characteristic of the process. Actions can lead to a result, then they form a useful process. Actions at the level of affects, habits, false beliefs, misconceptions regarding the goal are inappropriate and lead to unpredictable results. The means must correspond to the ends in two senses.

Firstly, the means must be proportionate to the ends. In other words, they cannot be insufficient (otherwise the activity will be fruitless) or excessive (otherwise energy and resources will be wasted). For example, you cannot build a house if there are not enough materials for it; It also makes no sense to buy materials several times more than are needed for its construction.

Secondly, the means must be moral: immoral means cannot be justified by the nobility of the end. If goals are immoral, then all activities are immoral

Goal Achievement Process

Action - an element of activity that has a relatively independent and conscious task. An activity consists of individual actions. For example, teaching activities consist of preparing and delivering lectures, conducting seminars, preparing assignments, etc.

Types of actions (classification by German sociologist, philosopher, historian M. Weber (1864--1920) depending on the motives of action):

• 1) Purposeful action - characterized by a rationally set and thoughtful goal. The individual whose behavior is focused on the goal, means and by-products of his actions acts purposefully.
• 2) Value-rational action - is characterized by a conscious determination of its direction and a consistently planned orientation towards it. But its meaning is not in achieving any goal, but in the fact that the individual follows his beliefs about duty, dignity, beauty, piety, etc.
• 3) Affective (from Latin af f ectus - emotional excitement) action - caused emotional state individual. He acts under the influence of passion if he seeks to immediately satisfy his need for revenge, pleasure, devotion, etc.
• 4) Traditional action - based on a long-term habit. Often this is an automatic reaction to habitual irritation in the direction of a once learned attitude.

The basis of activity is made up of actions of the first two types, since only they have a conscious goal and carry creative nature. Affects and traditional actions are only capable of exerting some influence on the course of activity as auxiliary elements.

Concepts, the relationship of which constitutes a problem expressed in the well-known maxim “the end justifies the means” and associated with the value aspect of the relationship between the goal and the means and, accordingly, the choice and evaluation of means in expedient activity. Regarding the solution to this problem, the antithesis of the so-called is formulated in popular literature. Jesuitism/Machiavellianism, etc. abstract humanism; It is generally accepted that the Jesuits, as well as Machiavelli, preached the principle according to which the end unconditionally justifies the means, while abstract humanists (who included L.N. Tolstoy, M. Gandhi, A. Schweitzer) argued the opposite, namely: the real value of the means entirely determines the value of the results achieved.

The named maxim goes back to the statement of T. Hobbes, made by him in explanation of the law of natural law (“On the Citizen,” chapter “Liberty,” I, 8); According to Hobbes, each person himself, on the basis of reason, i.e. natural law, must judge what means are necessary to ensure his own security. This maxim does not correspond to the spirit of Jesuit teaching, and although the formula “Whoever is allowed the goal, the means are also permitted” was developed in Jesuit theology (by G. Busenbaum), it only assumed that the means could be value-indifferent, and their value is determined by the worthyness of the goal , to achieve which they are used. The maxim was openly preached by a number of Jesuits, but principles of this kind were adhered to (openly or secretly) not only and not necessarily by the Jesuits, but in fact by all those thinkers and activists for whom ideal goals were the exclusive subject of moral evaluation.

From a formal point of view, the proposition that the end justifies the means is trivial: a good end actually justifies the means. From a pragmatic point of view, any practical, i.e., focused on a directly achievable result, action, by the very meaning of its intention, determines the means necessary to achieve it; achieving the goal compensates (justifies) the inconvenience and costs necessary for this. Within the framework of practical activity, efforts are recognized as a means only in their relation to a specific goal and acquire their legitimacy through the legitimacy of the goal. In praxeological terms, the problem of coordinating goals and means is: a) instrumental (the means must be adequate, i.e., ensure the effectiveness of activities) and b) goal-oriented (the means must be optimal, i.e., ensure the effectiveness of activities - achieving a result at the lowest cost ). According to the logic of practical action (see Benefit), successful and efficient operation is a significant factor in the transformation of value consciousness: the achieved goal approves updated evaluation criteria. In modern social sciences, antithetical ideas have been formed, correlating with the praxeological approach to this problem, regarding functionally different types of activities: a) in project activities it is recognized that means determine goals: technical capabilities presuppose their specific use (G. Shelsky), available financial resources predetermine the planned results and scale of the project; b) technical means develop within the framework of systems of purposeful rational action, one does not develop separately from the other (J. Habermas).

The demagogic-moralizing approach should be distinguished from the pragmatic one (see Moralism), in which the maxim “the end justifies the means” is used to justify obviously unseemly or criminal actions. Moreover, what is mentioned as a “good goal” is either (in perspective) a declaration, or (retrospectively) an event that chronologically followed the actions taken, and the actions themselves, if we take into account the results obtained, do not actually turn out to be a means, but are committed irresponsibly and willfully or for their own sake.

The actual ethical problem arises in connection with the assumption that for the sake of a good goal it turns out to be morally permissible to perform any necessary actions (even if they are usually considered unseemly, morally unacceptable, or even downright criminal). This point of view is objectively relativistic (see Relativism): although not all actions are considered acceptable, but only those that actually lead to what is recognized as the highest goal, ultimately the choice of means is determined by the strategy and tactics of the activity. This approach is fraught with a relativistic error. As Hegel showed, this error lies in the fact that actions considered as means are morally negative objectively, in themselves and in their concreteness, while the intended end is good only according to subjective opinion based on the idea of ​​abstract good. In other words, from an ethical point of view, although actions as means are performed for a specific purpose, their moral significance is determined not by expediency, but by their correlation with general principles. Therefore, the problem of ends and means is constituted as an ethical one in opposition to pragmatism and prudentialism.

Significant clarifications were made to the very formulation of the problem of goals and means/Ms. Dewey in polemics with L. D. Trotsky. 1. The concept of goal has a double meaning: a) goal as a plan and motive, focused on the final, all-justifying goal, and b) goal as an achieved result, or a consequence of the use of certain means; the achieved results themselves act as means in relation to the final goal. 2. The assessment of funds should also be made from the point of view of the result that is achieved with their help; This is the principle of the interdependence of ends and means. The goal as a result depends on the means used and is determined by them; but their assessment also depends on the goal as an achieved result. Since the final goal is the idea of ​​final consequences and this idea is formulated on the basis of those means that are assessed as most desirable for achieving the goal, the final goal itself is a means of directing action. The scheme proposed by Dewey contains a real dialectic of ends and means, which is not exhausted by the generally accepted proposition that goals achieved themselves become a means for subsequent ends (suffice it to say that this position in equally shared by both Trotsky and Andi). Adhering to the principle of interdependence requires a scrupulous and critical examination of the means used in terms of how closely the results they produce correspond to those intended. 3. The actual unity of goals and means can be ensured provided that the means are actually determined in accordance with the goals, and are not “derived,” as often happens, from considerations external to the situation of choice (thus, Trotsky justified the methods used revolutionary struggle“laws of social development”, in particular “the law of class struggle”), otherwise it turns out that the goal is made dependent on the means, while the means are not derived from the goal. 4. The highest goals are moral goals; ultimately, they must be understood as an ideal, the achievement of which in the sense of practical implementation, strictly speaking, is impossible; in ideal-oriented activities, it is all the more necessary to take into account the principle of interdependence of means and goals as the practical consequences of the use of means. This position was clarified by J. P. Sartre: the impossibility of achieving a goal that is in the unattainable future and functions as an ideal leads to a situation where the connection between the goal and the means is concrete, while the goal as an ideal plays the role of an imperative. To develop this, additional clarification is necessary: ​​morality is a value characteristic, but not the content of the goal. An attempt to accept “morality” as such as the goal of objectively defined activity, that is, to make the fulfillment of a principle or rule the content of actions, leads to rigorism. The assumption that “morality” can be the goal of activity results in practice in that the goals actually pursued are not analyzed for their compliance with moral criteria; intoxication with the goal leads to the assumption of any goals. Ideal, highest values and principles should not be the actual goal pursued, but the basis of actions and the criterion for their evaluation. Morality is not the final goal of life, but the path of life (N. A. Berdyaev).

The question of correlating actions with immediate results or general principles and, accordingly, the criteria for their evaluation was the subject of controversy (in a different ideological and methodological context) between representatives of action-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism (see Utilitarianism).

Lit.: Hegel G.V.F. Philosophy of Law. M., 1990, p. 189-190; Goals and means [selection of works by L. D. Trotsky, J. Dewey, J. P. Sartre, comments by A. A. Guseinova] - In: Ethical Thought. Scientific and journalistic readings. M-, 1992, p. 212-285; HabermasJ. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambr., 1990.

R. G. Apresyan