Historical experience and lessons of military reform in Russia. Military reforms of the 19th-20th centuries

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Social and organizational problems of military reforms

20-30sXXcentury

In Russian history, at various stages of the economic, political and social development of the state, fundamental changes and transformations were repeatedly carried out in military construction, in the sphere of solving defense problems in general (reforms of Ivan IV in the middle of the 16th century, Peter I in the first quarter of the 18th century; D A. Milyutin in the 60-70s of the 19th century, in 1907-1912 after the Russian-Japanese War). During the Soviet period, after the creation of the Red Army, reforms were carried out in 1923-1925. and on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, which played an important role in the development of the Armed Forces.

What these reforms had in common was a focus, first of all, on improving the combat element of the army: equipping it with modern technical means of combat, using more rational methods of recruiting human resources, finding the best organizational structure of troops, techniques and methods of armed struggle, etc. However, as a rule, the social side the improvement of the army was relegated to the background and did not find full resolution.

First of all, it should be noted that the first Soviet military reform after the creation of the Red Army was 1923-1925. due to its economic reasons, it was forced, because The national economy of Soviet Russia, exhausted by the First World War and civil wars, could not withstand the burden of maintaining a modern combat-ready army. After the end of the civil war and foreign intervention, large domestic industry produced almost 7 times less products than in 1913; in terms of coal and oil production, the country was thrown back to the end of the 19th century, in terms of pig iron production - to the level of the second half of the 18th century. Most of the metallurgical, engineering, and defense plants were inactive or operating at limited capacity. On the other hand, the temporary stabilization of the capitalist economy and the international situation reduced the threat to the external security of the USSR and for a certain time made it possible to expand the front line of work to restore the country's national economy in conditions of peaceful construction.

Maintaining an army of almost five million in these conditions placed an unbearable burden on the country's economy, distracted the bulk of the most able-bodied male population from productive work and threatened with serious social consequences. Therefore, already in 1921, a consistent reduction of the Armed Forces began. Over the course of three to four years, their numbers were reduced by more than 10 times (increased to 500 thousand people). From the point of view of ensuring the country's defense capability, this was a very radical and risky decision, but without it it was impossible to carry out fundamental social changes along the path of the new economic policy.

The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of September 28, 1922 “On compulsory military service for all male citizens of the RSFSR” confirmed the principle of compulsory service for workers, but they now began to draft into the army not from 18, but from 20 years of age. Since 1925, the conscription age was raised to 21 years, which provided significant reserves of labor for use in the national economy.

The most important essence of the military reform was the introduction of a mixed system of recruitment and training of the Armed Forces, which consisted of a combination of the territorial police system with the personnel system. The transition to a mixed territorial-personnel system was announced by the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 8, 1923 “On the organization of territorial military units and military training of workers.” He took a leading place in the reorganization of the Red Army in peacetime conditions. If by the end of 1923 only 20% of the rifle divisions were transferred to territorial positions, then by the end of 1924 there were already 52% of them, and in 1928 - 58%. Territorial units occupied a dominant place in the Red Army until the second half of the 30s.

Constituting a limited part of the Armed Forces, personnel formations were constantly staffed with personnel and weapons and were in a relatively high degree of combat readiness. These included a significant part of the divisions of the border districts, technical units, and the navy. In the overwhelming majority of units and formations, recruited according to the territorial-militia principle (“Local Troops”), there was always only 16% of the regular command and rank and file personnel, while the bulk of the military contingent was made up of a variable composition - Red Army soldiers called up for military service, who were stationed barracks position only during short periods of training camps; the rest of the time they lived at home and were engaged in normal work activities. This significantly reduced military expenditures of the state budget and contributed to an increase in labor resources in the national economy, but could not but affect the level of combat readiness of the army. “Of course, if we had a choice between a 1.5-2 million personnel army and the current police system,” emphasized M.V. Frunze, “then from a military point of view, all the data would be in favor of the first decision. But we don’t have such a choice.”

During the military reform, the mixed monetary-in-kind estimate was replaced with a purely monetary one, which transferred the entire maintenance of the Red Army to a paid principle. The maximum reduction in the army allowed not only to save significant funds for the restoration and development of the country's war-ravaged economy, but also to increase allocations for the reconstruction of the defense industry. But the general reduction in military spending aggravated the difficult living, service and living conditions of the remaining contingent of personnel troops in social terms.

The most pressing housing problem of that time made itself known. The barracks fund, created in the pre-revolutionary period at a rate of 1.5 square meters. m per person, was badly damaged and outdated. The best-equipped barracks buildings were lost in Poland, the Baltic states, Moldova, and Finland. Repairing the barracks required colossal funds, which the state did not have at its disposal. In the barracks that remained suitable for habitation, with great difficulty it was possible to accommodate the reformed personnel contingent, but without any basic amenities (there was no running water, the existing stove heating required a large amount of fuel in winter conditions, the standards for which were absolutely small). The estimate provided only 15% of the need for repairs to the barracks.

The command staff was in a difficult situation with housing. Of its number, only 30% were reasonably provided with apartments, and the remaining 70% were housed either in private apartments or in several families in one room. The situation with clothing in supplying troops was no better. There was a shortage of clothing, and what was available was of poor quality. A crisis situation has developed with bedding (sheets, blankets, pillowcases, mattresses, etc.). The troops were provided with them by less than 50%. Unfortunately, it should be noted that for several decades afterwards the soldier slept on mattresses and pillows stuffed with hay or straw.

Budget cuts have had a harsh impact on hygiene. Although diseases among the troops decreased, the threat of epidemics remained: only 30 kopecks were allocated for each Red Army soldier per month for baths and laundry. The situation with food was somewhat better. The food supply norm contained 3012 calories, but it was 300-600 calories below the optimal level (compared to the norms of the bourgeois armies).

The reduction of the army made it possible to free up a certain part of the funds to increase the payment standards for military personnel. The Red Army soldier began to receive 1 ruble. 20 kopecks instead of the previous 35 kopecks. per month. The situation with the command staff remained disastrous, despite the fact that their pay was increased by 38%. Even with this increase, it continued to amount to less than a third of the norm of the former tsarist army.

A very depressing financial situation developed among the reserve command staff, who were recruited for non-military training. For one teaching hour they were paid 5 kopecks, and the command staff of the unemployed - 9 kopecks. All ordinary “terarmen” involved in military training had to provide themselves with clothing, bedding, and food at their own expense.

Improving the social infrastructure of the Red Army due to the reduction of troops and lack of funds could not be resolved even in the most urgent manner during the reform. Its improvement was postponed until subsequent years. During the reform, such problems as pensions and employment of command personnel dismissed from the army were not adequately reflected. A significant part of them found themselves unemployed and without a means of subsistence. The desire to reduce the cost of spending on the army and at the same time maintain its combat effectiveness and combat readiness at the desired level was achieved mainly by infringing on the social sphere and household needs.

The demilitarization of the USSR during the NEP period is clearly visible when compared with the scale of military construction abroad. The number of the Red Army was 183 thousand less than in France, 17 thousand less than that of Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries combined. The USSR had 41 soldiers for every 10 thousand inhabitants, Poland - about 100, France - 200. In the USSR, the company commander received 53 rubles, in Germany (when converting the exchange rate) - 84 rubles, in France - 110 rubles, in England - 343 rub.

Despite the difficult material and living situation of military personnel and the low technical equipment of the troops, the military-political leadership of the country set before the command of the Red Army not only the task of combat training of troops, but also involving them on a massive scale in construction, agricultural and other non-military national economic work.

The personnel of many formations of the Red Army units directly participated in the construction of the Dneproges, Kharkov and Chelyabinsk tractor plants, Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants, the Kramatorsk heavy engineering plant, in the development of hard-to-reach areas of the North, Siberia, the Far East, railway construction, in the laying of the Moscow metro, etc. In the resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated January 30, 1930 “On the participation of the Red Army in collective farm construction,” the military command was given the task of preparing 100 thousand management and technical workers for the village from among the rank and file and junior command personnel. Red Army soldiers systematically took part in harvesting in many regions of the country. For the successful implementation of national economic tasks, more than 20 formations of the Red Army in the 20-30s were awarded state awards, incl. 1st Zaporozhye Red Banner Division, 39th Irkutsk Rifle Division, Chelyabinsk Rifle Division, 23rd Rifle Division, etc.

A negative factor in the social development of society and the army should be recognized as the unreality of the plans of the party and political leadership to eliminate illiteracy of the population in the shortest possible time - within three to four years.

In the 20s and early 30s. One after another, recruits were recruited for military service, almost entirely illiterate and semi-literate. For example, military conscription born in 1902, despite special selection, turned out to be 20% illiterate and 25% illiterate. Appeals in the national republics revealed an even more depressing situation. Among the conscripts in Georgia, over 50% were illiterate, in Armenia - 85%, in Azerbaijan - even more. The low general educational and cultural level of conscripts had a very negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the army until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, despite the relative increase in the number of young people who received lower, primary or incomplete secondary education.

However, the Red Army became a school not only for combat training, but also for instilling culture, improving education, and educating a soldier as a citizen. Teachers were added to the staff of military units, and more than 4,500 “Lenin’s corners” were created - where soldiers could spend their leisure time and self-education. Club, circle and library work was developed in the army, which played a huge role in the cultural education of millions of future defenders of the country. If in 1923 6.4 million books were taken from army libraries for reading, then in 1924 this figure increased to 10 million. Red Army Houses were opened in many garrisons, the network of film installations grew to 420. Newspapers became widespread. journal information. The publication of weekly territorial and national newspapers began, incl. 23 newspapers of the army, district, navy with a circulation of 60 thousand copies. daily. During two years of military service in the troops, it was possible to reduce the number of illiterate Red Army soldiers to 12%.

The cultural and educational conditions of army life formed more literate people, who, after demobilization, stood out noticeably among the poorly educated inhabitants of the city and village and occupied many leadership positions at the local level. However, the middle and highest leadership elite of society was formed mainly not from the ordinary Red Army environment, but from the party and Komsomol nomenklatura, closely associated with the internal affairs bodies.

The cost of social services and the maintenance of one serviceman increased from 1924 to 1926 by 90 rubles, but even this small increase had a beneficial effect on the political and moral state of the armed forces. From year to year, the morale of the army improved noticeably. This was manifested, in particular, in a sharp reduction in such a serious crime as desertion. The Red Army was not spared from it both during the civil war and in the post-war years. In 1923 of the total number of armed forces, deserters accounted for 7.5%, in 1924. - 5%, in 1925 their number dropped to 0.1%. Strict military discipline, unquestioning execution of statutory requirements and orders of the commander, the fight against promiscuity and sloppiness increasingly found support and understanding of the vast majority of army personnel. The rank and file for the most part consciously and confidently met all the requirements of official and civic duty.

The expansion of the territorial system of training conscripts required overcoming considerable difficulties of a social nature. 4,500 training points were deployed throughout the country. But this was extremely insufficient. In many regions, pre-conscription conscripts were forced to go to these points at a distance of over 100 km, which naturally caused criticism and dissatisfaction. To correct the situation, it was necessary to expand the network of training points with a coverage radius of at least 25 km (daily travel). This meant an increase in their number at least twice; therefore, additional allocations were needed, as well as special care for their arrangement on the part of the military department and local authorities.

The need to overcome the existing difficulties, especially of a social nature, faced by the military reform of 1923-1925, was reflected in the resolution of the Third Congress of Soviets of the Union “On the Red Army” (May 1925). Having approved the measures of the ongoing reform, the congress obliged the government to involve all all-Union and Union-Republican departments, as well as public organizations, in active participation in strengthening the country’s defense capability. The Congress instructed the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to carry out such practical measures in the 1925-1926 budget year as increasing the allocation of funds to improve the material and living situation of the army; qualitative and quantitative improvement of all types of allowances, apartment and barracks conditions (repairs, new construction, equipment of barracks premises), expansion of the apartment and housing stock of command personnel by reserving living space at cantonment points for military units, making reservations in all civilian institutions, enterprises and institutions for positions subject to exclusive filling by those demobilized from the ranks of the army and navy and equating them with respect to the conditions of employment to members of trade unions; improving the provision of benefits to disabled war veterans; the adoption of a special provision for pensions for army command personnel; ensuring the real implementation of the Code of Benefits for Red Army soldiers, etc. This resolution helped relieve socio-economic tension in the army environment.

Given the availability of meager funds, in conditions of social disorder, general poverty and lack of culture, the mixed personnel-territorial system of the army lasted almost until the fall of 1937. During this time, the number of personnel in the Red Army gradually increased by about 90 thousand per year. As a result, an army capacity was created that was capable of covering the entire annually conscripted contingent of those liable for military service with military training. Expenditures on maintaining the armed forces grew in the same proportions as the growth in their numbers; Since 1933, the military budget in its absolute value has doubled, but its share in the total state budget had gradually decreased and reached 4%, which was almost 6 times lower than in 1924. The volume of allocations for social -the domestic needs of the army during the period under review also increased, but significantly lagged behind the growth rate of general military expenditures.

The mixed territorial and personnel system of recruiting the Red Army and the minimum number of contingents diverted from the national economy to military service created favorable conditions for the restoration and development of the country's economy. However, the opportunities for strengthening the industrial and defense power of the USSR in the 20s. were far from being fully used due to major miscalculations in the socio-economic policy of the ruling regime.

“We are conducting our industrial economy with the most terrible mismanagement,” wrote the chairman of the Supreme Economic Council F.E. Dzerzhinsky in 1926. “If you look at our entire apparatus, if you look at our entire management system, if you look at our unheard-of bureaucracy, at our unheard-of fuss with all the approvals, then you will be horrified by everything.”

Of course, it must be recognized that, despite all the costs, on the basis of the NEP policy in the USSR, the national economy was restored to the level of 1913. The peasants became well-fed, but the country remained patriarchal-agrarian, and the army in its composition was predominantly peasant and illiterate: for 10 years after October, the planned plan to eliminate illiteracy and create a completely literate population could not be implemented. Consistent implementation of the NEP policy in the late 20s. was rolled up. A fairly objective assessment of the state of the economy in the USSR at that time was given by the economist A. Yugov in the book “The National Economy of Soviet Russia and Its Problems,” published in Berlin in 1929. The author explained the essence of the crisis in the Soviet Union by the presence in the country of a steady increase in inflation and an increase in the number of unemployed , a decrease in the proportion of the working population (from 14 workers in 1913 to 10 workers in 1928 for every 100 people of the amateur population), extreme wear and tear of industrial equipment, the renewal of which was not expected in the near future. Further, A. Yugov noted: “Practically in Russia from 1926 to 1928, there was a process not of industrialization, but of “agrarianization.” In the sphere of industrial management, for 10 years there has been a struggle between two main trends - centralization and decentralization of management. The latter took place only at turning points, critical moments of economic management. Bureaucracy, formalism, a lack of sense of responsibility took root in the economy, programs and plans did not correspond to production capacities, incredible amounts of abuse, theft and embezzlement flourished, the management apparatus was extremely cumbersome, the governing bodies lacked objective basic information about the work of enterprises and other negative aspects. Thus, the Soviet state, which took upon itself the titanic task of managing the national economy of a huge country, which no one had previously solved, has been struggling in vain for 10 years to implement it.”

Having rejected the market-based balanced development of agriculture and industry, which was oriented toward a time-drawn-out process of industrialization, the party leadership unambiguously set a course for accelerated technical reconstruction of heavy industry and complete collectivization in the agricultural sector based on a simplified, strictly directive, planned method. Sources of funds for industrialization were sought primarily within the country. They consisted of: income from light industry and agriculture, income from the monopoly of foreign trade, from increased taxes on Nepmen, income from limiting consumption of the population, intensive use of the spiritual energy of the working people, their labor enthusiasm and boundless faith in the ideals of the revolution. The latter was expressed in mass socialist competition: in the shock movement (since 1929), the Stakhanov movement (since 1935), for the right to be included among the leaders of production or to be included on the honor roll, etc. This was a desire in a short time at the cost of exhausting hard efforts to create a certain social ideal for a “bright future”.

Another source of income that was widely used was the forced free labor of prisoners in camps and colonies, the number of which, through mass repression, was brought to 2 million people by 1938. Prisoners produced almost 20% of the total volume of capital work, provided almost half of the gold, chromium-nickel ore mined in the country, a third of the platinum and timber. Their labor built entire cities (Norilsk, Magadan, etc.), canals (White Sea-Baltic, Moscow-Volga), railways (Khabarovsk-Komsomolsk-on-Amur, BAM-Tynda, etc.). Army personnel participated in many industrial construction projects (as already noted).

As a result, the industrialization of the national economy and complete collectivization in the countryside, carried out using the “storm and onslaught” method, due to the huge overstrain of material and human resources, and the robbery of rural workers, nevertheless produced significant results in the growth of industrial production. Over the course of 9 years, more than 6 thousand large enterprises came into operation. The rate of development of heavy industry was 2-3 times higher than in Russia in the 13 years before the First World War. From a patriarchal-agrarian country, the USSR turned into an industrial-agrarian country and, in terms of its potential, rose to the level of advanced capitalist states.

Simultaneously with the growth of the economic power of the Soviet Union, the formation of its military-technical defense base was underway, with the level of which the Red Army, as well as its social status, was gradually brought into line. The military doctrinal concept was subject to revision, according to which in the field of military development it was necessary to be guided by the following provision: “In terms of army size, we should not be inferior to our potential opponents in the main theater of war, and in the field of military equipment we should be stronger than them in decisive types of weapons: aviation, tanks, artillery , automatic fire weapons."

Changes in the technical equipment of the army and the growth of international tension in the mid-30s. necessitated a set of priority military-organizational measures. New types of troops appear and are organized in the army: tank, aviation, airborne, air defense, the face of artillery has changed (corps artillery, reserve artillery of the main command, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery), engineering troops, signal troops, chemical troops, military -transport troops, the structure of the rear and its support services changed. Territorial police formations, poorly adapted to mastering new technology, were gradually phased out and transferred to personnel status.

Organizational changes also affected military command and control bodies. In order to increase centralization and establish unity of command at the highest levels of leadership of the armed forces, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was abolished in June 1934, and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Defense. In 1935, the Headquarters of the Red Army was renamed the General Staff. In 1937, instead of the Defense Commission under the Council of People's Commissars, a Defense Committee was created and at the same time an independent People's Commissariat of the Navy was created. Main Military Councils were established under each of the military people's commissariats. In general, the above acts laid the administrative, organizational, as well as material foundations for carrying out the newly overdue military reform, which covered all aspects of the military development of the Soviet state and its army. It should be noted that this military reform has not been fully studied in domestic historiography, and its social aspects have not been studied at all. The transformations carried out during it are interpreted only as certain features of military reform, which distorts its actual significance in the development of the armed forces.

During the period of industrialization and technical reconstruction of the army, the need emerged to solve the most pressing problem of training and accumulating technically competent personnel. The course was taken, firstly, to familiarize people with technology and develop in them the necessary technical knowledge in the very process of production and operation of machines in the system of the entire national economy; secondly, for planned and systematic training in newly created military educational institutions (courses, military schools and colleges, military academies). According to the accelerated program, qualified military-technical specialists capable of operating military equipment were to be trained here.

The overexertion of workers in the struggle to fulfill the five-year plans and mass repressions dramatically changed the socio-demographic situation: if the birth rate in the country in 1913 (per 1000 people) was 45.5 people, then by 1940 it dropped to 31, 2 people, natural population growth over the same period decreased from 16.4 to 13.2 people. The above damage did not immediately manifest itself in the life of the country, since the USSR continued to have significant potential for labor and mobilization of human resources. According to the All-Union Census of 1937, the total population was 161.7 million people; on January 1, 1941 (after the annexation of Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, and Northern Bukovina) it increased to 191.7 million people. In the amateur part of the population, a large proportion was occupied by the age categories of men, who made up the potential of the current and future contingent of military personnel (Table 1).

Demographic potential of the USSR by main ages subject to military registration (according to the 1937 census)

*Age*	\| *Whole population*	\| *Incl. men*

The number of people potentially liable for military service in the USSR significantly exceeded similar indicators in Germany and Italy, which had a military reserve of 28 million people.

Despite the significant human resources, the military-political leadership of the country, taking into account the difficult social situation, the presence of deep imbalances in the national economy, the low technological level of industry and the level of training of young workers coming from a rural environment, did not immediately decide to change the principles of recruiting the army and increase in military spending. The search for optimal ways to further increase the state's defense potential was intense. During the summer and autumn of 1937, more than seven options for the development of the Red Army for the next five years were considered. Ultimately, the course was taken towards a transition to a single personnel army and a complete abandonment of territorial police and national formations.

In the conditions of the growing threat of world war and the increased economic capabilities of the USSR, the mixed territorial-personnel system of recruitment, when a small number of personnel units were combined with territorial-militia troops deployed only for short-term training camps, could no longer ensure reliable defense of the country. Only a permanent standing army with high combat training, high combat readiness, and backed by multimillion-dollar reserves could solve this problem.

A consistent transition to reducing territorial units and increasing personnel units began back in 1935. In 1937, more than 60% of divisions became personnel; in the subsequent pre-war years, territorial units were completely eliminated (Table 2).

table 2

Transition to a military personnel system

On the day the Second World War began (September 1, 1939), the USSR adopted the “Law on Universal Military Duty,” which became the core of the new military reform. The law lowered the conscription age from 21 to 19 years (for those who completed high school - from 18 years). This change in military legislation made it possible to quickly call up for active service more than three ages (young men 19, 20 and 21 years old and some 18-year-olds). The period of active military service for ordinary personnel of the ground forces is set at 2 years, for junior command personnel - 3 years, for the Air Force - 3 years, for the Navy - 5 years (for persons with higher education, the service period remained 1 year).

In order to fully and equally replenish the Armed Forces, the circle of persons exempt from conscription was significantly reduced, and deferments for university students, teachers and other categories of citizens were cancelled. For all rank and file and commanding personnel, the age of reserve status was increased by 10 years (from 40 to 50), which was caused by the need to increase the army reserve for wartime. The new law introduced a longer training period for reserve personnel. For command personnel it increased three times, for junior commanders - almost 5 times, for ordinary personnel the duration of military training sessions increased by 3.5 times. At the same time, initial military training of students in grades 5-7 and pre-conscription training in grades 8-10 of secondary schools, technical schools and higher educational institutions were mandatory. In order to improve the military registration of pre-conscription conscripts, a new registration system was introduced for the first time at the place of residence (military registration and enlistment offices) instead of the previously existing system of registration of conscripts at enterprises.

The fundamental changes in the recruitment of the Red Army on the eve and during the outbreak of the Second World War were largely due to changes in the technical base of the armed forces. Previously, mastery of elementary types of weapons (three-line rifle model 1891/30, light and heavy machine guns, cannons from the Civil War period, etc.) required very limited technical training of military personnel. The situation began to change from the beginning of the 30s, when the first samples of domestic tanks, aircraft and other military equipment began to appear in ever-increasing quantities in the Red Army's arsenal. Every year the army acquired a more industrial appearance, the number of military specialties increased more than 5 times, and in aviation and navy - even more.

Although the level of general education and professional training of the population (especially in secondary and higher education) lagged significantly behind the needs of the national economy and the development of military affairs, the intensive process of eliminating illiteracy and increasing primary education for the majority of people was an important factor influencing the degree of general development of all categories of workers and military personnel, who provided more qualified maintenance and operation of technical equipment (Table 3).

Table 3

Official dynamics of general literacy of the population of the USSR aged 9-49 years (in% )

Years Urban population Rural population

When conscripted for military service, increased demands were placed on the educational level of those liable for military service, especially those assigned to the technical troops, aviation, artillery, and navy. Therefore, the general level of education of Red Army soldiers in the 30s. continuously increased and significantly exceeded the educational level of the entire population. From 1937 to 1940, the number of military personnel with secondary education increased 4 times, the number of illiterate ones decreased almost 4-5 times. According to the General Staff, among the autumn conscription of 1939, there were 55% of recruits with a 4-6 grade education, 25% with a 7-9 grade education, up to 10% with a 10-year education, and about 2% with a higher education.

Increasing the general educational training of those liable for military service made it possible to increase the share of those types and branches of troops that required the greatest technical training (Table 4).

The trend of increasing technical personnel in the Armed Forces, ensured by the growth of the general educational and technical level of the population in the country, was associated not only with an absolute increase in the number of new combat weapons, but also with the complication of the military equipment itself. Thus, in 1937, the tank forces as a whole accounted for 6 people per armored unit, and by the beginning of 1941 there were already 19 people. Over four years, the number of service personnel in the tank forces increased by more than 3.2 times, although the tank fleet during the same time increased only 1.5 times. However, the number of technical personnel did not always, unfortunately, correspond to their professional training.

Table 4

The share of the regular number of personnel of various branches of the military (in% by 1937)


Red Army in

Ground troops
including:
rifle troops
armored forces
artillery RGK
air defense troops
Signal Corps
engineering troops
car troops

During the military reform of 1937-1941. significant changes occurred in solving the organizational problem of national formations, which were widely recruited under the territorial system, although the proportion of various nationalities in the strength of the Red Army during the 20-30s. changed relatively little (Table 5).

National composition of the Red Army in 1926-1938. (V% )

	*1926*	*1938*
*Nationalities*	*command staff*	*private*	*command staff*	*private*
		*compound*		*compound*

Ukrainians
Belarusians






Mountain peoples

Almost until the end of the 30s. in the personnel units of the Red Army - the main combat core of the Armed Forces - Russian-speaking elements prevailed, and in numerous territorial formations located in one or another republic, there was a significant layer of national units, with their own national command personnel. In fact, the unified allied army then consisted of separate national units, but the national question did not arise in full within the army environment at that time. Military nation-building not only expanded the mobilization capabilities of the state, but also strengthened the friendship of the peoples of the multinational country. In the mid-20s. national units made up 10% of the Red Army. However, already at that time, both real and imaginary deviations from the “national” line were suppressed as “nationalist”, which intensified with the establishment of the totalitarian regime.

With the transition from the territorial system to the creation of an army on a personnel basis, the situation in the national aspect changed significantly. The Red Army became in its composition a single multinational armed force, with a single extraterritorial principle of recruitment, a single organization, a socio-military way of life and way of life, a single Russian-language communication among personnel, a single, equally obligatory service in different geographical zones of a vast country.

At the same time, the national factor in the army acquired an increasingly national significance, although in socio-political terms it continued to be ignored in the old fashioned way in the consolidation of the army - it was avoided and often brushed aside. By inertia and according to the established dogmatic pattern, the main attention was focused on the characteristics of the class composition, the level of party membership, and the age limit. Declaring a more complete international community of the allied army, where a closer military brotherhood, close national ties, national patriotism, equal responsibility for the defense of the homeland, a class-ideological orientation in social policy within the army were forged, the military-political leadership in the national aspect was in no hurry to resolve specific problems of living conditions of military personnel of different nationalities.

Thus, in 1940, the conscript contingent included representatives of the peoples of Central Asia - 11%, the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia - 7.6%. Of these, 56% did not speak Russian. With primary education, 64% were semi-literate or illiterate. By the beginning of 1941, there were already more than 300 thousand people in the army who did not speak Russian, and another 100 thousand people were expected as part of the next conscription. the same level of language training. The issues of distributing them into units and teaching the Russian language, in which all regulations and instructions were published, orders, instructions and commands were given, were resolved unsatisfactorily. A large layer of conscripts were children of repressed and small peoples of the border regions. They were prohibited from being sent to the border and central districts, but were proposed to be enlisted in the internal districts to form special teams or work battalions. The latter also included representatives of small nations (Finns, Poles, Bulgarians, Greeks, Latvians, Estonians, Turks, Karelians, Germans and others) living on the border territory of the West and the East. The youth of the western regions of Belarus, Ukraine, Bessarabia (Moldova) were not subject to conscription due to the supposed absence of military commissariats there. A certain part of the command staff was also discriminated against: more than 4 thousand people were dismissed from the army. this category of military personnel belonging to the nationalities of the border countries. Such was the real price of the then widespread remark that “a son is not responsible for his father,” as well as the well-known thesis about the “indestructible” friendship of peoples and their moral and political unity.

In general, the activities carried out within the framework of the military reform of 1937-1941. played an important role in strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces in anticipation of repelling fascist aggression. The law on universal conscription created the possibility of deploying a mass army; millions of young people were drawn from the national economy into military service. The number of army, navy, and aviation increased several times: if in 1936 it did not exceed 1.1 million people, then in the fall of 1939 it was about 2 million, by June 1941 -5.4 million people . By June 22, 1941, the Red Army had more than 303 rifle, tank, motorized, and cavalry divisions, although 125 (over 40%) of them were still in the formation stage. New modern equipment entered service with the troops, replacing outdated and ineffective models from the mid-30s.

However, the social factor in the life of the Red Army, in the training of military personnel and their livelihoods remained the weakest link in increasing the combat readiness of troops at the level of military development necessary for that time. The main reason for this was the socio-political situation in the country and, above all, mass repression among all segments of the population, including the most qualified and experienced military personnel who formed the backbone of the armed forces, the support of their combat readiness and ability to resist the aggressor.

It is known that after defeat in the First World War, Germany, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, was deprived of the opportunity to build up its military-industrial potential, and had severe restrictions on the size of the Reichswehr and other paramilitary organizations. However, she took care of the command staff of the army and did everything to preserve its corporatism and high combat skills. In the Red Army, starting in the 20s. The situation with the command staff turned out to be deplorable. Thousands of “military specialists” were dismissed from military service under the pretext of “class filtration” and reduction in troop numbers. Mixed personnel-territorial system of military development by the mid-30s. completely exhausted itself and turned into a brake on the improvement of troops. Over the course of 12 years (1926-1937), the training of military personnel, maintaining their required availability in the army and reserves, became stagnant and chronic, lagging far behind the growing quantitative and qualitative needs.

If in 1924-1925. 8 thousand commanders graduated from military educational institutions annually (1% of the army), then in the 30s. their output increased only to 10 thousand people. per year (only 0.6% of the army). In terms of the level of military training, the changes were quite insignificant. Over a period of more than ten years, 115 thousand young commanders entered the troops, and the loss of command personnel (only in the ground forces) reached 68 thousand people. Taking into account the previous shortage of troops, the lack of commanders in the troops had already assumed a threatening character.

Our historiography focuses on the repressions of 1937-1938. What was in the army before these years remains a “blank spot”. Meanwhile, archival documents that have now become available make it possible to establish that already after the first military reform, with the advent of K.E. Voroshilov to lead the army, mass purges of army personnel immediately began. Only until 1936, on various pretexts, 47 thousand commanders of all levels were dismissed from the army, a significant part of whom were arrested or were deprived of the opportunity to continue military service in command positions in the future.

But the real moloch of repression reached its apogee in 1937-1938, when in two years almost 43 thousand commanders and political workers were dismissed from the army, more than 40 thousand of them were arrested. Of these, 35.2 thousand people were physically exterminated. Subsequently, the wave of repressions subsided somewhat, but did not stop. Two and a half years before the start of the war, about 10 thousand more command personnel were dismissed from the army, of which almost 4.4 thousand were arrested and shot (see Table 6).

Reduction of the command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army for socio-political and administrative reasons from 1926 to June 1941.

*Years*	*Total discharged from the army*	*Of them:*
		*arrested*	*dismissed due to illness, death, disability*	*returned to the army for rehabilitation*

From the data in table. it is clear that 7.5 years before the start of fascist aggression - during a period extremely important for the training and formation of command personnel, especially senior and top echelons, more than 49 thousand commanders were subjected to repression*.

The sharp weakening of the command staff of the armed forces by the People's Commissar of Defense - one of the most incapable and mediocre military leaders of the 20th century - was justified at meetings of the Politburo and Plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks by the need to fight allegedly against the “fifth column”, to cleanse the army of “enemies and oppositionists” (whose guilt could not be proven by any objective judicial authorities). At the end of 1938, summing up the results of terror in the army, Voroshilov stated: “1937 and all of 1938. we had to cleanse our ranks, mercilessly cutting off the infected parts to living healthy meat, cleansing the ulcers from the vile, treacherous rot.” And further he stated: “...We caught and crushed the reptile of treason in our ranks...”. At the same time, he made a statement for the future: “Having freed ourselves, basically, from traitors, we have not yet had time to... pull out all the roots.”

Repression in the army was, as we know, not a local phenomenon, but one of the links in the all-encompassing terror in the country for class and ideological reasons and under the pretext of fighting foreign intelligence agents. Marshall G.K. Zhukov wrote: “A terrible situation has been created in the country... An unprecedented epidemic of slander has unfolded... Every Soviet person, going to bed, could not firmly hope that he would not be taken away that night due to some slanderous denunciation.”

Fear reigned in the country, discontent and indignation grew. In 1938, the People's Commissariat of Defense alone, not counting other state and party bodies, received more than 50 thousand complaints and statements from workers, relatives and family members about the illegal actions of security forces. Under public pressure, Stalin’s entourage somewhat weakened the repressions by punishing their henchmen (Ezhova and others), but the release from arrest of a small part of the repressed military professionals could not radically change the overall picture.

The mass destruction of command personnel at a time of difficult international situation had no precedent in world history and affected all aspects of the preparation of the Red Army, the level of its combat readiness for the outbreak of war with Germany.

Due to the extermination and dismissal of almost 100 thousand personnel commanders at various levels, the army developed a chronic shortage and shortage of command personnel, which already expressed itself in 1937 at 84.5 thousand people. Due to the growth in the size of the army, this shortage increased more and more.

The tragic result of the repression was not only a quantitative decrease in officer cadres, but also a deep qualitative weakening of the officer corps, especially its top and middle ranks. All military district commanders, 90% of their deputies, chiefs of troops and services, 80% of corps and division commanders, more than 90% of regiment commanders and their deputies were replaced. In many units and formations, due to the displacement of commanders, virtual anarchy developed for a certain time, and then a massive leapfrog unfolded with a reshuffling of personnel. In 1938 alone, almost 70% of the commanders were transferred and assigned to new positions. At the same time, battalion commanders were often immediately appointed division and corps commanders, and platoon commanders became regiment commanders. This was one of the main sources of the heavy defeats of the Soviet troops in 1941-1942.

To urgently fill the colossal shortfall of command personnel, the mobilization bodies of the Red Army began a hasty call for reservists, which was not provided for in any previous plans. During 1938-1940 175 thousand people were removed from the reserve. and 38 thousand commanders were trained from among one-year students. Such a withdrawal from the supply of human reserves significantly exposed the personnel of the national economy, already weakened by terrorist attacks. But the main thing was that the commanders called up from the reserve could not qualitatively compensate for the loss of highly qualified military commanders who were subjected to repression. If in Germany there were a large number of experienced officers who participated in the First World War as part of the many thousands of reserve and reserve contingents, then in the USSR there were almost no such personnel left.

The sharp decline in the quality of the Soviet officer corps as a direct result, primarily of mass repressions of experienced command personnel, was clearly evident already during the Soviet-Finnish war. Characterizing the actual level of combat training of troops based on the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, the new People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko admitted: “The war with the White Finns revealed the destructiveness of our combat training system... Our commanders and staffs, lacking practical experience, did not know how to truly organize the efforts of the military branches and close interaction, and most importantly, they did not know how to truly command.” . Speaking about the six-month experience of restructuring the combat training of troops after the Finnish War, the People's Commissar made disappointing conclusions: “Combat training even today is lame on both legs. Facts show that the legacy of the old laxity has not been banished and lives close to the big leadership bosses and their headquarters. During the war, such commanders will pay with the blood of their units... Where the real demands and rigor of army life are replaced by talk, success cannot be expected, failure is being prepared for serious business, and commanders and chiefs of all levels are on the verge of crime.”

The huge losses of the Soviet troops, who had multiple numerical and technical superiority over the Finnish army, clearly demonstrated the major shortcomings in the condition and training of the Red Army. “Out of a battalion of 970 people,” wrote war participant S. Narovchatov, “there are a hundred and something of us left, of which 40 people are unharmed.” Major setbacks in the Finnish war and especially the low level of combat effectiveness of troops and headquarters greatly discredited the Red Army in military circles in many countries.

To avoid a catastrophic situation with personnel as a result of mass repressions, the government quickly decided to open dozens of new military schools and short-term training courses for junior officers. If in 1937 there were 47 military schools, then in 1939 their number was increased to 80, in 1940 - to 124, by January 1941 - to 203. All infantry, artillery, tank, and technical schools were transferred from three-year for a two-year period of study. At short-term courses for improving command personnel (about 80 thousand people graduated from them in 1938-1939), the training lasted only a few months. All this determined the low level of training of commanders.

The situation with the training of mid- and senior-level personnel in military academies was not the best. Head of the Military Academy named after. M.V. Frunze General M.S. Khozin admitted in December 1940 that out of the 610 students graduating that year, 453 were accepted into the Academy. with bad grades, “and they had not only one bad grade, but 2-3-4 and even more. All this creates a situation in which we... work with the command staff - students in vain.... We need to abandon such a pursuit of quantitative staffing of the academy with students and switch to quality selection.” Confirming the low level of middle and senior personnel in the Red Army, Chief of the General Staff K.A. Meretskov said six months before the start of the Great Patriotic War: “Our universities and academies are leaving personnel who have not sufficiently mastered the knowledge and practical skills in the combat use of military branches and modern means of combat. They cannot correctly and quickly organize the interaction of military branches on the battlefield and do not have a correct understanding of the nature of modern combat. This is happening because the entire system of training commanders from top to bottom does not meet the requirements for commanders of modern combat.”

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After the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) in 1923 - 1925 and on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, reforms were carried out aimed at improving the combat element of the army: equipping it with modern technical means of combat, using more rational methods of manpower, finding the best organizational structure troops, techniques and methods of armed struggle. The first, after the establishment of the Red Army, Soviet military reform of 1923-1925 was forced due to the fact that the national economy of Soviet Russia, exhausted after the First World War and Civil War, could not withstand the burden of maintaining a modern combat-ready army. Maintaining an army of almost five million placed a heavy burden on the economy USSR Therefore, since 1921, a consistent reduction of the country's Armed Forces began.

Within three to four years, the total number of armed forces was increased to 500 thousand people, that is, actually reduced by more than 10 times. The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of September 28, 1922 “On compulsory military service for all male citizens of the RSFSR” confirmed the principle of compulsory service for workers, but they now began to draft into the army not from 18, but from 20 years of age. Later, from 1925, the conscription age was raised to 21 years, which provided significant labor reserves for use in the national economy. Reducing the cost of maintaining the army, and at the same time maintaining its combat effectiveness and combat readiness at a high level, was achieved mainly by infringing on the social sphere and the household needs of military personnel.

One of the main innovations of the reform was the introduction of a mixed system of recruitment and training of the Armed Forces, which consisted of a combination of the territorial police system with the personnel system. This transition to a mixed territorial-personnel system was announced by the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 8, 1923 “On the organization of territorial military units and military training of workers” and took a primary place in the reorganization of the Red Army in peacetime conditions. By the end of 1923, 20% of the rifle divisions were transferred to territorial positions, by the end of 1924 - 52%, and in 1928 - 58%. Territorial units occupied a predominant place in the Red Army until the second half of the 1930s. In the local troops, staffed according to the territorial-militia principle, there was always only 16% of the regular command and rank and file, while the bulk of the military contingent was made up of a variable composition - Red Army soldiers called up for military service, who were in barracks position only during short periods of training camps, and the rest of the time they lived at home and went about their daily work activities.

This significantly reduced military expenditures of the state budget and contributed to an increase in labor resources in the national economy, but could not but affect the level of combat readiness of the army. M. V. Frunze put it this way: “Of course, if we had a choice between a 1.5-2 million-strong army and the current police system, then from a military point of view all the data would be in favor of the first decision. But we don’t have such a choice.” 2 A significant part of the divisions of the border districts, technical units, and the navy, which made up the personnel formations, were constantly staffed with personnel and weapons and were in a relatively high degree of combat readiness.

The maintenance of the Red Army was transferred from a mixed cash-in-kind to a paid principle. Instead of the previous 35 kopecks per month, the Red Army soldier began to receive 1 ruble 20 kopecks. The salary for command personnel was increased by 38%, but even with this increase it continued to be less than a third of the norm of the former tsarist army. The salary of a company commander at that time (when converting the exchange rate) by country: USSR - 53 rubles; Germany - 84 rubles; France - 110 rubles; England - 343 rubles. The reserve command staff, who were recruited for non-military training, also faced a poor financial situation. For one teaching hour they were paid 5 kopecks, and the command staff of the unemployed - 9 kopecks. All ordinary territorial units involved in military training had to provide themselves with clothing, bedding and food at their own expense.

Maximum reduction army made it possible not only to save significant funds for the restoration and development of the country's war-ravaged economy, but also to increase allocations for the reconstruction of the defense industry. However, the already difficult living, service and living conditions of the personnel of the personnel troops were socially worsened. The barracks fund, which was created in the pre-revolutionary period at a rate of 1.5 square meters per person, was badly damaged and outdated, and the state did not have the funds to repair it or create any basic amenities. The command staff was also in a difficult situation with housing: only 30% were provided with some apartments, while the rest were located either in private apartments, or several families huddled in one room. The troops did not have enough clothing, and what was available was of poor quality.

A very crisis situation developed with bedding, with which military units were provided with less than 50%. Each Red Army soldier was allocated only 30 kopecks per month for baths and laundry, so the threat of epidemics remained. The food allowance standard for a day contained 3012 calories, but it was, in comparison with the standards of the bourgeois armies, 300-600 calories below the optimal one. During the reform, such problems as pensions and employment of command personnel dismissed from the army were not adequately reflected. Most of them found themselves unemployed and without a livelihood. The number of the Red Army was 183 thousand people less than in France, 17 thousand people less than in Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries combined. IN USSR for every 10 thousand inhabitants there were 41 soldiers, Poland - about 100, France - 200. The combat effectiveness of the Red Army until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was negatively affected by the low general educational and cultural level of military personnel.

Therefore, teachers were added to the staff of military units, and more than 4,500 “Lenin’s corners” were created in which soldiers could spend their leisure time and self-education. Club, circle and library work was developed in the army, which played a huge role in the cultural education of millions of future defenders of the country. If in 1923 6.4 million books were taken from army libraries for reading, then in 1924 this figure increased to 10 million books. Houses of the Red Army were opened in many garrisons, the network of cinema installations grew to 420. During two years of military service in the troops, it was possible to reduce the number of illiterate Red Army soldiers to 12%. The cost of social services and the maintenance of one serviceman increased from 1924 to 1926 by 90 rubles. The number of cases of such a serious crime as desertion has sharply decreased. The number of deserters from the total number of armed forces: 1923 - 7.5%; 1924 - 5%; 1925 - 0.1%.

The resolution of the III Congress of Soviets of the Union “On the Red Army” in May 1925 approved the military reform of 1923 - 1925 and instructed the government to involve all all-Union and Union-Republican departments, as well as public organizations, in active participation in strengthening the country’s defense capability. The Congress instructed the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to carry out the following practical measures in the 1925-1926 budget year to increase the allocation of funds: - to improve the material and living situation of the army; - qualitative and quantitative improvement of all types of allowances, apartment and barracks conditions (repairs, new construction, equipment of barracks premises), expansion of the apartment and housing stock of command personnel by reserving living space at the cantonment points of military units; - carrying out reservations in all civilian institutions, enterprises and institutions for positions that are subject to exclusive replacement by those demobilized from the ranks of the army and navy and equating them with respect to the conditions of employment to members of trade unions; — improving the provision of benefits to disabled war veterans; — adoption of a special provision for pensions for army command and control personnel; — ensuring the real implementation of the Code of Benefits for Red Army soldiers. This resolution significantly contributed to the relief of socio-economic tension in the army environment.

In parallel with the growth of the economic power of the USSR, there was a development of its military-technical defense base, with the level of which the Red Army, as well as its social status, was gradually brought into line. The military doctrinal concept was revised, according to which in the field of military development it was necessary to be guided by the following provision: “In terms of army size, we should not be inferior to our potential opponents in the main theater of war, and in the field of military equipment, we should be stronger than them in decisive types of weapons: aviation, tanks, artillery , automatic fire weapons." 3 New types of troops are being created: tank, aviation, airborne, air defense, engineering troops, communications troops, chemical troops, military transport troops. The principle of formation of artillery units is changing - corps artillery, reserve artillery of the main command, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery are being created. There was a gradual winding down and transfer of territorial police formations to personnel status. Fundamental organizational transformations also affected military command and control bodies.

Thus, in order to increase centralization and establish unity of command at the highest levels of leadership of the armed forces, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was abolished in June 1934, and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Defense. In 1935, the Headquarters of the Red Army was renamed the General Staff. In 1937, instead of the Defense Commission under the Council of People's Commissars, a Defense Committee was created and at the same time an independent People's Commissariat of the Navy was created. Main Military Councils were established under each of the military people's commissariats. Based on the results of consideration during the summer and autumn of 1937 of more than seven options for the development of the Red Army, a decision was made to completely abandon territorial police and national formations and transition to a single personnel army. In 1937, more than 60% of the divisions became personnel; in the subsequent pre-war years, the territorial units were completely liquidated (see table below).

The “Law on Universal Conscription,” adopted on September 1, 1939, became the core of the new military reform. According to this law, the conscription age was reduced from 21 to 19 years (for those who graduated from high school - from 18 years). Such a change in the legislation of the USSR made it possible to quickly call up for active service more than three ages (young men 19, 20 and 21 years old and some 18-year-olds). The period of active military service for the rank and file of the ground forces was set at 2 years, for junior command personnel - 3 years, for the Air Force - 3 years, for the Navy - 5 years, and for persons with higher education the service period remained 1 year. In order to fully and equally replenish the Armed Forces, the circle of persons exempt from conscription was significantly reduced, and deferments for university students, teachers and other categories of citizens were cancelled.

For all rank and file and commanding personnel, the age of reserve status was increased by 10 years (from 40 to 50), which was caused by the need to increase the army reserve for wartime. The new law introduced a longer training period for reserve personnel. For command personnel it increased three times, for junior commanders - almost 5 times, for ordinary personnel the duration of military training sessions increased 3.5 times. At the same time, initial military training of students in grades 5-7 and pre-conscription training in grades 8-10 of secondary schools, technical schools and higher educational institutions were mandatory. Instead of the previously existing system of registering conscripts by enterprise, a system of registering those liable for military service at military registration and enlistment offices at the place of residence was introduced.

The number of army, navy, and aviation increased several times: - 1936 - did not exceed 1.1 million people; — autumn 1939 — about 2 million people; - June 1941 -5.4 million people. By June 22, 1941, the Red Army had more than 303 rifle, tank, motorized, and cavalry divisions, although 125 (over 40%) of them were still in the formation stage. To avoid a catastrophic situation with personnel as a result of mass repressions, the government quickly decided to open dozens of new military schools and short-term training courses for junior officers.

Number of military schools in USSR: - 1937 - 47; - 1939 - 80; - 1940 - 124; - January 1941 - 203. All infantry, artillery, tank, and technical schools were transferred from a three-year to a two-year training period. In short-term training courses for command personnel (about 80 thousand people graduated from them in 1938-1939), the training lasted only a few months. All this determined the low level of training of commanders.

As for costs, 1,660 million rubles were spent on the first military reform of 1923-1926, and 154.7 billion rubles were spent on the reform of 1937-1941.

Information sources: 1. Klevtsov “Social and organizational problems of military reforms of the 20s - 30s” 2. Frunze “Selected works” 3. TsAMO RF (f.7)

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Social and organizational problems of military reforms

20-30s of the XX century

1940 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense I.I. Proskurov stated: “No matter how hard it is, I must say frankly that there is no such laxity and low level of discipline in any army like ours.”

An important role in improving the organization, combat and moral training of troops was assigned to the activities of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda and Agitation and its bodies in the troops. However, the first stages of the reform were characterized by a weak and sluggish pace of restructuring the work of political agencies, which focused primarily on interaction with the NKVD system, drawing up appropriate reports and “signals” on suspected persons. The style of work of political agencies and party organizations did not change significantly for a long time, continuing to gravitate towards cabinet-declarative and directive-reporting-informing methods and techniques, demonstrating a disconnect from the urgent needs of the Red Army personnel. Thus, in 234 units of the Odessa Military District a year before the war there were no battle flags, and this did not bother the military-political leaders at all. The main impetus for restructuring political and educational work often came from the bottom. “The banner is the military shrine of the unit,” reported A.F., a member of the Military Council of the Odessa Military District. Kolobyakov. - We submitted the relevant information to the General Staff. But the matter is not resolved. This issue needs to be moved forward faster.” Questions about the continuity of military traditions were equally acute among the troops. “Odessa Military District,” said A.F. Kolobyakov, - is rich in divisions, formations with a great historical past, great traditions: Perekopskaya, Irkutskaya, Chapaevskaya, Tamanskaya divisions and a number of other units. And thus, with a special order, we checked and compiled a history; by orders for the district, we established annual unit holidays, at which units could sum up the results and educate fighters, so that the fighter would consider it an honor to serve in his unit.”

By the end of 1940, the Political Directorate of the Red Army managed to more clearly formulate the tasks of educational work in the troops, bringing it closer to the fighter. The company, battery, squadron, and squadron were chosen as the center of party-political, agitation, propaganda, and educational activities. Here they began to deploy joint propaganda teams, conduct propaganda seminars, and organize series of lectures on military history. For the first time, demands were put forward to abandon the peaceful tone and complacency in propaganda and agitation, to underestimate the strength of a potential enemy, to soberly assess the strength of the Red Army, to improve work with fighters of non-Russian nationality, where there was isolation, manifestation of nationalist sentiments or great-power chauvinism. The order of the People's Commissar of Defense for the winter period of 1941 clearly stated that victory in the war is ultimately decided by the moral strength of the fighters, their combat training and the availability of modern technical means.

It should be noted that political and educational work in the army after the conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 took place in difficult and contradictory conditions. The state of public consciousness, its tone, the prevailing cliché about the invulnerable power of the USSR, which was purposefully introduced and cultivated among people, could not but influence political work in the army. The feeling of impending danger and the need for vigilance was erased from the population and the army. This situation in society was noted with particular concern by the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda in a closed letter to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated February 22, 1941. “A peaceful tone and a simplified thesis prevail in the country that we are strong, and our Red Army, if they attack us, will march triumphantly through enemy countries,” the letter said. - It is not cultivated among the population that a modern war will require enormous strain on the country’s material resources and the high endurance of the Soviet people. There is no sober assessment of the forces of the Red Army. Without any sense of proportion, epithets are poured out: “great and invincible”, “all-destroying force”, “the most creative, disciplined army of heroes”, etc. All this gives rise to arrogance, complacency, underestimation of the difficulties of war, and reduces vigilance and readiness to repel the enemy.”

In the press and radio information, according to the Main Directorate of Propaganda, military service was noticeably idealized as a supposedly simple and easy matter; it was poorly revealed that the armed forces are a harsh school of combat training, where one has to endure the difficulties and hardships of a combat situation in order to achieve great success in combat training, you need to work hard and hard. Komsomol and school in their work with youth were aimed more at club-type entertainment. Theatre, cinema, and literature predominantly depicted the heroism of the civil war, which was far from the nature of modern armed struggle. A number of national republics have refrained from teaching pre-conscripts the Russian language as an important aspect of defense work.

Osoaviakhim represented one of the mass public organizations involved in pre-conscription military training of young people. By May 1941, it numbered 13 million people in its ranks. (from schoolchildren to students, young workers and collective farmers). It was, of course, difficult to cover such a mass of young people with specific military training, except by organizing the passing of standards for GTO, PVHO, and “Voroshilovsky shooter” (shooting from a small-caliber rifle). Under the pressure of harsh circumstances, the Central Council of Osoaviakhim in August 1940 revised the system of military training in its structures. New training centers, clubs and schools began to take shape - shooters, cavalrymen, paratroopers, and signalmen. It was possible to attract approximately 2.5 million people from among the members of Osoaviakhim to study military specialties at the existing rather low-power educational and technical base, although not all of them managed to start studying by the beginning of the war.

In general, during the entire existence of Osoaviakhim, by June 1941, it had trained about 400 thousand military specialists: reserve pilots, parachutists, glider pilots, aircraft mechanics, motorists, motorcyclists, signalmen, and a number of Navy specialists. But a broad combination of state and public forms of mass preliminary military training of young people and the creation of the necessary high-quality reserve reserve for military service could not be achieved; Therefore, at the beginning of the war, we had to urgently resort to the Vsevobuch system.

The patriotic education of the population and military personnel was greatly facilitated by the best works of Soviet writers, playwrights, poets, artists, filmmakers, publicists, and the creation of films about outstanding Russian commanders and naval commanders. A major role in increasing the moral self-awareness of Soviet soldiers was played by legitimate pride in the great achievements of the people in the development of the powerful industrial base of the USSR.

Repressions and daily supervision of the NKVD could not prevent the objective demands of life, the promotion of skillful, proactive, professionally competent commanders and military leaders capable of resisting a formidable enemy in the coming fierce struggle. Only from the walls of the Academy of the General Staff were A.M. Vasilevsky, N.F. Vatutin, A.I. Antonov, A.A. Grechko, S.M. Shtemenko, M.I. .Kazakov, I.Kh.Bagramyan, V.V.Kurasov, L.A.Govorov, M.V.Zakharov and many other generals and officers who became outstanding commanders of the Great Patriotic War.

Military reforms of the 20s - 30s. were carried out in conditions of increasing dynamics in the development of the national economy and society. The first of these reforms took about three or four years, the second of the five years provided for was used for three and a half years, and was interrupted due to the outbreak of war. Each of them had a specific target orientation of the transition from one stage of military development to another, qualitatively different from the previous one. The reform of the army in 1938-the first half of 1941 was characterized by the greatest contradictions, primarily due to mass repressions and their consequences, subjectivist approaches to solving many social and military-organizational problems.

One reform was separated from another by no more than 12 years. The period was extremely short, during which the country, having barely restored the destroyed economy, only began to move, at great expense, to an upswing in its development. Significant changes in military development, based on the need to urgently strengthen the defense capability of the state, put heavy pressure on society and its standard of living. It was extremely difficult to overcome the illiteracy of conscripts into the army and to improve their education, at least to the 4th grade level of primary school. Rapid progress in the field of weapons and military equipment required military personnel to master a higher degree of education, as well as the ability to withstand high physical loads. The lack of the required level of technical culture and education among young people forced them to have long periods of military service (3-5 years) with separation from family and work. An important social principle - the careful and persistent accumulation of the intellectual and physical potential of the people, for many reasons, was actually not observed.

When familiarizing yourself with the speeches of the leaders of the military department and party-political bodies over the course of decades, it is difficult to find in them even a modest objective analysis of the state of the social, moral and ethical sphere in the army. If they contained assessments of a moral and political nature, this concerned mainly the class composition, the party-Komsomol stratum, the level of military education, the presence of libraries, clubs, theaters, film installations in the army, the number of newspapers and magazines published. Despite the significance of this information, it was missing the most important component - the human warrior with his spiritual world, the state of which serves as an important indicator of the power of the armed forces.

The soldier's thoughts, aspirations, joys and sorrows, hopes, simply the spiritual and physical existence of the warrior, the satisfaction of his most important needs were not taken into account, they were simply kept silent. A man-warrior, a defender of the fatherland, lived on promises, often false and unfulfilled. Satisfaction of the needs for the arrangement of military social infrastructure was carried out on the basis of the residual principle. A small share of the military budget was allocated to this area, and even these funds were literally “knocked out” from the national economic sectors with great effort.

This practice ultimately led to the chronic backwardness of the army's social and living standards in comparison with its rapid saturation with modern military equipment. This was justified by the “unpretentiousness”, “undemandingness”, “super-tolerance” of the Soviet soldier and officer, supposedly characteristic of the very nature of their military campaign life, rooted in the traditions inherent in the Russian people.

An important, socially significant factor in the life of a soldier has always been his conscription into the army. With all the attempts to give the call a rainbow halo, he could not remove the heavy mental load from the conscript, who was still very young: separation from family, friends, comrades, his beloved girl, from his native place where he grew up and matured, a feeling of unfamiliarity and uncertainty of future service and other subtleties of the human psyche. And right there next to him is a diverse community of young men like him, the disorganization of recruiting stations, far from the comfort of home, uncomfortable train transportation, cruel and sometimes rude treatment by commanders and other “delights” of the initial stage of military life. All this immediately fell on the conscript, on his still fragile, far from fully formed nature.

The most important lesson of historical experience is the need to think through how to soften and facilitate the process of adaptation, the adaptability of young men of conscription age to a way of life and activity that is sharply different from their usual one.

The process of the opposite nature is no less difficult for young people - demobilization and dismissal from the army. It is no secret that we have long had a simplified attitude towards demobilized soldiers: we gave them severance pay, a set of military uniforms, a free ticket to travel to their place of residence, but often forgot to tell them a kind parting word. And again, for the young man, even if he had matured, there were sudden changes in fate, an uncertainty about the future. It is clear that the state and society are called upon to show maximum participation, care and attention to ensuring the rights and well-being of persons who have returned from the army, who have fulfilled their civic duty to ensure the interests and security of the Motherland.

The experience of military reforms in the interwar period shows that maintaining a stable moral state of army personnel to a significant extent depends on how they take care of a serviceman of any rank, so that he is confident when he leaves the army that he will always have sufficient and sustainable providing a place of work, certain benefits, the possibility of retraining, etc. Much has been done in this area, many regulations and laws have been adopted, but in practice not all of them have been fully implemented.

In modern conditions, as is known, the need for military reform has long arisen. As in previous times, many traditional problems have resurfaced: on the one hand, the army should be as burdensome as possible for the state; on the other hand, capable of protecting the country; and on the third side - socially equipped, with elements of strong legal protection for the serviceman in the future. Unlike previous military reforms, modern transformations in the army are forced to take place in the unusual conditions of an unbalanced, unstable economy. All this imposes special responsibility when making decisions and requires flexibility and firm consistency in the implementation of military reform. The conceptual orientation of transferring the army to other qualitative parameters of development fundamentally evokes support and approval (although there are other, even extreme points of view), but the prioritization of a series of problems to be solved in comparison with past experience requires, in our opinion, a radical revision.

Objectively, the current situation brings to the fore, along with the qualitative improvement of technical means of combat, the solution of urgent problems of a social nature: bringing the legal status of the army into line with the ongoing changes in society, establishing a flexible system for its recruitment, improving the standards of life and activities of military personnel, creating a favorable social environment (elimination of the housing crisis, ensuring environmental safety, medical care, employment, maintaining effective education, high culture, opportunities to master new professions, etc.), as well as moral and psychological satisfaction with the service. Any reform cannot be the lot of a narrow circle of specialists; the general public is called upon to participate in it, with a mandatory public exchange of views.

If in general across 20 military districts and fleets in 1939 8.6 thousand military personnel were convicted of various types of military crimes, then in 1940 the number of those sentenced to various terms of stay in disciplinary battalions exceeded 39 thousand people. 66 At a meeting of command and political personnel in May

By tracing the history of the development of our country's armed forces, one can see how the modern Russian army was formed and what it represents today.

The Russian state has always paid great attention to the development of its military potential, which, it must be said, was not surprising in the conditions of almost constant participation in military conflicts. Currently, rapidly developing social relations require the creation of a qualitatively new army, capable of withstanding both external threats and local internal conflicts.

We must not forget that the nature of threats today is also transforming and requires a prompt response from the authorized bodies of the state.

The issue of optimizing the management processes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation remains very important.

The reduction in the size of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, changes in the military-political situation in the world, and the normative consolidation of the military-administrative division are just some of the factors that determine the need to improve these management processes. The purpose of this work is to study the processes of modernization of various types of Russian troops and the evolution of legislation on the armed forces of the Russian Federation, as well as to analyze different points of view on the problem under consideration and formulate one’s own position on their basis.

It appears that the main threat to public safety today is the spread of international terrorism. Our country is in the process of comprehensive reform of all law enforcement agencies: anti-terrorist bodies (for example, in 2006, a new law “On Countering Terrorism” was adopted, the Anti-Terrorism Committee was created), prosecutors (since 2008, the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation has been operating , in the future it is planned to create a general Investigative Committee, which will include investigators from the police, prosecutor’s office, and police). Thus, reforming the armed forces fits into the all-Russian trend of improving the law enforcement system and meets the needs of society and the state at the present stage.

Military reforms of the Soviet Union 1918-1961.

Reforms of Local Air Defense (LAD) 1918 – 1932 During the First World War 1914 - 1918. For the first time, the possibility of disorganizing the rear arose when, during military operations, combat aircraft were used, capable of striking populated areas behind enemy lines. This circumstance made it necessary to organize the protection of large cities from air strikes.

Along with active air defense measures carried out by the troops, the population began to be involved in participation in activities designed to protect the population and industrial enterprises from air attacks and quickly eliminate the consequences of air raids. This led to the creation of local air defense systems (LAD), relying on the civilian population of cities.

The first MPVO activities were carried out in Petrograd in March 1918 after the first aerial bombardment of the city by German aircraft. Residents of a number of other large cities were involved in participation in MPVO activities during the Civil War when there was a threat of air raids.

The foundation of civil defense in the Soviet Union (formerly MPVO) began to be laid in the very first years of the establishment of Soviet power.

The Soviet government, drawing on the experience of the civil war and the growing military importance of aviation, since 1925, has issued a number of decrees aimed at creating and strengthening the country's air defense.

The decree “On air defense measures during construction in the 500-kilometer border strip”, issued in 1925 by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, prescribed that within this zone, determined by the range of military aviation of that time, during new construction, the implementation of appropriate engineering and technical measures to protect population and national economic facilities. The Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR (STO USSR) in 1926 issued a decree that obligated the implementation of air defense measures on railways within the threatened zone. In particular, shelters were to be built at railway stations and special formations of anti-aircraft and anti-chemical defense were to be created.

According to the decree "On the organization of air-chemical defense of the territory of the USSR", issued in 1927.

By the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR, the territory of the country was divided into the border (threatened) zone and the rear. All cities in the border zone began to be called air defense point cities. General management of air defense activities was entrusted to the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. In the same year, the USSR STO ordered the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs to create special courses for the training of air-chemical defense management personnel for the needs of civilian people's commissariats. Such courses were created in Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, Kyiv and Minsk. In 1928

The People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs approved the first Regulation on Air Defense of the USSR, which states that air defense is intended to protect the USSR from air attacks using for this purpose forces and means belonging to both military and civilian departments and the relevant public defense organizations. In connection with this formulation of the issue, it became necessary to organize training for the population in defense against air and chemical attacks.

This task was carried out mainly by Osoaviakhim and the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (SOKK and KP). They trained hundreds of thousands of local air defense activists. By 1932, mass training of the population for air defense and anti-chemical defense made it possible to create over 3 thousand voluntary air defense formations. About 3.5 million people were provided with gas masks; Several thousand bomb shelters and gas shelters were prepared to shelter the population in the threatened zone.

Measures were taken to blackout cities in the threatened zone and to create a high-speed system for alerting the population about the threat of attack. By 1932, the necessary organizational and material prerequisites had been created for the creation of a unified national system of local air defense in the country. Meanwhile, the rapid growth in the capabilities of combat aviation to strike targets in the deep rear required further improvement in the organization of the protection of the population and the national economy. Thus, we can say that the reforms of this period were aimed exclusively at countering attacks using aircraft and the chemical industry. As we can see, great importance was attached to working with the population of the Soviet Union, as well as to the construction of protective structures.

It was at this stage, in our opinion, that the prerequisites for the creation of a system of all-Russian civil defense were laid, which were developed in the course of further reforms.

Reforms of Local Air Defense (LAD) 1932 – 1941 On October 4, 1932, the Council of People's Commissars approved the new "Regulations on the air defense of the USSR", according to which local air defense was allocated as an independent component of the entire air defense system of the Soviet state. From this date it is customary to count the beginning of the existence of the all-Union MPVO, the successor of which was the Civil Defense of the USSR. By this time, the main tasks of the MPVO had developed: - warning the population about the threat of an attack from the air and warning that the threat had passed; - camouflaging settlements and national economic facilities from air attack (especially blackout); - eliminating the consequences of an attack from the air, including the use of toxic substances; - preparation of bomb shelters and gas shelters for the population; - organization of first medical and medical aid to victims of an air attack; - providing veterinary care to injured animals; maintaining public order and ensuring compliance with the regime established by the authorities and the Ministry of Defense in threatened areas.

All these tasks were to be carried out using the forces and resources of local authorities and national economic facilities. This determined the name of this air defense system. Headquarters, services and formations of anti-aircraft defense were created only in those cities and at those industrial facilities that could be within the range of enemy aircraft. In such cities and at such facilities, air defense and chemical protection measures were carried out in full.

Since the MPVO was an integral part of the entire air defense system of the country, the general management of the MPVO in the country was carried out by the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (since 1934 - the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR), and within the boundaries of military districts - by their command.

The organizational structure of the MPVO was determined by its tasks.

Military units of the MPVO, which were subordinate to the command of military districts, and voluntary formations of the MPVO were organized to solve the tasks of the MPVO. In urban areas these were precinct teams, at enterprises - site teams, at house management - self-defense groups.

MPVO formations were created based on the following calculation: 15 people from 100 to 300 workers and employees at enterprises and institutions, and from 200 to 500 people at house managements.

Precinct teams consisted of various special units, and self-defense groups, as a rule, consisted of six units: medical, emergency recovery, fire protection, law enforcement and surveillance, decontamination and shelter maintenance.

Precinct teams and self-defense groups were subordinate to the head of the police department. Personnel training was carried out at special MPVO courses, and the population was trained through the training network of public defense organizations.

The training of the population in air defense and chemical defense has acquired an even wider scope since 1935. In particular, standards for passing the “Ready for Air Defense and Anti-Chemical Defense” badge were established. The training of the population was improved as part of the voluntary formations of the MPVO. By the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 8, 1935, the preparation of the population to pass the standards for the "Ready for PVC" badge and the organization of MPVO formations were declared the tasks of Osoaviakhim. The standards of the complex “Ready for sanitary defense” (GSO) were introduced for adults and “Be ready for sanitary defense” (BGSO) for schoolchildren. All this was done with the aim of improving the forms of dissemination of sanitary and defense knowledge and skills.

The implementation of these standards was entrusted to the committees of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 20, 1937 "On the local (civil) air defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Baku and Kyiv" became an important milestone towards strengthening the air defense. It outlined a number of new measures to strengthen local air defense in these cities, in particular, the direct leadership of the air defense in these cities was entrusted to local authorities - the Councils of Workers' Deputies, and the positions of deputy chairmen of the executive committees of the Councils of Deputies were introduced into the executive committees of the city councils of these cities workers under the MVO. The creation and preparation of various MPVO services, such as warning and communications, medical and sanitary, law enforcement and security, shelters, transport, trade and public catering, water supply and sewerage, restoration of buildings, roads and bridges, blackout, were completed shortly before the start of the Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945

Services were created on the basis of relevant enterprises and organizations of city authorities. Their work involved a wide range of specialists who had significant material and technical resources. By this time, all city enterprises in the threatened zone were objects of local air defense, and full-time positions of deputy directors of enterprises for air defense were introduced at particularly important facilities. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, a lot of work had been done to prepare the population and cities of the threatened border zone for air defense and chemical defense.

Suffice it to say that the entire population of the threatened zone had an idea of how to protect themselves from air attacks; a large number of gas masks were accumulated for city residents. Due to the local nature of the activities of the MPVO bodies and forces and the need to concentrate the efforts of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR on preparing the Armed Forces for a war that was approaching the borders of the USSR, by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated October 7, 1940, the leadership of the MPVO was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, consisting of which the Main Directorate of the MPVO was created. From the above, we can conclude that during the period under review, the state made significant efforts to organize local defense, protect particularly important facilities and continue training the population.

Thanks to the measures taken, by the time the Great Patriotic War began, citizens had the basic methods of protection against air and chemical attacks.

It is also noteworthy that in order to train the civilian population, the military command used psychological techniques - namely, the introduction of various kinds of insignia and honorary titles, which, of course, influenced the increased motivation of the trainees.

The consequence of the reforms was the general militarization of the country - structural units of the MPVO were created even at industrial enterprises that could be within the range of enemy aircraft.

Conclusions and generalizations - how has the reform changed this troop structure? Reforms of local air defense (LAD) 1941 - 1945. On June 22, 1941, all headquarters, services and forces of the Air Defense Forces were put on combat readiness.

The first days of the war clearly demonstrated the high readiness of the anti-aircraft defense system and at the same time revealed some shortcomings, which were later quickly eliminated.

An important role in mobilizing the air defense for the successful completion of tasks arising in connection with the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union was played by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 2, 1941 “On universal mandatory training of the population for air defense.” According to this decree, all Soviet citizens from 16 to 60 years old were required to acquire the necessary knowledge of MPVO. In addition, men from 16 to 60 years old and women from 18 to 50 years old were required to belong to self-defense groups.

Fulfilling the demands of the party and government, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on July 3, 1941 approved the “Regulations on self-defense groups of residential buildings, institutions and enterprises.” An important role in the activation of air defense was played by I.V. Stalin’s speech on July 3, 1941, in which he pointed out the need to immediately “establish local air defense.” The MPVO rapidly gained strength during the war years.

The number of its formations exceeded 6 million people; district formations were reorganized into urban military units of the MPVO, and the number of engineering and anti-chemical military units increased significantly. Thus, the reform of the armed forces in previous years allowed the Soviet army to maintain its potential at the beginning of the war and subsequently successfully adapt its reserves in the conditions of hostilities. The MPVO forces successfully completed their task during the war. They eliminated the consequences of more than 30 thousand fascist air raids, prevented over 32 thousand serious accidents at national economic facilities in cities, neutralized over 430 thousand air bombs and almost 2.5 million shells and mines.

Through the efforts of the MPVO formations and units, 90 thousand fires and fires were eliminated. These results confirmed the timeliness and correct direction of the reforms carried out.

In a word, in interaction with units of the Armed Forces, the MPVO made a significant contribution during the war to protecting the population and national economy from fascist air raids; in a number of cases, its forces took part in repelling attacks by enemy ground units on cities.

Reforms of Local Air Defense (LAD) 1945 – 1961 In the post-war period, drawing on the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War, the MPVO steadily continued to improve. A new regulation on local air defense was put into effect, which reflected all the positive experience of the previous activities of the air defense. The tasks and organizational structure of the MPVO were clarified. The appearance of nuclear weapons in the arsenal of the US armed forces and the rapid increase in their stockpiles forced in 1956 to reconsider the organization of anti-aircraft defense. MPVO was first called a system of nationwide measures carried out to protect the population from modern weapons; creating conditions that ensure reliable operation of national economic facilities in conditions of air attack; and carrying out rescue and emergency recovery operations. Although nuclear weapons were not mentioned, the main efforts of the anti-aircraft defense system were aimed at organizing protection against them.

The head of the MPVO remained the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs. The heads of the MPVO in the union and autonomous republics were the ministers of internal affairs, but general management of the activities of the MPVO was entrusted to the councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics, and in regions, territories, cities and districts, in ministries and departments - to the executive committees of the Councils of Working People's Deputies, ministries and departments.

The most massive MPVO forces were the formations of republican, regional, regional and district MPVO services - detachments, brigades, teams, etc. In residential areas of cities and towns, the creation of self-defense groups was still envisaged. Methods for protecting the population and national economic facilities were also revised. Thus, the organization of anti-aircraft defense improved with the development of weapons and met the requirements of the time, ensuring the protection of the country at this stage.

Military reforms of the USSR during the years of perestroika The end of the Cold War became a fundamentally new factor in international relations. Major foreign policy initiatives forcedly undertaken by M. Gorbachev during the years of “perestroika”: rejection of the global confrontation with capitalism and ideological sympathies for socialist and “anti-imperialist” countries (the so-called “new thinking” - 1987); elimination of twice the number of medium-range missiles in Europe compared to the American one (since 1987, within three years); refusal to support regional conflicts in the world and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (February 1989); the end of control over the Eastern European allies, which led to the fall of communist regimes in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (1989-1990); non-opposition to German reunification (October 1990); conclusion of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1, July 1991); the unilateral dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the cessation of the activities of the CMEA - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (spring-summer 1991), which meant the loss of military-political allies; finally, the renunciation of the military presence in Europe and the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the former allies (since 1991) - indicated the end of the military-political confrontation between East and West, socialism and capitalism. If in previous decades we could observe a rapid build-up of military potential, the accumulation of enormous forces and means to develop a weapons system and counter external attacks, then in the period under review almost all the results achieved in this direction were leveled out. We believe that these events generally fit into the trend of global disarmament and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The end of the 20th century was marked by the realization of the fact that military conflicts are not a panacea for resolving interstate contradictions.

This period is characterized by a different prioritization, namely, an increasing awareness of the highest value of human rights. We are confident that the Soviet Union, through its actions, made a significant contribution to the development of this concept.

Analyzing the process of reforming the armed forces in the 20th century as a whole, it should be noted that they were caused by the objective needs of the country at that time: from 1918 to 1941, the army was preparing for war against Nazi Germany. This transition was difficult for the personnel of the Armed Forces and for the military leadership, but it was necessary to overcome it. In the reforms of 1941-1945, we see the eradication of almost all the mistakes made during the years of pre-war reform.

Thanks to these reforms (reforms of 1941-1945), the USSR was able to attract several million teenagers and old people to its defense, who provided invaluable assistance in protecting the USSR and the whole world.

The reforms of perestroika allowed us to overcome the long crisis in relations with the United States and avoid nuclear war.

Modern Russian troops We believe that the process of reforming the armed forces at this stage of the country's development deserves particularly careful consideration, and therefore we will try to reveal their composition, structure and possible development options in as much detail as possible. As experts note, army reform is necessary to preserve the military potential of the Russian state. In a rapidly changing world, the existing order of recruiting the army and its administrative apparatus cannot provide adequate protection for the population in military conflicts.

The main threat to the world community has become international terrorism, a rapidly developing and difficult to explain phenomenon.

It is noteworthy that states with powerful economic potential and a modern army are not immune from terrorist attacks (a good example is the events of September 11, 2002). The main types of troops, their characteristics and composition.

Ground forces are designed to repel aggressor attacks in continental theaters of military operations, hold occupied territories, regions, lines, defeat troop groups and capture enemy territory. The Ground Forces include: 1) branches of the military - motorized rifle, tank, missile troops and artillery, air defense troops; 2) special troops (formations and units of reconnaissance, communications, electronic warfare, engineering, technical support, automobile and rear security) 3) military units and logistics institutions Ground forces are structurally part of military districts and consist of armies, army corps, motorized rifle ( tank), artillery and machine-gun artillery divisions, fortified areas, brigades, individual military units, military institutions, enterprises and organizations.

The Air Force is designed to protect the administrative and economic centers and regions of the country, troop groups and important facilities from enemy attacks, to support combat operations of the Ground Forces and the Navy. They play a decisive role in gaining dominance in the air (aerospace). Conclusion.

The Air Force includes: 1) military command and control bodies; 2) types of air defense troops (anti-aircraft, missile, radio-technical troops); 3) types of aviation (bomber, attack, fighter, reconnaissance, transport, special purpose); 4) special troops (units and units of electronic warfare, radiochemical defense, communications and radio technical support, engineering and airfield, meteorological and others); 5) military units and logistics institutions; 6) other military units, institutions, enterprises and organizations. Goals and objectives. Conclusion.

The Navy is designed to ensure the protection of the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military means, maintain military and political stability in the seas adjacent to Russia, and ensure military security from sea and ocean directions. The Russian Navy has four fleets and the Caspian Flotilla.

The basis of the Northern and Pacific fleets are strategic missile submarines and multi-purpose nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, landing and multi-purpose surface ships, naval missile-carrying and anti-submarine aircraft.

The basis of the Baltic, Black Sea fleets and the Caspian flotilla are multi-purpose surface ships, mine-sweeping ships and boats, diesel submarines, coastal missile and artillery troops and attack aircraft.

The special geographical location of certain regions of the Russian Federation presupposes the presence in the fleets of groups of coastal troops, forces and air defense systems intended for the defense of these territories. Conclusion. Role and significance at the present stage.

The Strategic Missile Forces are designed for nuclear deterrence and destruction of strategic targets that form the basis of the enemy's military and military-economic potential. The Strategic Missile Forces retained their combat capabilities and ability to carry out their assigned tasks in a timely manner.

Organizationally, the Strategic Missile Forces consist of missile armies and divisions, a training ground, military educational institutions, enterprises and institutions. General management of the Strategic Missile Forces is carried out by the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces through the headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces, directorates and services.

The basis of the Strategic Missile Forces' weapons are stationary and mobile (ground and rail) missile systems.

Airborne troops are a highly mobile independent branch of troops designed to reach the enemy by air and carry out tasks in his rear.

Being the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Airborne Forces are capable of independently or as part of Ground Forces groupings to solve operational and tactical combat missions both in large-scale wars and in local conflicts. The Airborne Forces are a highly mobile branch of the military, 95% consisting of units of constant readiness.

Airborne troops or their individual units can be used as parachute landings behind enemy lines. The Airborne Forces include four divisions, the 242nd training center, the Ryazan Airborne Forces Institute, the 31st Airborne Brigade, as well as support and service units. Conclusion.

Space Forces are a fundamentally new branch of the military, which is designed to: 1) detect the beginning of a missile attack on the Russian Federation and its allies; 2) combating enemy ballistic missiles; 3) maintaining the established composition of orbital constellations of military and dual-use spacecraft and ensuring the use of spacecraft for their intended purpose; 4) control of outer space; 5) ensuring the implementation of the Federal Space Program of Russia, international cooperation programs and commercial space programs. The Space Forces include formations and military units of missile attack warning systems, missile defense and space control systems; State test cosmodromes "Baikonur", "Plesetsk" and "Svobodny"; Main Test Center for Testing and Control of Spacecraft named after G.S. Titova; military educational institutions. Conclusion.

Post-Soviet reforms of the Russian troops Relations with the so-called “far abroad”, that is, countries that were not previously part of the USSR, due to the inertia of Soviet times, were considered a priority for Russian foreign policy. But this does not correspond to the fundamental change in the geopolitical situation in which Russia found itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore there is a need for a more balanced foreign policy. The essence of Russian foreign policy towards “far abroad” countries throughout the 90s can be expressed in one phrase: a transition from hopes for an equal partnership to the protection of its national interests.

The first reform that officially ended the Cold War was the declaration signed by Russia and the United States in February 1992 to end the Cold War. Relations with the “far abroad” developed in two main directions: in the military-political and economic spheres. In the military-political sphere, demonstrating its friendly intentions, Russia pursued a policy of concessions and openness, and moved towards the strategic interests of the United States. In response, she received international support, which was important for the establishment of Russia as an independent state.

Russia sought to establish itself as the successor to the USSR in the international arena - and was given the Soviet Union's seat on the UN Security Council. Russia took the place of the USSR in all international organizations.

Russia declared its intention to remain the only nuclear power in the post-Soviet space, which was in keeping with the spirit of international treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons), Soviet nuclear weapons remained on the territory of three more states - Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan). The United States was interested in maintaining reliable control over nuclear weapons and carrying out the reductions provided for by the START I Treaty, so they fully supported Russia. In the Belovezhskaya Agreement of the leaders of the three Slavic republics - Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - and then at the Alma-Ata meeting of the leaders of post-Soviet states on December 21, 1991, it was stipulated that nuclear forces (and the Strategic Missile Forces - strategic missile forces, and tactical nuclear weapons) would not will be separated and will be under the control and protection of the command of the United Armed Forces of the CIS. Control of nuclear weapons was provided to the President of Russia and the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the CIS - and on December 25, M. Gorbachev handed over the so-called “nuclear button” to the Commander-in-Chief E. Shaposhnikov. The right to make a decision on the use of nuclear weapons was vested in the President of the Russian Federation - in agreement with the heads of other states on whose territory these weapons were located, and after consultations with all other states of the Commonwealth.

It was envisaged that all nuclear weapons would be relocated to Russian territory and that part of them that was subject to reduction under START-1 would be dismantled here. Belarus and Kazakhstan immediately declared their status as non-nuclear powers, but Ukraine was in no hurry to transfer nuclear warheads to Russia.

Ukraine did not sign the corresponding multilateral and bilateral agreements, and in July 1993 declared its ownership of 2 thousand nuclear warheads located on its territory (about 20% of the strategic arsenal of the former USSR). Showing a friendly initiative, President Boris Yeltsin officially announced that Russian nuclear missiles will no longer be aimed at US territory. In January 1993, the presidents of Russia and the United States signed a new treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (START-2) in Moscow, which stipulated that by 2003 the nuclear forces of the two countries should be mutually reduced to a level equal to 1/3 of the level previously fixed by the START-1 treaty. The Supreme Council of Russia, considering the agreement to be insufficiently developed, did not ratify it, and in October 1996.

The State Duma opposed the ratification of the START-2 treaty, believing that it would lead to the destruction of strategic missile forces and a violation of the nuclear parity between Russia and the United States. Evidence of Russia’s refusal to expand and military confrontation with other countries was its new military doctrine, approved by presidential decree on November 2, 1993. “Basic provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation” provided for the formation of the Russian Armed Forces based on the principle of sufficiency to maintain the country’s defense capability in all directions.

An important role was assigned to nuclear deterrence forces, and the refusal to launch a first nuclear strike, previously accepted by the military doctrine of the USSR, was not confirmed (the USSR only provided for a retaliatory and retaliatory nuclear strike). But Russia’s military doctrine did not identify the most likely opponents, which meant that flight missions were removed from the strategic missile control systems and they were not aimed at specific targets. The priority tasks of the Russian Armed Forces included ensuring the actions of the UN Security Council and other international organizations to maintain peace and stability in international relations, which indicated the intention of Russian diplomacy to play a “peacekeeper” role comparable to the United States in any regional conflicts. In general, Russian diplomacy during this period was not free in its decisions and unconditionally supported the actions of the United States in the international arena. Russia supported military inspection control of Iraqi military facilities and international economic sanctions against Iraq, imposed after the suppression of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the spring of 1991 by multinational forces. This undermined Russia's political influence in the Near and Middle East and caused it serious economic damage (Iraq was one of the main buyers of Soviet weapons and the largest debtor). Russia joined international economic sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia + Montenegro), introduced due to the Yugoslavs' support for the Bosnian Serbs in the interethnic conflict in Bosnia. This did not correspond to Russia’s historically traditional role as the patroness of Serbia and ran counter to its political interests in the Balkans. In all these cases, Russian diplomacy gave priority to maintaining friendly relations with the United States. As for relations with other large states, they were demonstratively friendly with Germany during this period: the withdrawal of troops from East Germany continued, and Germany allocated significant sums of money for their social development in new locations.

Relations with France had slowed down somewhat: both states had no points of economic and political contact, and President F. Mitterrand supported M. Gorbachev until the very last moment. Since the beginning of 1994, the Russian Foreign Ministry, instead of the fundamental idea of common interests with the United States, began to put forward a new foreign policy thesis - about the need to respect Russia's own national interests. On the one hand, this was caused by some changes in the balance of political forces within the country: the defeat of the Democrats in the Duma elections in December 1993 and accusations from the opposition of a pro-American course that received wide public attention. On the other hand, this was forced by the change in the geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe: in 1994 (finally in August) the withdrawal of Russian troops from the former socialist countries and the Baltic countries was completed, and some of them immediately declared their desire to be accepted into military-political bloc of Western countries - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The former allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact often motivated their intention by referring to the events of October 1993, which revived fears in Europe about the unpredictability of Russian politics. By this time, Russia no longer played an authoritative role in international affairs and had no real leverage to stop the unfavorable development of events. In response to Russia's expressed concern about NATO expansion plans, it was stated that NATO's readiness for expansion to the East does not mean practical measures in this direction, that the North Atlantic Pact is a guarantor of common security in Europe and is not directed against any countries, which NATO offers to former socialist countries and countries of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, to adopt a joint Partnership for Peace program that would establish forms of military cooperation between the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and NATO. This was a temporary compromise between the United States and Russia, which could only delay the implementation of plans to include the former allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact, as well as the Baltic countries, and, possibly, some CIS states, into the North Atlantic Pact. In June 1994, having stipulated a number of special conditions for itself, Russia joined, like other invited states, the NATO Partnership for Peace program. As part of this program, participants received the right to send their representatives to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Russian and Ukrainian battalions (from contract soldiers) were formed, which, as part of a multinational peacekeeping force, participated in the separation of warring parties in Bosnia, inspection trips to the troops and joint staff and military exercises. NATO assigns the Partnership for Peace program the role of cover against Islamic fundamentalism threatening from the south. Russia's accession to this program was caused mainly by fears of being politically isolated.

Tangible changes in Russia's foreign policy - the growth of its initiative and independence - began to be observed only in 1996, when in January V. Primakov, who was previously the head of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. E. Primakov says about himself that he is not “anti-Western,” but only defends the interests of the state, the national interests of Russia. Already in February, Russia abandoned sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, which was supported by other countries; In October, the UN Security Council unanimously lifted economic sanctions against Yugoslavia that had been in force since 1992.

Continuing the line of restoring Russia's traditional influence in the Balkans, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1997 tried to act as a mediator between the Serbian president and the opposition, which disputed the election results and held continuous two-month demonstrations. In September 1996

Russia condemned the bombing of military targets in Iraq by American cruise missiles. Since 1997

Russia is trying to regain its position in the Middle East settlement: in February, at a meeting between E. Primakov and Palestinian leader Ya. Arafat, it was promised to provide the Arabs not only political, but also possible economic assistance; in March, the visit of Israeli Prime Minister V. Netanyahu, although it was emphatically economic in nature, was accompanied by the hope that Russia would involve traditionally friendly Syria in the Middle East settlement. Since 1995

Russia began to regain lost positions in the international arms market: according to Rosvooruzhenie, a state monopolist in arms exports, its sales volumes amounted to $3 billion in 1995, and $3.5 billion in 1996 (the US had sales fell by $2 billion in 1996). In April 1996, the leaders of the G7 countries (USA, UK, Germany, Italy, Canada, France, Japan) and Russia, meeting in Moscow, reached an agreement on the need to completely stop nuclear testing in order to strengthen nuclear safety and not expand the group of nuclear states And on September 25, 1996, the official Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in All Environments was signed in New York (at that time only underground tests remained officially permitted, but China also carried out atmospheric ones), which was joined by 158 states (except India). In 1995, NATO started talking about the need to begin practical measures to prepare for the admission of new members - the former socialist states of Eastern and Central Europe.

Russia has put forward a proposal, instead of expanding the North Atlantic bloc, to increase the level of powers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in ensuring military security and political stability on the continent. The CSCE, first convened in 1975 in Helsinki to politically consolidate military “détente” in relations between the socialist East and the capitalist West, was transformed at the Paris conference in 1990 into a permanent organization with its own mechanism of periodic meetings at the “highest level” and regular consultations. The “subtext” of the Russian proposal was that each CSCE member state has the right to “veto” decisions.

Russia's initiative did not meet with a positive response. In September 1996 in Detroit, US President B. Clinton said that a two-pronged process would take place: NATO would expand eastward, and at the same time friendly relations with democratic Russia would develop.

The US President argued that with the end of the Cold War, the nature of the North Atlantic Alliance has changed; it no longer threatens Russia's security. At the same time, the need to expand the bloc was motivated by the dangerous unpredictability of the internal political situation in Russia (in particular, the events of October 1993 and the beginning of the Chechen war in December 1994). It was assumed that NATO and friendly Russia together could resist the expansion of Islamic terrorist states.

Russia did not agree with this approach, arguing that it does not fear a military attack by NATO, but considers the concentration of a powerful military group near its borders potentially dangerous.

The main thing is that NATO expansion without Russia's participation in it means its ousting from Europe and political isolation from the pan-European process. The general conclusion was this: NATO expansion disrupts the balance of power, and therefore stability in Europe, infringes on Russia’s national interests and can seriously affect the nature of relations between Russia and Western countries.

Initially, Russia wanted to gain the right of “veto” in all matters of NATO activity, this was firmly denied to it, but it was promised to provide a voice in the discussion of political and partly military issues, possibly within the framework of a special advisory council “Russia - NATO”. Then Russian diplomacy concentrated its efforts on achieving the adoption of a document binding on all NATO countries, which would contain guarantees of its security. In particular, Russia demanded the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons into the territory of newly admitted countries, not increasing the level of NATO conventional weapons and the right of Russia to unilaterally revise the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, not using NATO military infrastructure left over from the Warsaw Pact, and a ban on multilateral NATO military formations to move across national borders, etc. The United States proposed to expand the sphere of trust and cooperation between NATO and Russia: they promised to invite Russian armed forces to all NATO exercises in Europe, provide satellite information about the bends of the NATO defense line, proposed to create a joint brigade to respond to crisis situations on the continent, etc. As a result of difficult negotiations, the United States agreed in principle to sign a legally binding document containing concessions agreed upon with Russia to ensure its security and binding on all NATO members. But France and Germany declared that there could be no binding agreement between Russia and NATO; relations between them should be regulated only by a charter, that is, a declarative statement of mutual friendly intentions. Thus, the question of what nature the joint Russia-NATO document will have, binding or declarative, depends on the content of this document, on the weight of the concessions that NATO wants to make.

In addition to all this, in the 90s, Russia supplied nuclear reactors to Iraq and built a nuclear power plant in Iran, which raised questions among some Western countries about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies (as if the transfer of SS-4 missile technology), but all these accusations against Russia were sharply denied by the Russian government. Taken together, this could mark the beginning of a strategic turn in Russian foreign policy. All these reforms were aimed at restoring the former power of the Soviet Union.

Russian reformers wanted to recreate the former power and strength of our army, often making irreparable mistakes. When analyzing this period of reform, it should still be noted that the directions of reform became qualitatively different than in the 20th century - basically, the transformations were focused on establishing foreign policy cooperation in the context of globalization and the establishment of friendly ties.

Modern reforms of the Russian troops. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reforms carried out by its leadership were not curtailed in modern Russia; there was a combination of Soviet reforms and reforms of the new Russia.

Russia's reforms were aimed at creating and organizing fundamentally new armed forces, which were significantly different from the armed forces of the USSR. This reform began in May 1992 and initially envisaged a broad comprehensive program for transforming the military organization of the state, types and branches of troops, aimed at ensuring the country's national security in the new conditions. Plans for implementing the reform included: developing the foundations of a new military doctrine for Russia; determination of the future structure and combat strength of the Armed Forces; formation of governing bodies of the Armed Forces; creation of a legal framework for the construction and operation of aircraft; determining the status of Russian troops located outside Russia; carrying out the withdrawal of troop groups from a number of states; the formation of peacekeeping forces - a new operational-strategic association; conducting an inventory of weapons and military equipment; transition to a mixed recruitment system (conscription and contract) and to a new structure of the Armed Forces; creation of a group of troops (forces) on the territory of the Russian Federation; expansion and qualitative improvement of military legislation; introduction of alternative military service; reduction in numbers and restructuring of the state's military organization. The entire potential of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which was transferred to the Russian Federation, at the stage of reform of the 90s underwent a serious restructuring associated with the creation of new law enforcement agencies and departments with their own armed formations.

The most important document aimed at the successful implementation of military reform is the National Security Concept of Russia (put into effect by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 34 of January 10, 2000). From the material presented above, we can conclude that the military reforms of the 90s were aimed at changing the structure of the Armed Forces and creating not offensive, but defensive weapons capable of competently and unquestioningly protecting the interests of Russia.

In addition to the reforms of the 90s, the Russian army is currently undergoing a number of very important reforms aimed at strengthening the Russian armed forces, some of which we will try to analyze below. As noted by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin: “We are obliged to consistently strengthen our Armed Forces, while balancing our tasks with the capabilities of the national economy, as well as with the nature of potential threats and the dynamics of the international situation.” Currently, units and formations are being re-equipped as planned with new and modernized types of weapons and military equipment - equipment that is intended to become the basis of weapons systems until 2020.

The State Armaments Program for 2007-2015 (GPV-2015), which was approved in October 2006 by Decree of the President of Russia, is being implemented. Its plan involves focusing the main efforts on the most problematic and resource-intensive task of ensuring the rearmament of the Armed Forces and other law enforcement agencies with new types of weapons and military equipment.

Most of the expenses of the GPV-2015 go towards serial purchases of new weapons and military equipment. To effectively use these funds, contracts will be awarded to a new specialized federal agency.

It is to him that all law enforcement agencies of the state delegate part of their functions related to placing orders and paying for contracts. This reform also pays attention to Russia's nuclear forces. In the Strategic Missile Forces, the program provides for increasing the level of equipment of all components of nuclear forces to the level of 60-80 percent. At the same time, the basis of the nuclear triad will be new ground-based (Topol-M) and sea-based missile systems (Bulava). Also, GPV-2015 involves increasing the combat potential of units and troops of constant readiness. As is known from open sources, the GPV-2015 provides for the comprehensive equipment of about 200 formations and military units. In the Ground Forces and Airborne Forces, it is planned to re-equip up to 5 formations with Iskander-M missile systems, 2 formations with new combat vehicles of the Uragan-1 M multiple launch rocket system, 45 tank battalions (22 of them with new tanks), more than 170 motorized rifle battalions for new and modernized infantry fighting vehicles (airborne) and armored personnel carriers. The Air Force plans to supply about 120 new and more than 400 modernized front-line aviation complexes, more than 30 new and 150 modernized military transport aircraft for re-equipment. In the air defense forces, it is planned to re-equip 9 anti-aircraft missile regiments with new S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and one anti-aircraft missile regiment with the new Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile and gun system. In the General Purpose Navy, it is planned to introduce into the fleet 2 promising multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the Severodvinsk type, 4 diesel submarines of the Lada type, 15 combat surface ships of new projects and 3 combat boats of various projects. In total, the fleet will have more than 170 ships in service by 2016.

According to GPV-2015, the military orbital constellation will operate as part of 80 spacecraft for reconnaissance, communications, surveying, meteorological support and navigation of new types. In addition, it is planned to complete work on the creation of the Soyuz-2 medium-class launch vehicle and a family of heavy launch vehicles, which will be launched from the territories of the Russian Federation. Taking into account the available weapons and military equipment and the planned measures for military repair, GPV-2015 will generally ensure the fulfillment of the task of bringing the number of formations and units of constant readiness to 600. Economic difficulties in the defense industry of the 90s of the last century led to a general decline in production . Today, about 80 percent of technological equipment is 15 years old or more.

Therefore, GPV-2015 must be consistent with the industrial development program. According to the assessment of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal executive authorities, the new Program will be implemented by the military-industrial complex in full. For this purpose, the Government approved the Federal Target Program “Development of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation for 2007-2010 and for the period until 2015.” In terms of the focus of the changes, modern Russian military reform can be considered the most humane of domestic military reforms. Its starting position is to have a military system in Russia capable of making an effective contribution to the prevention of nuclear disaster, wars and armed conflicts.

The reform provides for the creation of normal conditions for military personnel for their life activities and the fulfillment of their professional duty to the Fatherland and the people. This reform, in our opinion, is competent and thoughtful. It meets all modern prospects for the development of the armed forces of other countries and the world as a whole.

The implementation of the Armament Program and the federal target program for the development of the defense-industrial complex (defense-industrial complex) will ensure the preservation of knowledge-intensive, high-tech and competitive industries and enterprises in various sectors of the economy, their utilization and new guidelines for the structural restructuring of the defense-industrial complex and its production and technological base.

Consequently, our country will be able to repel terrorists in the event of an attack.

Conclusion. So, we have traced the evolution of the Russian army from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day. During the research, the development of weapons and military policy of our country was clearly shown. In general, we can conclude that reforming the armed forces directly depends on the current foreign policy situation: the increase in armaments is a consequence of the increase in military conflicts, and in the conditions of peaceful settlement of conflicts we can observe the exact opposite situation. In the conditions of modern society, it is necessary to understand that the Russian army needs to be reformed as quickly as possible in order to comply with global trends and be able to withstand new threats. It seems to us that the priority area of reform should be the transfer of the army to a contract basis. Today no one doubts that the Russian army should be professional and modern.

President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Putin named some control positions while speaking at a press conference in the Kremlin. He said that by the end of 2007 there will already be over 100 thousand contract soldiers in Russia. Recruitment of the army under contract is intended to make the personnel component more consistent with the requirements of today.

Vladimir Putin emphasized that only citizens on contract service, and not young recruits, should serve in hot spots. We believe that this policy is the only correct one in modern conditions, since contract service has a huge number of advantages compared to conscript service.

First of all, the problem of financing officers will be solved, which will certainly increase the prestige of service in the army (unlike the current state of affairs). It is also important that the introduction of contract service will make it possible to attract to the service people who are interested in this activity, who are professionally trained, and have high moral and volitional qualities, and to exclude “random” people from entering the armed forces.

We think that in this way the problem of extra-statutory relations (so-called “hazing”) in the army will be resolved. Since January 2008, the conscription period has been reduced to 1 year, which confirms our position.

The leadership is aware that recruiting the army on the basis of conscription no longer meets the requirements of the time - after all, in the modern world, successful resistance to conflicts has long been no longer predetermined by the number of military personnel.

Consequently, attention needs to be paid to the development of modern technologies to counter external threats, as well as to concentrate efforts on training people who are ready and able to competently use existing high-tech and knowledge-intensive weapons.

It seems that in the near future our country will completely abandon recruiting the army on the basis of conscription.

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