Alexander Gorchakov Minister of Foreign Affairs. Great ideas, complex character: what role did Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov play in the history of Russia

Gorchakov Alexander Mikhailovich(June 4 (15), 1798, Gapsal - February 27 (March 11), 1883, Baden-Baden) - a prominent Russian diplomat and statesman, chancellor, His Serene Highness, Knight of the Order of the Holy Apostle Andrew the First-Called.

Biography

Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov was born on June 4, 1798 in Gapsala. His father, Prince Mikhail Alekseevich, was a major general, his mother, Elena Vasilievna Ferzen, was the daughter of a colonel. Alexander Mikhailovich belonged to an old noble family, dating back to the Rurikovichs. The family had five children - four daughters and a son. The nature of his father’s service required frequent moves: the Gorchakovs lived in Gapsala, Revel, and St. Petersburg. After graduating from high school in St. Petersburg, Gorchakov entered the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum in 1811, where he successfully studied not only the humanities, but also the exact and natural sciences. Already during his studies he chose as his future profession diplomacy. His idol was diplomat I.A. Kapodistrias. “The direct character of him [Kapodistrias] is not capable of court intrigue. I would like to serve under his command,” said Alexander. He studied together with A.S. Pushkin. The great poet dedicated a poem to his classmate, in which he predicted a brilliant future for him: “For you, the wayward hand of Fortune has shown you a happy and glorious path.” Gorchakov maintained friendly relations with Pushkin for the rest of his life.

Returning to Russia in 1825 and passing through the Pskov province, he met a friend of his youth who was serving exile, although this act was fraught with trouble for him. But the young diplomat was completely financially dependent on the salary he received, since he refused his share of the inheritance in favor of his sisters. In 1817, Gorchakov brilliantly graduated from the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum and began his diplomatic career with the rank of titular councilor. His first teacher and mentor was Count I.A. Kapodistrias, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Eastern and Greek Affairs. Together with Kapodistrias and other diplomats, Gorchakov was in the tsar’s retinue at congresses Holy Alliance in Troppau, Laibach and Verona. As an attaché, he carried out diplomatic assignments for the Tsar. Alexander I was favorable to him and “always noted him as one of the best pupils of the lyceum.” In 1820, Gorchakov was sent as secretary of the embassy to London.

In 1822 he became the first secretary of the embassy, and in 1824 he was awarded the rank of court councilor. Gorchakov remained in London until 1827, when he was transferred to the post of first secretary in Rome. The following year, the young diplomat became an adviser to the embassy in Berlin, and then, as a charge d'affaires, he again found himself in Italy, this time in Florence and Lucca, the capital of the Tuscan state.

In 1833, by personal order of Nicholas I, Gorchakov was sent to Vienna as an adviser. Ambassador D. Tatishchev entrusted him with important tasks. Many reports sent to St. Petersburg were compiled by Gorchakov. For his diplomatic successes, Gorchakov was promoted to state councilor (1834). In 1838, Gorchakov married Maria Alexandrovna Urusova, the widow of I.A. Musina-Pushkin. The Urusov family was rich and influential. Gorchakov left his service in Vienna and returned to the capital. Gorchakov’s decision to resign is explained by the fact that his relationship with Foreign Minister Nesselrode did not work out. Only in 1841, Alexander Mikhailovich received a new appointment and went as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Württemberg, whose king Wilhelm II was related to Nicholas I. Gorchakov’s task was to maintain the authority of Russia as the patroness of the German countries. The revolutions of 1848-1849, which swept Europe, found the diplomat in Stuttgart. Gorchakov did not approve of revolutionary methods of struggle. Reporting on rallies and demonstrations in Württemberg, he advised protecting Russia from an explosion similar to that in Western Europe. In 1850, Gorchakov was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the German Union (the capital was Frankfurt am Main). At the same time, he retained his post in Württemberg. Gorchakov sought to preserve the German Confederation as an organization that would restrain the efforts of Austria and Prussia - two rival powers - to act as a unifier of Germany. In June 1853, Gorchakov’s wife, with whom he lived for fifteen years, died in Baden-Baden. He left in his care two sons and children from his wife’s first marriage. Soon the Crimean War began. During this difficult time for Russia, Gorchakov proved himself to be a diplomat of the highest class.

In June 1854 he was sent as ambassador to Vienna. England and France then took the side of Turkey, and Austria, without declaring war on Russia, helped the powers of the anti-Russian bloc. In Vienna, Gorchakov became convinced of Austria's insidious plans directed against Russia. He was especially concerned about Austria's attempts to win over Prussia. He did everything to ensure that Prussia remained neutral. In December 1854, the ambassadors of all the warring powers and Austria gathered for a conference, with Gorchakov representing Russia. At numerous meetings of the conference, which lasted until the spring of 1855, he tried to soften the harsh demands of the powers. The Russian diplomat entered into secret negotiations with the Count of Morny, a confidant of Napoleon III. Having learned about this, representatives of Austria turned to Alexander II in St. Petersburg and got him to accept their conditions, the so-called “five points”. Gorchakov believed that continuing negotiations with France would allow Russia to conclude peace on more favorable terms for it. At the Paris Congress, which completed its work on March 18 (30), 1856, Russia signed an agreement that recorded its defeat in the Crimean War. The most difficult condition of the Paris Peace was the article on the neutralization of the Black Sea, according to which Russia was prohibited from having a navy there and building coastal defensive structures.

After the defeat in the Crimean War on April 15, 1856, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was headed by Gorchakov. Alexander II, paying tribute to his experience, talent, and intelligence, chose him, despite Nesselrode’s attempts to prevent this appointment. Historian S.S. Tatishchev associated “a sharp turn in Russian foreign policy” with Gorchakov’s appointment. The new direction of foreign policy was justified by the minister in a report to Alexander II and outlined in a circular dated August 21, 1856. It emphasized the desire Russian government to devote “primary care” to internal affairs, extending its activities beyond the borders of the empire, “only when the positive benefits of Russia absolutely require it.” And finally famous phrase: “They say Russia is angry. No, Russia is not angry, but is concentrating.” Gorchakov himself, in a report on the work of the ministry for 1856, explained it this way: “Russia mentally concentrated not out of a sense of wounded pride, but with an awareness of strength and its true interests. However, it did not abandon either concern for its dignity or the rank that belonged to it.” among the great powers of Europe." Moreover, the policy of abstinence, which it was decided to follow, did not at all exclude Russian diplomacy from exploring possibilities and preparing for the conclusion of new alliances, without, however, accepting any obligations in relation to anyone, while its own national interests they will not order this to her." Gorchakov sought to pursue a "national" policy without sacrificing the interests of Russia in the name of political goals alien to it, including the goals of the Holy Alliance. He was the first in his dispatches to use the expression: "sovereign and Russia." "Before me “, - said Gorchakov, - for Europe there was no other concept in relation to our Fatherland than “emperor”. Nesselrode reproached him for this. “We know only one tsar,” said my predecessor: “We don’t care about Russia.” “The prince is one of the most outstanding statesmen,” the Sardinian charge d’affaires in St. Petersburg, Filippo Oldoini, wrote about Gorchakov in his diary in 1856, “he is a purely Russian and liberal minister, of course, to the extent that this is possible in his country ... He is an intelligent and pleasant person, but very quick-tempered...” The fight for the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris Treaty became the strategic goal of Gorchakov’s foreign policy for the next decade and a half. To solve this main task allies were needed. Alexander II was inclined towards rapprochement with Prussia, but Gorchakov recognized an alliance with the weakest of the great powers as insufficient to return Russia to its former position in Europe. He associated the achievement of a positive result with close cooperation with France. Alexander II agreed with the diplomat's arguments. Gorchakov ordered the Russian ambassador in Paris, Kiselev, to convey to Napoleon III that Russia would not prevent France from taking possession of Nice and Savoy. Napoleon III, who was making diplomatic preparations for war with Austria, also needed the speedy signing of a Russian-French alliance. As a result of numerous meetings, disputes and compromises, on February 19 (March 3), 1859, a secret Russian-French treaty on neutrality and cooperation was signed in Paris. And although Russia did not receive French support in revising the articles of the Paris Peace, this agreement allowed it to get out of the isolation in which it was after the defeat in the war with Turkey.

In the early 1860s, Gorchakov occupied a prominent position in the government and had great influence not only on foreign policy, but also on the internal affairs of the country, advocating moderate bourgeois reforms. To the Russian Minister was awarded the rank of vice-chancellor (1862), and then state chancellor (1867). Gorchakov was skilled in the art of diplomatic play. A witty and brilliant speaker, he spoke French and German and, according to O. Bismarck, loved to show off with it. “Gorchakov,” wrote the French politician Emile Ollivier, “had a sublime, large, subtle mind, and his ability to use diplomatic tricks did not exclude loyalty. He loved to play with the enemy, confuse him, take him by surprise, but never allowed himself to be treated "It is rude to treat him or to deceive him. He did not have to resort to reprises and tricks, since his plan was always clear and devoid of mysteries. Communication with very few diplomats was so easy and reliable." Ollivier attributed the following to Gorchakov’s main shortcomings: “Always ready for conferences, congresses, where they speak or write, he was less ready for a quick, daring, risky action that could lead to a fight. The courageous risk of heroic enterprises frightened him and, although he had dignity , the first movement was to evade them, hiding behind condescension, and, if necessary, timidity.” Gorchakov updated the composition of the ministry, removing numerous foreigners and replacing them with Russian people. Gorchakov attached great importance to the historical traditions of his country and the experience of its diplomacy. He considered Peter I to be an example of a diplomat. Possessing undoubted literary talent, Gorchakov composed diplomatic documents so elegantly that they often resembled works of art.

In 1861, an uprising began in Poland, the goal of which was to restore the Kingdom of Poland from Russian lands. In June 1863, the Western powers approached St. Petersburg with a proposal to convene a European conference of the states that signed the 1815 treaties. Gorchakov stated that the Polish issue is an internal matter of Russia. He ordered Russian ambassadors abroad to stop all negotiations with European states on Polish affairs. At the beginning of 1864, the Polish uprising was suppressed. Prussia benefited the most: its active support for Russia's actions brought the positions of the two countries closer together. Gorchakov also participated in solving the problem of Russian colonies in North America- Alaska, the Aleutian Islands and the west coast to 55 degrees north latitude.

On December 16, 1866, a meeting was held with the participation of the Tsar, at which the initiator of the sale of Alaska was present Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, A.M. Gorchakov, N.Kh. Reitern, N.K. Krabbe, Russian Ambassador to the USA E.A. Stackl. All of them unconditionally supported the sale of Russian possessions to the United States. The tsarist government knew about the presence of gold placers there, but this was precisely what was fraught with considerable danger. “Following an army of gold miners armed with shovels could come an army of soldiers armed with guns.” Not having on Far East no significant army, no strong fleet, given the difficult financial position country, it was impossible to preserve the colony. The agreement on the sale of Alaska for 7 million 200 thousand dollars (11 million rubles) was signed on March 18 in Washington and ratified in April by Alexander II and the US Senate. During the negotiations in 1866-1867, it became obvious that Russia could not count on French support. Gorchakov came to the conclusion that “serious and close agreement with Prussia is the best combination, if not the only one.” In August 1866, General E. Manteuffel arrived from Berlin to St. Petersburg, confidant Wilhelm I. During the conversation with him, a verbal agreement was reached that Prussia would support Russia’s demands for the abolition of the most heavy articles Treaty of Paris. In return, Gorchakov promised to maintain benevolent neutrality during German unification.

In 1868, an oral agreement followed, which actually had the force of a contract. Gorchakov was a supporter of cautious actions. He believed, for example, that in the East one should take a “defensive position”: “morally lead the movement” in the Balkans, “prevent bloody battles and any religious fanaticism". Gorchakov ordered diplomats “not to drag Russia into complications that could interfere with our internal work.” However, Gorchakov’s “defensive” tactics met with opposition from the so-called national party, led by Minister of War Milyutin and Ambassador in Istanbul Ignatiev. They called for active action in the Middle East, in Central Asia, in the Far East. Gorchakov agreed with their arguments about the admissibility of a military offensive in Central Asia. It was under Gorchakov that the annexation of Central Asia to Russia took place.

In July 1870 it began Franco-Prussian War, in which Russia took a neutral position. Gorchakov hoped for Bismarck's support in revising the terms of the Treaty of Paris. The French army suffered a defeat that changed political situation in Europe. Gorchakov told the Tsar that it was time to raise the issue of Russia’s “fair demand.” The main "guarantor" of the Paris Treaty - France suffered a military defeat, Prussia promised support; Austria-Hungary would not risk moving against Russia for fear of being subjected to a new attack by Prussia. That left England, which always avoided single-handed military action. Moreover, Gorchakov insisted on immediate action, arguing that the decision should be made before the end of the Franco-Prussian war. "While the war lasted, we could count with greater confidence on goodwill Prussia and the restraint of the powers that signed the treaty of 1856,” the minister noted in a report to the emperor. At the suggestion of Minister of War D.A. Milyutin, it was decided to limit ourselves to a statement about the abolition of the articles of the treaty relating to the Black Sea, but not to touch on territorial demands.

On October 19 (31), 1870, Gorchakov, through Russian ambassadors abroad, handed over a “Circular Dispatch” to the governments of all states that signed the Paris Treaty of 1856. Russia claimed that the 1856 Treaty of Paris was repeatedly violated by the powers that signed it. Russia can no longer consider itself bound by that part of the obligations of the treaty of 1856, which limited its rights in the Black Sea. The circular also noted that Russia does not intend to “excite eastern question"; it is ready to fulfill the main principles of the 1856 treaty and enter into agreements with other states to confirm its provisions or draw up a new treaty. Gorchakov’s circular had the effect of a “bomb exploding” in Europe. The governments of England and Austria-Hungary greeted it with particular hostility. But they had to confine himself to verbal protests. The Porte ultimately remained neutral. As for Prussia, Bismarck was “irritated” by Russia’s performance, but he could only declare that he supported Russia’s demand for the abolition of the “most unfortunate” articles of the treaty. In order to reconcile the parties, the German Chancellor proposed to convene in St. Petersburg a meeting of the authorized powers that signed the treaty of 1856. This proposal was accepted by all powers, including Russia. But at the request of England, the meeting was decided to be held in London. The conference ended with the signing of the London Protocol on March 1 (13), 1871, the main result which for Russia was the cancellation of the article on neutralization of the Black Sea. The country received the right to maintain a navy on the Black Sea and build military fortifications on its coast. Gorchakov experienced genuine triumph. He considered this victory the main achievement of his entire diplomatic activities. Alexander II granted him the title of "lordship".

In May 1873, during the visit of Alexander II to Austria, the first after the end Crimean War, the Russian-Austrian political convention was signed. Gorchakov believed that the convention, despite all the amorphousness of its content, “made it possible to forget the unpleasant past... The ghosts of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Polonism... were reduced to a minimum size.” In October 1873, during the visit of Wilhelm I to Austria, the Act of Germany's accession to the Russian-Austrian Convention was signed. This is how an association was formed, which in history received the name of the Union of Three Emperors. For Russia, the meaning of the Union of Three Emperors came down primarily to a political agreement on the Balkan problem. But it was the Balkan crisis of the 1870s that dealt a heavy blow to the Alliance of the Three Emperors. Gorchakov tried to persuade his partners to support his autonomy plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, calls from European powers to resolve the conflict peacefully were rejected by the Sultan. At the end of 1876, Gorchakov recognized the need for military action. “Our traditions do not allow us,” he wrote in his annual report to Alexander II, “to be indifferent. There are national, internal feelings that are difficult to go against.” In January 1877, Gorchakov concluded the Budapest Convention with Austria-Hungary, which ensured Russia the neutrality of Austria-Hungary in the event Russian-Turkish war. Alexander II, under pressure from public opinion, started a war with Turkey on April 12, 1877. The war was fought under the banner of liberation Balkan peoples from the Turkish authorities. If it was successfully completed, Russia hoped to assert its influence in the Balkans. After the Adrianople Truce, concluded on January 19 (31), 1878 between Russia and Turkey, St. Petersburg demanded that its diplomats sign an agreement with Turkey as soon as possible. Gorchakov recommended that Ignatiev give “the act the form of a preliminary peace,” taking into account the interests of Austria-Hungary, to seek agreement with Germany in order to prevent Anglo-German-Austrian unity." With all this, the chancellor was decisive in the Balkan, especially the Bulgarian, issue. "Especially firmly stand your ground in everything that concerns Bulgaria,” noted Gorchakov.

The peace with Turkey signed on February 19 (March 3), 1878 in San Stefano, timed to coincide with the birthday of Alexander II, recognized the independence of Serbia, Romania, Montenegro, the broad autonomy of Bulgaria with the inclusion of Macedonia; Southern Bessarabia, torn from it under the terms of the Treaty of Paris, was returned to Russia. Not only England, but also Austria-Hungary resolutely opposed Russia’s new plans, which found expression in the Treaty of San Stefano. Gorchakov hoped for Germany, but at the Berlin Congress Bismarck took a position of neutrality. On this forum Gorchakov explained difficult situation his country in that there was “the evil will of almost all of Europe” against it. After the Berlin Congress, he wrote to the Tsar that “it would be an illusion to count in the future on an alliance of three emperors,” and concluded that “we will have to return to famous phrase 1856: Russia will have to concentrate." He admitted to Alexander II: "The Berlin Treaty is the darkest page in my career." After the Berlin Congress, Gorchakov headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for three more years. He made every effort to stabilize internal situation country and maintaining the “balance of power” in Europe. Special attention the minister was directed to the Balkans, to assist, as it was understood Russian government, in the formation of statehood there. Gorchakov became increasingly ill, and gradually the leadership of the ministry passed to other people.

In 1880, he went abroad for treatment, retaining his post as minister. Without his participation, Russian-German negotiations were conducted in Berlin, which led to the conclusion of the Russian-German-Austrian alliance in 1881. Having retired from active political life, Gorchakov met with friends, read a lot and dictated his memoirs. Gorchakov died in Baden-Baden on February 27, 1883; he was buried in St. Petersburg, in the family crypt at the cemetery of the Trinity-Sergius Primorsky Hermitage.

Memory

On December 27, 2003, the Gorchakov Street station was opened in the Moscow Metro on the street of the same name.
Operating since 1998 International Fund Chancellor Gorchakov
On October 16, 1998, in accordance with the order of the Governor of St. Petersburg, for the bicentennial anniversary of the diplomat’s birth, a bust of A. M. Gorchakov was unveiled in the Alexander Garden (St. Petersburg) in the space near the fountain. The sculptors took as a basis a small bust of the chancellor, made in 1870 by sculptor K. K. Godebski. The height of the bust is 1.2 m, the height of the pedestal is 1.85 m.

Sculptors: K. K. Godebsky (1835-1909), F. S. Charkin (1937), B. A. Petrov (1948);

Architect: S. L. Mikhailov (1929);

Artist-designer: Sokolov, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1957).

Monument material

Bust - bronze, casting made at the Monumentsculpture factory;

The pedestal and base are pink granite, delivered from the Kashina Gora deposit (Karelia).

Signatures on the monument

On the pedestal:

on the front side there are inset gilded signs:

on the back side with mortise signs:

arch. Mikhailov S. L.
Sokolov N. A.
sk. Petrov B. A.
Charkin A. S.

Opened in 1998 Memorial plaque Gorchakov A. M. on the former building of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg (Moiki Embankment., 39/6. (F-6). The inscription on the board reads: “In this building from 1856 to 1883, an outstanding statesman, minister lived and worked Foreign Affairs of Russia Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov” Architect T. N. Miloradovich, sculptor G. P. Postnikov. Marble, bronze.
In 1998, a memorial plaque to A.M. Gorchakov was unveiled on the side facade of the building of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow, st. Ostozhenka
In 1998, the Gorchakov School was opened in Pavlovsk, St. Petersburg

Prince, His Serene Highness Prince (1871), Russian statesman and diplomat, Chancellor of Foreign Affairs (1867), honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1856).

From the Gorchakov family. He graduated from the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum (1817; he studied with A.S. Pushkin, and subsequently maintained friendly relations with him). Since 1817, in the diplomatic service (Gorchakov’s mentor at the Foreign Ministry was I. Kapodistrias). As an attaché, he was in the retinue of Emperor Alexander I at the Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821) and Verona (1822) congresses of the Holy Alliance. 1st secretary of the embassy in London (1822-1827) and mission in Rome (1827-1828). Chargé d'affaires in Florence and Lucca (1828/29-1832). Counselor of the embassy in Vienna (1833-1838). He opposed Russia’s orientation toward an alliance with Austria and disagreed on this issue with Foreign Minister K.V. Nesselrode; resigned. Since 1839 again in the diplomatic service. Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Württemberg (1841-1854) and part-time during the German Confederation 1815-1866 (1850-1854).

Messenger by special assignments(1854-1855) and envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Vienna (1855-1856). Achieved Austrian neutrality in . Taking into account the anti-Russian position of Austria, he insisted on accepting all the preconditions for peace (see the article Vienna Conferences of 1854-1855), presented to him in July 1854 on behalf of the Allied powers by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria K. F. Buol.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Russia's defeat in the Crimean War prompted Gorchakov to reconsider the goals and methods of Russian foreign policy. They were substantiated by him in a report to Emperor Alexander II, and then set out in a circular sent to the heads of Russian diplomatic missions dated August 21 (09/02), 1856. In it, Gorchakov expressed the intention of the Russian government to temporarily abandon active intervention in international relationships in order to “devote your concerns to the well-being of your subjects” (phrases from the circular became widely known: “They say that Russia is angry. Russia is not angry. Russia is concentrating”). Gorchakov also emphasized the need to continue to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy. Most important direction Russian foreign policy Gorchakov considered the struggle for the abolition of the terms of the Paris Peace of 1856, which provided for the so-called neutralization of the Black Sea - the prohibition of Russia and the Ottoman Empire to have Navy and fortifications on the coast. To achieve this, he initiated a process of rapprochement between Russia and France [in 19.02 (03.03). 1859, a secret agreement was concluded between the two countries on the neutrality of Russia in the event of a Franco-Austrian war and on mutual consultations when changing existing international treaties], but it was interrupted after that how the French Emperor Napoleon III began to insist on an international discussion of the issue of the status of Poland during.

The conclusion between Russia and Prussia of the Alvensleben Convention of 1863, which provided for cooperation between the two countries in suppressing the uprising, as well as the growth international influence Prussia in the 1860s prompted Gorchakov to seek rapprochement with Berlin. Gorchakov took a position of benevolent neutrality towards Prussia during. Taking advantage of the weakening of France during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and Prussia’s interest in Russia’s neutrality, Gorchakov declared that Russia did not consider itself bound by regulations that limited its sovereign rights in the Black Sea [Gorchakov’s circular dated October 19 (31), 1870 representatives of Russia at the courts of the signatory powers Parisian world 1856]. At the London Conference of 1871 (see the article London Conventions on the Straits of 1840, 1841, 1871), Gorchakov’s demands were recognized by the European powers and the Ottoman Empire. Gorchakov contributed to the creation of " Union of three Emperors" (1873). At the same time, he believed that in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe, France must once again take “its rightful place in Europe.”

In an effort to avoid complications in relations between Russia and Great Britain, Gorchakov opposed offensive actions in Central Asia, on this issue he disagreed with the Minister of War D. A. Milyutin. Under the leadership of Gorchakov, a number of agreements were concluded with China (Argun Treaty of 1858, Tianjin Treaty of 1858), which assigned the Amur region and the Ussuri region to Russia. He signed the compromise Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 with Japan, according to which the island of Sakhalin (since 1855 was jointly owned by both countries) was annexed to Russia in exchange for the Kuril Islands. During the American Civil War of 1861-1865, on the initiative of Gorchakov, Russia took a benevolent position towards the government of President A. Lincoln. Gorchakov ensured the conclusion of the Washington Treaty of 1867, according to which the territory of Russian America was sold to the United States.

Supported the desire of the Balkan peoples for independence from Ottoman Empire, at the same time, during the Balkan crisis of the 1870s, he opposed Russia’s armed intervention in the conflict (he changed his position at the end of 1876), and sought to resolve the crisis through diplomatic measures. He concluded a series of agreements with Austria-Hungary, according to which Russia recognized its territorial claims in the western Balkans in exchange for Austria-Hungary’s neutrality in the event of a Russian-Turkish war. After the signing of the Peace of San Stefano in 1878, Gorchakov, fearing the formation of a wide anti-Russian coalition, agreed to submit to international congress discussion of the terms of the concluded peace. At the Berlin Congress of 1878, he was forced to sign the compromise Berlin Treaty of 1878.

In 1879, due to illness, Gorchakov actually resigned from the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During his diplomatic service, Gorchakov gained confidence Prussian kings Frederick William IV and William I of Hohenzollern, as well as many minor Italian and German rulers; was in friendly relations with major statesmen: in France - with A. Thiers, in Great Britain - with W. Yu. Gladstone, in Prussia (Germany) - with O. von Bismarck. Gorchakov’s arsenal of diplomatic means was in demand by domestic diplomats at the end of the 19th and 20th centuries.

He was awarded the orders of St. Alexander Nevsky (1855), St. Vladimir, 1st degree (1857), St. Andrew the First-Called (1858), etc., as well as the Order of the Legion of Honor, 1st degree (1857).

: Goa - Engraver. Source: vol. IX (1893): Goa - Engraver, p. 340-344 ( · index) Other sources: VE : MESBE :

Gorchakov(Prince Alexander Mikhailovich) - famous diplomat, Russian sovereign. Chancellor, b. July 4, 1798; was brought up in Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he was Pushkin's comrade. In his youth, “fashion’s pet, big world friend, a brilliant observer of customs” (as Pushkin characterized him in one of his letters), G., until his late old age, was distinguished by those qualities that were considered most necessary for a diplomat; but, in addition to secular talents and salon wit, he also possessed a significant literary education, which was subsequently reflected in his eloquent diplomatic notes. Circumstances early allowed him to study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe. In 1820-22 he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Troppau, Laibach and Verona; in 1822 he was appointed secretary of the embassy in London, where he remained until 1827; then he was in the same position at the mission in Rome, in 1828 he was transferred to Berlin as an embassy adviser, from there to Florence as a charge d'affaires, in 1833 - as an embassy adviser in Vienna. In 1841, he was sent to Stuttgart to arrange the proposed marriage of Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna with the Crown Prince of Württemberg, and after the wedding, he remained there as envoy extraordinary for twelve years. From Stuttgart he was able to closely follow the progress revolutionary movement in Southern Germany and the events of 1848-49. in Frankfurt am Main. At the end of 1850, he was appointed commissioner to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt, retaining his previous post at the Württemberg court. Russian influence dominated the political life of Germany at that time. In the restored Union Sejm, the Russian government saw “the guarantee of preserving common peace.” Prince Gorchakov stayed in Frankfurt am Main for four years; there he became especially close friends with the Prussian representative, Bismarck. Bismarck was then a supporter of a close alliance with Russia and ardently supported its policies, for which Emperor Nicholas expressed special gratitude to him (according to the report of the Russian representative at the Sejm after G., D. G. Glinka). G., like Nesselrode, did not share the passions of Emperor Nicholas on the Eastern issue, and the diplomatic campaign that had begun against Turkey aroused great fears in him; he tried to at least contribute to maintaining friendship with Prussia and Austria, as far as this could depend on his personal efforts. In the summer of 1854, G. was transferred to Vienna, where at first he temporarily managed the embassy instead of Meyendorff, who was closely related to the Austrian minister, Count. Buol, and in the spring of 1855 he was finally appointed envoy to the Austrian court. During this critical period, when Austria “surprised the world with its ingratitude” and was preparing to act together with France and England against Russia (under the treaty of December 2, 1854), the position of the Russian envoy in Vienna was extremely difficult and responsible. After the death of the emperor. Nicholas, a conference of representatives of the great powers was convened in Vienna to determine the conditions of peace; but the negotiations in which Drouin de Louis and Lord John Rossel participated did not lead to a positive result, partly thanks to the art and perseverance of G. Austria again separated from the cabinets hostile to us and declared itself neutral. The fall of Sevastopol served as a signal for a new intervention by the Vienna cabinet, which itself, in the form of an ultimatum, presented Russia with well-known demands for an agreement with the Western powers. The Russian government was forced to accept the Austrian proposals, and in February 1856 a congress met in Paris to develop a final peace treaty.

The Treaty of Paris on March 18/30, 1856 ended the era of Russia’s active participation in Western European political affairs. Count Nesselrode retired, and Prince G. was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (in April 1856). G. felt the bitterness of defeat more than anyone else: he personally endured the most important stages of the struggle against the political hostility of Western Europe, in the very center of hostile combinations - Vienna. The painful impressions of the Crimean War and the Vienna conferences left their mark on G.'s subsequent activities as a minister. His general views on the tasks of international diplomacy could no longer seriously change; his political program was clearly determined by the circumstances under which he had to take over the management of the ministry. First of all, it was necessary to observe great restraint in the first years, while great internal changes were taking place; then Prince Gorchakov set himself two practical purposes- firstly, to repay Austria for its behavior in 1854-55, and secondly, to achieve the gradual destruction of the Paris Treaty.

In 1856, Prince. G. avoided participating in diplomatic measures against the abuses of the Neapolitan government, citing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign powers (circ. note 22/10 September); at the same time, he made it clear that Russia was not giving up its right to vote in European international issues, but was only gathering strength for the future: “La Russie ne boude pas - elle se recueille.” This phrase had big success in Europe and was accepted as an accurate description political situation Russia after the Crimean War. Three years later, Prince. G. stated that “Russia is leaving the position of restraint that it considered obligatory for itself after the Crimean War.” The Italian crisis of 1859 seriously worried our diplomacy: G. proposed convening a congress for a peaceful resolution of the issue, and when war turned out to be inevitable, he kept the minor German states from joining the policy of Austria and insisted on the purely defensive significance of the German Confederation (in note 15/27 May 1859). Since April 1859, Bismarck had been the Prussian envoy in St. Petersburg, and the solidarity of both diplomats regarding Austria did not remain without influence on further move events. Russia openly stood on the side of Napoleon III in his conflict with Austria over Italy. IN Russian-French relations a noticeable turn took place, which was officially prepared by the meeting of the two emperors in Stuttgart in 1857. But this rapprochement was very fragile, and after the triumph of the French over Austria under Magenta and Solferino, G. again seemed to be reconciled with the Viennese cabinet. In 1860, he considered it timely to remind Europe of the disastrous state of the Christian nations subject to the Turkish government, and suggested an international conference to revise the provisions of the Paris Treaty on this subject (note 20/2 May 1860); he expressed at the same time that “events in the West responded in the East as encouragement and hope” and that “conscience does not allow Russia to remain silent any longer about the unfortunate situation of Christians in the East.” The attempt was unsuccessful and was abandoned as premature. In October of the same 1860, Prince. G. is already talking about common interests Europe, affected by the successes of the national movement in Italy; on the note 10 Oct. (Sept. 28) he hotly reproaches the Sardinian government for its actions regarding Tuscany, Parma, Modena: “this is no longer a question of Italian interests, but of the common interests inherent in all governments; this is a question that has a direct connection with those eternal laws, without which neither order, nor peace, nor security can exist in Europe. The need to fight anarchy does not justify the Sardinian government, because one should not go along with the revolution in order to take advantage of its inheritance.” Condemning the popular aspirations of Italy so sharply, G. retreated from the principle of non-interference, which he proclaimed in 1856 regarding the abuses of the Neapolitan king, and involuntarily returned to the traditions of the era of congresses and the Holy Alliance; but his protest, although supported by Austria and Prussia, had no practical consequences.

The Polish question that appeared on the scene finally upset the nascent “friendship” of Russia with the empire of Napoleon III and consolidated the alliance with Prussia. At the head of the Prussian government in September. 1862 Bismarck rose. Since then, the policy of our Minister has paralleled the bold diplomacy of his Prussian brother, supporting and protecting it as far as possible. Prussia concluded a military convention with Russia on February 8. (March 27) 1863 to facilitate the task of Russian troops in the fight against Polish uprising. Intercession of England, Austria and France for national rights The Poles were decisively rejected by the prince. G., when it took the form of direct diplomatic intervention (in April 1863). Skillful and, at the end, energetic correspondence Polish question brought G. the glory of a top diplomat and made his name famous in Europe and Russia. This was the highest, culminating point political career book G. Meanwhile, his ally, Bismarck, began to implement his program, equally taking advantage of both the dreamy gullibility of Napoleon III and the constant friendship and assistance of the Russian minister. The Schleswig-Holstein dispute escalated and forced the cabinets to postpone concerns about Poland. Napoleon III again floated his favorite idea of a congress (at the end of October 1863) and again proposed it shortly before the formal break between Prussia and Austria (in April 1866), but without success. Book G., approving the French project in principle, objected both times to the practical expediency of the congress under the given circumstances. A war began, which with unexpected speed led to the complete triumph of the Prussians. Peace negotiations were carried out without any interference from other powers; The idea of a congress came to the prince. G., but was immediately abandoned by him, due to his reluctance to do something unpleasant to the victors. Moreover, Napoleon III this time abandoned the idea of a congress in view of Bismarck’s tempting secret promises regarding territorial rewards for France.

The brilliant success of Prussia in 1866 further strengthened its official friendship with Russia. Antagonism with France and mute opposition from Austria forced the Berlin cabinet to firmly adhere to the Russian alliance, while Russian diplomacy could fully retain freedom of action and had no intention of imposing on itself unilateral obligations beneficial exclusively for the neighboring power. The Candiot uprising against Turkish oppression, which lasted almost two years (from the autumn of 1866), gave Austria and France a reason to seek rapprochement with Russia on the basis of the eastern question; the Austrian minister Count Beist even allowed the idea of revising the Paris Treaty for general improvement life of Christian subjects of Turkey. The project of annexing Candia to Greece found support in Paris and Vienna, but was coldly received in St. Petersburg. The demands of Greece were not satisfied, and the matter was limited to the transformation of the local administration on the ill-fated island, allowing for some autonomy of the population. For Bismarck, it was completely undesirable for Russia to achieve anything in the East before the expected war in the West with the assistance of outside powers. Prince G. saw no reason to exchange Berlin friendship for any other; Having decided to follow Prussian policy, he chose to surrender to it with confidence, without doubts or worries. However, serious political measures and combinations did not always depend on the minister or chancellor, since the personal feelings and views of the sovereigns constituted a very important element in the international politics of that time. When the prelude to the bloody struggle broke out in the summer of 1870, Prince G. was in Wildbad and - according to the testimony of our diplomatic body, the Journal de St. Pétersbourg,” was no less amazed than others by the unexpectedness of the gap between France and Prussia. “Upon my return to St. Petersburg. he could only fully join the decision taken by Emperor Alexander II to keep Austria from participating in the war in order to avoid the need for intervention from Russia. The Chancellor expressed only regret that reciprocity of services had not been agreed upon with the Berlin cabinet for the proper protection of Russian interests” (“Journ. de St. Pet.”, March 1, 1883). The Franco-Prussian war was considered inevitable by everyone, and both powers had been openly preparing for it since 1867; Therefore, the absence of preliminary decisions and conditions regarding such an important issue as support for Prussia in its fight against France cannot be considered a mere accident. Obviously, Prince G. did not foresee that the empire of Napoleon III would be so brutally defeated; and yet the Russian government took the side of Prussia in advance and with complete determination, risking drawing the country into a clash with victorious France and its ally Austria and not caring about any specific benefits for Russia, even in the event of the complete triumph of Prussian weapons. Our diplomacy not only kept Austria from interfering, but diligently protected Prussia's freedom of military and political action throughout the duration of the war, until the final peace negotiations and the signing of the Frankfurt Treaty. The gratitude of Wilhelm I, expressed in a telegram on February 14/26, 1871 to the Emperor, is understandable. Alexander II. Prussia has achieved its cherished goal and created a new powerful empire with the significant assistance of Prince G., and the Russian chancellor took advantage of this change in circumstances to destroy the 2nd article of the Paris Treaty on the neutralization of the Black Sea. The dispatch of October 17 / 29, 1870, notifying the cabinets of this decision of Russia, caused a rather sharp response from Lord Grenville, but all the great powers agreed to revise the said article of the Treaty of Paris and again allow Russia to keep a navy in the Black Sea, which was what happened approved by the London Conference in 1871

After the defeat of France, the mutual relations between Bismarck and Gorchakov changed significantly: the German Chancellor outgrew his old friend and no longer needed him. From this time on, a series of bitter disappointments began for Russian diplomacy, which gave a sad, melancholy shade to everything. last period activities of G. Anticipating that the Eastern question would not be slow to arise again in one form or another, Bismarck hastened to arrange a new political combination with the participation of Austria as a counterweight to Russia in the East. Russia's entry into this triple alliance, which began in September. 1872, made Russian foreign policy dependent not only on Berlin, but also on Vienna, without any need for that. Austria could only benefit from the constant mediation and assistance of Germany in relations with Russia, and Russia was left to protect the so-called pan-European, i.e., essentially the same Austrian, interests, the range of which was increasingly expanding in the Balkan Peninsula. Having bound himself to this system of preliminary agreements and concessions, Prince G. allowed or was forced to allow the country to be drawn into a difficult, bloody war, with the obligation not to derive any corresponding benefit from it for the state and to be guided in determining the results of victory by the interests and desires of alien and partly hostile cabinets. In minor or extraneous matters, such as the recognition of the government of Marshal Serrano in Spain in 1874, Prince. G. often disagreed with Bismarck, but in the essential and most important things he still trustingly obeyed his suggestions. A serious disagreement occurred only in 1875, when the Russian chancellor assumed the role of guardian of France and general peace from the encroachments of the Prussian military party and officially informed the powers of the success of his efforts in a note on April 30 (May 12) of the same year. Book Bismarck harbored irritation and maintained his former friendship in view of the emerging Balkan crisis, in which his participation was required in favor of Austria and, indirectly, Germany; later he repeatedly stated that relations with Gorchakov and Russia were spoiled by his “inappropriate” public intercession for France in 1875. All phases of eastern complications were passed through by the Russian government as part of the Triple Alliance, until it came to war; and after Russia fought and dealt with Turkey, the Triple Alliance again came into its own and, with the help of England, determined the final peace conditions most beneficial for the Vienna cabinet.

In April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. Even with the declaration of war, the elderly chancellor associated the fiction of authority from Europe, so that the paths to independent and open defense of Russian interests on the Balkan Peninsula after the enormous sacrifices of the two-year campaign were cut off in advance. Prince G. promised Austria that Russia would not go beyond the limits of the moderate program when concluding peace; in England it was entrusted to gr. Shuvalov to declare that the Russian army would not cross the Balkans, but the promise was taken back after it had already been transferred to the London cabinet - which aroused displeasure and gave another reason for protests. Hesitations, errors and contradictions in the actions of diplomacy accompanied all the changes in the theater of war. The Treaty of San Stefano on February 19 (March 3), 1878, created a vast Bulgaria, but increased Serbia and Montenegro with only small territorial increments, left Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish rule and gave nothing to Greece, so almost everyone was extremely dissatisfied with the treaty Balkan peoples and precisely those who made the most sacrifices in the fight against the Turks - Serbs and Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Herzegovinians. The Great Powers had to intercede for the offended Greece, make territorial gains for the Serbs and arrange the fate of the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians, whom Russian diplomacy had previously given under the rule of Austria (according to the Reichstadt Agreement of July 8/June 26, 1876). There could be no question of avoiding the congress, as Bismarck managed after Sadovaya. England was apparently preparing for war. Russia proposed to the German Chancellor to organize a congress in Berlin; between gr. Shuvalov and the Marquis of Salisbury reached an agreement on May 30/12 regarding issues to be discussed between the powers. At the Berlin Congress (from June 1/13 to July 1/13, 1878), Prince G. rarely and rarely participated in meetings; he attached particular importance to the fact that part of Bessarabia, taken from it under the Treaty of Paris, should be returned to Russia, and Romania should receive Dobruja in return. England's proposal for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops was warmly supported by the chairman of the congress, Bismarck, against the Turkish commissioners; book G. also spoke out for the occupation (meeting June 16/28). The German Chancellor supported everything positively stated Russian demand, but could not, of course, go further than Russian diplomats in protecting Russia’s political interests - and our diplomacy, from the beginning of the crisis to the end, acted without clearly defined goals and without deliberate methods of execution. Blaming Bismarck for our military-political mistakes and shortcomings would be too naive; he himself was confident that Russia would put an end to the eastern question this time and would be able to take advantage of the principle of “beati possidentes”, giving Austria and England a certain share of participation in the Turkish inheritance. Prince G. cared primarily about the consent of the powers, about the interests of Europe, about the selflessness of Russia, which, however, did not require such bloody and difficult evidence as war. The destruction of individual articles of the Treaty of Paris, which was more a matter of diplomatic pride than a serious matter, came to the fore. state interest. Later, part of the Russian press brutally attacked Germany and its chancellor as allegedly the main culprit of our failures; There was a cooling between both powers, and in September 1879, Prince Bismarck decided to conclude a special defensive alliance against Russia in Vienna. The political career of Prince Gorchakov ended Berlin Congress; From then on, he took almost no part in affairs, although he retained the honorary title of State Chancellor. He died in Baden on February 27. 1883. He ceased to be a minister, even nominally, in March 1882, when N.K. Girs was appointed in his place.

To correctly assess Gorchakov’s entire activity, it is necessary to keep in mind two circumstances. Firstly, its political character was developed and finally established during the reign of Emperor Nicholas, in that era when it was considered obligatory for Russia to take care of the fate of various European dynasties, to strive for balance and harmony in Europe, even to the detriment of the real interests and needs of their own country. Secondly, Russian foreign policy is not always directed solely by the foreign minister. Next to Gorchakov, although under his nominal leadership, Count Ignatiev and Count acted on behalf of Russia. Shuvalov, who had little agreement among themselves and were hardly in solidarity with the Chancellor himself in many respects: this lack of unity was expressed especially sharply in the drafting of the Treaty of San Stefano and in the way it was defended at the congress. Book G. was a sincere supporter of peace and, nevertheless, had to, against his will, bring matters to war. This war, as was stated frankly in the Journal de St.-Pétersbourg after his death, “was a complete overthrow of the entire political system of the prince. Gorchakov, which seemed to him mandatory for Russia for many years to come. When war became inevitable, the Chancellor stated that he could guarantee Russia against a hostile coalition only under two conditions - namely, if the war was short and if the goal of the campaign was moderate, without crossing the Balkans. These views were accepted by the imperial government. Thus we were undertaking a half-war, and it could only lead to half-peace.” Meanwhile, the war turned out to be real and very difficult, and its comparative futility was partly the result of the semi-politics of Prince Gorchakov. His hesitations and half-measures reflected, as it were, a struggle between two directions - the traditional, ambitiously international one, and the practical one, based on an understanding of the internal interests of the state. This ambiguity starting point vision and lack of accurate practical program were revealed primarily in the fact that events were never foreseen in advance and always took us by surprise. Bismarck's sober, vital methods did not have a noticeable impact on the diplomacy of the prince. Gorchakova. The latter still adhered to many outdated traditions and remained a diplomat of the old school, for whom a skillfully written note is a goal in itself. The pale figure of G. could seem bright only due to the absence of his rivals in Russia and the calm course of political affairs.

Since with the name of the prince. G. is closely related political history Russia during the reign of the Emperor. Alexander II, then information and discussions about him can be found in every historical work related to Russian politics for this quarter of a century. A more detailed, although very one-sided, characterization of our chancellor in comparison with Bismarck was made in the famous French book by Julian Klyachko: “Deux Chanceliers. Le prince Gortschakoff et le prince de Bismarck" (P., 1876).

Spouse Musina-Pushkina, Maria Alexandrovna [d]

Lyceum. “Happy from the first days.” Carier start

Alexander Gorchakov was educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he was a friend of Pushkin. From his youth, “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world, a brilliant observer of customs” (as Pushkin characterized him in one of his letters), until late old age he was distinguished by those qualities that were considered most necessary for a diplomat. In addition to secular talents and salon wit, he also had a significant literary education, which was later reflected in his eloquent diplomatic notes. Circumstances early allowed him to study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe.

In 1819, Gorchakov was awarded the court title of chamber cadet. In 1820-1822. he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Troppau, Ljubljana and Verona; in 1822 he was appointed secretary of the embassy in London, where he remained until 1827; then he was in the same position at the mission in Rome, in 1828 he was transferred to Berlin as an embassy adviser, from there to Florence as a chargé d'affaires, and in 1833 as an embassy adviser in Vienna. In July 1838 he was forced to resign due to marriage (see section " Personal life"), but returned to service in October 1839. During the period of resignation, Gorchakov, as an exception, retained the court title of chamberlain, which he received in 1828.

Ambassador to the German States

At the end of 1850, he was appointed commissioner to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt, retaining his former post at the Württemberg court. Russian influence then dominated the political life of Germany. In the restored Union Sejm, the Russian government saw “the guarantee of preserving common peace.” Prince Gorchakov stayed in Frankfurt am Main for four years; there he became especially close to the Prussian representative, Otto von Bismarck.

Bismarck was then a supporter of a close alliance with Russia and ardently supported its policies, for which Emperor Nicholas expressed special gratitude to him (according to the report of the Russian representative at the Sejm after Gorchakov, D. G. Glinka). Gorchakov, like Nesselrode, did not share Emperor Nicholas’ passion for the eastern question, and the diplomatic campaign that had begun against Turkey caused him great concern; he tried to at least contribute to maintaining friendship with Prussia and Austria, as far as this could depend on his personal efforts.

The Crimean War and the “ungratefulness” of Austria

« Events in the West resonated in the East with encouragement and hope.”, he put it, and “ conscience does not allow Russia to remain silent any longer about the unfortunate situation of Christians in the East" The attempt was unsuccessful and was abandoned as premature.

Condemning the popular aspirations of Italy so sharply, Gorchakov retreated from the principle of non-interference, which he proclaimed in 1856 regarding the abuses of the Neapolitan king, and unwittingly returned to the traditions of the era of congresses and the Holy Alliance. His protest, although supported by Austria and Prussia, had no practical consequences.

Polish question. Austro-Prussian War

The Polish question that appeared on the scene finally upset the nascent “friendship” of Russia with the empire of Napoleon III and consolidated the alliance with Prussia. Bismarck took charge of the Prussian government in September 1862. Since then, the policy of the Russian minister went in parallel with the bold diplomacy of his Prussian brother, supporting and protecting it as much as possible. On February 8 (March 27), Prussia concluded the Alvensleben Convention with Russia to facilitate the task of Russian troops in the fight against the Polish uprising.

The intercession of England, Austria and France for the national rights of the Poles was decisively rejected by Prince Gorchakov when, in April 1863, it took the form of direct diplomatic intervention. Skillful and, in the end, energetic correspondence on the Polish issue gave Gorchakov the glory of a top diplomat and made his name famous in Europe and Russia. This was the highest, culminating point of Gorchakov’s political career.

Meanwhile, his ally, Bismarck, began to implement his program, equally taking advantage of both the dreamy credulity of Napoleon III and the constant friendship and assistance of the Russian minister. The Schleswig-Holstein dispute escalated and forced the cabinets to postpone concerns about Poland. Napoleon III again floated his favorite idea of a congress (at the end of October 1863) and again proposed it shortly before the formal break between Prussia and Austria (in April 1866), but without success. Gorchakov, while approving the French project in principle, both times objected to the congress under the given circumstances. A war began, which unexpectedly quickly led to the complete triumph of the Prussians. Peace negotiations were carried out without any interference from other powers; The idea of a congress came to Gorchakov, but was immediately abandoned by him due to his reluctance to do anything unpleasant to the victors. Moreover, Napoleon III this time abandoned the idea of a congress in view of Bismarck’s tempting secret promises regarding territorial rewards for France. Honorary member of Moscow University (1867).

Period of strengthening of Germany

The power of Germany. Triple Alliance

After the defeat of France, the mutual relationship between Bismarck and Gorchakov changed significantly: the German Chancellor outgrew his old friend and no longer needed him. Anticipating that the Eastern question would not be slow to arise again in one form or another, Bismarck hastened to arrange a new political combination with the participation of Austria as a counterweight to Russia in the East. Russia's entry into this triple alliance, which began in September 1872, made Russian foreign policy dependent not only on Berlin, but also on Vienna, without any need for that. Austria could only benefit from the constant mediation and assistance of Germany in relations with Russia, and Russia was left to protect the so-called pan-European, that is, essentially the same Austrian, interests, the circle of which was increasingly expanding on the Balkan Peninsula.

Chancellor Bismarck harbored irritation and maintained his former friendship in view of the emerging Balkan crisis, in which his participation was required in favor of Austria and, indirectly, Germany; later he repeatedly stated that relations with Gorchakov and Russia were spoiled by his “inappropriate” public intercession for France in 1875. All phases of eastern complications were passed through by the Russian government as part of the Triple Alliance, until it came to war; and after Russia fought and dealt with Turkey, the Triple Alliance again came into its own and, with the help of England, determined the final peace conditions most beneficial for the Vienna cabinet.

The diplomatic context of the Russian-Turkish war and the Berlin Congress

In April 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey. Even with the declaration of war, the elderly chancellor associated the fiction of powers from Europe, so that the paths to independent and open defense of Russian interests on the Balkan Peninsula after the enormous sacrifices of the two-year campaign were cut off in advance. He promised Austria that Russia would not go beyond the limits of the moderate program when concluding peace; in England, Shuvalov was instructed to declare that the Russian army would not cross the Balkans, but the promise was taken back after it had already been transferred to the London cabinet - which aroused displeasure and gave another reason for protests.

Hesitations, errors and contradictions in the actions of diplomacy accompanied all the changes in the theater of war. Treaty of San Stefano February 19 (March 3) July 8

At the Berlin Congress (from June 1 (13) to July 1 (13), Gorchakov took part in meetings little and rarely; he attached particular importance to the fact that part of Bessarabia, taken from it under the Treaty of Paris, should be returned to Russia, and Romania should receive Dobruja in return. England's proposal for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops was warmly supported by the chairman of the congress, Bismarck, against the Turkish commissioners; Prince Gorchakov also spoke out in favor of occupation (meeting on June 16 (28). Later, part of the Russian press brutally attacked Germany and its chancellor as the main culprit for Russia's failures; There was a cooling between both powers, and in September 1879, Prince Bismarck decided to conclude a special defensive alliance against Russia in Vienna.

Which of us needs the Lyceum Day in our old age?
Will you have to celebrate alone?

Unhappy friend! among new generations
The annoying guest is both superfluous and alien,
He will remember us and the days of connections,
Closing my eyes with a trembling hand...
Let it be with sad joy
Then he will spend this day at the cup,
Like now I, your disgraced recluse,
He spent it without grief and worries.

The political career of Prince Gorchakov ended with the Berlin Congress; From then on, he took almost no part in affairs, although he retained the honorary title of State Chancellor. He ceased to be a minister, even nominally, from March 1882, when N.K. Girs was appointed in his place.

Gorchakov, in order of award, was one of the pensioners - Knights of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called (800 rubles per year) and pensioners - Knights, the niece of his boss D. P. Tatishchev, a Moscow beauty with whom Pushkin was infatuated, thus acquiring a stepdaughter and 4 stepsons, including Alexander Musin-Pushkin. For the sake of this marriage, he had to resign and leave for a while diplomatic service. The couple had sons Mikhail (1839-1897) and Konstantin (1841-1926).

Here is how Prince P.V. Dolgorukov wrote about his resignation in “Petersburg Sketches”: “Tatishchev did not want his niece, who had no other fortune except the seventh part after her (however, very rich) husband, to marry a man who did not who had absolutely no fortune. Tatishchev’s dislike for this marriage was still skillfully inflated by the then ruler of Austrian politics, famous prince Metternich; he did not love Prince Gorchakov for his Russian soul, for his Russian feelings, for his intransigence, always covered by an excellent knowledge of decency, the most elegant politeness, but nevertheless very unpleasant for Metternich; in a word, he tried with all his might to quarrel between Tatishchev and Prince Gorchakov and remove the latter from Vienna. The thing was a success. Tatishchev resolutely rebelled against the wedding. Prince Gorchakov, faced with the inevitable need to choose between his beloved woman and a service that was very tempting for his ambition, did not hesitate: despite his enormous ambition, he retired in 1838 and married Countess Pushkina.” Later family ties The Urusovs, his wife's relatives, helped him return to service and resume his career.

The descendants of Konstantin Gorchakov, who died in Paris, live in Western Europe and Latin America.

Period of strengthening of Germany

Last years

Curious facts

Modern

Memory of Gorchakov

Gorchakov in literature

His Serene Highness Prince (June 4 (15), 1798, Gapsal - February 27 (March 11), 1883, Baden-Baden) - a prominent Russian diplomat and statesman, chancellor, holder of the Order of the Holy Apostle Andrew the First-Called.

Lyceum. “Happy from the first days.” Carier start

Born into the family of Prince M.A. Gorchakov and Elena Vasilievna Ferzen.

He was educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he was a friend of Pushkin. From his youth, “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world, a brilliant observer of customs” (as Pushkin characterized him in one of his letters), until late old age he was distinguished by those qualities that were considered most necessary for a diplomat. In addition to secular talents and salon wit, he also had a significant literary education, which was later reflected in his eloquent diplomatic notes. Circumstances early allowed him to study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe. In 1820-1822. he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Troppau, Ljubljana and Verona; in 1822 he was appointed secretary of the embassy in London, where he remained until 1827; then he was in the same position at the mission in Rome, in 1828 he was transferred to Berlin as an embassy adviser, from there to Florence as a chargé d'affaires, and in 1833 as an embassy adviser in Vienna.

Ambassador to the German States

In 1841 he was sent to Stuttgart to arrange the marriage of Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna with Karl Friedrich, Crown Prince of Württemberg, and after the wedding he remained envoy extraordinary there for twelve years. From Stuttgart he had the opportunity to closely follow the progress of the revolutionary movement in Southern Germany and the events of 1848-1849 in Frankfurt am Main. At the end of 1850 he was appointed commissioner to the German Diet in Frankfurt, retaining his previous post at the Württemberg court. Russian influence then dominated the political life of Germany. In the restored Union Sejm, the Russian government saw “the guarantee of preserving common peace.” Prince Gorchakov stayed in Frankfurt am Main for four years; there he became especially close to the Prussian representative, Bismarck. Bismarck was then a supporter of a close alliance with Russia and ardently supported its policies, for which Emperor Nicholas expressed special gratitude to him (according to the report of the Russian representative at the Sejm after Gorchakov, D. G. Glinka). Gorchakov, like Nesselrode, did not share Emperor Nicholas’ passion for the eastern question, and the beginning of the diplomatic campaign against Turkey caused him great concern; he tried to at least contribute to maintaining friendship with Prussia and Austria, as far as this could depend on his personal efforts.

The Crimean War and the “ungratefulness” of Austria

In the summer of 1854, Gorchakov was transferred to Vienna, where he first temporarily managed the embassy instead of Meyendorff, who was closely related to the Austrian minister, Count Buol, and in the spring of 1855 he was finally appointed envoy to the Austrian court. During this critical period, when Austria “surprised the world with its ingratitude” and was preparing to act together with France and England against Russia (under the treaty of December 2, 1854), the position of the Russian envoy in Vienna was extremely difficult and responsible. After the death of Emperor Nicholas I, a conference of representatives of the great powers was convened in Vienna to determine peace terms; Although the negotiations in which Drouin de Louis and Lord John Russell participated did not lead to a positive result, partly thanks to the skill and perseverance of Gorchakov, Austria again separated from cabinets hostile to Russia and declared itself neutral. The fall of Sevastopol served as a signal for a new intervention by the Vienna cabinet, which itself, in the form of an ultimatum, presented Russia with well-known demands for an agreement with the Western powers. The Russian government was forced to accept the Austrian proposals, and in February 1856 a congress met in Paris to develop a final peace treaty.

Minister

The Peace of Paris and the first years after the Crimean War

The Treaty of Paris on March 18 (30), 1856 ended the era of Russia's active participation in Western European political affairs. Count Nesselrode retired, and in April 1856 Prince Gorchakov was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He felt the bitterness of defeat more than anyone else: he personally endured the most important stages of the struggle against the political hostility of Western Europe, in the very center of hostile combinations - Vienna. The painful impressions of the Crimean War and the Vienna conferences left their mark on Gorchakov’s subsequent activities as a minister. His general views on the tasks of international diplomacy could no longer seriously change; his political program was clearly determined by the circumstances under which he had to take over the management of the ministry. First of all, it was necessary to observe great restraint in the first years, while great internal changes were taking place; then Prince Gorchakov set himself two practical goals - firstly, to repay Austria for its behavior in 1854-1855. and, secondly, to achieve the gradual denunciation of the Treaty of Paris.

1850-1860s. Beginning of the alliance with Bismarck

In [U Gorchakov avoided participating in diplomatic measures against the abuses of the Neapolitan government, citing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign powers (circular note dated September 10 (22). At the same time, he made it clear that Russia is not giving up its right to vote in European international issues, but is only gathering strength for the future: “La Russie ne boude pas - elle se recueille” (Russia is concentrating). This phrase had great success in Europe and was accepted as an accurate description of the political situation in Russia after the Crimean War. Three years later, Prince Gorchakov said that “Russia is leaving the position of restraint that it considered obligatory for itself after the Crimean War.”

The Italian crisis of 1859 seriously concerned Russian diplomacy. Gorchakov proposed convening a congress to peacefully resolve the issue, and when war turned out to be inevitable, in a note on May 15 (27), 1859, he called on the minor German states to refrain from joining the policy of Austria and insisted on the purely defensive significance of the German Confederation. From April 1859, Bismarck was the Prussian envoy in St. Petersburg, and the solidarity of both diplomats regarding Austria influenced the further course of events. Russia openly stood on the side of Napoleon III in his conflict with Austria over Italy. There was a noticeable turn in Russian-French relations, which was officially prepared by the meeting of the two emperors in Stuttgart in 1857. But this rapprochement was very fragile, and after the triumph of the French over Austria under Magenta and Solferino, Gorchakov again seemed to reconcile with the Viennese cabinet.

In 1860, Gorchakov recognized it as timely to remind Europe of the disastrous state of Christian nations subject to the Turkish government, and expressed the idea of an international conference to revise the provisions of the Paris Treaty on this issue (note 2 (20) May 1860). " Events in the West resonated in the East with encouragement and hope.”, he put it, and “ conscience does not allow Russia to remain silent any longer about the unfortunate situation of Christians in the East" The attempt was unsuccessful and was abandoned as premature.

In October of the same 1860, Prince Gorchakov already spoke about the common interests of Europe, affected by the successes of the national movement in Italy; in a note on September 28 (October 10), he hotly reproaches the Sardinian government for its actions regarding Tuscany, Parma, Modena: “ this is no longer a question of Italian interests, but of the common interests inherent in all governments; this is a question that has a direct connection with those eternal laws, without which neither order, nor peace, nor security can exist in Europe. The need to fight anarchy does not justify the Sardinian government, because one should not go along with the revolution in order to benefit from its legacy" Condemning the popular aspirations of Italy so sharply, Gorchakov retreated from the principle of non-interference, which he proclaimed in 1856 regarding the abuses of the Neapolitan king, and unwittingly returned to the traditions of the era of congresses and the Holy Alliance. His protest, although supported by Austria and Prussia, had no practical consequences.

Polish question. Austro-Prussian War

The Polish question that appeared on the scene finally upset the nascent “friendship” of Russia with the empire of Napoleon III and consolidated the alliance with Prussia. Bismarck took charge of the Prussian government in September 1862. Since then, the policy of the Russian minister went in parallel with the bold diplomacy of his Prussian brother, supporting and protecting it as much as possible. On February 8 (March 27), 1863, Prussia concluded the Alvensleben Convention with Russia to facilitate the task of Russian troops in the fight against the Polish uprising.

Period of strengthening of Germany

The Candiot uprising against Turkish oppression, which lasted almost two years (from the autumn of 1866), gave Austria and France a reason to seek rapprochement with Russia on the basis of the eastern question. The Austrian minister Count Beist even admitted the idea of revising the Treaty of Paris to improve the situation of Christian subjects of Turkey. The project of annexing Candia to Greece found support in Paris and Vienna, but was coldly received in St. Petersburg. The demands of Greece were not satisfied, and the matter was limited to the transformation of the local administration on the ill-fated island, allowing for some autonomy of the population. For Bismarck, it was completely undesirable for Russia to achieve anything in the East before the expected war in the West with the assistance of outside powers.

Gorchakov saw no reason to exchange Berlin friendship for any other. As L. Z. Slonimsky wrote in an article about Gorchakov in ESBE “having decided to follow Prussian policy, he chose to surrender to it with confidence, without doubts or worries”. However, serious political measures and combinations did not always depend on the minister or chancellor, since the personal feelings and views of the sovereigns constituted a very important element in the international politics of that time.

When the prelude to the bloody struggle took place in the summer of 1870, Prince Gorchakov was in Wildbad and, according to the Russian diplomatic organ, the Journal de St. Pétersbourg,” was no less amazed than others by the unexpectedness of the gap between France and Prussia. “Upon his return to St. Petersburg, he could only fully join the decision made by Emperor Alexander II to keep Austria from participating in the war in order to avoid the need for intervention from Russia. The Chancellor expressed only regret that reciprocity of services with the Berlin cabinet was not stipulated for the proper protection of Russian interests.”(“Journ. de St. Pet.”, March 1, 1883).

A Franco-Prussian war was widely considered inevitable, and both powers had been openly preparing for it since 1867; Therefore, the absence of preliminary decisions and conditions regarding such an important issue as support for Prussia in its fight against France cannot be considered a mere accident. Obviously, Prince Gorchakov did not expect that the empire of Napoleon III would be so brutally defeated. Nevertheless, the Russian government took the side of Prussia in advance and with complete determination, risking drawing the country into a clash with victorious France and its ally Austria and not caring about any specific benefits for Russia, even in the event of the complete triumph of Prussian weapons.

Russian diplomacy not only kept Austria from interfering, but also diligently protected Prussia's freedom of military and political action throughout the war, right up to the final peace negotiations and the signing of the Frankfurt Treaty. The gratitude of Wilhelm I, expressed in a telegram on February 14, 1871 to Emperor Alexander II, is understandable. Prussia achieved its cherished goal and created a powerful new empire with the significant assistance of Gorchakov, and the Russian chancellor took advantage of this change in circumstances to destroy the 2nd article of the Paris Treaty on the neutralization of the Black Sea. The dispatch of October 19, 1870, notifying the cabinets of this decision of Russia, caused a rather sharp response from Lord Grenville, but all the great powers agreed to revise the said article of the Treaty of Paris and again grant Russia the right to maintain a navy in the Black Sea, which was approved by the London Treaty. convention of 1871.

Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev noted this event in verse:

The power of Germany. Triple Alliance

In minor or extraneous issues, such as the recognition of the government of Marshal Serrano in Spain in 1874, Prince Gorchakov often disagreed with Bismarck, but in essential and important matters he still trustingly obeyed his suggestions. A serious quarrel occurred only in 1875, when the Russian chancellor assumed the role of guardian of France and the general world from the encroachments of the Prussian military party and officially informed the powers of the success of his efforts in a note on April 30 of that year. Prince Bismarck harbored irritation and maintained his former friendship in view of the emerging Balkan crisis, in which his participation was required in favor of Austria and, indirectly, Germany; later he repeatedly stated that relations with Gorchakov and Russia were spoiled by his “inappropriate” public intercession for France in 1875. All phases of eastern complications were passed through by the Russian government as part of the Triple Alliance, until it came to war; and after Russia fought and dealt with Turkey, the Triple Alliance again came into its own and, with the help of England, determined the final peace conditions most beneficial for the Vienna cabinet.

The diplomatic context of the Russian-Turkish war and the Berlin Congress

In April 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey. Even with the declaration of war, the elderly chancellor associated the fiction of authority from Europe, so that the paths to independent and open defense of Russian interests on the Balkan Peninsula after the enormous sacrifices of the two-year campaign were cut off in advance. He promised Austria that Russia would not go beyond the limits of the moderate program when concluding peace; in England, Shuvalov was instructed to declare that the Russian army would not cross the Balkans, but the promise was taken back after it had already been transferred to the London cabinet - which aroused displeasure and gave another reason for protests. Hesitations, errors and contradictions in the actions of diplomacy accompanied all the changes in the theater of war. The Treaty of San Stefano on February 19 (March 3), 1878 created a vast Bulgaria, but increased Serbia and Montenegro with only small territorial increments, left Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish rule and gave nothing to Greece, so that almost all the Balkan peoples and precisely those who made the most sacrifices in the fight against the Turks - Serbs and Montenegrins, Bosnians and Herzegovinians. The Great Powers had to intercede for the offended Greece, make territorial gains for the Serbs and arrange the fate of the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians, whom Russian diplomacy had previously given under the rule of Austria (according to the Reichstadt Agreement on June 26 (July 8), 1876). There could be no question of avoiding the congress, as Bismarck managed after Sadovaya. England was apparently preparing for war. Russia proposed to the German Chancellor to organize a congress in Berlin; between Russian Ambassador In Great Britain, Count Shuvalov and the British Foreign Minister the Marquis of Salisbury reached an agreement on May 12 (30) regarding issues to be discussed between the powers.

At the Berlin Congress (from June 1 (13) to July 1 (13), 1878), Gorchakov took part in few and rare meetings; he attached particular importance to the fact that part of Bessarabia, taken from it under the Treaty of Paris, should be returned to Russia, and Romania should receive Dobruja in return. England's proposal for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops was warmly supported by the chairman of the congress, Bismarck, against the Turkish commissioners; Prince Gorchakov also spoke out in favor of occupation (meeting on June 16 (28). Later, part of the Russian press brutally attacked Germany and its chancellor as the main culprit for Russia's failures; There was a cooling between both powers, and in September 1879, Prince Bismarck decided to conclude a special defensive alliance against Russia in Vienna.

Which of us needs the Lyceum Day in our old age?
Will you have to celebrate alone?

Last years

In 1880, Gorchakov could not come to the celebrations on the occasion of the opening of the monument to Pushkin (at that time, of Pushkin’s lyceum comrades, only he and S. D. Komovsky were alive), but gave interviews to correspondents and Pushkin scholars. Soon after Pushkin's celebrations, Komovsky died, and Gorchakov remained the last lyceum student. These lines of Pushkin turned out to be said about him...

The political career of Prince Gorchakov ended with the Berlin Congress; From then on, he took almost no part in affairs, although he retained the honorary title of State Chancellor. He ceased to be a minister, even nominally, in March 1882, when N.K. Girs was appointed in his place.

Died in Baden-Baden.

He was buried in the family crypt at the cemetery of the Sergius Seaside Hermitage (the grave has survived to this day).

Curious facts

After the prince's death, Pushkin's unknown lyceum poem "The Monk" was discovered among his papers.