S. Lebedev philosophy of science. Philosophy of science general course

manual for universities

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

GENERAL COURSE

Under ed. S.A. Lebedeva

Academic Project 2 0 0 7

UDC 1/14 BBK 87 F56

AUTHOR TEAM: S.A Lebedev(Head of the Autonomous College) - Doctor of Philosophy. sciences, professor - preface, introduction, section AND, chapter VI, chapter VIII, applications. A.N. Avdulov- Doctor of Philosophy n. - chapter V V.G. Borzenkov VIII G.V. Bromberg- Ph.D. tech. n. - chapter VI V.V. Ilyin- Doctor of Philosophy Sc., prof. - chapter I F.V. Lazarev- Doctor of Philosophy, prof. - chapter II L.V. Leskov- Doctor of Physics and Mathematics Sc., prof. - chapter VII E.M. Mirsky- Doctor of Philosophy n. - chapter III B.G. Yudin- Corresponding Member RAS, prof. - chapter IV

Philosophy of Science / ed. S.A. Lebedeva: F56 Textbook for universities. Ed. 5th, revised and additional - M.: Academic Project; Alma Mater, 2007. - 731 p.- (« Gaudeamus»).

ISBN 978-5-8291-0860-1 (Academic Project)

ISBN 978-5-902766-40-7 (Alma Mater)

The textbook was written by a team of scientists and teachers from Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov and the Russian Academy of Sciences. It is addressed primarily to graduate students of all specialties to prepare for the exam for the new candidate minimum “History and Philosophy of Science.” The textbook was tested at the Department of Philosophy of the Institute for Retraining and Advanced Training of Teachers of the Humanities and social sciences Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov.

© Academic Project, original ISBN 978-5-8291-0860-1 layout, design, 2007 ISBN 978-5-902766-40-7 © Alma Mater, 2007

Preface

Currently, for all Russian graduate students and candidates for the degree of Candidate of Sciences (regardless of the specific specialty), a requirement has been introduced to pass an exam in a new candidate minimum discipline, which is called “History and Philosophy of Science.” The Program of the new candidate minimum, approved by the Ministry of Education and Science, has already been published, as well as a number of textbooks and teaching aids on the three main structural components of this mini-mum 1) general philosophy of science, 2) modern philosophical problems various industries sciences (natural sciences, mathematics, technical sciences, social and humanitarian knowledge), 3) the history of science in general and the history of individual scientific disciplines. The content of the first component of the candidate minimum is consideration of general philosophical questions science as a whole: the concept of science (and, accordingly, discussion of the criteria of scientific character), structure scientific knowledge(its levels, types, types, etc.), development of scientific knowledge (character, driving forces, orientation, etc.), the functioning of science as a special social institution, the interaction of science and society, etc. The authors of this textbook focused on these general problems of the philosophy of science.

The second component of the content of the new candidate minimum is the history of science. It is clear that there are also options here. First of all, this is a general history of science, giving an idea of ​​the genesis and main historical stages development of science as a whole. IN small volume Such a presentation of the general history of science is presented in the first chapter of this textbook. It is possible that in some universities the history of science may be limited either to the general history of natural science, or to the history of technology, or to the history humanitarian knowledge. Acquaintance of graduate students with the history of science can be somewhere reduced to more detailed presentation a specific science relevant to the university (physics, chemistry, biology, history, pedagogy, mathematics, management, etc.). Finally, the third component of the content of the new candidate minimum is graduate students’ knowledge of philosophical problems of one of the specific sciences close to their university profile (philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of psychology, etc.).

The joining of all three components in a candidate minimum can be carried out by the most in various ways(there are no official restrictions on this) and potentially contains a huge variety of content options. This will largely be determined by the profile of the university, the composition of the lecturers, their interests and knowledge, and, finally, the desires of the listeners themselves. With all the possible substantive diversity in the history and philosophy of science courses taught to graduate students at various universities, we are convinced that there must be some similarity, some unity between them. The general philosophy of science should become such a unifying principle for all of them, to the presentation of the main content of which this textbook is dedicated.

At the same time, we must be clear from the very beginning that in the history of world philosophy there has never been a single, equally understood philosophy of science (for philosophy, pluralism is an absolutely natural and necessary condition for its existence). In exactly the same way in modern philosophical and scientific thought There is a huge variety of concepts in the history and philosophy of science. And this is a consequence of the fact that every concept of the philosophy of science (Kantagan, Hegelian, Marxist-Leninist, positivist, natural philosophy, Husserlian, pragmatist, radical constructivist, analytical, postmodernist, etc.) is always the application of the explanatory resource of one or another general philosophical doctrine to the understanding of science and scientific knowledge. Of course, this is not a simple mechanical imposition of general philosophical schemes on the material of science, but always some kind of creative synthesis of philosophical and concrete scientific knowledge, carried out by a specific philosopher or scientist. The essence does not change from this: the defining element of this or that philosophy of science is always the preference, the choice made by its representatives of a certain general philosophy(materialism, idealism, empiricism, transcendentalism, philosophy of culture, philosophy of life, structuralism, analytical philosophy, pragmatism, rational theology and teleology, etc.). So to expect that there is, is possible or should be some kind of single, acceptable by all “ scientific philosophy science" - is a sure way to drive yourself into a dead end of illusions.

On the other hand, the question naturally arises: is it possible to somehow “bypass” pluralism? philosophies of science"and develop a general, invariant part of the content of the latter? My answer is yes. However, it is possible to form such a maximally consensually acceptable part of the philosophy of science only by observing two following conditions: 1) orientation towards discussing such a list of problems of the philosophy of science, which is constantly reproduced in most “philosophies of science”, regardless of their specific solutions; 2) orientation towards discussing such common problems philosophy of science, which are relevant for understanding not only its history, but also its current state and possible future.

It seems that the introduction of a new candidate minimum in the history and philosophy of science will certainly increase the general philosophical and methodological culture of Russian scientists. Russian science has always, as is known, been distinguished by a craving for the theoretical and fundamental. At the same time, over the past two decades, due to the departure from the political and ideological arena of Russia of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as the “universal methodology of science,” the aspiration of our scientists to new philosophical shores has not yet received sufficient certainty. This is rather a time of rethinking, waiting and new philosophical “maturation”. However, I believe that the worthy Russian science and philosophy, a time when courses of lectures by major Russian scientists on the philosophy of science will become a frequent culturally significant event in our lives.

The first edition of this textbook was published V 2004 G. Behind last years The publishing house "Academic Project" also published a series of our teaching aids: "Philosophy natural sciences", "Philosophy of social and humanities", "Philosophy of technical sciences, mathematics and computer science", "Philosophy of science: a dictionary of basic terms." These works provide a concretization of the provisions of the general philosophy of science set out in this textbook applied to various directions and areas of modern scientific knowledge.

S.A. Lebedev, Honored Professor of Moscow University

Introduction. CONCEPT OF SCIENCE

There are two possible ways of philosophically understanding such a cognitive construct (and its corresponding reality) as “science”. The first is transcendental-analytical. It consists, firstly, in defining “science” as a specific structure of consciousness in its knowledge and cognitive-processual certainty. Secondly, in answer to the question: how is such a structure possible from the point of view general characteristics consciousness, the foundations and cognitive means available in it? This approach is immanently philosophical, since it relies primarily on the categorical resources of philosophy itself and only secondarily on the study of the empirical existence of science. The beginning of the transcendental-analytical tradition of understanding “science” was laid by ancient Greek philosophers (Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle). It was dominant in the history of philosophy until early XIX century, however, it received the clearest formulation from I. Kant in the form of questions posed by him: how is mathematics possible, how is theoretical natural science possible, etc. Therefore this method philosophical study of "science" could be called “Kantian” paradigm of the philosophy of science.

Second logically possible way philosophical analysis of science - synthetically generalizing. It primarily relies on the empirical study of science as a special sociocultural reality that has specific cognitive, communication and practical mechanisms of functioning and reproduction. The philosophy of science in this understanding is essentially based on metascientific developments (history of science, sociology of science, logic of science, science studies, etc.). By exploring the concrete historical forms of the existence of science, its disciplinary diversity, this approach aims to generalize its logical-methodological, subject-matter and operational originality, to identify the structure of general patterns, trends in the development of “science”. This type of “philosophy of science” was first clearly stated in the works of O. Comte, and therefore it can be called "Kontovsky".

If Kant’s philosophy of science goes from the question of how science is possible to the answer of how it “really is,” then Comtian’s has the opposite research vector: from the question of how it “really is” to the answer of how it is possible. In the first case, we are dealing with the philosophy of science as an element of philosophical theory, in the second - as a generalizing scientific discipline. The issue of “docking” these paradigms is one of the urgent and underdeveloped problems modern philosophy.

In this textbook when presenting the main problems of the history and philosophy of science, we will focus on three main problems of the philosophy of science: the concept of science, the structure of scientific knowledge, the dynamics of scientific knowledge. At the same time, we will not strictly bind ourselves to the framework of either the Kantian or Comtean paradigms, using the language and resources of both when solving the stated problems.

Giving an answer to the seemingly clear question of what science is turns out to be not so simple. The fact is that science is a very complex and in many respects contradictory object in its empirical existence. This also applies to historical existence science, to its, so to speak, diachronic aspect and to its synchronous existence, bearing in mind its current state.

Thus, the diachronic (historical) diversity of forms of “science” is very contradictory and logically incompatible: 1) ancient eastern pre-science (Babylonian-Sumerian, Egyptian, ancient Indian, ancient Chinese); 2) ancient science; 3) medieval European science; 4) modern European classical science; 5) non-classical science; 6) post-non-classical science.

Features eastern pre-science were: direct interweaving and subordination to practical needs (the art of measurement and counting - mathematics, compiling calendars and serving religious cults - astronomy, technical improvements in tools of production and construction - mechanics, etc.); prescription (instrumentality) of “scientific” knowledge; the empirical nature of its origin and justification; casteism and closedness of the scientific community.

Directly opposite properties acquires what is called "science" in Ancient Greece: theoreticality (the source of scientific knowledge is thinking), logical evidence, independence from practice, openness to criticism, democracy. An example of the ancient understanding of science is, of course, Euclid’s Elements.

Essential Features medieval "science": theology, direct service to social and practical needs religious society, scholasticism, dogmatism. In medieval religious culture, science was forced to play the role of a servant of theology and coordinate its statements with it. Scientific truths(“truths of reason”) had a subordinate, lower epistemological status than religious truths (“truths of faith”). Astrology, alchemy, and religious hermeneutics were paradigmatic examples of medieval science. It is clear that medieval “science” contradicted both ancient “science” and ancient “pre-science” in its knowledge and operational characteristics.

Finally, in the Renaissance and Modern times in Europe, something completely new in its cognitive and social characteristics a phenomenon that can be called a prototype of modern “science”. What distinguishes it from what was previously called “science”? Firstly, a completely different ideology from the medieval one. Leonardo da Vinci, G. Galileo, R. Des Cartes, F. Bacon believed the main values new science secular character, critical spirit, objective truth, practical usefulness. The slogan “Knowledge is power” proclaimed by the Lord Chancellor of England was directed not only against medieval scholastic science, but also, in its own way, against ancient science with its biased independence from the practical needs of society. The project of modern science was based on the desire scientists of the era Renaissance and Modern times to combine, synthesize the rationality of ancient science with the techno-instrumental nature of Eastern pre-science. But in order to serve the needs of practice, increasing human dominance over the surrounding reality and, above all, nature, the new science, according to its architects, must: 1) focus on the study of individual processes and phenomena in order to use subsequently acquired knowledge about the properties and laws of these processes in technical and technological purposes; 2) science itself should not be contemplative-observational, but experimental at its core, i.e. the subject of science should not be nature itself in its naturalness and sophisticated objectivity, but “torn out” from nature as totalities or artificially created in laboratories material systems. Such “man-made” systems are easier to control than natural systems in their natural state. They are, in principle, reproducible an unlimited number of times. Regarding them, it is much easier to achieve an accurate, logically connected and quantitative description. Quantitative description properties, relationships and laws of operation of such systems presupposes the use of the language of mathematics, the language of functions. The latter, due to the continuous nature of the range of their values, allow, in principle, an unlimited increase in the range of accuracy, unambiguity and certainty scientific language. The ontological justification for this approach was clearly formulated by Galileo: “The Book of Nature is written in the language of mathematics” and even more decisively: “God is a mathematician.” The paradigmatic examples of new science were analytic geometry(R. Descartes), mechanics (G. Galileo, I. Newton) and mathematical analysis(I. Newton, G. Leibniz, O. Cauchy, K. Weierstrass). To designate a new science - the experimental-mathematical study of reality - it was proposed new term"science".

However, the new (modernist) science has undergone significant changes over the 300 years of its existence and development, having gone through a number of qualitatively different stages in the course of its evolution, which contradict each other in a number of parameters. Among these stages there are classical, non-classical and post-non-classical science(B.C. Stepin). These types of “science” differ from each other not only in their subject content and disciplinary scope, but also in their foundations (ontological, epistemological, social, etc.).

Thus, on ontological grounds classical science were: antiteleologism, unambiguous determinism, mechanism. Epistemological foundations of classical science: objective methods research, experiment, mathematical model of an object, deductive-axiomatic method of constructing a theory. Her social reasons: disciplinary organization, creation of scientific and educational institutions new type ( research laboratories, institutes, academic and engineering communities, polytechnic and natural science universities and departments, test benches, scientific journals), the demand for science by society, strengthening the connection between science and production, the creation of an industrial sector of science, the emergence of mass, “big” science. The awareness of the limitations of the cognitive resources of classical science comes at the late XIX- the beginning of the 20th century, the time of the beginning of the crisis of its foundations (the period of the creation of the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, constructive logic and mathematics, etc.).

Qualitatively new stage in the implementation of the science project “Science” is a non-classical science based on a fundamentally different foundation from the classical one. Ontology of non-classical science: relativism (space, time, mass), indeterminism (fundamental interrelations of objects), mass character (set of objects of any kind - a static system), systematicity, structure, organization, evolutionary nature of systems and objects. Epistemology of non-classical science: subject-objectivity of scientific knowledge, hypotheticality, probabilistic nature scientific laws and theories, partial empirical and theoretical verifiability of scientific knowledge. Methodology of non-classical science: lack of a universal scientific method, pluralism of scientific methods and means, intuition, creative constructivism. Sociology of non-classical science: the “granular” structure of the scientific community, the variety of forms of scientific cooperation, science is an object of economic, legal, social and government regulation, the contradictory variety of norms of the scientific ethos.

The non-classical stage of development of “new European” science reached its peak in the 70s of the 20th century. It is being replaced by the paradigm of “post-non-classical” science (the recording, identification and description of the features of which are thoroughly carried out in the works of V.S. Stepin). Leaders of post-non-classical science - biology, ecology, synergetics, global studies, human sciences. The primary subject of research in post-non-classical science is highly complex systems that include humans as an essential element of their functioning and development (mechanical, physical, chemical, biological, environmental, engineering, technological, computer, medical, social, etc.). The ideology, philosophical foundations and methodology of post-non-classical (modern) science are significantly different and in many ways incompatible with the principles and “spirit” of not only the “classical” stage of development of modernist (new European) science, but also its “non-classical” stage. Principles of ontology of post-non-classical science: systematicity, structure, organicism, nonlinear (multivariate) evolutionism, teleologism, anthropologism. Its epistemological foundations: problematic objectivity, sociality (collectivity) of scientific and cognitive activity, contextuality of scientific knowledge, usefulness, environmental and humanistic value scientific information. Methodology of post-non-classical science: methodological pluralism, constructivism, consensus, efficiency, expediency of scientific decisions.

We will not focus here on the fact that post-non-classical science is apparently a transitional state from the historical taxon “modernist science” with its ideas about scientific rationality to a qualitatively new historical taxon of science, which can be called “post-modern science”. sod science” with completely different ideas about “scientificness” and “rationality”. It is only important for us to emphasize the idea that historical forms The existence of what was and is called “science” is so diverse and so contradictory to each other that it does not lend itself to simple empirical generalization.

Along with the diachronic (“historical”) pluralism of “science,” there is also its synchronous pluralism. It is due to the significant difference in the subjects and methodological arsenal of different scientific disciplines, the ideals and norms of scientific research implemented in them, as well as the forms of organization of activity. When analyzing modern science, we can distinguish at least four completely different classes of sciences, which differ significantly from each other in a number of parameters: 1) logical-mathematical; 2) natural sciences; 3) engineering, technical and technological logical; 4) social and humanitarian. It is difficult to name the common thing that unites them all (especially since in each class there are very different disciplines and theories, including alternative, empirical and theoretical levels knowledge, etc.). Indeed, what do “mathematics” and “history”, or even “mathematics” and “physics” have in common? It is much easier to formulate the differences and even the opposition between the mathematical, physical and humanities “sciences” both in subjects, and in methods of constructing knowledge, and in methods of substantiating knowledge, criteria for its acceptability (“truth”), and even in ways of organizing scientific communities and them value orientations. Proof of the significant dissimilarity of these types of “sciences” is, in particular, the frequent misunderstanding of representatives of each other various sciences. A striking example of this is the question seriously discussed by E. Wigner about the incomprehensible effectiveness of pure mathematics in applying it to the description physical reality. This is also evidenced by the “shock reaction” of historians to the massive use mathematical models and methods for history, carried out by academician-mathematician L. Fomenko and his school.

Let's consider the possibilities of using it to answer the question, what is “science”, philosophical method. The latter presupposes the construction of the universal content of “science” as a special theoretical object (“category”), which has its basis in the universal characteristics of consciousness. From this point of view, science, firstly, is the result of the activity of the rational sphere of consciousness (and not the sensory, and even more so, its irrational spheres). Secondly, science is an objective type of consciousness, relying to a significant extent on external experience. Thirdly, science is equally refers to both the cognitive and evaluative spheres of rational consciousness.

So, from the point of view of the universal characteristics of consciousness, science can be defined as a rational-objective activity of consciousness. Its goal is to build mental models of objects and evaluate them based on external experience. The source of rational knowledge cannot be either sensory experience in itself or artistic imagination, neither religious-mystical revelation, nor existential experiences, but only thinking - either in the form of constructing empirical models of sensory experience, or in the form of constructing theoretical objects (the world of “pure essences” or the world of ideal objects).

Obtained as a result of thinking activity rational knowledge must meet the following requirements: conceptual and linguistic expressibility, certainty, consistency, logical validity, openness to criticism and change. The requirement for certainty of thinking is the main condition for its rationality. It has an adaptive and practical meaning, constituting a necessary basis for behavior, which always presupposes and makes some choice between A and not-A Logical The representative of the requirement of certainty in thinking is the law of identity - the fundamental law rational thinking. Two other fundamental laws of thinking - the law of consistency and the law of the excluded middle - are rather a consequence of the law of identity, ensuring its implementation.

It must be emphasized that rational thinking (and rational knowledge) is a broader concept than scientific knowledge. Although all scientific knowledge is rational, not all rational knowledge is scientific. Many layers of everyday and philosophical knowledge are rational, but non-scientific. Scientific rationality is, so to speak, “strengthened” rationality. The main properties of scientific rationality: objectivity (empirical or theoretical), unambiguity, evidence, verifiability (empirical or analytical), ability to improve. It is important to note that the implementation of each of the above necessary properties scientific rationality can be and is achieved in significantly different ways in different types sciences (logical-mathematical, natural sciences, engineering-technological and social-humanitarian). This depends both on the subject specificity of the corresponding type of science, and on the means of cognitive activity with external experience relevant to these subjects.

We can talk about the existence four main types of scientific rationality. Logical-mathematical rationality: ideal objectivity, constructive unambiguity, formal evidence, analytical verifiability. Natural scientific rationality: empirical objectivity, observational-experimental unambiguity (due to the potentially infinite reproducibility of observation results), partial logical evidence, experimental verifiability (confirmability and falsifiability). Engineering and technological rationality:“material” objectivity, constructive systematicity, empirical verifiability, system reliability, practical effectiveness. Social and humanitarian rationality: social-value objectivity, reflexivity, integrity, cultural validity, adaptive usefulness. Following each type of scientific rationality leads to the generation of the corresponding type of knowledge, which, however, only partially depends on the content of a specifically identified “objective” sphere. For geometry is possible as physics, physical biology, social technology, philosophy of mathematics, history of technology, etc., etc.

course philosophySciences (are common problems) - master the content of the discipline “History and philosophySciences" and have an idea...

Under ed. S.A. Lebedeva

Academic Project 2 0 0 7

UDC 1/14 BBK 87 F56

AUTHOR TEAM: S.A Lebedev(Head of the Autonomous College) - Doctor of Philosophy. sciences, professor - preface, introduction, section AND, chapter VI, chapter VIII, applications. A.N. Avdulov- Doctor of Philosophy n. - chapter V V.G. Borzenkov VIII G.V. Bromberg- Ph.D. tech. n. - chapter VI V.V. Ilyin- Doctor of Philosophy Sc., prof. - chapter I F.V. Lazarev- Doctor of Philosophy, prof. - chapter II L.V. Leskov- Doctor of Physics and Mathematics Sc., prof. - chapter VII E.M. Mirsky- Doctor of Philosophy n. - chapter III B.G. Yudin- Corresponding Member RAS, prof. - chapter IV

Philosophy of Science / ed. S.A. Lebedeva: F56 Textbook for universities. Ed. 5th, revised and additional - M.: Academic Project; Alma Mater, 2007. - 731 p.- (« Gaudeamus»).

ISBN 978-5-8291-0860-1 (Academic Project)

ISBN 978-5-902766-40-7 (Alma Mater)

The textbook was written by a team of scientists and teachers from Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov and the Russian Academy of Sciences. It is addressed primarily to graduate students of all specialties to prepare for the exam for the new candidate minimum “History and Philosophy of Science.” The textbook was tested at the Department of Philosophy of the Institute for Retraining and Advanced Training of Teachers of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov.

© Academic Project, original ISBN 978-5-8291-0860-1 layout, design, 2007 ISBN 978-5-902766-40-7 © Alma Mater, 2007

Preface

Currently, for all Russian postgraduate students and candidates for the degree of candidate of science (regardless of the specific specialty), a requirement has been introduced to pass an exam in a new candidate minimum discipline, which is called “History and Philosophy of Science”. The Program of the new candidate minimum, approved by the Ministry of Education and Science, has already been published, as well as a number of textbooks and teaching aids on the three main structural components of this minimum: 1) general philosophy of science, 2) modern philosophical problems of various branches of science (natural science, mathematics, technical sciences, social -humanitarian knowledge), 3) history of science in general and the history of individual scientific disciplines. The content of the first component of the candidate minimum is consideration of general philosophical issues of science as a whole: the concept of science (and, accordingly, discussion of the criteria of scientific character), the structure of scientific knowledge (its levels, types, types, etc.), the development of scientific knowledge (character, driving forces , orientation, etc.), the functioning of science as a special social institution, the interaction of science and society, etc. The authors of this textbook focused on these general problems of the philosophy of science.

The second component of the content of the new candidate minimum is the history of science. It is clear that there are also options here. First of all, this is a general history of science, giving an idea of ​​the genesis and main historical stages of the development of science as a whole. Such a presentation of the general history of science is presented in a small volume in the first chapter of this textbook. It is possible that in some universities the history of science may be limited either to the general history of natural science, or to the history of technical knowledge, or to the history of humanities. Acquaintance of graduate students with the history of science can be reduced somewhere to a more detailed presentation of a specific science relevant to the university (physics, chemistry, biology, history, pedagogy, mathematics, management, etc.). Finally, the third component of the content of the new candidate minimum is graduate students’ knowledge of philosophical problems of one of the specific sciences close to their university profile (philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of psychology, etc.).

The joining of all three components in the candidate minimum can be carried out in a variety of ways (there are no official restrictions on this) and potentially contains a huge variety of meaningful options. This will largely be determined by the profile of the university, the composition of the lecturers, their interests and knowledge, and, finally, the desires of the listeners themselves. With all the possible substantive diversity in the history and philosophy of science courses taught to graduate students at various universities, we are convinced that there must be some similarity, some unity between them. The general philosophy of science should become such a unifying principle for all of them, the presentation of the main content of which is the subject of this textbook.

At the same time, from the very beginning we must be clear about the fact that in the history of world philosophy there has never been a single, equally understood philosophy of science (for philosophy, pluralism is an absolutely natural and necessary condition for its existence). Likewise, in modern philosophical and scientific thought there is a huge variety of concepts of the history and philosophy of science. And this is a consequence of the fact that every concept of the philosophy of science (Kantaganian, Hegelian, Marxist-Leninist, positivist, natural philosophy, Husserlian, pragmatist, radical constructivist, analytical, postmodernist, etc.) is always the use of the explanatory resource of one or another another general philosophical doctrine to the understanding of science and scientific knowledge. Of course, this is not a simple mechanical imposition of general philosophical schemes on the material of science, but always some kind of creative synthesis of philosophical and concrete scientific knowledge, carried out by a specific philosopher or scientist. This does not change the essence: the defining element of a particular philosophy of science is always the preference, the choice made by its representatives of some general philosophy (materialism, idealism, empiricism, transcendentalism, philosophy of culture, philosophy of life, structuralism, analytical philosophy, pragmatism, rational theology and teleology, etc.). So to expect that there is, is possible or should be some kind of unified, universally acceptable “scientific philosophy of science” is a sure way to drive yourself into a dead end of illusions.

On the other hand, the question naturally arises: is it possible to somehow “bypass” the pluralism of “philosophies of science” and develop a general, invariant part of the content of the latter? My answer is yes. However, it is possible to form such a maximally consensually acceptable part of the philosophy of science only by observing the following two conditions: 1) focusing on discussing such a list of problems in the philosophy of science, which is constantly reproduced in most “philosophies of science”, regardless of their specific solutions; 2) orientation to the discussion of such general problems of the philosophy of science that are relevant for understanding not only its history, but also its current state and possible future.

It seems that the introduction of a new candidate minimum in the history and philosophy of science will certainly improve the general philosophical and methodological culture of Russian scientists. Russian science, as is known, has always been distinguished by a craving for the theoretical and fundamental. At the same time, over the past two decades, due to the departure from the political and ideological arena of Russia of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as the “universal methodology of science,” the desire of our scientists to new philosophical shores has not yet received sufficient certainty. This is rather a time of rethinking, waiting and new philosophical “maturation”. However, I believe that the time worthy of Russian science and philosophy is not far off, when lecture courses by major Russian scientists on the philosophy of science will become a frequent culturally significant event in our lives.

The first edition of this textbook was published V 2004 G. In recent years, the Academic Project publishing house has also published a series of our textbooks: “Philosophy of Natural Sciences”, “Philosophy of Social Sciences and Humanities”, “Philosophy of Technical Sciences, Mathematics and Computer Science”, “Philosophy of Science: A Dictionary of Basic Terms”. These works provide a concretization of the provisions of the general philosophy of science set forth in this textbook in relation to various directions and areas of modern scientific knowledge.

S.A. Lebedev, Honored Professor of Moscow University

The textbook examines the main provisions of the general philosophy of science, after which a solution to most particular problems of modern philosophy of science is given, which is shown in the form of didactic diagrams, accompanied by terminological explanations. This benefit structure contributes to more effective absorption and remembering the essence of the considered philosophical problems.

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