"THE TRUTH AND THE METHOD: the main features of philosophical hermeneutics" (“Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik”, Tüb., 1960, Russian translation 1988) - the main work H.-G. Gadamer. The book is the result of almost forty years of work by Gadamer as a practicing “hermeneut” - an interpreter of various texts of the philosophical and literary tradition. The title is provocative: the conjunction “and” does not so much connect “truth” with “method” as contrast them to each other. According to Gadamer, the method of knowledge that became established along with the establishment of modern European science is neither unique nor universal. Human knowledge is essentially “non-methodical”; it can only in a few cases be subordinated to a certain method. In addition, science and the scientific-theoretical exploration of reality is only one of man’s relationships to the world. Art has a paradigmatic significance in this regard. Experience carried out in art and through art has no less cognitive potential than experience provided by natural science and the “exact sciences”. Gadamer's book is dedicated to revealing the underestimated potential of this experience (the task of the book is essentially set by the work M. Heidegger "The Source of Artistic Creation").
Gadamer's work in a certain sense continues the “rehabilitation” of the humanities (the “spiritual sciences” going back to German romanticism), which began in late 19th century V. Dilthey . However, Gadamer finds Dilthey’s concept of understanding (as well as his hermeneutics in general) insufficient. The interpretation of understanding proposed by Dilthey seems to Gadamer not free from psychologism. In an effort to emphasize the radicality of his break with Dilthey’s school, Gadamer emphasizes his closeness to Schleiermacher (the priority of “grammatical” interpretation over “psychological”) and to Hegel (the doctrine of “objective spirit”).
The book consists of three sections, which correspond to three dimensions human existence: “aesthetic”, “historical” and “linguistic”. The purpose of each section is to show the inadmissibility of narrowing the “experience of truth” contained in art, history and language, respectively. In relation to art criticism (and to the aesthetic sphere in general), it can be argued that such a narrowing began with Kant. Although in Kant’s theory the primacy of “beautiful in nature” over “beautiful in art” is still preserved, Kant sees the basis of “beautiful” precisely in the a priori structure of subjectivity. This subsequently led to the predominance of the idea of “genius” over the idea of “taste” and to an increasing departure from the ontological parameters of a work of art towards “creative subjectivity”. Gadamer finds a counterbalance to the subjectivization of the phenomenon of art in the philosophy of Hegel. Hegel’s idea of the “artist” is not what the artist said, but what was expressed in him. Meaning is thus transcendental to the thinking subject. Understanding a work of art, we are dealing with a reality that does not fit into the subjectivity of its creator. In relation to historical science (Section 2 of the book), a similar reduction of the “experience of truth” occurs with the advent of the so-called historicism . The latter removed the “hermeneutical dimension” from the historical sphere: history began to be studied instead of understood. The texts of the past began to be approached “only historically,” i.e. to regard them solely as the product of certain socio-cultural circumstances, as if they were completely irrelevant to those who experience them. In an effort to overcome the limitations of a positivist-oriented historical science, Dilthey proposed a psychological approach to understanding the phenomena of the past: they must not only be explained based on a certain idea of the connection between the general and the particular, but also understood by reproducing the unique subjectivity of another in one’s own subjectivity. However, the hermeneutic problem, i.e. the problem of understanding is thereby not revealed. To understand, it is not enough for the interpreter to move into the “horizon” of the author; it is necessary to “remelt” their horizons. The latter can only happen thanks to something third - something common in which the positions of both can be reconciled. This “third” is language, considered from the point of view of its existential status, i.e. as a special reality within which a person finds himself and which cannot be captured by means of sociological or psychological research.
The third section of the book is devoted to revealing the ontological dimension of linguistic experience. Here Gadamer also appears as a faithful student of Heidegger. In the element of language, a person’s understanding of the world, his self-understanding, and people’s understanding of each other are realized. Language is the basic condition for the possibility of human existence; moreover, language in general is that “being that can be understood.” Being the load-bearing basis of the transmission cultural experience from generation to generation, language provides the possibility of tradition, and dialogue between different cultures is realized through the search for a common language. The pathos of the book lies in demonstrating the ontological rootedness of hermeneutic issues. In subsequent editions of Truth and Method, Gadamer, responding to criticism (E. Betti, J. Habermas, K. O. Apel, E. D. Hirsch, T. Seebom, etc.), clarified its individual theses, but did not refuse from its main idea: hermeneutics is not an auxiliary discipline or methodology (even one endowed with the broadest powers), it has a universal character. “Truth and Method” became a programmatic essay philosophical hermeneutics and one of the most frequently cited sources of the existential-phenomenological direction of modern Western philosophy.
TRUTH AND METHOD
TRUTH AND METHOD. The main features of philosophical hermeneutics are the work of Gadamer (1960), which was at the center of heated debate for several decades and influenced the formation of modern German literary criticism, psychoanalysis and neo-Marxism, as well as theorizing in the field of practical philosophy. Moreover, even the reception by modern German philosophy of the Anglo-Saxon analytical tradition and the theory of science, as well as the perception of French structuralism, post-structuralism and postmodernism, are stimulated by philosophical hermeneutics and are in the field of its influence. In the book I.iM... Gadamer examines issues of aesthetics, historicism, ontology of language and the theory of hermeneutical experience in both historical and systematic dimensions. The work of I. and M... is an attempt to develop universal transcendental conditions for the possibility of mutual understanding and understanding of texts. The title of the work consists of two key concepts: truth and method. As one of the researchers of the history of philosophy of the 20th century notes. P. Lübke, the title focuses on the concept of truth, since Gadamer seeks to draw attention primarily to the event of truth, in which our understanding participates with transcendental necessity. The second word from the title of the book - method - is considered rather ironic, since Gadamer - and he repeatedly pointed out this fact - does not seek to develop a doctrine of a method with the help of which we can undertake a truer interpretation or interpretation, but points to the transcendental elements that are assumed in every interpretation. The title of the book could be read as Truth or Method. However, it must also be taken into account that Gadamer does not oppose the method as such, but speaks of the existence of such forms of experience that cannot be scientifically verified. Namely, about the experience of art, the experience of history and the experience of philosophy. They are all modes of experience that go beyond what is offered to us. experimental sciences. The experience of art cannot be replaced by aesthetics, the science of art; living experience of history - historiography, the science of history; treating each other intelligently is the science of communication. But, according to Gadamer, the understanding gained in this non-scientific experience is also occupied with truth, namely truth that shows itself, clarifies itself, which impresses and, at the same time, makes demands. Consequently, this understanding of truth is clearly different from the traditionally accepted understanding of it, i.e. truth as a correspondence between mind and thing (veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus by Thomas Aquinas). Accordingly, truth essentially corresponds to the statement (logos apophansis of Aristotle). In contrast to this understanding of truth, Gadamer attributes truth, which shows itself (aletheia) in non-scientific experience, to works of art, history, human communication and considers the true logical statement as a derivative form of truth. Gadamer's understanding of truth is oriented towards the truth of unconcealment, openness, and self-discovery of a thing. Truth does not owe itself to human effort. Truth becomes a historical process of revelation that occurs, happens (actus exercitus as opposed to Augustine's actus signatus) and which determines us or has long determined us before we even realized it. The truth to which we appeal in this sense - and in the experience of art we encounter such a claim - is not commensurate with the thing itself. The thing shows itself, and at the same time the truth is realized, bypassing which it is impossible to return to a higher or deeper truth. Here it is not possible to distinguish between true and false. One can, therefore, speak of the truth of self-discovery not in the spirit of propositional truth. Such an understanding of truth should serve to clarify that understanding reality is not a self-sufficient achievement of a subject freed from reality, but an event in which the understander is already included in advance. The second key concept - method - is more contextual and has more connotations than the first. The problem of method in European philosophy was first posed by G. Zabarello in his work On Method (1558). The discussion about method was prepared by the theoretical achievements of the Renaissance in the humanities and natural sciences. Scientistic thinking of the 17th century. develops this discussion further. The most important thing now is to ensure the reliability of knowledge. In this regard, the idea of mathematization of natural science is being developed, and at the same time, attention to the reliability of the criteria of cognition is increasing. A dilemma arises: where does knowledge come from, from thinking or from experience? The answer to this question serves as a criterion for distinguishing between two significant thought paradigms of the 17th century. Rationalism proceeds from the fact that all reliability is determined by universal principles, and thus by pure reason, empiricism - from the fact that the reliability of knowledge is based on sensory sensations and observations. The tradition of rationalism influenced the formation of the ideology of the Enlightenment, while empiricism determined the development of specific sciences. At the same time, in contrast to natural scientific methodology, the project of modern humanities begins to develop. The basis for this approach can be found in the works of Vico. The division of sciences into natural and humanities was carried out in the 19th century. thanks to the theoretical achievements of Dilthey. It sets up a contrast between humanities and natural science methodology, which begins to be associated with the confrontation between two methodological strategies: explanation as a paradigmatic procedure of experimental sciences and understanding as the main procedure of human-oriented sciences. As Dilthey showed, the sciences of the spirit, i.e. The humanities arise as a result of distancing from philosophy and religion and try to either borrow the methodology of natural science or develop their own methodology, but on the model of the natural sciences. But, as is known, modern European science is built on abstraction from the clarity of everyday experience and the introduction of speculative constructions. In this respect, I.&M... represents an attempt to free the humanities from their orientation towards natural science and to ground them in the original experience of the world, which precedes the distinction between natural sciences and humanities, theory and practice. Thus, Gadamer joins Heidegger's reception of Dilthey - the ambivalence of the modern world can be presented as the opposition of scientific and humanitarian methods. The orientation of the humanities towards natural scientific standards, as it turns out, separates them from their own tradition, the so-called humaniora. For the spiritual sciences, it is not just verification or falsification procedures that are important. Much more important is the goal of these efforts: through humanistic research, a person must be formed, i.e. educate yourself and become humane. In other words, the ascent of the subjective spirit to the objective, understood as education in the Hegelian sense, can be interpreted as a person’s acquisition of his own identity. But at the same time, the process of education itself turns out to be scientifically illegitimate. Modern humanities are torn between science and the desire for education. Consequently, the humanities themselves, in Dilthey's sense, are a historical phenomenon. Of course, the opposite point of view is also possible, according to which, on the contrary, the humanities are compensation for the fundamental ahistoricity modern life. Gadamer connects the humanities with ancient tradition education and therefore understands them practically. He cannot help but emphasize the idea of continuity and coherence of the entire historical world, for which modernity is just one of its moments. Trying to simultaneously maintain scientific distancing and abstraction, on the one hand, and living tradition, on the other, Gadamer avoids the alternative, which already in the 19th century. determined the nature of the discussion about the role of the humanities. According to Gadamer, they are sciences, being special elements and carriers of historical education, i.e. not sciences in the modern European sense of the word. This author's position does not make it easier, but rather makes it more difficult for the reader to understand I. and M.... All objections that, in principle, can be put forward by scientifically oriented hermeneutics, Gadamer easily refutes, admitting their fundamental validity. He tries to trace what happens to the consciousness of a humanist in the process of humanitarian research. We are talking about what, strictly speaking, the humanities are. And in this sense, his work I. and M... is a kind of ontology, an answer to the question of what ultimately lies at the basis of all scientific achievements, historical consciousness and simply methodological effort. Gadamer criticizes science from the standpoint of humanitarian knowledge. For the spiritual sciences it has always been important to comprehend the state of affairs in their specific features. Consequently, humanitarian knowledge should be aimed at the one-time and originality, the uniqueness of a historical event. All humanities in this sense are historical and deal with singularity. Their strategy in this regard could be called exemplification, while the natural sciences strive to subordinate every event general rule, i.e. their main strategy is to let them down. According to Gadamer, there is an experience of the world that is fundamentally not subject to scientific methodological consciousness. It is clear, then, that the purpose of the book goes far beyond a discussion of method specific to the humanities. Rather, it is about demonstrating that humanitarian efforts are historically and substantively grounded in a field that cannot be opened up to scientific procedures. In this respect, I.&M... is in line with a certain tradition, closely associated with the names of Nietzsche, for whom scientific history becomes the enemy of life, and Heidegger, who criticized the metaphysical tradition and the opposition of subject to object. Gadamer views his work not simply as an analysis of the problems of humanitarian methodology in the narrow sense of the word. I.&M... is in many ways a continuation of Heidegger's intention to describe understanding as a mode of being (Dasein). Heidegger's philosophy is currently interpreted as a rejection of the scientific optimism of the 19th century, a rejection of the claims of science to discover a genuine approach to reality. The opposite point of view is inherent in scientist-oriented philosophical projects, for example, Marxism or, more commonly, to a greater extent , logical positivism, from the point of view of which only those statements are meaningful that, ultimately, can be double-checked using scientific methods and verified or falsified. Consequently, the statements of traditional metaphysics about God, freedom and immortality are meaningless. But for the humanities it is more important that all aesthetic and ethical statements, i.e. sentences that contain evaluations of works of art and human actions must also be regarded as sentences devoid of meaning. After all, there are no empirical verifications for this kind of assessment. In other words, everything that is especially significant for human life turns out to be meaningless. Heidegger's approach is extremely important for Gadamer. The term hermeneutic itself is interpreted by Gadamer in the spirit of the early Heidegger. With an orientation towards Heidegger, the direction of the humanities is set in their understanding of anthropological problems, based on the original context of the human world. This means that the true meaning of the humanities does not lie in their approximation to the methodological ideal of natural science. Therefore, not in scientization, but in humanization. And it is precisely this thesis that allows us to adequately read the text of I. and M.... In the project of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer follows the hermeneutics of facticity of the early Heidegger, who developed, based on Dilthey, his own version of hermeneutics (for various reasons this approach was not reflected in his work Being and time). Heidegger's influence is felt in the recognition of the prestructure of understanding and its historicity, in discussing the problems of the hermeneutic circle, prejudice and the history of influences. To an even greater extent, Gadamer follows the late Heidegger, whose philosophizing recalls the fate of being and language as the home of being, especially with regard to the thematization of the ontology of language. The thematization of the role of art also finds its parallels in the later works of Heidegger. At the same time, from Gadamer’s point of view, Heidegger’s later work is a return to the theme of the hermeneutics of facticity, despite the fact that Heidegger himself says almost nothing about any hermeneutics. Likewise, Gadamer develops other ideas of Heidegger, however, subjecting him to criticism on some points. I.iM... is a kind of continuation and development of Heidegger’s ideas, which were expressed by the latter in the period preceding the publication of Being and Time. For example, the idea of a person’s abandonment in the world is developed and deepened by Gadamer in the form of a thesis about the effective historical consciousness. But, first of all, it is the thematization of such phenomena as a work of art; thing (Ding) existing in a life context; and finally, the limitless realm of language. It is worth mentioning other authors on whom Gadamer relies and whose views he analyzes. This is, first of all, Dilthey with his eternal oscillations between the requirements of scientific methodology and objectivity, on the one hand, and the demand for a connection between science and life, on the other. This is Husserl, who criticized the idea that only in the objective data of scientific objects is the entire field of our possible experience represented. This is Count York (von Wartenburg), who re-founded the connection between life and self-awareness. In general, I. and M... was written in line with the grandiose philosophical tradition, which begins in Ancient Greece and continues to this day. From this point of view, this text represents the result of an impressive history of reception in the European philosophical tradition. What is important here is a fact that Gadamer himself drew attention to: this book is the result of his own forty years of pedagogical efforts and comprehension of not only significant issues in the history of philosophy, but also solutions to modern philosophical systematics. This fact thematizes another problem of the book named - the relationship between tradition and modernity. In other words, Gadamer offers his solution to the question posed by Husserl and Heidegger, according to which the development of Western European metaphysics leads to the modern dominance of European science and technology. This is where the main problem of the work follows: is it really only science and technology that provide a person with a real experience of the world, or are there other ways of comprehending reality other than methodically? organized experience Sciences? And if such forms exist, can they be considered justified? There is no doubt that this formulation of the problem is rooted in the very reality of the modern world. The growth of scientization leads to an increase in alienation, which, in turn, causes a decrease in the sphere of human experience itself. The problem that Gadamer develops in I.iM... can, therefore, be characterized as an attempt to re-thematize the relationship between the internal and external world, micro- and macrocosmos. In other words, Gadamer sets the task of describing the existence of a person in the conditions of a tragic culture, a culture that, on the one hand, forms a person, on the other hand, suppresses him, being alienated. In this regard, Gadamer, following Heidegger, poses an ontological problem: how is it possible for a person to exist as a finite and temporary being in the historical process. This leads to a problem of an epistemological nature: how can a finite person comprehend the world in its entirety in view of his own and his, the world’s, historicity, as well as in view of the numerous cultural ruptures and fault lines that have occurred in the last few centuries, and the ever-accelerating process of cultural evolution. One of the solutions significant for Gadamer was proposed by Hegel: reality is conceived as the movement of the absolute spirit through diversity to unity, ending in the reconciliation of opposites. But Hegel, when building his philosophical system distracted from limitation, dependence and finitude human mind. That is why for Gadamer the solution of Heidegger, who drew attention to the historicity, temporality and finitude of human existence, is paradigmatic. So, the title and pathos of Gadamer’s book are determined by a problem that dates back to the methodological dispute of the 19th century: the opposition of the natural and human sciences both in subject matter and in the method of research. It is defined by criticism of natural scientific thinking and an attempt to contrast the methodological thinking of science with other possibilities of human experience. These possibilities are transcendental in relation to the methodically organized scientific consciousness, which originates in Cartesian philosophy. Gadamer thematizes the possibilities of experiencing truth in the fields of art, history and language. Thus, we are talking about the experience of aesthetic, historical and linguistic consciousness. A consistent analysis of these phenomena forms the three corresponding parts of his program book. From here the structure of I. and M becomes clear.... The first part is devoted to aesthetic issues, i.e. the main problem of the 18th century. The second is about general methodological issues of the humanities using the example of the most important science of the 19th century. - history, and main problem this century - historicism. This part has systematic significance in Gadamer's hermeneutics. The third part of the book gives hermeneutics its philosophical status; it is devoted to the ontological basis of human experience. Such a basis is language, or, as Gadamer says, linguisticity. The third part is therefore devoted to the analysis of the most important philosophical theme 20th century - language. In turn, each part consists of two semantic sections, but the semantic and formal division coincides only in the second part, which has systematic significance for philosophical hermeneutics. In the first and third parts, this division is implicit. The first section is always destructive in nature (Abbau), the second is constructive in nature (Aufbau), which undoubtedly gives Gadamer’s reasoning even more weight. Each first section is in the nature of a historical and philosophical study and has independent scientific significance. Thus, the book has a historical dimension: it concisely presents historical aspects according to aesthetic, historical and linguo-philosophical reflection. Gadamer's argument begins with the problem of method. Thus, Gadamer joins the methodological discussion and determines his place in it. The book ends with a statement of the universal aspect of hermeneutics, i.e. affirmation of the universal claims of hermeneutics. The purpose of the first part of the book is to overcome the narrowing in which aesthetics has found itself in the process of modern development. It has become the criterion of what can be considered art. But an isolated aesthetic consciousness, to which beauty and art directly show themselves, does not exist. The experience of art in the broadest sense rather means that the work of art and the viewer are united in a single process. Consequently, Gadamer criticizes the irrational subjectivity of artistic experience and makes it clear that it is not consistent with the claim underlying the work of art to reduce the experience of art to a private experience. The specific situation of the humanities and the state of the debate about method is the starting point of the reasoning. Gadamer points out that modern humanities, as they took shape after Dilthey, understand themselves precisely as sciences. For Gadamer this self-understanding is false. It is not Dilthey who acquires normative significance for him, but the natural scientist G. Helmholtz, who contrasted the logical induction of the natural sciences with the artistic induction of the humanities. Such induction is based on a sense of tact, a rich memory and recognition of authorities, i.e. on the inclusion of the researcher in the research process. Consequently, the scientific nature of the humanities is rooted in the tradition of education, and not in the idea of modern science. Therefore, the analysis of leading humanistic concepts, to which his next discussion is devoted, becomes important. Gadamer sees the roots of the humanities in the sense of language, in the sense of its history, which are not an irrational gift, but rather a product of a humanitarian education. For Gadamer, turning to a discussion of leading humanistic concepts is not accidental; he uses a special historical and philosophical method of the so-called historical-conceptual analysis, which is a significant form of argumentation for him and which he contrasts with historical-problematic analysis. A historical analysis of four concepts - education, common sense, judgment, taste - is intended to show that the soil of the humanities, differentiated in the 19th century. from philosophy, religion and natural sciences, it is still a humanistically understood education (Bildung, paideia), and not an abstract methodology of natural science. With these historical and conceptual studies, Gadamer tries to transcend the problem of the method of the humanities. Extrapolation of natural scientific samples into the field of humanities cannot eliminate the need for the sciences of historical and social reality to deal with their subject not in the abstract, but concretely: education, common sense, judgment and taste in a broad sense are signs of the unity of the humanities scientist with his own subject. But historical and conceptual analysis also shows that humanistic concepts, and above all, the ability to judge and taste, are historically changeable. Under the influence of the methodological claims of natural scientific thinking, they have lost their cognitive functions, since they do not correspond to the standards of scientific methodology and are now perceived as aesthetic and subjective judgments. This transformation was carried out, according to Gadamer, under the influence of Kant. To strengthen his argument, Gadamer does not distinguish between Kant's own position and the history of its influence. Gadamer shows that Kant in his aesthetics narrows the concept of taste to the beautiful and, at the same time, removes the cognitive meaning underlying the concept of taste. Thus, instead of the commonality of the viewer and the work of art, the concepts of genius and experience come to the fore, concepts that fundamentally exclude continuity and community, since a brilliant creator cannot be counted and classified, because he is unique in his originality. But even in experience, the special and unique moment is essential, therefore, here too there is an exclusion of intersubjective community. Reliance on genius as a criterion for evaluating a work of art was fully realized only after Kant. But at the same time, the idea of the correspondence between the genius of creativity and the genius of understanding develops. Therefore, after clarifying the concept of genius, Gadamer moves on to the phenomenon of experience. Creations of genius are experienced; they are objects of experience in which a work of art in its one-time occurrence and its greatness is perceived in life as unusual. Genius and experience are romantic concepts, they are turned against the rationalism of the Enlightenment. This high romanticism is decisive for understanding the art of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Creativity and the experience of art are subjectified so radically that the so-called art of experience appears. To show that the concepts of genius and experience are not the only criteria for the experience of art, Gadamer turns to the history of art. For almost all non-European cultures, and in the most European culture- from antiquity to baroque, the artist is perceived as a craftsman. The work of art itself is included in a broader religious, cult, political or social context. Using the concepts of symbol and allegory as an example, Gadamer makes it clear that an orientation towards experience also cannot be justified for the phenomenon of art. The following discussion is devoted to criticism of aesthetic education and aesthetic consciousness. Gadamer again receives the elements of his criticism through historical and conceptual research. Gadamer relies primarily on Schiller's Letters on Aesthetic Education (1795) and emphasizes the idea of an educated society developed in them. Aesthetic education exists because of what Gadamer calls aesthetic discrimination. An educated person is one who can comprehend the subject of his consideration in its aesthetic quality, which is derived from the context of all non-aesthetic definitions, whether we are talking about the emergence of conditions, goals, objectives or the substantive meaning of the subject. To consider an object as aesthetic means to consider it in its beautiful appearance - in isolation from its world and its claims - as an object of a beautiful soul; Moreover, the beautiful soul should be understood, in turn, not as a part of historical and social reality, but precisely as a belonging to an abstract educated society. The consequences of aesthetic education and aesthetic discrimination are obvious. The work of art and the artist lose their historical and social place, since it has no meaning for aesthetic approach. So, in the 19th century. museums and other art institutions emerge. The loss of its place in the context of life is characteristic not only of a work of art, it also affects the artist. He becomes free, as befits a genius, but at the same time he is excluded from all social connections, and the idea of a bohemian arises. The artist acquires dual demonic features, and increasingly turns - due to secularization and alienation from religious traditions - into a sacred figure. This claim has determined the artist’s tragedy in the world ever since. Gadamer sees the problematic nature of the development of aesthetic education in the fact that the educational effect is not achieved. Aesthetic education leads only to an abstract universal that does not really exist. Having clarified the shortcomings of the aesthetics of genius, Gadamer builds a positive program for the experience of art. In the work of art itself, Gadamer finds the basis for own form experience of the art that is called understanding. Ontology of a work of art, i.e. the development of his own way of being thus serves as a preamble to the problems of the humanities. When interpreting a work of art, Gadamer does not focus on artistic self-understanding, but chooses play as a guide for research. The moment of play is important because with the help of this metaphor Gadamer gets rid of the opposition of subject and object of aesthetic experience. The game is pure self-presentation. The next important point is that art is always a performance for someone. The player is always included in the game, and the viewer (reader, listener) is included in the existence of the work of art. These considerations lead Gadamer to the assertion that the way of being of art is transformation into an image. This thesis articulates an idea central to Gadamer’s understanding of truth. Truth is presence showing itself. Consequently, there is no work in itself, which then, as if in a second step, would come to the image or mediation. Art is a representation or mediation that includes the recipient. If the way of being of art is contained in the image, then there is no difference between what is timeless in itself and its temporary images. Gadamer clarifies this metaphor by turning to the phenomenon of the holiday. In a holiday, everything is always the same, but repeated again. The way of being of a holiday is celebration. A holiday, like art, is a temporary phenomenon. Thus, there is an analogy between the holiday and art. Both the holiday and the work of art are always the same, although each time they are different. Moreover, this analogy again establishes a special relationship between the work of art and the viewer. The spectator and the celebrant are included in the action. Thus, instead of a brilliant creator and a brilliant interpreter of a work of art, a process comes to the fore, in contrast to which individual subjects play only a subordinate role. Analyzing the experience of art has implications for both aesthetics and hermeneutics. Gadamer notes that art is fundamentally a representation. Therefore he pays great attention image problem. Noting the unity in the picture of the image and the prototype, Gadamer characterizes this connection with the concept of representation. The relationship of a painting to the world and reality is described by Gadamer with the concept of occasionality. Further criticism of the abstraction of aesthetic consciousness is an appeal to the phenomenon of architecture and literature. Gadamer uses the phenomenon of literature to prepare the transition from the arts to the humanities. Like art in depiction - i.e. V theatrical production, in the appearance of a picture, in a work of literature, has its own existence, so the humanities could, in contrast to the usual self-understanding, have their own way of presentation. The last paragraph of the second section of the first part of I.iM... is devoted to the discussion of this problem. Here Gadamer contrasts the strategy of classical and modern hermeneutics. Having criticized reconstructive hermeneutics, Gadamer shows, drawing on Hegel, that, like the experience of art in which the viewer necessarily belongs to the representation, humanistic understanding also ends in the integration of the other into the corresponding one's own. Understanding of the humanities is explained in this sense as appropriation, mastery, a process that does not let the understander leave the game. In applying this understanding to the spiritual sciences, Gadamer seeks to show that the methodologically equipped humanist scientist is not isolated and timeless to his subject, i.e. for the historical world, and, therefore, the master and creator of history. Rather, it initially belongs to her, so that in understanding there is also a relationship between the observer and his subject. Consequently, the same thing is revealed as in the experience of art: there is no isolated, self-existing, timeless subject; rather an object- the historical world - always determines the subject, since the latter is inextricably linked with this world. The second part of the book is similar to the first, in which first the critique of aesthetic consciousness is developed, and then the ontology of the work of art. And here, first, a critical history of modern hermeneutics is given, which serves to prepare the conditions for presenting the theory of hermeneutic experience. The historical dimension is understood as the preparation of a systematic part. It is important for Gadamer to prove that the type of hermeneutics presented by Hegel, i.e. type of integration corresponds to the humanitarian understanding in the proper sense of the word. The purpose of the proof is to present as contradictory the most significant foundation of the humanities in the 19th century, namely Dilthey's attempt. To use Gadamerian terminology, it can be described as an unresolved oscillation between integration and reconstruction. Gadamer's deconstruction of hermeneutics has its own significance. In the historical preamble, he analyzes the conditions of possibility of romantic hermeneutics. Gadamer shows that the formation of Schleiermacher's romantic hermeneutics is associated with the transformation of the hermeneutic tradition under the influence of the new scientific historical consciousness emerging at that time. Thus, romantic hermeneutics differs significantly from the old Protestant hermeneutics that preceded it, presented in historical forms theological, legal and philological hermeneutics, which still exist today as special forms of hermeneutics. Gadamer's arguments, devoted to criticism of the German historical school represented by Herder, Ranke and Droysen, are a preliminary stage of a critical analysis of Dilthey's philosophy. From Gadamer's point of view, Dilthey appears as the embodiment of the oscillation between the demand for the objectivity of science and the claim to the truth of life experience. On the one hand, he recognizes living reality in the form of the immanent reflectivity of life. On the other hand, the ideal of the objectivity of science. Dilthey strives to unite both moments: the actual reality of life and science, what has become historically and objectivity in some higher unity. Thus he falls into a contradiction. Scientific objectivity must abandon precisely what is important to a person, namely, his concrete life reality, since objectivity presupposes the existence pure subject, which is free from all judgments and prejudices (literally: pre-judgments) of its time and its tradition, relates objectively to every time and every tradition. But such a subject is not alive, is not an agent of actions, actions and is not in continuity active life . This is how Gadamer describes the clash between the epistemological and pragmatic positions. Gadamer allows for the possibility of overcoming the tension between theory and praxis. In doing so, he refers to further developments in philosophical discussion, especially to Husserl and Heidegger. Their work fundamentally overcomes the formulation of the question that defined Dilthey’s concept. Based on the theoretical achievements of Husserl and Heidegger, Gadamer develops his own theory of hermeneutic experience, which is the core of his hermeneutics. Understanding is not the detour into the historical, discovered by B. Spinoza, but only the objective truth itself. However, the thing (Sache) addresses me in its truth only when I have an objective interest in it. This prestructure of understanding is precisely what Gadamer directs his own interest towards. Here the hermeneutic circle described by Heidegger is repeated: I understand something only when I already have a prior objective interest in the dubious circumstance. This interest can be designated, together with Gadamer, as prejudice (Vorurteil), therefore, in prejudice (Vorurteilshaftigkeit) it is necessary to look for the deepest basis of our understanding. It can be stated that Gadamer, in contrast to the rationalistic tradition of the Enlightenment, rehabilitates prejudice, and then such concepts as authority and tradition. Thus, the interest of hermeneutics in the pre-reflective level of consciousness, in doxa, is thematized, which, despite Gadamer’s objections, turns it into a methodology of the humanities and social sciences. Using the classical example, Gadamer clarifies how the past is each time determining and relevant for the corresponding present. Historical distance is not overcome through enormous efforts, as historical consciousness claims; in a classical work, the past always coincides with the present. In this form of mediation of past and present, Gadamer sees a genuine, significant way of historical knowledge for the humanities. In this perspective, time distance takes on its special meaning. The presence of the past does not mean the actual continuous life of a tradition. Such continuity is not at all capable of distinguishing, sensing, feeling the distance between the past and the present. But this distance is the main problem of hermeneutics. Gadamer views temporal distance as positive: it separates the true from the false; only distance allows things to happen,
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Title: Truth and Method: Fundamentals of Philosophical Hermeneutics
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The book of the famous West German philosopher H.-G. Gadamer (b. 1900) is dedicated to one of the philosophical trends widespread in Western thought today - hermeneutics - the theory of understanding and interpretation of texts, historical monuments and cultural phenomena. It provides an exposition of its history that is fundamental for all modern hermeneutics, a taxonomy of principles and problems, and outlines the outputs of hermeneutics in the methodology of the humanities.
Recommended for philosophers, sociologists, cultural historians, and anyone interested in the problems of the development of knowledge.
Content
Hermeneutics. History and modernity (B. Bessonov) 7
Introduction 40
Part one. Exposition of the problem of truth as applied to the knowledge of art 46
I. Expansion of the aesthetic dimension into the realm of the transcendental 46
1. The importance of the humanistic tradition for the humanities 46
a) Method 46 problem
b) Leading humanistic concepts 52
a) Education 52
ß) Sensus communis (common sense) 63
y) Judgment 74
δ) Taste 79
2. Subjectivization of aesthetics in Kantian criticism 87
a) Kant’s teaching on taste and genius 87
a) Transcendental difference of taste 87
β) The doctrine of free and incidental beauty 90
γ) The doctrine of the ideal of beauty 92
δ) Interest in beauty in nature and art 94
ε) The relationship between taste and genius 99
b) Aesthetics of genius and the concept of experience 101
a) Updating the concept of genius 101
β) On the history of the word “experience” 106
γ) The concept of experience 110
c) The boundaries of the art of experience. Rehabilitation of allegory 117
3. Return of the problem of the truth of art 128
a) Controversy of aesthetic education 128
b) Criticism of the abstraction of aesthetic consciousness 136
II. Ontology of a work of art and its hermeneutic meaning 149
1. Game as a guiding thread of ontological explication 149
a) Concept of game 149
b) Transformation into structure and total mediation 158
c) Temporality of the aesthetic 169
d) Example of tragic 176
2. Implications for aesthetics and hermeneutics 183
a) Existential valency of the image 183
b) Ontological basis of occasional and decorative 193
c) Boundaries of Literature 212
d) Reconstruction and integration as tasks of hermeneutics 217
Part two. Extension of the question of truth to understanding in the mental sciences 223
I. Historical preamble 223
1. The doubtfulness of romantic hermeneutics and its application to historical science 223
a) Essential metamorphosis of hermeneutics during the transition from Enlightenment to Romanticism 223
a) Prehistory of romantic hermeneutics 223
β) Schleiermacher's project of universal hermeneutics 234
b) Joining the historical school with romantic hermeneutics 247
a) Difficulties with the ideal of universal history 247
β) Ranke's historical worldview 254
γ) The relationship between history and hermeneutics in I.G. Droysen 263
2. Dilthey’s involvement in the aporia of historicism 269
a) From the epistemological problem of history to the hermeneutic foundation of the spiritual sciences 269
b) The bifurcation of science and philosophy of life in Dilthey’s analysis of historical consciousness 283
3. Overcoming the epistemological theoretical formulation of the question by phenomenology 295
a) The concept of life in Husserl and Count York 295
b) Heidegger's project of hermeneutic phenomenology 307
II. Main features of the theory of hermeneutic experience 319
1. Raising the historicity of understanding to a hermeneutic principle 319
a) The hermeneutic circle and the problem of prejudice 319
a) Heidegger's discovery of the prestructure of understanding 319
β) Discrediting prejudice. Enlightenment 326
b) Prejudices as a condition of understanding 331
a) Rehabilitation of authority and tradition 331
β) Example of a classic 340
c) Hermeneutic meaning of temporal distance 347
d) Impact history principle 357
2. Return to the main hermeneutical problem 366
a) Hermeneutic problem of application 366
b) Hermeneutic relevance of Aristotle 371
c) Indicative value of legal hermeneutics 391
3. Analysis of effective-historical consciousness 405
a) Boundaries of reflective philosophy 405
b) The concept of experience and the essence of hermeneutic experience 411
c) Hermeneutic primacy of question 428
a) Sample of Platonic dialectics 428
β) Logic of question and answer 437
Part three. Ontological turn of hermeneutics on the guiding thread of language 448
1. Language as a medium of hermeneutical experience 448
a) Verbality as a definition of the hermeneutic subject 455
b) The linguistic nature of the hermeneutic process 462
2. Formation of the concept of “language” in the history of European thought 473
a) Language and logos 473
b) Language and verbum 487
c) Language and concept formation 498
3. Language as a horizon of hermeneutic ontology 510
a) Language as experience of the world 510
b) The environment of language and its speculative structure 530
c) Universal aspect of hermeneutics 550
Excursion I 569
Excursion II 573
Excursion III 576
Excursion IV 577
Excursion V 578
Excursion VI 579
Hermeneutics and historicism 582
Afterword 617
Notes 649
Name index 694
“TRUTH AND METHOD:”
“TRUTH AND METHOD: main features of philosophical hermeneutics”
“TRUTH AND METHOD: the main features of philosophical hermeneutics” (“Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik”, Tub., I960, Russian translation 1988) is the main work of H.-G. Gadamer. The book is the result of almost forty years of work by Gadamer as a practicing “hermeneut” - an interpreter of various philosophical and literary texts. The title is provocative: the conjunction “and” does not so much connect “truth” with “method” as contrast them to each other. According to Gadamer, the method of knowledge that became established along with the establishment of modern European science is neither unique nor universal. Humanity is essentially “non-methodical”; only in a few cases can it be subordinated to a certain method. In addition, the scientific and theoretical mastery of reality is only one of the relationships of a person to the world. There is something paradigmatic in this regard. Experience carried out in art and through art has no less cognitive potential than that provided by natural science and the “exact sciences”. Gadamer’s book is dedicated to revealing the underestimated potential of this experience (the task of the book is essentially set by the work of M. Heidegger “The Source of Artistic Creation”).
Gadamer's work, in a certain sense, continues the “rehabilitation” of the humanities (the “spiritual sciences” going back to German romanticism), which began in . 19th century V. Dilypeem. However, Gadamer finds Dilthey’s concept of understanding (as well as his hermeneutics in general) insufficient. The interpretation of understanding proposed by Dilthey seems to Gadamer not free from psychologism. In an effort to emphasize the radicality of his break with Dilthey’s school, Gadamer emphasizes his closeness to Schleiermacher (the priority of “grammatical” interpretation over “psychological”) and to Hegel (the doctrine of “objective spirit”).
The book consists of three sections, which correspond to three dimensions of human existence: “aesthetic”, “historical” and “linguistic”. The purpose of each section is to show the inadmissibility of narrowing the “experience of truth” contained, respectively, in art, history and language. In relation to art criticism (and to the aesthetic sphere in general), it can be argued that such a narrowing began with Kant. Although in Kant’s theory the “beautiful in nature” is still preserved over the “beautiful in art,” Kant sees the basis of the “beautiful” precisely in the a priori structure of subjectivity. This subsequently led to the predominance of the idea of “genius” over the idea of “taste” and to an increasing departure from the ontological parameters of a work of art towards “creative subjectivity”. Gadamer finds a counterbalance to the subjectivization of the phenomenon of art in the philosophy of Hegel. The idea of the “artist” in Hegel lies not in what he said, but in what was expressed in him. The meaning, therefore, is transcendental to the thinking subject. Understanding a work of art, we are dealing with a reality that does not fit into the subjectivity of its creator. In relation to historical science (Section 2 of the book), a similar “experience of truth” occurs with the advent of so-called historicism. The latter removed the “hermeneutical dimension” from the historical sphere: history began to be studied instead of understood. The texts of the past began to be approached “only historically,” that is, they were viewed exclusively as a product of certain socio-cultural circumstances, as if they were absolutely irrespective of those who know them. In an effort to overcome the limitations of a positivist-oriented historical science, Dilthey proposed a psychological approach to understanding the phenomena of the past: they must not only be explained based on a certain idea of the connection between the general and the particular, but also understood by reproducing the uniqueness of the other in one’s own subjectivity. However, the hermeneutic, i.e., problem of understanding, is not thereby revealed. To understand, it is not enough for the interpreter to move into the “horizon” of the author; it is necessary to “remelt” their horizons. The latter can only happen thanks to something third - something common in which the positions of both can be reconciled. Such a “third” is , considered from the point of view of its existential status, that is, as a special one, within which it finds itself and which cannot be captured by means of sociological or psychological research.
The third section of the book is devoted to revealing the ontological dimension of linguistic experience. Here Gadamer also appears as a faithful student of Heidegger. In language, both man of the world, his self-understanding, and people’s understanding of each other are realized. Language is the fundamental possibility of human existence; moreover, language in general is that “being that can be understood.” Being the supporting basis for the transmission of cultural experience from generation to generation, language provides traditions, and is realized between different cultures through the search for a common language. The pathos of the book is in demonstrating the ontological rootedness of the hermeneutic problematic. In subsequent editions of “Truth and Method,” Gadamer, responding to criticism (E. Betti, J. Habermas, K. O. Apel, E. D. Hirsch, T. Seebohm, etc.), clarified its individual theses, but did not refuse from its main idea: it is not an auxiliary or methodology (even if endowed with the broadest powers), it has character. “Truth and Method” has become a programmatic work of philosophical hermeneutics and one of the most frequently cited sources of the existential-phenomenological direction of modern Western philosophy.
V. S. Malakhov
New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M.: Thought. Edited by V. S. Stepin. 2001 .
See what ““TRUTH AND METHOD:”” is in other dictionaries:
Truth and Method- “THE TRUTH AND METHOD” is a fundamental philosophical study by Hans Georg Gadamer (ategN.U. Wahrheit und Methode. Tubingen, 1960; Russian translation: Truth and Method: Fundamentals of Philosophical Hermeneutics. M., 1988). The main idea of the book is to present... ... Encyclopedia of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
- “TRUTH AND METHOD: the main features of philosophical hermeneutics” (“Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik”, Tüb., 1960, Russian translation 1988) is the main work of H. G. Gadamer. The book is the result of almost forty years of work... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia
- 'THE TRUTH AND METHOD. The main features of philosophical hermeneutics’ work by Gadamer (1960), which was at the center of heated discussions for several decades and influenced the formation of modern German literary criticism, psychoanalysis...
Gadamer's work (1960), which was at the center of heated debate for several decades and influenced the formation of modern German literary criticism, psychoanalysis and neo-Marxism, as well as theorizing in the field of... ... History of Philosophy: Encyclopedia
This term has other meanings, see Truth (meanings). Truth is an epistemological characteristic of thinking in its relation to its subject. Contents 1 Definitions 1.1 In philosophy ... Wikipedia
Method- Method ♦ Méthode A set of rules and principles, rationally organized to achieve a certain result. In philosophy, I do not know of a single truly convincing method, except for the actual movement of thought, not... ... Sponville's Philosophical Dictionary
- (from the Greek methodos path, method of research, teaching, presentation) a set of techniques and operations of cognition and practical activities; a way to achieve certain results in knowledge and practice. The use of one or another M. is determined... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia
Verification The scientific method is a set of basic methods for obtaining new knowledge and methods for solving problems within the framework of any science. The method includes methods of studying phenomena, systematization, adjustment of new and previously acquired knowledge.... ... Wikipedia
Gadamer "Truth and Method"
Part one
Exposition of the problem of truth as applied to the knowledge of art I. Expansion of the aesthetic dimension into the realm of the transcendental 1. The importance of the humanistic tradition for the humanities a) THE PROBLEM OF METHOD The logical self-awareness of the humanities, which accompanied their actual formation in the 19th century, is completely dominated by the model of the natural sciences. This can be shown by the very consideration of the term “humanitarian science” (Geisteswissenschaft, lit., “science of the spirit”), although it receives its usual meaning only in the plural. The fact that the humanities are understood by analogy with the natural sciences is so obvious that the overtone of idealism inherent in the concept of spirit and the science of spirit recedes before this. The term “humanities” gained currency mainly due to the translator of “Logic” by John Stuart Mill. In his work, Mill consistently attempts to outline the possibilities available to the application of inductive logic to the field of the humanities (“moral sciences”). The translator at this point puts “Geisteswissenschaften.” From the very course of Mill’s reasoning it follows that here we are not talking at all about the recognition of some special logic of the humanities, but, on the contrary, the author seeks to show that the basis of all cognitive sciences is the inductive method, which appears as the only effective one in this area.Thus, Mill remains in line with the English tradition, which was most expressively formulated by Hume in the introduction to his Treatise 2. In the moral sciences, it is also necessary to recognize the similarities, regularities, patterns that make individual predictable phenomena and processes. However, even 44 in the field of natural sciences this goal is not always equally achievable. The reason is rooted solely in the fact that the data on the basis of which similarities could be recognized are not always presented in sufficient quantity. Thus, meteorology works in such a way It is the same methodical method as physics, but its initial data is lacunar, and therefore its predictions are inaccurate. The same is true for moral and social phenomena. The application of the inductive method in these areas is free from all metaphysical assumptions and remains completely independent of how exactly the formation of the observed phenomenon is conceived. Here, for example, they do not invent reasons for certain manifestations, but simply state regularity. Thus, regardless of whether one believes, for example, in free will or not, in the field of social life, prediction in any case turns out to be possible. Drawing conclusions about phenomena from the presence of regularities in no way means recognizing something like the existence of a relationship, the regularity of which allows for the possibility of prediction. The implementation of free decisions - if they exist - does not interrupt the regularity of the process; U itself belongs to the sphere of generalizations and regularities obtained through induction. This is the ideal of “natural science” about society, which takes on a programmatic character here and to which we owe research successes in many areas; it is enough to recall the so-called mass psychology. However, in this case, in fact, the problem that the humanities pose to thinking arises: their the essence cannot be correctly understood if they are measured by the scale of progressive knowledge of laws. Knowledge of the socio-historical world cannot rise to the level of science through the application of inductive methods of the natural sciences. Whatever the word “science” means here and no matter how widespread it is in historical science in general, the use of more common methods to this or that subject of research, historical knowledge nevertheless does not aim to present specific phenomenon as a case illustrating a general rule. The singular does not simply confirm a pattern that, in practical circumstances, allows predictions to be made. On the contrary, the ideal here should be an understanding of the phenomenon itself in its one-time and historical concreteness. At 45, exposure to an arbitrarily large volume is possible general knowledge; the goal is not to fix and expand them for a deeper understanding of the general laws of development of people, nations and states, but, on the contrary, to understand what this person, this people, this state is like, what its formation was like, in other words - “how could it turns out that they became like this. What kind of knowledge is this that allows us to understand something as such through understanding the ways of its formation? What is called science here? And even if we admit that the ideal of this kind of knowledge is fundamentally different in type and attitudes from that accepted in the natural sciences , there still remains a temptation to turn in this case, at least privately, to such a characteristic as “inexact sciences.” Even the attempt (as significant as it is fair) to equalize the rights of the humanities and natural sciences, undertaken by Hermann Helmholtz in his his famous speech of 1862, no matter how much he emphasized the superiority of the humanities in their universal significance, retained the negativity of their logical characteristics from the point of view of the methodological ideal of the natural sciences3. Helmholtz distinguishes two types of induction: logical and artistic-instinctive. But this means that he distinguishes both ways of thinking at their basis not logically, but psychologically. Both use inductive inference, but the process that precedes inference in the humanities is unconscious inference. Thus, the practice of humanitarian induction is associated with special psychological conditions. It requires a kind of tact, and requires various spiritual qualities, such as a rich memory and recognition of authorities, while the self-conscious inferences of natural scientists, on the contrary, are based entirely on the inclusion of their own consciousness. Even if we admit that the great natural scientist resisted the temptation to make a generally binding norm out of his own way of working, he nevertheless clearly does not have any other logical possibility of characterizing the results of the human sciences other than with the help of the concept of induction familiar to him thanks to Mill's Logic. What is the actual sample for Sciences XVIII century, a new mechanics became, which achieved triumph in Newton’s celestial mechanics, it was still so self-evident for Helmholtz that he did not even ask the question, for example, 46 about what philosophical prerequisites ensured the formation of this new science for the 17th century. Today we know how important the Paris Occamist school was for this. For Helmholtz, the methodological ideal of the natural sciences does not need either a search for historical precedence or theoretical-cognitive restrictions, and therefore he is logically unable to understand the work of humanities scientists in any other way. An urgent task also urgently required a solution: to raise to logical self-knowledge such studies that had reached their full bloom, such as, for example, the studies of the “historical school.” Already in 1843, I. G. Droyzen, the author and discoverer of the history of Hellenism, wrote: “There is probably not a single field of science that is as remote, theoretically justified, limited and dissected as history.” Already Droysen needs Kant, who saw in the categorical imperative of history “a living source, ίίί>, which flows historical life humanity." He expects “that a more deeply comprehended concept of history will become that point of gravity where the current empty fluctuations of the humanities can find permanence and opportunities for further progress.”°. The example of the natural sciences, to which Droysen appeals here, is thus understood not meaningfully, in the sense of scientific-theoretical assimilation, but, on the contrary, in the sense that the humanities must find justification as an equally independent group scientific disciplines. Droysen's "History" is an attempt to solve this problem. Dilthey, in whom the influence of the natural scientific method and the empiricism of Mill's logic is much more pronounced, nevertheless firmly adheres to the romantic-idealistic traditions in the understanding of humanism. He also experiences a constant feeling of superiority in relation to the English empirical school, since he directly observes the advantages of the historical school in comparison with any natural scientific and natural legal thinking. “Only from Germany can a truly empirical method come, taking the place of preconceived dogmatic empiricism. Mill is dogmatic for lack of historical education,” is Dilthey’s note on a copy of Mill’s Logic 6. In fact, all the intense, decades-long work that Dilthey expended in establishing the human sciences was “47 a constant confrontation with the logical demands that to these sciences is the famous final chapter of Mill. Nevertheless, in the depths of his soul, Dilthey agrees that the natural sciences are a model for the humanities, even when he tries to defend the methodological independence of the latter. This can be clarified by two evidences that simultaneously show us the way to further observations In his obituary for Wilhelm Scherer, Dilthey emphasizes that the spirit of natural science accompanied Scherer in his work, and attempts to explain why Scherer was so strongly influenced by the English empiricists: “He was modern man, and the world of our ancestors was no longer the homeland of his spirit and heart; he was his historical object” 7. This very turn shows that for Dilthey, scientific knowledge is associated with a severance of life connections, a departure to a certain distance from one’s own history, allowing one to turn these connections and this history into objects. We can say that both Scherer and Dilthey use inductive! And comparative method with genuine individual tact and that such tact arises only on the basis of a spiritual culture that preserves live connection with the world pro-; luminosity and a romantic belief in individuality. Nevertheless, in its scientific concept both of them were guided by the model of natural sciences. Particularly evident here is Dilthey’s attempt to appeal to the independence of the method of the humanities, justifying it by their relationship to their object8. Such an appeal ultimately sounds quite Aristotelian and demonstrates a genuine rejection of the natural scientific model. However, Dilthey traces this independence of humanitarian methods back to the old Baconian thesis “natura parendo vin-citur” (“nature is conquered by submission”) 9, and this deals a sensitive blow to the classical-romantic heritage that Dilthey so sought to master. Thus, even Dilthey, to whom historical education gave advantages in relation to modern neo-Kantianism, in his logical constructions, in essence, did not go far beyond the modest statement proclaimed by Helmholtz. No matter how much Dilthey defends the epistemological independence of the humanities, what is called method in modern science is the same everywhere 48 and only manifests itself in the field of natural sciences with the greatest consistency. There is no own method humanities, but perhaps one can follow Helmholtz to ask to what extent the concept of method is used here and whether the style of work in the humanities is not influenced by certain conditions associated with them to a greater extent than inductive logic. Helmholtz correctly noticed this when, wanting to rehabilitate the humanities, he spoke about memory, authority and psychological tact, which in this field of knowledge take the place of conscious inference. What is this tact based on? How does it arise? Is the scientific nature of the humanities contained in it rather than in their methodology? Because motivation similar questions created by the humanities, which prevents the introduction of modernity into scientific concepts; they were and remain a strictly philosophical problem. The answer that Helmholtz and his century gave to these questions cannot satisfy us; they followed Kant, orienting the concepts of science and knowledge to the example of the natural sciences and searching for the distinctive features of the humanities in artistic aspects (artistic flair, artistic induction). At the same time, the picture of the work of a scientist in the natural sciences given by Helmholtz turns out to be rather one-sided when he is silent about the “quick lightning of the spirit” (that is, what is called insight) and prefers to find here only “the iron work of self-conscious inference.” He relies on the testimony of J. S. Mill, according to which “the inductive sciences have done more in modern times for progress logical method than all professional philosophers” 10. He recognizes these sciences as examples of the scientific method. However, Helmholtz knows that historical research is predetermined by a completely different type of knowledge than that which serves the study of the laws of nature. He therefore tries to argue that the inductive method, as applied to historical knowledge, is in different conditions than in the study of nature. In this regard, he turns to the distinction between nature and freedom, which lies at the heart of Kantian philosophy. Historical knowledge, in his opinion, is so unique precisely because in its sphere there are not the laws of nature, but voluntary submission to practical laws, that is, commandments. World human freedom I am therefore unfamiliar with the absence of exceptions asserted for the laws of nature. This line of thinking is nevertheless unconvincing. It corresponds neither to Kant's intentions, according to which the inductive investigation of the world of human freedom should be based on his distinction between nature and freedom, nor to his own ideas of inductive logic. Mill was more consistent, methodically bracketing the problem of freedom. But in addition, the inconsistency with which Helmholtz relies on Kant to justify the humanities also brings false fruits, since, according to Helmholtz, the empiricism of these sciences should be regarded in the same way as the empiricism of weather forecasts, namely as a refusal active position and an attempt to rely on chance. But in fact, the humanities are far from feeling inferior to the natural sciences. The spiritual followers of German classical philosophy, on the contrary, developed a proud self-awareness that they were the true defenders of humanism. The era of German classicism not only brought a renewal of literature and aesthetic criticism, which were able to overcome the outdated ideals of the Baroque and the rationalism of the Enlightenment, but also gave a completely new content to the concept of humanity, this ideal of enlightened reason. Above all, Herder transcended the perfectionism of the Enlightenment with a new ideal of the “education of man” and thereby prepared the ground on which the historical sciences could develop in the 19th century. The concept of education (Bildung), which at that time captured the minds, was probably the greatest thought of the 18th century, and it was it that designated the “element” in which the humanities of the 19th century existed, even if they did not yet know its epistemological justification. b) LEADING HUMANISTIC CONCEPTS a) Education The concept of education helps to most clearly sense how deep the spiritual evolution is, which allows us to still feel like contemporaries of 50 Goethe and, on the contrary, makes the Baroque century already considered a prehistoric time. The most significant concepts and figures of speech with which we are accustomed to operate took their form precisely in this process, and those who do not want to engage with language, surrendering to the will of its elements, but strive to gain an independent and well-founded understanding of history, find that they are forced to move from one problem from the field of the history of words and concepts to another. In the following presentation we will try to touch only on the prerequisites for the enormous work task, which confronts researchers here and contributes to the philosophical formulation of the problem. Concepts such as “art”, “history”, “creativity”, “worldview”, “experience”, “genius”, “outer world”, “inner world”, “expression”, “style”, “symbol”, for us taken for granted, they conceal an abyss of historical connotations. If we turn to the concept of education, the importance of which for the humanities has already been emphasized, we find ourselves in a happy position. We have at our disposal a compact study of the history of this word: its origins rooted in medieval mysticism, its further existence in Baroque mysticism, its religiously based spiritualization in Klopstock's Messiah, which captured an entire era, and, finally, its seminal definition by Herder as "raised_and_ya_k.g^zhadaoshi". The religion of education in the 19th century retained the deep parameters of this word, and our concept of education comes precisely from here. In relation to our usual meaning of the word "education", the first important statement is that that the older concept of "natural education" as the formation of external manifestations (the structure of body parts, proportional physique) and in general the work of nature (for example, "mountain formation") has already almost completely separated from the new concept. Now "education" is closely connected with the concept of culture and ultimately denotes a specific human way transformation of natural inclinations and capabilities. The final polishing of this concept, stimulated by Herder, ended in the period between Kant and Hegel. Kant does not yet use the word “education” in precisely this meaning and in such a connection. He talks about the “culture” of abilities (or “natural inclinations”), which in this capacity represents the act of freedom of the acting subject. Thus, among the duties in relation to himself, he also names the duty “not to allow your talent to become covered with rust,” without using the word “education.” Hegel, on the contrary, talks about self-education and education when he raises the same the question of duties towards oneself, which Kant 13 and Wilhelm von Humboldt fully perceive with his subtle ear, which was his distinctive feature, the whole difference in the meaning of “culture” and “education”: “... but when we In our language, when we say “education,” we mean something at the same time high and rather internal, namely, a type of understanding that harmoniously flows into perception and character, originating in the experience and feeling of a combined spiritual and sensual aspiration.” Here, “education "is no longer equivalent to culture, that is, the development of abilities or talents. Such a change in the meaning of the word "education" rather awakens the old mystical traditions, according to which man bears and nurtures in his soul the image of God, in whose likeness he was created. The Latin equivalent of this word is formatio, and it corresponds to it in other languages, for example in English (in Shaftesbury) form and formation. IN German For a long time, the word “education” was competed with the corresponding derivative concepts forma, for example, formation, formation (Formierung, Formation). Since the time of Aristotelianism, the concept of "form" was completely separated by the Renaissance from its technical significance and was interpreted purely dynamically and in a natural sense. Nevertheless, the victory of the word “education” over “form” seems not accidental, since in “education” (Bildung) the “image” (Bild) is hidden. The concept of form retreats before the mysterious two-sidedness with which the “image” simultaneously includes the meanings of display, cast (Nachbild) and sample (Vorbild). That “education” (like the more modern word “formation”) denotes the result of the process of becoming rather than the process itself corresponds to the widespread transfer of the meaning of becoming to being. Here the transfer is quite legitimate, since the result of education is not represented as a technical intention, but stems from the internal process of formation and education and therefore is constantly in a state of continuation and development. It is no coincidence that the word “education” is identical to the Greek physis. Education, to the same small extent as nature, knows 52 about anything beyond its stated goals. (One should be suspicious of the word and the associated concept “goal of education”, behind which a certain secondary “education” is hidden. Education cannot be the goal itself; one cannot strive for it in this capacity, even if only in the reflections of the educator.) This is precisely the superiority of the concept of education in relation to the simple cultivation of existing inclinations, from which it originated. Cultivation of inclinations is the development of something given; here the simple means of achieving the goal are exercise and diligence, which have become a habit. So, educational material A language textbook is just a means, not the end itself. Its assimilation serves only the development of language skills. In the process of education, on the contrary, on what and thanks to what someone receives an education must be assimilated entirely. In this regard, education includes everything that it touches, but all this does not enter as a means that loses its functions. On the contrary, in the education received, nothing disappears, but everything is preserved. Education is a truly historical concept, and it is precisely this historical character of “preservation” that must be discussed in order to understand the essence of the humanities. Thus, the very first glance at the history of the word “education” introduces us to the circle of historical concepts that Hegel initially placed in the sphere of “first philosophy.” In practice, Hegel developed the most subtle concept of what education is. We follow him here. 15 He also saw that for philosophy “the conditions of its existence lie in education,” and we will add to this that this is also true of the humanities in general. For the existence of the spirit is essentially connected with the idea of education. Man is distinguished by the fact that he breaks with the immediate and natural; this is required of him by the spiritual, rational side of his being. “Taken from this side, he is not by nature what he should be,” and therefore he needs education. What Hegel called the formal essence of education is based on its universality. Based on the concept of the rise to the universal, Hegel was able to uniformly comprehend what in his time was understood as education. The rise to universality is not limited to theoretical education and generally does not imply only a theoretical aspect as opposed to a practical one, but embraces the essential definition of human rationality as a whole. The general essence of human education is that man makes himself in every respect a spiritual being. One who indulges in particulars is uneducated, for example, one who does not control his blind, disproportionate and irrelevant anger. Hegel shows that such a person initially lacks the ability to abstract: he cannot abstract himself from himself and look at the general by which his particular is proportionately and relatively determined. Education as an ascent to the universal is thus the task of man. It requires sacrificing the common and the special. Negatively, sacrificing characteristics means curbing drives and thereby freedom from their objects and freedom for one’s objectivity. Here the deductions of phenomenological dialectics complement what was introduced in the Propaedeutics. In “Phenomenology of Spirit” Hegel develops the genesis of a truly free “in itself and for itself” self-consciousness and shows that the essence of labor is to create a thing, and not to consume it 1b. The working consciousness again finds itself as an independent consciousness in the independent existence that labor gives to a thing. Labor is a curbed desire. As long as it forms objectivity, that is, it acts selflessly and provides a general, working consciousness rises above the immediacy of its being to universality, or, as Hegel put it, while it creates, forms an object, it forms itself. At the same time, he implies the following: to the extent that a person has mastered a “skill”, achieved dexterity in work, he has received his own sense of self. That which, as it seems to him, is denied him in his selfless service, as soon as he is completely subordinate to someone else's mind, becomes his lot as soon as he acquires a work consciousness. And in this capacity, he finds in himself his own mind, and it is absolutely correct to say about work that it forms a person. The self-perceptions of the working consciousness contain all the aspects of what constitutes practical education: the distance from the immediacy of drives, personal needs and private interests, that is, the requirement of universality. In Propaedeutics, Hegel, emphasizing that the essence of practical education lies in the pursuit of the universal, shows that it also appears in moderation, which limits the immensity in satisfying needs and applying forces to the universal. It is also present in the prudence shown in relation to individual states or activities, in taking into account other things that may still be necessary. But in any vocation there is something from fate, from external necessity, and any vocation requires one to devote oneself to completing tasks that cannot in any way be regarded as the pursuit of personal goals. Practical education means that professional work is carried out entirely and comprehensively. But this also includes overcoming the alien that is in work in relation to a person, that is, the complete transformation by a person of this alien into his own. Thus, to give oneself to the general one in one’s work means at the same time to be able to limit oneself, that is, to make one’s calling entirely one’s own business. And then it is no longer an obstacle for a person. In this Hegelian description of practical education one can see the fundamental definition of the historical spirit: reconciliation with oneself, recognition of oneself in otherness. This definition is finally clarified in the idea of theoretical education, for theoretical activity as such is already alienation, namely the desire “to engage in the non-immediate, alien, belonging to recollection, memory and thinking.” So, theoretical education takes us beyond what a person directly knows and comprehends. It consists in learning to give meaning to the other and to find generalized points of view in order to “perceive the objective in its freedom” and without selfish interests. 17 That is why every educational activity leads through the development of theoretical interests, and Hegel justifies the special suitability for education of studying world and language of the ancients. This is due to the fact that such a world is sufficiently distant and alien to us so that the necessary distance that separates it from us can have a positive impact, but it “at the same time contains all the initial moments and threads of returning us to ourselves, but in the form of a truly universal essence of the spirit" "8. In these words of the director of the gymnasium in Hegel one can see the typical prejudice of an adherent of classicism, who believes that it is especially easy to find the universal essence of the spirit among the ancients. But the main idea retains its validity: to recognize one’s own in someone else’s, to get used to it - that’s what is the main movement of the spirit, the meaning of which is only in returning to oneself from other existence. Otherwise, all theoretical education, including the study foreign languages and alien worldviews - a simple continuation of the process of education, laid down much earlier. Each individual, rising from his natural essence into the sphere of the spirit, finds in the language, customs, and social structure of his people a given substance that he wishes to master, as happens when learning to speak. Thus, this individual is constantly on the path of education, and his naturalness is constantly removed in proportion to the fact that the world into which he grows is formed by human language and human customs. Hegel emphasizes: in this world of its own, the people find existence. He produces it in himself and from himself and in the same way establishes what he is in himself. Thus, it is clear that the essence of education is not alienation as such, but a return to oneself, the precondition of which, however, is alienation. At the same time, education should be understood not only as a process that ensures the historical rise of the spirit into the realm of the universal; at the same time it is the element in which an educated person lives. What kind of element is this? This is where the questions that we already addressed to Helmholtz begin. Hegel's answer cannot satisfy us, since for him education takes place as a movement from alienation and assimilation to complete mastery of substance, to separation from all objective entities, which is achievable only in absolute philosophical knowledge. Real education, like the element of spirit, is by no means connected with Hegel’s philosophy of absolute spirit, just as a true understanding of the historicity of consciousness has little connection with his philosophy of world history. It is necessary to understand that even for the historical sciences of the spirit, which have moved away from Hegel, the idea of perfect education remains a necessary ideal, since education is precisely the element in which they move. And what more ancient usage calls “perfect education” in the field of bodily phenomena is not so much the last phase of development as a state of maturity that has left behind all development and ensures the harmonious movement of all members. It is in this sense that the humanities assume that the scientific consciousness appears already educated and precisely because of this it has a genuine tact that can neither be learned nor imitated and which supports the formation of judgment in the humanities and their way of knowing. What Helmholtz describes as the working specificity of the humanities, especially what he calls artistic feeling and tact, actually presupposes an element of education, within which a particularly free mobility of the spirit is ensured. Thus, Helmholtz speaks of “the readiness with which the most heterogeneous experience should be implanted in the memory of the historian or philologist.”19 This can be described very superficially from the point of view of the ideal of “the iron work of self-conscious inference” in the light of which the natural scientist thinks of himself. The concept of memory in the sense in which he uses it is not sufficient to explain the components of this work. In fact, this tact or this feeling is misunderstood when it is meant as an incoming mental faculty, served by a tenacious memory and thus achieving knowledge that is not subject to strict control. What provides the possibility of such a function of tact, what helps to acquire it and dispose of it, is not a simple psychological device favorable to humanitarian knowledge. The essence of memory itself cannot be understood correctly without seeing in it anything other than a general inclination or ability. Preservation in memory, forgetting and remembering anew belong to the historical states of man and themselves form part of his history and his education. If someone uses his memory as a simple ability - and all technical methods are an exercise in such use - he still does not attribute it to the sphere of what is most inherent to him. Memory should be formed, because it is not memory in general and for him. Some things are stored in memory, some others are not, they want to keep some things in their memory, and some things they want to expel from it. The time has come to free the phenomenon of memory from psychological equation with abilities and understand that it represents an essential feature of the finite historical existence of man. Along with the abilities to store in memory and remember, connected by a certain relationship, the same relationship enters in a certain way, to which due attention has not yet been paid, and the ability to forget, which is not only an omission and a drawback, but also - this was primarily emphasized by F .Nietzsche - a condition for the life of the spirit20. Only through forgetting does the spirit retain the possibility of 57. total renewal, the ability to look at everything with fresh eyes, so that what has been known for a long time is fused with what has been seen anew into a multi-layered unity. “Store in memory” is equally ambiguous. Being a memory (μνήμη), it is connected with recollection (άνάμνησις) 21. But the same is true with regard to the concept of “tact” used by Helmholtz. By tact we mean a certain receptivity and ability to perceive a situation and behavior within it, for which we do not have knowledge based on general principles. Because of this, the concept of tact is inexpressive and inexpressible. You can say something tactfully. But this will always mean that something is being tactfully bypassed and not expressed, and that it is tactless to talk about something that can be bypassed. But "bypass" does not mean to turn away from something; on the contrary, you need to have this something in front of your eyes so that you don’t stumble over it, but walk past it. Thus, tact helps to keep a distance, avoid injury and collisions, too close contact and injury to the intimate sphere of the individual. But the tact that Helmholtz speaks of is not simply identical with this sensory and everyday phenomenon. However, there is an essential commonality here, since the tact operating in the humanities is not limited to a sensual and unconscious nature; rather, it is a way of knowing and a way of being at the same time. The above analysis of the concept of education helps to clarify this. What Helmholtz calls tact includes education and represents both its aesthetic and historical function. One must have a feeling for both the aesthetic and the historical, or develop this feeling, in order to be able to rely on one's tact in humanistic works. And since this tact is not just a natural device, we are rightfully talking about aesthetic or historical consciousness, and not about our own feeling, although, obviously, such consciousness correlates with the immediacy of feeling, that is, in some cases it can certainly produce dissection and evaluation , although I am unable to give reasons for this. Thus, someone who has an aesthetic sense knows how to distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly, good or poor quality, and one who has a historical sense knows what is possible and what is impossible for a certain era, and has a sense of the otherness of the past in relation to the present. If all this is based on education, then this means that it is not a matter of experience or position, but a matter of the past formation of being. Neither more accurate observations nor a more thorough study of tradition can help this if the receptivity to the otherness of a work of art or the past is not prepared. This is exactly what we were faced with when, following Hegel, we emphasized such a general distinctive feature of education as his openness to everything else, other, more generalized points of view. Education contains a general sense of proportion and distance in relation to itself, and through it - a rise above oneself to the universal. To consider yourself and your personal goals as if from a distance means to consider them as others do. This universality is certainly not a community of concepts or reason. Based on the general, the specific is determined and nothing is forcibly proven. The general points of view to which an educated person is open do not become for him a rigid standard that is always effective; rather, they are peculiar to him only as possible points of view of other people. To this extent, an educated consciousness in practice actually has rather the character of a feeling, since any sense, for example vision, seems to be general exactly to the extent that it covers its sphere, to the extent that a wide field is open to it, and to the extent that it is capable of making distinctions within what is revealed to it. Educated consciousness is superior to any of the natural senses in that these latter are each limited to a specific sphere, but it also has the ability to act in all directions; it is a general feeling. The general feeling is, in fact, the formulation of the essence of education, in which one can hear the echo of broad historical connections. Understanding the concept of education, which lies at the heart of Helmholtz's thoughts, takes us back to the distant history of this concept. Let's follow this connection if we want to clear the problem philosophical approach to the humanities from the artificial narrowness imparted to it by the doctrine of the method of the 19th century. The modern concept of science and the subordinate concept of method are insufficient for us. What makes the humanities sciences is more likely to be understood in terms of traditional concept education than from the methodological ideas of modern science. This is the humanistic tradition, and we will turn to it. In comparison with the claims of modern science, it takes on a new meaning. Obviously, it would be worthwhile to specifically trace how, from the time of humanism, the criticism of “school” science found its audience and how this criticism evolved following the evolutions of its opponents. First of all, ancient motifs have been revived here. The enthusiasm with which humanists proclaimed the Greek language and the path of erudition was something more than just a passion for antiques. The revival of classical languages brought with it a new appreciation of rhetoric. It opened a front against the “school,” that is, against scholastic science, and served the ideal of human wisdom, which was unattainable within the framework of the “school”; such opposition truly stands at the origins of philosophy. Plato's criticism of the sophists, and even more so, his peculiarly ambivalent attitude towards Isocrates, explains the philosophical problem inherent here. In connection with the new awareness of method in the natural sciences of the 17th century, this ancient problem further increases its critical urgency. In the face of this new science's claims to exclusivity, the question increasingly arises whether the only source of truth may lie in the humanistic concept of education. Indeed, we will see that the humanities of the 19th century, without realizing it, drew their only vital force from the vitality of humanistic thought about education. At the same time, it basically goes without saying that the determining factors here are humanistic studies, and not mathematics, for what could a new teaching about the method of the 17th century mean for the humanities? One has only to read the relevant chapters of the Port-Royal Logic, concerning the laws of reason as applied to historical truth, in order to understand the paucity of what the humanities can draw from this methodological idea. 2 All extracts from it are reduced to mere triviality, to something like the idea that the assessment of an event in all its truth requires attention to the circumstances accompanying it (circonstances). The Jansenists in this way of proof tried to provide methodological guidance for deciding the question to what extent miracles are trustworthy. They thereby sought to contrast the uncontrolled faith of the spirit in a miracle was a new method and believed that in this way it would be possible to legitimize the true feelings of biblical tradition and church tradition. New Science in the Service of the Ancient Church - It is all too obvious that this relationship did not promise to last, and one can imagine what must have happened when the very premises of Christianity became problematic. The methodological ideal of natural science in its application to the reliability of historical evidence of biblical tradition should have led to completely different results, catastrophic for Christianity. The path from Jansenist miracle criticism to historical biblical criticism is not so far, Spinoza - good for that example. In the future, we will show that the consistent application of this methodology as the only criterion for determining truth in the humanities in general is equivalent to its self-destruction. &) Sensus communis (common sense) Given this state of affairs, it is not difficult, drawing on the humanistic tradition, to wonder what ways of knowledge the humanities can learn from such a methodology. A valuable starting point for this reasoning is Vico’s work “On the Meaning of the Sciences of Our Time.” 23 Vico’s defense of humanism, as the title itself shows, is mediated by Jesuit pedagogy and, to the same extent as against Descartes, is directed against Jansenism. This pedagogical manifesto of Vico, like his project of a “new science,” is based on old truths. He appeals to common sense, to social feeling and to the humanistic ideal of eloquence, that is, to those points that were already inherent in the ancient concept of wisdom. “Nobility” (ευ λέγειν) in this regard becomes an internally ambiguous formula, and by no means just a rhetorical ideal. It also implies speaking correctly, that is, true, and not just the art of speech, the ability to say something well. Therefore, in ancient times, this ideal, as we know, was proclaimed by both teachers of philosophy and teachers of rhetoric, and yet rhetoric has long been at enmity with philosophy and claimed to convey true life wisdom, in contrast to the idle speculations of the “sophists.” Vico, who himself was a teacher of rhetoric, is therefore in line with the humanistic tradition coming from antiquity. Obviously, this tradition, and especially the positive ambiguity of the rhetorical ideal, legitimized not only by Plato, but also by the anti-rhetorical methodologism of the New Age, is also important for the self-awareness of the humanities. In this regard, Vico already sounds a lot of what interests us. His appeal to common sense, however, conceals one more element of the ancient tradition, in addition to the rhetorical one: the opposition of the “school” scientist and the sage, on which Vico relies, a contrast that had as its prototype the Cynic Socrates and its material basis - the opposition of “Sophia” and “phronesis,” first developed by Aristotle and developed by the Peripatetics to the level of criticism of the theoretical ideal of life, 24 and in the Hellenistic era, which became one of the defining images of the sage, especially after the Greek ideal of education fused with the self-awareness of the leading political stratum of Rome. Roman jurisprudence of later times is also known to develop against the background of legal art and legal practice, which come into contact with the practical ideal of “phronesis” rather than with the theoretical ideal of “philosophy” 25. Since the revival of ancient philosophy and rhetoric, the image of Socrates has finally turned into an antithesis science, as evidenced by the figure of the amateur, who took a fundamentally new position between the scientist and the sage. 26. The rhetorical tradition of humanism also skillfully appealed to Socrates and to the skeptics' criticism of dogmatists. Thus, Vico criticizes the Stoics for believing in reason as the régula veri (rule of truth), and, on the contrary, praises the ancient academicians, who affirmed only the knowledge of ignorance, and then the academicians of the modern era for being strong in the art of argumentation, which refers to the art of speech. Vico's appeal to common sense takes on, however, in line with this humanistic tradition a special coloring. In the field of science, too, there is a clash of old and new, and what Vico has in mind is no longer opposition to the "school", but a special opposition to contemporary science. The critical science of the New Age has its advantages, which he does not dispute, but indicates their boundaries. The wisdom of the ancients, their desire for prudence (prudentia) and eloquence (eloquentia), according to Vico, have not lost their significance in the face of this new science and its mathematical methods. When applied to problems of education, they turn out to be nothing more than the formation of common sense, fed not by the true, but by the probable. Here the following is important for us: common sense in this connection clearly means not only that general ability that every person has, but at the same time also the feeling that gives rise to community. Vico 62 believes that the direction of human will is given not by an abstract community of reason, but by a concrete commonality, the community of a group, people, nation or the entire human race. The development of this general feeling thereby becomes of decisive importance for life. On this general sense of truth and right, which is not fundamentally knowledge, but allows one to find a guiding light, Vico bases the meaning of eloquence and its right to independence. After all, education cannot proceed through critical research. Youth needs images to develop imagination and memory. But this is precisely what the study of sciences in the spirit of modern criticism does not provide. Thus, for Vico, the old topic pushes aside Cartesian criticism. Topeka is the art of finding arguments, it serves to develop a sense of conviction that functions instinctively and instantly (ex tempore), and that is why it cannot be replaced by science. These definitions by Vico reveal their apologetic nature. They indirectly recognize the new, truthful concept of science, but at the same time exclusively defend the right to the existence of the probable. In this, Vico, as we have seen, follows an ancient rhetorical tradition dating back to Plato. But what Vico means goes far beyond rhetorical persuasion. In fact, here, as we have already said, there is an Aristotelian opposition between practical and theoretical knowledge, which cannot be reduced to the opposition of the true and the probable. Practical knowledge, “phronesis,” is another type of knowledge 27. This ultimately means that it is aimed at a specific situation. Consequently, it requires taking into account “circumstances” in their infinite variety. This is precisely what stands out in Vico; True, he only pays attention to the fact that this knowledge departs from rational concept knowledge. But this is not really the ideal of quietism. Aristotle's opposition also means something other than just the opposition of knowledge based on general principles, and knowledge of the specific, is something other than just the ability to subsume the individual under the general, which we call the “ability of judgment.” Rather, it has a positive ethical motive, which is included in the teaching of the Roman Stoics about common sense. Awareness and sensory overcoming of a specific situation require such subsuming under the general, that is, the goal that is pursued in order to achieve what is right. Consequently, such subordination already has as a prerequisite the direction of the will, and this means sensory being (εξιζ). Hence “phronesis,” according to Aristotle, is “spiritual virtue.” He sees in it not just an ability, but a certainty of sensory existence, which cannot exist without the entire set of “ethical virtues,” and vice versa, they cannot exist without it. Although the exercise of this virtue involves discerning between what is suitable and what is not, it is not merely practical intelligence and general resourcefulness. Its distinction between suitable and inappropriate always includes the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate and implies a certain moral position, which in turn develops. This is the motive that Aristotle developed against Plato’s “idea of the good” and which Vico’s appeal to common sense essentially points to. In scholasticism, for example, for Thomas Aquinas, common sense - in the development of the ideas of the treatise “On the Soul” 28 - is the common root of external feelings, as well as the ability to judge the given that combines them, which is inherent in all people 29. For Vico, on the contrary, common sense is this feeling of rightness and common good , which lives in all people, but even more so it is a feeling obtained thanks to the community of life, thanks to its way of life and goals. In this concept one hears an echo of natural law, as in κοι,ναί εννοιαι (general ideas) Stop. But common sense in this sense is not a Greek concept and does not at all imply χοινή δΰναμις (general ability), which Aristotle speaks of in his essay “On the Soul”, when he tries to draw a parallel between the doctrine of specific feelings (αΐσΦησις ίσια) and the phenomenological state , which shows any perception as a distinction of the general and as a judgment about it. Vico rather relies on the ancient Roman concept of sensus communie as it appears among the Roman classics, who, in contrast to Greek education, adhered to the values and meaning of their own traditions of state and social life. Consequently, already in the Roman concept of common sense one can hear a critical note directed against the theoretical speculations of philosophers, and Vico picks up this in his opposition to contemporary science (critica). One has only to base historical and philological studies and the specifics of work in the field of the humanities on this concept of common sense, and something immediately appears that explains the problem. For the subject of these sciences, the moral and historical existence of man, outlined in his works and deeds, is itself decisively determined by common sense. Thus, inference from the general and proof by reason cannot be sufficient, because circumstances are decisive. But this is only a negative formulation. There is actually positive knowledge, mediated by common sense. The type of historical knowledge is in no way exhausted by the assumption of “faith in evidence from the outside” (Tetens 30) in place of “self-conscious inference” (Helmholtz). The point is also not at all to attribute to such knowledge only a limited truth value. D" Alembert rightly wrote: “Probability mainly refers to the field of historical facts and in general to all past, present and future events that we attribute to some kind of chance, because we cannot find out their causes. That part of this type of consciousness that relates to the present and the past, even if it were based on simple evidence, often produces in us a conviction as strong as that generated by axioms.”31 Moreover, history is a completely different source of truth than theoretical reason. Cicero already had this in mind when he called it the life of memory (vita mémo-pae) 32. Its own right is based on the fact that it is impossible to control human passions using the general prescriptions of reason. Rather, convincing examples are provided for this, which only history can provide. Therefore, Bacon calls history, which provides such examples, another way of philosophizing (alia ratio philosophandi) 33. This is also a completely negative formulation. But we will see that in all these evolutions of the concept, the way of existence of sensory knowledge seen by Aristotle can be traced. Remembering this turns out to be important for the proper self-awareness of the humanities. Vico's return to the Roman concept of common sense and his defense of humanistic rhetoric against contemporary science represent for us special interest, since here we come to the moment of truth of humanitarian knowledge, which is no longer accessible to awareness science XIX century. Vico lived in the untouched tradition of rhetorical-humanistic education, and all he had to do was renew the full significance of its timeless 65 rights. After all, it has long been known that the possibilities of rational proof and teaching do not completely exhaust the sphere of knowledge. In this regard, Vico's appeal to common sense, as we have seen, appears in a broad context extending all the way back to antiquity, and its continuing influence to this day is the topic of our study. 34 We, on the contrary, have to struggle to find our way back to this tradition; Let us first turn to the difficulties encountered in the application of the modern concept of method to the field of the humanities. To this end, we will study how this tradition fell into decline and how, at the same time, the problem of the truth of humanitarian knowledge fell under the standards of the inherently alien methodological thinking of modern science. In this evolution, essentially determined by the German “historical school,” Vico and the uninterrupted rhetorical tradition of Italy did not play a directly decisive role at all. Vico's influence on the 18th century is barely noticeable. But he was not alone in his desire to appeal to the concept of common sense. An essential parallel to him was Shaftesbury, whose influence in the 18th century was enormous. Under the name of common sense Shaftesbury pays homage public importance wit and humor and pointedly refers to the Roman classics and their humanistic interpreters 35. Of course, for us the concept of common sense, as we noted, also has a connotation of stoicism and natural law. However, it is impossible to dispute the correctness of the humanistic interpretation, based on the Roman classics, which Shaftsbry follows. According to him, humanists interpreted common sense as an understanding of the common good, but also as a commitment to a community or society, as natural feelings, humanity, and courtesy. They associated all this with one word from Marcus Aurelius - κοινονοημοσΰνη 36, denoting the unity of the common mind. Here we see in highest degree is a rare artificial word, and this thoroughly demonstrates" that the concept of common sense does not at all come from Greek philosophy, that the conceptual echo of Stoic philosophy is heard in it only as an overtone. The humanist Salmasius describes the content of this word as "moderate, generally accepted and proper human reason, which cares in every possible way about public affairs, and does not turn everything to its own benefit, and also has respect from those with whom it communicates, thinks of itself modestly and gently." Consequently, this is not so much a mechanism of natural law given to all people, as much as social virtue, and more the virtue of the heart than the mind; this is what Shaftesbury has in mind. And when he analyzes wit and humor from these positions, then in this too he follows the ancient Roman concepts, which included in humanitas vital refinement, behavior a person who understands a lot about pleasures and amusements and “indulges in them because he is confident in the deep solidarity of his partner. (Shaftesbury limits wit and humor exclusively to social friendships.) If common sense appears here almost as a social everyday virtue, then in fact this must imply some moral and even metaphysical basis. Shaftesbury has in mind the spiritual and social virtue of mutual understanding (sympathy), on which he, as we know, bases not only morality, but also all aesthetic metaphysics. His followers, most notably Hutcheson 37 and Hume, developed this position in the doctrine of common sense, which was later ridiculed in Kantian ethics. The concept of common sense received a truly central systematic function in the philosophy of the Scottish school, which is polemically directed against metaphysics, as well as against its version diluted with skepticism, and builds its new system on the basis of the original and natural judgment of common sense (Thomas Reid) 38 . Undoubtedly, the Aristotelian-skeptical conceptual tradition of common sense was manifested here. The study of the senses and their cognitive achievements is drawn from this tradition and is ultimately intended to serve as a corrective to exaggerations in philosophical speculation. But at the same time, the concept of common sense concentrates on society: “It serves to guide us in public affairs or in public life when our powers of reasoning leave us in the dark.” The philosophy of the healthy human mind (good sensé) of the representatives of the Scottish school acts not only as a healing remedy against the “sleepwalking” of metaphysics, it also contains the foundations moral philosophy truly satisfying the vital needs of society.