Composition of Genghis Khan's army. Mongols and the size of the army of the Mongol Empire

The invincible army of the Mongols

In the 13th century, the peoples and countries of the Eurasian continent experienced a stunning onslaught of the victorious Mongol army, sweeping away everything in its path. The armies of the Mongols' opponents were led by honored and experienced commanders; they fought on their own land, protecting their families and peoples from a cruel enemy. The Mongols fought far from their homeland, in unfamiliar terrain and unusual climatic conditions, often inferior to their opponents in numbers. However, they attacked and won, confident in their invincibility...

Throughout the victorious path, the Mongol warriors were opposed by troops different countries and peoples, among whom were warlike nomadic tribes and peoples who had extensive combat experience and well-armed armies. However, the indestructible Mongolian whirlwind scattered them across the northern and western outskirts Great Steppe, forced them to submit and stand under the banners of Genghis Khan and his descendants.

Even the armies could not resist largest states the Middle and Far East, which had multiple numerical superiority and the most advanced weapons for their time, the states of Western Asia, Eastern and Central Europe. Japan was saved from the Mongolian sword by the Kamikaze typhoon - the “divine wind” that scattered Mongolian ships on the approaches to the Japanese islands.

The Mongol hordes stopped only at the borders of the Holy Roman Empire - either due to fatigue and increased resistance, or due to the intensification of the internal struggle for the throne of the Great Khan. Or maybe they mistook the Adriatic Sea for the limit that Genghis Khan bequeathed to them to reach...

Very soon the glory of the victorious Mongol weapons began to outstrip the boundaries of the lands they had reached, remaining for a long time in the memory of many generations of different peoples of Eurasia.

Fire and strike tactics

Initially, the Mongol conquerors were considered people from hell, an instrument of God's providence to punish irrational humanity. The first judgments of Europeans about Mongol warriors, based on rumors, were not complete and reliable. According to the description of contemporary M. Paris, the Mongols “dress in bull skins, are armed with iron plates, are short, portly, hefty, strong, invincible, with<…>backs and chests covered with armor.” The Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II claimed that the Mongols knew no other clothing than ox, donkey and horse skins, and that they had no other weapons than crude, poorly made iron plates (Carruthers, 1914). However, at the same time, he noted that the Mongols are “combat-ready shooters” and could become even more dangerous after rearming with “European weapons.”

More accurate information about the weapons and military art of the Mongol warriors is contained in the works of D. Del Plano Carpini and G. Rubruk, who were envoys of the Pope and the French king to the court of the Mongol khans in the middle of the 13th century. The attention of Europeans was drawn to weapons and protective armor, as well as military organization and tactics of warfare. There is also some information about the military affairs of the Mongols in the book. Venetian merchant M. Polo, who served as an official at the court of the Yuan Emperor.

Most complete event military history The time of the formation of the Mongol Empire is covered in the Mongolian “Secret Legend” and the Chinese chronicle of the Yuan dynasty “Yuan shi”. In addition, there are Arabic, Persian and Old Russian written sources.

According to the outstanding orientalist Yu. N. Roerich, the Mongol warriors were well-armed horsemen with a varied set of weapons of distance, close combat and means of defense, and the Mongol equestrian tactics were characterized by a combination of fire and strike. He believed that much of the military art of the Mongol cavalry was so advanced and effective that it continued to be used by generals until the beginning of the 20th century. (Khudyakov, 1985).

Judging by archaeological finds, the main weapon of the Mongols in the XIII-XIV centuries. there were bows and arrows

In recent decades, archaeologists and weapons specialists have begun to actively study finds from Mongolian monuments in Mongolia and Transbaikalia, as well as images of warriors in medieval Persian, Chinese and Japanese miniatures. At the same time, researchers encountered some contradiction: in descriptions and miniatures, Mongol warriors were depicted as well-armed and equipped with armor, while during excavations archaeological sites It was possible to find mainly only the remains of bows and arrowheads. Other types of weapons were very rare.

Experts in the history of weapons Ancient Rus', who found Mongol arrows at the devastated settlements, believed that the Mongol army consisted of lightly armed horse archers, who were strong with the “massive use of bows and arrows” (Kirpichnikov, 1971). According to another opinion, the Mongol army consisted of armored warriors who wore practically “impenetrable” armor made of iron plates or multi-layer glued leather (Gorelik, 1983).

Arrows are raining down...

In the steppes of Eurasia, and primarily on the “indigenous lands” of the Mongols in Mongolia and Transbaikalia, many weapons were found that were used by the soldiers of the invincible army of Genghis Khan and his commanders. Judging by these finds, the main weapon of the Mongols in the XIII-XIV centuries. there really were bows and arrows.

Mongolian arrows had a high flight speed, although they were used for shooting at relatively short distances. In combination with rapid-fire bows, they made it possible to conduct massive shooting in order to prevent the enemy from approaching and engaging in hand-to-hand combat. For such shooting, so many arrows were required that there were not enough iron tips, so the Mongols in the Baikal region and Transbaikalia also used bone tips.

The Mongols learned the ability to shoot accurately from any position while riding on horseback from early childhood - from the age of two

According to Plano Carpini, Mongol horsemen always started the battle from arrow range: they "wound and kill horses with arrows, and when men and horses are weakened, then they engage in battle." As Marco Polo observed, the Mongols “shoot back and forth even when driven. They shoot accurately, hitting both enemy horses and people. Often the enemy is defeated because his horses are killed.”

He described it most vividly Mongol tactics Hungarian monk Julian: when “in a clash in war, their arrows, as they say, do not fly, but seem to rain down.” Therefore, as contemporaries believed, it was very dangerous to start a battle with the Mongols, because even in small skirmishes with them there were as many killed and wounded as other peoples in large battles. This is a consequence of their dexterity in archery, as their arrows penetrate almost all types of defenses and armor. In battles, in case of failure, they retreat to in an organized manner; however, it is very dangerous to pursue them, since they turn back and know how to shoot while fleeing and injure soldiers and horses.

Mongol warriors could hit a target at a distance in addition to arrows and darts - throwing spears. In close combat, they attacked the enemy with spears and palms - tips with a single-edged blade attached to a long shaft. The latter weapon was common among soldiers who served on the northern periphery of the Mongol Empire, in the Baikal region and Transbaikalia.

In hand-to-hand combat, Mongol horsemen fought with swords, broadswords, sabers, battle axes, maces and daggers with one or two blades.

On the other hand, details of defensive weapons are very rare in Mongolian monuments. This may be due to the fact that many shells were made of multi-layered hard leather. However, in Mongolian time Metal armor appeared in armored warriors' arsenal.

In medieval miniatures, Mongol warriors are depicted in armor of lamellar (from narrow vertical plates) and laminar (from wide transverse stripes) structures, helmets and with shields. Probably, in the process of conquering agricultural countries, the Mongols mastered other types of defensive weapons.

Heavily armed warriors also protected their war horses. Plano Carpini gave a description of such protective clothing, which included a metal forehead and leather parts that served to cover the neck, chest, sides and croup of the horse.

As the empire expanded, the Mongol authorities began to organize large-scale production of weapons and equipment in state workshops, which was carried out by craftsmen from the conquered peoples. The Chinggisid armies widely used weapons traditional to the entire nomadic world and the countries of the Near and Middle East.

“Having participated in a hundred battles, I was always ahead”

In the Mongol army during the reign of Genghis Khan and his successors, there were two main types of troops: heavily armed and light cavalry. Their ratio in the army, as well as weapons, changed during many years of continuous wars.

The heavily armed cavalry included the most elite units of the Mongol army, including detachments of the Khan's guard, formed from Mongol tribes that had proven their loyalty to Genghis Khan. However, the majority of the army was still lightly armed horsemen, about big role The latter is evidenced by the very nature of the military art of the Mongols, based on the tactics of massive shelling of the enemy. These warriors could also attack the enemy with lava in close combat, and pursue during retreat and flight (Nemerov, 1987).

As the Mongol state expanded, auxiliary infantry detachments and siege units were formed from subject tribes and peoples accustomed to the conditions of foot combat and fortress warfare, armed with pack and heavy siege weapons.

Achievements of sedentary peoples (primarily the Chinese) in the region military equipment The Mongols used them for siege and storming of fortresses for other purposes, and for the first time used stone-throwing machines for field combat. The Chinese, Jurchens, and natives were widely recruited into the Mongolian army as “artillerymen.” Muslim countries Middle East.

For the first time in history, the Mongols used stone-throwing machines for field combat.

A quartermaster service was also created in the Mongol army, special units, ensuring the passage of troops and the construction of roads. Particular attention was paid to reconnaissance and disinformation of the enemy.

The structure of the Mongol army was traditional for the nomads of Central Asia. According to "Asian decimal system“Division of troops and people, the army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tumens (detachments of ten thousand), as well as into wings and a center. Each combat-ready man was assigned to a specific detachment and was obliged to report to the gathering place at the first notice in full equipment, with a supply of food for several days.

At the head of the entire army was the Khan, who was the head of state and supreme commander in chief armed forces of the Mongol Empire. However, many important matters, including plans for future wars, were discussed and outlined at the kurultai - a meeting of military leaders chaired by the khan. In the event of the death of the latter, a new khan was elected and proclaimed at the kurultai from members of the ruling “Golden Family” of the Borjigins, descendants of Genghis Khan.

Thoughtful selection played an important role in the military successes of the Mongols command staff. Although the highest positions in the empire were occupied by the sons of Genghis Khan, the most capable and experienced commanders were appointed commanders of the troops. Some of them in the past fought on the side of Genghis Khan's opponents, but then went over to the side of the founder of the empire, believing in his invincibility. Among the military leaders there were representatives of different tribes, not only Mongols, and they came not only from the nobility, but also from ordinary nomads.

Genghis Khan himself often stated: “I treat my warriors as brothers. Having participated in a hundred battles, I was always ahead.” However, in the memory of his contemporaries, the most severe punishments to which he and his commanders subjected their soldiers to maintain harsh military discipline were preserved much more. The soldiers of each unit were bound by mutual responsibility, answering with their lives for the cowardice and flight from the battlefield of their colleagues. These measures were not new to the nomadic world, but during the time of Genghis Khan they were observed with particular rigor.

They killed everyone without any mercy

Before starting military operations against a particular country, Mongol military leaders tried to learn as much as possible about it in order to identify the weaknesses and internal contradictions of the state and use them to their advantage. This information was collected by diplomats, traders or spies. Such focused preparation contributed to the eventual success of the military campaign.

Military operations, as a rule, began in several directions at once - in a “round-up”, which did not allow the enemy to come to his senses and organize a unified defense. The Mongolian cavalry armies penetrated far into the interior of the country, destroying everything in their path, disrupting communications, routes for the approach of troops and the supply of equipment. The enemy suffered heavy losses even before the army entered the decisive battle.

Most of the Mongol army was lightly armed cavalry, indispensable for massive shelling of the enemy

Genghis Khan convinced his commanders that during the offensive they could not stop to seize booty, arguing that after victory “the booty will not leave us.” Thanks to its high mobility, the vanguard of the Mongol army had a great advantage over the enemies. Following the vanguard, the main forces moved, destroying and suppressing all resistance, leaving only “smoke and ashes” in the rear of the Mongol army. Neither mountains nor rivers could hold them back - they learned to easily cross water obstacles, using waterskins inflated with air to cross.

The basis of the offensive strategy of the Mongols was the destruction of enemy personnel. Before the start of a big battle, they gathered their troops into a powerful single fist to attack with as many forces as possible. The main tactical technique was to attack the enemy in loose formation and massacre him in order to inflict as much damage as possible without large losses of his soldiers. Moreover, the Mongol commanders tried to throw detachments formed from subject tribes first into the attack.

The Mongols sought to decide the outcome of the battle precisely at the shelling stage. It did not escape the observers that they were reluctant to engage in close combat, since in this case losses among the Mongol warriors were inevitable. If the enemy stood firm, they tried to provoke him into an attack by feigning flight. If the enemy retreated, the Mongols intensified their attack and sought to destroy as many enemy soldiers as possible. The horse battle was completed by a ramming attack by armored cavalry, which swept away everything in its path. The enemy was pursued until complete defeat and destruction.

The Mongols waged wars with great ferocity. Those who resisted most steadfastly were especially brutally exterminated. They killed everyone, indiscriminately, old and small, beautiful and ugly, poor and rich, resisting and submissive, without any mercy. These measures were aimed at instilling fear in the population of the conquered country and suppressing their will to resist.

The offensive strategy of the Mongols was based on the complete destruction of enemy personnel.

Many contemporaries who experienced the military power of the Mongols, and after them some historians of our time, see precisely this unparalleled cruelty as the main reason for the military successes of the Mongol troops. However, such measures were not the invention of Genghis Khan and his commanders - acts of mass terror were typical for the conduct of wars by many nomadic peoples. Only the scale of these wars was different, so the atrocities committed by Genghis Khan and his successors remained in the history and memory of many peoples.

It can be concluded that the basis for the military successes of the Mongolian troops were the high combat effectiveness and professionalism of the soldiers, the enormous combat experience and talent of the commanders, the iron will and confidence in their victory of Genghis Khan himself and his successors, and strict centralization military organization and the level of armament and equipment of the army was quite high for that time. Without mastering any new types of weapons or tactical techniques of mounted combat, the Mongols were able to perfect the traditional military art nomads and used it with maximum efficiency.

War strategy in initial period The creation of the Mongol Empire was also common for all nomadic states. Its primary task - quite traditional for foreign policy any nomadic state in Central Asia - Genghis Khan proclaimed the unification under his rule of “all peoples living behind felt walls,” i.e. nomads. However, then Genghis Khan began to put forward more and more new tasks, striving to conquer the whole world within the limits known to him.

And this goal was largely achieved. The Mongol Empire was able to subjugate all the nomadic tribes of the steppe belt of Eurasia and conquer many sedentary agricultural states far beyond the borders of the nomadic world, which no nomadic people could do. However, the human and organizational resources of the empire were not unlimited. The Mongol Empire could exist only as long as its troops continued to fight and win victories on all fronts. But as more and more lands were captured, the offensive impulse of the Mongol troops gradually began to fizzle out. Having encountered stubborn resistance in Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle East and Japan, the Mongol khans were forced to abandon their ambitious plans for world domination.

The Genghisids, who ruled individual uluses of the once united empire, eventually became involved in internecine wars and they pulled it into separate pieces, and then completely lost their military and political power. The idea of world domination of Genghis Khan remained an unfulfilled dream.

Literature

1. Plano Carpini D. History of the Mongols; Rubruk G. Travel to Eastern countries; Book of Marco Polo. M., 1997.

2. Khara-Davan E. Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy. Elista, 1991.

3. Khudyakov Yu. S. Yu. N. Roerich on the art of war and the conquests of the Mongols // Roerich readings of 1984. Novosibirsk, 1985.

4. Khudyakov Yu. S. Armament of Central Asian nomads in the era of the early and developed Middle Ages. Novosibirsk, 1991.

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The huge Mongol Empire created by the great Genghis Khan was many times larger than the empires of Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander the Great. And she did not fall under blows external enemies, but only due to internal decay...
Having united the disparate Mongol tribes in the 13th century, Genghis Khan managed to create an army that had no equal in Europe, Rus', or the Central Asian countries. None ground force of that time could not compare with the mobility of his troops. And its main principle has always been attack, even if the main strategic objective was defense.

The Pope's envoy to the Mongol court, Plano Carpini, wrote that the victories of the Mongols depended in many ways not so much on their physical strength or numbers, how much from superior tactics. Carpini even recommended that European military leaders follow the example of the Mongols. “Our armies should be managed on the model of the Tatars (Mongols - author's note) on the basis of the same harsh military laws... The army should in no way be conducted in one mass, but in separate detachments. Scouts should be sent out in all directions. And our generals must keep their troops day and night in combat readiness, since the Tatars are always vigilant, like devils.” So where did the invincibility of the Mongol army lie, where did its commanders and rank and file originate from those techniques of mastering the martial art?

Strategy

Before starting any military operations, the Mongol rulers at the kurultai (military council - author's note) developed and discussed in the most detailed manner the plan for the upcoming campaign, and also determined the place and time for the collection of troops. Spies were required to obtain “tongues” or find traitors in the enemy’s camp, thereby providing military leaders with detailed information about the enemy.

During Genghis Khan's lifetime, he was the supreme commander. He usually carried out an invasion of the captured country with the help of several armies and in different directions. He demanded a plan of action from the commanders, sometimes making amendments to it. After which the performer was given absolute freedom in solving the problem. Genghis Khan was personally present only during the first operations, and after making sure that everything was going according to plan, he provided the young leaders with all the glory of military triumphs.

Approaching fortified cities, the Mongols collected all kinds of supplies in the surrounding area, and, if necessary, set up a temporary base near the city. The main forces usually continued the offensive, and the reserve corps began preparing and conducting the siege.

When a meeting with an enemy army was inevitable, the Mongols either tried to attack the enemy suddenly, or, when they could not count on surprise, they directed their forces around one of the enemy flanks. This maneuver was called “tulugma”. However, the Mongol commanders never acted according to a template, trying to extract maximum benefit from specific conditions. Often the Mongols rushed into feigned flight, covering their tracks with consummate skill, literally disappearing from the eyes of the enemy. But only until he let his guard down. Then the Mongols mounted fresh spare horses and, as if appearing from underground in front of the stunned enemy, made a swift raid. It was in this way that the Russian princes were defeated on the Kalka River in 1223.
It happened that in a feigned flight, the Mongol army scattered so that it enveloped the enemy from different sides. But if the enemy was ready to fight back, they could release him from the encirclement and then finish him off on the march. In 1220, one of the armies of Khorezmshah Muhammad, which the Mongols deliberately released from Bukhara and then defeated, was destroyed in a similar way.

Most often, the Mongols attacked under the cover of light cavalry in several parallel columns stretched along a wide front. The enemy column that encountered the main forces either held its position or retreated, while the rest continued to move forward, advancing on the flanks and rear of the enemy. Then the columns came closer together, the result of which, as a rule, was complete environment and destruction of the enemy.

The amazing mobility of the Mongol army, allowing it to seize the initiative, gave the Mongol commanders, and not their opponents, the right to choose both the place and time of the decisive battle.

To streamline the movement of combat units as much as possible and quickly convey to them orders for further maneuvers, the Mongols used signal flags in black and white. And with the onset of darkness, signals were given by burning arrows. Another tactical development of the Mongols was the use of a smoke screen. Small detachments set the steppe or dwellings on fire, which concealed the movements of the main troops and gave the Mongols the much-needed advantage of surprise.

One of the main strategic rules of the Mongols was the pursuit of a defeated enemy until complete destruction. IN military practice in medieval times this was new. The knights of that time, for example, considered it humiliating for themselves to chase an enemy, and such ideas persisted for many centuries, right up to the era Louis XVI. But the Mongols needed to make sure not so much that the enemy was defeated, but that he would no longer be able to gather new forces, regroup and attack again. Therefore, it was simply destroyed.

The Mongols kept records in a rather peculiar way enemy losses. After each battle, special detachments cut off the right ear of each corpse lying on the battlefield, and then collected it in bags and accurately counted the number of killed enemies.
As you know, the Mongols preferred to fight in winter. The favorite way to test whether the ice on the river could withstand the weight of their horses was to lure them there. local population. At the end of 1241 in Hungary, in full view of starving refugees, the Mongols left their cattle unattended on the eastern bank of the Danube. And when they were able to cross the river and take away the cattle, the Mongols realized that the offensive could begin.

Warriors

Every Mongol from early childhood prepared to become a warrior. Boys learned to ride a horse almost earlier than to walk, and a little later they mastered the bow, spear and sword to the subtleties. The commander of each unit was chosen based on his initiative and courage shown in battle. In the detachment subordinate to him, he enjoyed exceptional power - his orders were carried out immediately and unquestioningly. No medieval army knew such cruel discipline.
Mongol warriors did not know the slightest excess - neither in food nor in housing. Having acquired unprecedented endurance and stamina over the years of preparation for military nomadic life, they practically did not need medical care, although since the time of the Chinese campaign (XIII-XIV centuries), the Mongol army always had a whole staff of Chinese surgeons. Before the start of the battle, each warrior put on a shirt made of durable wet silk. As a rule, the arrows pierced this tissue, and it was drawn into the wound along with the tip, significantly complicating its penetration, which allowed surgeons to easily remove the arrows along with the tissue from the body.

Consisting almost entirely of cavalry, the Mongol army was based on the decimal system. The largest unit was the tumen, which included 10 thousand warriors. The tumen included 10 regiments, each with 1,000 people. The regiments consisted of 10 squadrons, each of which represented 10 detachments of 10 people. Three tumens made up an army or army corps.

An immutable law was in force in the army: if in battle one of the ten fled from the enemy, the entire ten were executed; if a dozen escaped in a hundred, the entire hundred were executed; if a hundred escaped, the entire thousand were executed.

The light cavalry fighters, who made up more than half of the entire army, had no armor except for a helmet, and were armed with an Asian bow, spear, curved saber, light long pike and lasso. The power of curved Mongolian bows was in many ways inferior to large English ones, but each Mongolian horseman carried at least two quivers of arrows. The archers had no armor, with the exception of a helmet, and it was not necessary for them. The tasks of the light cavalry included: reconnaissance, camouflage, supporting the heavy cavalry with shooting and, finally, pursuing the fleeing enemy. In other words, they had to hit the enemy from a distance.
Units of heavy and medium cavalry were used for close combat. They were called nukers. Although initially nukers were trained in all types of combat: they could attack scattered, using bows, or in close formation, using spears or swords...
The main striking force of the Mongol army was heavy cavalry, its number was no more than 40 percent. Heavy cavalry had at their disposal a whole set of armor made of leather or chain mail, usually taken from defeated enemies. The horses of the heavy cavalry were also protected by leather armor. These warriors were armed for long-range combat - with bows and arrows, for close combat - with spears or swords, broadswords or sabers, battle axes or maces.

The attack of the heavily armed cavalry was decisive and could change the entire course of the battle. Each Mongol horseman had from one to several spare horses. The herds were always located directly behind the formation and the horse could be quickly changed on the march or even during the battle. On these short, hardy horses, the Mongol cavalry could travel up to 80 kilometers, and with convoys, battering and throwing weapons - up to 10 kilometers per day.

Siege
Even during the life of Genghis Khan, in the wars with the Jin Empire, the Mongols largely borrowed from the Chinese both some elements of strategy and tactics, and military equipment. Although at the beginning of their conquests Genghis Khan’s army often found itself powerless against the strong walls of Chinese cities, after several years the Mongols developed such fundamental system a siege that was almost impossible to resist. Its main component was a large but mobile detachment, equipped with throwing machines and other equipment, which was transported on special covered wagons. For the siege caravan, the Mongols recruited the best Chinese engineers and created on their basis the most powerful engineering building, which turned out to be extremely effective.

As a result, not a single fortress was any longer an insurmountable obstacle to the advance of the Mongol army. While the rest of the army moved on, the siege detachment surrounded the most important fortresses and began the assault.
The Mongols also adopted from the Chinese the ability to surround a fortress with a palisade during a siege, isolating it from the outside world and thereby depriving the besieged of the opportunity to make forays. The Mongols then launched an assault using various siege weapons and stone-throwing machines. To create panic in the enemy ranks, the Mongols rained down thousands of burning arrows on the besieged cities. They were fired by light cavalry directly from under the fortress walls or from a catapult from afar.

During the siege, the Mongols often resorted to cruel, but very effective methods for them: they drove in front of them big number defenseless prisoners, forcing the besieged to kill their own compatriots in order to get to the attackers.
If the defenders offered fierce resistance, then after the decisive assault the entire city, its garrison and residents were subjected to destruction and total plunder.
“If they always turned out to be invincible, this was due to the boldness of their strategic plans and the clarity of their tactical actions. In the person of Genghis Khan and his commanders, the art of war reached one of its highest peaks,” as the French military leader Rank wrote about the Mongols. And apparently he was right.

Intelligence service

Reconnaissance activities were used by the Mongols everywhere. Long before the start of campaigns, scouts studied the terrain, weapons, organization, tactics and mood of the enemy army to the smallest detail. All this intelligence gave the Mongols an undeniable advantage over the enemy, who sometimes knew much less about himself than he should have. The Mongol intelligence network spread literally all over the world. Spies usually acted under the guise of merchants and merchants.
The Mongols were especially successful in what is now commonly called psychological warfare. Stories about cruelty, barbarity and torture of the rebellious were deliberately spread by them, and again long before the fighting, in order to suppress any desire of the enemy to resist. And even though there was a lot of truth in such propaganda, the Mongols were very willing to use the services of those who agreed to cooperate with them, especially if some of their skills could be used to benefit the cause.

The Mongols did not refuse any deception if it could allow them to gain an advantage, reduce their casualties or increase the enemy's losses.

A wide strip of steppes and deserts from the Gobi to the Sahara runs across Asia and Africa, separating the territories of European civilization from China and India, the centers of Asian culture. On these steppes, the unique economic life of the nomads has been partially preserved to this day.
This steppe expanse, with a huge scale of operational lines, with original forms of labor, leaves an original Asian imprint on.
The most typical representatives of the Asian method of warfare were the Mongols in the 13th century, when they were united by one of greatest conquerors- Genghis Khan.

The Mongols were typical nomads; the only work they knew was that of a watchman, a shepherd of countless herds that moved across the Asian expanse from north to south and back, depending on the seasons. The nomad’s wealth is all with him, all in reality: it is mainly cattle and small valuable movables/silver, carpets, silks, collected in his yurt.

There are no walls, fortifications, doors, fences or locks that would protect the nomad from attack. Protection, and even then only relative, is provided by the wide horizon and deserted surroundings. If peasants, due to the bulkiness of the products of their labor and the impossibility of concealing them, always gravitate toward firm power, which alone can create sufficiently secure conditions for their labor, then nomads, whose entire property can so easily change its owner, are a particularly favorable element for despotic rule. forms of concentration of power.

General military service, which appears as a necessity with high economic development of the state, is the same necessity at the infant stages of labor organization. A nomadic people in which everyone capable of bearing arms would not be ready to immediately defend their herd with arms in their hands could not exist. Genghis Khan, in order to have a fighter in every adult Mongol, even forbade the Mongols to take other Mongols as servants.

These nomads, natural horsemen, brought up in admiration of the authority of the leader, very skilled in small war, with a common military service, represented excellent material for creating, during the Middle Ages, an army superior in number and discipline. This superiority became obvious when brilliant organizers - Genghis Khan or Tamerlane - were at the head.

Technology and organization.

Just as Mohammed managed to weld urban merchants and Bedouins of the desert into one whole in Islam, so the great organizers of the Mongols knew how to combine the natural qualities of a nomadic shepherd with everything that the urban culture of that time could give to the art of war.
The onslaught of the Arabs threw many cultural elements into the interior of Asia. These elements, as well as everything that Chinese science and technology could provide, were introduced by Genghis Khan to the Mongol art of war.

There were Chinese scientists on Genghis Khan's staff; Writing was imposed on the people and the army. The patronage that Genghis Khan provided to trade reached a level that testifies, if not to the importance of the bourgeois urban element in this era, then to a clear desire for development and the creation of such.
Genghis Khan paid great attention to the creation of safe trade routes, distributed special military detachments along them, organized stage hotels at each crossing, and established a post office; issues of justice and a vigorous fight against robbers were in the first place. When cities were captured, craftsmen and artists were removed from the general slaughter and moved to newly created centers.

The army was organized according to the decimal system. Particular attention was paid to the selection of managers. The authority of the chief was supported by such measures as a separate tent for the commander of a dozen, an increase in his salary 10 times that of an ordinary soldier, the creation at his disposal of a reserve of horses and weapons for his subordinates; in the event of a rebellion against an appointed superior - not even a Roman decimation, but the total destruction of the rebels.

Strict discipline made it possible to demand, in necessary cases, the execution of extensive fortification works. Near the enemy, the army strengthened its bivouac for the night. The guard service was organized excellently and was based on the detachment of guard cavalry detachments, sometimes several hundred miles ahead, and on frequent patrols, day and night, of all surrounding areas.

Siege art of the Mongol armies

Siege art shows that at the time of their heyday the Mongols were in a completely different relationship with technology than later, when Crimean Tatars They felt powerless against any wooden Moscow prison and were afraid of the “fiery battle.”

Fachines, tunnels, underground passages, filling up ditches, creating gentle slopes on strong walls, earthen bags, Greek fire, bridges, constructing dams, floods, the use of battering machines, gunpowder for explosions - all this was well known to the Mongols.

During the siege of Chernigov, the Russian chronicler notes with surprise that the Mongol catapults threw stones weighing over 10 pounds over several hundred steps. European artillery achieved such a battering effect only at the beginning of the 16th century. And these stones were delivered from somewhere far away.
During operations in Hungary, we encounter a battery of 7 catapults among the Mongols, which worked in maneuver warfare, when forcing a river crossing. Many strong cities in Central Asia and Russia, which, according to medieval concepts, could only be taken by famine, were taken by the Mongols by storm after 5 days of siege work.

Mongol strategy.

Great tactical superiority makes war easy and profitable. Alexander the Great dealt the final blow to the Persians mainly using the means that the conquest of the rich Asia Minor coast gave him.

The father conquered Spain to obtain funds to fight Rome. Julius Caesar, capturing Gaul, said - war must feed war; and, indeed, the wealth of Gaul not only allowed him to conquer this country without burdening the budget of Rome, but also created for him the material basis for the subsequent civil war.

This view of war as a profitable business, as an expansion of the base, as an accumulation of forces in Asia was already the basis of the strategy. A Chinese medieval writer points out how main feature, which defines a good commander, the ability to maintain an army at the expense of the enemy.
While European strategic thought, in the person of Bülow and Clausewitz, based on the need to overcome resistance, from the great defensive capacity of its neighbors, came to the idea of a basis that feeds the war from the rear, of the culminating point, the limit of any offensive, of the weakening force of the scope of the offensive, Asian strategy I saw an element of strength in the spatial duration of the offensive.

The more the attacker advanced in Asia, the more herds and all kinds of movable wealth he captured; with low defensive capability, the losses of the attacker from the resistance encountered were less than the increase in the strength of the attacking army from the local elements drawn in and co-opted by it. The military elements of the neighbors were half destroyed, and half were placed in the ranks of the attacker and quickly assimilated into the existing situation.

The Asian offensive was an avalanche of snow, growing with every step of the movement.” In the army of Batu, the grandson of Genghis Khan, who conquered Rus' in the 13th century, the percentage of Mongols was negligible—probably no more than five; the percentage of fighters from the tribes conquered by Genghis ten years before the invasion probably did not exceed thirty. About two-thirds represented Turkic tribes, which were immediately invaded east of the Volga and carried with them the debris. In the same way, in the future, Russian squads formed a noticeable part of the Golden Horde militia.

The Asian strategy, given the enormous scale of distances, in the era of the dominance of predominantly pack transport, was unable to organize proper transportation from the rear; The idea of transferring bases to areas that lay ahead, only fragmentarily flickering in the European strategy, was fundamental to Genghis Khan.
The base ahead can only be created through the political disintegration of the enemy; the widespread use of means located behind the enemy’s front is possible only if we find like-minded people in his rear. Hence the Asian strategy required a far-sighted and cunning policy; all means were good to ensure military success.

The war was preceded by extensive political intelligence; they did not skimp on bribes or promises; all possibilities of pitting some dynastic interests against others, some groups against others, were used. Apparently, a major campaign was undertaken only when there was a conviction that there were deep cracks in the neighbor’s state body.

The need to satisfy the army with a small supply of food that could be taken with them, and mainly with local funds, left a certain imprint on the Mongol strategy. The Mongols could only feed their horses pasture. The poorer the latter was, the faster and on a wider front it was necessary to strive to absorb space.
All deep knowledge knowledge that nomads have about the seasons when, at different latitudes, grass reaches its greatest nutritional value, about the relative richness of grass and water various directions, must have been used by Mongol strategy to make possible these mass movements, which undoubtedly included over one hundred thousand horses. Other stops in operations were directly dictated by the need to exercise the bodies of the weakened horse train after passing through a hungry area.

Concentration of forces on a short time on the battlefield was impossible if the point of contact were located in an area poor in resources. Reconnaissance of local resources was mandatory before each campaign. Overcoming space in large masses, even within one's own boundaries, required careful preparation. It was necessary to advance forward detachments that would guard the pasture in the intended direction and drive away the nomads who were not taking part in the campaign.

Tamerlane, planning an invasion of China from the west, 8 years before the campaign, prepared a stage for himself on the border with it, in the city of Ashir: several thousand families with 40 thousand horses were sent there; arable land was expanded, the city was fortified and vast food reserves began to be collected. During the campaign itself, Tamerlane sent sowing grain for the army; the harvest on the fields cultivated for the first time in the rear was supposed to facilitate the army’s return from the campaign.

The tactics of the Mongols are very similar to the tactics of the Arabs. The same development of throwing combat, the same desire to divide the battle formation into separate parts, to conduct combat from the depths.
In large battles there is a clear division into three lines; but each line was also divided, and thus Tamerlane’s theoretical requirement - to have 9 echelons in depth - may not be far from practice.

On the battlefield, the Mongols sought to encircle the enemy in order to give a decisive advantage to throwing weapons. This encirclement was easily obtained from a wide marching movement; the width of the latter allowed the Mongols to spread exaggerated rumors about the size of the advancing army.

The Mongol cavalry was divided into heavy and light. Light-horse fighters were called Cossacks. The latter fought very successfully on foot. Tamerlane also had infantry; infantrymen were among the best paid soldiers and played a significant role in sieges, as well as in fighting in mountainous areas. When crossing vast spaces, the infantry was temporarily mounted on horses.

Source - Svechin A.A. The evolution of the art of war, vol.1. M.-L., 1927, p. 141-148

Drawing by Mikhail Gorelik.

An excerpt from a review article by orientalist, researcher of the history of weapons, art critic Mikhail Gorelik - about the history of Mongolian armor. The author of more than 100 scientific works passed away almost exactly a year ago. He devoted a significant part of his scientific activity to the study of the military affairs of the ancient and medieval peoples of Eurasia.

Source - Gorelik M.V. Early Mongolian armor (IX - first half of the 14th century) // Archeology, ethnography and anthropology of Mongolia. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1987.

As shown in recent works (18), the main components of the Mongolian medieval ethnos migrated to Mongolia, previously occupied mainly by the Turks, from the Southern Amur region and Western Manchuria during the 9th-11th centuries, displacing and partially assimilating their predecessors. IN early XIII V. Under Genghis Khan, almost all Mongol-speaking tribes and the Omongolized Turks, Tungus, and Tanguts of Central Asia were consolidated into a single ethnic group.

(The extreme east of Eurasia, the claims to which the Mongols never managed to realize: Japan)

Immediately following this, during the first half of the 13th century, the gigantic conquests of Genghis Khan and his descendants immeasurably expanded the territory of settlement of the Mongolian ethnic group, while on the outskirts there was a process of mutual assimilation of aliens and local nomads - Tungus-Manchus in the east, Turks in the west, and in the latter case, linguistically the Turks assimilate the Mongols.

A somewhat different picture is observed in the sphere of material and spiritual culture. In the second half of the 13th century. The culture of the Genghisid empire is emerging, with all its regional diversity, united in socially prestigious manifestations - costume, hairstyle (19), jewelry (20) and, of course, military equipment, especially armor.

To understand the history of Mongolian armor, you should find out next questions: armor traditions of the Amur region of the 8th-11th centuries, Transbaikalia, Mongolia, southwest Central Asia and the Altai-Sayan Highlands by the 13th century, as well as nomads of Eastern Europe and Trans-Urals to the same period.

Unfortunately, there are no published materials on the armor of the period of interest to us, which existed in the territory of Outer Mongolia and Northwestern Manchuria. But quite representative material has been published for all other regions. A fairly wide distribution of metal armor is shown by finds of armor plates in the Northern Amur region (21) (see Fig. 3, 11-14), adjacent to the original habitat of the Mongols, in Transbaikalia (22) (see Fig. 3, 1, 2, 17, 18), where the clan of Genghis Khan roamed from the period of resettlement. Few, but striking finds come from the territory of Xi-Xia (23) (see Fig. 3, 6-10), many remains of Kyrgyz shells (24) were discovered in Tuva and Khakassia.

Xinjiang is especially rich in materials, where finds of things (see Fig. 3, 3-5) and especially the abundance of exceptionally informative painting and sculpture make it possible to extremely fully and in detail present the development of armor here in the second half of the 1st millennium (25), and not only in Xinjiang, but also in Mongolia, where the center of the first khaganates of the Turks, Uighurs and Khitans was located. Thus, we can safely say that the Mongols of the 9th-12th centuries. was well known and they used metal lamellar armor quite widely, not to mention armor made of hard and soft leather.

As for the production of armor by nomads, who, according to the conviction (or rather, prejudice) of many researchers, are not capable of making it themselves on a large scale, the example of the Scythians, in whose burials hundreds of armor were found (26), the Sakas, who in a short time mastered their mass production production and creation of the original complex of protective weapons (27), the Xianbi (one of the ancestors of the Mongols), whose sculptural images of men-at-arms on armored horses fill burials in Northern China, and finally, the Turkic tribes, who brought the original lamellar armor in the middle of the 1st millennium, including and horse armor, to Central Europe (it was borrowed by the Germans, Slavs and Byzantines) (28) - all this suggests that the nomads, given military necessity, could well produce a sufficient amount of metal armor, not to mention leather.

A sample of Scythian armor from the famous golden comb from the Solokha mound.

By the way, the etiological legend of the Mongols (like the Turks) characterizes them precisely as ironworkers; their most honorable title is darkhan, as well as the name of the founder of the state - Temujin, meaning masters of ironwork (29).

Equipping the Mongols with defensive weapons during the last decades of the 12th - first decades of the 14th centuries. can be determined, albeit very approximately, from written sources.

Lubchan Danzan in “Altan Tobchi” gives the following story: once Temujin, even before he created the state, was attacked on the road by 300 Tatars. Temujin and his warriors defeated the enemy detachment, “killed a hundred people, captured two hundred... took away a hundred horses and 50 shells” (30). It is unlikely that 200 prisoners were taken on foot and undressed - it would have been enough to tie their hands and tie the reins of their horses to their torques.

Consequently, one hundred captured horses and 50 shells belonged to 100 killed. This means that every second warrior had a shell. If such a situation took place in an ordinary skirmish of the time of troubles in the depths of the steppes, then in the era of the creation of an empire, enormous conquests, and the exploitation of the productive resources of cities, the equipment with defensive weapons should have increased.

Thus, Nasavi reports that during the storming of the city, “all the Tatars put on their armor” (31) (namely, shells, as the translator of the text Z. M. Buniyatov explained to us). According to Rashid ad-Din, gunsmiths under the Hulaguid Khan Ghazan supplied state arsenals with bad organization business is 2 thousand, and if it is good - 10 thousand complete sets of weapons, including protective ones, per year, and in the latter case, weapons in large quantities went on free sale. The fact is that by the end of the 13th century. There was a crisis in kar-khane - state-owned factories, where hundreds of craftsmen gathered by the Mongol khans worked in semi-slave conditions.

The dissolution of craftsmen, subject to a certain quota of supplies to the treasury, for free work on the market, immediately made it possible to increase the production of weapons several times (instead of distributing weapons from arsenals, soldiers were given money to buy them on the market) (32). But at first, during the era of conquest, the organization of karkhane based on the exploitation of artisans captured in areas with a settled population should have had a great effect.

Mongol siege of Baghdad in 1221

On the Mongols of the 13th century. it is possible to extrapolate data on the Oirats and Khalkhins of the 17th and early XVIII V. The Mongol-Oirat laws of 1640 speak of shells as a regular fine: from the sovereign princes - up to 100 pieces, from their younger brothers- 50, from non-ruling princes - 10, from officials and princely sons-in-law, standard bearers and trumpeters - 5, from bodyguards, warriors of the categories lubchiten (“armor-bearer”), duulgat (“helmet-bearer”), degeley huyakt (“tegileinik” or “tegiley bearer”) and metal shell"), as well as commoners, if the latter have shells, - 1 piece (33) Armor - shells and helmets - appear in bride price, trophies, they were objects of theft, they were awarded for those saved from fire and water the owner gave the shell to the horse and sheep (34).

The production of armor in steppe conditions is also noted in the laws: “Every year, out of 40 tents, 2 must make armor; if they don’t do it, then they will be fined with a horse or a camel” (35). Later, almost 100 years later, on the lake. Texel from local ore, which the Oirats themselves had long mined and smelted in forges in the forest, they received iron, made sabers, armor, armor, helmets, they had about 100 craftsmen there, as the Kuznetsk nobleman I wrote about this. . Sorokin, who was in Oirat captivity (36).

In addition, as one Oirat woman told the wife of the Russian ambassador I. Unkovsky, “all summer they collect up to 300 or more women from all the uluses in Urga to the kontaisha, and after a whole summer, for their own money, they sew kuyaks and clothes into armor, which they send to the army.” (37). As we see, in the conditions of a nomadic economy, simple types of armor were made by unskilled workers, complex ones - by professional craftsmen, of whom there were quite a few, and in the era of Genghis Khan, such as, say, the wandering blacksmith Chzharchiudai-Ebugen, who descended to the khan from Mount Burkhan-Khaldun (38) . Constantly, as if something ordinary (meaning the application itself), they talk about Mongolian armor in European sources XIII century(39)

A. N. Kirpichnikov, who wrote about the weakness of the defensive weapons of the Tatar-Mongols, referred to information from Rubruk (40). But this eyewitness was traveling to Peaceful time and, in addition, noting the rarity and foreign origin of the metal armor of the Mongols, casually mentioning their armor made of skins among other weapons, he singled out only the exotic, in his opinion, armor made of hard leather (41). In general, Rubruk was extremely inattentive to military realities, unlike Plano Carpini, whose detailed descriptions are a first-class source.

The main visual source for the study of early Mongolian armor are Iranian miniatures of the first half of the 14th century. In other works (42) we have shown that in almost all cases the miniatures depict purely Mongolian realities - hairstyle, costume and weapons, strikingly different from those that we saw in Muslim art before mid-XIII century, and coinciding down to the details with the realities in the images of the Mongols in Chinese painting of the Yuan era.

Mongol warriors. Drawing from Yuan painting.

In the latter, however, there are practically no battle scenes, but in works of religious content (43) warriors are depicted in armor that differs from the traditional Sung, with facial features reminiscent of “Western barbarians.” Most likely these are Mongol warriors. Moreover, they look like the Mongols from the painting “The Tale of Mongol invasion"("Moko surai ecotoba emaki") from the imperial collection in Tokyo, attributed to the artist Tosa Nagataka and dating from about 1292 (44)

The fact that these are Mongols, and not the Chinese or Koreans of the Mongolian army, as is sometimes believed (45), is evidenced by the national Mongolian hairstyle of some warriors - braids arranged in rings, falling onto the shoulders.

- on ARD.

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Notes

18 Kyzlasov L. R. Early Mongols (to the problem of the origins of medieval culture) // Siberia, Central and East Asia in the Middle Ages. - Novosibirsk, 1975; Kychanov E.I. Mongols in the VI - first half of the XII century. // Far East and neighboring territories in the Middle Ages. - Novosibirsk, 1980.

16 Gorelik M.V. Mongols and Oghuzes in Tabriz miniature of the 14th-15th centuries // Mittelalterliche Malerei im Orient.- Halle (Saale), 1982.

20 Kramarovsky M. G. Toreutics Golden Hordes XIII-XV centuries: Author's abstract. dis. ...cand. ist. Sciences. - L., 1974.

21 Derevianko E.I. Troitsky burial ground. - Table. I, 1; III. 1-6; XV,7, 8, 15-18 et al.; Medvedev V. E. Medieval monuments... - Fig. 33, 40; table. XXXVII, 5, 6; LXI et al.; Lenkov V.D. Metallurgy and metalworking... - Fig. 8.

22 Aseev I.V., Kirillov I.I., Kovychev E.V. Nomads of Transbaikalia in the Middle Ages (based on burial materials). - Novosibirsk, 1984. - Table. IX, 6, 7; XIV, 10,11; XVIII, 7; XXI, 25, 26; XXV, 7, 10, I-

23 Yang Hong. Collection of articles...- Fig. 60.

24 Sunchugashev Ya. I. Ancient metallurgy of Khakassia. The Age of Iron. - Novosibirsk, 1979. - Table. XXVII, XXVIII; Khudyakov Yu. V. Armament...-Table. X-XII.

23 Gorelik M.V. Armament of nations...

26 Chernenko E.V. Scythian armor. - Kyiv, 1968.

27 Gorelik M.V. Saki armor // Central Asia. New monuments of culture and writing. - M., 1986.

28 Thordeman V. Armour...; Gamber O. Kataphrakten, Clibanarier, Norman-nenreiter // Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien.- 1968.-Bd 64.

29 Kychanov E.I. Mongols...- P. 140-141.

30 Lubsan Danzan. Altan tobchi (“The Golden Legend”) / Trans. N. A. Shastina. - M., 1965. - P. 122.

31 Shihab ad-Din Muhammad an-Nasawi. Biography of Sultan Jalalad-Din Mankburny / Trans. 3. M. Buniyatova. - Baku, 1973. - P. 96.

32 Rashid ad-Din. Collection of chronicles / Trans. A. N. Arends. - M. - L., 1946. - T. 3. - P. 301-302.

33 Their tsaaz (“great code”). Monument to the Mongolian feudal law XVII century/Transliteration, trans., introduction. and comment. S. D. Dylykova. - M., 1981. - P. 14, 15, 43, 44.

34 Ibid. - pp. 19, 21, 22, 47, 48.

35 Ibid. - P. 19, 47.

36 See: Zlatkin I. Ya. History of the Dzungar Khanate. - M., 1983.-P. 238-239.

37 Ibid. - P. 219.

38 Kozin A. N. Secret legend. - M. - L., 1941. - T. 1, § 211.

39 Matuzova V.I. English medieval sources of the 9th-13th centuries - Moscow, 1979. - P. 136, 137, 144, 150, 152, 153, 161, 175, 182.

40 Kirpichnikov A. N. Old Russian weapons. Vol. 3. Armor, a complex of military equipment of the 9th-13th centuries. // SAI E1-36.- L., 1971.- P. 18.

41 Travels to the eastern countries of Plano Carpini and Rubruk / Per.I. P. Minaeva. - M., 1956. - P. 186.

42 Gorelik M.V. Mongols and Oguzes...; Gorelik M. Oriental Armour...

43 Murray J. K. Representations of Hariti, the Mother of Demons and the theme of “Raising the Aims-howl” in Chinese Painting // Artibus Asiae.- 1982.-V. 43, N 4.- Fig. 8.

44 Brodsky V. E. Japanese classical art. - M., 1969. - P. 73; Heissig W. Ein Volk sucht seine Geschichte. - Dusseldorf - "Wien, 1964. - Gegentiher S. 17.

45 Turnbull S. R. The Mongols.- L., 1980.- P. 15, 39.

Reference

Mikhail Viktorovich Gorelik (October 2, 1946, Narva, ESSR - January 12, 2015, Moscow) - art critic, orientalist, researcher of the history of weapons. Candidate of Art History, senior Researcher Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Academy of Arts of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Author of more than 100 scientific works, devoted a significant part of his scientific activity to the study of the military affairs of the ancient and medieval peoples of Eurasia. He played a big role in the development of artistic scientific and historical reconstruction in the USSR, and then in Russia.

The huge Mongol Empire created by the great Genghis Khan was many times larger than the empires of Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander the Great. And it fell not under the blows of external enemies, but only as a result of internal decay...

Having united the disparate Mongol tribes in the 13th century, Genghis Khan managed to create an army that had no equal in Europe, Rus', or the Central Asian countries. No ground force of that time could compare with the mobility of his troops. And its main principle has always been attack, even if the main strategic objective was defense.

The Pope's envoy to the Mongol court, Plano Carpini, wrote that the victories of the Mongols depended largely not so much on their physical strength or numbers, but on superior tactics. Carpini even recommended that European military leaders follow the example of the Mongols. “Our armies should be managed on the model of the Tatars (Mongols - author's note) on the basis of the same harsh military laws... The army should in no way be conducted in one mass, but in separate detachments. Scouts should be sent out in all directions. And our generals must keep their troops day and night in combat readiness, since the Tatars are always vigilant, like devils.” So where did the invincibility of the Mongol army lie, where did its commanders and rank and file originate from those techniques of mastering the martial art?

Strategy

During Genghis Khan's lifetime, he was the supreme commander. He usually carried out an invasion of the captured country with the help of several armies and in different directions. He demanded a plan of action from the commanders, sometimes making amendments to it. After which the performer was given complete freedom in solving the task. Genghis Khan was personally present only during the first operations, and after making sure that everything was going according to plan, he provided the young leaders with all the glory of military triumphs.

It happened that in a feigned flight, the Mongol army scattered so that it enveloped the enemy from different sides. But if the enemy was ready to fight back, they could release him from the encirclement and then finish him off on the march. In 1220, one of the armies of Khorezmshah Muhammad, which the Mongols deliberately released from Bukhara and then defeated, was destroyed in a similar way.

Most often, the Mongols attacked under the cover of light cavalry in several parallel columns stretched along a wide front. The enemy column that encountered the main forces either held its position or retreated, while the rest continued to move forward, advancing on the flanks and rear of the enemy. Then the columns approached each other, the result of which, as a rule, was the complete encirclement and destruction of the enemy.

The amazing mobility of the Mongol army, allowing it to seize the initiative, gave the Mongol commanders, and not their opponents, the right to choose both the place and time of the decisive battle.

One of the main strategic rules of the Mongols was the pursuit of a defeated enemy until complete destruction. This was new in the military practice of medieval times. The knights of that time, for example, considered it humiliating for themselves to chase an enemy, and such ideas persisted for many centuries, until the era of Louis XVI. But the Mongols needed to make sure not so much that the enemy was defeated, but that he would no longer be able to gather new forces, regroup and attack again. Therefore, it was simply destroyed.

The Mongols kept track of enemy losses in a rather unique way. After each battle, special detachments cut off the right ear of each corpse lying on the battlefield, and then collected it in bags and accurately counted the number of killed enemies.

As you know, the Mongols preferred to fight in winter. A favorite way to test whether the ice on the river could withstand the weight of their horses was to lure the local population there. At the end of 1241 in Hungary, in full view of starving refugees, the Mongols left their cattle unattended on the eastern bank of the Danube. And when they were able to cross the river and take away the cattle, the Mongols realized that the offensive could begin.

Warriors

Mongol warriors did not know the slightest excess - neither in food nor in housing. Having acquired unprecedented endurance and stamina over the years of preparation for military nomadic life, they practically did not need medical care, although since the time of the Chinese campaign (XIII-XIV centuries), the Mongol army always had a whole staff of Chinese surgeons. Before the start of the battle, each warrior put on a shirt made of durable wet silk. As a rule, the arrows pierced this tissue, and it was drawn into the wound along with the tip, significantly complicating its penetration, which allowed surgeons to easily remove the arrows along with the tissue from the body.

Units of heavy and medium cavalry were used for close combat. They were called nukers. Although initially nukers were trained in all types of combat: they could attack scattered, using bows, or in close formation, using spears or swords...

The main striking force of the Mongol army was heavy cavalry, its number was no more than 40 percent. Heavy cavalry had at their disposal a whole set of armor made of leather or chain mail, usually taken from defeated enemies. The horses of the heavy cavalry were also protected by leather armor. These warriors were armed for long-range combat - with bows and arrows, for close combat - with spears or swords, broadswords or sabers, battle axes or maces.

Siege

Even during the life of Genghis Khan, in the wars with the Jin Empire, the Mongols largely borrowed from the Chinese some elements of strategy and tactics, as well as military equipment. Although at the beginning of their conquests Genghis Khan's army often found itself powerless against the strong walls of Chinese cities, over the course of several years the Mongols developed a fundamental system of siege that was almost impossible to resist. Its main component was a large but mobile detachment, equipped with throwing machines and other equipment, which was transported on special covered wagons. For the siege caravan, the Mongols recruited the best Chinese engineers and created on their basis a powerful engineering corps, which turned out to be extremely effective.

The Mongols also adopted from the Chinese the ability to surround a fortress with a palisade during a siege, isolating it from the outside world and thereby depriving the besieged of the opportunity to make forays. The Mongols then launched an assault using various siege weapons and stone-throwing machines. To create panic in the enemy ranks, the Mongols rained down thousands of burning arrows on the besieged cities. They were fired by light cavalry directly from under the fortress walls or from a catapult from afar.

During a siege, the Mongols often resorted to cruel, but very effective methods for them: they drove a large number of defenseless captives in front of them, forcing the besieged to kill their own compatriots in order to get to the attackers.

If the defenders offered fierce resistance, then after the decisive assault the entire city, its garrison and residents were subjected to destruction and total plunder.

“If they always turned out to be invincible, this was due to the boldness of their strategic plans and the clarity of their tactical actions. In the person of Genghis Khan and his commanders, the art of war reached one of its highest peaks,” as the French military leader Rank wrote about the Mongols. And apparently he was right.