The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies not the last place in the series of most important historical events. Its main reasons were the contradictions between Russia and France regarding the policy pursued in Europe by Napoleon Bonaparte, as well as the violation by these states of the terms of the Tilsit Treaty.
The fact that Napoleon was twice refused to marry the sisters of Alexander the First can also be considered an indirect reason for the outbreak of war, one of the key moments of which was the Tarutino maneuver.
The significance of this movement of troops near Moscow and the subsequent battle for the victory over Napoleon will be discussed further.
Already since 1810, both warring parties were actively preparing for military operations, forming their military forces.
Napoleon Bonaparte, a wise commander, proved himself to be an extraordinary politician and statesman.
He expanded the borders of France in the shortest possible time, thereby turning it into a powerful empire. European monarchs were forced to submit to the political and economic interests of the ambitious Frenchman.
This fact had a negative impact on internal discipline: such people were hostile towards commanders and their orders. There were also those who voluntarily joined Napoleon’s army - as a rule, these were subjects of the allied states.
In this regard, the French troops were distinguished by their multinationality. They included:
- Poles,
- Germans,
- Italians,
- Dutch,
- Spaniards,
- Austrians,
- Saxons.
It was the Polish regiments that were the most militant and friendly to representatives of other nationalities and the command. The Poles remained with Napoleon Bonaparte until the very end - the final battle of Waterloo.
The involvement of representatives of different nations into the ranks of the troops, on the one hand, provided a constant opportunity to replenish its numbers. On the other hand, to some extent this explains Napoleon’s defeat at the decisive stage of the war.
In turn, the Russian army under the command of Kutuzov during the war with the French was considered one of the best in Europe, and therefore in the world.
The troops were armed with the best types of artillery and small arms. It was this, combined with the personal qualities of the soldiers and the excellent Suvorov school, that made the Russians a very serious adversary.
Such experienced Russian commanders as Suvorov, Ushakov, Barclay de Tolly, Bagration, Kutuzov and others raised the Russian art of battle planning to the highest level.
For this reason, our soldiers were not only not inferior to the French, but in many ways superior to them. The principles of combat operations and Suvorov's strategic maneuvers were carefully studied by the French.
Napoleon appreciated the skill of the Russian military leader and even adopted his offensive style of battle and some tactical ideas. The troops included infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineering troops.
Important! The highest fighting spirit of Russian soldiers, unity, speed, determination and clear calculation gave Russia the opportunity to win victory after victory.
The difference in the balance of forces between the two opposing forces was not too stunning - the French were approximately 600 thousand, and the Russians were approximately 500 thousand.
The command of the troops had information that Napoleon wanted to defeat the enemy with one blow. Therefore, Kutuzov’s main strategy was to avoid the decisive battle. This tactic was personally approved by Alexander the First.
Tarutino maneuver
War is not a chain of accidents; all actions taken entail certain consequences. They can change not only the course of the war itself, but also the course of history.
There were two such turning points in the War of 1812 that forced Napoleon's troops to change their plans and abandon their goal.
The first is the Battle of Borodino, the second is the Tarutino maneuver. Wikipedia contains an article entitled “Battle of Tarutino,” but the battle itself was preceded by a cunning maneuver by the Russian command.
After the Battle of Borodino, it became clear that it was impossible to hold Moscow - the forces of the Russian troops were too small. The situation was truly tragic: there had never been a case before when, after the fall of the capital of a state, the army continued to fight.
Napoleon was firmly convinced that, having lost the capital, Alexander the First would be forced to negotiate. The decision to retreat was very wise: the loss of Moscow as such meant nothing, while the death of the entire Russian army would have been the collapse of everything.
As mentioned earlier, Bonaparte tried to force a general battle from the very beginning of hostilities in Russia. Until now, he had not succeeded in this, and, it would seem, the battle for Moscow should definitely have become that decisive moment.
However, the Russian command, led by Field Marshal Kutuzov, did not allow this, and this time the forces were still unequal.
September 2 (September 14), 1812 is the date when the army was withdrawn from Moscow along the Ryazan road. A crossing was carried out across the Moscow River - this took place near the Borovsky transportation (now the city of Zhukovsky is located there).
Tarutino maneuver: general information
The rearguard under the command of General Raevsky was responsible for covering the army. After this, the main forces of the army, on the orders of Kutuzov, turned in a westerly direction. The Cossacks carried out a diversionary maneuver: by simulating a retreat to Ryazan, they managed to attract the main forces of the French with them.
In addition, the same “retreats” were made by the Cossacks in two more directions: along the Kashirskaya and Tula roads. The peasants of the surrounding villages also played an important role in the retreat of the Russian army - local residents actively participated in the partisan war, destroying small detachments of the French.
On September 7 (19), the Russian army safely reached Podolsk, and then the village of Krasnaya Pakhra. The main location of the troops was the vicinity of the village of Tarutino across the Nara River (this is shown on the historical map).
The troops remained here for the next week, until September 14 (26). This gave a small but vital respite: both the soldiers' strength and food supplies were running out.
At the same time, detachments of generals Raevsky and Miloradovich moved to Moscow to wage partisan warfare.
The objectives of the Tarutino two-week “sitting” (to distract the French and prepare for battle) were completed.
In fact, it turned out that Napoleon simply lost sight of the Russian army, thus finding himself in a very difficult situation.
The French army could not get everything it needed in Moscow. This was largely facilitated by the unfolding guerrilla war. After all, detachments were constantly sent in different directions from Moscow in search of provisions for the army, but there was never a case where they returned without losses.
Napoleon's best commander, Murat, was sent to search for the Russians. Beginning on September 24, Murat's vanguard, having discovered the Russian army, observed it near Tarutino on the Chernishna River (at a distance of about 90 km from Moscow).
The number of the French group was 26,540 people. There was only one forest between the Russians and the French. However, for some time this neighborhood managed without any clashes. This situation lasted for about two weeks.
The Tarutino maneuver made it possible not only to restore the strength of the Russians, but also to replenish their numbers. Having taken a fortified position, the Russians had contact with the south of Russia.
This made it possible to simultaneously increase the number of troops, cover the arms factory in Tula, the Kaluga supply base and maintain contact with the armies of Chichagov and Tormasov.
The Tarutino maneuver is truly an outstanding tactical move by Kutuzov. Thanks to him, Napoleon was not able to strike; as a result, he had to retreat through the war-ravaged area along the Smolensk road.
Battle of Tarutino
The location of the Tarutino camp was very advantageous - the front and left flank were surrounded by rivers and forests, in addition, the entire front line was fortified with abatis and rubble.
The location made it possible to observe three directions from Moscow at once - Kaluga, Ryazan and Tula roads.
In the camp, the army received the necessary ammunition, weapons and food. The number of cavalry was increased. Military training of soldiers was constantly carried out in the camp.
The attack itself was planned by cavalry general Bennigsen. Dense forests located close to the French left flank allowed Russian troops to get as close as possible to the enemy camp - this greatly simplified the general’s plan.
The idea itself was that the attack should be carried out in two parts. The first of them, under the command of Bennigsen himself, should strike the enemy’s left flank. The second part, led by Miloradovich, had the goal of attacking Napoleon from the right flank.
Dorokhov’s additional detachment cut off Murat’s retreat along the Old Kaluga Road. Kutuzov himself exercised command from the camp, having with him a significant reserve of military forces.
Important! The French had some idea of the upcoming events, so on the night before the battle all the forces of the enemy army were in full combat readiness. Murat was well aware of the danger of his position.
The attack occurred at 7 a.m. on the personal initiative of General Orlov-Denisov. At first, Murat even managed to repel the Russian attack with a counterattack and stop their advance. It was not possible to completely defeat Murat due to the incomplete coherence of the Russian troops.
Excerpt from Kutuzov's letter
The night march of Bennigsen's column delayed the start of the attack. If this had been avoided, the victory would have been even more beneficial for the Russians. The looting of the Cossacks played a negative role to a large extent - the rich convoys of the French became a truly tasty bait for them.
Despite the fact that the goal of the Tarutino battle was not fully achieved, the success was still considerable, especially in terms of raising the morale of Russian soldiers. The result of the battle was:
- 2500 French killed,
- 1500 prisoners,
- 38 captured guns.
Russian losses amounted to 300 people.
Useful video
Let's sum it up
The Tarutino maneuver is briefly described in the open Internet encyclopedia, but the uniqueness of both it and the subsequent battle lies in the fact that they forced Napoleon’s troops to retreat and leave Moscow. The role of the Russian Tarutino maneuver has been well studied by historians from different countries, including the French.
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Among all the events of the War of 1812, the most significant for society was the Battle of Borodino, the abandonment and fire of Moscow, however, for historians, tacticians and strategists of subsequent times, the main turning point of the Patriotic War was the ingenious march-maneuver, which was carried out by the retreating Russian army in late September - early October . Napoleon himself was amazed by its scale and correctness of organization, and most of M.I.’s contemporaries. Kutuzov believed that for one Tarutino transition it would be possible to rank His Serene Highness among the greatest commanders of the New Age.
Course of events
On the evening of September 17 (5), the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Field Marshal General M.I. Kutuzov unexpectedly gives the order to turn off the Ryazan road, along which the army has been retreating until now, and go to Podolsk. None of the corps commanders knew where or why the army was withdrawing, and only by the evening of the next day did the Russians find themselves on the Tula road near Podolsk. Next, the Russian troops went along the Old Kaluga Road south to Krasnaya Pakhra, after passing which they stopped at the village of Tarutino.
click to enlarge
Military historian and adjutant of Kutuzov, who was present during the implementation of this flanking maneuver, A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky describes the advantages that the Russian army received from these movements: “Having established a firm foot on the Kaluga road, Prince Kutuzov had the opportunity: 1) to cover the midday provinces, which were replete with supplies; 2) threaten the route of enemy actions from Moscow through Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk; 3) to cross by detachments the French communications stretched over an excessive area and 4) in the event of Napoleon’s retreat to Smolensk, to warn him along the shortest road.” Indeed, the Tarutino maneuver allowed Russian troops to simultaneously protect from the enemy food reserves in Kaluga, arms factories in Tula, and foundries in Bryansk, and also prevent Napoleon from entering the fertile southern provinces. Moreover, such a disposition of Russian troops deprived Napoleon of the opportunity to carry out the so-called “autumn plan” for a campaign against St. Petersburg.
In fact, for the first time during the campaign, Kutuzov outplayed Napoleon, putting him in check and forcing him to play according to his scheme. A. Jomini recognized that in the history of wars since ancient times “the retreat that the Russian army made in 1812 from the Neman to Moscow... without allowing itself to be upset or partially defeated by such an enemy as Napoleon... of course, should be placed above all others” not so much by the “strategic talents” of the generals, but by “ regarding the amazing confidence, steadfastness and firmness of the troops.” The Grand Army became increasingly entangled in a skillfully laid trap, in which Moscow was the bait.
The ghost of the Russian army wanders through the fields
But how did Kutuzov manage to hide the movement of an army of more than 80,000 from Murat’s cavalry, which was hot on its heels? The point here was an old military trick with lighting fires: the French patrols, not being able to get further than the rearguard of Miloradovich, and then the Cossacks of Efremov, could only be content with the sight of lit fires, from which they calculated the approximate size of the military group in front of them. However, in this case, they were deceived by the Cossacks in the same way as Khan Akhmat on the Ugra River was deceived by Ivan III - there were several dozen times more fires than needed for the two Cossack regiments that covered the retreat. In addition, the covering troops constantly made some kind of false maneuvers. Kutuzov wrote in a report to the emperor: “The army, making a flank movement, for the sake of secrecy in this direction, confused the enemy on every march. Heading herself to a certain point, she disguised herself with false movements of light troops, making demonstrations, now to Kolomna, now to Serpukhov, after which the enemy followed in large parties.”
Map from the book by A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky
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This is how G. von Roos describes this campaign of Murat in his memoirs: “We drove off, accompanied by smoke that was driving towards us from the direction of the city. The sun shone through the smoke, turning all visible objects yellow. The Cossacks were very close in front of us, but that day they did not even exchange pistol shots.<…>The next day, September 16, we continued along the road leading to Vladimir and Kazan.<…>We saw our opponents only in the evening, when we approached the wooden town of Bogorodsk, which stood to the right of the road.” For another whole day the French moved in the direction in which the Cossacks had disappeared. On the third day “Early in the morning I paid a visit to my commander, Colonel von Mielkau. He greeted me with the words: “We have lost the enemy and every trace of him; we have to stay here and wait for new orders,”- writes Roos.
Indeed, continuing to follow the retreating ghost of the Russian army along the Ryazan road, Murat missed the flanking movement of the Russians and on September 22 (10), when the Cossacks scattered along with the fog, he discovered an empty road in front of him.
Marshal B. de Castellane describes a colorful picture, perhaps more than others, indicating the mood of the French troops at that moment: “Our vanguard is twelve miles away. The Neapolitan king, standing in the mud in his yellow boots, with his Gascon accent, spoke to the officer sent by the emperor in the following terms: “Tell the emperor that I carried the vanguard of the French army beyond Moscow with honor, but I’m tired, tired of all this, do you hear Do you? I want to go to Naples to take care of my subjects."
On the same days, Kutuzov sent the following report to the emperor: “I am still receiving information about the success of my false movement, for the enemy followed the Cossacks in parts (that is, the detachment left on the Ryazan road). This gives me the convenience that the army, having made a flank march of 18 versts on the Kaluga road tomorrow and sent strong parties to Mozhaiskaya, should greatly concern the enemy’s rear. In this way I hope that the enemy will seek to give me a battle, from which, in a favorable location, I expect equal successes, as at Borodino.”
Of course, after more than a week, as Roos writes, the French “we found the Russians again, who seemed to have sunk into the abyss from the moment when... we saw them on the top of the hill near Bogorodsk. The bloody war fun began again; all types of weapons were put into action, and cannon firing took place every day, often from morning to evening...” But that was a completely different story.
Staff games: opponents and supporters of maneuver
The Tarutino maneuver caused fierce debate at headquarters and stirred up a new wave of intrigue around the field marshal. Chief of Staff L.L. openly opposed the maneuver. Bennigsen, F. Buxweden, M.I. Platov and their supporters. Historian E.V. Tarle writes that “at this time at the headquarters, except for two or three people, no one understood the enormous and beneficial significance of Kutuzov’s movements.”
Kutuzov's position was worsened by the fact that Murat had nevertheless opened up the movements of Russian troops and began to push back the Russian rearguard on the Kaluga road. Bennigsen's comrades, foaming at the mouth, insisted on a battle with Murat at Krasnaya Pakhra, to which Kutuzov categorically disagreed, arguing that it was necessary to retreat even further south, to the village. Tarutino, because from there it will be easier to control the three roads leading from Moscow to Kaluga. Their dispute went so far that Kutuzov announced that he was relinquishing power and giving Bennigsen the entire headquarters, all the adjutants and the army: "You command the army, and I am only a volunteer", he told Bennigsen, giving him the opportunity to look for a place to fight. Bennigsen honestly spent the whole morning looking for a place to fight in the vicinity of Krasnaya Pakhra, found nothing and reported that it was really impossible to fight here. After which Kutuzov “regained” command and ordered a retreat.
In the future, Kutuzov would deal with Bennigsen more harshly; in one of the disputes, in which Bennigsen argued that Kutuzov’s position was incorrect for attacking the French vanguard (another maneuver that Kutuzov promised to do and did not carry out), the commander-in-chief directly stated: “Your position near Friedland was good for you, but as for me, I am content with this position, and we will stay here, because I am the commander here, and I am responsible for everything.” Another reminder of the defeat at Friedland was a grave insult for Bennigsen. With caustic ridicule and virtual removal from business, Kutuzov destroyed the persistent critic of the Tarutin maneuver.
Be that as it may, but after all the advantages of the Tarutino maneuver became fully obvious, many of those generals who opposed it not only recognized this plan as ingenious, but even claimed to be its author. However, the most impartial and revealing evidence is the opinion of Kutuzov’s rival and the author of the “retreat” concept: "This action- wrote M.B. Barclay de Tolly, - gave us the opportunity to complete the war with the complete extermination of the enemy.”
By the beginning of October 1812, the Russian army was quite ready to launch a counteroffensive. The Russian command monitored the enemy’s actions and waited for an opportune moment. Mikhail Kutuzov believed that the French army would leave Moscow in the near future. Intelligence data gave reason to assume that Napoleon would soon take active action. However, the enemy tried to hide his intentions and made false maneuvers for these purposes.
The first signs of unusual enemy movement appeared in the evening of October 3 (15). General Ivan Dorokhov reported on the possibility of enemy movement towards Kaluga. True, on the same day, the chiefs of the partisan detachments, Alexander Figner, who was operating near Mozhaisk, and Nikolai Kudashev from the Ryazan road, reported that there was no reason for concern. However, Dorokhov's message alerted the commander-in-chief. He ordered the commanders of the army guerrilla units to strengthen surveillance in order to obtain more accurate information about the enemy and not miss his movements.
Mikhail Kutuzov knew that Napoleon, having occupied Moscow, found himself in a difficult situation. The French army could not fully provide itself with everything it needed in Moscow. The command of the Russian army launched a widespread guerrilla war, which prevented the normal supply of troops. To search for food and fodder, the French command had to send significant detachments, which suffered losses. To protect communications and collect provisions, Napoleon was forced to maintain large military formations far beyond the borders of the ancient Russian capital. Napoleon's attempts to begin peace negotiations with Alexander and Kutuzov failed. The time for a decision to withdraw the army from Moscow was quickly approaching.
The generals of the Russian army perceived the news of the possible movement of the enemy from Moscow as the beginning of the retreat of Napoleon's troops. Quartermaster General Karl Toll proposed his plan for an attack on Murat's vanguard, which was supposed to significantly weaken the French army. The implementation of this goal, according to Tol, did not present any particular difficulties. Murat's vanguard could only receive reinforcements from Moscow; the opportunity arose to defeat a significant part of the French army separately from the main forces. According to reconnaissance data on the Chernishna River (a tributary of the Nara) 90 km from Moscow, Murat’s forces had been stationed there since September 24, observing the Russian army, there were no more than 45-50 thousand people. And, most importantly, the enemy settled down at ease and poorly organized the security system. In reality, under the command of Murat there were 20-26 thousand people: Poniatowski’s 5th Polish Corps, 4 cavalry corps (or rather, all that was left of them; after the Battle of Borodino, the French command was unable to restore its cavalry). True, the French vanguard had strong artillery - 197 guns. However, according to Clausewitz, they “were rather a burden to the avant-garde than they could be useful to it.” The front and right flank of the extended disposition of the forces of the Neapolitan king were protected by the Nara and Chernishna rivers, the left wing went out into the open, where only a forest separated the French from the Russian positions. For about two weeks, the positions of the Russian and French armies were adjacent.
It turned out that the left flank of the French, abutting the Dednevsky forest, was actually not guarded. Tol's opinion was joined by the Chief of the Army General Staff Leonty Bennigsen, the general on duty under the Commander-in-Chief Pyotr Konovnitsyn and Lieutenant General Karl Baggovut. Mikhail Kutuzov approved the idea and decided to attack the enemy. That same evening, he approved the disposition, according to which the movement of troops was to begin the next day - October 4 (16), at 18 o'clock, and the attack itself was to begin at 6 o'clock in the morning on October 5 (17).
On the morning of October 4 (16), Konovnitsyn sent an order to the chief of staff of the 1st Western Army, Ermolov, which confirmed that the performance would take place “today at 6 o’clock in the afternoon.” However, the troops did not move out that day, since the disposition was not delivered to the units on time. Mikhail Kutuzov was forced to cancel the order. Apparently, the responsibility for the failure to timely deliver the disposition to the troops lies with Bennigsen, who was entrusted with command of the troops of the right flank, he did not check the receipt of the order by the corps commanders, as well as Ermolov, who was hostile to Bennigsen and did not check the implementation of the instructions. In addition, there was another reason that forced the command to cancel the performance. On the night of October 5 (17), Kutuzov received information about the beginning of the movements of enemy forces along the Old and New Kaluga roads. The commander-in-chief suggested that the French army had left Moscow and might end up at Tarutin at the time of the battle with Murat’s vanguard. Not wanting to meet the main forces of the enemy in unfavorable conditions, Kutuzov canceled the attack. Then it turned out that this information turned out to be false and the commander-in-chief scheduled the offensive for October 6 (18).
Battle plan
The Russian headquarters assumed that the enemy forces amounted to 45-50 thousand people and consisted of the cavalry corps of Murat, the corps of Davout and Poniatovsky. The main forces of the Russian army were sent to attack the reinforced vanguard of Marshal Murat. The army was divided into two parts. The right wing under Bennigsen included the 2nd, 3rd, 4th infantry corps, 10 Cossack regiments, and parts of the 1st cavalry corps. The left wing and center, under the command of the chief of the vanguard of the Main Army, Mikhail Miloradovich, included the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th infantry corps and two cuirassier divisions.
The 2nd, 3rd, 4th cavalry corps, Cossack regiments under the leadership of Major General Fedor Korf, were located in front of the left flank. The headquarters of the commander-in-chief was also to be located on the left flank. The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of Bennigsen’s right wing on the enemy’s left flank. Bennigsen divided his forces into three columns and a reserve. The first column was made up of cavalry under the command of Vasily Orlov-Denisov: 10 Cossack regiments, one horse-jaeger regiment, two dragoon regiments, one hussar regiment, one uhlan regiment. Orlov-Denisov was supposed to go around the left flank of the French troops through the Dednevsky forest and reach their rear near the village of Stremilova. The second column consisted of the infantry of Baggovut's 2nd Corps. She received orders to attack the enemy's left wing from the front near the village of Teterino (Teterinka). The third column included the 4th Infantry Corps under the command of General Alexander Osterman-Tolstoy. The third column was supposed to line up with the second column and attack the center of the French troops, also located near the village of Teterino. The reserve included the 3rd Infantry Corps of Pavel Stroganov, the 1st Cavalry Corps of Pyotr Meller-Zakomelsky. The reserve had the task of assisting Baggovut's 2nd Infantry Corps.
At the same time, M.A.’s troops were supposed to hit the enemy. Miloradovich with the support of part of the forces of the Russian army under the command of Kutuzov himself. Their task was to pin down the enemy's right flank. The troops were positioned in two lines. According to the disposition in the first line, near the village of Glyadovo (Glodovo), there were units of the 7th and 8th Infantry Corps. Behind in the second line was the reserve (5th Corps). The 6th Infantry Corps and two cuirassier divisions were to leave Tarutino to the edge of the Dednevsky forest and act in the center, advancing in the direction of the village of Vinkova. Finally, the army partisan detachments of I.S. Dorokhov and Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Figner struck behind enemy lines, they were given the task of cutting off the retreat route of the enemy army. According to Mikhail Kutuzov’s plan, Russian troops were supposed to encircle and destroy the enemy vanguard. The plan was good, but its implementation depended on the synchronization of the actions of the Russian troops. Under the conditions of that time, at night and in a wooded area, it was very difficult to achieve this plan.
Progress of the battle
To carry out the maneuver, the commander-in-chief sent the author of the plan, Tol, to help Bennigsen, who carried out reconnaissance of the routes. However, in practice, neither Bennigsen nor Tol managed to carry out the maneuver as planned. Only the first column of Orlov-Denisov arrived at the appointed place in the village of Dmitrievskoye on time. The other two columns got lost in the night forest and were late. As a result, the moment of surprise was lost.
As soon as dawn came, Orlov-Denisov, fearing detection of his troops by the enemy, decided to launch an offensive. He hoped that other columns had already taken up positions and would support his attack. At 7 o'clock in the morning, the Cossack regiments attacked Sebastiani's cuirassier division. The Russian Cossacks took the enemy by surprise. Orlov-Denisov noted the feat of 42 officers of the Cossack regiments, who “always being among the hunters in front, were the first to cut into the enemy cavalry columns, knock them over and drive them to the infantry covering their batteries; when the enemy lined up and was preparing to attack, they, warning him, despising all the danger and horror of death, regardless of either grapeshot or rifle volleys, desperately rushed at the enemy, cutting into the ranks, killed many in place, and drove the rest in great confusion several miles." The enemy abandoned 38 guns and fled in panic. The Cossacks reached the Ryazanovsky ravine, along which the road to Spas-Kuplya ran, but here they were met by the cavalry of Claparede and Nansouty and pushed back.
While the enemy's left flank was crushed, in the center the French managed to prepare to repel the attack of Russian troops. When units of the 4th Corps of the third column reached the northwestern edge of the forest and began an attack on Teterinka, the French were ready for battle. In addition, at first only one Tobolsk regiment went on the offensive (the rest of the units had not yet left the forest), then it was joined by the 20th Jaeger Regiment from the Orlov-Denisov detachment. Finally, parts of Baggovut’s second column began to appear, which included Bennigsen. Having deployed the rangers at the edge, Baggovut led them into the attack, without waiting for the rest of the column’s troops to approach.
Russian rangers pushed back the enemy and captured the Ryazanovskoye defile (a narrow passage between hills or water barriers), along which was the retreat route of the French troops. Marshal Murat, realizing the danger of the situation, gathered troops and drove the rangers out of the ravine. Karl Fedorovich Baggovut died during this battle. Bennigsen took command of the column. He did not dare to attack with the forces at his disposal and began to wait for the arrival of the third column and reserve. Joachim Murat took advantage of the respite and, under the cover of artillery fire, withdrew the main forces, convoys and part of the artillery to Spas-Kupla.
Karl Fedorovich Baggovut.
The reserve, the 3rd Infantry Corps, finally joined the second column. According to the original plan, he was supposed to advance in the direction of the Ryazanovsky ravine. However, Bennigsen ordered Strogonov’s corps to support the 2nd Corps and act in the direction of the village of Teterinka. Later, units of the 4th Corps emerged from the forest and Bennigsen directed them to Murat’s central position. This was a grave mistake, since the enemy was already withdrawing his troops.
Thus, the blow to the original plan was delivered only by the forces of Orlov-Denisov and part of the troops of the third column of Osterman-Tolstoy. And yet this attack brought some success. The French batteries were suppressed by Russian artillery fire. Russian infantry knocked the enemy out of their positions and forced them to hastily retreat. The enemy retreat soon turned into a rout. The Cossack regiments of Orlov-Denisov and the cavalry of Miloradovich pursued the French to Voronov. The success could have been more significant if the main part of the troops of the right wing of the Russian army had acted more consistently.
The troops of the right flank of the Russian army did not take part in the battle at all. They were stopped by order of the commander-in-chief. Kutuzov suspended the movement of troops for several reasons. He received a package from Kudashev, which contained an order from Marshal Berthier to General Arzhan dated October 5 (17) to send them convoys and cargo to the Mozhaisk road and the transition of his division to the New Kaluga road to Fominsky. This indicated that the French army was leaving Moscow and was going to move towards Kaluga and Tula along the New Kaluga Road. Therefore, Mikhail Kutuzov decided not to bring his main forces into battle with Murat. On October 4 (16), Seslavin reported to the commander-in-chief that he had encountered significant enemy forces at Fominsky. After analyzing this information, Kutuzov began to suspect that Napoleon was beginning to move his main forces. He orders Dorokhov’s detachment, instead of moving to the rear of Murat’s vanguard, to return to the Borovskaya road. Dorokhov's detachment, which arrived at Fominsky on October 6 (18). Dorokhov met a large French force and asked for reinforcements. The commander-in-chief sent two regiments to him and ordered Dokhturov's 6th Corps, the Guards Cavalry Division and Figner's army partisan detachment to also move into this area. Thus, Mikhail Kutuzov created in advance on his left flank a group that could withstand the battle until the main forces of the Russian army arrived.
It was information about the movement of large enemy forces that forced the Russian commander to act so carefully in the Battle of Tarutino. Further active actions against Murat’s forces lost their former significance, and a more serious “game” began. Therefore, the Russian commander-in-chief rejected the proposals of Miloradovich and Ermolov to pursue the forces of Marshal Murat.
Result of the battle
The defeat of Murat's troops did not happen due to the command's blunders, both in planning the offensive and in the unclear execution of the plans by the troops. According to the calculations of the historian M.I. Bogdanovich, 5 thousand infantry and 7 thousand cavalry actually took part in the battle with the French.
However, despite the fact that Murat’s forces were not destroyed, significant tactical success was achieved in the Battle of Tarutino. The battle ended in victory and the flight of the enemy; large trophies and a significant number of prisoners strengthened the morale of the army. This private victory became the beginning of active offensive actions by the army of Mikhail Kutuzov.
38 guns were captured. The French army lost about 4 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners (of which 1.5 thousand were prisoners). The Russian army lost about 1,200 people killed and wounded.
The Tarutino maneuver under the leadership of Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov is one of the outstanding strategies in Russian military affairs. This maneuver was carried out during the Patriotic War of 1812 in the direction from the capital of the Russian state to the village of Tarutino, which is 80 kilometers from Moscow, in the territory of the present Kaluga region, from September 5 to 21, old style.
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Tarutino maneuver: Wikipedia
According to the electronic encyclopedia, the Tarutino maneuver is a strategy that Kutuzov prepared with the aim of getting extra time to prepare for battle with the French army. The French army was defeated here, and the Russians achieved their first victory in the War of 1812 and managed to launch a counteroffensive.
What is the cause of the Patriotic War of 1812?
The French Revolution ended with the ascension to the imperial throne, which negatively affected relations between Russia and France. This relationship deteriorated for several reasons:
- Alexander I was afraid that a similar revolution would break out in Russia;
- Napoleon's aggressive policy towards some European countries, and, in particular, towards England, with which the Russian Empire was an ally.
Once two friendly powers, Russia and France, now find themselves on the battlefield as opponents.
By the beginning of 1812, the entire European territory (except England) had been conquered by Napoleon I, and only the Russian Empire continued its independence from others foreign policy, as well as trade relations with England, although this contradicted the previously concluded Tilsit Agreement, where the most important condition was a continental blockade against England. However, Russia and England now maintained their trade relations through other European countries, which corresponded to the conditions of this blockade, but Napoleon was still very angry about this fact.
The independent policy of the Russian Empire destroyed the plans of the Emperor of France for world domination, so war between these states was inevitable. The French emperor hoped to inflict a crushing blow on Russia already at the first battle and force Alexander I to dance to his tune.
Actions that prompted the development of the Tarutino maneuver
The battle of Borodino made it clear to the Russian army that the capital of the state with the help of the remaining strength it is not possible to keep it. Then Kutuzov drew a plan on the map, according to which it was necessary:
- break away from the French army;
- prevent the passage of the enemy army to the southern latitudes of the country, where large food reserves were located;
- try to destroy the communications of Napoleon's army and prepare for a counter-offensive.
The Military Council in Fili decided that it was necessary to leave Moscow and develop escape routes for the Russian army. It was decided to retreat towards Ryazan.
Preparation and execution of the Tarutino maneuver
When the army crossed the Moscow River, Kutuzov gave the order to the main forces to move west, and convoys guarded by Cossacks set off along the Ryazan road, and they took the French army behind them. Cossacks still “faked” retreat twice and led Napoleon's army along the Tula and Kashira roads. Thus, the French had no idea where the Russian troops were actually moving.
On September 7, the main forces of the Russian army approached Podolsk, and a couple of days later they were already near the village of Krasnaya Parkha, a camp was set up here and Russian troops settled in it until September 14.
Napoleon began to suspect that the command of the Russian army wanted to make a surprise attack, so he was ordered to throw all his efforts into searching for the main strength of the Russian army. Divisions under the command of Delzon, Ney, Davout would be sent to the northern, southern and eastern directions from Moscow, and the troops of Murat, Bessier and Poniatowski examined every corner south of the capital. And only on September 14, the French, or rather Murat’s troops, were able to detect Russian troops near Podolsk.
This position of the army of the Russian Empire was convenient for battle, if suddenly the troops under the command of French military leaders decided to attack. However, if Napoleonic army decided to engage in hostilities, Bonaparte could quickly bring reinforcements to Podolsk, so Kutuzov decided to “pull” the troops further to Krasnaya Parkha. Near Podolsk itself there are only a few combat posts of the Russian army.
The advanced troops of General Miloradovich, a detachment led by Raevsky, as well as partisan detachments were sent towards the capital. Retreating, these troops burned all the crossings.
The march of the Russian army was also helped by peasants who, together with the Cossacks, attacked the advanced reconnaissance troops of the French, thereby causing serious damage to the enemy.
After the French discovered the direction of retreat of the Russian army, Kutuzov ordered troops to move along the Nara River towards Tarutino at night.
Strengthening positions near the village of Tarutino
Near the village of Tarutino, the Russian army camp stood from September 21 to October 11 (these dates are indicated according to the old style). This camp is located in a very advantageous position, from which one could observe all the roads leading from Moscow.
The camp was protected from the front and left flank by rivers, on the banks of which additional earthen fortifications were also built. The rear of the camp was covered by a forest, where rubble and abatis had been prepared.
In the Tarutino camp, a reorganization of the army took place: additional forces, new weapons and ammunition arrived, food supplies replenished, a plan of offensive action was developed, partisan detachments were sent towards the enemy army. The number of cavalry increased sharply as a counterattack was planned, and many soldiers received combat training.
The Napoleonic army that entered Moscow fell into a trap, since the capital was surrounded by partisan Cossack and peasant detachments, and the southern borders of Russia were defended by the newly recruited army of the Russian Empire.
The significance of the march maneuver in the Patriotic War of 1812
A well-thought-out and perfectly executed maneuver made it possible not only to confuse Napoleon’s army and gain time to prepare defensive measures, but also to develop a plan for a counterattack. In addition, Kutuzov was able to protect from attack the French south coast, due to which the domestic army was able to strengthen its power. In addition, the Tula arms factory and the Kaluga supply base still remained untouched by the French troops and provided their own army with supplies.
Thanks to this, Kutuzov maintained contact with the troops of Chichagov and Tormasov, who took up defensive positions near St. Petersburg. He came up with a brilliant plan for how to encircle Napoleon’s army and subsequently completely defeat it.
On October 6, Kutuzov decided to attack Murat’s troops, who also set up their camp near Tarutino. The troops of this commander could not be completely defeated, since most of them decided to retreat.
Seeing the increased power of the Russian army, the French emperor decided not to attack St. Petersburg, liberate the capital and begin a retreat along the road through Smolensk, that is, through those areas that have already been ravaged by the fighting.
The Tarutino maneuver of the Patriotic War of 1812 is an important stage on the path to victory over Napoleon’s army. The Tarutino march-maneuver of the Russian army - from Moscow to the village of Tarutino, located on the Nara River, 80 kilometers southwest of Moscow - was carried out from September 17 to October 3 (from September 5 to 21, old style) 1812.
After the Battle of Borodino, it became obvious that it was impossible to hold Moscow with the remaining forces without replenishment of reserves. Then the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, outlined a plan. It was necessary to break away from the enemy and take a position that would cover Russian supply bases in Tula and Kaluga and threaten the operational line of Napoleonic troops, in order to gain time and create conditions for launching a counteroffensive.
On September 14 (2 old style), leaving Moscow, Russian troops headed southeast along the Ryazan road. On September 17 (5, old style), after crossing the Moscow River at the Borovsky Bridge, Kutuzov, under the cover of the rearguard of Lieutenant General Nikolai Raevsky, secretly from the enemy, turned the main forces of the army to the west. The Cossacks of the rearguard managed to carry away the vanguard of the French army with a demonstrative retreat to Ryazan.
On September 19 (7 old style), the Russian army arrived in Podolsk, and two days later - in the area of the village of Krasnaya Pakhra, where it camped, closing the Old Kaluga Road.
The vanguard of Infantry General Mikhail Miloradovich and Raevsky’s detachment were advanced towards Moscow, and detachments were allocated for partisan operations.
Having lost sight of the Russian army, Napoleon I sent strong detachments along the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads to search for it.
On September 26 (September 14, old style), the cavalry corps of Marshal Joachim Murat discovered Russian troops in the Podolsk region. Subsequently, Kutuzov secretly (mostly at night) withdrew the army along the Old Kaluga Road to the Nara River.
The skillfully organized and carried out Tarutino maneuver allowed the Russian army to break away from the enemy and occupy an advantageous strategic position, which ensured its preparation for a counter-offensive. As a result of the maneuver, Kutuzov maintained communication with the southern regions of Russia, which made it possible to strengthen the army, cover arms factories in Tula and the supply base in Kaluga, maintain contact with the 3rd Reserve Observation Army of cavalry general Alexander Tormasov and the Danube Army of Admiral Pavel Chichagov.
The Tarutino maneuver demonstrated Kutuzov’s leadership talent and his art of strategic maneuver.
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