The last Soviet decade was marked by the Afghan War (1979-1989). The course of the war, in short, today is not known to every resident of Russia and other countries. In the 90s, due to rapid reforms and economic crises, the Afghan campaign was almost crowded out of public consciousness. But today, when a lot of work has been done by historians and researchers, all ideological clichés have disappeared, and a good opportunity has arisen to take an impartial look at the events of those years.
Prerequisites
In Russia and throughout the post-Soviet space, the Afghan War, briefly speaking, is associated with a ten-year period (1979-1989) when the armed forces of the USSR were present in this country. In fact, this was only one part of a long civil conflict. The prerequisites for its emergence appeared in 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown in Afghanistan. The short-lived regime of Muhammad Daoud came to power. It ceased to exist in 1978, when the Saur (April) revolution took place. After her, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) began to rule the country, which proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
The organization was Marxist, which made it similar to the Soviet Union. Leftist ideology has become dominant in Afghanistan. Just like in the USSR, they began to build socialism there. However, by 1978 the country already existed in conditions of ongoing chaos. Two revolutions, a civil war - all this destroyed stability in the region.
The socialist government was opposed by various forces, but primarily by radical Islamists. They considered members of the PDPA to be enemies of the entire Afghan people and Islam. In essence, (jihad) was declared against the new political regime. Mujahideen detachments were created to fight the infidels. It was with them that the Soviet army fought, for which the Afghan War soon began. Briefly, the success of the Mujahideen can be explained by their skillful propaganda work in the country. For Islamist agitators, the task was made easier by the fact that the vast majority of the Afghan population (about 90%) was illiterate. In the state outside the big cities, tribal orders reigned with extremely patriarchal views of the world. Religion certainly played a significant role in such a society. These were the reasons for the Afghan War. They were briefly described in official Soviet newspapers as providing international assistance to the friendly people of a neighboring country.
No sooner had the PDPA come to power in Kabul than Islamist-fuelled attacks began in the rest of the country’s provinces. The Afghan leadership began to lose control of the situation. Under these conditions, in March 1979, it first turned to Moscow for help. Subsequently, such messages were repeated several more times. There was nowhere else to wait for help from the Marxist party, surrounded by nationalists and Islamists.
For the first time, the issue of providing assistance to Kabul “comrades” was considered in the Kremlin on March 19, 1979. Then Brezhnev spoke out against armed intervention. However, time passed, and the situation at the borders of the USSR became worse. Gradually, members of the Politburo and other senior government officials changed their minds. For example, the Minister of Defense believed that the Afghan war, in short, could pose a threat to Soviet borders.
In September 1979, another coup took place in Afghanistan. This time the leadership in the ruling PDPA party has changed. He became the head of the party and state. Through the KGB, the Soviet Politburo began to receive reports that he was a CIA agent. These reports further influenced the Kremlin to intervene militarily. At the same time, preparations began for the overthrow of Amin. At the suggestion of Yuri Andropov, it was decided to replace Babrak Karmal, who was loyal to the Soviet Union, in his place. This member of the PDPA was at first an important person in the Revolutionary Council. During party purges, he was first sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and then declared a traitor and conspirator. Karmal, who was in exile at that moment, remained abroad. At the same time, he moved to the USSR, becoming a figure on whom the Soviet leadership put their bets.
Making a decision to send troops
On December 12, 1979, it became finally clear that the USSR would begin its own Afghan war. After briefly discussing the latest reservations in the documents, the Kremlin approved the operation to overthrow Amin.
Of course, hardly anyone in Moscow then realized how long this military campaign would drag on. But from the very beginning, the decision to send troops had its opponents. Firstly, Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov did not want this. Secondly, he did not support the decision of the Politburo. This position of his became an additional and decisive reason for the final break with Leonid Brezhnev and his supporters.
Direct preparations for the transfer of the Soviet army to Afghanistan began the next day, December 13. The Soviet special services tried to organize an assassination attempt on Hafizzulu Amin, but the first pancake came out lumpy. The operation hung in the balance. Nevertheless, preparations continued.
Storming of Amin's Palace
The deployment of troops began on December 25. Two days later, Amin, while in his palace, felt ill and lost consciousness. The same thing happened to some of his close associates. The reason for this was poisoning, which was organized by Soviet agents who worked as cooks at the residence. Amin was given medical assistance, but the guards sensed something was wrong.
At seven o'clock in the evening, not far from the palace, a Soviet sabotage group stalled in its car, which stopped near the hatch that led to the distribution center of all Kabul communications. The mine was safely lowered there, and a few minutes later there was an explosion. Kabul was left without electricity.
Thus began the Afghan War (1979-1989). Briefly assessing the situation, the commander of the operation, Colonel Boyarintsev, ordered the assault on Amin’s palace. The Afghan leader himself, having learned about the attack by unknown military personnel, demanded that his entourage ask for help from the Soviet Union (formally, the authorities of the two countries continued to remain friendly to each other). When Amin was informed that USSR special forces were at his gate, he did not believe it. It is not known exactly under what circumstances the head of the PDPA died. Most eyewitnesses later claimed that Amin committed suicide even before Soviet soldiers appeared in his apartment.
One way or another, the operation was successfully carried out. Not only the palace was captured, but the whole of Kabul. On the night of December 28, Karmal arrived in the capital and was declared head of state. The USSR forces lost 20 people (among them were paratroopers and special forces). The commander of the assault, Grigory Boyarintsev, also died. In 1980, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Chronology of the conflict
According to the nature of the fighting and strategic objectives, a brief history of the Afghan War (1979-1989) can be divided into four periods. In the winter of 1979-1980. Soviet troops entered the country. Military personnel were sent to garrisons and important infrastructure facilities.
The second period (1980-1985) was the most active. The fighting took place throughout the country. They were offensive in nature. The Mujahideen were destroyed and the army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was improved.
The third period (1985-1987) is characterized by Soviet aviation and artillery operations. Activities using ground troops were carried out less and less, until they finally came to naught.
The fourth period (1987-1989) was the last. Soviet troops were preparing to withdraw. At the same time, the civil war in the country continued. The Islamists were never completely defeated. The withdrawal of troops was caused by the economic crisis in the USSR and a change in political course.
Continuation of the war
When the Soviet Union first sent its troops into Afghanistan, the country's leadership argued its decision by saying that it was only providing assistance, in accordance with numerous requests from the Afghan government. Following fresh developments, the UN Security Council was convened at the end of 1979. An anti-Soviet resolution prepared by the United States was presented at it. The document was not supported.
The American side, although it did not actually take part in the conflict, actively financed the Mujahideen. The Islamists had weapons purchased from the West. Thus, in fact, the cold confrontation between the two political systems received a new front, which became the Afghan war. The progress of the war was briefly covered in all world media.
The CIA organized several training and educational camps in neighboring Pakistan, in which Afghan Mujahideen (dushmans) were trained. The Islamists, in addition to American funding, received money from the drug trade. In the 80s, this country became the world leader in the production of heroin and opium. Often the goal of Soviet operations was precisely the destruction of these industries.
The causes of the Afghan War (1979-1989), in short, sent a huge mass of the population into confrontation, who had never before held a weapon in their hands. Recruitment into the ranks of dushmans was led by a wide network of agents throughout the country. The advantage of the Mujahideen was that they did not have a specific center. Throughout the armed conflict it was a collection of numerous heterogeneous groups. They were controlled by field commanders, but there was no “leader” among them.
The low effectiveness of guerrilla operations was fully demonstrated by the Afghan War (1979-1989). Brief summaries of many Soviet offensives were mentioned in the media. Many raids were nullified by the enemy’s effective propaganda work among the local population. For the Afghan majority (especially in deep provinces with a patriarchal structure), Soviet military personnel have always been occupiers. The common people did not feel any sympathy for the socialist ideology.
"Politics of National Reconciliation"
In 1987, the implementation of the “policy of national reconciliation” began. At its plenum, the PDPA renounced its monopoly on power. A law appeared that allowed opponents of the government to create their own parties. The country has a new Constitution and a new president, Mohammed Najibullah. All these measures were taken to end the war through compromise and concessions.
At the same time, the Soviet leadership, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, set a course to reduce its own weapons, which meant the withdrawal of troops from the neighboring country. The Afghan war (1979-1989), in short, could not be waged in the conditions of the economic crisis that began in the USSR. In addition, the Cold War was already on its last legs. The USSR and the USA began to agree among themselves by signing numerous documents on disarmament and ending the escalation of the conflict between the two political systems.
Mikhail Gorbachev first announced the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops in December 1987, while on an official visit to the United States. Soon after this, the Soviet, American and Afghan delegations sat down at the negotiating table in Geneva, Switzerland. On April 14, 1988, following the results of their work, program documents were signed. Thus the history of the Afghan War came to an end. Briefly, we can say that according to the Geneva agreements, the Soviet leadership promised to withdraw its troops, and the American leadership promised to stop funding opponents of the PDPA.
Half of the USSR military contingent left the country in August 1988. In the summer, important garrisons were left in Kandahar, Gradez, Faizabad, Kundduz and other cities and settlements. The last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan on February 15, 1989 was Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. The whole world saw footage of how the military crossed and crossed the Friendship Bridge across the border river Amu Darya.
Losses
Many events of the Soviet years were subject to a one-sided communist assessment. Among them was the history of the Afghan war. Dry reports briefly appeared in newspapers, and television talked about the continued successes of internationalist soldiers. However, until the start of Perestroika and the announcement of the policy of glasnost, the USSR authorities tried to keep silent about the true scale of their irretrievable losses. Zinc coffins containing conscripts and privates returned to the Soviet Union semi-secretly. The soldiers were buried without publicity, and for a long time there was no mention of the place and cause of death on the monuments. A stable image of “cargo 200” appeared among the people.
Only in 1989, the Pravda newspaper published real data on losses - 13,835 people. By the end of the 20th century, this figure reached 15 thousand, since many military personnel died in their homeland for several years due to injuries and illnesses. These were the real consequences of the Afghan war. Briefly mentioning her losses only further intensified her conflict with society. By the end of the 80s, the demand to withdraw troops from the neighboring country became one of the main slogans of Perestroika. Even earlier (under Brezhnev) dissidents advocated this. For example, in 1980, the famous academician Andrei Sakharov was sent into exile in Gorky for his criticism of the “solution to the Afghan issue.”
Results
What are the results of the Afghan war? In short, Soviet intervention extended the life of the PDPA exactly for the period for which USSR troops remained in the country. After their withdrawal, the regime suffered agony. Mujahideen groups quickly regained their own control over Afghanistan. Islamists even appeared at the borders of the USSR. Soviet border guards had to endure enemy shelling after the troops left the country.
The status quo was broken. In April 1992, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was finally liquidated by Islamists. Complete chaos began in the country. It was divided by numerous factions. The war of all against all continued there until the invasion of NATO troops at the beginning of the 21st century. In the 90s, the Taliban movement appeared in the country, which became one of the leading forces of modern world terrorism.
In the mass post-Soviet consciousness, the Afghan war became one of the most important symbols of the 80s. Briefly for school, today they talk about it in history textbooks for grades 9 and 11. Numerous works of art are dedicated to the war - songs, films, books. Assessments of its results vary, although at the end of the USSR the majority of the population, according to sociological surveys, were in favor of withdrawing troops and ending the senseless war.
The fighting of the Mujahideen against Soviet soldiers was particularly brutal. For example, the authors of the book “Battles that Changed the Course of History: 1945-2004” make the following calculations. Since opponents considered the Russians to be “interventionists and occupiers,” when counting those killed, about 5 thousand per year—13 people died per day in the Afghan war. There were 180 military camps in Afghanistan, 788 battalion commanders took part in military operations. On average, one commander served in Afghanistan for 2 years, therefore, in less than 10 years, the number of commanders changed 5 times. If you divide the number of battalion commanders by 5, you get 157 combat battalions in 180 military camps.
1 battalion – no less than 500 people. If we multiply the number of towns by the number of one battalion, we get 78,500 thousand people. Troops fighting the enemy need a rear. The auxiliary units include those who transport ammunition, replenish provisions, guard roads, military camps, treat the wounded, and so on. The ratio is approximately three to one, meaning another 235,500 thousand people were in Afghanistan per year. Adding the two numbers, we get 314,000 people.
According to this calculation by the authors of “Battles that Changed the Course of History: 1945-2004”, over 9 years and 64 days, a total of at least 3 million people took part in military operations in Afghanistan! Which seems like absolute fantasy. Approximately 800 thousand participated in active hostilities. The losses of the USSR were at least 460,000 people, of which 50,000 were killed, 180,000 were wounded, 100,000 were blown up by mines, about 1,000 people are listed as missing, more than 200,000 people were infected with serious diseases (jaundice, typhoid fever). These numbers show that the data in the newspapers is underestimated by a factor of 10.
It must be admitted that both the official data on losses and the figures given by individual researchers (probably biased) are unlikely to correspond to reality.
And the republican system was established. This was the impetus for the start of the civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces in the country.
In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty destruction of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, strengthened the population's resistance to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, and NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.
By the end of 1979, the situation in the country had become sharply complicated, and the threat of overthrowing the ruling regime loomed. In this regard, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send military units to the country. The Soviet side initially rejected this form of intervention, but, in the context of the worsening Afghan crisis, on December 12, 1979, the leadership of the USSR, fearing the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Central Asian republics, decided to send troops to provide military assistance to the government of Afghanistan. The decision was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation", concluded on December 5, 1978, and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was considered by the political leadership of the USSR as a short-term measure aimed at ensuring the security of the southern borders of the Soviet Union.
The main task of the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) was to create a “cordon sanitaire” at the borders of the USSR in the face of the looming threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on the territory of the Soviet Muslim republics.
On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the field administration of the 40th Army from the administration of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) and its complete mobilization. The first deputy commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yuri Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army. Formations and units of the 40th Army were fully mobilized 10-12 days before entry.
The commissioning and deployment of OKSV in the DRA began on December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into Afghanistan.
Subsequently, the combat strength of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly updated in order to strengthen it. The largest number of OKSV (1985) was 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four front-line regiments and two army aviation regiments, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and divisions.
The general management of OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, and since 1985 - Army General Valentin Varennikov. Direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, subordinate to the command of the TurkVO troops.
Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, and roads vital for the country, and carried out transport convoys with cargo through the territory under the control of the armed opposition.
To reduce the military activity of the opposition, OKSV conducted active military operations of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and carried out air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR, Soviet troops, in response to numerous attacks on their garrisons and transport columns by opposition units, began to carry out military operations together with Afghan units to search for and eliminate the most aggressive armed groups of the enemy. Thus, the Soviet troops brought into Afghanistan found themselves involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, to whom Pakistan provided the greatest assistance.
The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.
Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of protection of deployment points and various objects.
Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.
3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.
Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.
Even after sending troops to Afghanistan, the USSR continued to look for opportunities for a political resolution of the intra-Afghan conflict. Since August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, and since April 1986, to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.
On April 14, 1988, in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, the obligations of which were assumed by the USSR and the USA. Deadlines for the withdrawal of Soviet troops were set: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the remaining units - after another six months.
On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which was completed on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.
About 620 thousand military personnel completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525.2 thousand people in the OKSV.
The losses of the 40th Army personnel were: killed and killed - 13,833 people, including 1,979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the fighting on the territory of Afghanistan, in addition, 572 military personnel of state security agencies, 28 employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers, were killed. Due to injuries, 172 officers stopped serving in the Armed Forces. 6,669 Afghans became disabled, including 1,479 people disabled in the first group.
For military and other merits, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.
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The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the Cold War, which provoked a crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15 thousand Soviet military personnel, the appearance of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, aggravated the already severe socio-economic crisis in which the Soviet Union found itself in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military expenditures exorbitant for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.
The true causes of the war lay in the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, and the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth due to the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.
In the region, from the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which in abundance began to spread everywhere. The political divide in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow mistakenly imagined, but along religious lines.
The introduction of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States, as the arena of some kind of “big” zero-sum superpower game.
The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow’s lack of understanding of its national interests, an incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in its own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, and political myopia.
In Afghanistan, the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy with the real state of affairs in the world was revealed.
The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by increased instability in the Middle East, which was a consequence of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. The year 1979 turned out to be especially turbulent: the leader of the Arab world, Egypt, concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes a storm of indignation in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a reason for an armed conflict and finds it in the war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (the elder), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya, under the leadership of Gaddafi, sponsors various terrorist groups; The center-left government in Turkey resigns.
The situation in peripheral Afghanistan is also becoming radicalized. In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a “client” of the USSR in anticipation of financial, economic and military assistance.
The Soviet Union has had good, even excellent relations with Afghanistan since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. In all the decades that have passed since then, one cannot find any mention of Afghanistan in a negative context in Soviet history. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West tacitly recognized this fact and was never interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from monarchy to republic in 1973 as a result of a palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.
The April “revolution” of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. The leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many of the participants in the coup were well known in Moscow - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) closely communicated and worked with them.
It seemed that Moscow had lost nothing from the regime change. However, the “socialists” repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures caused resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the “socialists” steadily narrowed. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began sending groups of their military personnel in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as supporting the opposition with weapons. China has shown activity. At the same time, the historical and previously existing contradictions between the leaders of the “socialists” intensified.
As a result, just a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more of the 34 provinces remained under its control.
March 18, 1979 Taraki, in a long telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin, explains the current situation and persistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. In every word of Taraki one can see despair, a consciousness of hopelessness. He returns every question from the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send in troops.
For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin is perplexed as to why you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin’s naive, ideologically driven proposals to rely on the “workers,” Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet prime minister proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls the several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.
Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told almost the same thing to the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov.
On the same day, Kosygin informs his Politburo colleagues about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly common-sense considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean a war with the population. It seems that there is a reason to review or at least adjust the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, etc. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin proposed to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send in troops. Then the question had to be answered: what to do in the event of the imminent fall of the regime, which is what the regime itself warns about? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of wait-and-see and situational decisions. There is no strategy.
Three groups are gradually being identified in the Politburo: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The sick Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on the problems that need to be solved. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making relevant decisions.
Throughout the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increased pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help with troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.
By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, was heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin occurs in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power and removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.
Since then, Moscow has set itself the goal of eliminating Amin, whom it does not trust, bringing “its” man, Karmal, to power and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these in themselves reasonable actions, but carried out without coordination and secretly from the Soviet side, are viewed as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to remove Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.
Around October-November, issues of a special operation by Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, the cover for which should be a second, parallel and subordinate operation to the first operation of introducing a “limited” contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with Amin’s support among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin, were replaced with new ones.
By December 1, the work on the issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note to this effect. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the deployment of troops is made.
Before the final decision was made, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov, actively resisted him. It came to the point of his open clashes and wrangling in raised voices with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the terrain, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and large losses, that these actions would weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.
The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border or crossing the border either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was removed and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. Troops gradually began to be brought in - more and more.
The conflict grew at a tremendous pace. And already at the beginning of December 1979, the authorities decided to send in Soviet troops, allegedly based on contractual relations providing for good neighborliness and mutual assistance. The official reason for making such a decision was the desire to help friendly people. But was it really so? The Soviet leadership feared that the coming to power of Islamic radicals with an anti-Soviet attitude would lead to a complete loss of control over the southern borders. Pakistan, whose political regime at that time was largely supervised by the US authorities, also caused concern. Thus, the territory of Afghanistan served as a “layer” between the USSR and Pakistan. And the loss of control over Afghan territory could provoke a serious weakening of state borders. That is, friendly mutual assistance was just a cover under which the Soviet government skillfully hid the true motive of its actions.
On December 25, Soviet troops entered Afghan territory, initially small units. No one expected that hostilities would drag on for a decade. In addition to military support, the leadership pursued the goal of eliminating Amin, the then-current leader of the PDPA, and replacing him with Karmal, who was close to the Soviet regime. Thus, the Soviet authorities planned to completely regain control over Afghan territory.