Who in a year will take an active part in the war against yesterday’s “ally”. In November 1994, they will burn out Russian tanks on the streets of Grozny, recklessly loaned to the anti-Dudaev opposition along with their crews. And in August 1996, Basayev will carry out the “Sukhumi remake”, recapturing the Chechen capital from the federal group and forcing the Kremlin to negotiate with Aslan Maskhadov.
The “boomerang of separatism” sent by the Kremlin in a southern direction quickly returned and dealt a crushing blow to the Russian North Caucasus.
15 years ago, on August 14, 1992, the Georgian-Abkhaz war began. The attempt of the Chairman of the State Council of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze to stop the collapse of his own country by force encountered fierce resistance, and not only from Abkhaz separatists. During the conflict, the so-called militants took the side of the latter. Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus (hereinafter referred to as CNK) and representatives of the Cossacks.
Publication date: 08/19/2007 11:49
http://voinenet.ru/index.php?aid=12540.
The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is one of the most acute interethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Tensions between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz autonomy appeared periodically during the Soviet period. The fact is that when the USSR was created in 1922, Abkhazia had the status of a so-called treaty republic - it signed the treaty on the creation of the USSR. In 1931, the “treaty” Abkhaz SSR was transformed into an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. After this, the “Georgianization” of the republic began: in 1935, license plates of the same series as in Georgia were introduced, a year later, geographical names were modified in the Georgian way, and the Abkhaz alphabet was made based on Georgian graphics.
Until 1950, the Abkhaz language was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by compulsory study of the Georgian language. In addition, Abkhazians were prohibited from studying in Russian schools, and Russian sectors in Sukhumi institutes were closed. Signs in the Abkhaz language were banned, and radio broadcasting in the native language of the region's residents was stopped. All paperwork was translated into Georgian.
The migration policy, which began under the auspices of Lavrentiy Beria, reduced the share of Abkhazians in the total population of the republic (by the beginning of the 1990s it was only 17%). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians that were freed after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949.
Mass protests and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and the largest in May and September 1978.
The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), a 30,000-strong gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and restore it to the status of a union republic.
The Lykhny Declaration caused sharp protests from the Georgian population. On March 20, mass rallies began, which took place both in the regions of Georgia and in the cities and villages of Abkhazia. The culmination was a multi-day unauthorized rally in front of the Government House in Tbilisi - it began on April 4, and on April 9 it was dispersed by the use of troops, while in the resulting stampede about 20 people died, more than 250 were injured and injured, and 189 military personnel were also injured.
On July 15-16, 1989, bloody clashes took place between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi. The riots reportedly killed 16 people and injured about 140. Troops were used to stop the unrest. The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during the period Zviad Gamsakhurdia was in power in Tbilisi.
On February 21, 1992, the ruling Military Council of Georgia announced the abolition of the 1978 Constitution of the Georgian SSR and the restoration of the 1921 Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic.
The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet Constitution of Georgia as the actual abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic (with a boycott of the session by Georgian deputies) restored the Constitution of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic of 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state (this decision The Supreme Council of Abkhazia was not recognized internationally).
On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which escalated into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The military phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict began with the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of liberating Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, and protecting communications, incl. railway, and other important objects. This move provoked fierce resistance from Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic communities of Abkhazia.
The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over Abkhazia, which it viewed as an integral part of Georgian territory. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and, ultimately, gain independence.
On the part of the central government were the National Guard, volunteer formations and individual volunteers, on the part of the Abkhaz leadership - the armed formations of the non-Georgian population of the autonomy and volunteers (who arrived from the North Caucasus, as well as Russian Cossacks).
On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze signed a document providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.
By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993 hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, which was occupied by Georgian troops.
On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an Agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.
At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely abandon Abkhazia.
The armed conflict of 1992-1993, according to the data released by the parties, claimed the lives of 4 thousand Georgians (another 1 thousand were missing) and 4 thousand Abkhazians. The autonomy's economic losses amounted to $10.7 billion. About 250 thousand Georgians (almost half the population) were forced to flee Abkhazia.
On May 14, 1994, in Moscow, an Agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces was signed between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides through the mediation of Russia. Based on this document and the subsequent decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were deployed in the conflict zone since June 1994, whose task was to maintain the regime of non-renewal of fire. These forces were entirely staffed by Russian military personnel.
On April 2, 2002, the Georgian-Abkhaz protocol was signed, according to which Russian peacekeepers and UN military observers were entrusted with patrolling the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (the territory of Abkhazia controlled at that time by Georgia).
On July 25, 2006, units of the Georgian armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (up to 1.5 thousand people) were introduced into the Kodori Gorge to conduct a special operation against local armed Svan formations (“militia” or the “Monadire” battalion) of Emzar Kvitsiani, who refused to obey the demands of the Minister of Defense Georgia's Irakli Okruashvili to lay down his arms. Kvitsiani is accused of “treason.”
Official negotiations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi were subsequently interrupted. As the Abkhaz authorities emphasized, negotiations between the parties can only resume if Georgia begins to implement the UN Security Council Resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of troops from Kodori.
In the summer-autumn of 2006, Georgia regained control over the Kodori Gorge. On September 27, 2006, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, by decree of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia. In the village of Chkhalta, on the territory of the gorge, the so-called “legitimate government of Abkhazia” in exile was located.
On October 18, 2006, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia appealed to the Russian leadership with a request to recognize the independence of the republic and establish associated relations between the two states. For its part, the Russian leadership has repeatedly stated its unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is an integral part.
On August 9, 2008, after Georgian troops attacked South Ossetia, Abkhazia launched a military operation to oust Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge. On August 12, the Abkhaz army entered the upper part of the Kodori Gorge and surrounded the Georgian troops. Georgian formations were completely ousted from Abkhaz territory.
On August 26, 2008, after Georgia's military operation in South Ossetia, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia.
STORIES OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE OPERATION IN THE KODORI GORGE
The participants in the operation recall the officers of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Abkhazia, Major Nodar Avidzba and Senior Lieutenant Daut Nanba:
“We boarded the Mi-8 landing transport helicopters at 10:20 a.m. on August 12, 2008. Our fire group consisted of 15 people. In total, 87 military personnel from various brigade tactical groups of our armed forces took part in the landing. Each group was assigned a landing point and a target to attack. Our group included two sappers, two snipers, two machine gunners with RPK and PC, one grenade launcher with RPG-7. In addition, each soldier who was part of the group had a disposable RPG-26 “Mukha” grenade launcher.
The flight time to the target was three minutes. Already upon landing at the Svan settlement of Chhal-ta, it was clear that the Georgians were in panic and confusion. They abandoned everything and ran towards the border with Georgia. Having joined the assault group after landing, together, consisting of 25 people, we examined the entire village and the surrounding area for three hours. During the inspection, a stone road bridge across one of the mountain rivers was cleared of mines. A Georgian observation post discovered near the village was opened fire from small arms and a grenade launcher, completely blowing it to smithereens.
After this, they began to advance to the settlement of Azhara, located seven kilometers east of Chkhalta. We advanced to Azhara on foot, simultaneously conducting reconnaissance and inspecting the area adjacent to the road. At every step there were abandoned weapons. In particular, 5.56 mm Bushmaster assault rifles made in the USA (apparently, we are talking about the XM15E2 automatic carbine, developed on the basis of the M4), shots for the RPG-7 grenade launcher, abandoned brand new Hunter cars, three-axle KamAZ trucks, tractor-graders, French Renault ambulances, American-made snowmobiles and ATVs. NATO uniforms and ammunition were lying around everywhere. The names of Georgian military personnel on the tags are in English. There were a lot of documents thrown away in a hurry, NATO instructions for conducting classes.
By 16:00 we reached Azhara. It was quiet. At the entrance to the mountain village we were met by the clergyman of the local church. During the conversation with him, it turned out that a hundred meters from the church building there is a house in which the Georgians left an ammunition depot. During the retreat they wanted to blow it up, but did not have time. During a thorough inspection of the house, sappers discovered many 82 mm mortar shells, as well as 60 mm mortar shells made in the United States. In each room there was a box of TNT blocks with detonators. A field wire 30 meters long ran from the house towards the forest. All this was neutralized. Also in Azhar, during the inspection, they found a warehouse of ammunition for artillery and small arms destroyed by an air strike. In this settlement, the Georgians left a large warehouse of fuels and lubricants. Here we captured a fully deployed military hospital with a significant supply of medicines. It took exactly an hour to explore Azhara.
Further, by order of the commander of the Kodori direction, Major General Law Nanba (he is the first deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Abkhazia - commander of the ground forces), we began moving from Azhara to Gentsvish. After the whole day, of course, we were quite tired, since we had been walking since the landing from the helicopter. Therefore, we decided to drive captured cars. We got from Azhara to Genzwish in 30 minutes. The Georgians were nowhere to be found. Already in Azhar, and then in Genzwish, our group was joined by paratroopers, special forces and scouts from other groups and assault units.
Around half past five in the evening we reached the village of Saken. Local residents were not visible throughout the entire movement from Chkhalta to the very border with Georgia, located 10 kilometers from Saken. They, as it turned out later, were hiding. These are mainly women, old people and children. The Svan men left with the Georgians behind the cordon. Already at about half past eight in the evening we reached the foot of the Khida pass, where the border with Georgia passed. With this we have completed our task. There were no fights, as the Georgians simply ran away.”
The chief of staff of the intelligence department of the general staff of the armed forces of the Republic of Abkhazia, Colonel Sergei Arshba, a 1983 graduate of the Lvov Higher Military-Political School, says:
“Yes, the Georgians were thoroughly preparing for the offensive operation code-named “Skala”. We managed to capture as trophies tens of thousands of artillery shells, mortar shells, dozens of guns, mortars, communications equipment compatible with NATO systems, GPS space navigation receivers, thermal imagers, the latest Western-made night vision devices, and military equipment.
The Pentagon and NATO structures were thoroughly preparing the operation to seize Abkhazia, as well as South Ossetia. We managed to find out all this both through intelligence and from captured documents. The Georgians were only puppets in their hands. If Russia had given in to them here too, then these dashing guys from Washington and Brussels would not have stopped there. They would have climbed further into the North Caucasus, primarily into Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. The situation there is already explosive. There are also difficulties in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. Abkhazia directly borders on these two subjects of the Russian Federation. If the Americans and their henchmen had managed to carry out their plans, no one would have cared enough. They have one goal - to seize natural resources, which, by the way, are rich in both Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus. First of all, these are oil, gas and other strategic raw materials.
That’s why they armed and trained the Georgians according to their own patterns. They just didn’t take into account the mentality and morale of those being trained and armed.
The result is known - by the end of the day on August 12, 2008, units and units of the armed forces of the Republic of Abkhazia along the entire length from the junction of the borders of Russia and Abkhazia with Georgia from the Main Caucasus Range in the areas of Southern Priyut, the Khida, Kalamri-Suki passes in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge reached the line at which the operation to capture the Upper Kodori was completely completed.
There were no contact battles with Georgian troops, except for reconnaissance in force on August 10, 2008, during the entire operation. The artillery and aviation did a good job, delivering precise strikes on identified targets. Here we should also note the good work of reconnaissance officers, artillery fire spotters and aircraft gunners.
Of course, in the conditions of mountainous, wooded terrain and highlands, it was difficult to conduct overhead fire to hit point targets with heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. The artillerymen several times asked the reconnaissance officers and the artillery spotters with them for updated coordinates of the targets being hit. But thanks to the filigree work of the artillerymen and pilots, not a single building in the area, except for those objects that were struck, was damaged.
According to radio interception data, at 21:00 on August 11, 2008, the radio network of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Upper Koderi ceased to exist. From 3:50 a.m. on August 12, 2008, the group of security forces of the Republic of Georgia in Upper Koderi also ceased to exist.”
According to Colonel Sergei Arshba, who oversees special operations with the participation of special forces, the enemy, having entered the upper part of the Kodori Gorge at the end of July 2006, also captured the Marukhsky, Klukhorsky, Naharsky passes and a number of others along the Main Caucasian ridge along the state border with Russia in its Abkhazian section with a total length of 50-60 kilometers. And he “placed” special forces and intelligence units on them. The Abkhazians held the Adange pass and all the rest towards Krasnaya Polyana, Adler and Sochi. On the northern slopes of the Russian Federation, the state border with Georgia was guarded by Russian border guards. They were reinforced with airborne assault maneuver groups from the directorates of the Border Service of the FSB of Russia in Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, the directorates of the Border Service of the FSB of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District, as well as army special forces from the North Caucasus Military District.
According to Abkhaz military intelligence, at the above-mentioned passes and in Southern Priyut, where there was a base camp for the special forces of the Georgian Armed Forces, there was a regular rotation of special forces and intelligence units. Moreover, the regular “guests” there were American, Israeli, French, Turkish “specialists” and sabotage and intelligence specialists from other NATO states and countries friendly to them. I think it’s easy to guess what they were doing there.
Sergei Arshba recalls the following incident: “We were sitting in ambush on a slope near one of the passes. I saw Georgian special forces walking along the path in NATO camouflage. And ahead of the “students” are stomping... who do you think? That's right - Americans, blacks. They confidently walk towards the Main Caucasus Range, where the border with Russia lies. And not just one or two, but a whole group of “comrades” from overseas. Well, I think we’ll hit them now. Contacted higher command. Unfortunately, I received an order to let us through, although they were 5-6 meters away from us. We would put them all in a row...
And all this special forces “lads” from different foreign countries constantly “hanged out” in this area, as if it were smeared with honey there. Moreover, helipads and special forces bases were openly equipped. Apparently, they were preparing not only for actions against Abkhazia, but also, possibly, against Russia. Abkhaz fighters on territory recaptured from the Georgians. There is a flag of Abkhazia on the building.
And in August 2008, they fled from the passes as best they could. Some were filmed from a height of 2500 meters by helicopters, and some descended on their own along paths and glaciers towards Georgia. But these bastards gave us a lot of “gifts” in the form of minefields, and very sophisticated ones at that. I have already lost six experienced special forces soldiers there. Therefore, the passes where the Georgians and their friends from the West gathered together are impassable, there are mines everywhere.”
According to Sergei Arshba, the depth of the operation from the initial line in the Kuabchar area to the border with Georgia was 50 kilometers, and from the Adange pass area to the Khida and Kalamri-Suki passes - about 70 kilometers.
It took a long time for the Abkhaz military to remove everything that the Georgians left behind when fleeing the Upper Kodori. There were not enough trucks for such a volume of trophies, and the capacity of the broken roads in the Kodori Gorge was not enough. As Colonel S. Arshba noted, it is clear from the reserves created by the Georgian side that they expected to fight long and stubbornly.
The Georgians even managed, probably with the help of their friends from abroad, to drag heavy guns and mortars, as well as multiple launch rocket systems, onto mountain peaks and pass points. “We still cannot understand,” said Sergei Arshba, “how they managed to do this in high altitude conditions.” From there, as if in a shooting range, they could freely shoot for tens of kilometers the entire defense of the Abkhaz army and its supply routes.
Moreover, it must be said that during the two years of ownership of the Upper Kodori, the Georgian military, with the help of money allocated by foreign sponsors, built an excellent road there, part of which was asphalted, and part had a gravel surface. Through communications Tsebelda - Azhar - Upper Kodori, the enemy could freely transfer various forces and means to the battlefield. Road bridges over the mountain rivers Kodor, Chkhalta, Gvandra, Klych and others were permanent, that is, made of stone. Heavy equipment, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, etc. could move along them. The Georgians could increase their grouping with manpower, weapons and military equipment at any time.
In their rapid flight, the Georgians did not have time to blow up bridges across mountain rivers behind them, although explosives were placed under their foundations. Abkhaz sappers, moving forward, neutralized dangerous finds in time and preserved bridge crossings across rivers.
And one more point that Colonel S. Arshba drew attention to. The Georgians, with the help of the Americans, were able to quickly form brigades of reservists in preparation for and during the fighting in South Ossetia and transfer them to the areas where the fighting was taking place. Another thing is that they had low combat effectiveness and low morale. But the very fact that they were quickly put together and brought into battle speaks volumes. Here, the experience of units of the US National Guard - the strategic reserve of the American armed forces - was used to the fullest. In a good situation for the Georgians, if they, with the help of overseas friends, managed to create a combat-ready reserve, both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the defenders of these republics, and even the Russian military, would have a hard time. Moreover, in Georgia the mobilization reserve is significant. Fighting on both sides could then become fierce and protracted. And it is unknown which side would prevail. It is necessary to draw certain conclusions from what happened. Moreover, the Georgians have not calmed down and will not calm down. The events of recent months show that they, too, have drawn certain conclusions from the short war. And now they will prepare more thoroughly for revenge, using foreign military and economic assistance.
In many ways, the positive results of the operation in the Upper Kodori were influenced by the fact that units of the Russian Armed Forces prevented Saakashvili from intensifying his actions to launch attacks on Abkhazia.
V. Anzin, “Soldier of Fortune”, 2009
The magnolia flower is perfect. Refined and strict, snow-white and modest - without the bright multicolored colors characteristic of the subtropics, full of purity and dignity. Such a flower is worthy only of a bride. Abkhazian bride, of course! Do you know the Abkhazian wedding - when a thousand people of relatives and neighbors gather!? When half the city is raising its ears: who is putting firewood under huge cauldrons, who is slaughtering bulls, who is building tables and tents - knocking, roaring, roaring. And then a holiday, a feast, and all the men took turns using a liter feast horn - for a new family, for new lives! For the harvest, for the vine! For the ancestral mountains, visible from everywhere in Abkhazia! Pour: here is “Psou” - a white semi-sweet dessert, you don’t have to have a snack, although the grape churchkhela is lying next to it on the plate; but “Chegem” is red and so dry, only for its fragrant juicy shish kebab. Here in the glass “Amra” (in Abkhazian - sun) sparkles with purple reflections, and when drinking songs begin, all other sounds will fade away. The friendly Caucasian polyphony will be heard by luxurious thickets of magnolia, tall arrogant eucalyptus trees, gorgeous spreading palm trees, twisted impudent vines, ready to burst right into the house. Abkhazia is Apsny in Abkhazian, a country of the soul. The country that God left for himself, distributing all the lands to different tribes and peoples. And when the Abkhazians arrived late, God didn’t even ask them where they were? Of course, guests were welcomed again. I had to give them this fertile land, and go to the heavenly distances myself. Cocky mountain rivers, noisy as Abkhazian weddings, rush straight into the sea, but calm down immediately, tamed by the immortal power of the world's oceans. And unusual people live here. They sacredly honor traditions and the laws of their ancestors. Proud, strong, intolerant of injustice. Next to the Abkhazians are their good neighbors, the Georgians. They lived side by side for centuries, fighting off the Romans, Arabs, and Turks shoulder to shoulder. They loved the same dishes. Corn porridge - hominy; stewed beans - “lobio” in Georgian, and “akud” in Abkhazian; khachapur and khachapuri, satsivi and achapu. But in hospitality, will a Georgian yield to an Abkhaz?! Millions of vacationers in the Soviet Union fell in love with the magnificent Abkhazia, and came there again and again: to Ritsa, to the waterfalls, to the New Athos Monastery, languid Gagra, fragrant boxwood Pitsunda with its clear water off the coast, and, of course, Sukhum. However, Sukhum is Abkhazian. In Georgian it will be Sukhumi.
Plague
On August 14, 1992, when the midday heat reached its peak, a helicopter appeared over the beaches of Sukhumi, colorful with pampered tourists. People began to turn their heads in his direction, and first saw lights flickering near the body of the rotorcraft. Only a moment later a lead hail hit them. And from the east we could already hear the roar of tanks bursting into the serene city. These were parts of the so-called “guard” of the State Council of Georgia, as well as thousands of armed volunteers, thoroughly imbued with a nationalist and criminal spirit, under the command of the “godfathers” Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani. Under the general leadership of the President of Georgia Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze. In the future, the author will call them “Georgian forces.” It could be shorter - “guardsmen”.
S.B. Zantaria (Sukhum, Frunze St., 36-27) testifies:
- State Council soldiers broke the door and entered, allegedly to seize weapons. At this time I had my sister Vasilisa and ex-husband Ustyan V.A. They began to demand money and insult me. After drinking alcohol, they robbed the apartment, took away the sister and Ustyan V.A. The sister was bullied and raped, Ustyan was beaten, and then killed. They robbed everyone, took them indiscriminately, caught girls and women, raped them... What they did is impossible to describe...
Testified by L.Sh. Aiba (Sukhum, Dzhikia St., 32):
- At night, my neighbor Dzhemal Rekhviashvili called me outside, saying: “Don’t be afraid, I’m your neighbor, come out.” As soon as I came out, they hit me on the head, then they dragged me into the house and began to search me. Everything in the house was turned over and all valuables were taken. Then they took me to the depot area, where they beat me between the cars, demanding a machine gun and three million money... Then they went to the police, where they said that they had found a grenade on me and showed me one of their grenades. Then they put me in a cell. They periodically tortured me with electric shock and beat me. Once a day they gave us a bowl of food, and they often spat into this bowl in front of our eyes. When the Georgians had setbacks at the front, they burst into the cell and beat everyone in it...
Z.Kh. Nachkebia (Sukhum) testifies:
- 5 “guards” came, one of them put my grandson Ruslan against the wall and said that he had come to kill. Another approached my two-year-old granddaughter Lyada Dzhopua, lying in her crib, and put a knife to her throat. The girl said to herself: “Lyada, don’t cry, my uncle is good, he won’t kill you.” Ruslan’s mother, Sveta, began to beg not to kill her son, saying: “I won’t bear his death.” One “guardsman” said: “Hang yourself, then we won’t kill our son.” The neighbors arrived, and Ruslan’s mother ran out of the room. Soon they went to look for her and found her in the basement. She was hanging on a rope and was already dead. The “guards,” seeing this, said: “Bury her today, and tomorrow we will come to kill you.”
B.A. Inapha testifies:
- The “guards” hit me, tied me up, took me to the river, took me into the water and started shooting next to me and asking questions about what kind of weapons the Abkhazians had. Then they started demanding 3 million. After the beating, I lost consciousness. I woke up in the room. Having found an iron, they undressed me and began to torture me with a hot iron. They bullied me until the morning; in the morning their replacement came and started beating me again and demanding a million. Then they took me out into the yard, handcuffed me, started cutting up chickens and injecting me with morphine. In the evening of the same day, I was able to escape, ended up with the Armenians, who treated my wounds, cut my handcuffs, fed me, let me spend the night, and in the morning showed me the way to the city.
There is no one in the city of Ochamchira who speaks Abkhazian. They can kill you just for speaking. The bodies of Abkhazians with signs of terrible torture and with separated body parts end up in the district hospital. There have been cases of scalping and skinning living people. Hundreds of people were tortured and brutally killed by fanatics from the “Babu” gang, the leader of which is shown on Georgian television in a white burka as a national hero. The number of Abkhazians living in Ochamchira during the 8 months of the war decreased from 7 thousand to about 100 old men and women, exhausted by torture and abuse. In order to shift the burden of the war onto the Georgian population of Abkhazia, Tbilisi “ideologists” ordered the distribution of weapons to local Georgians. And a certain part of the Georgians began to kill their neighbors, but many, risking their lives, hid the families of the Abkhazians with them, and then helped them escape. About 30% of the Georgian population of the Ochamchira region left Abkhazia so as not to take part in the extermination of the Abkhazians.
V.K. Dopua (Adzyubzha village) testifies:
- On October 6, the “guards”, together with local Georgians, entered the village. Everyone who was found in the houses was driven away. The adults were lined up in front of the tank, the children were put on the tank and everyone was led towards Dranda. Dopua Juliet, tied with ropes to a tank, was dragged along the street. Thus, civilians were used as a barrier from partisan shelling.
The world practically does not know the names of the Abkhazian village of Tamysh and the Armenian Labr, and other villages that were almost completely destroyed by Georgian forces. After E. Shevardnadze came to power in Georgia, the West declared Georgia a “democratic country”, and this was a real indulgence - the forgiveness of all sins. In the West, Eduard Amvrosievich was always listened to attentively and sympathized with his problems. He probably deserved it. Neither in the countries of “civilized democracy” nor in Russia did they focus on the “problems” of the residents of Labra and Tamysh. Meanwhile, the entire Caucasus shuddered from the stories of eyewitnesses.
V.E. Minosyan, a resident of the prosperous village of Labra in the Ochamchira region, where hardworking Armenians lived, whose ancestors fled the Turkish genocide of 1915, testifies:
- It was during the day, about three o'clock. They gathered several families, about 20 people, and forced them to dig a deep hole. Then the elderly, children and women were forced to go down into this pit, and the men were forced to cover them with earth. When the earth became waist-high, the “guards” said: “Bring money, gold, or we’ll bury everyone alive.” The entire village gathered, children, old people, women fell to their knees, begging for mercy. It was a terrible picture. Once again they collected the valuables... only then did they release the almost distraught people.
Eremyan Seysyan, machine operator, testifies:
- The village of Labra was completely destroyed, they were expelled, robbed, everyone was tortured, many were killed and raped. One guy named Kesyan was offered to rape his mother. The collective farmer Sedya was raped by several people in the presence of her husband, as a result of which the latter went crazy. Ustyan Khingal was stripped and forced to dance, while they stabbed her with a knife and shot her with machine guns.
The Svans, a people inhabiting the northeastern regions of Abkhazia and the Kodori Gorge, participated more actively than others in this violence. Georgian tanks, Grads and aircraft eventually razed Labra to the ground, as well as the villages of Tamysh, Kindgi, Merkulu, Pakuash, and Beslakha.
They not only destroyed an entire people, they destroyed the very memory of them. During the occupation, institutes whose developments were world famous were looted: the Sukhumi Physico-Technical Institute, the Institute of Experimental Pathology and Therapy with its famous monkey house. Georgian soldiers released the monkeys from their cages with the words: “Let them run through the streets and chew on the Abkhazians.” The building of the Abkhaz Institute of Language, Literature and History was looted and burned; on November 22, 1992, the Abkhaz State Archive was completely destroyed, where 17 thousand items of storage only in the funds of the ancient period were destroyed. Gasoline was poured into the archive basements and set on fire; The townspeople who tried to extinguish the fire were driven away by shots. The buildings of the printing house, publishing house, base and storage facilities of archaeological expeditions in Sukhum, in the villages of Tamysh and Tsebelda, and the Gagra Historical and Archaeological Museum were looted and burned, where unique collections of ancient artifacts were lost. Professor V. Karzhavin, laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes, a prisoner of the Gulag, died of hunger in Sukhum.
A little history
The Abkhazian kingdom is mentioned in fairly ancient sources no later than the 8th century AD. Moving from one empire to another - Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Russian - the Abkhazians did not lose their national identity. In addition, the conquerors were more interested in the coast, and few people wanted to climb the mountains. But the obstinate nature of the Abkhazians in relation to the conquerors gave rise to such a tragic phenomenon as “Makhajirism” - the forced relocation of the local population from Abkhazia to other places, mainly to the territory of the Ottoman Empire. For many centuries, the Abkhazians and their Georgian neighbors lived peacefully. However, in the 20th century, a new wave of displacement began, now under the Stalin regime. In the early 30s, Abkhazia, as an autonomous republic, was transferred from the Russian SFSR to the Georgian SSR. In 1948, a large number of Greeks, Turks and representatives of other non-indigenous peoples were forcibly resettled from Abkhazia. Georgians began to actively settle in their place. According to the 1886 census, there were 59 thousand Abkhazians in Abkhazia, just over 4 thousand Georgians; according to 1926 data: Abkhazians - 56 thousand, Georgians - 67 thousand, according to 1989: Abkhazians - 93 thousand, Georgians - almost 240 thousand.
The impetus for the conflict was the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Abkhaz Supreme Council, led by its leader Vladislav Ardzinba, demanded that Tbilisi conclude a federal treaty, following the path taken by Russia in building a new federal-type state. This demand caused a wave of indignation among most Georgian politicians of modern times, since they saw Georgia as an exclusively unitary state. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who came to power in Georgia in 1991, called the country’s national minorities nothing more than “Indo-European pigs” and considered them “Georgianized.” Gamsakhurdia’s adventurous policy pushed Georgia into the abyss in all directions, and then organized crime entered the political arena. Criminal authorities T. Kitovani and D. Ioseliani created their own armed formations (Ioseliani’s group was called “Mkhedrioni” - horsemen), and overthrew Gamsakhurdia. And in his place they put Eduard Shevardnadze. And the former Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR agreed. Now the next task was to pacify the excessively “insolent” national borderlands: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A pretext for an attack on Abkhazia was quickly found: supporters of the ousted Zviad Gamsakhurdia settled in the territory of eastern Abkhazia and began to wage a sluggish struggle against the Shevardnadze regime. They also carried out attacks on trains, which took place on the only railway leading to Georgian territory from Russia. On August 12, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia adopted an appeal to the State Council of Georgia, which contained the following lines:
The new Treaty between both states, the need for which the Parliament of Abkhazia has been talking about since August 25, 1990, will clearly define both the terms of reference of each of the republics and the competence of their joint bodies... The conclusion of a Union Treaty between Abkhazia and Georgia is a reliable means of overcoming mutual distrust between our peoples.
However, by that time the Georgian side had received the main thing: Russian weapons sufficient to equip a full-fledged division, including heavy weapons, tanks, and a large amount of ammunition. There is every reason to believe that the then President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin not only armed the aggressor, but also gave him political carte blanche, guaranteeing the non-interference of Russian military units stationed in Abkhazia and Georgia in the conflict. And on August 14, 1992, a Georgian column of armored vehicles, hung with clusters of heavily armed criminals Kitovani and Ioseliani, with the support of aviation (Su-25 and Mi-24), moved to Abkhazia.
War
Georgian forces immediately captured a significant territory of Abkhazia, but were unable to get further than Sukhum. On the Gumista River, which serves as the western border of Sukhum, Abkhaz forces delayed the advance of the aggressor; A few machine guns, hunting rifles, and rubble were used. Craftsmen made hand bombs and landmines by filling various metal cylinders with industrial explosives. Someone came up with the idea of dousing the “guards” with a liquid intended to destroy tangerine pests. Hot Abkhaz guys jumped on enemy armored vehicles on the move, blinded the observation devices with capes, destroyed the crew and shouted to their own: “Who will be the tank driver?” So the Abkhaz forces gradually acquired their own tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, painted over them with inscriptions in Georgian, and wrote their slogans in Abkhazian. The whole of Abkhazia, for 200 km from the border with Russia to the border with Georgia, is connected by almost a single road running along the sea. In addition, this entire road runs along mountain slopes, densely covered with forest. Naturally, this made the task of the Abkhaz militia forces defending and waging a guerrilla war in the occupied eastern regions easier. Enraged by the fierce resistance of the Abkhazians, the commander of the Georgian forces, G. Karkarashvili, spoke on Sukhumi television on August 27, 1992 and declared that “... I am ready to sacrifice 100 thousand Georgians for the destruction of 98 thousand Abkhazians.” In the same speech, he stated that he had given an order to the troops not to take prisoners.
A few days after the invasion began, Georgian forces landed an amphibious assault in the Gagra area. Well-armed guards quickly took control of a significant territory and distributed the weapons they brought with them to local Georgians. Now the Abkhaz forces were sandwiched between two groupings of Georgian forces: Sukhumi and Gagra.
The situation seemed hopeless. There are no weapons or ammunition, in the east there is an enemy, in the west there is an enemy, at sea there are Georgian boats and ships, in the north there is the impenetrable Caucasus ridge. But then a new factor entered the arena, not material - spiritual. Perhaps a suitable name for it would be “a just war for liberation.” The atrocities committed by the aggressor in the occupied territories caused mass outrage not only in Abkhazia itself. Volunteers from the republics of the North Caucasus reached Abkhazia through difficult mountain passes: Adygs, Kabardians, Chechens, representatives of many other Caucasian nationalities, and... Russians. A thin trickle of weapons also came from Chechnya, which by that time had gained de facto independence, having completely eliminated all federal structures on its territory. Having finally realized that the situation in Abkhazia cannot be called anything other than genocide, Moscow began a “double” game. In words it recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia, but in reality it began to supply weapons to Abkhaz forces from the territories of Russian military units stationed in Abkhazia. At the Abkhaz mountain training bases, strong men with military bearing and Slavic physiognomies appeared, who taught the science of war to the Abkhazians and the volunteers who formed their units. And two months later, the Abkhaz forces took Gagra by storm, reaching the border with Russia along the Psou River. The Russians (mostly Cossacks, many after Transnistria) fought in the so-called “slavbat” - considered one of the most combat-ready units of the Abkhaz forces, and in small groups in different units.
A memorial plaque at the bridge over the Gumista River, there were fierce battles there.
The soldiers of the Armenian battalion fought selflessly and took part in almost all serious operations (before the war there were more than 70 thousand Armenians in Abkhazia). The battalion of “confederates” (volunteers from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus), led by Shamil Basayev, fought skillfully and bravely. It was in his battalion that the poet Alexander Bardodym fought and died, who then wrote the lines that became famous:
The spirit of the nation must be predatory and wise,
Judge of merciless troops,
He hides mother-of-pearl in his pupil like a cobra,
He is a buffalo with a fixed gaze.
In the land where the swords are crimson from blood,
Doesn't look for cowardly solutions.
He is a hawk, counting peaceful men
In the heat of battle.
And his count is as precise as his scope
In an indestructible movement.
The fewer men who choose fear,
The higher the hawk's flight.
The grave of the poet Alexander Bardodym, who fought for the freedom of the Abkhaz people. Under a bouquet of fresh flowers lies a piece of paper with the text of the poem “Spirit of the Nation.”
The fate of the war was sealed. Now weapons came freely to the Abkhazians across the border with Russia, and volunteers also arrived freely, the number of which, however, never exceeded more than one thousand people at the front at a time. The Abkhazians themselves fielded about 7-8 thousand fighters, for a people of 100 thousand this was the maximum. In fact, all men and many women fought. 22-year-old nurse of the Abkhaz militia Liana Topuridze, a student at the Faculty of Biology of the Abkhaz State University, was captured by the “guards” and abused her all day, only to be shot in the evening. The Georgian military, of course, made certain efforts to establish discipline and order in their units; There were many cases when guardsmen, especially older ones, stopped their fellow soldiers who were causing chaos. However, in general the situation was depressing: violence, bullying and atrocities against civilians and prisoners, drunkenness and drug addiction flourished in the Georgian forces. During the period of initial successes, the Georgian side had about 25 thousand fighters at the front, but as they realized the fact that they would have to fight for real, their number steadily decreased. The Georgian people of 4 million actually did not support the war; the atrocities of their own troops were well known in Georgia, so the recruitment of Georgian forces was extremely difficult. We had to recruit those who urgently wanted to fight in Ukraine and other CIS countries, and in March 1993, about 700 Ukrainian militants arrived in Sukhum on 4 planes from Ukraine. A number of fighters from the Baltic states and Russia fought on the Georgian side, but the total number of “foreigners” at the front also did not exceed 1 thousand people. It is interesting that in connection with the end of the war in Transnistria, the liberated forces from the Transnistrian side moved to the war in Abkhazia: only the Ukrainians went to fight for the Georgian forces, and the Russians (Cossacks, mainly) for the Abkhazian ones. Criminals from the Mkhedrioni detachments and the Kitovani police, having collected all the valuables in the controlled territories and transported them to Georgia, began to evaporate before our eyes. It is one thing to torture old people with irons, and quite another to openly fight with the now well-armed Abkhazians. Having besieged the capital from all sides, after a series of heavy battles, Sukhum was taken during the third assault. Shevardnadze, who flew to Sukhum to cheer up his soldiers, was evacuated to Tbilisi from the battle zone on a Russian military helicopter, under the protection of Russian special forces. On September 30, 1993, Abkhaz forces reached the border with Georgia, and this date is celebrated in Abkhazia as Victory Day.
Fighters of the Abkhaz forces: Sukhum is ahead!
Sandwiched between the Caucasus Mountains and Georgian forces, the mining town of Tkvarchal in the eastern zone lasted the entire war - more than 400 days. Georgian forces were unable to take it, despite repeated artillery and airstrikes and a carefully orchestrated blockade. Angry "guardsmen" shot down a Russian helicopter that was evacuating women and children from Tkvarchal to Gudauta - more than 60 people burned alive in a huge fire. The people of Tkvarchal - Abkhazians, Russians, Georgians - died of hunger right on the streets, as in besieged Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War, but they never surrendered. And it is no coincidence that today in Abkhazia they call that war of 1992-1993. - Domestic. The total irretrievable losses of all parties in it are approximately estimated at 10 thousand people. Almost all Georgians left Abkhazia, almost all Russians left. There are more Armenians left. As a result, the population fell by about two-thirds. There were facts of massacres of the Georgian civilian population committed by some of the Abkhazians and “Confederates”. The Chechens began to practice techniques such as cutting the throats of prisoners at that time. However, the Georgian side did not stand on ceremony with the prisoners. In fact, the population was reduced to two-thirds of its pre-war level. About 50 thousand Georgians, untainted by crimes, have already returned to the Gali region, where they lived compactly before the war.
Today
Today tourists are traveling to Abkhazia again - a million per season. They look at the luxurious thickets of magnolia, tall arrogant eucalyptus trees, gorgeous spreading palm trees, twisted impudent vines, ready to burst right into the house. Many vines burst into houses - these are the houses of people expelled by the war. They frighten tourists a little with the hostile blackness of their windows and destroyed roofs. There are now monuments next to the magnolias and eucalyptus trees, and in some places right on the rocks you can see memorial plaques with portraits of various people who defended the honor, freedom and right to exist of a small but proud people. At the height of the tourist season in August-September, vacationers periodically see ceremonies of local residents. It is the Abkhazians who remember August 14, the day the aggression of Georgian forces began, and celebrate August 26, Independence Day, and September 30, Victory Day. Today Russia has finally decided. In Gudauta there is now a military base of the Russian army, on the roadstead of New Athos there are warships of the Russian fleet.
A small rocket ship on the roadstead of New Athos under the St. Andrew's flag.
The threat of a new war has not disappeared. In August 2008, Georgian forces under the leadership of the new Commander-in-Chief M. Saakashvili tried to take revenge, but a big brown bear came from the north, slammed its paw, and everyone ran away. The war ended in 3 days. And rightly so, a magnolia flower should be flawless.
For tens of millions of people in the former Soviet Union and beyond, who have visited Abkhazia, it is difficult to forget about the sea and palm trees in Gagra, the smell of the needles of a relict pine grove in Pitsunda, Lake Ritsa, the Sukhumi embankment, the underground beauties of the New Athos karst cave... But in August 1992 The cypress-oleander paradise overnight turned into hell - Abkhazia was plunged into the abyss of war.
On September 30, 1993, Georgian troops, who had captured most of the territory of Abkhazia a year earlier, were completely defeated. About 2 thousand defenders of Abkhazia laid their heads on the altar of Victory. More than a quarter of them are not Abkhazians; they are Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Greeks, Turks, representatives of the North Caucasian republics, Cossacks and others. The Georgian side suffered even more, tens of thousands of residents of this blessed land became refugees, and the army lost about 2,000 killed and 20,000 wounded.
What are the reasons for this war? Could it have been prevented? Was there still a chance to find a compromise in all the difficulties of Abkhaz-Georgian relations? We will try to give answers to these questions.
The fertile land in which the Abkhaz lived had long attracted the attention of neighboring peoples and was a crossroads of cultures. The ancient Greeks sailed here and founded their states; there were Roman and Byzantine fortresses here from the 8th to the 10th centuries. There was an Abkhazian kingdom, which in 975 became part of Georgia. In the 16th–18th centuries, Turkey’s political influence increased in Abkhazia.
On February 17, 1810, Abkhazia, separately from Georgia, voluntarily became part of Russia. In the centuries-old history of relations between the Abkhaz and Georgian peoples, there was a joint struggle with the conquerors (the Arab Caliphate), and territorial disputes and wars. However, a qualitatively new situation in Georgian-Abkhaz relations began to take shape in the last third of the 19th century, when after the Caucasian War of 1817–1864. and the Abkhaz uprising of 1866 began their mass evictions to Turkey. This phenomenon was called “mahajirism”.
The depopulated part of Abkhazia was populated by Russians, Armenians, Greeks and especially by the population of Western Georgia. And if in 1886 the Abkhazians made up 86% of the population on their territory, and the Georgians - 8%, then in 1897 they were 55% and 25%, respectively. After the establishment of Soviet power, Abkhazia was an independent Soviet Socialist Republic. But under pressure from I.V. Stalin, it first concluded a federal agreement with Georgia, and in 1931 it entered it with autonomy rights. In the 1930s–1950s. The repressions of L.P. Beria and the mass resettlement of Georgian peasants brought the Georgian population in the republic to 39%, and the Abkhazian population to 15%. By 1989, this figure had reached 47% and 17.8%, respectively. In Sukhumi and Gagra the Georgian population was even higher. This was accompanied by the squeezing out of the life of the Abkhazians of their language and culture. The protests of the Abkhazian intelligentsia and the growth of national Abkhazian self-awareness reached their peak by 1989 during the period of Gorbachev's perestroika, after the 19th All-Union Party Conference.
The rally of the Abkhazian public in the village of Lykhny and the appeal to the CPSU Central Committee to restore the status of Abkhazia as a union republic were used to their advantage by Georgian nationalists. On April 9, 1989, a rally began in Tbilisi with a demand to stop “Abkhazian separatism”, and ended in fact with a demand for the separation of Georgia from the USSR. On March 17, 1991, 57% of the population of Abkhazia voted to preserve the USSR. Elections to the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, which was headed not by a representative of the state apparatus, but by a scientist, doctor of historical sciences, director of the Abkhaz Institute of Language, Literature and History Vladislav Ardzinba, also split it in half. The subsequent civil war in Georgia in December 1991-January 1992 and the overthrow of the nationalist Gamsakhurdia only worsened the situation. Under the guise of fighting the Zviadists of Gamsakhurdia, the State Council of Georgia partially sent its troops into the territory of Abkhazia and tried to dissolve the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, elected on January 6, 1992. The subsequent parade of sovereignties, instead of negotiations and the conclusion of a new agreement between Abkhazia and Georgia, as a result of the collapse of the USSR, did not defuse the situation. The leadership of Abkhazia was preparing for negotiations between V. Ardzinba and E. Shevardnadze, but in response shots rang out, tanks moved forward, blood was shed...
The forces that brought E. Shevardnadze to power in Georgia, headed by people with criminal records Kitovani and Ioseliani, did not want to wait.
The commander of the Mkhedrioni detachment, Jaba Ioseliani, in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, shortly before the start of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, extremely highly appreciated E. Shevardnadze’s contribution to the destruction of the USSR: “Shevardnadze destroyed the empire “from within and from above”, “creeping there”.”
By this time, Ioseliani was known for his extensive punitive campaigns against South Ossetia.
Historical Russia (Russian Empire, USSR, Russian Federation), claiming legal succession, instead of uniting peoples around itself, acted differently: contrary to its own interests, the Union and then Russian leadership made remarkable efforts to alienate their allies - by no means, of course, having acquired an ally in Georgia.
The Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, Stanislav Lakoba, would later have every reason to say: “It seems that Russia is ready to sacrifice its national interests for the sake of the territorial integrity of Georgia.”
The highest expression of Georgia's gratitude can be considered the intensive shelling of Russian military units stationed in the village of Nizhnyaya Eshera, which began on September 22, 1992 at 11.30 am, by units of the State Council of Georgia. Russian troops were forced to return fire from infantry fighting vehicles to suppress Georgian firing points.
Georgia started the war when the possibilities for a peaceful resolution to the conflict were far from exhausted. Alas, the Georgian leadership decided, instead of a treaty, to solve the national problem by force, up to and including the genocide of an entire people. The far-fetched pretext of sending troops to protect communications and defeat the remnants of the “Zviadists” turned into a repetition of the “experience of annexing South Ossetia.” But the troops of the State Council of Georgia also had their own characteristics. This is a combination of primitive criminal violence with the widespread use against civilians and civilian objects of combat helicopters equipped with missiles and bombs, tanks, howitzers, Grad systems, as well as weapons prohibited by the Geneva Convention of 1949 - “needle” shells and cluster bombs. This was especially evident during the destruction of places of compact residence of the Abkhaz ethnic group in the villages of the Sukhumi and Ochamchira regions and remained characteristic of the actions of the armed forces of the State Council of Georgia throughout the war.
At the same time, the war that began on August 14, 1992, combined the features of almost all local wars that had already unfolded by that time in the territory of the former USSR. The speed and cruelty of the aggression with the use of powerful military equipment gave it a resemblance to the just ended war in Transnistria; rampant criminal terror against the civilian population by the Georgian army already had a precedent in South Ossetia; The multi-month occupation and the extension of military operations for more than a year had an analogy in Nagorno-Karabakh. The common, generic feature of these wars was also expressed extremely sharply in Abkhazia: the blatant inequality in armaments legitimized by the Union and then by the Russian leadership. The “first-class” republics received their share during the division of the Soviet Army, autonomy - nothing. They were forced to solve their own security problems already at the height of the conflict.
This had a particularly dramatic effect in Abkhazia, due to its historical connection with the peoples of the North Caucasus and the resonance that Georgia’s attack on it caused here.
Based on the totality of all these signs, the war of 1992–1993 in Abkhazia still occupies a special place in the chain of wars caused by the collapse of the USSR. The paradoxical combination of various, seemingly mutually exclusive elements in it has no analogues. Here it is called “domestic”. Monuments stand throughout the republic and honor its defenders. And this name has two plans. The first, obvious one is, of course, the defense of one’s small Motherland. But the second one was also quite clearly indicated: the semantic and mental-emotional connection with the then universal and living memory of the Great Patriotic War in the country. This was expressed in many features: in the name of Marshal Bagramyan, given to the Armenian volunteer battalion, and in the likening of Tkuarchal to besieged Leningrad, and in the inscription “fascists” on bridges, buildings, etc. in relation to the troops of the State Council of Georgia.
Finally, there was no alienation of “Sovietism”, which by that time had flooded the territory of Georgia and Russia itself. On the contrary, Abkhazia, like South Ossetia and Transnistria, was a territory trying to defend the Union as a universal value, and this was bizarrely combined with the widespread participation in the Abkhaz militia of volunteers from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (KGNK), not at all alien to Russophobia, and the Cossacks, famous with his ability to defend the interests of the state.
It remains an indisputable historical fact, which can be confirmed by documents and evidence, that real assistance to Abkhazia was provided by the KGNK battalion (highlanders) and the so-called “Slavbat” (Cossacks and volunteers from the Russian regions of Russia). It was they, approximately 1.5 thousand people, including Shamil Basayev’s battalion (286 people), together with the Abkhaz militia, who formed the regular army, and not the mythical large-scale support of the Russian army, who turned the tide of the war.
Soldiers of the women's Abkhaz battalion
The true reason for the failure of the war for Georgia was shown even by the authors of the “World History of Wars”, Ernest and Trevor Dupuis, who were very unfavorable to the Abkhazians. Having an overwhelming superiority in forces, the Georgians were unable to take advantage of it. The Georgian army showed absolute helplessness on the battlefield. There was no single command in it until very recently. Quarrels and resentments between military leaders became the order of the day.
During more than a year of war in Abkhazia, the Georgian army did not conduct a single operation that was more or less competent from a military point of view.
The entire course of hostilities confirms the correctness of this assessment.
In the early morning of August 14, 1992, Georgian troops entered the Republic of Abkhazia. Up to 2 thousand Georgian “guards,” 58 units of armored vehicles and Ikarus buses, and 12 artillery installations took part in this action. The column stretched for several kilometers along the highway from Gali to Ochamchira. In addition, the offensive was supported from the air by four MI-24 helicopters and naval forces.
During the operation, code-named “Sword,” Tbilisi planned, according to Abkhaz intelligence, that the main forces would proceed by rail, land their garrisons at all key points, and awakened Abkhazia would be in their hands. Another group was sent by sea from Poti to Gagry on the night of August 14-15. An amphibious assault force of several hundred National Guardsmen with four armored vehicles moved on two landing ships, two Komets and a barge. On the eve of the inglorious campaign in Abkhazia, Georgia, according to experts from the Center for Caucasian Studies, received from the warehouses of the former ZakVO about 240 tanks, many armored personnel carriers, about 25 thousand machine guns and machine guns, dozens of guns and missile and artillery systems, including "Grad" and " Hurricane". These weapons, which previously belonged to the 10th Motorized Rifle Division, were transferred in accordance with the Tashkent agreements. The then Minister of Defense T. Kitovani promised not to use it in Abkhazia, but did not keep his word.
At dawn on August 15, the amphibious assault stopped at a roadstead near the village of Gantiadi (now Tsandryti), 7 km from the border with the Russian Federation. The Gagra administration had already been notified of the landing. He was visually observed from the shore in different places, but there were too few forces and means to prevent his landing. At about one o'clock in the afternoon, the amphibious assault quickly approached the shore and landed at the mouth of the Khashunse River. Among the fighters of the Abkhaz people's militia who prevented him, some were with machine guns, most were with hunting rifles, and some were completely unarmed. Nevertheless, the militias entered the battle. They held the defense until seven in the evening, and then received an order to retreat to the “Ukraine” sanatorium, a section of the highway convenient for defense on the western outskirts of Gagra. But there was a danger of an attack from the rear, from the village of Psakhara (Kolkhida) on the eastern outskirts of Gagra, where members of the local Gagra group “Mkhedrioni” who had settled near the road and the Gagra police officers of Georgian nationality who joined them fired at passing cars and killed several civilians.
Part of the Georgian landing moved to the Psou River. After a short battle at a post near the border, eight soldiers of the internal troops of Abkhazia had to retreat to the Russian side, where they were disarmed and interned.
But the main events of the outbreak of the war developed in the Sukhumi direction and, of course, in Sukhumi.
Shortly before the war, at the insistence of the head of the Gat region, the Abkhaz leadership removed the post on the bridge over the Ingur River. In Gala, local “guards” joined the Georgian troops. Then the Georgian column moved to the first patrol post near the village of Okhurei, Ochamchira district, where nine reservists from a separate regiment of internal troops (OPVV), created on the basis of the disbanded 8th regiment of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, were on duty. They were captured by deceit. At about 12 noon on August 14, near the village of Agudzera, reservists of the local OPVV battalion resisted the attackers. But it was quickly suppressed by superior forces, and then the Georgian troops moved unhindered.
By 12 noon, Georgian troops found themselves in Sukhumi, in the area of the camp site named after the XV Komsomol Congress. Here they were joined by local Georgian formations. Subsequently, the column moved towards the center of Sukhumi. Georgian guards attacked the positions of the OPVV fighters, who, under the pressure of a significantly superior enemy, were forced to retreat to the Red Bridge. Here, the military commissar of the republic, S. Dbar, took charge of organizing the defense. The Red Bridge was blocked and mined. The reservists, against whom tanks and helicopters were operating, were armed with Molotov cocktails, manufactured during the battle. In addition, snipers and machine gunners, holed up in nearby high-rise buildings, acted against the defenders of the Red Bridge. After the Georgian tanks went on the offensive, the lead one was shot down by Abkhaz fighters, and then the tank was delivered to their positions. After repairs, it began to terrify its former owners. On the same day, August 14, after an address to the people of the republic by the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia V.G. Ardzinba, the Presidium of the Supreme Council announced a general mobilization of citizens from 18 to 40 years of age.
“...The troops of the State Council of Georgia invaded our land... Our proposals to resolve issues of relations peacefully were answered with tanks, guns, planes, murders and robberies. And this shows the true role of the current leadership of Georgia. The world strongly condemns this barbaric action, and its moral and material support is provided to us. I think we must withstand this difficult hour and we will." - said V. G. Ardzinba in an address on television.
In these first days of the war, the first casualties appeared on both sides. As a result of a helicopter shelling of the beach of a sanatorium of the Russian Defense Ministry, a Russian officer and several family members of military personnel were killed. All vacationers were then urgently evacuated to Russian territory.
Already on August 15, the Georgian side was undertaking a diplomatic maneuver. At the initiative of the Georgian Minister of Defense T. Kitovani (leader of the State Council armed group), negotiations began. In order to prevent further bloodshed, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides from the confrontation line outside the city. However, already on August 18, Georgian troops treacherously captured Sukhumi, which was left without cover by Abkhaz formations that had retreated across the Gumista River. Guardsmen of Tengiz Kitovani solemnly hoisted the state flag of Georgia with the autograph of their patron on the dome of the building of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia. In the “best traditions” of the Middle Ages, Kitovani gave them the city for 3 days. Massive looting of shops, warehouses, private houses and apartments of non-Georgian nationalities, murders and abuse of civilians on ethnic grounds began. The OPVV troops were forced to begin creating the Gumista defensive line.
On August 18, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia adopted a Decree on the creation of the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the republic under the chairmanship of V. Ardzinba. Colonel V. Kakalia was appointed commander of the Armed Forces of Abkhazia, and Colonel S. Sosnaliev, who arrived in Abkhazia on August 15, 1992 as a volunteer from Kabardino-Balkaria, was appointed chief of staff.
From the first days of the war, at the call of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (KGNK) to provide fraternal assistance to the Abkhaz people, volunteers began to arrive in Abkhazia from the North Caucasus and South Russia through the Main Caucasus Range in groups and alone. Volunteers joined the Abkhaz armed forces. Some of them, especially the Chechens and Cossacks, had good field training. Shamil Basayev was appointed commander of the 1st battalion of the KGNK, and Ruslan Gelayev was appointed commander of the 2nd. Nine years later, R. Gelayev, together with a group of Georgian saboteurs, unsuccessfully tried to test the strength of his former fellow soldiers. The history of the war between Georgia and Abkhazia made such zigzags.
In turn, snipers from Lithuania and Latvia and mercenaries from the western regions of Ukraine began to fight on the side of Georgia.
From the very beginning of the war, a very difficult situation arose in Abzhuy Abkhazia - Ochamchira district and the city of Tkuarchal. These regions found themselves cut off from the main part of the country, where the military and political leadership of the republic was stationed.
From the first day of the war, partisan detachments began to be spontaneously created in Abzhui Abkhazia, which did not allow Georgian troops to capture Tkuarchal. These groups were commanded by Aslan Zaktaria.
After the capture of Sukhumi by the Georgians, the leadership of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia were evacuated to Gudauta, a regional center 35 km west of Sukhumi.
Thus, by August 18, the Armed Forces of Abkhazia controlled the area from the Gumista River to the village of Kolkhida (turn to Pitsunda) and the mining village of Tkuarchal with a number of Abkhaz villages in the Ochamchira district in the east of the republic. But in these areas there was practically no Georgian population left, which in Sukhumi greeted the State Council tanks with flowers.
But the Georgian troops, instead of developing their military success, engaged in rampant robberies, looting and drunkenness. Looted property of citizens of Abkhazian, Armenian, Russian nationalities, government agencies, museums, and scientific institutes was, as a rule, exported towards Tbilisi. The bronze monument to Lenin in front of the building of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia was removed and sent for melting down, the remaining monuments were fired upon from tanks and machine guns. Traces of this vandalism throughout Abkhazia are visible even 10 years later - in 2002.
Even Givi Lominadze, who was appointed chairman of the Provisional Committee for Stabilization of the Situation in Abkhazia and who did so much for their arrival, was discouraged by the behavior of the “brave victors”: “I heard and could imagine what war is, but the guards attacked the city like locusts.”
The Georgian military carried out outrages in the city and in the countryside, raping women and killing them. Tens and hundreds of people were taken hostage and subjected to beatings and abuse. All this caused a massive flow of refugees. The world community could not help but respond to the misfortune of little Abkhazia. On August 20, a delegation of the Supreme Council of Russia visited Gudauta, Tbilisi, and Sukhumi. Demonstrations swept through the cities of the Middle East, Europe and America, where representatives of the large Adyghe-Abkhaz diaspora live. The Confederation of Mountain Peoples began to transfer volunteers to Abkhazia. Russian President B. Yeltsin did not want to enter into conflict with E. Shevardnadze. But a trilateral meeting of Russia, Georgia and Abkhazia was scheduled for September 3. At the same time, Georgian military leaders tried to solve the “Abkhaz problem” using their own methods.
A clear idea of how they saw it, and at the same time about themselves, is given by the speech of the then commander of the special forces brigade “Tetri Artsivi”, later the commander of the troops of the State Council of Georgia in Abkhazia, a former captain of the Soviet army, a 27-year-old colonel (then a brigadier general ) Georgiy Karkarashvili, heard on August 25 on Sukhumi television: “If 100 thousand Georgians die out of the total number, then all 97 thousand of yours who will support Ardzinba’s decisions will die.”
The crew of the legendary BMP “01 APSNY” of the Abkhaz army, recaptured from the enemy in the battle near the Red Bridge in Sukhumi on August 14, 1992.
This was an open threat of genocide of the Abkhaz people. In response, V. Ardzinba stated that this struggle of a well-armed and trained army against, in fact, the civilian population is deeply immoral, inhumane, that “we will defend our Motherland to the end, if necessary, we will go to the mountains and wage a guerrilla war.”
During late August and early September, Georgian troops tried unsuccessfully to break through the defenses of Abkhaz forces on the Gumista River and seize the remaining Abkhaz territory before negotiations began. But they failed to do this either before the negotiations or after the conclusion of the agreement on the withdrawal of Georgian troops. The Georgian side did not comply with it, and, in turn, the Abkhazians, highlanders, and Cossacks themselves went on the offensive near Gagra on October 2, 1992. Heroically defending his land, knocking out a tank, Gudau resident Sergei Smirnov died, the favorite of the fighters, young commander Arthur Shakhanyan, a graduate of the 17th Sukhumi secondary school, died the death of a brave man. Georgians also fought side by side with Abkhazians, Armenians, Russians, Greeks, and Ukrainians, who later became heroes of Abkhazia and earned orders and glory.
Special mention should be made about the Cossacks. Once upon a time, during the uprising of 1866, the Abkhazians who rose up against tsarism destroyed a chapel in the village of Lykhny, near the walls of which Cossacks had previously been buried. In 1992, inside this destroyed chapel, a Cossack who came to fight for Abkhazia was buried with honors - a gesture symbolizing a new page in the relationship between Abkhazia and the Cossacks.
All these people, regardless of nationality, stood up in defense of justice, against the barbarity of the Georgian leadership and its methods of warfare (on August 29, 1992, Abkhazian positions were fired from howitzers with needle shells prohibited by international conventions).
The Russian leadership as a whole, in relation to the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, took a “balanced” approach, balancing tactics.
At the same time, the session of the Supreme Council of Russia on September 24–25, 1992 adopted a resolution “On the situation in the North Caucasus in connection with the events in Abkhazia.” It said, in particular: “To resolutely condemn the policy of the Georgian leadership, which is trying to solve the problems of interethnic relations through violence, and to demand from it an immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of military units from the territory of Abkhazia, and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. Suspend the transfer of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, units and formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to Georgia, and also stop the transfer of weapons, military equipment, ammunition to Georgia under previously concluded contracts. Refrain from concluding economic agreements with Georgia until the conflict in Abkhazia is resolved.” It is noteworthy that this resolution was adopted by an overwhelming number of votes and reconciled both the “right” and the “left,” including such ideological opponents as S. Baburin and M. Molostvov.
Even greater troubles awaited E. Shevardnadze on the fronts of the Georgian-Abkhaz war. The English military magazine Caucasus World published a lengthy article “Abkhazians. Military aspects of the war: a turning point" (author - Georg Hewitt), dedicated to the battle for Gagra. It is of exceptional interest for the history of military art. Before the start of the offensive, the Abkhaz forces had no superiority either in manpower or in equipment, but the Abkhaz troops controlled all the heights above the city. The strategy of the Abkhaz and North Caucasian volunteers was to cross the Bzyn River south of Gagra and occupy the strategically important village of Colchis. The invasion of Gagra itself was carried out by attack in three directions, from the southern passes to the city. One group followed the coastline and attacked the city from the beach and marshland through a tourist camp located in the southern part of the city. The other two Abkhaz detachments made their way through the city along parallel axes (along the Old and New highways). The Abkhaz troops breaking through the Old Highway were supposed to make their way to the city center and unite with the troops moving along the coast. Units advancing along the New Highway would take a shortcut to Gagry, heading towards the northern edge of the city to block any Georgian reinforcements that might arrive from the north. Thus, the Abkhaz troops sought to lure the Karvelin forces defending Gagra into a trap. The attack went according to plan. Both Abkhaz detachments clashed in battle against Georgian forces defending the railway station. The fight for her lasted three hours (from 6.00 to 9.00). On October 2, Abkhaz troops continued to advance throughout the day. The next place of decisive resistance was the sanatorium opposite the supermarket. But by 17.35 this position was surrounded and destroyed. Other Abkhaz detachments proceeded down the Old Highway through the center of the city, and by 16.00 all the main strongholds of the Georgian defense were under complete Abkhaz control, including the Abkhazia Hotel and the police station. An hour and a half later, Gagra was completely under the control of the Abkhazians.
The battle for the police station was extremely brutal, as it was defended by local Georgian policemen and members of the elite White Eagle squad. In the area of the Rehabilitation Center, the Abkhazians took 40 prisoners.
In the early morning hours of October 3, Georgian helicopters arrived from Sukhumi, but they were too few to stop the Abkhaz advance.
One of the Abkhaz detachments at the training ground. In the background is an interesting “homemade” infantry fighting vehicle with ten tubes for launching projectiles from the Grad MLRS (apparently, the prototype was the M4 Sherman with a launcher for 114-mm Calliope rockets).
Captured Georgian soldiers. In the foreground is General Zurab Mamulashvili, captured on July 4, 1993 at the Sukhumi hydroelectric station
Subsequently, the Georgian defense of Gagra turned into a large-scale retreat. The Georgian population fled in thousands towards the Russian border.
At noon on October 3, a Georgian SU-25 bomber attacked Abkhaz positions at the intersection of the old and new highways in the Ukraine sanatorium. The Georgians, with the help of the White Eagle formation, began to prepare for a counter-offensive. 60 detachments had to go around the sanatorium through the mountains and attack it from above. At the same time, part of the Georgian forces (military police, Kutaisi, Tetri Artsivi battalions) advanced south of the highway, capturing Old Gagra and attacking the sanatorium. But this offensive failed after the Georgians saw two ships on the coast and the Abkhazians landing from them on the coast.
The next day, October 5, the Abkhazians drive the White Eagle into a very difficult mountainous area. By 1800, these elite Georgian forces were defeated. After this, the Georgian formations were scattered throughout the surrounding villages, and at 8.40 on October 6, the Abkhazians reached the border with Russia and raised their flag.
The remnants of the Georgian formations suffered heavy losses over the next twelve days, including the death of Gogi Karkaroshvili, the brother of the commander-in-chief of the Georgian troops. The head of the State Council himself miraculously escaped by helicopter, which made two flights and picked up 62 militants.
Abkhaz forces captured 2 tanks, 25 infantry fighting vehicles, a radio station, a boat and thousands of prisoners.
Selected Georgian battalions were defeated near Gagra: Didgori, Tskhaltub, Rustavi, 101st Gagra and other elite units of Mkhedrioni. The defeat of the Georgian units foreshadowed eventual defeat in the war.
Abkhazia gained the opportunity to receive weapons and volunteers through mountain passes and its northern borders.
The Georgian units were unable to organize defense in depth; their forward positions were instantly broken through. In street battles, the Georgians were unable to use their heavy weapons, discipline and morale were low in their ranks, small detachments of 10–12 people defending individual buildings had no communication with each other. Each detachment only monitored its sector and knew nothing else. There were many disagreements between the leaders and their troops.
In a word, the Georgian army showed true helplessness on the battlefield; there was no single command in it until very recently. A characteristic touch is that in 1992 Gagra was defended by Georgian detachments that carried out the orders of several commanders and did not interact with each other. Battalions appeared like mushrooms after the rain (Zugdidi, Khashur, etc.) of 7-8 people each, headed by self-proclaimed colonels (no one agreed to a lower rank or position). Quarrels and resentments between military leaders became the order of the day. This was the case when, after the defeat, Georgy Karkaroshvili began accusing Colonel General Anatoly Kamkamidze of incompetence and made it clear that he would not get along with him. (For information, unlike Major General Georgiy Karkaroshvili, who only has a higher military school and the position of chief of staff of an artillery division in the former Soviet army, Anatoly Kamkamidze went in this army from a military school cadet to a lieutenant general, deputy commander of the troops district for combat training, and the rank of Colonel General was awarded to him by Eduard Shevardnadze.) The choice was made in favor of Karkaroshvili. But, having become Minister of Defense in May 1993, he was never able to put an end to indiscipline, discord, and localism in the army. Against this background, his repeated promises to “punish the Abkhaz with a large-scale offensive” could only cause a smile. Finally, in the summer of 1993, in an interview with one of the news agencies, he was forced to admit that “there is no order and discipline in the Georgian army.”
As the intensity of the fighting increased, the Georgian army turned into an army of vagabonds, blaming each other for the defeat. The Abkhaz troops, which included volunteers - representatives of the diaspora from Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and mountaineers of the North Caucasus, were much better prepared for joint actions. They had good reconnaissance and were distinguished by their experience and knowledge of the mountainous terrain.
There is an opinion that the Russian army also provided military assistance to Abkhazia. But such accusations are unfounded. Shamil Basayev stated that he was fighting on the side of Abkhazia until Russia started the war with Georgia. In this case, he will fight on the side of Georgia. In total, according to various sources, there were about 500 volunteers on the side of Abkhazia near Gagra. The Georgian forces were significantly larger.
The Abkhazians ensured their superiority in a variety of ways.
An interesting and very expressive detail: even before the start of hostilities, having no combat vehicles, the Abkhaz formed crews for them. The captured combat vehicle was handed over to one of the crews and immediately entered into battle. This made it possible, eyewitnesses say, to first equalize the forces of the attackers and defenders, and then create an advantage in technology on the Abkhaz side. By the evening of October 1, the Abkhazians took the village of Colkhida and quickly advanced towards Gagra, which caused panic in the Georgian units; they even had to use barrage detachments.
Practically, the battle for Gagra was a battle for Abkhazia itself. It showed the inability of Georgian troops to conduct large-scale operations. There were subsequently 4 significant offensives (January 1993, March 1993, July 1993 and the final offensive in September 1993). All of them were carried out by the Abkhaz side. On October 11, 1992, by resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, the Ministry of Defense of Abkhazia was formed, headed by Colonel Vladimir Arshba. On the same day, the air defense of Abkhazia near the village of Eshera shot down a SU-25 aircraft of the Georgian Air Force for the first time with a surface-to-air missile.
The defeat of the Gagra group of troops of the Republic of Georgia caused panic in Sukhumi. But overall the war became protracted. On the part of Abkhazia, there were attempts to land an amphibious assault force in Ochamchira from Gudauta. The Abkhaz inflicted significant damage on the Georgian side, but were forced to retreat. After several unsuccessful, however, and insufficiently persistent attempts to “clean up” Ochamchira, the Abkhazians relied on the Zviadist detachments that controlled Western Georgia, and they were not mistaken. Colonel Loti Kobalia never got involved (even though he promised) in active hostilities in Abkhazia. Moreover, he created a lot of obstacles for government troops, while not missing the opportunity to profit from heavy equipment and weapons at their expense. And when the decisive hour came in the battle for Sukhumi, units of the 1st Army Corps of the Georgian Army were stuck somewhere on the outskirts of Ochamchira. A little later, on November 3–4, the Abkhaz army conducted reconnaissance in force on the northern outskirts of Sukhumi near the village of Giroma. At the end of November, a ceasefire agreement was concluded between the Abkhaz and Georgian sides for the period of evacuation from Sukhumi of some units of the Russian army - the 903rd separate radio engineering center and the 51st road depot. The leadership of Abkhazia faced two interrelated tasks: liberating the republic from Georgian troops and ensuring a more or less bearable life for the population in the territory under the control of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia. This was especially true for humanitarian assistance to the mining district of Tkuarchal. The whole world was shocked by the tragedy of the downed Mi-8 helicopter, which was taking civilians (women, children, old people) out of the blockade area on December 14, 1992. The helicopter, controlled by a Russian crew, was shot down over the village of Lata, Gulriksha district, by a Strela thermal missile from the Georgian side. The crew and more than 60 people died. civilians. Nowadays, a photo exhibition dedicated to this barbarity is on display at the State Museum of Abkhazia. But the world did not shudder from this barbarity. Ruling Russia was left without any special emotions.
It is not surprising that on May 26, 1993, the tragedy repeated itself - a helicopter carrying flour and medicine for the besieged Tkuarchal was shot down over Saken. As a result, squadron commander L. Chubrov, helicopter commander E. Kasimov, navigator A. Savelyev, flight mechanic V. Tsarev and radio operator E. Fedorov were killed. And again silence from official Russia. By that time, she had transferred the port of Poti to Georgia with a large amount of equipment.
In total, during the war years, about 50 Russian military personnel and members of their families died from the actions of the Georgian side.
Subsequently, the Russian army immortalized the memory of the fallen Russian peacekeepers by engraving their names on a memorial installed in the sanatorium of the Moscow Military District in Sukhumi.
The year 1993 was marked by a new offensive by the Abkhazians on Sukhumi. They managed to capture several areas on the left bank of the Gumista. But deep snow contributed to increased losses among the attackers, and they were forced to retreat under heavy artillery and mortar fire. The bodies of 23 dead from Abkhazia were exchanged for captured Georgians. In mid-March, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia made a new attempt to liberate Sukhumi, crossing Gumista in its lower reaches. Preparations for the offensive were carried out carefully. The equipment was also thought out - bulletproof vests and waterproof suits - which in this situation saved the lives of many Abkhazians. But at the same time, taught by the bitter Gagra experience, the Georgian command took the most serious measures to strengthen the city’s defense against the proposed attack. And yet, on the night of March 16, after intensive artillery preparation and air bombing, Abkhaz units (including the Armenian battalion named after Marshal Bagramyan created shortly before) crossed to the left bank of the Gumista, broke through the Georgian defenses in several places and started fighting for mastering strategically important heights. Separate groups infiltrated into the depths of the city.
However, the Abkhaz offensive failed, although, as Georgian leaders admitted, “the fate of the city hung in the balance.” Many groups that went forward found themselves surrounded and stayed on the left bank for up to 2-3 days, but eventually managed to get to the right bank and carry out the wounded. In no military operation since the beginning of the war has the Abkhaz army suffered such significant losses; there were three times more than on January 5. The Georgians also suffered great damage.
A rather long period began again, this time lasting three and a half months, when the fighting on the Gumista Front was reduced to fierce artillery exchanges, and the Abkhaz and Georgian armed formations came into direct contact only on the Eastern Front, in the Ochamchira region. During this period, the number of Cossacks increased in the Armed Forces of Abkhazia, and new mercenaries from Western Ukraine appeared in the Georgian army. The presence of a group of Russian troops on the territory of Abkhazia during this period was a deterrent. At the same time, Russia’s shuttle diplomacy represented by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev and Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation B. Pastukhov in Tbilisi, Sukhumi, and Gudautu did not produce the desired effect. There was a threat of the division of Abkhazia, not the end of the conflict.
Since it was not possible to agree on the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the territory of Abkhazia, the leadership of the Republic of Abkhazia had no choice but to continue the fight by armed means.
July 2, 1993 The Armed Forces of Abkhazia again launched offensive operations. At night, an amphibious assault of 300 people was landed in the village of Tamysh, Ochamchira district. Having united in the area of the Black Sea highway with units of the Abkhaz army fighting on the Eastern Front, the paratroopers cut the highway and for a week brutally held a corridor of about 10 km, preventing the Georgian military command from transferring reinforcements to the Sukhumi region. But the main actions of the offensive operation are taking place north of Sukhumi. Having crossed Gumista in the two rivers area, Abkhaz forces within several days occupied the villages of Gumma, Akhalsheni, Kaman, as well as the village of Sukhum-GES. The Georgian general Mamulashvili was captured. By July 9, the strategically important village of Shroma was captured. Georgian troops tried to retake Shromy, but failed.
There were stubborn battles for possession of the heights dominating the capital of Abkhazia. Shevardnadze himself flew to Sukhumi, and the new Minister of Defense of Georgia, Gia Karkarashvili, presented Abkhazia with an ultimatum to withdraw troops from the village. Shroms.
Negotiations between the warring parties with the participation of the Russian representative, Minister of Emergency Situations S. Shoigu, led to the signing of a truce agreement. The Georgian side committed to withdrawing its troops and heavy equipment from the territory of Abkhazia. In turn, the Abkhaz side also pledged to demilitarize its territory and consolidated its military formations into a regiment of internal troops to protect communications and important facilities. On August 17, Abkhazia sent home its defenders - volunteers from the republics and regions of Southern Russia. But the Georgian side was in no hurry to implement the agreement. Heavy equipment was not withdrawn, and on September 7, an armed group of supporters of Z. Gamsakhurdia invaded the Gallic region.
In response to this, on September 16, on the Eastern Front, Abkhaz forces attempted to lift the blockade of Tkuarchal on their own and reached the Kodor River (3 km from Sukhumi airport). The expansion of the bridgehead for the attack on Sukhumi from the north also began. Georgian forces attempted to break through from Ochamchira and create a corridor to Sukhumi, but to no avail. By September 20–21, Abkhaz units closed a ring around Sukhumi. After stubborn fighting, Georgian troops were driven out of the supermarket area at the entrance to Sukhumi and blocked in the New Microdistrict. By September 25, Abkhaz units captured the television tower and the railway station. Starting from September 25, Russian ships, in agreement with the Abkhaz side, began to take out thousands of refugees. But the Georgian army led by E. Shevardnadze refused to leave the city voluntarily.
As a result of the offensive on September 26–27, the operation to liberate Sukhumi was completed. During 12 days of fighting, Abkhaz troops defeated the 2nd Army Corps of the Georgian army, numbering more than 12 thousand people. Many tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, etc. were captured as trophies.
On September 29, the Sukhumi airport was taken and the troops of the Gumista and Eastern Fronts united near the Kodor River, ending the blockade of the Tkuarchal region.
Schematic map of the Georgian-Abkhaz war
At 8.30 on September 30, the Armed Forces of Abkhazia attacked and captured Ochamchira and by evening entered empty Gaul. By 20:00 on the same day, Abkhaz troops reached the Ingur River and the border with Georgia. Victory has come for the people of Abkhazia. The massive flight of the majority of the Georgian population of Sukhumi, Sukhumi, Gulriksha, Ochamchira and Galli regions outside Abkhazia during the last week of September 1993 is, of course, also a huge human tragedy. But if there had not been an attempt to bring the Abkhaz people to their knees by force, there would not have been a catastrophe that befell the Georgian population of the Republic of Abkhazia in September 1993. After all, never and nowhere, at any level, in any statement of the Abkhaz, seeking the sovereignty of Abkhazia, they did not raise the question of the deportation of the Georgian population from it, or of ethnic cleansing. Only thanks to Shevardnadze, by October 1, 1993, the share of the Georgian population in Abkhazia returned to the level of 1886. Shevardnadze himself fled in disgrace with Russia’s “last” helicopter to the south, abandoning his dying army in Sukhumi. Russia once again provided Georgia with an invaluable service by saving its president. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia V. Ardzinba prohibited the shooting down of this helicopter in order to avoid international conflict. The Russians in the helicopter with Shevardnadze became a human shield for him, a guarantee of his personal safety during this last flight. At the same time, he left his old friend and associate, head of the administration in Abkhazia Zhauli Shartava, to die in besieged Sukhumi. “E. Shevardnadze himself could not help but know how hated he and his friends were by the Abkhazians and North Caucasians - one could hope for leniency only if respected people stood up for the prisoners - S. Shamba, S. Soskaliev or Vladislav himself Ardzinba... But to the question of a major Russian official: - Where is Shartava? - followed the response of the head of Georgia: “Everything is fine with him...”
Even for the most unbiased Russian observer it is obvious that it was not Russian troops that were defeated by Georgian forces and that the victory of the people of Abkhazia was deeply natural. The decisive role in the fact that Abkhazia survived was played by the courage and heroism of its sons and daughters, all honest and brave people of different nationalities who came to its aid.
In Abkhazia, the “Book of Eternal Memory” was published, edited by V. M. Pachulia (Sukhumi, 1997), where those who died in this war are listed by name (Abkhazians, Russians, Armenians, Chechens, Georgians, Kabardians, Ossetians, Turks, Ukrainians, Greeks, Circassians, Laz, Adygeis, Tatars, Karachais, Abazas, Germans, Jews).
From the point of view of military art, this war is indicative of the fact that the July and September offensive of the Abkhazians was active, decisive, highly maneuverable, the width of the front was 40 km, the depth was 120 km. Abkhazian units and subunits, created on the basis of the people's militia, skillfully hit Georgian positions with fire, broke through their defenses at a high pace, saturated with a large number of anti-tank and armored weapons, crushed them in a counter battle with daring blows, preempting them from opening fire. Already the first months of the war showed that the Abkhazians used guerrilla warfare tactics only to gain time to mobilize their forces. After the Gagrin events, their actions were not dominated by blind chance or luck, but purely strategic. This was especially important at the first stage of the war, when they were limited both in strength and in the means of waging it. In these battles, the Abkhazians recaptured tanks, combat vehicles, artillery mounts, ammunition, in a word, they fought for trophies, replenishing their military arsenal. What about the Georgians? It’s paradoxical, but it’s a fact that, having an overwhelming superiority in forces, they failed to take advantage of it. The Abkhazians showed themselves confidently in close and contact combat. This was especially evident on the Eastern Front. As a result of the military campaign of 1993, the command and personnel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia gained experience in fighting in specific conditions, both urban and mountainous, and learned to storm strong strongholds and centers of resistance.
The actions of the Air Force, Naval Forces and Air Defense Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia, which solved common strategic tasks during the 1993 military campaign, also deserve high praise.
On August 27, 1992, the combat use of Abkhazian aviation began with two AN-2 aircraft in the Gudauta area. Before this, the Abkhazians, led by military pilot Oleg Chamba, used only hang gliders, and the skies were dominated by the aviation of the Georgian State Council troops: Su-25 attack aircraft and Mu-24 helicopters. They bombed populated areas and ships carrying refugees with impunity, including an ordinary passenger ship plying the Poti-Sochi line. The paradox of the war was that the first Abkhaz hang glider on September 19, 1992, which bombed Georgian armored vehicles in the Gagra area, was flown by the Georgian O. G. Siradze. The news that a Georgian bombed the troops of the State Council of Georgia spread throughout Abkhazia. Subsequently, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Abkhazia and one of the Sukhumi schools was named after him.
Hang gliders controlled by pilots O. Chamba, Avidzba, Gazizulin successfully carried out reconnaissance and bombed Georgian positions, and operated in such hard-to-reach places where neither helicopters nor airplanes could operate. In total, Abkhaz pilots spent about 150 hours in military skies.
An analysis of the combat experience of Abkhaz hang gliders showed the need to equip the devices with a light machine gun and a landing light. The war confirmed that such aircraft are detected only if the pilot at low altitude increases engine speed. The best way to evade fire is to quickly descend and fly at low level. The war showed the undoubted effectiveness of motorized hang gliders and the possibility of training a physically strong man to fly them in 30 hours. Considering the report that in 1998 Georgia also acquired hang gliders, it is possible that combat hang gliders can be used in local military conflicts, and not only in the North. western part of Transcaucasia.
As naval forces in the war, both sides have used boats and other watercraft for amphibious landings and protection of the coast and communications since August 1992.
The air defense forces of Abkhazia began counting victories on October 11, 1992, when a native of New Athos, Sergeant Oleg Chmel, shot down a Georgian Su-25 plane that was bombing ancient Christian churches. At the beginning of hostilities near Gagra in September 1992, the Abkhaz units had two 120-mm mortars and two Alazan installations, delivered by the highlanders. By the end of the war, thanks to trophies, the Abkhaz army had cannon, anti-tank and mortar batteries. The Abkhaz army acquired armored vehicles, undermining and capturing them from the enemy, then they were repaired, and the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles fought on their side. In the final operations of the war, carefully prepared and planned by the Abkhazians, ground forces, aviation, and warships acted according to a single plan. The directions of the main and auxiliary attacks were skillfully chosen.
It should be noted that, unlike the beginning of the war, the last offensive of the Abkhazians was fully provided with equipment, weapons, uniforms, food and ammunition. Commander-in-Chief V. Ardzinba, generals S. Soskaliev, S. Dvar, M. Kshimaria, G. Arba, V. Arshba skillfully led their armed forces.
It seems to us that Russia should learn certain lessons for itself after the war.
For centuries, the Caucasus has been a zone of interest for the leaders of various state entities, both from the West and the East. Located on the border of Europe and Asia, possessing a unique nature and raw material wealth, it was partly part of the Roman Empire, then the Byzantine Empire, the Arab Caliphate and the state of Genghis Khan left their traces here. It has been divided among themselves since the time of Prince Svyatoslav by the Russians, Persians and Ottomans.
But the Northwestern Transcaucasus is of special national interest for Russia, and not for the United States.
Firstly, at the beginning of the 19th century the Christian principalities of Abkhazia and Georgia voluntarily, unlike some Muslim territories, became part of the Russian Empire. Abkhazians are still striving for Russia, as they are closely connected with the Circassians, Karachais, Circassians and other peoples of the North Caucasus.
Secondly, if Russia leaves this area, then the Americans will occupy it in order to have access to the raw material riches of the Caspian Sea and control this troubled region. In terms of explored reserves, it ranks third in the world after the Arab East and Western Siberia. This is 40–60 billion barrels of oil and 10–20 trillion cubic meters of gas. And Georgia is one of the most convenient corridors for transporting oil to the world market, bypassing Russia.
Third, The Muslim factor is increasingly entering the Black Sea region. Under the auspices of Turkey, the descendants of the Crimean Tatars are increasingly settling in Crimea, and the Muhajirs - businessmen from Asia Minor and the Middle East are restoring the economy of their historical homeland and exporting tons of relict timber - sawlogs - by sea routes for next to nothing. And this is not indifferent to Russia in light of the ambiguous attitude of the Arabs to the Chechen problem. When the 1st war in Chechnya (1994–1996) turned out to be a failure for Russia, Georgia turned away from its northern neighbor, turning its gaze to NATO countries. The far-fetched strategic partnership has come to an end. Moscow was not only weakened, but also deceived.
Fourthly, the total redivision of the world by force under the pretext of the fight against terrorism is bringing NATO ever closer to our borders. Through Shevardnadze, Georgia announced that by 2005 it would join NATO. The current state of the Georgian army, armed with Russian weapons from the 1960s–1970s. (T-72 tanks, Su-25 planes, anti-aircraft missile systems that shot down Powers) no longer suits the Georgian leadership. Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzadze, a native Sukhumite, graduated from three military colleges - in Italy, Germany and the USA. Only recently, in addition to the American special forces from the Green Berets in the Pankisi Gorge, Germany transferred 150 trucks and 500 sets of uniforms to the Georgian armed forces. Türkiye supplies kerosene for aviation and diesel fuel for armored vehicles. The Americans provided 6 Iroquois helicopters and allocated 4 more such vehicles for disassembly for spare parts.
And finally, After the collapse of the USSR, Russians and Russian citizens who found themselves outside the Russian Federation, for the most part, found themselves in a difficult and humiliating situation. But to such areas of the so-called Near Abroad, such as Crimea, Abkhazia, where there are a significant number of Russian citizens, and although, so to speak, the body belongs to Ukraine and Georgia, but the soul and heart are with Russia, we should have a particularly reverent attitude. Moreover, under certain circumstances, the nationalists of Ukraine and Georgia have united more than once and are ready to unite again against the “Russian imperial thinking”, and, as a last resort, to give these territories and peoples to a third force that is defending its interests all over the world, energetically destroying bin Laden and all potential terrorists.
Therefore, Russia must take a clearer position regarding Western Transcaucasia. After the Russian peacekeepers were taken hostage in March 2002, the Russian State Duma made a balanced but firm statement. The territorial integrity of Georgia is not denied, but there is no place for a forceful solution to the Abkhaz problem.
Belgian researcher Bruno Conniters in his book “Western Security Policy and the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict” expressed a fairly independent point of view on the events in Western Transcaucasia. He says that “in the end, Georgia may never be able to build its own statehood.” Georgia is essentially a state without territory, without Abkhazia, without South Ossetia, with the independence of Adjara, the hidden bitterness of Mengrelia, the isolation and isolation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani enclaves.
Conniters is also supported by his compatriots - Olivier Paix and Eric Remacle - that the UN and OSCE can in the future change the policy of “double standards” and “not deny statehood to peoples who have been waging a painful war for independence for a long time.”
The Georgian people, who have lived in friendship with Russia for centuries, and the current Georgian leadership are two different concepts.
But until we revive our economy and maintain powerful and combat-ready armed forces, we will not be taken seriously either in the Caucasus or in the international arena as a whole.
Notes:
15 developing countries have ballistic missiles in service, and another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 countries.
The engineering structure itself, which bore this name and included a high wall of reinforced concrete slabs, was installed in August 1961 and existed until 1990.
Imre Nagy was a non-staff employee of the NKVD since 1933.
Dupuis E. and T. World history of wars. St. Petersburg: Polygon, 1993. T. IV. P. 749.
Sharia V. Abkhazian tragedy. - Sochi, 1993. pp. 6–7.
Sharia V. Abkhazian tragedy. - Sochi, 1993. P. 41.
Myalo K. Russia in the wars of the last decade of the 20th century. - M., 2001.
Pavlushenko M. Ikars of Abkhazia // Youth technology. No. 11, 1999.
Conniters B. Western security policy and the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. - M., 1999. P. 70.
Pe O., Remakl E. Policy of the UN and OSCE in Transcaucasia. Disputed borders. - M., 1999. P. 123–129.