Batu's invasion of Rus'

Key dates and events:

1206 - formation of the Mongol state, proclamation of Temujin as Genghis Khan;

1223 - battle on the Kalka River;

1237 - beginning of Batu’s campaign against North-Eastern Russia;

1238 - Battle of the City River;

1239-1240 - Batu's campaign against South-Western Rus'.

Historical figures: Genghis Khan; Batu; Yuri Vsevolodovich; Daniil Romanovich; Evpatiy Kolovrat.

Basic terms and concepts: temnik; nuker; invasion; yoke.

Response Plan: 1) formation of the Mongolian state; 2) Genghis Khan’s campaigns in Asia; 3) battle on the Kalka River; 4) Batu’s invasion of North-Eastern Russia; 5) Batu’s campaign in Southwestern Russia and Western Europe; 6) the consequences of the invasion for Russian lands.

Material for the answer: At the beginning of the 13th century. The Mongol tribes living in Central Asia entered a period of disintegration of the tribal system and the formation of statehood. In 1206, at the kurultai - a congress of representatives of the Mongolian nobility - Temujin, who took the name of Genghis Khan, was proclaimed ruler of the Mongolian state. The main instrument of his state power was a powerful and numerous army, distinguished by high organization and iron discipline. The controllability of this army was ensured largely thanks to its thoughtful division into tens, hundreds, thousands and “darkness” (10,000) nukers (warriors).

The aggressive nature of the Mongolian state was rooted not only in the presence of a strong army, but also in the economic system of the Mongols itself, the basis of which was nomadic cattle breeding. Herding numerous flocks of livestock required moving over large areas. In addition, military booty became almost the only source of subsistence for many warriors and a source of enrichment for military leaders.

In 1207-1215 the Mongols captured Siberia and Northwestern China, began invading Central Asia in 1219, and in Transcaucasia in 1222.

On May 31, 1223, the first battle of Russian squads with the Mongols took place on the Kalka River. The attempts of the princes to agree on the formation of a single army and unified administration led to nothing; this became the main reason for the brutal defeat of the southern Russian princes and Polovtsian khans who opposed the Mongols. Nevertheless, the advanced detachment of the Mongols did not dare to move further and retreated to Asia.

With the death of Genghis Khan, his power collapsed. In 1235, at the kurultai, a decision was made to march to the West. The troops were led by Genghis Khan's grandson Batu (nicknamed Batu in Rus').

In 1236 he defeated detachments of the Kama Bulgars and in the winter of 1237 he invaded North-Eastern Rus'. Despite the stubborn and selfless resistance of Russian military detachments and the local population, Ryazan, Kolomna, Moscow, Vladimir, Suzdal, Yaroslavl, Tver, and Kostroma were taken and devastated in a short period of time. The squads of Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir were defeated in an unequal battle. North-Eastern Rus' came under the rule of the Mongol khans. However, the resistance to the invaders was so stubborn, and the losses were so great that Batu, not reaching 100 km from Novgorod, ordered a retreat to the south, to the steppe regions for rest. Only in 1239 did he undertake a new campaign - against Southern and South-Western Rus'. Kyiv and other cities were captured and plundered, and the Galician-Volyn principality was devastated. In 1240, Batu's troops invaded the countries of Central Europe. However, weakened by Russian resistance, the Mongol army could not withstand the fight against the new enemy. In addition, nomads were not used to fighting in mountainous and forested areas. After the defeat from the combined forces of the Czech Republic and Hungary near Olomouc (1242), Batu ordered to return to the Volga valley.

July 21st, 2012

Empire on a planetary scale

The topic of the Tatar-Mongol yoke still causes a lot of controversy, reasoning and versions. Was it or wasn’t it, in principle, what role did the Russian princes play in it, who attacked Europe and why, how did it all end? Here is an interesting article on the topic of Batu’s campaigns in Rus'. Let's get some more information about all this...

The historiography about the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars (or Tatar-Mongols, or Tatars and Mongols, and so on, as you like) into Rus' goes back over 300 years. This invasion has become a generally accepted fact since the end of the 17th century, when one of the founders of Russian Orthodoxy, the German Innocent Gisel, wrote the first textbook on the history of Russia - “Synopsis”. According to this book, the Russians hammered home history for the next 150 years. However, so far no historian has taken it upon himself to make a “road map” of Batu Khan’s campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 in North-Eastern Rus'.

A little background

At the end of the 12th century, a new leader appeared among the Mongol tribes - Temujin, who managed to unite most of them around himself. In 1206, he was proclaimed at the kurultai (analogous to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR) as the all-Mongolian khan under the nickname Genghis Khan, who created the notorious “state of nomads.” Without wasting a minute, the Mongols began to conquer the surrounding territories. By 1223, when the Mongol detachment of commanders Jebe and Subudai clashed with the Russian-Polovtsian army on the Kalka River, the zealous nomads managed to conquer territories from Manchuria in the east to Iran, the southern Caucasus and modern western Kazakhstan, defeating the state of Khorezmshah and capturing part of northern China along the way.

In 1227, Genghis Khan died, but his heirs continued his conquests. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle Volga, where they waged war with the nomadic Cumans and their allies - the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of the modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources - in 1236), a decision was made at the kurultai on a global campaign against the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russians, as well as further to the West. The grandson of Genghis Khan, Khan Batu (Batu), had to lead this campaign. Here we need to make a digression. In 1236-1237, the Mongols, who by that time were fighting in vast areas from modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to the modern Volga republics, captured Tatarstan (Volga Bulgaria) and in the fall of 1237 began concentrating for a campaign against the Russian principalities.

In general, why the nomads from the banks of Kerulen and Onon needed to conquer Ryazan or Hungary is not really known. All attempts by historians to laboriously justify such agility of the Mongols look rather pale. Regarding the Western campaign of the Mongols (1235-1243), they came up with a story that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to secure their flank and destroy potential allies of their main enemies - the Polovtsians (part of the Polovtsians went to Hungary, but the bulk of them became the ancestors of modern Kazakhs). True, neither the Ryazan principality, nor the Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called. The “Novgorod Republic” was never allies of either the Cumans or the Volga Bulgars.

Steppe ubermensch on a tireless Mongolian horse (Mongolia, 1911)

Also, almost all historiography about the Mongols does not really say anything about the principles of forming their armies, the principles of managing them, and so on. At the same time, it was believed that the Mongols formed their tumens (field operational units), including from conquered peoples, the soldier was not paid anything for his service, and for any offense they were threatened with the death penalty.

Scientists tried to explain the successes of the nomads this way and that, but each time it turned out quite funny. Although, ultimately, the level of organization of the Mongol army - from intelligence to communications - could be envied by the armies of the most developed states of the 20th century (however, after the end of the era of wonderful campaigns, the Mongols - already 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan - instantly lost all their skills). For example, it is believed that the head of Mongolian intelligence, commander Subudai, maintained relations with the Pope, the German-Roman emperor, Venice, and so on.

Moreover, the Mongols, naturally, during their military campaigns acted without any radio communications, railways, road transport, and so on. In Soviet times, historians interspersed the then-traditional fantasy about steppe ubermenches who knew no fatigue, hunger, fear, etc., with classical ritual in the field of the class-formational approach:

With a general recruitment into the army, each ten tents had to field from one to three warriors, depending on the need, and provide them with food. In peacetime, weapons were stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the state and was issued to soldiers when they went on a campaign. Upon returning from the campaign, each warrior was obliged to surrender his weapons. The soldiers did not receive a salary, but they themselves paid the tax with horses or other livestock (one head per hundred heads). In war, each warrior had an equal right to use the spoils, a certain part of which was obliged to hand over to the khan. In the periods between campaigns, the army was sent to public works. One day a week was reserved for serving the khan.

The organization of the army was based on the decimal system. The army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumyns or darkness), headed by foremen, centurions and thousands. The commanders had separate tents and a reserve of horses and weapons.

The main branch of the army was cavalry, which was divided into heavy and light. The heavy cavalry fought with the main forces of the enemy. The light cavalry carried out guard duty and conducted reconnaissance. She started a battle, disrupting the enemy ranks with arrows. The Mongols were excellent archers from horseback. Light cavalry pursued the enemy. The cavalry had a large number of factory (spare) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. A feature of the Mongol army was the complete absence of a wheeled train. Only the tents of the khan and especially noble persons were transported on carts...

Each warrior had a file for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle, thread and a sieve for sifting flour or straining muddy water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuks (leather bags): one for water, the other for kruta (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran low, the Mongols bled their horses and drank it. In this way they could be content for up to 10 days.

In general, the term “Mongol-Tatars” (or Tatar-Mongols) itself is very bad. It sounds something like Croatian-Indians or Finno-Negros, if we talk about its meaning. The fact is that Russians and Poles, who encountered nomads in the 15th-17th centuries, called them the same - Tatars. Subsequently, the Russians often transferred this to other peoples who had nothing to do with the nomadic Turks in the Black Sea steppes. Europeans also made their contribution to this mess, who for a long time considered Russia (then Muscovy) Tatarstan (more precisely, Tartaria), which led to very bizarre constructions.

The French view of Russia in the mid-18th century

One way or another, society learned that the “Tatars” who attacked Rus' and Europe were also Mongols only at the beginning of the 19th century, when Christian Kruse published “Atlas and tables for reviewing the history of all European lands and states from their first population to of our times." Then Russian historians happily picked up the idiotic term.

Particular attention should also be paid to the issue of the number of conquerors. Naturally, no documentary data on the size of the Mongol army has reached us, and the most ancient and unquestioningly trusted source among historians is the historical work of a team of authors under the leadership of the official of the Iranian state of the Hulaguids, Rashid ad-Din, “List of Chronicles”. It is believed that it was written at the beginning of the 14th century in Persian, however, it surfaced only at the beginning of the 19th century; the first partial edition in French was published in 1836. Until the middle of the 20th century, this source was not completely translated and published.

According to Rashid ad-Din, by 1227 (the year of Genghis Khan's death), the total army of the Mongol Empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe Plano Carpini, then 10 years later the army of phenomenal nomads consisted of 150 thousand Mongols themselves and another 450 thousand people recruited in a “voluntary-forced” manner from subject peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimated the size of Batu's army, concentrated in the fall of 1237 near the borders of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. At the same time, it was taken for granted that each nomad had 2-3 horses.

By the standards of the Middle Ages, such armies look completely monstrous and implausible, we must admit. However, reproaching pundits for fantasizing is too cruel for them. It is unlikely that any of them could even imagine even a couple of tens of thousands of mounted warriors with 50-60 thousand horses, not to mention the obvious problems with managing such a mass of people and providing them with food. Since history is an inexact science, and indeed not a science at all, everyone can evaluate the range of fantasy researchers. We will use the now classic estimate of the size of Batu’s army at 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by the Soviet scientist V.V. Kargalov. His assessment (like all the others, completely sucked from thin air, to be very serious) in historiography, however, is prevalent. In particular, it is shared by the largest modern Russian researcher of the history of the Mongol Empire, R.P. Khrapachevsky.

From Ryazan to Vladimir

In the autumn of 1237, Mongol troops, who had fought all spring and summer across vast areas from the North Caucasus, Lower Don and to the middle Volga region, converged on the general gathering place - the Onuza River. It is believed that we are talking about the modern Tsna River in the modern Tambov region. Probably, some detachments of Mongols also gathered in the upper reaches of the Voronezh and Don rivers. There is no exact date for the start of the Mongols’ offensive against the Ryazan principality, but it can be assumed that it took place in any case no later than December 1, 1237. That is, the steppe nomads with a herd of almost half a million horses decided to go camping in winter. This is important for our reconstruction. If so, then they probably had to be sure that in the forests of the Volga-Osk interfluve, still rather weakly colonized by the Russians by that time, they would have enough food for horses and people.

Along the valleys of the Lesnoy and Polny Voronezh rivers, as well as the tributaries of the Pronya River, the Mongol army, moving in one or several columns, passes through the forested watershed of the Oka and Don. The embassy of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich arrives to them, which turned out to be ineffective (the prince is killed), and somewhere in the same region the Mongols meet the Ryazan army in a field. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move upstream of the Pronya, plundering and destroying small Ryazan cities - Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, and burning Mordovian and Russian villages.

Here we need to make a small clarification: we do not have accurate data on the number of people in the then North-Eastern Rus', but if we follow the reconstruction of modern scientists and archaeologists (V.P. Darkevich, M.N. Tikhomirov, A.V. Kuza), then it was not large and, in addition, it was characterized by low population density. For example, the largest city of the Ryazan land - Ryazan, numbered, according to V.P. Darkevich, a maximum of 6-8 thousand people, another 10-14 thousand people could live in the agricultural district of the city (within a radius of 20-30 kilometers). The remaining cities had a population of several hundred people, at best, like Murom - up to a couple of thousand. Based on this, it is unlikely that the total population of the Ryazan principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.

Of course, for the conquest of such a “proto-state” 120-140 thousand warriors were more than an excessive number, but we will stick to the classical version.

On December 16, the Mongols, after a march of 350-400 kilometers (that is, the pace of the average daily march here is up to 18-20 kilometers), go to Ryazan and begin its siege - they build a wooden fence around the city, build stone-throwing machines, with the help of which they lead shelling of the city. In general, historians admit that the Mongols achieved incredible - by the standards of that time - success in siege warfare. For example, historian R.P. Khrapachevsky seriously believes that the Mongols were able to build any stone-throwing machines on the spot from available wood in literally a day or two:

There was everything necessary to assemble stone throwers - the united army of the Mongols had enough specialists from China and Tangut..., and Russian forests abundantly supplied the Mongols with wood for assembling siege weapons.

Finally, on December 21, Ryazan fell after a fierce assault. True, an inconvenient question arises: we know that the total length of the city’s defensive fortifications was less than 4 kilometers. Most of the Ryazan soldiers died in the border battle, so it is unlikely that there were many soldiers in the city. Why did a gigantic Mongol army of 140 thousand soldiers sit for 6 whole days under its walls if the balance of forces was at least 100-150:1?

We also do not have any clear evidence of what the climatic conditions were in December 1238, but since the Mongols chose the ice of rivers as a method of transportation (there was no other way to pass through wooded areas, the first permanent roads in North-Eastern Rus' are documented only in the 14th century). century, all Russian researchers agree with this version), we can assume that it was already a normal winter with frosts, possibly snow.

An important question is also what the Mongolian horses ate during this campaign. From the works of historians and modern studies of steppe horses, it is clear that we were talking about very unpretentious, small horses - up to 110-120 centimeters tall at the withers - koniks. Their main diet is hay and grass (they did not eat grain). In their natural habitat, they are unpretentious and quite hardy, and in winter, during tebenevka, they are able to tear up snow in the steppe and eat last year’s grass.

Based on this, historians unanimously believe that thanks to these properties, the question of feeding the horses during the campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 against Rus' did not arise. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to notice that the conditions in this region (the thickness of the snow cover, the area of ​​grass stands, as well as the general quality of phytocenoses) differ from, say, Khalkha or Turkestan. In addition, the winter training of steppe horses consists of the following: a herd of horses slowly, walking a few hundred meters a day, moves across the steppe, looking for withered grass under the snow. Animals thus save their energy costs. However, during the campaign against Rus', these horses had to walk 10-20-30 or even more kilometers a day in the cold (see below), carrying luggage or a warrior. Were horses able to replenish their energy expenditure under such conditions? Another interesting question: if Mongolian horses dug through snow and found grass under it, then what should be the area of ​​their daily feeding grounds?

After the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols began to advance towards the Kolomna fortress, which was a kind of “gate” to the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Having walked 130 kilometers from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid ad-Din and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the Mongols were “stuck” at this fortress until January 5 or even 10, 1238 - that is, at least for almost 15-20 days. On the other hand, a strong Vladimir army is moving towards Kolomna, which Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich probably equipped immediately after receiving news of the fall of Ryazan (he and the Chernigov prince refused to help Ryazan). The Mongols send an embassy to him with an offer to become their tributary, but the negotiations also turn out to be fruitless (according to the Laurentian Chronicle, the prince still agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops to Kolomna. It is difficult to explain the logic of such an act).

According to V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the battle of Kolomna began no later than January 9 and lasted for 5 whole days (according to Rashid ad-Din). Here another logical question immediately arises - historians are sure that the military forces of the Russian principalities as a whole were modest and corresponded to the reconstructions of that era, when an army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 thousand or more people seemed like a huge army. It is unlikely that the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich could have collected more (if we make a digression: the total population of the Vladimir land, according to various estimates, varied between 400-800 thousand people, but they were all scattered over a vast territory, and the population of the capital city of the earth - Vladimir, even according to the most daring reconstructions, it did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). However, near Kolomna the Mongols were pinned down for several days, and the intensity of the battle is shown by the fact of the death of Genghisid Kulkan, the son of Genghis Khan. With whom did the gigantic army of 140 thousand nomads fight so fiercely? With several thousand Vladimir soldiers?

After the victory at Kolomna in either a three- or five-day battle, the Mongols are vigorously moving along the ice of the Moscow River towards the future Russian capital. They cover a distance of 100 kilometers in literally 3-4 days (the pace of an average daily march is 25-30 kilometers): according to R.P. Khrapachevsky, the nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 (according to N.M. Karamzin - January 20). The nimble Mongols took the Muscovites by surprise - they did not even know about the results of the battle of Kolomna, and after a five-day siege, Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan: the city was burned, all its inhabitants were exterminated or taken prisoner.

Again, Moscow at that time, if we take archaeological data as the basis for our reasoning, was an absolutely tiny town. Thus, the first fortifications, built back in 1156, had a length of less than 1 kilometer, and the area of ​​the fortress itself did not exceed 3 hectares. By 1237, it is believed that the area of ​​the fortifications had already reached 10-12 hectares (that is, approximately half the territory of the current Kremlin). The city had its own suburb - it was located on the territory of modern Red Square. The total population of such a city hardly exceeded 1000 people. What a huge army of Mongols, possessing supposedly unique siege technologies, did for five whole days in front of this insignificant fortress, one can only guess.

It is also worth noting here that all historians recognize the fact of the movement of the Mongol-Tatars without a convoy. They say that the unpretentious nomads did not need it. Then it remains not entirely clear how and on what the Mongols moved their stone-throwing machines, shells for them, forges (for repairing weapons, replenishing lost arrowheads, etc.), and how they drove away prisoners. Since during the entire period of archaeological excavations on the territory of North-Eastern Rus' not a single burial of “Mongol-Tatars” was found, some historians even agreed to the version that the nomads took their dead back to the steppes (V.P. Darkevich, V. .V. Kargalov). Of course, it’s not even worth raising the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light (otherwise our historians will come up with the fact that they were eaten, a joke)...

However, after spending about a week in the vicinity of Moscow and plundering its agricultural contado (the main agricultural crop in this region was rye and partly oats, but steppe horses accepted grain very poorly), the Mongols moved along the ice of the Klyazma River (crossing the forest watershed between this river and Moscow River) to Vladimir. Having covered over 140 kilometers in 7 days (the pace of an average daily march is about 20 kilometers), on February 2, 1238, the nomads began the siege of the capital of the Vladimir land. By the way, it was at this transition that the Mongol army of 120-140 thousand people was “caught” by a tiny detachment of the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat of either 700 or 1700 people, against whom the Mongols - out of powerlessness - were forced to use stone-throwing machines in order to defeat him ( It is worth considering that the legend of Kolovrat was recorded, according to historians, only in the 15th century, so... it is difficult to consider it completely documentary).

Let’s ask an academic question: what is an army of 120-140 thousand people with almost 400 thousand horses (and it’s not clear if there is a convoy?) moving on the ice of some Oka or Moscow river? The simplest calculations show that even moving with a front of 2 kilometers (in reality, the width of these rivers is significantly less), such an army under the most ideal conditions (everyone moves at the same speed, maintaining a minimum distance of 10 meters) stretches for at least 20 kilometers. If we take into account that the width of the Oka is only 150-200 meters, then the gigantic army of Batu already stretches for almost... 200 kilometers! Again, if everyone walks at the same speed, maintaining a minimum distance. And on the ice of the Moscow or Klyazma rivers, the width of which varies from 50 to 100 meters at best? For 400-800 kilometers?

It is interesting that none of the Russian scientists over the past 200 years have even asked such a question, seriously believing that giant cavalry armies literally fly through the air.

In general, at the first stage of Batu Khan’s invasion of North-Eastern Rus' - from December 1, 1237 to February 2, 1238, a conventional Mongolian horse covered about 750 kilometers, which gives an average daily rate of movement of 12 kilometers. But if we exclude from the calculations at least 15 days of standing in the Oka floodplain (after the capture of Ryazan on December 21 and the battle of Kolomna), as well as a week of rest and looting near Moscow, the pace of the average daily march of the Mongol cavalry will seriously improve - up to 17 kilometers per day.

It cannot be said that these are some kind of record paces of march (the Russian army during the war with Napoleon, for example, made 30-40-kilometer daily marches), the interesting thing here is that all this happened in the dead of winter, and such paces were maintained for quite a long time.

From Vladimir to Kozelsk

On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War of the 13th century

Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, left Vladimir, leaving with a small squad for the Trans-Volga region - there, among the windbreaks on the Sit River, he set up a camp and awaited the arrival of reinforcements from his brothers - Yaroslav (father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. There were very few warriors left in the city, led by Yuri's sons - Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the Mongols spent 5 days with the city, shelling it with stone throwers, taking it only after the assault on February 7th. But before this, a small detachment of nomads led by Subudai managed to burn Suzdal.

After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol army is divided into three parts. The first and largest unit under the command of Batu goes from Vladimir to the northwest through the impassable forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed. The first march is from Vladimir to Yuryev-Polsky (about 60-65 kilometers). Then the army is divided - part goes exactly northwest to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (about 60 kilometers), and after a five-day siege this city fell. What was Pereyaslavl like then? It was a relatively small city, slightly larger than Moscow, although it had defensive fortifications up to 2.5 kilometers long. But its population also hardly exceeded 1-2 thousand people.

Then the Mongols go to Ksnyatin (about another 100 kilometers), to Kashin (30 kilometers), then turn west and move along the ice of the Volga to Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line it’s a little more than 110 kilometers, but they go along the Volga, there it’s all 250- 300 kilometers).

The second part goes through the dense forests of the Volga, Oka and Klyazma watershed from Yuryev-Polsky to Dmitrov (about 170 kilometers in a straight line), then after its capture - to Volok-Lamsky (130-140 kilometers), from there to Tver (about 120 kilometers) , after the capture of Tver - to Torzhok (together with the detachments of the first part) - in a straight line it is about 60 kilometers, but, apparently, they walked along the river, so it will be at least 100 kilometers. The Mongols reached Torzhok on February 21 - 14 days after leaving Vladimir.

Thus, the first part of the Batu detachment travels at least 500-550 kilometers in 15 days through dense forests and along the Volga. True, from here you need to throw out several days of siege of cities and it turns out about 10 days of march. For each of which, nomads pass through forests 50-55 kilometers a day! The second part of his detachment covers a total distance of less than 600 kilometers, which gives an average daily march pace of up to 40 kilometers. Taking into account a couple of days for sieges of cities - up to 50 kilometers per day.

Near Torzhok, a rather modest city by the standards of that time, the Mongols were stuck for at least 12 days and took it only on March 5 (V.V. Kargalov). After the capture of Torzhok, one of the Mongol detachments advanced towards Novgorod another 150 kilometers, but then turned back.

The second detachment of the Mongol army under the command of Kadan and Buri left Vladimir to the east, moving along the ice of the Klyazma River. Having walked 120 kilometers to Starodub, the Mongols burned this city, and then “cut off” the forested watershed between the lower Oka and middle Volga, reaching Gorodets (this is about another 170-180 kilometers, if the crow flies). Further, the Mongolian detachments along the ice of the Volga reached Kostoroma (this is about 350-400 kilometers), some detachments even reached Galich Mersky. From Kostroma, the Mongols of Buri and Kadan went to join the third detachment under the command of Burundai to the west - to Uglich. Most likely, the nomads moved on the ice of the rivers (in any case, let us remind you once again, this is the custom in Russian historiography), which gives about another 300-330 kilometers of travel.

In early March, Kadan and Buri were already near Uglich, having covered a little over three weeks to 1000-1100 kilometers. The average daily pace of the march was about 45-50 kilometers for the nomads, which is close to the performance of the Batu detachment.

The third detachment of Mongols under the command of Burundai turned out to be the “slowest” - after the capture of Vladimir, he set out for Rostov (170 kilometers in a straight line), then covered another 100 kilometers to Uglich. Part of Burundai's forces made a forced march to Yaroslavl (about 70 kilometers) from Uglich. At the beginning of March, Burundai unmistakably found the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Trans-Volga forests, whom he defeated in the battle on the Sit River on March 4. The transition from Uglich to the City and back is about 130 kilometers. In total, Burundai's troops covered about 470 kilometers in 25 days - this gives us only 19 kilometers of the average daily march.

In general, the conditional average Mongolian horse clocked up “on the speedometer” from December 1, 1237 to March 4, 1238 (94 days) from 1200 (the minimum estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Mongol army) to 1800 kilometers. The conditional daily journey ranges from 12-13 to 20 kilometers. In reality, if we throw out standing in the floodplain of the Oka River (about 15 days), 5 days of the assault on Moscow and 7 days of rest after its capture, the five-day siege of Vladimir, as well as another 6-7 days for the sieges of Russian cities in the second half of February, it turns out that Mongolian horses covered an average of 25-30 kilometers for each of their 55 days of movement. These are excellent results for horses, taking into account the fact that all this happened in the cold, in the middle of forests and snowdrifts, with a clear lack of feed (it is unlikely that the Mongols could requisition a lot of feed from the peasants for their horses, especially since the steppe horses did not eat practically grain) and hard work.

The Mongolian steppe horse has not changed for centuries (Mongolia, 1911)

After the capture of Torzhok, the main part of the Mongol army concentrated on the upper Volga in the Tver region. They then moved in the first half of March 1238 on a broad front south into the steppe. The left wing, under the command of Kadan and Buri, passed through the forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed, then went to the upper reaches of the Moscow River and descended along it to the Oka. In a straight line it is about 400 kilometers, taking into account the average pace of movement of fast-moving nomads - this is about 15-20 days of travel for them. So, apparently, already in the first half of April this part of the Mongol army entered the steppe. We have no information about how the melting of snow and ice on the rivers affected the movement of this detachment (the Ipatiev Chronicle only reports that the steppe inhabitants moved very quickly). There is also no information about what this detachment did the next month after entering the steppe; it is only known that in May Kadan and Buri came to the rescue of Batu, who by that time was stuck near Kozelsk.

Small Mongol detachments, probably, as V.V. believes. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, plundering and burning Russian settlements. How they came out into the steppe in the spring of 1238 is not known.

Most of the Mongol army under the command of Batu and Burundai, instead of taking the shortest route to the steppe, which the detachments of Kadan and Buri took, chose a very intricate route:

More is known about Batu’s route - from Torzhok he moved along the Volga and Vazuza (a tributary of the Volga) to the interfluve of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk lands to the Chernigov city of Vshchizh, lying on the banks of the Desna, writes Khrapachevsky. Having made a detour along the upper reaches of the Volga to the west and northwest, the Mongols turned south and, crossing watersheds, went to the steppes. Probably some detachments were marching in the center, through Volok-Lamsky (through the forests). Approximately, the left edge of Batu covered about 700-800 kilometers during this time, other detachments a little less. By April 1, the Mongols reached Serensk, and Kozelsk (the chronicle Kozeleska, to be precise) - April 3-4 (according to other information - already March 25). On average, this gives us about 35-40 more kilometers of daily march (and the Mongols no longer walk on the ice of rivers, but through dense forests on watersheds).

Near Kozelsk, where ice drift on Zhizdra and snow melting in its floodplain could already begin, Batu was stuck for almost 2 months (more precisely, for 7 weeks - 49 days - until May 23-25, maybe later, if we count from April 3, and according to Rashid ad-Din - generally for 8 weeks). Why the Mongols necessarily needed to besiege an insignificant, even by medieval Russian standards, town that had no strategic significance is not entirely clear. For example, the neighboring towns of Krom, Spat, Mtsensk, Domagoshch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk were not even touched by the nomads.

Historians are still arguing on this topic; no sane argument has been given. The funniest version was proposed by the folk historian of the “Eurasian persuasion” L.N. Gumilev, who suggested that the Mongols took revenge on the grandson of the Chernigov prince Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the Kalka River in 1223. It’s funny that the Smolensk prince Mstislav the Old was also involved in the murder of the ambassadors. But the Mongols did not touch Smolensk...

Logically, Batu had to quickly leave for the steppes, since the spring thaw and lack of food threatened him with the complete loss of, at a minimum, “transport” - that is, horses.

None of the historians was puzzled by the question of what the horses and the Mongols themselves ate while besieging Kozelsk for almost two months (using standard stone-throwing machines). Finally, it is simply difficult to believe that a town with a population of several hundred, even a couple of thousand people, a huge army of the Mongols, numbering tens of thousands of soldiers, and supposedly having unique siege technologies and equipment, could not take 7 weeks...

As a result, near Kozelsk, the Mongols allegedly lost up to 4,000 people, and only the arrival of the troops of Buri and Kadan in May 1238 from the steppes saved the situation - the town was finally taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor, it is worth saying that former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, in honor of the services of the population of Kozelsk to Russia, awarded the settlement the title of “City of Military Glory.” The humor was that archaeologists, after almost 15 years of searching, were unable to find unambiguous evidence of the existence of Kozelsk destroyed by Batu. You can talk about what passions were boiling over this issue in the scientific and bureaucratic community of Kozelsk.

If we summarize the estimated data in a first and very rough approximation, it turns out that from December 1, 1237 to April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozelsk), a conventional Mongol horse traveled on average from 1,700 to 2,800 kilometers. In terms of 120 days, this gives an average daily journey ranging from 15 to 23-odd kilometers. Since periods of time are known when the Mongols did not move (sieges, etc., and this is about 45 days in total), the scope of their average daily actual march spreads from 23 to 38 kilometers per day.

Simply put, this means more than intense stress on the horses. The question of how many of them survived after such transitions in rather harsh climatic conditions and an obvious lack of food is not even discussed by Russian historians. As well as the question of the Mongolian losses themselves.

For example, R.P. Khrapachevsky generally believes that during the entire Western campaign of the Mongols in 1235-1242, their losses amounted to only about 15% of their original number, while historian V.B. Koshcheev counted up to 50 thousand sanitary losses during the campaign in North-Eastern Rus' alone. However, all these losses - both in people and horses, the brilliant Mongols quickly made up for at the expense of... the conquered peoples themselves. Therefore, already in the summer of 1238, Batu’s armies continued the war in the steppes against the Kipchaks, and in 1241 Europe was invaded by who knows what army - for example, Thomas of Splitsky reports that there were a huge number of... Russians, Kipchaks, Bulgars, Mordovians, etc. P. peoples It is not really clear how many of them there were “Mongols” themselves.

In August 1227, Genghis Khan died. But his death did not put an end to the Mongol conquests. The successors of the great kagan continued their aggressive policy. They significantly expanded the borders of the empire and turned it from a huge into an immense power. Genghis Khan's grandson Batu Khan made a significant contribution to this. It was he who started the Great Western Expedition, which is also called Batu's invasion.

Start of the hike

The defeat of the Russian squads and Polovtsian troops on Kalka in 1223 did not at all mean for the Mongols that the Polovtsians were completely defeated, and their main ally in the person of Kievan Rus was demoralized. It was necessary to consolidate success, and to replenish their bins with new riches. However, the war with the Jurchen Kin Empire and the Tangut state of Xi-Xia prevented the start of the campaign to the west. Only after the capture of the city of Zhongxi in 1227 and the fortress of Caizhou in 1234 did the great conquerors have the opportunity to begin a western campaign.

In 1235, a kurultai (congress of the nobility) gathered on the banks of the Onon River. It was decided to resume expansion to the west. This campaign was entrusted to the leadership of the grandson of Genghis Khan, Batu Khan (1209-1256). One of the best military leaders, Subedei-Bagatura (1176-1248), was appointed commander of his troops. He was an experienced one-eyed warrior who accompanied Genghis Khan on all his campaigns and defeated the Russian squads on the Kalka River.

Mongol Empire on the map

The total number of troops that moved on the long journey was small. In total, there were 130 thousand mounted warriors in the empire. Of these, 60 thousand were in China all the time. Another 40 thousand served in Central Asia, where there was a constant need to pacify Muslims. At the headquarters of the Great Khan there were 10 thousand soldiers. So for the western campaign the Mongols were able to allocate only 20 thousand horsemen. These forces were certainly not enough. Therefore, they mobilized and took the eldest son from each family, recruiting another 20 thousand soldiers. Thus, Batu’s entire army numbered no more than 40 thousand people.

This figure is given by the outstanding Russian archaeologist and orientalist Nikolai Ivanovich Veselovsky (1848-1918). He motivates it by the fact that every warrior on a campaign had to have a riding horse, a war horse and a pack horse. That is, for 40 thousand warriors there were 120 thousand horses. In addition, convoys and siege weapons moved behind the army. These are again horses and people. They all needed to be fed and watered. The steppe had to fulfill this function, since it was simply impossible to carry food and forage in huge quantities.

The steppe, despite its endless expanses, is not omnipotent. She could only feed the specified number of people and animals. For her, this was the optimal figure. If more people and horses had gone out on a campaign, they would very soon have begun to die of hunger.

An example of this is General Dovator’s raid on German rear lines in August 1941. His body was in the forests all the time. By the end of the raid, people and horses almost died of hunger and thirst, since the forest could not feed and water the huge mass of living creatures gathered in one place.

Genghis Khan's military leaders turned out to be much smarter than the command of the Red Army. They were practitioners and knew the possibilities of the steppe perfectly. From this it can be seen that the figure of 40 thousand horsemen is the most likely.

The great invasion of Batu began in November 1235. Batu and Subedei-bagatur chose the time of year for a reason. Winter was beginning, and snow always replaced water for people and horses. In the 13th century, it could be eaten without fear in any corner of the planet, since the ecology met the best standards and was in ideal condition.

The troops crossed Mongolia, and then, through passes in the mountains, entered the Kazakh steppes. In the summer months, the great conquerors found themselves near the Aral Sea. Here they had to overcome a very difficult section along the Ustyurt plateau to the Volga. People and horses were saved by springs dug in the ground, and caravanserais, which from time immemorial provided shelter and food to numerous merchant caravans.

A huge mass of people and horses walked 25 km a day. The path covered a distance of 5 thousand kilometers. Therefore, the glorious bagaturs appeared in the lower reaches of the Volga only in the fall of 1236. But a well-deserved rest did not await them on the fertile banks of the great river.

The great conquerors were driven by a thirst for revenge against the Volga Bulgars, who in 1223 defeated the wax of Subedei-bagatur and Dzhebe-noyon. The Mongols stormed the city of Bulgar and destroyed it. The Bulgars themselves were mostly massacred. The survivors recognized the power of the Great Khan and bowed their heads before Batu. Other Volga peoples also submitted to the invaders. These are the Burtases and Bashkirs.

Leaving behind grief, tears and destruction, Batu’s troops crossed the Volga in 1237 and moved towards the Russian principalities. Along the way, the army split up. Two tumen (a tumen is a military unit in the Mongol army numbering 10 thousand people) went south towards the Crimean steppes and began to pursue the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan, pushing him towards the Dniester River. These troops were led by Genghis Khan's grandson Mongke Khan. Batu himself and Subedei-bagatur moved with the remaining people to the borders of the Ryazan principality.

Kievan Rus in the 13th century did not represent a single state. Back in the first half of the 12th century, it split into separate principalities. These were absolutely independent entities that did not recognize the authority of the Kyiv prince. There were constant wars between them. As a result, cities were destroyed and people died. This time is called the period of feudal fragmentation. It is typical not only for Rus', but also for the rest of Europe.

Some historians, including Lev Gumilyov, argue that the Mongols did not set themselves the goal of capturing and conquering Russian lands. They only wanted to get food and horses to fight their main enemies - the Polovtsians. It is difficult to argue with anything here, but, in any case, it is best to rely on the facts and not draw any conclusions.

Batu's invasion of Rus' (1237-1240)

Once on the Ryazan lands, Batu sent parliamentarians demanding that he be given food and horses. Ryazan Prince Yuri refused. He led his squad out of the city to fight the Mongols. Princes from the city of Murom came to his aid. But when the Mongols turned like lava and went on the attack, the Russian squads wavered and ran. They locked themselves in the city, and Batu’s troops laid siege around it.

Ryazan was poorly prepared for defense. It was only recently rebuilt after the destruction by the Suzdal prince Vsevolod the Big Nest in 1208. Therefore, the city lasted only 6 days. At the beginning of the third decade of December 1237, the Mongols took it by storm. The princely family died, and the city itself was plundered by the invaders.

By this time, Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir had gathered an army. It was headed by the son of Prince Vsevolod and the Vladimir governor Eremey Glebovich. This army also included the remnants of the Ryazan squad, the Novgorod and Chernigov regiments.

The meeting with the Mongols took place on January 1, 1238 near Kolomna in the floodplain of the Moscow River. This battle lasted 3 days and ended with the defeat of the Russian squads. The Vladimir governor Eremey Glebovich was killed, and Prince Vsevolod with the remnants of the army fought off the enemies and reached Vladimir, where he appeared before the stern eyes of his father Yuri Vsevolodovich.

But as soon as the Mongols celebrated their victory, the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat hit them in the rear. His detachment numbered no more than 2 thousand soldiers. With this handful of people, he bravely resisted two Mongolian tumens. The cutting was scary. But the enemy eventually prevailed due to their numbers. Evpatiy Kolovrat himself was killed, and many of his warriors were killed. As a sign of respect for the courage of these people, Batu released the survivors in peace.

After this, the Mongols besieged Kolomna, and another part of the troops surrounded Moscow. Both cities fell. Batu's troops took Moscow by storm on January 20, 1238, after a siege that lasted 5 days. Thus, the invaders ended up on the land of the Vladimir-Suzdal principality and moved towards the city of Vladimir.

Prince Vladimirsky Yuri Vsevolodovich did not shine with military leadership talents. He did not have much strength, but the prince divided this little into two parts. One was charged with protecting the city from invaders, and the second was to leave the capital city and fortify itself in the dense forests.

The prince entrusted the defense of the city to his son Vsevolod, and he himself went with the second detachment to the bank of the Mologa River and set up camp in the place where the Sit River flowed into it. Here he began to wait for the army from Novgorod, so that together with him he could strike the Mongols and completely defeat the invaders.

Meanwhile, Batu's troops besieged Vladimir. The city lasted only 8 days and fell in early February 1238. The prince's entire family and a large number of residents died, and the invaders burned and destroyed many buildings.

After this, the main forces of the Mongols moved to Suzdal and Pereslavl, and Batu ordered his military leader Burundai to find the Vladimir prince and destroy his troops. He didn’t look for Yuri Vsevolodovich’s fighting squad for long. The prince, holed up on the City River, did not even bother to set up patrols and send out patrols.

The Mongols accidentally stumbled upon an unguarded camp. They surrounded him and attacked him unexpectedly. The Russians bravely resisted, but were killed. Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich himself also died. This event happened on March 4, 1238.

Meanwhile, the army led by Batu and Subedei-bagatur besieged Torzhok. Its inhabitants were under siege, as Novgorod promised them help. But the saviors never appeared. While the Novgorodians were holding a meeting and gathering, Batu took Torzhok on March 5th. The city's population was completely slaughtered. But the invaders did not go to Novgorod, but turned south. The spring thaw had its say, and the Mongols’ strength diminished.

The invaders also moved to the south in two detachments. These are the main forces and several thousand horsemen led by Burundai. The city of Kozelsk appeared on the path of the main group of troops. Its residents refused to open the gates. The Mongols organized a siege and began to storm the walls. But their military efforts were in vain. For 7 long weeks, the residents of a small town held back the frenzied attacks of the enemy. At the same time, they themselves made regular forays and inflicted significant damage on the aggressor.

In mid-May, Burundai's detachment approached. The enemy group strengthened, and the final assault began. It continued almost without interruption for 3 days. Finally, when there were no longer adult men left on the walls, and they were replaced by women and teenagers, the Mongols managed to take possession of the city. They completely destroyed it, and slaughtered the surviving inhabitants.

The courageous defense of Kozelsk completely undermined the strength of the Mongol army. In a quick march, almost without stopping anywhere, the Mongols crossed the borders of the Chernigov principality and went to the lower reaches of the Volga. Here they rested, gained strength, replenished their tumens with human resources at the expense of the Bulgars and Russians, and began their second campaign to the west.

It should be noted that not all Russian cities resisted the invaders. The inhabitants of some of them negotiated with the Mongols. So, for example, rich Uglich supplied the invaders with horses and provisions, and Batu did not touch the city. Some Russian people willingly went to serve the Mongols. The chroniclers called such “heroes” “the worst Christians.”

Batu's second invasion of Russian lands began in the spring of 1239. The invaders walked through the already devastated cities, and then besieged Pereslavl and Chernigov. Having captured these cities and plundered them, the Mongols rushed to the Dnieper. Now their goal was the city of Kyiv. The same one suffered from princely strife. At the time of the siege, there was not even a single prince in the capital city. The defense was led by Dmitry Tysyatsky.

The siege began on September 5, 1240. The city's garrison was small, but it held out until mid-November. Only on the 19th did the Mongols take the city, and Dmitra was captured. Next came the turn of the Volyn principality. Residents of the city of Volyn initially wanted to resist the invaders, but the Bolkhov princes, who had houses in the southern part of the city, agreed with the Mongols. The townspeople gave Batu horses and provisions and thereby saved their lives.

Batu's invasion of Europe

Having defeated the Russian principalities individually, the invaders reached the western borders of the once united and powerful Kievan Rus. Before them lay Poland and Hungary. Batu sent a tumen to Poland, led by Genghis Khan's grandson Baydar. In January 1241, the Mongols approached Lublin and sent their envoys. But they were killed. Then the invaders took the city by storm. They then marched towards Krakow and defeated the Polish troops who tried to stop them. Krakow fell on March 22. Duke of Krakow Boleslaw V (1226-1279) fled to Hungary, where he hid for some time.

In April, the Battle of Liegnitz took place in Silesia. Polish and German troops opposed Tumen Baidar. In this battle, the Mongols won a complete victory and moved further west. In May they occupied the town of Maysen, but subsequent advances were stopped by Batu's order. He gave the command to Baydar to turn south and connect with the main forces.

The main forces were led by Batu himself and Subedei-Baghatur. They consisted of two tumens and operated in the southern regions. Here they stormed the city of Galich and moved to Hungary. The invaders sent their envoys forward, but the Hungarians killed them, thereby aggravating the situation. The Mongols stormed cities one after another, and mercilessly killed prisoners, avenging their ambassadors.

The decisive battle with the Hungarian troops took place on the Chajo River on April 11, 1241. The Hungarian king Bela IV (1206-1270) opposed the Tumen under the command of Batu and Subedei-bagatur. The Croatian army came to his aid. It was headed by the king's brother, Duke Coloman (1208-1241).

The Hungarian army was twice as large as the Mongol army. There were at least 40 thousand warriors in it. For sparsely populated Europe, such an army was considered a very serious force. The crowned persons had no doubts about victory, but they were not familiar with the tactics of the Mongol troops.

Subedei-Baghatur sent forward a 2,000-strong detachment. He appeared in the field of view of the Hungarians, and they began to pursue him. This lasted for almost a whole week, until the armored warriors found themselves in front of the Shayo River.

Here the Hungarians and Croats set up camp, and at night the main forces of the Mongols secretly crossed the river and went to the rear of the allied army. In the morning, stone-throwing machines began firing at the camp from the opposite bank of the river. Huge granite blocks flew towards the Hungarian army. Panic arose, which was aggravated by the archers of Subedei-bagatur. From the nearby hills they began to shoot arrows at the people rushing around the camp.

Having demoralized the allies, the Mongols broke into their location and the felling began. The Hungarian army managed to break through the encirclement, but this did not save it. The Mongols, retreating in panic, caught up and destroyed them. This whole massacre lasted 6 days, until Batu’s troops burst into the city of Pest on the shoulders of those fleeing.

In the battle on the Chaillot River, the Croatian Duke Koloman was mortally wounded. He died a few days after the end of the battle, and his brother King Béla IV fled to the Austrians for help. At the same time, he gave almost his entire treasury to the Austrian Duke Frederick II.

The Hungarian state came under the rule of the Mongols. Khan Batu waited for the tumen coming from Poland, led by Baydar, and turned his gaze to the lands of the Holy Roman Empire. During the summer and autumn of 1241, the Mongols conducted military operations on the right bank of the Danube and practically reached the Adriatic Sea. But after the defeat from the Austrian-Czech army near the city of Neustadt, they left for the Danube.

The forces of the aggressors weakened after many years of exhausting war. In March 1242, the Mongols turned their horses and moved east. Thus, Batu’s invasion of Europe ended. Khan of the Golden Horde returned to the Volga. Here he founded his main headquarters, the city of Sarai. This is 80 km north of modern Astrakhan.

At first, the khan's headquarters was an ordinary nomadic camp, but in the early 50s it turned into a city. It stretches along the Akhtuba River (the left branch of the Volga) for 15 km. In 1256, when Batu died, the population of Saray reached 75 thousand people. The city existed until the end of the 15th century.

Results of Batu's invasion

Batu's invasion is, of course, a grandiose event. The Mongols traveled a long way from the Onon River to the Adriatic Sea. At the same time, the campaign to the west cannot be called aggressive. It was more of a raid, typical of nomads. The Mongols destroyed cities, killed people, robbed them, but after that they left and did not impose tribute on the conquered areas.

An example of this is Rus'. There was no talk of any tribute for 20 years after Batu’s invasion. The only exceptions were the Kiev and Chernigov principalities. Here the invaders collected taxes. But the population very quickly found a way out. People began to move to the northern principalities.

This is the so-called Zalesskaya Rus'. It included Tver, Kolomna, Serpukhov, Murom, Moscow, Ryazan, Vladimir. That is, exactly those cities that Batu destroyed in 1237-1238. Thus, the original Russian traditions moved north. As a result, the south lost its importance. This affected the further history of the Russian state. Less than 100 years passed and the main role began to be played not by the southern cities, but by Moscow, which over time turned into the capital of a new strong power.

This is an article about the Mongol invasions of Rus' in 1237-1240. For the 1223 invasion, see Battle of the Kalka River. For later invasions, see List of Mongol-Tatar campaigns against Russian principalities.

Mongol invasion of Rus'- invasions of the troops of the Mongol Empire into the territories of the Russian principalities in 1237-1240. during the Western campaign of the Mongols ( Kipchak campaign) 1236-1242 under the leadership of Genghisid Batu and the military leader Subedei.

Background

For the first time, the task of reaching the city of Kyiv was set to Subedei by Genghis Khan in 1221: He sent Subeetai-Baatur on a campaign to the north, ordering him to reach eleven countries and peoples, such as: Kanlin, Kibchaut, Bachzhigit, Orosut, Machzharat, Asut, Sasut, Serkesut, Keshimir, Bolar, Rural (Lalat), to cross the high-water the rivers Idil and Ayakh, as well as reach the city of Kivamen-kermen When the united Russian-Polovtsian army suffered a crushing defeat in the battle on the Kalka River on May 31, 1223, the Mongols invaded the southern Russian border lands (the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary calls it the first Mongol invasion of Russia), but abandoned the plan to march on Kyiv, and then were defeated in Volga Bulgaria in 1224.

In 1228-1229, having ascended the throne, Ogedei sent a 30,000-strong corps to the west, led by Subedei and Kokoshay, against the Kipchaks and Volga Bulgars. In connection with these events, in 1229 the name of the Tatars reappears in Russian chronicles: “ Bulgarian watchmen came running from the Tatars near the river, whose name is Yaik"(and in 1232 Tatarov arrived and winter did not reach the Great Bulgarian City).

The “Secret Legend”, in relation to the period 1228-1229, reports that Ogedei

He sent Batu, Buri, Munke and many other princes on a campaign to help Subeetai, since Subeetai-Baatur encountered strong resistance from those peoples and cities whose conquest he was entrusted with under Genghis Khan, namely the peoples of Kanlin, Kibchaut, Bachzhigit, Orusut, Asut, Sesut, Machzhar, Keshimir, Sergesut, Bular, Kelet (the Chinese “History of the Mongols” adds ne-mi-sy) as well as cities beyond the high-water rivers Adil and Zhayakh, such as: Meketmen, Kermen-keibe and others...When the army is numerous, everyone will rise up and walk with their heads held high. There are many enemy countries there, and the people there are fierce. These are the kind of people who accept death in rage, throwing themselves on their own swords. Their swords, they say, are sharp.”

However, in 1231-1234 the Mongols waged a second war with Jin, and the movement to the west of the united forces of all uluses began immediately after the decision of the kurultai of 1235.

Gumilyov L.N. estimates the size of the Mongol army similarly (30-40 thousand people). In modern historical literature, another estimate of the total number of the Mongol army in the western campaign is dominant: 120-140 thousand soldiers, 150 thousand soldiers.

Initially, Ogedei himself planned to lead the Kipchak campaign, but Munke dissuaded him. In addition to Batu, the following Genghisids took part in the campaign: the sons of Jochi Orda-Ezhen, Shiban, Tangkut and Berke, the grandson of Chagatai Buri and the son of Chagatai Baydar, the sons of Ogedei Guyuk and Kadan, the sons of Tolui Munke and Buchek, the son of Genghis Khan Kulhan, the grandson of Genghis Khan's brother Argasun. The importance the Chingizids attached to the conquest of the Russians is evidenced by Ogedei’s monologue addressed to Guyuk, who was dissatisfied with Batu’s leadership.

The Vladimir chronicler reports in 1230: “ That same year, the Bulgarians bowed to Grand Duke Yuri, asking for peace for six years, and make peace with them" The desire for peace was supported by deeds: after the conclusion of peace in Rus', famine broke out as a result of a two-year crop failure, and the Bulgars brought ships with food to Russian cities free of charge. Under 1236: " The Tatars came to the Bulgarian land and took the glorious Great Bulgarian City, slaughtered everyone from old to young and even to the last child, and burned their city and captured all their land" Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich Vladimirsky accepted Bulgarian refugees on his land and resettled them in Russian cities. The Battle of the Kalka River showed that even the defeat of the combined forces in a general battle is a way to undermine the forces of the invaders and force them to abandon plans for a further offensive. But in 1236, Yuri Vsevolodovich Vladimirsky and his brother Yaroslav of Novgorod, who had the largest military potential in Rus' (under 1229 in the chronicle we read: “ and bowed to Yuri, who is his father and master"), did not send troops to help the Volga Bulgars, but used them to establish control over Kiev, thereby putting an end to the Chernigov-Smolensk struggle for it and taking into their own hands the reins of the traditional Kiev collection, which at the beginning of the 13th century was still recognized by all Russian princes . The political situation in Rus' in the period 1235-1237 was also determined by the victories of Yaroslav of Novgorod over the Order of the Sword in 1234 and Daniil Romanovich of Volyn over the Teutonic Order in 1237. Lithuania also acted against the Order of the Sword (Battle of Saul in 1236), resulting in its remnants uniting with the Teutonic Order.

First stage. North-Eastern Rus' (1237-1239)

Invasion 1237-1238

The fact that the Mongol attack on Rus' at the end of 1237 was not unexpected is evidenced by the letters and reports of the Hungarian missionary monk, Dominican Julian:

Many report as true, and the Prince of Suzdal conveyed verbally through me to the King of Hungary, that the Tatars are conferring day and night on how to come and seize the kingdom of the Christian Hungarians. For they, they say, have the intention to go to the conquest of Rome and further... Now, being on the borders of Rus', we have closely learned the real truth that the entire army going to the countries of the West is divided into four parts. One part near the Etil (Volga) river on the borders of Rus' from the eastern edge approached Suzdal. The other part in the southern direction was already attacking the borders of Ryazan, another Russian principality. The third part stopped opposite the Don River, near the Oveheruch castle, also a Russian principality. They, as the Russians themselves, the Hungarians and the Bulgarians who fled before them verbally conveyed to us, are waiting for the earth, rivers and swamps to freeze with the onset of the coming winter, after which it will be easy for the entire multitude of Tatars to plunder all of Rus', the entire Russian country.

The Mongols directed the main attack on the Ryazan principality (see Defense of Ryazan). Yuri Vsevolodovich sent a united army to help the Ryazan princes: his eldest son Vsevolod with all the people, the governor Eremey Glebovich, the forces retreating from Ryazan led by Roman Ingvarevich and the Novgorod regiments - but it was too late: Ryazan fell after a 6-day siege on December 21. The sent army managed to give the invaders a fierce battle near Kolomna (on the territory of Ryazan land), but was defeated.

The Mongols invaded the Vladimir-Suzdal principality. Yuri Vsevolodovich retreated to the north and began to gather an army for a new battle with the enemy, waiting for the regiment of his brothers Yaroslav (who was in Kiev) and Svyatoslav (before this, he was last mentioned in the chronicle in 1229 as a prince sent by Yuri to reign in Pereyaslavl-Yuzhny) . " Within the land of Suzdal"The Mongols were caught up by those returning from Chernigov" in a small squad“The Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat, together with the remnants of the Ryazan troops and thanks to the surprise of the attack, was able to inflict significant losses on them (some editions of “The Tale of the Ruin of Ryazan by Batu” tell about the solemn funeral of Evpatiy Kolovrat in the Ryazan Cathedral on January 11, 1238). On January 20, after 5 days of resistance, Moscow fell, which was defended by Yuri’s youngest son Vladimir and governor Philip Nyanka “ with a small army", Vladimir Yuryevich was captured and then killed in front of the walls of Vladimir. Vladimir himself was taken on February 7 after a five-day siege (see Defense of Vladimir), and the entire family of Yuri Vsevolodovich died. In addition to Vladimir, in February 1238, Suzdal, Yuryev-Polsky, Starodub-on-Klyazma, Gorodets, Kostroma, Galich-Mersky, Vologda, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Uglich, Kashin, Ksnyatin, Dmitrov and Volok Lamsky were taken, the most stubborn resistance except Moscow and Vladimir were supported by Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (taken by the Chingizids together in 5 days), Tver and Torzhok (defense of February 22 - March 5), which lay on the direct route of the main Mongol forces from Vladimir to Novgorod. One of the sons of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich died in Tver, whose name has not been preserved. The Volga region cities, whose defenders had gone with their princes Konstantinovich to Yuri on the Sit, were attacked by the secondary forces of the Mongols, led by Temnik Burundai. On March 4, 1238, they unexpectedly attacked the Russian army (see Battle of the City River) and were able to defeat it, however, they themselves “ suffered a great plague, and many of them fell" In the battle, Vsevolod Konstantinovich Yaroslavsky died along with Yuri, Vasilko Konstantinovich Rostovsky was captured (later killed), Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich and Vladimir Konstantinovich Uglitsky managed to escape.

Summing up the defeat of Yuri and the ruin of the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, first Russian historian Tatishchev V.N. says that the losses of the Mongolian troops were many times greater than the losses of the Russians, but the Mongols made up for their losses at the expense of prisoners (prisoners covered their destruction), who at that time turned out to be more numerous than the Mongols themselves ( and especially the prisoners). In particular, the assault on Vladimir was launched only after one of the Mongol detachments that took Suzdal returned with many prisoners. However, eastern sources, which repeatedly mention the use of prisoners during the Mongol conquests in China and Central Asia, do not mention the use of prisoners for military purposes in Rus' and Central Europe.

After the capture of Torzhok on March 5, 1238, the main forces of the Mongols, having united with the remnants of Burundai’s army, did not reach 100 versts to Novgorod and turned back to the steppes (according to different versions, due to the spring thaw or due to high losses). On the way back, the Mongol army moved in two groups. The main group traveled 30 km east of Smolensk, stopping in the Dolgomostye area. The literary source - “The Tale of Mercury of Smolensk” - talks about the defeat and flight of the Mongol troops. Next, the main group went south, invaded the Chernigov principality and burned Vshchizh, located in close proximity to the central regions of the Chernigov-Seversky principality, but then turned sharply to the northeast and, bypassing the large cities of Bryansk and Karachev, besieged Kozelsk. The eastern group, led by Kadan and Buri, passed by Ryazan in the spring of 1238. The siege of Kozelsk dragged on for 7 weeks. In May 1238, the Mongols united near Kozelsk and took it during a three-day assault, suffering heavy losses both in equipment and in human resources during the attacks of the besieged.

Yaroslav Vsevolodovich was succeeded by Vladimir after his brother Yuri, and Kyiv was occupied by Mikhail of Chernigov, thus concentrating in his hands the Principality of Galicia, the Principality of Kiev and the Principality of Chernigov.

Invasions 1238-1239

At the end of 1238 - beginning of 1239, the Mongols led by Subedei, having suppressed the uprising in Volga Bulgaria and Mordovian land, again invaded Rus', ravaged the outskirts of Nizhny Novgorod, Gorokhovets, Gorodets, Murom, and Ryazan again. On March 3, 1239, a detachment under the command of Berke ravaged Pereyaslavl South.

The Lithuanian invasion of the Grand Duchy of Smolensk and the campaign of Galician troops against Lithuania with the participation of 12-year-old Rostislav Mikhailovich also date back to this period (taking advantage of the absence of the main Galician forces, Daniil Romanovich Volynsky captured Galich, establishing himself in it completely). Considering the death of the Vladimir army in the City at the beginning of 1238, this campaign played a certain role in the success of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich near Smolensk. In addition, when in the summer of 1240 the Swedish feudal lords, together with the Teutonic knights, launched an attack on Novgorod land, in the battle on the river. Neva, the son of Yaroslav, Alexander Novgorod, stops the Swedes with the forces of his squad, and the beginning of successful independent actions of the troops of North-Eastern Rus' after the invasion dates back only to the period 1242-1245 (Battle of the Ice and victories over the Lithuanians).

Second stage (1239-1240)

Principality of Chernigov

After the siege that began on October 18, 1239, using powerful siege technology, the Mongols captured Chernigov (an army led by Prince Mstislav Glebovich unsuccessfully tried to help the city). After the fall of Chernigov, the Mongols did not go north, but took up robbery and destruction in the east, along the Desna and Seim - archaeological studies showed that Lyubech (in the north) was untouched, but the towns of the principality bordering the Polovtsian steppe, such as Putivl, Glukhov, Vyr and Rylsk were destroyed and devastated. At the beginning of 1240, an army led by Munke reached the left bank of the Dnieper opposite Kyiv. An embassy was sent to the city with a proposal to surrender, but it was destroyed. The Kiev prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich left for Hungary in order to marry the daughter of King Bela IV Anna to his eldest son Rostislav (the wedding would take place only in 1244 to commemorate the alliance against Daniil of Galicia).

Daniil Galitsky captured in Kiev the Smolensk prince Rostislav Mstislavich, who was trying to take over the great reign, and put his thousandth Dmitry in the city, returned Mikhail’s wife (his sister), captured by Yaroslav on the way to Hungary, gave Mikhail Lutsk to feed (with the prospect of returning to Kyiv), his ally Izyaslav Vladimirovich Novgorod-Seversky - Kamenets.

Already in the spring of 1240, after the devastation of the Dnieper left bank by the Mongols, Ogedei decided to recall Munke and Guyuk from the western campaign.

The Laurentian Chronicle records in 1241 the murder of the Rylsky prince Mstislav by the Mongols (according to L. Voitovich, the son of Svyatoslav Olgovich Rylsky).

Southwestern Rus'

On September 5, 1240, the Mongol army led by Batu and other Chingizids besieged Kiev and only took it on November 19 (according to other sources, December 6; perhaps it was on December 6 that the last stronghold of the defenders, the Tithe Church, fell). Daniil Galitsky, who owned Kiev at that time, was in Hungary, trying - like Mikhail Vsevolodovich a year earlier - to conclude a dynastic marriage with the King of Hungary, Bela IV, and also unsuccessfully (the marriage of Lev Danilovich and Constance to commemorate the Galician-Hungarian union would take place only in 1247) . The defense of the “mother of Russian cities” was led by Dmitry Tysyatsky. The “Biography of Daniil Galitsky” says about Daniil:

Dmitry was captured. Ladyzhin and Kamenets were taken. The Mongols failed to take Kremenets. The capture of Vladimir-Volynsky was marked by an important event in internal Mongolian politics - Guyuk and Munke left Batu for Mongolia. The departure of the tumens of the most influential (after Batu) Chingizids undoubtedly reduced the strength of the Mongol army. In this regard, researchers believe that further movement to the west was undertaken by Batu on his own initiative.
Dmitry advised Batu to leave Galicia and go to the Ugrians without cooking:

The main forces of the Mongols, led by Baydar, invaded Poland, the rest led by Batu, Kadan and Subedei, taking Galich to Hungary in three days.

The Ipatiev Chronicle under 1241 mentions the princes of Ponizhye ( Bolokhovsky), who agreed to pay tribute to the Mongols in grain and thereby avoided the destruction of their lands, their campaign together with Prince Rostislav Mikhailovich against the city of Bakota and the successful punitive campaign of the Romanovichs; under 1243 - the campaign of two military leaders Batu against Volyn up to the city of Volodava in the middle reaches of the Western Bug.

Historical meaning

As a result of the invasion, about half of the population died. Kyiv, Vladimir, Suzdal, Ryazan, Tver, Chernigov, and many other cities were destroyed. The exceptions were Veliky Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, as well as the cities of Polotsk and Turov-Pinsk principalities. The developed urban culture of Ancient Rus' was destroyed.

For several decades, stone construction practically ceased in Russian cities. Complex crafts, such as the production of glass jewelry, cloisonne enamel, niello, grain, and polychrome glazed ceramics, disappeared. “Rus was thrown back several centuries, and in those centuries, when the guild industry of the West was moving to the era of primitive accumulation, the Russian handicraft industry had to go back through part of the historical path that had been made before Batu.”

The southern Russian lands lost almost their entire settled population. The surviving population fled to the forested northeast, concentrating in the area between the Northern Volga and Oka rivers. There were poorer soils and a colder climate than in the completely devastated southern regions of Rus', and trade routes were under the control of the Mongols. In its socio-economic development, Rus' was significantly thrown back.

“Military historians also note the fact that the process of differentiation of functions between formations of riflemen and detachments of heavy cavalry, specializing in direct strikes with cold weapons, in Rus' stopped immediately after the invasion: there was a unification of these functions in the person of the same warrior - a feudal lord forced to shoot with a bow and fight with a spear and sword. Thus, the Russian army, even in its selected, purely feudal in composition part (princely squads), was thrown back a couple of centuries: progress in military affairs was always accompanied by the division of functions and their assignment to successively emerging branches of the military, their unification (or rather, reunification) is a clear sign of regression. Be that as it may, Russian chronicles of the 14th century do not contain even a hint of separate detachments of riflemen, similar to the Genoese crossbowmen, the English archers of the Hundred Years' War. This is understandable: such detachments of “dacha people” cannot be formed; professional shooters were required, that is, people separated from production who sold their art and blood for hard cash; Rus', thrown back economically, simply couldn’t afford mercenaries.”