The ZIS-3 cannon, like many other artillery systems, was created under the leadership of the talented designer, Hero of Socialist Labor, State Prize laureate, Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor, Colonel General of the Technical Troops Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin.
She appeared on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War in the midst of fierce battles in 1942. And she immediately won not just sympathy - the love of the artillerymen. Among the field guns, there was no equal to it in technical excellence and maneuverability, in power and rate of fire, in accuracy and range - the Soviet 76-mm ZIS-3 divisional gun of the 1942 model.Here is just one example of tens of thousands of combat biographies of famous weapons. About gun No. 256563, Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote on June 16, 1944: “...It covered 12,280 km under its own power along direct and side roads of the war, along highways and paths, across fields and swamps, across snow and grass. On the way from Stalingrad to Ternopol, she destroyed 10 German tanks, 5 armored personnel carriers, 5 self-propelled guns, 15 vehicles, 16 guns, 4 anti-tank guns, 7 mortars, 26 bunkers, killed 5 battalions of Nazis. She fired over 11 thousand shots (this is twice the norm )".
The history of the creation of this gun is one of the remarkable pages in the history of the development of Soviet artillery weapons. This is about our enemy’s one of the leading experts in the field of artillery - the former head of the artillery research department of the Krupp company, Professor Wolff, who wrote: “...The opinion that the ZIS-3 is the best 76-mm gun of the Second World War is absolutely justified. It is possible without It is no exaggeration to say that this is one of the most ingenious designs in the history of cannon artillery... "
The ZIS-3 cannon, like many other artillery systems, was created under the leadership of the talented designer, Hero of Socialist Labor, State Prize laureate, Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor, Colonel General of the Technical Troops Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin.
Vasily Grabin was born in 1900 in the rich and grain-rich Kuban, in the city of Ekaterinodar (now Krasnodar) in the family of a former fireworksman of the tsarist artillery, who, in order to feed eleven souls, was forced to work for pennies in various workshops. Vasily's childhood was hungry and joyless.
Vasya Grabin went to school for only three years - it was necessary to help his family, where poverty forced him to count every penny. The difficult situation forced the boy to start his working life early. He was forced to go to work as an apprentice riveter and then as a boiler shop worker. An eleven-year-old boy worked twelve hours a day with pay of 3 kopecks per hour. Soon after the outbreak of the First World War, the workshops were closed. And then my father began working as a flour miller at a mill in the village of Staro-Nizhnesteblevskaya. He also placed his son here as a laborer. The first year Vasily worked for free, for food, and in the second year he received 5 rubles a month. One family acquaintance hired the savvy boy to work as a letter sorter in a postal and telegraph office.
At the beginning of 1920, Grabin left for the Red Army. In July of the same year, he was enrolled as a cadet at the Krasnodar joint commander courses. As part of them, Vasily Grabin fought against the Wrangelites, and after the defeat of the latter in 1921, he was sent to the 3rd Petrograd Command School of Field Heavy Artillery.
After graduating from school in 1923, Grabin was sent as a platoon commander to a heavy artillery division. Soon he is appointed chief of communications for the division. As one of the best combat soldiers and educators of the Red Army in 1924, Vasily Grabin was promoted to the position of course commander of the 2nd Leningrad Artillery School.
Grabin's cherished dream was to continue his studies. He stubbornly prepared to enter the military academy. The young, capable commander was recommended to the Military Technical Academy of the Red Army (later the Artillery Academy named after F. Dzerzhinsky). In 1925, having successfully passed the exams, V. Grabin was enrolled as a student at the academy.
In the final year, students were asked to choose a topic for their graduation project. Grabin decided to develop a 152 mm mortar. If he solved the problems of external ballistics relatively simply, then the problems of internal ballistics forced the graduate student to work hard and rack his brains. In the end, Grabin found an original solution. The project manager, Professor N. Drozdov, approved it. During the defense, the project was highly appreciated and was left at the department for use as a model by future graduate students. His project was recommended for use not only in the academy, but also in design bureaus.
In July 1929, a special decree “On the State of Defense of the USSR” was adopted, which indicated the need for widespread work to strengthen and improve the army’s weapons. The special design bureau to which V. Grabin was assigned after graduating from the academy had not yet been created. He is temporarily sent to a research artillery range. Here the young engineer had to test the 76-mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic gun of F. Lender (model 1914/15). At that time, the brake rod of this gun was being finalized: it was noticed that it extended when firing. It was strengthened by the designer R. Durlyakhov, and Grabin should have tested the strength of the device he proposed. The young engineer coped with the task brilliantly.
In November 1930, Grabin began working in the design bureau of the Krasny Putilovets plant. And a little over a year later, Grabin was sent to work at the design bureau No. 2 of the gun-arsenal association of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Here Vasily Gavrilovich proved himself to be a talented designer and an active fighter in the creation of domestic cadres of artillery designers. In KB-2, together with Soviet engineers and designers, a group of German specialists from the Rheinmetall company worked under a contract.
Subsequently, Grabin noted that cooperation with them did bring a certain benefit - communication with the Germans improved the culture of design and development of drawings, and most importantly, foreigners taught how to draw up projects with greater consideration of the requirements of technology and production capabilities. Soon design bureau No. 2 was merged with another similar team. The new organization received the name "Design Bureau No. 2 of the All-Union Weapon and Arsenal Association." V. Grabin was appointed deputy head of the design bureau.
The first success of the KB-2 team should be considered the completion of work on the drawings of a 122-mm howitzer (Lubok index) and a 203-mm caliber mortar. The KB-2 team actively participated in the development of universal and semi-universal 76-mm divisional guns, limbers and charging boxes for them, and in the refinement of prototypes of the 122-mm gun.
In the USSR and abroad, many were then keen on the idea of universalizing artillery, that is, creating weapons that could perform various tasks, for example, destroying both ground and air targets. Such guns were complex designs, had a large mass and, as tests showed, were unable to effectively hit targets. Largely for this reason, until 1934, the efforts of the designers did not produce satisfactory results. The question arose about the feasibility of further development of universal weapons.
At the beginning of 1933, the design bureau received new premises and a well-equipped pilot production facility. Now the organization began to be called “Main Design Bureau 38 (GKB-38) of Narkomtyazhprom.” The group led by Grabin was entrusted with the development of a 76-mm semi-universal divisional gun that could hit ground targets and conduct barrage fire against aircraft. Another department is to create a 76-mm universal cannon.
When work on the ordered semi-universal A-51 cannon was close to completion, the design bureau was unexpectedly disbanded.
In December 1933, Grabin and a small team of designers moved to a new job at the New Sormovo artillery plant No. 92 in Gorky. Vasily Gavrilovich was appointed to the position of chief designer of the plant. At the new location, Grabin was tasked with modifying the A-51 cannon and making a prototype of it. At the same time as solving this problem, Grabin, together with several like-minded people, took the initiative to create a new divisional gun, designed to destroy only ground targets, reliable, light and easy to manufacture. The leaders of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) reacted to the project of the new gun without much enthusiasm. However, thanks to the help of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry of the USSR Sergo Ordzhonikidze, by the summer of 1935 a prototype of the new gun, designated F-22, was ready. It was Ordzhonikidze who insisted that in the same year the Council of Labor and Defense convene a special meeting, at which it was decided to create separate guns for divisional artillery and for anti-aircraft fire.
In June 1935, Grabin’s guns were also presented for a live-firing review of all available artillery samples. As a result of the review, it was decided to abandon the universalization of guns, and Grabin was offered to modify the 76-mm divisional gun he had designed.
In a very short time, the team eliminated all the shortcomings. However, at a meeting at the GAU, artillery inspector N. Rogovsky demanded to abandon the muzzle brake and return to the old cartridge case from the 76-mm gun mod. 1902. Despite the objections of Grabin, who argued that the muzzle brake absorbs a third of the recoil energy and makes it possible to reduce the weight of the gun, he was nevertheless forced to accept both requirements. As a result of modifications, the weight of the gun increased by 150 kg and the length by 2 m. The gun successfully passed new tests and was put into service under the name “76-mm divisional gun F-22 model 1936.” "
This weapon was a completely new model - all its components and mechanisms were original. The F-22 was significantly different from its predecessor - the 76-mm cannon of the 1902/1930 model - a modernized three-inch gun that was in service. Design innovations made it possible to increase the rate of fire of the gun to 15 - 20 rounds per minute. Increasing the barrel length by ten calibers made it possible to increase the initial speed and range from 13,290 m to 13,700 m. However, the gun turned out to be overweight. Its mass in combat position was 1620 kg versus 1335 kg for the 1902/1930 model gun. The gun's ammunition included unitary cartridges with fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation grenades, armor-piercing, smoke, incendiary shells, shrapnel and buckshot.
The 76-mm divisional gun of the 1936 model was successfully used in battles against the Japanese invaders on Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River. But it turned out that its mass was large and made it difficult for crews to transport the gun in field conditions.
At this time, the Kirov Plant proposed a new model of the 76-mm divisional gun. During testing, a number of shortcomings were identified. The plant was given the task of finalizing the sample and submitting it again for testing. At the same time, trying to more fully take into account the front-line experience gained, the design bureau team of plant No. 92, headed by Grabin, began to work on further improving the F-22 cannon. Counting on the fact that the Kirov people would need about ten months to eliminate the shortcomings, Grabin decided to design and manufacture his own model of the gun and aimed the design bureau he headed at this. Since there was little time left, for the new model it was decided to make maximum use of those components and mechanisms of the F-22 gun that had already proven themselves well and the production of which had been established. To speed up the work, designers and technologists worked together from the very first day, and a technological project was immediately created. Working and design drawings were completed in just four months (when creating the F-22 gun - in 8 months). This was the high-speed design method, which subsequently became widely used in industry.
The new model gun, simultaneously with the Kirov guns, entered field and military tests, successfully passed them and was put into service under the name “76-mm modernized divisional gun model 1939 (USV).”
The tactical and technical characteristics of this gun differed only slightly from those of the gun mod. 1936 (F-22). The longest firing range was 13290 m, compared to the F-22 it decreased by 340 m.
Simultaneously with the development of field artillery systems, tank guns were created at the Grabin Design Bureau. In total, from 1934 to 1942, tank guns were developed: 76 mm F-22 for the T-34, 76 mm ZIS-5 for the KV-1, 107 mm for a new tank that was not accepted for service, 57 mm ZIS- 4 for the ZIS-30 Komsomolets self-propelled guns, as well as 76-mm guns for long-term firing points, ships and submarines.
For major achievements in the creation of new types of weapons that increase the defensive power of the Soviet Union, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 28, 1940, Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. For theoretical research in the field of design and inventive activity, he is awarded the academic degree of Doctor of Technical Sciences, and for scientific and pedagogical activities he is awarded the title of professor.
The outbreak of World War II convincingly showed the increased role of tanks and the tendency to increase the thickness of their armor. In connection with this, in the summer of 1940, the design bureau, headed by Grabin, began developing a new anti-tank weapon.
By the end of the thirties, anti-tank guns abroad had, as a rule, a caliber of 37 - 50 mm. Calculations carried out by Grabin showed that to significantly increase armor penetration, the caliber should be 57 mm, and the initial speed should be about 1000 m/s. Such a gun would be superior in power and armor penetration to the standard 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 four times. The work proceeded quickly, the designers understood the tension and complexity of the international situation. In 1940, under the leadership of Grabin, the design bureau designers developed a 57-mm anti-tank gun.
By the end of August of the same year, all technical documentation was ready, and in late autumn the prototype was sent to the artillery range. When firing at the shields, a large scatter was revealed, and the accuracy of the battle turned out to be extremely low. Only after a long search was it possible to discover a gross arithmetic error in the source data. The steepness of the rifling had to be changed dramatically to increase the stability of the projectile in flight. In repeated tests with new barrels, the 57-mm gun showed high accuracy.
The gun was put into service in 1941 under the name: “57-mm anti-tank gun ZIS-2 model 1941.” It was planned to be produced simultaneously at three artillery factories, and already in May 1941 it went into mass production. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun was successfully used to fight against German tanks. In July 1941, a decision was made to install a 57-mm gun on the chassis of the Komsomolets semi-armored tracked artillery tractor, and already in September the first Soviet serial self-propelled artillery units ZIS-30 were used in battles on the Western Front. They were used in the battle of Moscow. But, despite its high combat qualities, at the end of 1941, by decision of the State Defense Committee, production of the 57-mm cannon was discontinued. The critical situation at the front required a sharp increase in the supply of anti-tank guns using already mastered and established technology in a short time. Meanwhile, the fight against enemy tanks was successfully carried out by 45-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1937, the production of which was well established. Therefore, the director of artillery plant No. 92, Amo Sergeevich Elyan, gave a far-sighted order: “All ZIS-2 pipes unfinished in production should be collected, mothballed and removed. All technological equipment and technical documentation should be preserved, so that, if necessary, the production of the 57-mm ZIS cannon will be restarted.” -2".
When developing a new divisional gun, called ZIS-3, we tried to make maximum use of already existing parts and assemblies from the F-22 USV. Tests at the factory site fully met all the hopes of the creators, and the muzzle brake absorbed recoil energy even more than predicted by calculations. Engineer Alexander Pavlovich Shishkin took care of the upper machine. The installation of the sight was entrusted to Boris Pogosyants and Zoya Minaeva. The most difficult issue - the refinement of recoil devices - was tackled by a group of young designers under the leadership of Fedor Fedorovich Kaleganov. The final layout of the new gun was entrusted to experienced designer Alexander Khvorostin.
All work on the new gun, including the preparation of technical documentation, was carried out in close collaboration with technologists, with full consideration of production capabilities; ways were sought to reduce the number of parts and assemblies and simplify their production. Finally, the gun was taken to the factory site. Everything seemed to be going well. However, a serious drawback unexpectedly emerged - when rolling back during firing at the maximum elevation angle, the breech hit the ground.
Then, in order to completely exclude this possibility, Grabin made a decision that the design team called historic. He proposed raising the height of the firing line by 50 mm and reducing the maximum elevation angle from 45 to 37 degrees. The latter led to a slight reduction in the firing range, but significantly simplified and cheaper the design of the gun.
The converted 76-mm ZIS-3 divisional gun successfully passed the tests. Its mass in combat position was only 1200 kg, that is, 400 kg less than the USV, which made it possible to roll it onto the battlefield by crew forces, and most importantly, it was simpler and cheaper to manufacture. The rate of fire of the new gun, thanks to a unified wedge breech, on which designer Pyotr Muravyov worked hard, was brought to 25-30 rounds per minute.
The war presented Soviet artillery designers with new, extremely important tasks. She found V. Grabin and the chief engineer of the plant M. Olevsky in Moscow, where they arrived on official business. Shortly after noon on June 22, they were urgently invited to a meeting held by the People's Commissar of Armaments D. Ustinov. At the end of the meeting with the leaders of the defense industry, the People's Commissar said: “Now, comrades, the most important thing is to increase the quantity of products, the front expects guns and other weapons from you!” "
“The task set by the party and the government,” Grabin later recalled, “was accomplished through the introduction of high-speed design methods and the development of a new technological process. We developed any design together with technologists and production workers; we worked out standard gun designs, standard parts, components, mechanisms; We used steel casting as widely as possible, requiring minimal machining, as well as stamping and welding. The standard sizes of smooth and threaded holes were reduced to a minimum, and the number of steel grades and non-ferrous metals used was reduced. We began manufacturing a prototype immediately after the development of individual working drawings, without waiting for the complete set... "
To sharply increase the production of guns, at the suggestion of chief designer V. Grabin, plant director A. Elyan, and chief engineer M. Olevsky, organizational measures were carried out sequentially, in three stages. The decision of the management and team was bold: to carry out a complete structural and technological processing of parts, assemblies and mechanisms of guns without stopping production.
The first stage consisted of constructive and technological modernization of only some elements of the guns towards their simplification, partial development of new technology and equipment. All this made it possible to increase the production of guns fivefold by the end of 1941. At the second stage, modernization of all parts and assemblies of guns began, a radical change in production technology and the complete introduction of new equipment. By May 1942, this was supposed to increase production ninefold. Having started modernization on August 15, the design bureau team completed it in December 1941.
From the beginning of 1942, the plant and design bureau staff began implementing the third stage of using internal reserves - the widespread development and implementation of more rational technology in all workshops. The new gun has become much simpler than its predecessors. If the 76-mm cannon of the 1936 model had 2080 parts, then the 1939 model gun had 1077, and the 1942 model had only 719. Compared with the 1936 model cannon, the number of man-hours spent on its manufacture decreased by four times! As a result of the introduction of conveyor assembly, the cost of guns decreased significantly.
Back in 1943, at plant No. 92, many production processes were mechanized and automated, high-performance cutting tools, multi-location devices, multi-spindle heads, special and modular machines were widely introduced.
The results were immediate. If by December 1941 the production of guns increased 5.5 times, then by the end of 1942 it increased 15 times compared to the pre-war period.
“In the days of the end of the war, in the bright days of victory over German fascism, the 100,000th cannon came off the assembly line of our plant...” - this is how the team of artillery plant No. 92, who showed labor heroism, reported on May 9, 1945, to the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. Stalin, increasing the production of guns almost 20 times compared to the pre-war period.
By the end of 1941, more than a thousand 76-mm ZIS-3 guns were used on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. However, it was “legalized” only on February 12, 1942, when, by a decree of the State Defense Committee, it was put into service under the name “76-mm ZIS-3 divisional gun model 1942.” instead of the 76-mm cannon of the 1939 model.
76-mm ZIS-3 cannons were in service in artillery regiments of rifle and mechanized divisions, light artillery, anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades of army artillery and artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (AR VGK). They successfully and accurately fired both from indirect fire positions and direct fire, repelling the attack of infantry and tanks and accompanying the infantry with fire and wheels in the offensive. The guns penetrated the armor of any German tank. The merits of Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin were appreciated by the government. At the end of 1942, he headed the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB) in Kaliningrad near Moscow (now Korolev).
In 1943, the Nazi command, planning an offensive on the Kursk Bulge, pinned great hopes on the use of new heavy tanks "Panther" and "Tiger", as well as self-propelled artillery units "Ferdinand". The Soviet command became aware of this. In a detailed note addressed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grabin proposed resuming the production of 57-mm ZIS-2 guns. At the same time, the designer proposed developing a new, more powerful 100 mm gun to combat enemy tanks.
Grabin and the team led by him made a great contribution to the defeat of the enemy by creating a new 100-mm field gun. Its arrival at the front at the most crucial, turning point of the Great Patriotic War, like the guns developed by F. Petrov, was the Soviet people’s response to Hitler’s heavy-duty tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts.
In the spring of 1943, the TsAKB design team began work on creating a 100-mm anti-tank gun. The caliber was chosen based on the need to create a gun with a power several times greater than that of existing 57 mm and 76 mm anti-tank guns. In addition, the navy had 100 mm guns, and a unitary cartridge was developed for them. The fact that it was mastered by production was important when choosing the caliber of the gun. The general layout of the new gun was entrusted to the designer Alexander Khvorostin, who had proven himself well in the development of the ZIS-3 gun. After some discussion, it was decided to use an effective muzzle brake to reduce the weight of the anti-tank gun. A high rate of fire - up to 10 rounds per minute - was ensured by a semi-automatic wedge bolt. For the first time, torsion bar suspension was used here, which has become widespread in modern artillery. The original was a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism. All this together made it possible to create a weapon with a relatively small mass in firing position - 3650 kg. The 100-mm field gun they created had good tactical and technical characteristics: firing range - 20650 m, direct shot range - 1080 m, the armor-piercing projectile, thanks to its high initial speed (895 m/s), penetrated armor up to 160 mm thick at a distance of 500 m, and at 2000 m up to 125 mm.
A month after the start of work on the 100-mm cannon, the first working drawings, signed by Grabin, had already been sent to the workshop. After successful tests, by decree of the State Defense Committee of May 7, 1944, the gun was put into service under the name “100-mm field gun BS-3 model 1944.”
From the very first days at the front, "Sotka" showed itself to be a threat to fascist tanks - all "tigers" and "panthers". Shells from 100-mm BS-3 cannons penetrated the armor of all heavy and super-heavy German tanks. Having appeared almost simultaneously on many fronts, powerful guns quickly tamed the fascist “menagerie” and thereby accelerated the complete defeat of the enemy. Soviet soldiers aptly nicknamed the new gun of the 1944 model - "St. John's wort". It was also used to engage long-range targets, combat long-range artillery, and destroy enemy fire weapons and manpower.
Grabin was a general designer; over the thirty years of his design activity, he created many examples of wonderful guns. The guns created under the leadership of Grabin took part in battles from the first to the last day of the Great Patriotic War. They could be seen in rifle chains, anti-tank fighter regiments, on tanks and self-propelled artillery units, on armored boats, submarines and river flotilla ships.
The creation and improvement of guns for the Soviet Armed Forces became the main work of his life. The creative thought of the talented designer in the post-war years was aimed at improving artillery weapons and increasing the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces. Vasily Grabin, being the head and chief designer of the Central Research Institute (TsNII-58), achieved that by the end of the 1950s. The institution he headed became one of the most powerful domestic artillery research institutes. TsAKB designed 12 artillery systems, three of which were put into service. Grabin was twice elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. After retiring in 1968, Vasily Gavrilovich taught for many years at the department of special technology at the Moscow Higher Technical School. Bauman. His contribution to the defense of the Motherland was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, four USSR State Prizes, and numerous orders and medals.
Sergey MONETCHIKOV, "Brother" magazine, 2004
The Russian land has always been famous for its craftsmen in various spheres of human life. One of these specialists, who came from a simple family, is called Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin. The fate and life's ups and downs of this legendary designer will be discussed in this article.
Birth
Grabin Vasily Gavrilovich, whose family lived very poorly, was born in the Kuban, in a village called Staronizhesteblievskaya. It happened on December 29, 1899. By nationality - Russian. The father of the future designer served as a fireworksman in the artillery and worked as a mechanic. There were 10 children in the family. He had the opportunity to work as a riveter, boilermaker, mill worker, and post office worker. In addition, local peculiarities added additional difficulties, because Kuban is a Cossack region, and hereditary Cossacks always had their own traditions, which did not really contribute to good relations with other residents of this region who did not come from this military family. Life was difficult financially, and therefore Vasily Gavrilovich was forced to begin his working career at the age of 11.
Joining the army
In July 1920, Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin volunteered for the Red Army. He was enrolled in the Krasnodar command courses in the artillery department. While studying, the young warrior was part of a combined battalion and fought against Wrangel’s White Guard army. In 1921, Grabin became a member of the RCP(b).
Continuation of military career
After the courses were completed in 1921, Vasily Gavrilovich was sent to the Military School of Coastal and Heavy Artillery, which was stationed in Petrograd. The officer graduated from this educational institution in 1923, after which he was sent to combat units of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army as an artillery platoon commander. He also served as division chief communications officer.
In 1924, Grabin was appointed course commander at the artillery school in Leningrad. A year later he entered the Academy. Felix Dzerzhinsky, whose graduates became officers and employees of engineering and technical units. Our hero studied under the guidance of such prominent scientists as Gelvikh, Rdultovsky, Durlyakhov.
In 1930, Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin successfully graduated from the academy and received an engineering diploma, after which he was assigned to the design bureau of the Krasny Putilovets enterprise, located in Leningrad.
In 1931, our hero becomes a designer in Bureau No. 2 of the USSR Weapon and Arsenal Association of the People's Commissariat of Industry of the country. In the same year, the two design bureaus merged and a common design association was created.
In 1932, engineer Vasily Grabin became the first deputy head of the state design bureau number 38, which - the only one in the state - was engaged in the creation and modernization of artillery guns and systems. But this organization did not last long and was liquidated in 1933 by order of the head of the army’s armaments, Tukhachevsky, who gave preference to the so-called dynamo-reactive guns, also called recoilless guns.
In a leadership position
At the end of 1933, engineer Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin went to an artillery production plant in the city of Gorky, where he became the head of the design bureau of this enterprise. It was under the sensitive command of Grabin that dozens of a wide variety of guns were created, which were absolutely in no way inferior to their Western counterparts. According to historians and weapons experts, the only area of technical weapons in which the Soviet Union was always superior to Germany was artillery.
Vasily Gavrilovich was the first person in the world who managed to combine the development, design and production of new guns, which made it possible to master the creation of the latest guns for army units in a short period of time.
Distinctive features
Grabin Vasily Gavrilovich, whose biography is discussed in this article, also went down in history due to the fact that he began to apply the unification of all components and parts of guns, reduced their number to the maximum, and introduced the principle of equal strength. All together, this made it possible to reduce the design time for artillery products from 30 months to 3. In addition, the cost of guns was significantly reduced, and mass production made it possible to withstand the fascist onslaught throughout the entire period of the Great Patriotic War.
On August 1, 1940, the engineer was awarded the rank of major general of the technical forces of the USSR, and on November 20, 1942, the rank of lieutenant general.
Activities during World War II
In the fall of 1942, Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin headed the Central Artillery Design Bureau, which was located at the Podlipki railway station near Moscow. The country's leadership entrusted this organization with the responsibility for creating projects for new guns in the artillery field. Of those 140,000 guns that our ancestors used on the battlefields against the Nazis, over 90,000 were created at the enterprise, which was headed by Grabin as chief designer. At the same time, another 30,000 copies were produced according to projects authored by this famous engineer.
Life in peacetime
In 1946, Grabin was appointed head of the Central Research Institute of Artillery. And in 1955, this institution was given an ambitious task - to create a nuclear reactor. Because of this, Vasily Gavrilovich now finds himself in the status of a department head and tries in every possible way to defend the tasks of the artillery direction. As a result, in 1956, the USSR Ministry of Defense decided to create Central Research Institute No. 58. It goes without saying that Grabin became its main leader. Under his command, the development of tactical artillery systems of the ground-to-ground and ground-to-air types took place.
Decline of a career
In the summer of 1959, TsNII-58 was absorbed by the Korolev Design Bureau. At the same time, the most important documentation archives and weapons samples, many of which existed in one copy, were destroyed. This happened due to the fact that the head of the country, Nikita Khrushchev, set a course to strengthen the Union’s missile forces, and he considered artillery a relic of the past. Grabin himself became a member of the advisory group of the Ministry of Defense, and in 1960 he resigned.
Teaching path
In the same 1960, Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin, whose photo is given below, became the head of the department of the Moscow Higher Technical School named after. Bauman. At the same time, he gave lectures on artillery guns and created a youth design bureau from among university students.
It is worth noting that the legendary creator of guns was a Doctor of Science and held the title of professor. He also twice served on the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Had awards:
- Four Orders of Lenin.
- Order of the Red Banner.
- Order of Suvorov, two degrees.
- Four-time winner of the Stalin Prize.
In addition, he authored a book called “Weapons of Victory,” which was published in full version only at the end of the 1980s. By the way, the book was not published for a long time only because Vasily Gavrilovich during his lifetime was in disgrace by the People's Commissar of Armaments Ustinov, who did not like the fact that the talented engineer had the right to communicate directly with the main leader of the country and was under his protectorate. Stalin's patronage of the designer was ensured by the fact that the latter was able to clearly formulate his thoughts and ideas and always stubbornly defended his position during discussions of the most important state issues.
Grabin Vasily Gavrilovich, whose children did not follow in his footsteps, was married twice and lived with his second wife for 32 years.
The most talented designer died on April 18, 1980 in the Moscow region. His body was interred at the Novodevichy cemetery. The grave is located on plot number 9.
Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin(/-) - Soviet designer and organizer of the production of artillery weapons of the Great Patriotic War.
Biography
Born on December 28, 1899 (January 9) in the village of Staronizhesteblievskaya (now Krasnoarmeysky district, Krasnodar region. Member of the RCP (b) since 1921. He graduated from the artillery school in Petrograd, then served as a combat commander for several years. After that he entered the artillery faculty of the Military -Technical Academy named after Dzerzhinsky... At that time, such prominent specialists as V. I. Rdultovsky, P. A. Gelvikh and others taught there.
In the 1950s, interest in artillery systems declined sharply. First, L.P. Beria, and then N.S. Khrushchev, headed for rocket science. This was superimposed on a long-standing conflict with Marshal D. F. Ustinov. As a result, only one cannon developed by Grabin was put into service - the S-60 anti-aircraft gun. In part, the S-23 was also adopted, but later, when an urgent need arose for it, and in a small series. However, the team under his leadership developed several artillery weapons systems:
- Honorary citizen of the city of Korolev
- Colonel General of Technical Troops ()
- Doctor of Technical Sciences ()
- Deputy of the USSR Supreme Council of 2-3 convocations (1946-1954)
Memory
- One of the streets in Korolev and a street in Krasnodar are named after Grabin.
- A square in Nizhny Novgorod is named after Grabin
- In honor of Grabin and the workers of the Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant, a memorial was opened at the 70th anniversary of the Victory
- Memorial plaque in Korolev on the entrance building of RSC Energia OJSC.
Sources
- Khudyakov A. P., Khudyakov S. A. Artillery genius. - 3rd ed. - M.: RTSoft, 2010. - 656 p. - 1500 copies. - ISBN 978-5-903545-12-4.
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Notes
Links
Website "Heroes of the Country".
- Grabin Vasily Gavrilovich // Great Soviet Encyclopedia: [in 30 volumes] / ch. ed. A. M. Prokhorov. - 3rd ed. - M. : Soviet encyclopedia, 1969-1978.
- on the website "Military Literature"
- (link unavailable since 09/27/2016 (889 days))
An excerpt characterizing Grabin, Vasily Gavrilovich
Returning from a second anxious trip along the line, Napoleon said:– The chess has been set, the game will start tomorrow.
Ordering some punch to be served and calling Bosset, he began a conversation with him about Paris, about some changes that he intended to make in the maison de l'imperatrice [in the court staff of the Empress], surprising the prefect with his memorability for all the small details of court relations.
He was interested in trifles, joked about Bosse's love of travel and chatted casually in the way a famous, confident and knowledgeable operator does, while he rolls up his sleeves and puts on an apron and the patient is tied to a bed: “The matter is all in my hands.” and in my head, clearly and definitely. When it’s time to get down to business, I’ll do it like no one else, and now I can joke, and the more I joke and am calm, the more you should be confident, calm and surprised at my genius.”
Having finished his second glass of punch, Napoleon went to rest before the serious business that, as it seemed to him, lay ahead of him the next day.
He was so interested in this task ahead of him that he could not sleep and, despite the runny nose that had worsened from the evening dampness, at three o’clock in the morning, blowing his nose loudly, he went out into the large compartment of the tent. He asked if the Russians had left? He was told that the enemy fires were still in the same places. He nodded his head approvingly.
The adjutant on duty entered the tent.
“Eh bien, Rapp, croyez vous, que nous ferons do bonnes affaires aujourd"hui? [Well, Rapp, what do you think: will our affairs be good today?] - he turned to him.
“Sans aucun doute, sire, [Without any doubt, sir,” answered Rapp.
Napoleon looked at him.
“Vous rappelez vous, Sire, ce que vous m"avez fait l"honneur de dire a Smolensk,” said Rapp, “le vin est tire, il faut le boire.” [Do you remember, sir, those words that you deigned to say to me in Smolensk, the wine is uncorked, I must drink it.]
Napoleon frowned and sat silently for a long time, his head resting on his hand.
“Cette pauvre armee,” he said suddenly, “elle a bien diminue depuis Smolensk.” La fortune est une franche courtisane, Rapp; je le disais toujours, et je commence a l "eprouver. Mais la garde, Rapp, la garde est intacte? [Poor army! It has greatly diminished since Smolensk. Fortune is a real harlot, Rapp. I have always said this and am beginning to experience it. But the guard, Rapp, are the guards intact?] – he said questioningly.
“Oui, Sire, [Yes, sir.],” answered Rapp.
Napoleon took the lozenge, put it in his mouth and looked at his watch. He didn’t want to sleep; morning was still far away; and in order to kill time, no orders could be made anymore, because everything had been done and was now being carried out.
– A t on distribue les biscuits et le riz aux regiments de la garde? [Did they distribute crackers and rice to the guards?] - Napoleon asked sternly.
– Oui, Sire. [Yes, sir.]
– Mais le riz? [But rice?]
Rapp replied that he had conveyed the sovereign’s orders about rice, but Napoleon shook his head with displeasure, as if he did not believe that his order would be carried out. The servant came in with punch. Napoleon ordered another glass to be brought to Rapp and silently took sips from his own.
“I have neither taste nor smell,” he said, sniffing the glass. “I’m tired of this runny nose.” They talk about medicine. What kind of medicine is there when they cannot cure a runny nose? Corvisar gave me these lozenges, but they don't help. What can they treat? It cannot be treated. Notre corps est une machine a vivre. Il est organise pour cela, c"est sa nature; laissez y la vie a son aise, qu"elle s"y defende elle meme: elle fera plus que si vous la paralysiez en l"encombrant de remedes. Notre corps est comme une montre parfaite qui doit aller un certain temps; l"horloger n"a pas la faculte de l"ouvrir, il ne peut la manier qu"a tatons et les yeux bandes. Notre corps est une machine a vivre, voila tout. [Our body is a machine for life. This is what it is designed for. Leave the life in him alone, let her defend herself, she will do more on her own than when you interfere with her with medications. Our body is like a clock that must run for a certain time; The watchmaker cannot open them and can only operate them by touch and blindfolded. Our body is a machine for life. That's all.] - And as if having embarked on the path of definitions, definitions that Napoleon loved, he suddenly made a new definition. – Do you know, Rapp, what the art of war is? - he asked. – The art of being stronger than the enemy at a certain moment. Voila tout. [That's all.]
Rapp said nothing.
– Demainnous allons avoir affaire a Koutouzoff! [Tomorrow we will deal with Kutuzov!] - said Napoleon. - Let's see! Remember, at Braunau he commanded the army and not once in three weeks did he mount a horse to inspect the fortifications. Let's see!
He looked at his watch. It was still only four o'clock. I didn’t want to sleep, I had finished the punch, and there was still nothing to do. He got up, walked back and forth, put on a warm frock coat and hat and left the tent. The night was dark and damp; a barely audible dampness fell from above. The fires did not burn brightly nearby, in the French guard, and glittered far through the smoke along the Russian line. Everywhere it was quiet, and the rustling and trampling of the French troops, which had already begun to move to occupy a position, could clearly be heard.
Napoleon walked in front of the tent, looked at the lights, listened to the stomping and, passing by a tall guardsman in a shaggy hat, who stood sentry at his tent and, like a black pillar, stretched out when the emperor appeared, stopped opposite him.
- Since what year have you been in the service? - he asked with that usual affectation of rough and gentle belligerence with which he always treated the soldiers. The soldier answered him.
- Ah! un des vieux! [A! of the old people!] Did you receive rice for the regiment?
- We got it, Your Majesty.
Napoleon nodded his head and walked away from him.
At half past five Napoleon rode on horseback to the village of Shevardin.
It was beginning to get light, the sky cleared, only one cloud lay in the east. Abandoned fires burned out in the weak morning light.
A thick, lonely cannon shot rang out to the right, rushed past and froze in the midst of general silence. Several minutes passed. A second, third shot rang out, the air began to vibrate; the fourth and fifth sounded close and solemnly somewhere to the right.
The first shots had not yet sounded when others were heard, again and again, merging and interrupting one another.
Napoleon rode up with his retinue to the Shevardinsky redoubt and dismounted from his horse. The game has begun.
Returning from Prince Andrei to Gorki, Pierre, having ordered the horseman to prepare the horses and wake him up early in the morning, immediately fell asleep behind the partition, in the corner that Boris had given him.
When Pierre fully woke up the next morning, there was no one in the hut. Glass rattled in the small windows. The bereitor stood pushing him aside.
“Your Excellency, your Excellency, your Excellency...” the bereitor said stubbornly, without looking at Pierre and, apparently, having lost hope of waking him up, swinging him by the shoulder.
- What? Began? Is it time? - Pierre spoke, waking up.
“If you please hear the firing,” said the bereitor, a retired soldier, “all the gentlemen have already left, the most illustrious ones themselves have passed a long time ago.”
Pierre quickly got dressed and ran out onto the porch. It was clear, fresh, dewy and cheerful outside. The sun, having just broken out from behind the cloud that was obscuring it, splashed half-broken rays through the roofs of the opposite street, onto the dew-covered dust of the road, onto the walls of the houses, onto the windows of the fence and onto Pierre’s horses standing at the hut. The roar of the guns could be heard more clearly in the yard. An adjutant with a Cossack trotted down the street.
- It's time, Count, it's time! - shouted the adjutant.
Having ordered his horse to be led, Pierre walked down the street to the mound from which he had looked at the battlefield yesterday. On this mound there was a crowd of military men, and the French conversation of the staff could be heard, and the gray head of Kutuzov could be seen with his white cap with a red band and the gray back of his head, sunk into his shoulders. Kutuzov looked through the pipe ahead along the main road.
Entering the entrance steps to the mound, Pierre looked ahead of him and froze in admiration at the beauty of the spectacle. It was the same panorama that he had admired yesterday from this mound; but now this entire area was covered with troops and the smoke of gunfire, and the slanting rays of the bright sun, rising from behind, to the left of Pierre, threw upon it in the clear morning air a piercing light with a golden and pink tint and dark, long shadows. The distant forests that completed the panorama, as if carved from some precious yellow-green stone, were visible with their curved line of peaks on the horizon, and between them, behind Valuev, cut through the great Smolensk road, all covered with troops. Golden fields and copses glittered closer. Troops were visible everywhere - in front, right and left. It was all lively, majestic and unexpected; but what struck Pierre most of all was the view of the battlefield itself, Borodino and the ravine above Kolocheya on both sides of it.
Above Kolocha, in Borodino and on both sides of it, especially to the left, where in the marshy banks Voina flows into Kolocha, there was that fog that melts, blurs and shines through when the bright sun comes out and magically colors and outlines everything visible through it. This fog was joined by the smoke of shots, and through this fog and smoke the lightning of the morning light flashed everywhere - now on the water, now on the dew, now on the bayonets of the troops crowded along the banks and in Borodino. Through this fog one could see a white church, here and there the roofs of Borodin's huts, here and there solid masses of soldiers, here and there green boxes and cannons. And it all moved, or seemed to move, because fog and smoke stretched throughout this entire space. Both in this area of the lowlands near Borodino, covered with fog, and outside it, above and especially to the left along the entire line, through forests, across fields, in the lowlands, on the tops of elevations, cannons, sometimes solitary, constantly appeared by themselves, out of nothing, sometimes huddled, sometimes rare, sometimes frequent clouds of smoke, which, swelling, growing, swirling, merging, were visible throughout this space.
These smokes of shots and, strange to say, their sounds produced the main beauty of the spectacle.
Puff! - suddenly a round, dense smoke was visible, playing with purple, gray and milky white colors, and boom! – the sound of this smoke was heard a second later.
“Poof poof” - two smokes rose, pushing and merging; and “boom boom” - the sounds confirmed what the eye saw.
Pierre looked back at the first smoke, which he left as a round dense ball, and already in its place there were balls of smoke stretching to the side, and poof... (with a stop) poof poof - three more, four more were born, and for each, with the same arrangements, boom... boom boom boom - beautiful, firm, true sounds answered. It seemed that these smokes were running, that they were standing, and forests, fields and shiny bayonets were running past them. On the left side, across the fields and bushes, these large smokes were constantly appearing with their solemn echoes, and closer still, in the valleys and forests, small gun smokes flared up, not having time to round off, and in the same way gave their little echoes. Tah ta ta tah - the guns crackled, although often, but incorrectly and poorly in comparison with gun shots.
Pierre wanted to be where these smokes were, these shiny bayonets and cannons, this movement, these sounds. He looked back at Kutuzov and his retinue to compare his impressions with others. Everyone was exactly like him, and, as it seemed to him, they were looking forward to the battlefield with the same feeling. All faces now shone with that hidden warmth (chaleur latente) of feeling that Pierre had noticed yesterday and which he understood completely after his conversation with Prince Andrei.
During the Great Patriotic War, there were more guns designed by Grabin on the fronts than guns of other types of Soviet and pre-revolutionary production. German and American designers and military historians unanimously recognize the ZiS-3 as the best divisional gun of the Second World War. By 1941, the 76-mm F-34 tank gun had become the strongest tank gun in the world; it was not without reason that the vast majority of our medium tanks, armored trains and armored boats were armed with it. The 100-mm BS-3 anti-tank gun pierced right through the armor of German Tigers and Panthers.
Soviet soldiers on the streets of Vienna. In the foreground is a 76-mm ZiS-3 cannon.
By the end of the Great Patriotic War, forty-five-year-old Grabin became a colonel general, doctor of technical sciences, professor, Hero of Socialist Labor and head of the most powerful artillery design bureau. During the war years I.V. Stalin repeatedly addressed Grabin directly, bypassing all intermediate authorities. All these statements are available in all domestic monographs devoted to the Great Patriotic War. In reality, everything was much more complicated, and Grabin himself was a controversial figure.
FROM COMMANDERS TO ENGINEERS
Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin was born in Ekaterinodar (since 1920 - Krasnodar) at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Moreover, this should be understood in a literal sense: according to the old Russian calendar, he was born on December 28, 1899, and according to the new one, already in the twentieth century, on January 9, 1900.
The designer's father, Gavril Grabin, served in the field artillery and rose to the rank of senior fireworksman. He talked a lot and vividly to his son about the 1877 model cannons and, perhaps, already in childhood attracted Vasily’s interest in artillery.
In June 1920, Vasily Grabin became a cadet at the joint command courses in Yekaterinodar. He is considered one of the best cadets. He is distinguished by his natural intelligence, determination and strong-willed character. Proletarian origin and “ideological literacy” play an equally important role - from the very beginning he becomes a convinced Bolshevik. In November, a group of the best artillery cadets is sent from Yekaterinodar to the Petrograd Command School of Field Heavy Artillery.
On March 1, 1921, the famous Kronstadt uprising began. The cadets of the artillery school were among the first units mobilized to fight the rebels. Grabin hit a 152-mm howitzer battery sent on March 7 to the Northern Group of Forces. The battery was placed on the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland and began shelling Fort Totleben, occupied by the rebels.
Grabin graduated from the Petrograd Command School on September 16, 1923. A few days later he was appointed platoon commander at the Karelian artillery site. In August 1926, he became a student at the Dzerzhinsky Military Technical Academy of the Red Army, created a year earlier by merging the Artillery and Military Engineering Academies. In March 1930, 146 academy students graduated.
Grabin, among many graduates, became a “thousander”. The fact is that the Soviet government decided to strengthen the military industry personnel with a thousand specialists from the Red Army. Thus, engineer of the artillery department of the Red Army V.G. Grabin was sent to design work in KB-2. At the same time, he, like other “thousanders”, remained in the cadres of the Red Army.
KB-2 was headed by Lev Aleksandrovich Shnitman. Before the revolution he was a worker, and during the Civil War he was a red commander. After the war, apparently, he worked in the OGPU and often traveled abroad through Vneshtorg. Well, Schnittman’s deputy was... a German citizen, Vocht, and all the work was carried out by engineers from the Rheinmetall company.
In his memoirs, Grabin speaks poorly of Schnittman, Focht and other German engineers. However, I saw in the archives excellent developments of the KB-2, which, for subjective reasons, never entered service.
Grabin went through an excellent school at KB-2. The designer himself admitted: “ The bureau did all the structural and technical development, produced working drawings, technical specifications, and the plant, which was entrusted with the mass production of guns, received from KB-2 complete technical documentation for the manufacture of a prototype, and the standard of working drawings was high. The artillery industry has never seen drawings of this quality.».
In November 1932, Vasily Grabin was appointed deputy head of the Main Design Bureau No. 38 (GKB-38) plant No. 32 in the village of Podlipki near Moscow. At the end of 1933, GKB-38 was disbanded, and Grabin was sent to the city of Gorky to the Novoye Sormovo plant, a relatively young enterprise that delivered its first artillery products in 1916.
Major General V. Grabin (sitting in the center) and other outstanding designers awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor by decree of October 28, 1940.
UNIVERSAL DEADLOCK
Both GKB-38 and the Novoye Sormovo plant were puzzled by Tukhachevsky’s demand to create a 76-mm universal cannon, that is, a weapon capable of solving the problems of divisional and anti-aircraft artillery.
By the end of 1934, a prototype of the 76-mm semi-universal gun A-51 (F-20) was manufactured at plant No. 92 (formerly “Novoye Sormovo”). In his memoirs, Vasily Gavrilovich does not hide the fact that he worked on the semi-universal F-20 cannon under duress. That's why I wasn't particularly interested in her fate. But at the design bureau, work was in full swing on the “beloved child” - the 76-mm divisional gun, which was assigned the index F-22. Its project was completed by the beginning of 1935.
Tukhachevsky demanded that the designers of divisional and universal guns achieve a firing range of up to 14 km. At the same time, he forbade increasing the caliber and changing cartridges of Model 1900. In the end, a little more gunpowder was squeezed into the cartridge, and the charge increased from 0.9 kg to 1.08 kg. The barrel of the 30-caliber model 1902 cannon was increased to 40 calibers in the model 1902 cannon. 1902/30, and in the F-22 - even up to 50 calibers.
Finally, they introduced a long-range grenade and barely got a range of 14 km. What's the use? Observing explosions of 76-mm weak grenades at such a distance is impossible for a ground observer. Even from an airplane from a height of 3-4 km, 76-mm grenade explosions were not visible, and it was considered dangerous for a scout to descend lower due to anti-aircraft fire.
Grabin tried to enlarge the chamber of the F-22 and introduce a new cartridge case with a larger volume, which significantly improved the ballistics of the gun, for which he received a categorical ban from Tukhachevsky. By government decree No. OK 110/SS of May 11, 1936, the F-22 was put into service under the name “76-mm divisional gun mod. 1936" .
The F-22 gun was quite heavy: 1620 kg versus 1350 kg of the 76-mm gun mod. 1902/10. Its elevation angle was 75 degrees, which made it possible to shoot at aircraft.
I wonder what during the war, the Germans actually restored the F-22 according to Grabin’s original design, although they did not know either this project or the name of the designer. They simply rid the weapon of all Tukhachevsky’s absurdities. The Germans squandered the chambers of the captured F-22s, increased the charge by 2.4 times, installed a muzzle brake and reduced the elevation angle, and also turned off the variable recoil mechanism. The gun was named "7.62-cm PAC 36(r)", it was used as a towed anti-tank gun, and was also installed on the self-propelled guns "Marder II" (Sd.Kfz.132) and "Marder 38" (Sd.Kfz.139 ).
It should be noted that until mid-1943, the 7.62 cm PAK 36(r) was the most powerful anti-tank gun of the Wehrmacht. In addition, some of the captured F-22s were used as field guns - “7.62 cm Feldcanone 296 (r)”.
By the beginning of 1937, the obsession with universal guns was over. A bitter hangover set in - they experimented for 10 years, but there was no passable divisional gun, just as there were no anti-aircraft guns, artillery systems of high and special power, etc. In divisional artillery, the simplest solution was to make a cannon with the ammunition and ballistics of a 76-mm cannon mod. 1902/30, 40 klb long.
In March 1937, the Art Directorate issued tactical and technical requirements for such a gun. According to these requirements, the Kirov Plant OKB created the L-12 cannon, OKB-43 created the NDP cannon, and Grabin Design Bureau created the F-22USV cannon. Of these, the USV divisional gun was adopted for service. Its main difference from the F-22 was the reduction in elevation angle and shortening of the barrel by 10 calibers.
In the second half of 1937, the idol collapsed - a 76-mm cartridge case mod. 1900, and it was decided to increase the caliber of divisional guns. It would be ridiculous to claim that the designers of all artillery design bureaus suddenly saw the light and became convinced that increasing the power of divisional guns was unthinkable without increasing the caliber of divisionals.
Rather, this phenomenon should be associated with the elimination of Deputy People's Commissar for Armaments Tukhachevsky and a thorough purge in the Artillery Directorate.
Grabin responded the fastest to the new trends - by October 1938, design documentation for the divisional duplex was sent to the Art Directorate: the 95-mm F-28 cannon and the 122-mm F-25 howitzer. This time, Grabin had only one competitor - the Ural Transport Engineering Plant (UZTM), where a divisional duplex of the 95-mm U-4 cannon and the 122-mm U-2 howitzer was created. Moreover, the U-4 cannon was only 100 kg heavier than the F-22. In 1938-1939 produced prototypes of both duplexes, which successfully passed tests. It was assumed that in 1940 one of the duplexes would go into large-scale production.
However, in the fall of 1938, the authorities had a new hobby - give them a 107-mm divisional gun! According to the author, the reasons for the new hobby were purely psychological:
- Firstly, “higher and higher” - they finally broke away from the 76 mm caliber, immediately jumped through 85 mm, and stopped a little at 95 mm. What if a little more - and it will be 107 mm. Fortunately, our caliber is Russian, and there are tons of shells in the warehouses.
- Secondly, the leadership was greatly impressed by the tests in the USSR of the 105-mm ODC gun, a Czech “special delivery” gun.
- Thirdly, in 1939-1940. The USSR received disinformation about the creation in Germany of tanks with super-thick armor and the preparation of their mass production. This “misinformation” scared many in the Soviet leadership.
Perhaps there were other considerations that the leaders of that time took with them to the grave. Grabin very sensitively grasped trends in the highest spheres. He slowed down work on the F-28 and proactively took up the 107-mm ZiS-38 divisional gun. But war broke out.
On June 22, 1941, the Red Army was armed with 76-mm divisional guns:
4477 units - arr. 1902/30;
2874 units - F-22 and 1170 - USV.
Thus, in 1941, three-inchers made up the majority (53%). Only 107-mm M-60 guns were in production, but it was soon discontinued, since these guns were too heavy for divisional artillery and too weak for corps artillery.
In the first difficult months of the war, Grabin correctly assessed the difficult situation. There was no question of fine-tuning the 95 mm guns, so he again decided to return to the 76 mm caliber. Grabin is proactively creating a new 76-mm ZiS-3 gun, applying the barrel with ballistics and ammunition of a 76-mm cannon mod. 1902/30 for the carriage of a 57-mm ZiS-2 anti-tank gun. Thanks to its high manufacturability, the ZiS-3 became the first artillery gun in the world to be put into mass production and assembly line.
BEST IN ITS CALIBER
Now there are critics who claim that the famous Grabin ZiS-3 not only was not the best divisional gun in the world, but was seriously inferior to the divisional guns of Germany and other countries. Unfortunately, there is some truth in these accusations. After all, the main task of divisional guns is to destroy enemy personnel, as well as their firepower - machine guns, mortars and cannons. The fragmentation and high-explosive effect of the 76-mm ZiS-3 projectile is very weak, and due to the high initial velocity of the projectile and unitary loading, the ZiS-3 could not conduct overhead fire.
KV-1S tanks of the 6th separate breakthrough tank regiment before the march. North Caucasus Front, 1943. KV-1S were armed with ZiS-5 Grabin guns.
The Germans back in the 1920s. They abandoned divisional guns altogether, and their divisional artillery consisted exclusively of 10.5- and 15-cm howitzers, and the regiments also had 15-cm infantry guns, combining the properties of a cannon, howitzer and mortar. The British also abandoned 76.2 mm guns. In the division they had howitzer guns of 84 and 94 mm caliber.
Both German and British guns had shells with a much greater fragmentation and high-explosive effect than the ZiS-3, and separate-case loading made it possible to conduct overhead fire. It may be objected to me that separate-case loading somewhat reduced the rate of fire. Yes, this was the case in the first minutes of shooting, but then the rate of fire of the gun begins to be determined by recoil devices capable of withstanding one or another thermal regime. Therefore, both the British and the Germans had anti-tank guns with unitary loading, while the divisional guns had separate-case loading.
However, the shortcomings of the ZiS-3 are not Grabin’s fault, but rather his misfortune. After all, back in 1938, Vasily Gavrilovich designed the 95-mm F-28 divisional gun and the 122-mm F-25 howitzer on a single carriage (such systems are called duplex).
Returning to the 76-mm caliber, Grabin makes the world's best 76.2-mm divisional gun, the ZiS-3. No one has done anything better with this caliber and unitary loading. And the blame for the shortcomings of the ZiS-3 divisional gun lies entirely with those who demanded such guns for divisional artillery.
Speaking about the famous Grabin 76-mm divisional guns ZiS-3 and 57-mm anti-tank guns ZiS-2, we should not forget that in the pre-war period the design bureau of plant No. 92 under the leadership of Grabin was engaged in tank guns (76 mm F-32, F- 34, ZiS-4, ZiS-5; 95 mm F-39; 107 mm F-42, ZiS-6, etc.), battalion and regimental guns (76 mm F-23, F-24), mountain and casemate guns.
In the pre-war years, there was a fierce life-and-death struggle between the design bureau and their chief designers.. The memos that the chief designers wrote to various authorities, throwing mud at each other, have not yet been declassified (and, perhaps, destroyed). In any case, Grabin in his memoirs, without naming names, harshly criticizes the chief designer of the Kirov plant I.A. Makhanov and the chief designer of plant No. 7 (Arsenal) L.I. Gorlitsky.
Grabin and Makhanov were competitors in the creation of divisional, tank and casemate guns. Grabin's divisions and tank guns went into production, but Vasily Gavrilovich was defeated with casemate guns, and Makhanov's 76-mm L-17 gun, rather than Grabin's F-28, was put into mass production.
Grabin demanded that the L-17, to begin with, fire 20 shells at maximum speed at a maximum elevation angle of 12 kilometers, and then abruptly switch to the maximum descent angle and open fire again at the maximum speed. I’m curious, was there ever a case in the history of wars when a casemate cannon had to fire in this mode?
One way or another, on June 27, 1939, Makhanov was arrested under Article 58. He was accused of deliberately designing “defective” 76-mm L-6, L-11, L-12 and L-15 guns. As for the L-17, he deliberately sabotaged its mass production. Makhanov was sentenced to death.
Grabin also had a serious conflict with the chief designer of plant No. 7 L.I. Gorlitsky. The reason for the conflict is traditional: Vasily Gavrilovich had a 76-mm F-31 mountain gun, and the Arsenal team had a 76-mm 7-2 mountain gun. It was adopted for service on May 5, 1939 under the name “76-mm mountain gun model 1938.” Gorlitsky was not repressed, but in 1940 he was transferred from the post of chief designer of the Arsenal plant to the chief designers of the Kirov plant (for artillery).
However, despite some setbacks, during the Great Patriotic War Grabin managed to almost monopolize the production of divisional, anti-tank and tank guns. Until August 1943, all KV heavy tanks were equipped with the Grabin 76-mm ZiS-5 cannon, and until January 1944, all T-34 tanks were equipped with the Grabin 76-mm F-34 cannon.
German artillerymen at the FK 296 (r) gun from the 200th anti-tank division of the 21st tank division of the Wehrmacht. Libya, 1942
ORIGINS OF THE CONFRONTATION
Already before the war, Grabin, in the fight against the leadership of the GAU and, especially, the People's Commissariat of Armaments, began to appeal personally to Stalin. The Secretary General appreciated not only the excellent qualities of Grabin’s guns, but also the fantastically short time frame for their development. Thus, when creating the 107-mm ZiS-6 tank gun, only 42 days passed between the start of design and the first shooting of the prototype. Stalin begins to patronize the designer. As a result, Stalin and Grabin resolve production issues “tete-a-tete” over the phone and in person, and only then confront the GAU and the People’s Commissariat of Armaments with a fait accompli.
Since the beginning of the war, Grabin has been in contact with Stalin even more often. This style of work of Grabin infuriated the young People's Commissar of Armaments Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov. The People's Commissar tried several times to correct the designer and force him to strictly observe the chain of command. Grabin, unfortunately, did not take Ustinov’s threats seriously.
Formally, Grabin was subordinate to Ustinov, but they were of equal rank, Grabin was 8 years older than Ustinov, and most importantly, Ustinov also began his career as an artillery engineer, but unlike Grabin, he did not design a single gun.
Even before the war, Vasily Gavrilovich repeatedly raised the issue of cooperation between the activities of artillery factories and their design bureaus. He initiated the creation of the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB). In July - early August 1942, Grabin contacted Stalin and proposed organizing the TsAKB. It must be said that there were objective prerequisites for the creation of a central artillery design bureau.
In 1941-1942. a number of artillery design bureaus of Leningrad factories - "Bolshevik", LMZ named after. Stalin, plant named after. Frunze, the Stalingrad Barrikady plant, the Kiev Arsenal and others were evacuated to the Urals and Siberia. Often, the designers of one design bureau ended up in different cities, hundreds of kilometers away from each other. For example, the engineering and technical staff of the Barrikady plant in the fall of 1942 was literally scattered across seventeen cities.
On November 5, 1942, Stalin signed a GKO decree on the creation of the TsAKB on the basis of the former GKB-38. Lieutenant General Vasily Grabin was appointed head and chief designer of the bureau. In fact, it was the most powerful artillery design bureau in the history of mankind, and I am not afraid to call it “Grabin’s empire.”
With the creation of the TsAKB, Grabin’s dreams of designing all artillery systems without exception came true. The name itself - Central Artillery - obligated us to do this. In the thematic plan of the TsAKB for 1943 there were over fifty main topics. Among them are regimental, divisional, anti-aircraft, tank and casemate guns, guns for self-propelled guns, ships and submarines. Prototypes of mortars with calibers ranging from 82 to 240 mm were created. For the first time, Grabin decided to work on aircraft cannons, both classical and dynamo-reactive.
For the TsAKB guns, Grabin also chose a new factory index - “C”. I did not find a decoding of this index, but I believe that it was associated with Stalin. By the way, the design bureau of plant No. 92 also stopped giving its products the ZiS index, but adopted a new index - “LB”. It is not difficult to guess that the index was chosen in honor of the brother-in-law of plant director Amo Yelyan, Lavrentiy Beria.
Grabin’s ambitious plans arouse dissatisfaction and simply envy among many artillery designers who worked both in other design bureaus and in the TsAKB. Ustinov takes advantage of these sentiments and tries in every possible way to quarrel between Grabin and other designers. His goal is to blow up the TsAKB from the inside, or at least dismember it.
And such an opportunity soon presented itself. In the spring of 1944, several TsAKB employees, led by I.I. Ivanov, went to Leningrad to set up serial production of the Grabin 100-mm S-3 cannon at the Bolshevik plant, a prototype of which had already been tested. The designers of the TsAKB, together with the Bolshevik engineers, made a number of small changes to the design of the gun and launched it into production. It seems to be an everyday matter. But for some reason they are proposing to replace the Grabin index with BS-3. Ivanov tries to stay away from Ustinov’s intrigues, but the idea of separating from Grabin is not at all alien to him.
By resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of May 27, 1944, “to more successfully solve the problems of arming the Navy,” the Leningrad branch of the TsAKB was created. Naturally, Ivanov is appointed its leader. In March 1945, by decree of the State Defense Committee, the Leningrad branch of the TsAKB was transformed into an independent enterprise - the Naval Artillery Central Design Bureau (MATSKB). Ivanov remains his boss.
I note that the “separatists,” having left for Leningrad, took with them dozens of boxes with documentation for naval guns, which was mainly developed by Renne and other employees who remained with Grabin. For example, the 130-mm S-30 coastal mobile gun was designed by Grabin in May 1944, and in December 1944 the production of its working drawings began in Podlipki. At the MATSKB, even in secret documents, they tried to exclude any mention of TsAKB and Grabin in connection with the 130-mm S-30 gun, which was renamed SM-4 (SM is the MATSKB index).
Having deprived Grabin of the opportunity to work on naval guns, Ustinov did not calm down, but began to discredit all Grabin’s developments, especially since after the end of the war Stalin became much less interested in artillery affairs and had less contact with Grabin.
In the fight against Grabin, Ustinov also had a serious ally - Beria, who was of the opinion that artillery had outlived its usefulness. Let me remind you that since 1946 he led the atomic project, supervised work on ballistic, anti-aircraft and cruise missiles. By the way, it was Beria, and not Khrushchev, who in March 1953 began to destroy naval, coastal and army artillery, and Nikita Sergeevich, after some hesitation, continued his line.
For a whole decade after the end of the war, the Artillery Research Institute, under the leadership of Grabin, has been developing a very wide range of artillery pieces, most of which were never put into service.
To replace the 57-mm ZiS-2 and 100-mm BS-3 anti-tank guns in 1946, Grabin created about a dozen experimental anti-tank guns from battalion 57-mm S-15 to heavy-duty guns. Among them was the S-40 system with a cylindrical-conical barrel, the projectile of which pierced 285-mm armor along the normal line at a distance of 500 m.
In 1945-1947 Grabin creates a hull duplex consisting of a 130 mm S-69 cannon and a 152 mm S-69-I howitzer. However, based on the results of field tests, the system of plant No. 172 M-46 and M-47, which had the same tactical and technical characteristics, was adopted for service.
In 1946-1948. a unique system of high-power guns was developed that had a single carriage: 180 mm S-23 cannon, 210 mm S-23-I howitzer, 203 mm S-23-IV howitzer gun and 280 mm S-23-II mortar . At the same time, a special-power duplex was developed consisting of a 210-mm S-72 cannon and a 305-mm S-73 howitzer.
I note that during the war years our artillery of great and special power was seriously inferior to Germany, England and the USA, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Grabin guns of the S-23, S-73 and S-73 types were superior in their ballistic characteristics to all German and allied guns, and most importantly, they were more mobile than them, that is, they were much faster transferred from the traveling position to the combat position and almost did not require engineering equipment for the positions.
None of our artillery design bureaus could create anything like this. However, neither the S-23 gun system nor the S-72 and S-73 duplex were adopted for service. Moreover, Ustinov and Co. did not risk abandoning them immediately; they preferred to stall for time with the help of various “rational proposals.”
For example, the guns of the S-23 system were designed for separate cartridge loading. Ustinov and the GAU approved the project, and then, when the guns were ready and passed tests, they proposed converting them for cap loading. The same thing happened with the S-72 – S-73 duplex. From May 26, 1956 to May 13, 1957, the 305-mm S-73 howitzer was tested at the Rzhevka training ground near Leningrad.
Judging by the report, the howitzer fired perfectly, but the management of the training ground was extremely unfriendly towards it. The head of the test site, Major General Bulba, was unable to point out a single flaw during the testing of the howitzer. I personally read many dozens of reports on testing guns on Rzhevka, and I can safely say that this happened extremely rarely.
But Bulba began to mutter, saying that re-equipment of the system is impossible without the AK-20 crane, which supposedly has low maneuverability, etc. " Military unit No. 33491 believes that if there is a need for a weapon with the ballistic characteristics of the S-73 howitzer, then it would be advisable to attach its swinging part to an artillery self-propelled vehicle of the type 271».
The “wise” General Bulba proposed to superimpose the S-73 on an “artillery self-propelled vehicle of the Object 271 type,” but did not specify how much it would cost the state and how many years it would take. And the main thing is that the artillery self-propelled gun object 271 (406-mm SM-54 cannon) was a monstrous monster that could not pass through ordinary bridges, did not fit into city streets, tunnels under bridges, could not pass under power lines, could not be transported by rail platform, etc. For this reason, this monster was never adopted for service.
Another question is that the SM-54 cannon was designed by the native Leningrad TsKB-34, manufactured in the same city at the Bolshevik plant, and the artillery self-propelled gun was created at the Kirov plant. Rhetorical question, what was Bulba’s relationship with the management of these enterprises?
THE END OF THE “GRABIN EMPIRE”
Since the mid-1950s, all our artillery design bureaus and factories have gradually switched to missile technology. So, the Bolshevik factories, named after. Frunze (Arsenal), Barrikady, Perm plant No. 172, TsKB-34 and others began to design and manufacture launchers for missiles of all classes, and then some of them (named after Frunze, No. 172, etc.) they began to make the rockets themselves. Some artillery design bureaus were simply closed in the 1950s (OKB-172, OKB-43, etc.).
Grabin, too, saving his design bureau, began to work on missile launchers, installations for shooting aerial bombs, etc. In the second half of the 1950s. he even began designing guided missiles. In particular, a prototype ATGM was created and tested, on which, by the way, the son of the chief designer, a graduate of the Moscow Higher Technical School Vasily Vasilyevich Grabin, also worked.
In February 1958, Grabin, on a competitive basis (the main competitor is OKB-8 in Sverdlovsk, chief designer L.V. Lyulev) began designing an anti-aircraft missile for the Krug military complex. The Grabin S-134 rocket was equipped with a ramjet engine. TsNII-58 independently developed S-135 launchers for missiles.
Apparently, Grabin had other developments in the field of missile weapons, but they either still lie in the archives under the heading “Top Secret”, or were simply destroyed. Grabin did not have to complete all this work.
By the beginning of 1959, Grabin was full of strength and energy and was making far-reaching plans. Alas, danger lurked nearby, a few tens of meters from the TsNII-58 fence across the railway tracks. These paths were the border between two empires - Grabina and Korolev.
Having failed in the creation of liquid-fuel ICBMs, Korolev in 1958 simultaneously began work on long-range solid-fuel missiles. Accordingly, Korolev demanded from the government additional money, people and premises for this work.
Republika Srpska Colonel Vinko Pandurevic shows a ZiS-3 cannon to inspecting American IFOR officers. 1996
As B.E. Chertok wrote: “ In 1959, Ustinov had a very convenient opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: to finally pay off all the grievances with Grabin, finally proving to him “who is who,” and to satisfy Korolev’s urgent, legal demands to expand the production and design base».
By order of the State Committee on Defense Technology under the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 3, 1959, work on long-range solid-fuel ballistic missiles was entrusted to OKB-1 with the inclusion of TsNII-58 in its composition.
Grabin himself falls into disgrace. At TsNII-58, a wonderful museum of Soviet and German guns is being destroyed, a significant part of which were our and German unique guns, created in several or even a single copy. Who did this museum bother? What about guns, a significant part of the documentation of TsNII-58 was destroyed. By personal order of Korolev, Grabin’s correspondence with Stalin and Molotov was destroyed.
It is curious that Grabin’s secret miracle guns had to be remembered in 1967., when the Israelis occupied the Golan Heights dominating Syrian territory and installed American 175-mm M107 self-propelled guns there, which had a firing range of 32 km. The Israelis were able to suddenly open fire on Syrian military installations with impunity - headquarters, radar stations, anti-aircraft missile positions, airfields, etc. And the “great and mighty Soviet Union” could do nothing to help the Arab brothers.
At the direction of the CPSU Central Committee, the Barrikady plant (No. 221) urgently began restoring production of the S-23. This was very difficult to do, since a significant part of the documentation and technical equipment was lost. Nevertheless, the plant team successfully completed the task. Until 1971, twelve 180-mm S-23 guns were manufactured for Syria.
The famous designer's guns outlived him for a long time. His brainchildren ZiS-3, BS-3 and others participated in all local conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century.
Grabin Vasily Gavrilovich
Weapon of Victory
The author of this book, the famous Soviet designer of artillery systems Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin - Colonel General of the technical troops, Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor, Hero of Socialist Labor, four times laureate of the USSR State Prize (he was awarded it in 1941, 1943, 1946 and 1950), holder of four Orders of Lenin and other high government awards.
"Famous" is an imprecise word. If we talk about wide popularity, it would be more correct to say - unknown. How unknown were S.P. Korolev and the creator of the legendary T-34 tank A.A. Morozov. How the names of many engineers and scientists who worked for the Victory were unknown until now. Both their workdays and their holidays took place in the strictest secrecy.
Of the 140 thousand field guns that our soldiers fought with during the Great Patriotic War, more than 90 thousand were made at the plant, which was headed by V. G. Grabin as the Chief Designer (in the book this plant is called Privolzhsky), and another 30 thousand were manufactured according to Grabin’s projects at other factories in the country. Few people knew the name of V.G. Grabin, but everyone knew the famous divisional gun ZIS-3, which absorbed all the advantages of the famous Russian “three-inch gun” and multiplied them many times over, assessed by the highest world authorities as a masterpiece of design thought. To this day, these guns stand on memorial pedestals on the fields of major battles - as a monument to Russian weapons. This is how the people appreciated them. Grabin's guns were armed with "thirty-fours" and heavy "KV" tanks, Grabin's 100-mm "St.
Usually in memoirs the reader looks for details of the lives of famous people, living details that allow them to fully and vividly recreate the image of the time. This book is different. V. G. Grabin does not describe the story of his life, he writes what could be called a biography of his case. As fully as the stages of the birth of almost each of the guns are traced, the author is just as stingy with regard to even the sharp turns of his life. For V.R. Grabin, the event was the adoption of his gun for service, and not the awarding of the highest prize to him. That’s why I had to start these pages with an encyclopedic reference, an official listing of his titles and titles.
As for most readers who are far from the special problems of weapons and who have not delved into the history of the Great Patriotic War in detail, the surname “Grabin” did not mean anything to me until one of the cold early spring evenings of 1972, when a young major with black buttonholes and placed two heavy packages on the floor with the words: “Ordered to be handed over.” Only paper could be that heavy. And so it turned out: the bundles contained two dozen folders with dense typewritten text. I was internally horrified: it would take at least a week to read! But there was nowhere to retreat. The day before, in a telephone conversation with my senior colleague in the writing workshop M.D. Mikhalev (he was then in charge of the essay department in the magazine "October"), I agreed to look at the materials in order, if it interested me, to take part in their literary processing. M.D. Mikhalev himself had been doing this work for about a year and felt that he could not cope alone. The major, saluting, disappeared into the darkness. I dragged the bags closer to the table and opened the first folder. On the title page there was: V. G. Grabin.
I read it for exactly a week. Without stopping - like a fascinating detective. Putting everything aside and turning off the phone. Actually, these were not memoirs at all. It would be more correct to say: technical report. With all the external signs of this stationery genre. But the report is about my entire life. And since for V.G. Grabin, as for many of his peers, whose youth was illuminated by the young ideology of the October Revolution, work was the main, and sometimes simply the only content of life, Grabin’s report on his life became a report on his work.
Among Vasily Gavrilovich’s talents there was no literary gift, but he possessed a different, rare gift, which makes him similar to Leo Tolstoy. I would call it point memory. His memory was phenomenal, he remembered everything in the smallest detail - in the course of our work, M.D. Mikhalev and I, archival research invariably confirmed that he was right. But not only did he remember everything that happened. The most amazing thing is that he remembered everything that he felt then; subsequent impressions did not erase or distort what he experienced at each specific moment of his almost forty years of activity. Once upon a time, somewhere, some minor military official interfered (more often tried to interfere) with the work on another cannon. And although a little earlier or a little later this official was convinced or simply retreated, pulled away, was crushed, was put out of the way by the course of the case itself, Grabin seems to return to that day, and all the hatred for the bureaucrats, all the despair falls on paper, he argues again with his long-defeated opponent in the same way as he argued then, and provides evidence of his own, and not his, rightness, without missing the slightest detail: “Firstly... thirdly... fifthly... And finally, one hundred and thirty-secondly...”
V.G. Grabin wrote a report about his life. And the opportunity not just to find out the result, but to trace the process gives V. G. Grabin’s book a special dynamism, as well as additional and rather rare value for memoir literature.
A few days later I arrived in Valentinovka, near Moscow, and walked for a long time along the streets, muddy from the spring flood, looking for the house where V.G. Grabin lived. Two shabby little men stood near the gate with the number I needed and unsuccessfully pressed the bell button. At their feet stood a milk flask with some kind of drying oil or paint, which they were eager to sell as quickly as possible for any price that was a multiple of the cost of the bottle. Finally, not in response to a bell, but in response to a knock, the gate opened, a man looked out, dressed the way all residents of the villages near Moscow dress to work on the street, in the most shabby time: some kind of quilted jacket, props, - he looked questioningly for visitors: what do you need?
Listen, dad, call the general, there’s something to do! - one of them perked up.
The man glanced at the flask and muttered unfriendly:
The general is not at home.
And when they, cursing, dragged their flask to another gate, he turned his gaze to me. I introduced myself and explained the purpose of my visit. The man stepped aside to let me through:
Come on in. I'm Grabin.
In the depths of a spacious, but not at all general-sized plot, there stood a small two-story house surrounded by a veranda, which also did not in any way resemble a general’s mansion. Later, while working on the book, I often visited this house, and every time it struck me with some kind of strangeness. There were quite a few rooms in it, six or seven, but they were all small and walk-through, and in the center of the house there was a staircase, a chimney and what are called utilities. One day I asked Anna Pavlovna, the wife of Vasily Gavrilovich, who built this house.
Vasily Gavrilovich himself,” she answered. - He designed and supervised the construction himself, he loved it very much.
And everything became clear, the house looked like a cannon: in the center there was a barrel, and everything else was around...
Two years later, work on the manuscript was completed; in the spring of 1974, a typesetting arrived from the printing house, the title of which read: Politizdat, 1974. A year later, the typesetting was scattered and the book ceased to exist.
It was as if it had ceased to exist.
But it still existed. Still, “manuscripts don’t burn.”
According to tradition, prefaces to the memoirs of major statesmen are written by other major statesmen, with their authority as if testifying to the authenticity of the author’s merits, the significance of his contribution to science, culture or the economy of the country. V. G. Grabin was undoubtedly a major statesman and in this capacity undoubtedly deserves a preface written (or at least signed) by a man with a much more respectable title than the modest “member of the Writers’ Union”, and who also spoke in the very the most modest role of a lithographer or litographer. I think that “Weapons of Victory” will attract the attention of authoritative authors who will note not only V.G. Grabin’s contribution to the overall victory of our people over fascism, but also his role as the largest organizer of industrial production, who (again I turn to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia) " developed and applied methods for high-speed design of artillery systems with simultaneous design of technological processes, which made it possible to organize in a short time the mass production of new types of guns to support the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War." Simply put: the Grabin design bureau created a tank gun in 77 days after receiving the order, and it did not create a prototype, but a serial, gross one. I hope that the less material, but no less important side of V. G. Grabin’s activity, which affirmed not in words, but in the most urgent deeds, such a forgotten concept as the honor of a Soviet engineer, will not be left without attention.