Where the Varangian drowned. Details not included in reports

At the end of the 19th century, the Naval Ministry of the Russian Empire ordered the construction of a light armored cruiser from the United States. The contract was signed on April 11, 1898, and the shipyards of the American Company William Cramp & Sons on the Delaware River in Philadelphia were chosen as the construction site.

Despite its American "origin", all the armament of the cruiser "Varyag" was manufactured in Russia. Guns - at the Obukhov plant, torpedo tubes - at the Metal plant in St. Petersburg. The Izhevsk plant manufactured equipment for the galley. But the anchors were ordered in England.

Specifications

For its time, "Varyag" was one of the highest class ships. It was a four-pipe, two-masted, armored cruiser of the 1st rank with a displacement of 6,500 tons. The cruiser's main caliber artillery consisted of twelve 152-mm (six-inch) guns. In addition, the ship had twelve 75 mm guns, eight 47 mm rapid-fire cannons and two 37 mm cannons. The cruiser had six torpedo tubes. It could reach speeds of up to 23 knots.

Such equipment was not the only strength of the cruiser. It differed from ships built earlier by a significantly larger number of instruments and mechanisms powered by electricity.

In addition, all the cruiser's furniture was made of metal. This significantly increased the safety of the ship in battle and during a fire: previously the furniture was made of wood and, as a result, it burned very well.

The cruiser "Varyag" also became the first ship of the Russian fleet on which telephone sets were installed in almost all service areas, including posts at the guns.

The ship's crew consisted of 550 sailors, non-commissioned officers, conductors and 20 officers.

With all the advantages, there were also some disadvantages: the boilers installed on the cruiser, after several years of operation, no longer provided the required power, and in 1901 there was even talk of repairs. However, during tests in 1903, before leaving Kronstadt for its home port, the Varyag showed excellent performance, close to the maximum possible.

Launching and journey to home port

The cruiser "Varyag" would have been launched on October 19, 1899. Until January 1901, the team that arrived from Russia carried out work on arming and equipping the ship. In mid-January, the equipment was completed and the ship was officially accepted into the navy of the Russian Empire.

On the morning of May 3, 1901, the Varyag dropped anchor in the Great Kronstadt roadstead. The cruiser spent very little time in Kronstadt: after two inspections, one of which was carried out personally by Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, the Varyag was assigned to Port Arthur to reinforce the 1st Pacific Squadron. There weren’t that many ships in this squadron and they were scattered across all the ports: Vladivostok, Port Arthur, Dalniy, Chemulpo, near Seoul, off the coast of Korea.

The cruiser reached its home port halfway around the world: first the course lay through the Baltic and North Seas, then across the English Channel to the Atlantic Ocean, then around Africa to the Indian Ocean. The entire voyage took about six months, and on February 25, the cruiser "Varyag" anchored in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur.

Battle, death and subsequent fate

"Varyag" took part in one of the most dramatic naval battles in history. It happened during the Russo-Japanese War, literally a month before the start of which the Tsar’s governor in the Far East, Admiral E.I. Alekseev sent the cruiser "Varyag" from Port Arthur to the neutral Korean port of Chemulpo (modern Incheon).

On January 26 (February 8), 1904, the Japanese squadron of Rear Admiral Uriu blocked the port of Chemulpo to cover the landing and prevent the intervention of the Varyag.
On January 27 (February 9), the captain of the Varyag, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, received an ultimatum from Uriu: leave the port before noon, otherwise the Russian ships will be attacked in the roadstead. Rudnev decided to fight his way to Port Arthur, and in case of failure, blow up the ships.

At noon, the Varyag and the gunboat Koreets left the port and, at a distance of 10 miles, met a Japanese squadron occupying a position behind Yodolmi Island. The battle lasted only 50 minutes. During this time, "Varyag" fired 1105 shells at the enemy, "Koreets" - 52 shells.

During the battle, the Varyag received 5 holes below the waterline and lost three 6-inch guns. According to Rudnev, the ship did not have the opportunity to continue the battle, and it was decided to return to the port of Chemulpo.

In the port, after assessing the severity of the damage, the remaining guns and equipment on it were destroyed, if possible, the cruiser itself was scuttled, and the "Korean" was blown up. However, this is not the end of the story of the legendary cruiser.

In 1905, the Japanese raised and repaired the Varyag. The ship received a new name "Soya" and for the next few years served as a training ship for Japanese sailors.
In 1916, Russia bought the ship from Japan, and in 1917 the ship sailed to British docks for repairs. After the revolution, the Soviet government was unable to pay for repairs and the ship remained with the British.
In 1920, the British authorities sold the cruiser for scrapping to Germany.
In 1925, during transportation, the Varyag was caught in a storm and ran aground off the Irish coast, near the village of Lendalfoot. It was there that the naval legend found her last berth: the ship was blown up so that the hull would not interfere with fishing and shipping.
In 2004, the exact location of the cruiser's sinking was determined. Now all that remains of the ship lies on the seabed at a depth of 8 meters, several hundred meters from the shore.

Today, in the Far East, Ireland and Korea, museums and memorials dedicated to the memory of the cruiser "Varyag" have been opened. The songs “Our proud Varyag does not surrender to the enemy” and “Cold waves are splashing” are dedicated to the feat of the ship’s crews; in addition, in 1972, a commemorative postage stamp with the image of the cruiser was issued in the USSR.

"Varyag" - armored cruiser of the 1st rank of the 1st Pacific squadron of the Russian Navy in 1901-1904. Participant in the battle at Chemulpo (1904).

In 1898, in the city of Philadelphia, the armored cruiser “Varyag” was laid down by order of the Russian Naval Ministry. The shipyard of the American Company William Cramp & Sons in Philadelphia on the Delaware River was chosen as the site for the construction of the ship. The parties signed a contract on April 11, 1898.

One of the weak points of the cruiser was the new Nickolas steam boilers; they allowed for high speeds, sometimes up to 24 knots, but were extremely unreliable in operation. Due to some deficiencies found when the ship was accepted, the Varyag was commissioned at the beginning of 1901. During the construction of the cruiser, 6,500 people worked at the shipyard. Simultaneously with the construction of the Varyag, the Russian leadership ordered the construction of the battleship Retvizan for the Russian Pacific squadron. It was being built on a nearby slipway.

In accordance with the preliminary specifications, the mass of the hull, taking into account practical things, was supposed to be 2900 tons.

The cruiser's hull was equipped with a forecastle, which improved its combat and performance characteristics in stormy seas. The basis of the hull was the keel, enclosed between bronze stems. On the flooring of the second bottom, foundations for 30 Nikloss boilers were installed on specially prepared sites. The height of the ship's hull was 10.46 m.

All vital mechanisms, machines, boilers and cellars were covered by an armored deck made of “extra-soft nickel steel”, stretching from stem to stem at a height of 6.48 m from the main line. Above the engine room, the deck rose to a height of 7.1 m; to the sides its bevels descended below the waterline by about 1.1 m. The armor was riveted from 19 mm and 38 mm plates; the total thickness of the horizontal deck and bevels was 38 and 76 mm, respectively. The viscosity of the armor material caused the projectile to ricochet when it hit it at an acute angle. All armor plates were supplied by the Carnegie Steel Company, located in Pittsburgh. In the middle of the deck along the center plane above the boiler rooms there were openings for chimneys, and above the engine rooms for a skylight. Along the sides, above and below the slopes in the area of the engine and boiler rooms, there were coal pits. In addition to their direct purpose, they also performed protective functions, forming a parapet around the vital mechanisms and systems of the ship.

Under the armored deck, on the second bottom, all the main units, mechanisms and machinery of the ship were located. Here, at the bow and stern ends, there were magazines with ammunition, divided into two groups of nine rooms, which simplified their protection.

Initially, in accordance with the “Program for Designing a Cruiser,” it was planned to install 2,203 mm on the ship; 10 152 mm; 12 75 mm; 6 47-mm guns and 6 torpedo tubes, 2 of the latter being underwater. In total, 440.5 tons were allocated for artillery weapons according to the project; in reality it was almost 30 tons heavier.

In the final version of the project, the “six-thousander” cruisers (“Varyag”, “Askold” and “Bogatyr”) had 12 152/45 mm, 12 75/50 mm, 8 47/43 mm (two of them with removable mounts ), 2 37/23-mm; 2 63.5/19-mm Baranovsky guns; 6 381 mm TA and 2 7.62 mm machine guns. In addition, it was planned to install removable TA for boats, as well as barrage mines deployed from special rafts.

"Varyag" was equipped with all these numerous weapons. Unlike other cruisers, all TAs on it were located above the water. The cruiser's large artillery (152 mm and 75 mm guns) was combined into three batteries. The first included 6 152-mm guns located in the bow, the second - 6 stern 152-mm guns; in the third - 12 75 mm guns.

All the cruiser's guns, including small-caliber ones, had continuous numbering, with odd numbers on the starboard side and even numbers on the left side. Numbering - from bow to stern:

152 mm Kane guns of the 1891 model. On the forecastle - No. 1 and No. 2. On the upper deck - guns No. 3 - No. 12;

75-mm Kane guns of the 1891 model on Meller machines. On the upper deck - No. 13 - No. 22; on the living deck in the commander's salon - No. 23 and No. 24;

47 mm Hotchkiss guns of the 1896 model. On the forecastle on the sponson of guns No. 5 and No. 6 are guns No. 27 and No. 28. Guns No. 25 and No. 26 were mounted on removable mounts designed for steam boats, No. 29 and No. 30 were mounted on the foremast top, and No. 31 and No. 32 - on the top of the mainmast;

37 mm Hotchkiss guns of the 1896 model. Both guns No. 33 and No. 34 were mounted on a platform behind the aft bridge;

63.5 mm Baranovsky model 1882 landing guns. Guns No. 35 and No. 36 were located on the forecastle under the wings of the bow bridge. Wheel carriages for them were stored separately - under the bow bridge behind the conning tower;

As already mentioned, all torpedo tubes on the cruiser were surface-mounted. Two of them were located in the stems at the ends of the ship in a stationary position; four - on the sides: two in the ship's church and two in the wardroom. The onboard vehicles were rotary; their guidance was carried out using a ball device. In the initial position they were in a disassembled state; they had to be collected before firing. Firing from the onboard devices was carried out using the energy of powder gases, and from the bow, due to the danger of flooding with water, using compressed air.

In addition, the ship had 254 mm torpedo tubes for arming steam boats. In the stowed position, they were secured to the decking of the longitudinal bridges next to the boats.

The cruiser's ammunition was stored in 18 cellars. They contained shells of all calibers, as well as torpedoes, throwing mines, barrage mines and cartridges for machine guns and small arms. For the main caliber, armor-piercing, high-explosive, cast iron and segment projectiles were used; for firing from 75 mm guns - only armor-piercing and cast iron.

According to the state, the cellars contained 2,388 cartridges (charges in cases) and shells for 152-mm guns (199 rounds per barrel), 3,000 unitary cartridges for 75-mm guns (250 per barrel), 5,000 unitary cartridges for 47-mm guns (625 per barrel), 2584 unitary cartridges for 37 mm guns (1292 per barrel), 1490 unitary cartridges for 63.5 mm guns (745 per gun), 12 torpedoes with a caliber of 381 mm (Despite the fact that all reference and special literature speaks of 381-mm torpedo tubes, there is reason to believe that in fact on the Varyag they had a caliber of 450 mm. This assumption is based on measurements of the dimensions of the torpedo tubes given in the original drawings of the Kramp plant, and is indirectly confirmed by photographs of the available on a torpedo cruiser), six throwing mines with a caliber of 254 mm and 35 barrage mines (according to other sources - 22).

The supply of ammunition for all calibers was carried out by elevators with electric and manual drives. Shells and cartridges were fed upward in gazebos with four shots each, and the gazebos were rolled up to the guns on special monorails and there they were unloaded onto a tarpaulin spread on the deck. Monorails were laid to all guns located on the upper deck; there were them in all the cellars. Shells and cartridges (cases) were delivered to guns No. 1 and No. 2 using folding monorails or carried manually directly from the elevators. Shots were delivered to the guns mounted on the tops by lifts located inside the masts. The 152 mm guns were served by 12 elevators (one per gun); 75 mm guns - three; 47 mm guns - two; the remaining elevators were intended for 37 mm guns and Baranovsky cannons. The lifting speed of the gazebos by electric drive is 0.8 - 0.9 m/s, manually 0.2 - 0.4 m/s.

The cruiser was equipped with a remote fire control system using special indicators installed near the guns and in the cellars. Data on firing parameters and type of shells were specified directly from the conning tower.

Determination of the distance to the target according to the project was to be carried out by six rangefinder stations using Luzhol-Myakishev micrometers. In fact, the Varyag was equipped with only three such stations; two of them were located on the tops and one on the forward bridge.

Triple expansion steam engines rated at 20,000 hp. were located in two adjacent engine rooms and had a height of 4.5 m together with the foundation. Their excess power, revealed during full-stroke tests, was a kind of “dead weight”, since it could not be realized with the existing steam output of the boilers.

The cruiser's four-cylinder engines had one high (14 atm), medium (8.4 atm) and two low (3.5 atm) pressure cylinders. Accordingly, their diameters were equal to 1.02, 1.58 and 1.73 m. The piston stroke was 0.91 m. The maximum angular speed of the shaft rotation was 160 rpm. The piston rods were made of forged nickel steel and were hollow. The steel shafts of the main machines are also forged.

In accordance with the design drawings, it was planned to install two four-blade propellers with removable blades with a diameter of 4.4 m on the Varyag. However, during construction they were replaced with two three-bladed propellers with fixed blades and a standard pitch of 5.6 m. Auxiliary two-cylinder cars.

While the ship was moving at full speed (during tests in the USA), the temperature in the engine rooms reached 31° and 43° - on the lower and upper platforms, respectively.

The “Stop” command from full forward motion to a complete stop of the car was executed in 15 seconds; “Move forward” - in 8 s, and changing from full forward to full backward - in 25 s.

The three boiler rooms of the cruiser housed 30 Nikloss water-tube boilers: 10 in the bow; on average - 8 and in the aft - 12. The height of each boiler with a foundation is 3 m, of which 2 m was occupied by a collector with pipes. Each boiler had three fireboxes lined with brick. All boilers were combined into four groups, each with its own chimney, and the bow one was narrower than the others. The heating surface area of all 30 boilers was 5786 m2, and the area of the swinging grates was 146 m2. The design operating pressure in the boilers was taken to be 18 atm (test - 28.1 atm). During running 12-hour progressive tests, the pressure in the boilers did not exceed 17.5 atm, the temperature in the boiler room on the upper platforms reached 73°, on the lower ones - 50°. Water was supplied to the boilers using 10 feed pumps. The amount of water in the boilers is 110t; another 120 tons were additionally stored in the double-bottom space. High pressure steam from the boilers to the machines was supplied through a pipeline with a diameter of 381 mm. Slag from the boiler room was thrown out through special shafts equipped with an electric drive. The total cooling surface of the two main refrigerators is 1120 m2.

Coal pits were adjacent to the boiler rooms. Coal was taken from them through special necks located in the boiler room. It was transported to the fireboxes on rails in trolleys.

Coal was loaded into the pits through 16 necks with a diameter of 508 mm located on the upper deck.

The steering wheel was controlled either from the combat or from the wheelhouse; in the event of their failure, the control was transferred to the steering compartment, located under the armored deck.

The cruiser "Varyag", unlike previously created ships, had a large percentage of equipment powered by electricity. In this regard, the ship's energy consumption exceeded 400 kW. This required a significant amount of fuel. For example, out of 8,600 tons of coal consumed per year, 1,750 tons were spent on lighting, 540 tons on the desalination plant, and 415 tons on heating and galleys.

The ship's power sources were three dynamos. The power of the two, located in the bow and stern, was 132 kW each, and the power of the generator located on the living deck was 66 kW. They generated an electric current of 105 V. In addition, a 2.6 kW generator with a circuit voltage of 65 V was used to lift boats and boats. There was also a steering generator in the tiller compartment; in everyday life it more often served for lighting. In addition, in a special compartment there was a battery for emergency power supply of running lights, loud bells and other needs.

To extinguish fires, a fire main with a diameter of 127 mm was laid under the armored deck. To connect fire hoses, the pipe had branches with a diameter of 64 mm, which extended into all cellars, boiler rooms and engine rooms. Fire alarm sensors were installed in coal pits. Fires in coal pits were extinguished using steam.

The drainage system consisted of signaling devices, drainage pumps and drives (electric motors). It ensured the pumping of incoming water from all rooms located under the armored deck of the ship.

Water was removed from the boiler rooms using centrifugal pumps placed on a double bottom deck. They were driven by electric motors installed on the armored deck and connected to the pumps by a long shaft. The productivity of one pump is 600 m3/h. The diameters of the inlet pipes on all pumps were the same - 254 mm. Water was pumped out of the engine rooms by two circulation pumps of the main refrigerators with a capacity of 2x1014 m3/h.

The ventilation system could provide 5-fold air exchange within an hour in all rooms below the armored deck, 12-fold in the cellars and 20-fold in the dynamo rooms.

To protect against torpedoes while anchored in open roadsteads, the ship was equipped with metal nets. They were hung along the sides on poles. In the traveling position, the poles were laid along the sides in an inclined position, and the nets were placed on special shelves.

The cruiser's anchorage consisted of two fairleads with sac-cluses, four Hall anchors with rods, anchor chains, two capstans, a windlass with a drive, breakouts and a crane for cleaning the anchors. The mass of each anchor is 4.77 tons. Two of them were installed on special cushions on the starboard side: the first, closer to the fairlead, was the main anchor, the second was the spare one. On the left side there is one guard. The fourth was attached to the front wall of the conning tower foundation. Anchor chains with a length of 274 m and a caliber of 54 mm were attached to both main anchors. In addition to the main chains, the cruiser had two more spare ones, each 183 m long. The anchors were lifted by a windlass located under the forecastle. The drive of the windlass and capstan located on the forecastle is steam; stern spire - electric. The anchors were removed after lifting by a crane installed on the forecastle not far from the huys rod. To work with the spare anchor, a collapsible crane was used, installed on the forecastle. In the stowed position it was stored on the roof of the wheelhouse.

In addition to anchors, the cruiser had one stop anchor and three verpas weighing 1.18 tons, 685 kg, 571 kg and 408 kg, respectively. The stop anchor was located on the left side behind the “casemate” of the 75 mm gun on special brackets. On the starboard side, in the area of whaleboat No. 1, one verp was fixed on brackets, the rest were placed on the port side.

The cruiser's rescue craft included two 12.4 m long steam boats; one 16-oar and one 14-oar longboat; two 12-oar boats; two 6-oared whaleboats; two 6-oar yawls and two trial 4-oar boats. All of them were made of galvanized steel. Except for two yawls, all watercraft were installed on rostra. The sixes were located on the sides on the forecastle in front of the first chimney; trial boats - next to 12-oar boats on rostra.

The controls, communications and surveillance on the cruiser were concentrated mainly on the stern and bow bridges, including the wheelhouse and conning tower. The cruiser's conning tower, increased compared to the design from 2.8x2.3 m to 4.2x3.5 m, was an oval armored parapet protected by 152 mm armor. To ensure the normal operation of the combat and traveling compasses, the roof and floor of the cabin were made of bronze and brass. Above there was a transverse bridge on which combat lights (searchlights) and taillights were installed. The pilothouse, also made entirely of sheet brass and copper, was located in the center of the bridge. There were fifteen windows in its walls: five in front, four on the sides and two in the back. There are four doors. The bridge rested on the roof of the conning tower and 13 racks installed on the forecastle.

There were five compasses on the cruiser. The two main ones were located on the roof of the chassis and on a special area of the aft bridge. The non-magnetic zone of these compasses is 4.5 m.

The Varyag's communications equipment included a telephone network, speaking pipes and a staff of messengers. If the latter were a traditional type of communication, then the telephone was almost a novelty in the Russian fleet. It covered almost all of the ship's service areas. Telephone sets were installed in all cellars, in boiler rooms and engine rooms, in the cabins of the commander, senior officer, and mechanical engineer, in the conning and wheelhouses, and at gun posts.

Electrical alarm systems (bells, indicators, fire alarm sensors, sirens, etc.) were available in the command staff's cabins, at combat posts and in the conning tower. In addition to warning calls, the cruiser, paying tribute to traditions, retained a staff of drummers and buglers (drummers gave signals for artillery crews on the starboard side, and buglers on the left). To communicate with other ships, in addition to the radio station, the cruiser had a large staff of signalmen transmitting messages using flags, flags, figures, Tabulevich lanterns and a mechanical semaphore (removed in the summer of 1901 due to cumbersomeness and inconvenience of use).

The Varyag had six spotlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm. They were located on masts (one at a time) and bridges (two at a time).

The crew's living quarters were located under the forecastle on the living deck, and aft on the armored deck. From the 72nd shp. towards the stern were the cabins of the officers and command of the ship. The officers' cabins were single, with an area of 6 m2; cabins for the senior officer, mechanical engineer and senior navigator - 10 m2 each. The premises towards the stern at a length of 12.5 m were occupied by the commander. Adjoining them was a wardroom with an area of 92 m2. On the living deck there was an infirmary, a pharmacy, a galley, a bathhouse (25 m2) and a ship's church. On the living deck, all doors, except the watertight ones, were sliding.

During the voyage as part of the escort of Emperor Nicholas II from August to September 1901: the hull and masts are white; chimney elbows and fans (pipes and funnels) are yellow; the crowns of the chimneys are 1.5 m wide, the topmasts of both masts and the yards are black; the inner surface of the bells is red; the underwater part is red.

During the transition to the Far East and in Port Arthur from August 1901 to September 1903: the hull and masts are white; the lower bends of chimneys and fans (pipes and funnels) are yellow; the upper bends of the chimneys, the topmasts of both masts and the yards are black; the inner surface of the bells is red; the underwater part is red.

From September 1903 until the moment of death: from the mouth to the waterline - olive color (in accordance with the order for painting ships in war color, a 0.9 m wide strip of orange color was to be marked on the chimneys); the underwater part is red.

During repairs in Vladivostok and the passage to Hong Kong from March to July 1916: from the waterline to the waterline - spherical color; chimney crowns 1m wide - black; the underwater part is most likely red.

During the transition from Hong Kong to Greenock from July to November 1916: from the waterline to the waterline - “half-white” color (as in the document - Author); chimney crowns 1m wide - black; the underwater part is red.

During the passage from Greenock to the capture by the British from November 1916 to November 1917: from klotik to waterline - spherical color; chimney crowns 1m wide - black; the underwater part is red.

On December 27, 1903, the commander of the cruiser “Varyag” Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev received an order from the Russian governor to go to the Korean international port of Chemulpo (the current port of Inchhon, South Korea). According to the command's plan, the cruiser was supposed to establish reliable communications between Port Arthur and our envoy in Seoul, as well as indicate the Russian military presence in Korea. It was forbidden to leave the port of Chemulpo without an order from senior command. Due to the difficult fairway and shallow water, the Varyag dropped anchor in the outer roadstead. A few days later he was joined by the gunboat "Korean". Very soon it became clear that the Japanese were preparing for a major landing operation. On January 25, the commander of the cruiser V.F. Rudnev personally went to the Russian ambassador to pick him up and go home with the entire mission. But Ambassador Pavlov did not dare to leave the embassy without an order from his department. A day later, the port was blocked by an armada of a Japanese squadron consisting of 14 ships. The flagship was the armored cruiser Osama.

On January 27, the commander of the cruiser Varyag received an ultimatum from Admiral Urio. The Japanese commander offered to leave the port and surrender to the mercy of the victors, otherwise he threatened to attack Russian ships right in the roadstead. Having learned about this, the ships of foreign states sent a protest - to go into battle in a neutral roadstead, at the same time they refused to accompany the Russians to the sea, where they would have more opportunities to maneuver and repel an attack.

The cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" began to prepare for battle. According to tradition, all sailors and officers changed into clean shirts. At 10:45 V. F. Rudnev addressed the crew with a speech. The ship's priest blessed the sailors before the battle.

At 11:20 the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" weighed anchor and went towards the Japanese squadron. As a sign of the sailors' admiration, the French, British, and Italians lined up the crews of their ships on the decks. On the Varyag, the orchestra played the national anthems, and in response, on the Italian ship, the anthem of the Russian Empire sounded. When Russian ships appeared in the roadstead, the Japanese raised a signal offering to surrender, the commander of the cruiser ordered not to respond to enemy signals. Admiral Urio waited in vain for several minutes for an answer. At first, he could not believe that the Russians were not coming to surrender, but to attack his squadron. At 11:45, the flagship Osama opened fire on the cruiser Varyag. One of the first shells hit the upper bow bridge and destroyed the rangefinder station, the navigator's combat unit was killed. Two minutes later, the Varyag opened strong return fire from the starboard side.

It was especially hard for the gunners who were on the upper deck. The Japanese used new tactics for the first time in this battle - they literally bombarded the cruiser "Varyag" with high-explosive shells of strong explosive action, even when hitting the water such a shell scattered into hundreds of pieces.

The Russian fleet used powerful armor-piercing shells. They pierced the sides of enemy ships without exploding.

When the stern flag was torn off by another explosion, the boatswain raised a new one, risking his life. At 12:15 Rudnev decided to bring the left side gun into battle. When the ship began to turn around, two large shells hit it simultaneously. The first hit the room where all the steering gears were located, fragments of the second flew into the conning tower, three people standing next to Rudnev were killed on the spot. The commander of the cruiser "Varyag" himself was wounded in the head, but, despite the concussion, he remained at his post and continued to lead the battle. When the distance between the opponents was reduced to 5 km, the gunboat “Koreets” entered the battle.

It is curious that not a single Japanese shell hit it. The day before, the commander ordered the masts to be shortened, which prevented the Japanese from accurately determining the distance and adjusting the shooting.

At 12:25, the Varyag opened fire from the port side. The Osama's aft bridge was destroyed by a direct hit, after which a severe fire broke out on the flagship. By this time, the second Japanese cruiser Takatiha, having received serious damage, was forced to withdraw from the battle. One of the destroyers sank. At 12:30 two shells pierced the side of the cruiser "Varyag" under water. The cruiser began to list to port. While the team was sealing the holes, Rudnev decided to return to the port of Chemulpo. At the raid, he planned to repair the damage and put out the fires, so that he could then return to battle again.

At 12:45, as the raid approached, the general fire stopped. During the battle, the Varyag managed to fire 1,105 shells at the enemy. At 13:15, the wounded and smoking “Varyag” dropped anchor in the roadstead. According to eyewitnesses, its entire deck was covered in blood. There were 130 wounded sailors lying in the charred premises of the cruiser. 22 people died during the battle. Of the 12 six-inch guns, two remained in working order. Further resistance was not possible. And then the military council of the cruiser decided to prevent the Japanese from sinking the ships, and to place the crew on foreign ships by agreement. Having received Rudnev’s appeal, the commanders of European ships immediately sent boats with orderlies. Several sailors died during the evacuation. The French cruiser "Pascal" took the most of all - 352 people, the British took 235 people, the Italians - 178. At 15:30 on the "Varyag" the kingstons and flood valves were opened, the "Korean" was blown up.

On February 9, 1904, at 18:10, the light armored cruiser "Varyag" lay on its left side and disappeared under water.

Not a single officer or sailor was captured after the battle. Respecting the courage shown in that battle, Admiral Urio agreed to let them pass through the combat zone to return to their homeland.

Two months later, the steamer with the sailors “Varyag” and “Korean” arrived in Odessa. The heroes of Chemulpo were greeted with the thunder of orchestras and demonstrations of thousands. The sailors were showered with flowers and an unprecedented explosion of patriotic feelings. All participants in the battle were awarded St. George's crosses. Each sailor received a personalized watch from the emperor. Then the first songs appeared dedicated to the cruiser “Varyag” and the gunboat “Koreets”.

However, the story of the legendary cruiser did not end there. Soon after the battle it became clear that the Varyag did not sink deeply. During low tides, the water level in Chemulpo Bay dropped to 9 meters. Having learned about this, the Japanese began work on raising the cruiser Varyag. Within a month, divers and special equipment were delivered to Chemulpo from Japan. The cruiser's guns, masts and pipes were removed, coal was unloaded, but all attempts to raise it in 1904 ended in failure. Only on August 8, 1905, after the creation of special caissons, was it possible to tear the cruiser away from the muddy bottom. In November 1905, the Varyag reached Japan under its own power. For almost two years, the cruiser "Varyag" was in the city of Yokosuka undergoing major repairs. The work to raise and restore it cost the Japanese treasury 1 million yen. In 1907, he was enlisted in the Japanese Navy under the name "Soya". At the stern, as a sign of respect for the enemy, an inscription of the cruiser's former name was left. For nine years, the cruiser was a training ship for the cadet school. It taught how to defend the honor of your homeland.

After the First World War, the Russian government began negotiations on the transfer of several captured ships. After lengthy bidding, the Russian government bought the Varyag from the Japanese. In March of the same year, the cruiser set sail for Russia. On March 21, 1916, thousands of residents of Vladivostok watched as three Russian ships flying Japanese flags entered the Golden Horn Bay. These were the battleships of the first Pacific squadron “Poltava”, “Peresvet” and the legendary cruiser “Varyag”. After 12 years, the cruiser moored again at her native shores. The ships were accepted back into the Russian fleet. From now on, they were staffed only by guards crews.

At the end of 1916, the cruiser Varyag was assigned to the Arctic Ocean flotilla. Soon it was sent to England for repairs. In 1917 he arrived in Liverpool. The further fate of the “Varyag” was tragic. After news of the October coup in Russia, the British government ordered all Russian ships to be detained in its ports, by which time the cost of repairing the Varyag was estimated at 300,000 pounds sterling. When it became clear that the Bolsheviks were not going to pay the tsar’s debts, the British confiscated the Varyag and after some time sold it to one of the German companies for scrapping. On February 5, 1920, two tugs took him to the port of Glasgow. While being towed, a severe storm arose in the Irish Sea. Off the coast of Southern Scotland, the Varyag hit rocks and sank, although again not deeply. During low tides, the cruiser's hull protruded from the water by almost 2 meters. All attempts to remove him from the cliff were unsuccessful. Then the new owners began to dismantle it directly into the sea. In 1925, all work at the Varyag crash site was completed. Thus ended the fate of the legendary ship, but the feat of its crew was not forgotten.

On August 9, 1992, a monument to the commander of the cruiser V.F. was unveiled in the village of Savina. Rudnev. In the summer of 1997, a monument to the cruiser Varyag was erected in Vladivostok.

"Varyag" - armored cruiser of the 1st rank of the 1st Pacific squadron of the Russian Navy in 1901-1904. He became famous throughout the world for his decision to take on the unequal battle at Chemulpo against the superior forces of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

In 1895 and 1896, Japan adopted two shipbuilding programs, according to which by 1905 it was planned to build a fleet superior to the Russian naval forces in the Far East. In 1897, shipbuilding programs were revised in the direction of strengthening linear forces. The focus was placed primarily on battleships and armored cruisers, developed by leading European shipbuilding companies. Funding for the programs was calculated until 1905.
In April 1900, naval exercises of unprecedented scale were held in Japan. All ships of the first line took part in them - over 53 units at the first stage and over 47 at the second. The main purpose of the maneuvers was to test the general plan for the mobilization of the fleet and coastal defense forces. In addition to 2,734 naval personnel, the exercises involved over 4,000 people called up from the reserves. The maneuvers continued for a month.

In parallel with the implementation of shipbuilding programs, the Japanese paid no less attention to the technical equipment of ports and bases for the fleet, the construction of modern docks, ship repair plants, coal stations, arsenals and other infrastructures that ensure the execution of combat missions by the linear forces of the fleet. In addition, observation posts were created along the coast of Japan, which were supposed to immediately report by telegraph the appearance of suspicious ships at sea.

In Russia at this time they also did not sit idly by. The militarization of Japan has not gone unnoticed. In 1895, Emperor Nicholas II was presented with an analytical note “On the current state of the Russian fleet and its immediate tasks.” The author of the document was M.I. Kazi. The author in his work reasonably argued that the center of gravity of the fleet’s actions had shifted from the Western theater to the Far East. The king agreed with Kazi's conclusions, and they significantly influenced the plans of the Naval Ministry.

At that time, the shipbuilding program for strengthening the military fleet, adopted in 1895, was being implemented. But it clearly did not match the growth rate of the Japanese fleet. Therefore, in 1897, an additional program was developed “for the needs of the Far East.” It, like the Japanese programs, was supposed to be completed in 1905. By that time, Russia planned to have in the Far East 10 squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 8 armored cruisers of the 1st rank, 5 armored cruisers of the 2nd rank, 7 gunboats, 2 mine transports, 67 destroyers of various types, 2 mine cruisers and 2 auxiliary cruisers. Due to the workload of domestic factories, some of the ships were ordered abroad: in the USA, France and Germany.

The 1st rank armored cruisers of the program “for the needs of the Far East,” the lead of which was the Varyag, were conceived as “long-range reconnaissance aircraft for the squadron.” According to the “program for designing a cruiser” developed by MTK (in modern terms - technical specifications), they were supposed to have a displacement of 6000 tons, a speed of 23 knots, armament of 12 152 mm and 12 75 mm guns, as well as 6 torpedo tubes. Orders for three cruisers of this type (the future Varyag, Askold and Bogatyr) were placed with various private companies in the USA and Germany; later, another ship (Vityaz) was laid down according to a German project in St. Petersburg.
The main contractor in the construction of the Japanese fleet was Great Britain - at that time a recognized leader in the field of military shipbuilding. As a result, the Land of the Rising Sun basically completed its shipbuilding program already in 1903, two years ahead of schedule. The Russian program “for the needs of the Far East,” on the contrary, was lagging behind. As a result, Japan was able to start the war at a time when the balance of power at sea was clearly in its favor.

Construction and testing

An order for two ships of the shipbuilding program “for the needs of the Far East” - a squadron battleship and an armored cruiser (the future Retvizan and Varyag) - was placed in the USA at the plant of The William Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Building Company. This company managed to bypass its competitors and, having avoided participation in the international competition announced by the Marine Technical Committee, signed a contract on April 11, 1898, which was “highly” approved on April 20. According to its terms, a cruiser with a displacement of 6,000 tons (order No. 301) was to be ready 20 months after the arrival of the monitoring commission from Russia at the plant. The cost of the ship without weapons was estimated at 2,138,000 US dollars (4,233,240 rubles). Due to the lack of a detailed project at the time of concluding the contract, it was specifically stipulated that the final specification of the cruiser would be clarified during the construction process with mutual agreement on emerging issues.

The observing commission arrived at the plant on July 13, 1898, headed by Captain 1st Rank M.A. Danilevsky. The commission included specialists in all the main departments of the ship under construction. Immediately upon arrival, the members of the commission had to enter into a struggle with the head of the company, C. Crump, who, taking advantage of the discrepancies that arose as a result of translating the signed documents into English, began to challenge many of the requirements - in his opinion, they were impracticable or entailed additional expenses. In particular, Crump believed that the cruiser’s displacement was underestimated in the terms of reference, and therefore insisted on removing two 152-mm guns from the ship and reducing the coal reserve by 400 tons. As a result of the compromise reached, the displacement was allowed to increase to 6,500 tons. To fulfill the clause on ensuring the contractual speed of 23 knots, Kramp proposed adding to the draft technical specifications the possibility of forced blast in the furnaces. The commission did not agree to this. Therefore, to guarantee a speed of 23 knots, the American company designed machines with excess power - 20,000 hp. With. instead of the design 18,000 l. With.

As for the main caliber artillery, according to the original design it was planned to disperse it throughout the ship - just like the magazines of artillery shells. As a result, the company had serious problems in locating cellars, especially in the area of boiler rooms and engine rooms. There was clearly not enough space, and Crump suggested grouping the guns at the extremities. This made it possible to compactly place the cellars, providing them with better protection from enemy fire in battle. The commission found the proposal acceptable and agreed to the changes.

Crump proposed taking the Japanese armored cruiser Kasagi as a prototype for the construction of a new ship, but MTK insisted on the cruiser Diana, which was built according to the 1895 program. At the same time, the contract provided for the installation on the ship of Belleville boilers, which had proven themselves well in the Russian fleet. Although they were heavy, they were more reliable than Nikloss boilers. Crump, contrary to the customer's requirements, persistently offered the latter, refusing, otherwise, to guarantee the achievement of the contract speed. Alas, he was also supported in St. Petersburg (in the person of Admiral General and Head of GUKiS V.P. Verkhovsky), finally resolving the dispute in favor of the construction company. It should be noted that representatives of the monitoring commission often found themselves in a difficult position due to the intervention of various MTC officials from St. Petersburg and Washington, in particular, naval agent D.F. Dead. The chairman of the commission got it especially hard. Crump, as one might expect, took advantage of this. In the end, due to the conflict that arose between Danilevsky and Mertvago, a new chairman of the commission was appointed in December 1898 - Captain 1st Rank E.N. Shchenenovich, future commander of the battleship "Retvizan"

On January 11, 1899, by the will of the emperor and by order of the Maritime Department, the cruiser under construction was given the name “Varyag” - in honor of the sail-screw corvette of the same name, a participant in the “American Expedition” of 1863. Captain 1st Rank V.I. was appointed commander of the new cruiser. Bare.
And at that time work was in full swing on the slipway. In difficult “battles”, sometimes going beyond the bounds of decency, each side defended its interests. Disputes continued about what the cruiser's appearance would be. As a result, the main pipe was eliminated; The conning tower has been increased in size, in addition, it has been raised to improve visibility; The end torpedo tubes, chimney covers, ammunition supply elevators, and the engine room skylight received armor protection. It was possible to convince Crump to increase the height of the cruiser's side keels from 0.45 to 0.61 m. The undoubted victory of the commission was the provision of auxiliary mechanisms with electric drives - right up to the dough mixer in the galley. But there were some obvious miscalculations. Thus, gun shields were not installed for fear of overload. And due to the ambiguity of the wording of “weapons,” Crump had to pay additionally for the manufacture of auxiliary systems and mechanisms that ensure the firing of guns - fire control dials, elevators, ammunition supply monorails and other devices.

After the laying ceremony on May 10, 1899, work continued: propeller shaft brackets, stern tubes, outboard valves, kingstons and other fittings were installed. Due to delays by MTK officials (in addition to Varyag, MTK had more than 70 orders), misunderstandings constantly arose, which inevitably led to delays in work, and sometimes to reworking of already completed ones.

Suddenly, a problem arose with ordering armor plates for the ship. Despite the fact that the MTC and the monitoring commission insisted on the use of monolithic armor plates made of “extra-soft nickel steel,” Crump ordered ordinary shipbuilding steel from the contractor. At the same time, he once again rightly referred to the inaccurate wording in the “cruiser design program.” The conflict was settled only after the company was promised an additional payment for the installation of nickel steel. Much controversy arose around the design of the armored deck. Due to the slowness of MTC officials, the commission quickly had to accept the armor installation scheme proposed by the plant: composite horizontal armor riveted from two plates.

Although the construction of the ship proceeded at a fairly rapid pace, the launch date for the cruiser was constantly pushed back. So, due to a strike in August 1899 at the plant, and then a general strike in the country, it was postponed to October. Finally, on October 19, on a rainy day, in the presence of the Russian ambassador to the United States, Count A.P. Cassini and other officials of the two countries launched the cruiser Varyag into the water. The descent went well. Immediately after the launch, tugs pulled the ship's hull to the outfitting wall.

On December 29, the ship "Vladimir Savin" arrived from Russia with weapons. By January 1, 1900, the installation of the main equipment inside the hull was almost completed and the installation of weapons on the upper deck began. Although the work went on continuously, it was even necessary to remove workers from the battleship Retvizan, which was under construction, it was clear that the Varyag would not be delivered by the contract deadline - June 29, 1900. MTC began preparing documents to withhold penalties from the company. In response, Crump presented his counter-arguments - the long approval process for drawings in Russia, multiple alterations of already assembled units, as well as strikes and walkouts that swept across the United States. The last reason for the delay in construction in St. Petersburg was considered valid and Crump was not fined.

By the beginning of May, smokestacks, masts and weapons were finally installed. By the middle of the month, the company began mooring tests. On the 16th, the ship with the factory crew went to sea for the first time. When testing the vehicles, the cruiser developed a speed of 22.5 knots. Despite the excessive heating of the bearings, the tests were considered successful. This gave hope that the contract speed would be achieved. At the same time, artillery firing was carried out, including on both sides. No damage or deformation of the body was found. True, when firing at the bow from guns No. 3 and No. 4, the shock wave tore off the muzzle covers from the tank guns No. 1 and No. 2. The same thing happened when firing from the stern ones - No. 9 and No. 10. In this regard, extended bulwarks were installed on the forecastle on both sides above guns No. 3 and No. 4 (much later, during the cruiser’s service in Japan, similar bulwarks appeared above guns No. 5 and No. 6).
Meanwhile, the deadline for the cruiser's delivery had passed, and the ship was still not ready even for sea trials. Finally, on July 2, the Varyag was docked for painting the underwater part. On July 12, the ship, with a draft of 5.8 m at the bow and 6 m at the stern, went out into the ocean a measuring mile to conduct progressive sea trials. The day turned out to be cloudy: it was raining, a strong wind was blowing, the sea state at the beginning of the tests was three points, and by the end it reached four. Progressive tests were carried out over a distance of 10 miles: three runs at a speed of 16 knots and two each at a speed of 18, 21 and 23 knots. By the end of the tests in a headwind, the Varyag reached a speed of 24.59 knots (with a machine power of 16,198 hp and a steam pressure of 15.5 atm).

On July 15, 12-hour continuous testing began in full swing. Everything started well. The ship was already moving at full speed for the eighth hour, when suddenly the cover of the left engine's central cylinder was knocked out. The tests were forced to stop; repairs to the mechanisms continued until mid-September. Before the 12-hour tests, they decided to conduct 24-hour tests, with an economical speed of 10 knots. They passed without comment. As a result, the actual operational characteristics of the cruiser's power plant were clarified: the productivity of the desalination plants was 38.8 tons of fresh water per day against the design 37 tons; coal consumption - 52.8 tons per day. Thus, with a full capacity of coal pits of 1350 tons, the cruising range was 6136 miles, which significantly exceeded the design value. At the same time, the power of the left and right cars was 576 and 600 hp. With. respectively; propeller speed 61.7 and 62 rpm.

On the morning of September 21, the 12-hour progressive tests began in full swing. The deepening of the cruiser to an even keel was 5.94 m; sea roughness - 2 points; wind force in the lateral direction - 3 points. In general, the tests went well; only one of the boilers had a pipe rupture. The average speed was achieved - 23.18 knots - exceeding the contract value. The cars developed a power of 14,157 hp. With. at a steam pressure of 17.5 atm. The average shaft rotation speed was 150 rpm.
On September 22, Crump handed over the ship with exceeding basic characteristics. The plant rejoiced. The commission members, on the contrary, were restrained in their emotions, although they were satisfied with the test results. During delivery, many minor defects were identified, which continued to be corrected until the cruiser left for Russia.

Hull and armor

In accordance with the preliminary specifications, the mass of the hull, taking into account practical things, was supposed to be 2900 tons. The cruiser's hull was made with a forecastle, which improved combat and performance characteristics in stormy seas. The basis of the hull was the keel, enclosed between bronze stems. The keel was assembled on exposed keel blocks from simple elements: sheets and profiles. First, the horizontal keel sheets were laid and riveted, and the vertical keel sheets were secured to this structure using technological fasteners. Then reinforced sheets of transverse set - flora - were added to this assembly. On top of this structure were laid sheets of the second bottom, stretching the entire length of the ship. The foundations of all mechanisms and main machines were installed on the second bottom flooring. The brickwork of the foundations of 30 Nikloss boilers was installed on specially prepared sites. The cruiser's hull consisted of reinforced plating, longitudinal and transverse strength, deck flooring, armored deck, stems and other structural elements providing fastening of mechanisms, boilers and machinery. The height of the ship's hull was 10.46 m.

Armored cruiser "Varyag" in the Baltic

All vital mechanisms, machines, boilers and cellars were covered by an armored deck made of “extra-soft nickel steel”, stretching from stem to stem at a height of 6.48 m from the main line. Above the engine room, the deck rose to a height of 7.1 m; to the sides its bevels descended below the waterline by about 1.1 m. The armor was riveted from 19 mm and 38.1 mm plates; the total thickness of the horizontal deck and bevels was 38 and 76 mm, respectively. The width of the plates was 3.74 m. The viscosity of the armor material caused the projectile to ricochet when it hit it at an acute angle. All armor plates were supplied by the Carnegie Steel Company, located in Pittsburgh. In the middle of the deck along the center plane above the boiler rooms there were openings for chimneys, and above the engine rooms for a skylight. Along the sides, above and below the slopes in the area of the engine and boiler rooms, there were coal pits. In addition to their direct purpose, they also performed protective functions, forming a parapet around the vital mechanisms and systems of the ship.

In the area of the coal pits, adjacent to the outer skin of the side, there were cofferdam compartments 0.76 m wide and 2.28 m high for storing cellulose. But due to the fragility of cellulose, the compartments were not filled with it. Armor covers were installed around the chimneys, skylight, rudder drives, ammunition elevators and other devices that passed through the armored deck. The muzzle parts of the torpedo tubes also had enhanced protection. The hatch covers in the armored deck could be opened both from the inside and from the outside.
Under the armored deck, on the second bottom, all the main units, mechanisms and machinery of the ship were located. Here, at the bow and stern ends, there were magazines with ammunition, divided into two groups of nine rooms, which simplified their protection.
On the armored deck there were compartments of the bow and stern torpedo tubes, all utility rooms, and coal pits on the slopes along the sides. Above the armored deck there was a living deck intended to accommodate the crew. The command quarters were also located in free places under the forecastle.

Photo of the cruiser Varyag

Armament of the cruiser Varyag

Initially, in accordance with the “design program for a cruiser,” it was planned to install two 203 mm, ten 152 mm, twelve 75 mm, six 47 mm guns and 6 torpedo tubes on the ship, two of the latter being underwater. In total, 440.5 tons were allocated for artillery weapons; in reality it was almost 30 tons heavier. Of this mass, 150.4 tons were allocated for 152-mm guns, 134 tons for torpedo and mine weapons, of which 26 tons were for underwater TTs.
In the final version of the project, the "six-thousanders" ("Varyag", "Askold" and "Bogatyr") had 12 152/45 mm, 12 75/50 mm, 8 47/43 mm (two of them with removable machines), 2 37/23 mm; 2 63.5/19 mm Baranovsky guns; 6 381 mm TA and 2 7.62 mm machine guns. In addition, it was planned to install removable TA for boats, as well as barrage mines deployed from special rafts.
"Varyag" was equipped with all these numerous weapons. Unlike other cruisers, all TAs on it were located above the water. Despite the fact that all reference and specialized literature speaks of 381-mm torpedo tubes, there is reason to believe that in fact on the Varyag they had a caliber of 450 mm. This assumption is based on measurements of the dimensions of the torpedoes and torpedoes given in the original drawings of the Kramp plant, and is indirectly confirmed by photographs of the torpedoes on the cruiser.

The cruiser's large artillery (152 mm and 75 mm guns) was combined into three batteries. The first included 6 152-mm guns located in the bow, the second - 6 stern 152-mm guns; in the third - 12 75 mm guns.
All the cruiser's guns, including small-caliber ones, had continuous numbering, with odd numbers on the starboard side and even numbers on the left side. Numbering - from bow to stern:

152 mm Kane guns of the 1891 model. On the forecastle - No. 1 and No. 2. On the upper deck - guns No. 3 to No. 12;
- 75-mm Kane guns of the 1891 model on Meller machines. On the upper deck from No. 13 - No. 22; on the living deck in the commander's salon - No. 23 and No. 24;
- 47-mm Hotchkiss guns of the 1896 model. On the forecastle on the sponson of guns No. 5 and No. 6 - guns No. 27 and No. 28. Guns No. 25 and No. 26 were installed on removable mounts intended for steam boats, No. 29 and No. 30 - on the top of the foremast, No. 31 and No. 32 - on the top of the mainmast;
- 37-mm Hotchkiss guns of the 1896 model. Both guns No. 33 and No. 34 were mounted on a platform behind the aft bridge;
- 63.5-mm landing guns of the Baranovsky model of 1882. Guns No. 35 and No. 36 were located on the forecastle under the wings of the bow bridge. Wheel carriages for them were stored separately - under the bow bridge behind the conning tower;

The machine guns were mounted on special brackets located on the bulwarks near the conning tower. Before firing, the crew folded back a special platform, stood on it and fired. Exactly such platforms were prepared in the stern of the ship under the whaleboats. If desired, detachable 47-mm guns No. 25 and No. 26 could be installed on the same brackets.
As already mentioned, all torpedo tubes on the cruiser were surface-mounted. Two of them were located in the stems at the ends of the ship in a stationary position; four - on the sides: two in the ship's church and two in the wardroom. The onboard vehicles were rotary; their guidance was carried out using a ball device. In the traveling position they were in a disassembled state; they had to be collected before firing. Firing from the onboard devices was carried out using the energy of powder gases, and from the bow, due to the danger of flooding with water, using compressed air.

In addition, the ship had 254 mm torpedo tubes for arming steam boats. In the stowed position, they were secured under the decking of the longitudinal bridges next to the boats/
The cruiser's ammunition was stored in 18 cellars. Initially, the cellars were located along the sides throughout the ship (similar to the Askold), but due to crowded conditions, especially in the area of the boiler rooms and engine rooms, and the impossibility of providing sufficient protection, in the final version they were all concentrated in nine cellars at the ends. They contained shells of all calibers, as well as torpedoes, throwing mines, barrage mines and cartridges for machine guns and small arms. For the main caliber, armor-piercing, high-explosive, cast iron and segment projectiles were used; for firing from 75 mm guns - only armor-piercing and cast iron. According to the state, the cellars contained 2,388 cartridges (charges in cases) and shells for 152-mm guns (199 rounds per barrel), 3,000 unitary cartridges for 75-mm guns (250 per barrel), 5,000 unitary cartridges for 47-mm guns (625 per barrel), 2,584 unitary cartridges for 37 mm guns (1,292 per barrel), 1,490 unitary cartridges for 63.5 mm guns (745 per gun), 12 torpedoes with a caliber of 381 (or 450) mm, six throwing mines with a caliber of 254 mm and 35 barrage mines (according to other sources - 22).

The supply of ammunition for all calibers was carried out by elevators with electric and manual drives. Shells and cartridges were fed upward in gazebos with four shots each, and the gazebos were rolled up to the guns on special monorails and there they were unloaded onto a tarpaulin spread on the deck. Monorails were laid to all guns located on the upper deck; there were them in all the cellars. Shells and cartridges (cases) were delivered to guns No. 1 and No. 2 using folding monorails or carried manually directly from the elevators. Shots were supplied to the guns mounted on the tops using elevators located inside the masts. The 152 mm guns were served by 12 elevators (one elevator per gun); 75 mm guns - three; 47 mm guns - two; the remaining elevators were intended for 37 mm guns and Baranovsky cannons. The lifting speed of the gazebos by electric drive is 0.8 - 0.9 m/s, manually - 0.2 - 0.4 m/s. .

The cruiser was equipped with a remote electrical fire control system using special indicators installed near the guns and in the cellars. Data on firing parameters and type of shells was transmitted directly from the conning tower via cables laid throughout the ship. The total length of the cable network of the fire control system was equal to 1730 m. The system consisted of a step-down transformer (supply voltage from 100 to 23 volts, current up to 25 A), cable network, setting and receiving devices.
The transmission of commands from the conning tower was carried out by turning the handle of the setting device, which, according to the selsyn principle, rotated the receiving device at the guns to the same angle, indicating either the value of the heading angle, or the type of shells used for firing, or information about the type of firing being performed. Receiving devices were installed not only in the batteries, but also in the cellars (8 projectile dials), issuing commands to supply certain projectiles to the guns.

Determination of distances to the target was carried out by six rangefinder stations equipped with rangefinder keys. The keys were included in the set of rangefinder stations, which were columns with Lujol-Myakishev micrometers installed on them. Using a micrometer, the distance to the target was determined and transmitted to the dials in the conning tower and to the guns. To control the correctness of the transmitted distance, the station had a control dial.
In the central post, two master and two combat dials were installed, with four keys and two projectile master dials each. Electrical devices that monitor network parameters were also installed here.

Main mechanisms

Triple expansion steam engines with a capacity of 20,000 HP. With. were located in two adjacent engine rooms and had a height together with the foundation of 4.5 m. Their excess power, revealed during full-stroke tests, was a kind of “dead weight”, since it could not be realized with the existing steam output of the boilers.

The cruiser's four-cylinder engines had one high (14 atm), medium (8.4 atm) and two low (3.5 atm) pressure cylinders. Accordingly, their diameters were equal to 1.02; 1.58 and 1.73 m. The piston stroke was 0.91 m. The maximum angular speed of shaft rotation was 160 rpm. The piston rods were made of forged nickel steel and were hollow. The steel shafts of the main machines are also forged. The crankshaft of the machine consisted of four elbows. The thrust shaft in its design had 14 rings, which are the main elements that receive the pushing force from the propeller. This force was absorbed by 14 horseshoe-shaped brackets attached to the thrust bearing housing. The rubbing parts of the staples were filled with white metal. This entire structure was cooled by tap water during rotation. The ship had two shafts, respectively, two propellers. The shafts were led out over the side of the ship through stern tubes.
In accordance with the design drawings, the Varyag was supposed to be equipped with two four-blade propellers with removable blades with a diameter of 4.4 m. However, during construction they were replaced with two three-blade propellers with fixed blades and a standard pitch of 5.6 m. Auxiliary tools were used to rotate the shafts two-cylinder cars.
While the ship was moving at full speed (during tests in the USA), the temperature in the engine rooms reached 3 G and 43 ° - on the lower and upper platforms, respectively.

The "Stop" command from full forward motion to the complete stop of the vehicle was executed by a 10 - 75 mm gun; 11 - boat, 12 - davit; 13 - trial boat; 14 - longitudinal bridge decking, 15 - chimney casing; 16 - skylight; 17 - upper deck flooring. Graphics: V. Kataev
15 s; “Move forward” - in 8 s, and changing from full forward to full backward - in 25 s.
The three boiler rooms of the cruiser housed 30 Nikloss water-tube boilers:
nasal 10; on average - 8 and in the aft - 12. The height of each boiler with a foundation is 3 m, of which 2 meters were occupied by a collector with pipes. Each boiler had three fireboxes lined with brick. All boilers were combined into four groups, each with its own chimney, and the bow one was narrower than the others. The heating surface area of all 30 boilers was 5786 m2, and the area of the swinging grates was 146 m2. The design operating pressure in the boilers was taken to be 18 atm (test - 28.1 atm). During running 12-hour progressive tests, the pressure in the boilers did not exceed 17.5 atm, the temperature in the boiler room on the upper platforms reached 73°, on the lower ones - 50°. Water was supplied to the boilers using 10 feed pumps. The amount of water in the boilers is 110 tons; another 120 tons were additionally stored in the double-bottom space. High pressure steam from the boilers to the machines was supplied through a pipeline with a diameter of 381 mm. Slag from the boiler room was thrown out through special shafts equipped with an electric drive. The total cooling surface of the two main refrigerators is 1120 m2.

Coal pits were adjacent to the boiler rooms. Coal was taken from them through special necks located in the boiler room. It was transported to the fireboxes on rails in special trolleys.
Coal was loaded into the pits through 16 necks with a diameter of 508 mm located on the upper deck.

Ship devices and systems

The Davis mechanism, which was the basis of the cruiser's steering gear, was the first in the Russian fleet to have three types of drive: steam, electric and manual. The rudder blade was made in the form of a three-section steel frame, sheathed with sheet steel 9 mm thick. The frame space was filled with wooden blocks. The steering wheel area is 12 m2.
The steering wheel was controlled either from the conning or wheelhouse; in the event of their failure, the control was transferred to the steering compartment, located under the armored deck.
The cruiser "Varyag", unlike previously created ships, had a large percentage of equipment powered by electricity. In this regard, the ship's energy consumption exceeded 400 kW. This required a significant amount of fuel. For example, out of 8,600 tons of coal consumed per year, 1,750 tons were spent on lighting, 540 tons on the desalination plant, and 415 tons on heating and galleys.
The ship's power sources were three dynamos. The power of the two, located in the bow and stern, was 132 kW each, and the power of the generator located on the living deck was 63 kW. They generated an electric current of 105 V. In addition, a 2.6 kW generator with a circuit voltage of 65 V was used to lift boats and boats. There was also a steering generator in the tiller compartment; in everyday life it more often served for lighting. In addition, in a special compartment there was a battery for emergency power supply of running lights, a loud bell and other needs.
To extinguish fires, a fire main with a diameter of 127 mm was laid under the armored deck. To connect fire hoses, the pipe had branches with a diameter of 64 mm, which extended into all cellars, boiler rooms and engine rooms. Fire alarm sensors were installed in coal pits. Fires in coal pits were extinguished using steam.
The drainage system consisted of signaling devices, drainage pumps and drives (electric motors). It ensured the pumping of incoming water from all rooms located under the armored deck of the ship.
Water was removed from the boiler rooms using centrifugal pumps placed on a double bottom flooring. They were driven by electric motors installed on the armored deck and connected to the pumps by a long shaft. The productivity of one pump is 600 mH. The diameters of the inlet pipes on all pumps were the same - 254 mm. Water was pumped out of the engine rooms by two circulation pumps of the main refrigerators with a capacity of 2x1014 m3/h.

Armored cruiser "Varyag". Interior

The ventilation system could provide 5-fold air exchange within an hour in all rooms below the armored deck, 12-fold in the cellars and 20-fold in the dynamo rooms.
To protect against torpedoes while anchored in open roadsteads, the ship was equipped with metal nets. They were hung along the sides on poles. In the traveling position, the poles were laid along the sides in an inclined position, and the nets were placed on special shelves.
The cruiser's anchorage consisted of two hawses with saccuses, four Hall anchors with rods, anchor chains, two capstans, a windlass with a drive, embankments and a crane for cleaning the anchors. The mass of each anchor is 4.77 t. Two of them were installed on special cushions on the starboard side: the first, closer to the fairlead, is the dead anchor, the second is the spare. On the left side there is one guard. The fourth was attached to the front wall of the conning tower foundation. Anchor chains 274 m long and 54 mm in caliber were attached to both anchors. In addition to the main chains, the cruiser had two more spare ones, each 183 m long. The anchors were lifted by a windlass located under the forecastle. The drive of the windlass and capstan located on the forecastle is steam; stern spire - electric. In case of failure of these drives, the spiers could be maintained manually using knockouts. Ramps in the stowed position were installed on the bulkhead of the aft superstructure and on the outer wall of the elevators on the forecastle. The anchors were removed after lifting by a crane installed on the forecastle not far from the main rod. To work with the spare anchor, a collapsible crane was used, installed on the forecastle. In the stowed position it was stored on the roof of the wheelhouse.
In addition to anchors, the cruiser had one stop anchor and three ropes weighing 1.18 tons, 685 kg. 571 kg and 408 kg. The stop anchor was located on the left side behind the “casemate” of the 75 mm gun on special brackets. On the starboard side in the area of whaleboat No. 1, one verp was fixed on brackets, the rest were placed on the port side.
The cruiser's rescue craft included two 12.4 m long steam boats; one 16-oar and one 14-oar longboat; two 12-oar boats; two 6-oar whaleboats; two 6-oar yawls and two trial 4-oar boats. All of them were made of galvanized steel. Except for two yawls, all watercraft were installed on rostra. The sixes were located on the sides on the forecastle in front of the first chimney; trial boats are next to the 12-oar boats on the rostra.

The roof was a mushroom-shaped oval shape with downward curved edges. The edges of the roof protruded beyond the parapet; the gap between the roof and the vertical armored parapet formed inspection slits 305 mm high. The entrance to the armored cabin was open. To prevent shells and shrapnel from entering the wheelhouse, a traverse made of an armor plate 152 mm thick was installed opposite the entrance. The armored cabin was connected through a vertical armored pipe to the central post room located under the armored deck. The pipe wall thickness was 76 mm. Above the conning tower there was a transverse bridge on which combat lights (searchlights) and taillights were installed. The pilothouse, also made entirely of sheet brass and copper, was located in the center of the bridge. There were fifteen windows in its walls: five in front, four on the sides and two in the back. There are four doors. Moreover, all the doors were sliding. The bridge rested on the roof of the conning tower and 13 racks installed on the forecastle.
Duplicate devices and instruments were installed in both control rooms for ship control, communications and surveillance. Similar devices, in addition to the steering wheel and compass, were installed in the central control room.
There were five compasses on the cruiser. The two main ones were located on the roof of the chassis and on a special area of the aft bridge. The non-magnetic zone of these compasses was 4.5 m.
The Varyag's communications equipment included a telephone network, speaking pipes and a staff of messengers. If the latter were a traditional type of communication, then the telephone was almost a novelty in the Russian fleet. It covered almost all of the ship's service areas. Telephone sets were installed in all cellars, in boiler rooms and engine rooms, in the cabins of the commander, senior officer, and mechanical engineer, in the conning and wheelhouses, and at gun posts.
Electrical signaling devices (bells, indicators, fire alarm sensors, sirens, etc.) were available in the command staff's cabins, at combat posts and in the conning tower. In addition to warning calls, the cruiser, paying tribute to traditions, retained a staff of drummers and buglers (drummers gave signals to the artillery crews on the starboard side, and buglers - to the field). To communicate with other ships, in addition to the radio station, the cruiser had a large staff of signalmen transmitting messages using flags, flags, figures, Tabulevich lanterns and a mechanical semaphore (removed in the summer of 1901 due to cumbersomeness and inconvenience of use).

To raise signal flags, figures, stretch the radio antenna and place searchlight and Mars platforms, two single-pole masts were installed on the cruiser. The topmasts of both masts were made telescopic and, if necessary, could be retracted into the masts using special devices. Elevators were also located inside the masts for supplying cartridges to the 47 mm guns on the tops.
The Varyag had six searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm. They were located on masts (one at a time) and bridges (two at a time).

Combat dressing stations

There were four dressing stations on the Varyag: two in the bow and two in the stern. In the bow, in a combat situation, the wounded were bandaged in the infirmary located on the starboard side, and in the pharmacy opposite the infirmary on the port side. In the aft part - in the 4th command room at the descent to the combat dressing station and in the station itself, located under the armored deck. It was possible to get to the bow points through two hatches located between the 1st and 2nd chimneys. In peacetime, it was possible to go down to them through the hatches between the 2nd and 4th pipes, passing through the 3rd command room, separated from them by a waterproof partition. But in a combat situation, during an emergency, this passage cannot be used, since the doors are usually locked.
To deliver a wounded man to a point located in the 4th command quarters, it was necessary to lower him into the officer's quarters, then from there along a steep ladder to the armored deck, then carry him along a narrow corridor that ran at right angles to the ladder, go through a door in a waterproof bulkhead and get into the 4th command room.

To deliver a wounded person to a combat dressing station, you need to go down the ladder to the officer’s quarters, and from there carry him to the wardroom. Then, using hoists, lower the wounded man into the torpedo storage room (at the same time, torpedoes were fed through this hatch during an alarm to the devices located in the wardroom), and from there through a narrow door into the dressing station.
The unsuitability of this point was revealed during a training alert before the battle, since during the alarm the ladder leading from the wardroom to the armored deck was removed and the hatch cover was battened down to ensure the survivability of the ship. Subsequently, in accordance with the order of the commander, the following were approved as dressing stations:

1. In the bow there is an infirmary and a pharmacy.
2. In the aft part there is a mess room and a dressing station on the armored deck.
Dressings were stored in special boxes located in four places. All personnel were trained to provide first aid to the wounded.
The porters of the wounded (14 people) were equipped with special bags with medical supplies. There were enough surgical instruments: in addition to government instruments, doctors also used their own.

Crew and living quarters

On the cruiser "Varyag", in accordance with the specifications, the crew consisted of 21 officers, 9 conductors and 550 lower ranks. Before the ship left for Russia, there were 19 officers, a priest, 5 conductors and 537 lower ranks on board. 558 people took part in the battle on January 27, 1904: 21 officers, a priest, 4 conductors, 529 lower ranks and 3 civilians. Another 10 crew members of the Varyag were left in Port Arthur before leaving for Chemulpo.
The crew's living quarters were located under the forecastle and on the living deck and aft on the armored deck. From the 72nd shp. towards the stern were the cabins of the officers and command of the ship. The officers' cabins were single, with an area of 6 m2; cabins for the senior officer, mechanical engineer and senior navigator - 10 m2 each. The premises towards the stern at a length of 12.5 m were occupied by the commander. Adjoining them was a wardroom with an area of 92 m2. On the living deck there was an infirmary, a pharmacy, a galley, a bathhouse (25 m2) and a ship's church. On the living deck, all doors, except the watertight ones, were sliding.

Coloring

During its service, the Varyag was painted as follows. Before leaving for Russia and in Russia from September 1900 to May 1901: the hull and masts are white; the lower bends of chimneys, fans (pipes and funnels) are yellow; the upper bends of the chimneys, the topmasts of both masts and the yards are black; underwater part - green and inner surface of the bells - red
While sailing as part of the escort of Emperor Nicholas II from August to September 1901: the hull and masts were white; chimney elbows and fans (pipes and sockets) - yellow; the crowns of the chimneys are 1.5 m wide, the topmasts of both masts and the yards are black; the inner surface of the bells is red; the underwater part is red.
During the transition to the Far East and in Port Arthur from August 1901 to September 1903: the hull and masts are white; the lower bends of chimneys and fans (pipes and funnels) are yellow; the upper bends of the chimneys, the topmasts of both masts and the yards are black; the inner surface of the bells is red; the underwater part is red.
From September 1903 until the moment of death: from the mouth to the waterline - olive color (in accordance with the order for painting ships, a 0.9 meter wide strip of orange color was to be marked on the chimneys); the underwater part is red.
During repairs in Vladivostok and the passage to Hong Kong from March to July 1916: from the waterline to the waterline - spherical color; chimney crowns 1 meter wide are black; the underwater part is most likely red. During the transition from Hong Kong to Greenock from July to November 1916: from the waterline to the waterline - “half-white” color (as in the document - V.K); chimney crowns 1 meter wide are black; the underwater part is red.
During the passage from Greenock to the capture by the British from November 1916 to November 1917: from klotik to waterline - spherical color; chimney crowns 1 meter wide are black; the underwater part is red.

Project evaluation

The cruisers of the program “for the needs of the Far East” were built according to the same technical specifications, but appeared to the world completely different, both in appearance and in basic shipbuilding characteristics. Perhaps the only thing that made them related was the same composition of weapons. In this regard, the question involuntarily arises: how successful were these ships and which one was better?
It seemed that combat experience should have answered these questions. However, in reality everything turned out to be much more complicated. The tasks that the cruisers had to perform during the Russo-Japanese War turned out to be far from those originally prescribed in the projects.

Ironically, Bogatyr, the most protected and advanced of the 6,000-ton armored cruisers, did not fire a single shot during the entire war and practically did not take part in a single campaign, standing in the dock for protracted repairs. But on the very first day of the war, the “Varyag” had to meet face to face with representatives of almost all generations of “Elsvik cruisers” - from outdated to the latest models. But fate placed him in such conditions that the tragic outcome was a foregone conclusion. The third representative of the family - "Askold" - took an active part in all operations of the Pacific squadron. True, there were few such operations - significantly fewer than expected before the opening of hostilities. Nevertheless, the cruiser showed its extraordinary capabilities, becoming the only ship of the series that managed to emerge with honor from the crucible of that war, in the “arena” of which these cruisers were so unwisely used.

Speaking of 6,000-ton cruisers, one cannot fail to mention the ships built under the 1895 program. It was they who became the prototype for the development of the lead cruiser under the shipbuilding program of 1898. We are talking about Diana-class cruisers. Having entered service before the start of the Russo-Japanese War, they, alas, were morally and physically outdated and no longer met modern requirements. This fact speaks, first of all, about the level of development of domestic industry at the beginning of the 20th century. "Diana", "Pallada" and "Aurora" were distinguished by good reliability of their mechanisms, but in all respects they were inferior to foreign-built armored cruisers.

Armored cruiser "Varyag" in 1916

"Varyag" and "Askold", which were essentially experimental ships of this type, are most suitable for comparison in terms of their design and layout. There is no doubt that the Varyag was designed more thoughtfully and compactly. The forced placement of artillery at the extremities freed it from cramped magazines along the sides. The ship had good seaworthiness; boats and boats were very well located on it. The machine and boiler rooms were spacious; their equipment and ventilation system deserved the highest praise.

“Askold” lost to “Varyag” in this regard. The builders' fears of not achieving the contract speed led to the fact that the relative length of the cruiser (already large in the original design) became 8.7 in the final version (for the Varyag it was 8.1). As a result, the body was a long flexible beam; its low safety margin led to local loss of stability and sometimes structural failure. The “fragility” of the hull while moving caused strong vibration, this was especially felt on the quarterdeck. Due to fear of overloading, the ship lost its forecastle and wheelhouse (the latter was installed only after sea trials, at the insistence of the commander), which noticeably worsened its operational characteristics in stormy weather. The narrowness of the hull led to cramped living quarters and ammunition cellars.

At the measured mile during progressive maximum speed tests, both ships showed outstanding results. Thus, on July 12, 1900, the Varyag reached a speed of 24.59 knots. On September 6, 1901, Askold, in turn, reached a speed of 23.39 knots. During 12-hour continuous tests, the Varyag showed an average result of 23.18 knots, with a vehicle power of 19,602 hp. With. "Askold" on September 15 and 17, 1901, on 6-hour runs, reached speeds of 23.98 and 24.01 knots with a power of 21,100 and 20,885 hp. With. respectively. It should be noted that due to a malfunction of the mechanical lag, the speed values were not measured. The final test tables included the numbers obtained during other tests.

The 24-hour tests of the Varyag during its run at an economical speed of 10 knots are interesting. So, during the day the cruiser traveled 240 miles, while consuming 52.8 tons of coal (that is, 220 kg per mile). Simple calculations show that with a normal supply of coal of 720 tons, the cruising range was 3,270 miles, and with a full supply of 1,350 tons - 6,136 miles.

True, the actual cruising range of a ship always differs significantly from the calculated one obtained from test results. Thus, during long voyages, the Varyag at a speed of 10 knots consumed 68 tons of coal per day, which corresponds to the longest cruising range of 4288 miles. The daily coal consumption on the Askold for a speed of 11 knots was 61 tons - thus, its cruising range was 4,760 miles.

One of the main advantages of Askold was the reliable operation of its power plant. This advantage compensated for all its shortcomings. Alas, “Varyag” could not “boast” of this. The cruiser spent a significant part of her pre-war service in Port Arthur near the wall undergoing endless repairs. The reason lay both in the careless assembly of the machines and in the unreliability of the Nicloss system boilers, which were ingenious in concept, but were no good in operation.

The placement of the main caliber guns on the Askold looks preferable. On it, seven six-inch guns could participate in a broadside salvo, but on the Varyag only six. True, the Varyag could fire strictly at the bow or stern from four guns, and the Askold only from one gun. The rest were limited to an angle of 30° due to the risk of structural failure of the superstructures.

But the main disadvantage of both the Varyag and Askold lies in the depravity of the very concept of armored cruisers with a displacement of 6,000 tons. While Japan, preparing for war, wisely relied on much cheaper 3,000-ton ships, and the savings invested in the creation of armored cruisers with 203 mm artillery, Russia continued to spend money on “trade fighters” designed to operate alone on ocean communications. As a result, the domestic fleet was replenished with a whole series of large, beautiful, but, alas, practically useless ships, including the legendary Varyag.

The battle

In the twenties of January, telegraph communication with Port Arthur was interrupted. But despite all the signs of an impending war, the envoy to Korea Pavlov did not release the “Varyag” from Chemulpo, giving the go-ahead only for the “Korean” to be sent to Port Arthur with diplomatic mail. It is noteworthy that on the night of January 26, the Japanese stationary Chiyoda also suddenly went to sea.

On January 26, the gunboat "Koreets", having received mail, weighed anchor, but at the exit from the roadstead it was blocked by a squadron of Rear Admiral S. Uriu consisting of the armored cruiser "Asama", 2nd class cruisers "Chyoda", "Naniwa", " Takachiho, Niitaka and Akashi, as well as three transports and four destroyers. The destroyers attacked the gunboat with two torpedoes, but were unsuccessful. Having no order to open fire and not knowing about the start of hostilities, the commander of the “Korean”, Captain 2nd Rank G.P. Belyaev, ordered to turn back.

Immediately after anchoring, Belyaev arrived on the cruiser "Varyag" and reported to its commander about the incident. Rudnev immediately departed for the English cruiser "Talbot", whose commander, Captain L. Bailey, was the senior officer in the roadstead. Bailey, after listening to the Russian commander, immediately went to the senior Japanese ship for clarification. During the trial, the commander of the Takachiho denied a mine attack on the Russian boat, and the actions of the destroyers, according to him, were dictated by protecting the transports from the attack of the Korean. As a result, the incident was presented as a misunderstanding.

All night the Japanese landed troops from transports. And the next morning, the Russian sailors learned that war had been declared between Russia and Japan...

Rear Admiral Uriu sent messages to the commanders of the warships of neutral countries located in Chemulpo - the English cruiser Talbot, the French Pascal, the Italian Elba and the American gunboat Vicksburg - with a request to leave the raid in connection with possible actions against the Varyag " and "Korean". After a meeting on the English cruiser Talbot, the commanders of the first three ships protested, since a battle in the roadstead would be a flagrant violation of Korea's formal neutrality, but it was clear that this was unlikely to stop the Japanese. The ambassadors of England, France and other countries accredited in Seoul also protested to the Japanese admiral.

Painting "Cruiser "Varyag", Artist P.T. Maltsev. 1955

Then V.F. Rudnev, who was the commander of a detachment of Russian ships, decided to go to sea and try to fight his way to Port Arthur. The officers of the “Varyag” and “Korean” unanimously supported this proposal at the military councils.

After an incendiary speech by the commander of the Varyag, which the ship’s crew greeted with repeated loud “hurrays,” and the performance of the national anthem by the ship’s orchestra, the command was sounded: “Everyone up, weigh anchor!” At 11.20 on January 27, 1904, the cruiser “Varyag” and the gunboat “Koreets” raised anchors and headed towards the exit from the roadstead. The “Korean” walked ahead for some time. The distance between the ships was maintained at 1-2 kbt, the speed was approximately 6-7 knots. The weather that day turned out to be calm and frosty, and the sea was completely calm.

The horizon line was not visible due to the haze, and so far there was nothing to indicate the presence of the enemy at sea. On foreign ships, people standing along the sides paid tribute to the courage of the Russians. According to the British from the Talbot, “they greeted us three times, and we also answered very amicably three times...”. On the Varyag, the orchestra played the anthems of those countries whose ships were passing by at that moment. The Russians looked solemnly and decorously at the foreigners, who admired their calmness before the upcoming unequal battle. The French sailors from the cruiser Pascal expressed their feelings especially enthusiastically: breaking formation, they waved their arms and caps, shouted greetings, trying to encourage people going to certain death.

When the Italian cruiser Elba was left behind, the music stopped. Now there was only the enemy ahead, who was not yet visible beyond the island of Yodolmi (Pha-mildo). Gradually increasing the speed, the Russian ships brought the speed to 12 knots. The signalmen on the bridge of the Varyag, who had been on duty since the morning according to the combat schedule, peered intensely into the distance and soon noticed the silhouettes of enemy ships in the haze. Captain 1st Rank V.F. Rudnev at 2:25 pm ordered the combat alarm to be sounded and the topmast flags to be raised. As soon as the blue and white panels of St. Andrew's flags fluttered in the wind, the crack of a drum and the high notes of a horn were heard, the loud bells rang deafeningly, calling the fireman and water divisions upstairs. People quickly fled to their combat posts. The conning tower began to receive reports about the readiness of batteries and posts for battle.

Although S. Uriu was preparing for retaliatory actions on the part of the Russians, their entry into the sea was still unexpected for him. The Japanese squadron, with the exception of a few ships, was guarding the Russians at the southern tip of Phillip Island. The “Asama” and “Chiyoda” were closest to the exit from the roadstead, and it was from them that they discovered the “Varyag” and “Koreets” going to sea. The commander of the “Asama”, Captain 1st Rank R. Yashiro, ordered the signal to be raised to the commander: “Russian ships are leaving in the sea".

Rear Admiral Uriu, on board the cruiser Naniva, at that time read the protest of the commanders of the international squadron, delivered by Lieutenant Wilson from the English cruiser Talbot. Having received news from the Asama and Chioda, the commander, along with those present, quickly went upstairs. Signal flags flew up from the masts of the Naniva. Having riveted the anchor chains, since there was no longer time to raise and remove the anchors, the ships of the squadron began to hastily stretch out onto the reach, as they moved, reforming into combat columns in accordance with the disposition received the day before. Having assessed the situation, the admiral ordered Chiyoda to join Asama and act together with it.

The Asama and Chiyoda were the first to move, followed by the flagship Naniwa and the cruiser Niitaka, somewhat behind. Three destroyers of the 14th destroyer detachment were sailing abeam the non-firing side of the Naniva. In the morning, the destroyers of the 9th detachment were sent to Asan Bay for coal and water. The cruisers Akashi and Takachiho, having developed a large speed, rushed in a southwestern direction. Advice "Chihaya" together with the destroyer of the 14th detachment "Kasasagi" were on patrol at the exit from the 30-mile fairway.

The Russian ships continued to move on the same course, but the “Korean” was now moving on a ledge, somewhat to the left of the “Varyag”. On the right wing of the cruiser's bridge, near the combat lantern (spotlight), rangefinders began to adjust their instruments. The ship froze in anticipation of battle. The priest Father Mikhail blessed “the Christ-loving warriors for their feat and victory over the enemy” and went down to the infirmary.

Rolled out hoses of fire hoses lay on the deck like giant snakes. Rangefinder stations began to report the distance to the nearest enemy ships. The elevators fired the first charges, and the gazebos with charges roared along the suspended monorails towards the guns.

In the distance, the island of Yodolmi appeared. To the right of the island, the gray silhouettes of the ships of the Japanese squadron could already be seen with the naked eye. Meanwhile, the nearest Japanese ships, stretched out in a combat column (as it seemed from the Russian ships), were moving on a converging course, descending ahead of the line of movement of the Russian ships. There were more than 45 kbt to the lead ship. Against the background of numerous smokes, multi-colored signal flags fluttered on the masts of the third cruiser from the head of the column. Without a doubt, the meaning of the signal was clear - the Japanese commander was inviting the Russians to surrender without a fight. They immediately let the conning tower know about this. From there the command came: “Do not respond to the signal.”

The ship's clock installed in the wheelhouse showed 11.40. The conning tower was cramped. In addition to the watch, which had already been on duty since the morning according to the combat schedule, there were a commander, a senior artilleryman, a senior navigator, an auditor and a watch commander. The helmsman froze at the helm, the lower ranks froze at the telephones and speaking pipes, and the staff bugler and drummer stood at attention in the aisle of the conning tower. And already outside, at the entrance to the control room, almost on the steps of the ladder, the signalmen and messengers of the commander stood.

Russian sailors continued to watch the enemy. The second group of Japanese ships - "Naniwa" and "Niitaka", - slightly behind the first group, moved to the right, keeping a little more seaward. In the distance, in the haze, several more enemy ships were visible, but they were difficult to classify due to too great a distance.

The conning tower of the Naniva was also cramped. In addition to the command of the ship, the squadron commander was here with his headquarters. At 11.44 a signal was raised at the Naniva masts to open fire. A minute later, the armored cruiser Asama began firing from the guns of the bow turret,

The enemy's first salvo fell in front of the Varyag with a slight overshoot. To the surprise of the Russians, the Japanese shells exploded even when they hit the water, raising huge columns of water and clouds of black smoke. The Varyag's guns were silent for now - the commander was waiting for the distance to decrease.

The first shell that hit the cruiser killed the junior navigator midshipman A. M. Nirod and two rangefinder sailors, and three people were injured. The explosion destroyed the deck and handrails of the bridge, and the shock wave bent the bridge posts. A fire broke out in the chart room, but it was quickly put out.

The next shell exploded at the side. Its fragments disabled all the servants of the 152-mm gun No. 3, and the plutong commander, midshipman P.N. Gubonin, was also seriously wounded.

"Varyag" and "Koreets" returned fire. True, the very first salvoes from the gunboat missed a large target, and subsequently the Russian cruiser fought the artillery duel with the enemy almost alone.

Meanwhile, the density of fire from the enemy increased: the ships of the second group entered the battle. The Varyag was mainly fired on by Asama, Naniva and Niytaka; occasionally, when the situation allowed, “Takachiho” and “Akashi” opened fire. “Varyag” was literally bombarded by enemy shells, at times hiding behind huge waterspouts, which with a roar every now and then took off to the level of the combat tops. Missing shells, exploding at the sides, showered the superstructures and deck with streams of water and a hail of fragments, destroying the superstructures and maiming people standing openly on the upper deck. Despite the casualties, the Varyag energetically responded to the enemy with frequent fire, but, alas, the results were not yet visible. The “Korean” was fired upon by the “Chiyoda” and, probably, by several other ships of the Uriu squadron. Moreover, their shooting was very inaccurate, and it was not corrected during the battle. Looking ahead, we note that during the entire battle not a single shell hit the “Korean”. According to the gunboat commander, there were only three undershots, and the rest of the shells fell over a long distance.

Since the Japanese ships were initially far ahead and to the right along the course of our ships, the “Varyag” and “Korean” had to constantly catch up with them and fire from rather sharp angles. The Japanese, in turn, moving in a converging course towards the Russians, gradually “descended” to the intended line of movement of the “Varyag” and “Korean”. At the same time, they had to watch the fairway so as not to run into stones.

The battle flared up with renewed vigor, and, as the English observer Captain Trubridge noted, during this period of the battle “he observed many shells falling near the Naniva and believed that it must have been hit.” Finding itself under fire from the Varyag, the Japanese flagship cruiser immediately broke down and, making a coordinate to the right, let the Nii-taka pass ahead, and then entered its wake.

At that time, on the Varyag, a fire was raging on the quarterdeck, caused by the explosion of a segmented six-inch shell, which ignited the cartridges prepared for firing. The fire from the cartridges spread to the canvas awning of whaleboat No. 1. The explosion of this shell destroyed the crew of the six-inch gun No. 9; it became temporarily silent. The shrapnel also killed commutator K. Kuznetsov, three people from the servants of gun No. 8, and almost the entire crew of the 47-mm gun located on the main top. Through the efforts of the fire division, headed by midshipman N.I. Chernilovsky-Sokol and boatswain Kharkovsky, the fire was soon extinguished. The control room received information about damaged starboard guns. It turned out that the compressors and knurlings of the 75-mm guns failed during firing.

Intense work was going on in the wardroom, which had been adapted for a dressing station. A shell exploded very close to the entrance hatch, and the ship shuddered noticeably. The senior doctor M.N. Khrabrostin, who was performing the dressing, could barely stay on his feet. In an instant, the wardroom was filled with smoke, it became impossible to breathe. The orderlies began to drag the wounded into an adjacent room. They were putting out a fire upstairs - streams of water poured through the open hatch; Khrabrostin and some of the orderlies were soaked to the skin.

By that time, the distance between the warring parties had decreased so much that the Korean’s guns were finally able to enter the battle. Its first shells landed at the side of the lead Japanese cruiser.

Due to the tightness in the conning tower and the difficulties of observing the enemy (the hanging remains of the canvas body, shrouds and davits were in the way), the commander of the Varyag stood in the aisle of the conning tower between bugler N Nagle and drummer D. Korneev and from here continued to command the ship. On the right beam one could see the gloomy rocks of the island of Iodolmi. Enemy ships were moving ahead on a wide stretch. The Uriu squadron “came together” in relation to the Russians for a while. In the process of complex evolutions, Japanese ships found themselves on the same line. As a result, the cruisers of the second and third groups, which rarely fired, stopped firing altogether. The tension of the battle subsided somewhat.

“Varyag” and “Koreets”, having reached the beam of Yodolmi Island, had to follow the fairway and turn to the right. Therefore, at 12.12, the signal “P” (“Rest”, which meant “Turning to the right”) was raised on the surviving halyards of the cruiser’s foremast. The rudder was shifted “to the left side 20°”, and the cruiser began to perform the maneuver. The clock in the control room showed 12.15 pm. From that moment on, a chain of tragic events followed, accelerating the end of the battle. First, one enemy shell, piercing the deck near the conning tower, broke the pipe in which all the steering gears were laid. As a result, the uncontrollable ship rolled in circulation directly onto the rocks of Yodolmi Island. Almost simultaneously with the first, a second shell hit here, creating a hole in the deck with an area of about 4 m2. In this case, the entire crew of gun No. 35 died, as well as Quartermaster I. Kostin, who was at the wheelhouse transmitting orders. The fragments flew into the passage of the conning tower, mortally wounding sailors Nagle and Korneev; the commander escaped with a slight wound and concussion. Further control of the ship had to be transferred to the aft steering compartment. There, under the leadership of boatswain Shlykov, helmsmen Gavrikov, Lobin and driver Bortnikov hastily began to establish manual control.

On the “Korean”, having seen the signal from the cruiser, they wanted to turn after it, but then, seeing that the “Varyag” was not under control, they reduced the speed and described a circulation of 270° in the opposite direction. After the battle, the commander of the boat, Belyaev, in his report to Rudnev, noted: “Having passed the island of Yodolmi, I saw your signal (“P”) “I’m changing course to the right,” and, avoiding getting in contact with you for the enemy, and also assuming you had damage to the rudder, put “ starboard" and, reducing the speed to a small one, described a circulation of 270°... At 12 1/4 o'clock in the afternoon, following the movement of the 1st rank cruiser "Varyag", he turned to the roadstead, continuing to shoot, first from the left 8-dm and 6-dm guns, and then from one 6-dm.”

Suddenly, a grinding sound was heard under the bottom of the Varyag, and the cruiser, shuddering, stopped. As a result of the grounding, boiler No. 21 moved from its place, and water appeared in the boiler room. Later, when the Japanese were raising the ship, a large hole was discovered on the port side in the area of frame 63, about seven feet long and about a foot wide.

In the conning tower, instantly assessing the situation, we gave the car the fullest reverse, but it was too late. Now the Varyag, turning to the enemy on its left side, was a stationary target.

The Japanese ships, which had moved far ahead, did not immediately notice the danger of their enemy’s maneuver and continued to move on their previous course, firing from the guns of the stern sectors. However, having seen the signal on the masts of the Varyag and assuming that the Russians had decided to break through behind its stern, Uriu immediately set off on a reverse course. The ships of his detachment, consistently describing the coordinates to the right, continued to fire fiercely. And only then, having assessed the plight of the Russians, Uriu raised the signal: “Everyone turn to approach the enemy... The ships of all groups set on a new course, without stopping firing from the bow guns.

The Varyag's position seemed hopeless. The enemy was quickly approaching, and the cruiser sitting on the rocks could not do anything. It was at this time that he received the most severe injuries. One of the enemy shells hit the third chimney; The main yard guy ropes burst with a ringing sound. The fragments flying in all directions killed two people from the servants of the 75-mm gun on the left side. Another shell, which exploded next to the cruiser, broke the pertulin and rustov (chains with which the anchor is attached to the cushion) of the right main anchor. The anchor came loose with a roar and hung on the slack of the anchor chain. The side lining in the bathhouse area was pierced by shrapnel. Another large-caliber shell, having pierced the side under water, exploded at the junction of coal pits No. 10 and No. 12, resulting in a large hole in the area of frames No. 47 and No. 48 with an area of about 2 m5. The spread of water was stopped by closing the mouth of the coal pit. The water that reached the fireboxes immediately began to be pumped out using all available means. Emergency parties under the leadership of senior officer V.V. Stepanov, despite enemy fire, began to apply a plaster under this hole. And here a miracle happened: the cruiser itself, as if reluctantly, slid off the shoal and moved in reverse away from the dangerous place. And without further tempting fate, Rudnev ordered to set a reverse course.

However, the situation still remained very difficult. Although the water was pumped out by all means, the Varyag continued to list to the left side. On the poop, the fire division unsuccessfully fought the fire in the provision department - flour was burning. The fire was caused by a shell that flew in from the port side. The shell, passing through the officer's cabins in the area of frame No. 82, pierced the adjacent deck and exploded in the provision cellar. Shell fragments pierced the starboard side (looking ahead, we note that this fire was extinguished only after the cruiser returned to the roadstead). Soon another source of fire arose - the bed nets of the spruce side flared up. A heavy shell, having pierced the mesh behind the bow bridge in the area of frame No. 39, exploded between the first and second chimneys exactly above the ladder to the infirmary, while the shock wave dropped the 75-mm gun No. 16 onto the deck.

Armored cruiser "Varyag" in Port Arthur

The enemy continued to approach: the distance to the nearest ship (Asama) was no more than 25 kbt. The "Korean", located somewhat to the side of the cruiser, fired intensely at the enemy, first from the left shoulder gun, and then from one retread gun. The enemy still did not pay attention to the gunboat, and there were no killed or wounded on it.

To the surprise of Admiral Uriu, the Varyag, despite the visible fires, increased its speed and, together with the Korean, confidently moved towards the raid. Due to the narrowness of the fairway, only the Asama and Chiyoda could pursue the Russians. According to the Japanese, due to problems with the car and poor coal, Chiyoda, with the permission of the admiral, was forced to leave the battle ahead of time and join other cruisers that were heading to the anchorage.

“Varyag” and “Koreets” fired back furiously, although due to the sharp heading angles only two or three 152-mm guns could fire. Meanwhile, the cruiser Asama, giving way to the destroyer, circled to the right and temporarily left the battle. A nimble destroyer appeared from behind the island and began to attack. It was the turn of small-caliber artillery. The Russians opened dense barrage fire from the surviving stern guns. The destroyer turned sharply and left without firing a torpedo.

This unsuccessful attack prevented the Asama from approaching the Russian ships in a timely manner, and when the enemy cruiser, having circled to the right, again rushed in pursuit, the Varyag and Koreets were already approaching the anchorage. The Japanese had to cease fire as their shells began to fall near the ships of the international squadron. On the latter, they were forced to sound a combat alert and prepare for battle, and the cruiser Elba even had to move deeper into the raid. At 12.45 the Russian ships also ceased fire. The fight is over. The “Varyag” anchored next to the cruiser “Talbot”, and the “Korean”, having received permission from the “Varyag”, moved on and stopped away from the foreign ships.

In the battle with the Varyag, the Japanese fired a total of 419 shells: “Asama” - 27,203 mm; 103 152 mm; 9 76 mm; "Chiyoda" - 71 120 mm; "Naniva" - 14 152 mm; “Nyita-ka” - 53 152 mm; 130 76 mm; "Takachiho" 10 152 mm; and "Akashi" 2 152-mm shells.

According to Russian data, during the battle the “Korean” fired 22 shots from eight-inch guns, 27 from a six-inch gun and 3 from a 9-pound gun; "Varyag" fired 1105 shells; 425 152 mm, 470 75 mm and 210 47 mm. If these data are true, then the Varyag’s artillery showed a record rate of fire in battle. However, it is not entirely clear how the records of fired shells were kept during the battle (or whether they were kept at all). It can be assumed that the number of shots fired given in the report of the Varyag commander was calculated based on a survey of the crew after the battle, and in fact it was less. However, there is still no exact answer to this question.

To this day, the dispute about the effectiveness of the fire of the Russian cruiser has not been settled. As often happens, the opinions of opponents on this matter varied greatly. According to official Japanese data published during the Russo-Japanese War, there were no hits on the ships of the Uriu squadron, and no one from their crews was injured. On the contrary, in the Russian, and later The Soviet official press spoke of significant Japanese losses - both in ships and in people. Both sides had reasons not to trust each other. Thus, the official Japanese work “Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji,” published immediately after the war, was replete with inaccuracies, omissions of inconvenient facts for Japan, and even outright misinformation. Russian printed publications also committed similar sins. And additional confusion was caused by the contradictory testimony of foreign observers who were in Chemulpo. A comprehensive analysis of all available information is the topic of a separate study, beyond the scope of this book. In the meantime, we present the main official documents, including reports of participants in the battle on January 27, without comment.

In accordance with the report of the Varyag commander, 557 people took part in the battle, including 21 officers (including ranks equivalent to officers). According to the official document (sanitary report for the war), the losses of the Varyag crew amounted to 130 people, including 33 killed. In total, according to Russian data, about 14 large shells hit the cruiser; according to the Japanese - 11. However, after the cruiser was raised, the Japanese discovered 8 combat damage from shells. Other damage was not directly related to the battle: one hole (area of frames No. 63) with an area of approximately 0.3 m2 was the result of a grounding near the island of Yodolmi and three - in the area of frames No. 91-93 and No. 99 - the result of an explosion of ammunition and a fire in the stern that occurred after the evacuation of the ship’s crew in the port of Chemulpo.

Although the armored deck was not destroyed and the ship kept moving, it should be recognized that by the end of the battle the Varyag had almost completely exhausted its combat capabilities for resistance due to large losses in personnel, damage to the steering gears, and the failure of a significant number of guns ( according to Rudnev’s report) and the presence of several underwater holes, which, in the conditions of a besieged port, could not be corrected on their own. In addition, the morale of the crew, which experienced the effects of powerful Japanese shells, changed greatly by the end of the battle. And, apparently, it was very difficult to force people to go into battle again, without the slightest hope of success.

On foreign ships, seeing the plight of the Varyag, they lowered their boats and rushed to the Russian cruiser. One of the first to approach the Varyag was a boat from the English Talbot. On board, in addition to the officers, there were doctors - Dr. Austin himself from the Talbot and Dr. Keeney from the merchant ship Ajax. Then the longboat from the Pascal approached with the commander, who arrived in person. The cruiser's doctor, Dr. Prejean, and the orderlies were also on the barge. Having boarded the Varyag, they wasted no time and immediately began to provide assistance to the wounded.

At 13.35, the commander of the Varyag set out on a French boat for the Talbot. On the English cruiser, he agreed on further actions: transporting the crew of his ship to foreign ships and sinking the cruiser right in the roadstead. According to Rudnev, Bailey objected to the explosion of the Varyag, citing the large crowding of ships in the roadstead. At 13.50 Rudnev returned to his cruiser, hastily gathering the officers nearby (and the senior officer and some others involved in repairing the damage were not nearby), he informed them of his intention. The officers present approved it. Immediately began transporting the wounded, and then the entire crew to foreign ships. The sailors behaved courageously, discipline and order reigned among the crew, and the wounded were sent first. The British, French and Italians accepted the Russian sailors, only the American sailors from the Vicksburg, according to the British, for some reason transported the Varangians not to their ship, but to the Talbot or Pascal. The American gunboat Vicksburg, although it sent its doctor to bandage it, refused to accept people from the sinking cruiser. Subsequently, the commander of the gunboat A. Marshall justified his actions by the lack of permission from his government to provide assistance to the Russians.

The sunken armored cruiser "Varyag" in Chemulpo

At 15.15 V.F. Rudnev sent midshipman V.A. A beam on the "Koreets" to notify the boat commander about the situation on the "Varyag". The commander of the “Korean” immediately convened a military council and proposed to discuss the question: what to do in these conditions?

The officers decided: “the upcoming battle in half an hour is not equal, it will cause unnecessary bloodshed... without harming the enemy, and therefore it is necessary... to blow up the boat.”

The entire crew of the Korean moved to the cruiser Pascal. Subsequently, the GMSH forwarded to the second department (MFA) 38 certificates for the medal “For Diligence”, awarded to the lower ranks of the cruiser “Elba” - for the assistance provided to the Russians, and 3rd class mechanic Umberto Morocci received a gold medal on the Annen Ribbon.

Crews of other foreign ships later received similar awards.

At 15.50, Rudnev and the senior boatswain, having walked around the ship and made sure that there was no one left on it, got off it along with the owners of the hold compartments, who opened the kingstons and flood valves. At 16.05 the "Korean" was blown up.

The cruiser continued to slowly sink; Rudnev, fearing that the Japanese might capture the dying ship, asked Captain Bailey to fire a torpedo at the waterline.

Having been refused, he and his men headed to the Varyag on a French boat and “created a number of fires that accelerated the death of the ship.”

At 18.10, the burning Varyag capsized with a roar on its left side and disappeared under the water.

The Japanese are raising the Russian cruiser "Varyag", Chemulpo. 1905

The further fate of the cruiser Varyag

"Varyag" was raised by the Japanese on August 8, 1905. On August 22, 1905, she was included in the Imperial Japanese Navy. Repaired and commissioned on July 7, 1907 as a 2nd class cruiser named Soya (宗谷, after the Japanese name for the La Perouse Strait). It was used by the Japanese for training purposes for more than seven years. Saluting the feat of the Russian sailors, the Japanese left the name “Varyag” on the stern, and during the rise on board there was an inscription: “On this ship we will teach you how to love your Motherland.” From March 14 to August 7, 1909, the cruiser went on a voyage to the Hawaiian Islands and North America to practice navigation in long-distance voyages and train officers. The cruiser carried out similar trips until 1913.

After the Varyag was raised and repaired in Japan, its helm was transferred to the flagship of the Japanese fleet, the battleship Mikasa. The latter was used as a museum ship. To this day, the Mikas has a steering wheel on display, passed off as the Varyag's steering wheel. However, its appearance suggests that, most likely, the steering wheel belonged to the Russian steamship Sungari.

During World War I, the Russian Empire and Japan became allies. In 1916, the cruiser Soya (together with the battleships Sagami and Tango) was bought by Russia. On April 4, the Japanese flag was lowered and on April 5, 1916, the cruiser was transferred to Vladivostok, after which, under the former name “Varyag”, it was included in the Arctic Ocean flotilla (it made the transition from Vladivostok to Romanov-on-Murman) as part of the Special Purpose Vessels Detachment under the command of Rear Admiral Bestuzhev-Ryumin.

In February 1917, it went to Great Britain for repairs, where it was confiscated by the British because the Soviet government refused to pay the debts of the Russian Empire. In 1920 it was resold to German companies for scrapping. In 1925, while being towed, the ship encountered a storm and sank offshore in the Irish Sea. Some of the metal structures were then removed by local residents. Was subsequently blown up.

The Japanese are raising the Russian cruiser "Varyag", Chemulpo. 1905

Performance characteristics of the cruiser Varyag

Home port: Port Arthur
- Organization: First Pacific Squadron
- Manufacturer: William Cramp and Sons, Philadelphia, USA
- Construction started: 1898
- Launched: 1899
- Put into operation: 1901
- Status: Sunk on February 9, 1904
- Commissioned by Japan: July 9, 1907 under the name "Soya"
- Returned to Russia: April 5, 1916
- Withdrawn from the fleet: 1917
- Status: sank while being towed for scrapping in 1925

Displacement of the cruiser Varyag

6604 tons, 6500 tons (design displacement)

Dimensions of the cruiser Varyag

Length: 129.56 m
- Width: 15.9 m (without lining)
- Draft: 5.94 m (midship)

Reservation of the cruiser Varyag

Armor deck: 38/57/76 mm,
- Conning tower - 152 mm

Engines of the cruiser Varyag

Vertical triple expansion steam engines, 30 Nikloss steam boilers
- Power: 20,000 l. With.
- Propulsion: 2 three-blade propellers

Speed of the cruiser Varyag

On tests 13.7.1900: 24.59 knots
- after repairs in Port Arthur 10/16/1903: 20.5 knots
- after repair in Vladivostok: 16 knots
- Cruising range: (10 knots): 6100 miles (full coal supply), 3270 miles (normal coal supply)

Crew: 20 officers, 550 sailors and non-commissioned officers

Armament

Artillery
- 12 × 152 mm/45,
- 12 × 75 mm/50,
- 8 × 47 mm/43,
- 2 × 37 mm/23 guns,
- 2 × 63 mm/19 Baranovsky guns,
- 2 × 7.62 machine guns

Mine and torpedo weapons
- 6 × 381(450) mm TA (2 in stems, 4 onboard, 12 torpedoes),
- 2 × 254 mm TA (6 throwing mines),
- 35 (22) barrage mines.

The Japanese are raising the Russian cruiser "Varyag", Chemulpo. 1905

The cruiser "Varyag" needs no introduction. However, the battle of Chemulpo is still a dark page in Russian military history. Its results are disappointing, and there are still a lot of misconceptions about the participation of “Varyag” in this battle.

"Varyag" - a weak cruiser

In popular publications there is an assessment that the combat value of the Varyag was low. Indeed, due to poor quality work performed during construction in Philadelphia, the Varyag could not reach the contract speed of 25 knots, thereby losing the main advantage of a light cruiser.

The second serious drawback was the lack of armor shields for the main caliber guns. On the other hand, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan, in principle, did not have a single armored cruiser capable of resisting the Varyag and the Askold, Bogatyr or Oleg, which were similarly armed.

Not a single Japanese cruiser of this class had 12,152 mm guns. True, the fighting unfolded in such a way that the crews of Russian cruisers never had to fight an enemy of equal size or class. The Japanese always acted with certainty, compensating for the shortcomings of their cruisers with numerical superiority, and the first, but not the last in this glorious and tragic list for the Russian fleet, was the battle of the cruiser Varyag.

A hail of shells hit the Varyag and Koreets

Artistic and popular descriptions of the battle at Chemulpo often say that the “Varyag” and “Korean” (which did not receive a single hit) were literally bombarded by Japanese shells. However, official figures indicate otherwise. In just 50 minutes of the battle at Chemulpo, six Japanese cruisers spent 419 shells: “Asama” 27 - 203 mm. , 103 152 mm., 9 76 mm; "Naniva" - 14,152 mm; "Niitaka" - 53 152 mm, 130 76 mm. "Takachiho" - 10,152 mm, "Akashi" - 2,152 mm, "Chiyoda" 71,120 mm.

In response, the Varyag fired, according to Rudnev’s report, 1105 shells: 425 -152 mm, 470 - 75 mm, 210 - 47 mm. It turns out that Russian gunners achieved the highest rate of fire. To this we can add 22,203 mm, 27,152 mm and 3,107 mm of projectiles fired from the Koreyets.

That is, in the battle of Chemulpo, two Russian ships fired almost three times more shells than the entire Japanese squadron. The question remains debatable about how the Russian cruiser kept records of spent shells or whether the figure was indicated approximately based on the results of a survey of the crew. And could such a number of shells be fired on a cruiser that, by the end of the battle, had lost 75% of its artillery?

Rear Admiral at the head of the Varyag

As is known, after returning to Russia and upon his retirement in 1905, the commander of the Varyag, Rudnev, received the rank of rear admiral. Already today, one of the streets in South Butovo in Moscow received the name of Vsevolod Fedorovich. Although, perhaps, it would have been more logical to name Captain Rudnev, if necessary, to distinguish him among his famous namesakes in military affairs.

There is no mistake in the name, but this image requires clarification - in military history this man remained a captain of the 1st rank and commander of the Varyag, but as a rear admiral he could no longer prove himself. But an obvious mistake has crept into a number of modern textbooks for high school students, where the “legend” is already heard that the cruiser “Varyag” was commanded by Rear Admiral Rudnev. The authors did not go into detail and think about the fact that a rear admiral was somehow out of rank to command an armored cruiser of the 1st rank.

Two against fourteen

The literature often states that the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" were attacked by the Japanese squadron of Rear Admiral Uriu, consisting of 14 ships - 6 cruisers and 8 destroyers.

Here it is necessary to make several clarifications.

Outwardly, there was a huge numerical and qualitative superiority of the Japanese, which the enemy never took advantage of during the battle. It is necessary to take into account that on the eve of the battle at Chemulpo, the Uriu squadron consisted of not even 14, but 15 pennants - the armored cruiser Asama, armored cruisers Naniwa, Takachiho, Niitaka, Chiyoda, Akashi and eight destroyers and advice note "Chihaya".

True, even on the eve of the battle with the Varyag, the Japanese suffered non-combat losses. When the gunboat "Koreets" attempted to proceed from Chemulpo to Port Arthur, the Japanese squadron began dangerous maneuvering (which ended with the use of a gun) around the Russian gunboat, as a result of which the destroyer "Tsubame" ran aground and did not directly participate in the battle. The messenger ship Chihaya, which, nevertheless, was in close proximity to the battle site, did not participate in the battle. In reality, the battle was waged by a group of four Japanese cruisers, two more cruisers participated only sporadically, and the presence of Japanese destroyers remained a presence factor.

"A cruiser and two enemy destroyers at the bottom"

When it comes to military losses, this issue often becomes the subject of heated debate. The battle at Chemulpo was no exception, in which estimates of Japanese losses were very contradictory.

Russian sources indicate very high enemy losses: a destroyed destroyer, 30 killed and 200 wounded. They are based mainly on the opinions of representatives of foreign powers who observed the battle.

Over time, two destroyers and the cruiser Takachiho were sunk (by the way, this data ended up in the feature film “Cruiser Varyag”). And if the fate of some Japanese destroyers raises questions, the cruiser Takachiho safely survived the Russo-Japanese War and died 10 years later with its entire crew during the siege of Qingdao.

Reports from all Japanese cruiser commanders indicate that there were no losses or damage to their ships. Another question: where, after the battle in Chemulpo, did the main enemy of the Varyag, the armored cruiser Asama, “disappear” for two months? Neither Port Arthur nor Admiral Kammimura was part of the squadron operating against the Vladivostok cruiser squadron. And this was at the very beginning of the war, when the outcome of the confrontation was far from decided.

It is likely that the ship, which became the main target of the Varyag’s guns, received serious damage, but at the beginning of the war, for propaganda purposes, the Japanese side was undesirable to talk about this. From the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, it is well known how the Japanese tried for a long time to hide their losses, for example, the death of the battleships Hatsuse and Yashima, and a number of destroyers that apparently ended up at the bottom were simply written off after the war as beyond repair.

Legends of Japanese modernization

A number of misconceptions are associated with the service of the Varyag in the Japanese fleet. One of them is related to the fact that after the rise of the Varyag, the Japanese retained the Russian state emblem and the name of the cruiser as a sign of respect. However, this was more likely due not to the desire to pay tribute to the crew of the heroic ship, but to design features - the coat of arms and name were mounted in the aft balcony and the Japanese attached the new name of the cruiser “Soya” on both sides to the balcony grille. The second misconception is the replacement of Nicolossa boilers with Miyabara boilers on the Varyag. Although the vehicles had to be thoroughly repaired, the cruiser showed a speed of 22.7 knots during testing.

In On cuts and kickbacks in Tsarist Russia

The development of a fire control system for the battleship Borodino was entrusted to the Institute of Precision Mechanics at the court of His Imperial Highness. The creation of the machines was carried out by the Russian Society of Steam Power Plants. A leading research and production team whose developments have been successfully applied on warships around the world. Ivanov's guns and self-propelled mines designed by Makarov were adopted as weapon systems...

All of you, there on the upper deck! Stop the ridicule!

The fire control system was French, mod. 1899. The set of instruments was first presented at an exhibition in Paris and was immediately purchased for the RIF by its commander, Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich (according to the recollections of relatives, le Beau Brummel, who almost permanently lived in France).

Barr and Studd horizontal base rangefinders were installed in the conning tower. Boilers of the Belleville design were used. Mangin spotlights. Worthington steam pumps. Martin's anchors. Ston pumps. Medium and anti-mine caliber guns - 152- and 75-mm cannons of the Canet system. Rapid-fire 47 mm Hotchkiss guns. Whitehead system torpedoes.

The Borodino project itself was a modified design of the battleship Tsesarevich, designed and built for the Russian Imperial Navy by specialists from the French shipyard Forges and Chantiers.

To avoid misunderstandings and unfounded reproaches, it is necessary to make an explanation for a wide audience. The good news is that most of the foreign names in the Borodino EDB design belonged to systems manufactured under license in Russia. On the technical side, they also met the best world standards. For example, the generally accepted design of the sectional boiler of the Belleville system and the very successful guns of Gustave Canet.

However, the French fire control system alone on the Russian EBR makes one think. Why and why? It looks as ridiculous as the Aegis on the Soviet Orlan.

There are two bad news.

A great empire with a population of 130 million people, with a high-quality education system (for the elite) and a developed scientific school - Mendeleev, Popov, Yablochkov. And besides, there are all kinds of foreign technologies all around! Where is our domestic “Belleville”? But he was an engineer-inventor V. Shukhov, an employee of the Russian branch of the Babcock & Wilksos company, who patented a vertical boiler of his own design.

In theory, everything was there. In practice, there are solid Belvilles, the Nikloss brothers and the Tsarevich EBR at the Forges and Chantiers shipyard as a standard model for the Russian fleet.

But, what is especially offensive, ships at domestic shipyards were built many times slower. Four years for EDB Borodino versus two and a half years for Retvizan (Cramp & Sans). Now you shouldn’t become like a recognizable hero and ask: “Why? Who did it?" The answer is on the surface - a lack of tools, machines, experience and skilled hands.

Another problem is that even with “mutually beneficial cooperation” in the conditions of an “open world market,” there are no torpedoes of the Makarov design in service with the French fleet. And in general there is nothing observed that would indicate an exchange of technologies. Everything, everything according to the old, proven scheme. We give them money and gold, in return they give them their technical innovations. Belleville boiler. Whitehead's mine. iPhone 6. Because Russian Mongols are completely impotent in terms of the creative process.

Speaking specifically about the fleet, even licenses were not always enough. We just had to take and place orders at foreign shipyards.

The fact that the cruiser “Varyag” was built in the USA is no longer hidden. It is much less known that the second participant in the legendary battle, the gunboat “Korean”, was built in Sweden.

Armored cruiser "Svetlana", built in Le Havre, France.
Armored cruiser "Admiral Kornilov" - Saint-Nazaire, France.
Armored cruiser "Askold" - Kiel, Germany.
Armored cruiser "Boyarin" - Copenhagen, Denmark.
Armored cruiser "Bayan" - Toulon, France.
The armored cruiser Admiral Makarov was built at the Forges & Chantiers shipyard.
The armored cruiser Rurik was built at the English shipyard Barrow Inn Furness.
The battleship Retvizan, built by Cramp & Sons in Philadelphia, USA.
Series of destroyers "Whale", Friedrich Schichau shipyard, Germany.
The Trout series of destroyers were built at the A. Norman plant in France.
Series "Lieutenant Burakov" - "Forges & Chantiers", France.
Series of destroyers “Mechanical Engineer Zverev” - Schichau shipyard, Germany.
The lead destroyers of the “Horseman” and “Falcon” series were built in Germany and, accordingly, Great Britain.
"Batum" - at the Yarrow shipyard in Glasgow, UK (the list is incomplete!).

A regular participant in “Military Review” spoke very caustically about this:

Well, of course, they ordered ships from the Germans. They built well, their cars were excellent. Well, clearly in France, like an ally, plus kickbacks to the Grand Dukes. One can also understand the order to the American Crump. He did it quickly, promised a lot and delivered everything no worse than the French. But it turns out that under the Tsar Father, we even ordered cruisers in Denmark.
Comment from Eduard (qwert).

The irritation is well understandable. Given the colossal gap in technology and labor productivity, building a series of armored cruisers is equivalent to building a modern spaceport. Outsourcing such “fat” projects to foreign contractors is unprofitable and ineffective in all respects. This money should go to the workers of the Admiralty shipyards and move the domestic economy. And together with it, develop our own science and industry. This is what everyone has strived to do at all times. Steal from profits, not losses. But we don’t do that.

We did it differently. The scheme was called “to steal a ruble, harm the country for a million.” The French have a contract, they, whoever needs it, get a kickback. Their shipyards are sitting without orders. Industry is deteriorating. Qualified personnel are not needed.

There was a time when they even tried to build dreadnought battleships, but it would be better not to try. During the implementation of this most complex project, all the shortcomings of pre-revolutionary Russia were clearly revealed. There is a widespread lack of production experience, machines and competent specialists. Multiplied by incompetence, nepotism, kickbacks and chaos in the offices of the Admiralty.

As a result, the formidable “Sevastopol” took six years to build and by the time the St. Andrew’s flag was raised it was completely outdated. “Empress Maria” turned out to be no better. Look at their peers. Who entered service at the same time as them in 1915? Isn't it the 15-inch Queen Elizabeth? And then say that the author is biased.

They say that there was still the mighty “Ishmael”. Or it wasn't. The battle cruiser “Izmail” turned out to be an unbearable burden for the Republic of Ingushetia. It’s a rather strange habit to pass off as an achievement something that you didn’t do.

Even in peacetime, with the direct help of foreign contractors, ships turned into long-term construction projects over and over again. With the cruiser everything turned out to be even more serious. When Izmail's readiness level reached 43%, Russia entered into a war that lacked any purpose, objective benefit, and was impossible to win. For “Ishmael” this was the end, because... Some of its mechanisms were imported from Germany.

If we talk outside of politics, then the Izmail LCR was also not an indicator of the heyday of the empire. Dawn has already begun to glow in the East. Japan stood up to his full height with his 16-inch “Nagato”. One that even their British teachers were taken aback by.

Time passed, there was not much progress. From the author’s point of view, industry in Tsarist Russia was in complete decline. You may have an opinion different from the author’s, which, however, will not be easy to prove.

Go down to the engine room of the destroyer Novik and read what is stamped on its turbines. Come on, bring some light here. Really? A.G. Vulkan Stettin. Deutsches Kaiserreich.

Things didn't work out with the engines from the very beginning. Climb into the engine nacelle of the same “Ilya Muromets”. What will you see there? Engines of the Gorynych brand? Really, surprise. Renault.

Legendary royal quality

All the facts indicate that the Russian Empire languished somewhere at the very bottom of the list of developed states. After Great Britain, Germany, the States, France and even Japan, which, having gone through the late Meiji modernization, by the 1910s. managed to bypass RI in everything.

In general, Russia was not at all where it should be for an empire with such ambitions.

After this, jokes about “Ilyin’s light bulb” and the state program for eliminating illiteracy no longer seem so funny. Years passed and the country healed. Fully. It would become a state with the best education in the world, with advanced science and a developed industry that could do everything. Import substitution in the most important industries (military industry, atom, space) was 100%.

And the descendants of the degenerates who fled will continue to whine in Paris for a long time about “the Russia they lost.”
Author A. Dolganov.