August 25th, 2013 , 10:40 pm

Kamikaze tanks, Hitler's technical innovations and the reasons for the defeat of the USSR in the Battle of Prokhorovka - on the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk for my readers.

“I decided, as soon as weather conditions permitted, to launch the Citadel Offensive, the first offensive of the year. This offensive is given decisive importance. It must end in quick and decisive success, putting the initiative in our hands for the spring and summer of this year... Every commander and every soldier must be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk will be a guiding star, a torch for the whole world.”

In February-March 1943, Army Group South, under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, managed to inflict a heavy defeat on the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts and recapture Kharkov.

As a result, the Soviet command had to switch to a tough defense, although they managed to stop the Germans only at the end of March. There was an operational pause that lasted 100 days—the longest lull in the entire war. On the southern flank, the front line acquired a double arc configuration. This situation was especially unfavorable for the German side, and Manstein considered it necessary, albeit with the last of his strength, to launch an immediate attack on Kursk. To do this, he needed reinforcements, which could only be quickly obtained from the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Kluge. The latter not only did not meet Manstein halfway, but also developed extreme activity in Berlin, convincing Hitler, Chief of the General Staff Zeitzler and Field Marshal Keitel of the need to postpone the offensive in the Kursk salient area at least until the end of the spring thaw. In vain Manstein argued in favor of an immediate offensive, citing the fact that the Soviet troops had not yet been able to build any defense and then “cutting off” the ledge would be a hundred times harder - it was all in vain.

Hitler said that for the offensive it was necessary to better prepare by supplying new tanks to the troops, and to begin it “from May 3, as soon as weather conditions permit.” For the Soviet command, the plans of the German leadership were no secret - the Wehrmacht strike groups were pulled together almost demonstratively. At this time, in the places where the enemy was supposed to attack, Soviet troops were building an unprecedentedly powerful field defense system, which would eventually become the strongest anti-tank defensive position in history. In addition, a strong group of reserve armies was created - the Steppe Front under the command of I. Konev. The Supreme Command Headquarters canceled all offensive operations - literally all forces were devoted to preparing for a defensive battle.

At this time, endless meetings and conferences of the Reich's high military command were held at the Fuhrer's headquarters, devoted to two questions - when and how to attack. Zeitzler, Keitel and von Kluge advocated an offensive through double flanking - attacks “under the base” of the Kursk ledge and, as a result, the encirclement and destruction of many Soviet divisions. Thus, the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops was to be weakened to such an extent that the strategic initiative would again pass to the Wehrmacht. Manstein hesitated, expressing doubts about the success he could guarantee if the offensive began in April. Inspector General of Panzer Forces Heinz Guderian was a fierce opponent of Zeitzler's plan. From the very beginning, he stated that the offensive was pointless, since the General Staff plan programmed heavy losses in tanks, and it would not be possible to significantly replenish the Eastern Front with new armored vehicles during 1943 due to the limited capabilities of German industry. This position of the “father of tanks” was shared by the Reich Minister of Arms and Ammunition Albert Speer, whose opinion the Fuhrer always respected.

Guderian also tried to dispel his opponents' illusions regarding the newest Pz tanks. V "Panther", recalling that these tanks were still an unproven design with many defects that could not be eliminated before August. The training of the crews of the new vehicles was also not up to par, since the few Panthers that arrived in units were almost immediately sent for repairs. There were too few heavy “tigers”, which had already proven their exceptional effectiveness, to “push through” the Soviet defense in all sectors with their help alone. At this meeting, held on May 3, Hitler, after listening to all sides, did not come to a definite opinion, but ended it with these words: “There should be no failure!” On May 10, Guderian again tried to convince Hitler to abandon the offensive, this time in a personal conversation.

The Fuehrer said: “You are absolutely right. As soon as I start thinking about this operation, my stomach starts to hurt.” But no matter what ailed Hitler, he did not listen to Manstein’s proposal, who recommended changing the plan of operation and advancing from the Kharkov area in a south-eastern direction, expanding the flanks of the breakthrough, that is, where the Soviet command simply did not expect a strike. During these endless discussions, Hitler himself came up with an interesting proposal - to attack Kursk from west to east, through Sevsk, forcing Soviet troops to fight with an “inverted front”, but Zeitzler, Keitel and von Kluge managed to force the Fuhrer to abandon even his own idea. In the end, Hitler “gave in” and finally agreed with the General Staff’s plan. The offensive, which was supposed to decide the outcome of the war, was scheduled for July 5.

Balance of power

On the southern face of the Kursk Bulge
a defensive line 244 km long was held by the Voronezh Front under the command of N.F. Vatutina.

Voska Voronezh Front(two echelons):
First line 38th, 40th, 6th, 7th Guards Armies
Second line 69th Army, 1st Tank Army, 31st Rifle Corps
Reserve 5th and 2nd Tank Corps
Cover 2nd Air Army

The Voronezh Front was opposed by:
4th Tank Army as part of the 52nd Army Corps (3 divisions)
49th Panzer Corps (2 tank, 1 elite motorized division "Grossdeutschland")
2nd SS Panzer Corps (tank divisions "Das Reich", "Totenkopf", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler")
7th Army Corps (5 infantry divisions)
42nd Army Corps (3 infantry divisions)
Task Force "Kempf" consisting of the 3rd Panzer Corps (3 tank and 1 infantry divisions) and the 11th Army Corps (2 infantry divisions)
Reserve 24th Panzer Corps (17th Panzer Division and SS Wiking Panzer Division)
Cover 8th Air Corps of the 4th Air Fleet
The commander of the strike force was Field Marshal Erich von Manstein.

On the northern face of the Kursk Bulge
a defensive line 306 km long was held by the Central Front of K.K. Rokossovsky.

Troops of the central front(two echelons):
First line 48th, 60th, 13th, 65th, 70th armies
Second line 2nd Tank Army, 19th and 3rd Tank Corps
Cover 16th Air Army

The Central Front was opposed by:
First line German 9th Army (6 tank and motorized divisions and 15 infantry divisions)
Second line 13th Army Corps (4 infantry divisions)
The commander of the group was Colonel General Walter Model, subordinate to Field Marshal von Kluge.

Both Soviet fronts had sufficient forces to repel the German offensive, but just in case, the Supreme High Command Headquarters placed the Steppe Front under the command of I.S. behind these two fronts. Konev, which became the most powerful strategic reserve of the Soviet command during the entire war (2 guards, 5 combined arms, 5th guards tank, 5th air army, 3 tank, 3 cavalry, 3 mechanized and 2 rifle corps). In the event of the most unfavorable outcome, the front troops would defend themselves at the base of the arc in previously prepared positions, so the Germans would have to start all over again. Although no one believed that things could come to this, in 3 months they managed to build an exceptionally powerful field defense according to all the rules.

The main zone, 5-8 kilometers deep, included battalion resistance centers, anti-tank obstacles and reserve engineering structures. It consisted of three positions - in the first of them there were 2-3 continuous trenches of a full profile, connected by communication passages, the second and third had 1-2 trenches. The second defense line, 10-15 km from the front edge of the main line, was equipped in the same way. The rear army zone, running 20-40 km from the front edge, adjoined three front defensive lines with a total depth of 30-50 km. The entire defensive system consisted of eight lines. The forward tactical defense zone consisted of a developed network of strong points, each of which had from 3 to 5 76.2 mm ZiS-3 guns or 57 mm ZiS-2 guns, several anti-tank rifles, up to 5 mortars, up to a company of sappers and infantrymen . The area was literally strewn with minefields - the average mining density reached 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per 1 km of front (4 times more than in Stalingrad).

And behind there was an “insurance policy” - the defensive line of the Steppe Front. So the Soviet troops spent their time in endless exercises, alternating with rest. But the Germans’ morale was also very high - never before had troops had 3 months to rest, study and replenish. Never before had the Germans concentrated such a mass of armored vehicles and troops in such limited areas. The best of the best were here. True, the veterans, looking at all the preparations, recalled the First World War, since the upcoming battle was supposed to be similar to the battles of the last war, when one huge army stomped around, trying to “gnaw through” the layered defense of the other, and both sides suffered huge losses with scanty results . But there were much more young people, and they were determined, although there was a certain fatalism in the air - if so many armored vehicles and troops do not crush the Ivans this time, then what to do next? Nevertheless, everyone believed in victory...

Prologue

The Germans had to start the battle not on the 5th, but on the 4th of July. The fact was that from the starting position of the 4th Tank Army on the southern front it was impossible to see either the positions of the Soviet artillery or the defense system in general - the ridge of hills behind the no-man's land was in the way. From these hills, Soviet artillery observers could clearly see all the German preparations and adjust the artillery fire accordingly. So the Germans had to take this ridge in advance. On the night of July 4, sappers from Grossdeutschland made passages in the minefields and several grenadier battalions from the same division, after intensive artillery bombardment and an air raid by Ju-87G Stuka dive bombers, went on the attack at approximately 15.20. Only in the evening did the grenadiers manage to push back the advanced units of 3 Soviet guards divisions and gain a foothold on the heights, suffering heavy losses.

Not a single shot was fired on the northern front that day. The commander of the Central Front, Army General Rokossovsky, knew the day and hour of the German offensive as early as July 2, so he prepared a surprise for the enemy. At 1.10 on July 5, when German motorized units had already moved to their initial positions for the attack, Soviet artillery began intensive shelling of the areas where German troops were concentrated.

The artillery raid lasted about an hour and caused heavy damage, but did not affect the timing of the German attack, which began at exactly 3.30 am. It took the sappers a full 2 ​​hours to make passages in the minefields for the “tigers” from the 505th heavy tank battalion under continuous fire. The 20th Panzer Division advanced the furthest that day, managing to reach the second line of Soviet defense and capture the village of Bobrik, a strong stronghold 8 km from the original line of attack. The 41st Tank Corps also managed to make significant progress, but on the left wing of Model, in the offensive zone of the 23rd Tank Corps, things did not go very well for the Germans. They were stuck in the defensive positions of four rifle divisions and could not break through them, even despite the use of two hitherto secret new products - Goliath mini-tanks (teletanks) and B-IV mine clearing vehicles.

The Goliaths were 60 cm high, 67 cm wide and 120 cm long. These “mighty dwarfs” were controlled either remotely by radio or using a cable that unrolled from the rear of the vehicle up to 1,000 meters. They carried 90 kg of explosives. According to the designers, they had to be brought as close as possible to enemy positions and undermined by pressing a button in their trench. Goliaths proved to be effective weapons, but only when they managed to crawl to the target, which did not happen often. In most cases, teletanks were destroyed as they approached.

To make wide passages in minefields, the Germans used a very exotic B-IV vehicle in battles on the northern front, which weighed 4 tons and carried a high-explosive explosive charge of 1,000 kg and resembled an armored ammunition transporter. The driver had to drive up to the edge of the minefield, turn on the remote control device, and then run away like he had never run in his life. The high-explosive charge detonated all mines within a radius of 50 m. Near Maloarkhangelsk, the Germans used 8 of these “mechanical sappers”, and quite successfully - the large minefield ceased to exist.

But out of eight drivers, four died because they were not fast enough, so since then it has been difficult to find anyone willing to drive the B-IV. However, after the Battle of Kursk the Germans practically did not use them. From the very beginning, Model massively used 90 Ferdinand heavy assault guns designed by F. Porsche. Few could resist this 68-ton monster, armed with an even longer-barreled 88-mm gun than the Tiger’s and 200 mm of frontal armor, but one drawback negated all the efforts of their crews. The Ferdinands did not have a single (!) machine gun - only a cannon.

It is strange that no one paid attention to this at the stages of development and testing, but now, having “ironed” the Soviet trench, the low-speed “self-propelled gun” could not fight the infantry with anything other than tracks, which had adapted to let the “monster” through and cut off the German enemy with intense fire infantry from their "ram". As a result, the “Ferdinands” had to go back in order to somehow help their own. During these movements back and forth, self-propelled guns often got stuck in trenches and craters or were blown up by mines, becoming prey to Soviet troops.

But, operating from cover as a tank destroyer, the Ferdinand was guaranteed to destroy any Soviet tank or self-propelled gun at a distance of up to 2,500 m. This vehicle was clearly not suitable as a “ram” for infantry. Of the 90 Ferdinands, the Germans lost half on the Kursk Bulge.

By the end of July 6, the Soviet front had been broken through by Model 32 km wide and up to 10 km deep, but at least 16 km remained to be broken through. Neither Model nor any of his soldiers and officers had ever encountered such an incredibly powerful defense. The immediate target of the Germans was the village of Olkhovatka, and mainly the ridge of hills around it. From a strategic point of view, the importance of these heights was difficult to overestimate - they offered a view of Kursk, the final goal of the offensive, located 120 m below the Olkhovat hills.

If it were possible to capture these heights, the extremely important area between the Oka and Seim rivers could be considered ours. To seize a bridgehead around Olkhovatka, Model sent 140 tanks and 50 assault guns of the 2nd Panzer Division and more than 20 Tigers into the attack, supported by numerous motorized infantry. Dive bombers and FW-190F3 attack aircraft non-stop bombed and strafed Soviet positions, clearing the way for tanks. On July 8, the 4th Tank Division joined the assaulters, but Soviet troops, replenished the day before by 2 infantry and artillery divisions, with the support of 2 tank brigades (tbr), held their positions.

For 3 days there was a continuous battle for the village of Teploye and the Olkhovat hills, but the Germans failed to achieve decisive success. Companies in which there were 3-5 soldiers left without a single officer were replaced with new ones, but nothing helped. To the left of Olkhovatka, 2 tank and 1 infantry German divisions fought for a week for the village of Ponyri, which the soldiers called “little Stalingrad.” There were battles here for every house, and the village changed hands a dozen times. Only on July 11, with the help of Model’s last reserve—the 10th Motorized Infantry Division—Ponyri was captured. But the Germans were not destined to advance further. The German commander knew about the impending counterattack of the Soviet troops from air reconnaissance data. Now he had to think about holding his position.

The combat order of the High Command of the German Ground Forces to von Manstein and the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel General Hoth, read: “Achieve a connection with the 9th Army by a direct breakthrough through Oboyan.” However, both Manstein and Goth understood that when all their forces were in front of the crossings across Psel in Oboyan, Soviet tank troops from the Prokhorovka area would hit the flank of the advancing German troops and, at a minimum, seriously slow down the advance on Kursk.

Therefore, Hoth proposed to his commander some change in the plan of action - after breaking through the main lines of Soviet defense, turn not to Oboyan, but to Prokhorovka, in order to repel the inevitable massive Soviet tank counterattack, and only then move north towards Kursk. Manstein approved this proposal, and on July 5 Hoth went on the offensive according to a new plan. Manstein’s tactics differed from Model’s tactics on the northern front - a quick breakthrough was made not by infantry, but by tank divisions, all at once. Manstein considered the traditional method of breaking through layered defenses, when motorized infantry with assault guns punches a hole into which tanks then rush, too time-consuming and labor-intensive, given the large width of the front.

Hoth, with his approximately 700 tanks, was supposed to push through the Soviet defenses immediately, “with a jerk, not a crawl,” and meet the Soviet tank reserves already in the operational space, where he, with the support of the Luftwaffe, had a good chance of defeating them. General Kempff's task force further south was to operate in a similar manner. Manstein was confident that the Russians would not be able to withstand a simultaneous attack from 1,300 tanks and assault guns. They won't be able to stand it. But the outbreak of hostilities did not confirm Manstein’s optimism - although his troops managed to advance 8 km deep into the Soviet defense and capture the village of Cherkasskoe, the task for the first day was to break through all lines of enemy defense. The next day, July 6, the 11th TD was supposed to capture the bridge over Psel, south of Oboyan, 50 km from the starting position! But it was by no means 1941, and therefore we could no longer count on such a pace.

Although it must be said that all plans went into the trash bin largely due to the incredible failure of the new “miracle weapon” - the Panther tank. As Heinz Guderian predicted, the new combat machine, which did not have time to get rid of “childhood diseases,” showed itself very poorly from the very beginning. All “Panthers” were consolidated into two battalions of 96 vehicles each. Both of them became part of the 39th Panzer Regiment under the command of Major von Lauchert. Together with 8 headquarters vehicles, the regiment consisted of exactly 200 tanks. The Panther regiment was attached to the Grossdeutschland motorized division and, together with its tank regiment (about 120 tanks), operated in the Oboyan direction throughout the entire operation. Of the 196 Pz tanks that went into battle. 162 V Panthers were lost due to technical reasons alone. In total, in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the Germans irretrievably lost 127 Panthers. It's hard to imagine a more unsuccessful debut. Although in some cases the new tanks performed very well: for example, one “Panther” managed to knock out a T-34 at a distance of 3000 m!

But all these, although successful, few episodes did not play any positive role for the Germans. But at one time, waiting for the commissioning of these tanks, Hitler moved the start of the “Citadel” at least a month and a half ahead! However, not paying attention to these failures, the German tank wedge penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards Army. Here the SS tank divisions especially distinguished themselves, after just a few hours they found themselves directly in front of the command post of army commander M. Chistyakov. The commander of the Voronezh Front, N. Vatutin, gave the order to the commander of the 1st Tank Army, M. Katukov, to immediately counterattack. In Katukov’s army, 1/3 were light T-70 tanks, which for German tanks were only mobile targets, and the “thirty-four” guns were inferior to the German ones. Under these conditions, several brigades went on the attack and immediately suffered heavy losses. Katukov turned to Vatutin with a request to cancel the order, but he refused. The restless army commander then contacted Stalin and proved to the Supreme Commander that he was right.

Vatutin's order was canceled. T-34s continued to operate from ambushes, which was much more effective than frontal counterattacks. By the end of the first day, the Germans had advanced 10-18 km and did not stop fighting even at night. On July 6-7, they developed an offensive along the Oboyan highway to Syrtsovo-Greznoye, and by the end of July 7, the Leibstandarte and Totenkopf began to break through the key position of the Soviet defense between the Psel and Donets rivers. The front of the 6th Guards Army no longer existed, and the 1st Tank Army suffered heavy losses. Arriving on the evening of July 7 at the Katukova command post, member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev said: “The next two or three days are the worst. Either the lord or... the Germans are in Kursk. They put everything on the line, for them it is a matter of life or death. It’s necessary... for them to break their necks, and for us to move forward!” But on July 8-10, the Germans “didn’t break their necks,” but, on the contrary, methodically shaking the Soviet defenses, reached the town of Verkhopenye and crossed the Pena River. Then the SS Leibstandarte and Das Reich TDs turned towards Prokhorovka. The 48th Panzer Corps partially went to Oboyan, which was about 30 km away, and partially supported the advance of the SS Panzer Corps to the east.

But Hoth had nothing to cover the eastern flank of his operation - the Kempf task force missed the schedule before reaching the upper reaches of the Donets. Nevertheless, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps continued to advance, and the Headquarters representative, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky together with General N.F. Vatutin asked Stalin to nominate the 5th Guards Army of Lieutenant General A.S. to strengthen the Prokhorov direction. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov from the Ostrogozhsk region. By the end of the day on July 9, the 5th Guards approached Prokhorovka. At this time, Colonel General Hoth condensed the battle formations of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and reduced its offensive zone by half. The Kempf task force, which had arrived on July 10, was preparing an attack on Prokhorovka from the south, through Rzhavets.

Battle

The Battle of Prokhorov began on July 10. By the end of the day, the Germans captured an important defensive point - the Komsomolets state farm - and entrenched themselves in the area of ​​​​the village of Krasny Oktyabr. The Germans would not have been able to achieve all this, even despite the striking power of their formations, if not for the exceptionally effective actions of the Luftwaffe in supporting their troops. As soon as the weather permitted, German planes literally “lived” in the skies above the battlefield: 7-8, or even 10 combat sorties a day were not uncommon for pilots. Ju-87Gs with 37-mm cannons in suspended containers literally terrorized Soviet tank crews, inflicting very heavy losses on them. The artillerymen suffered no less, especially since in the first week of the battle Soviet aviation was unable to organize a proper rebuff to the Luftwaffe.

By the end of July 11, the Germans had pushed back the Soviet units in the area of ​​the Storozhevoye farmstead and formed a tight ring around the units defending Andreevka, Vasilievka and Mikhailovka. On this day, a platoon of anti-tank rifles of the 284th joint venture of the 95th Guards Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant P.I. accomplished their feat. Shpyatnogo. 9 armor-piercing soldiers entered into battle with 7 German tanks and knocked out all of them. All Soviet soldiers were killed, and the last enemy tank was blown up by the seriously wounded platoon commander himself, throwing himself under it with grenades. There were only 2 km left to Prokhorovka itself without any serious fortifications. Vatutin understood that the next day, July 12, Prokhorovka would be taken and the Germans would turn to Oboyan, at the same time going to the rear of the 1st Tank Army. One could only hope for a counterattack from Rotmistrov’s army, which was supposed to turn the situation around.

The tankers were supported by the 5th Guards Army. Its commander, General Zhadov, recalled: “There were only a few hours of daylight and a short summer night left to organize a counterattack. During this time, a lot needs to be done: make a decision, assign tasks to the troops, carry out the necessary regrouping of units, arrange artillery. In the evening, mortar and howitzer artillery brigades arrived to reinforce the army, having an extremely limited amount of ammunition. The army had no tanks at all.” Rotmistrov's tankers also experienced a shortage of ammunition. Around midnight, Vatutin changed the time of the attack from 10.00 to 8.30, in order, in his opinion, to forestall the Germans.

This decision became fatal. Having gone into battle in a narrow 10-kilometer area, the tankers discovered that they were attacking the prepared SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler tank head-on. The German gunners had a clear view of the Soviet tanks, and already in the first minutes of the battle, dozens of T-34s and light T-70s flared up on the field, which should not have been sent to attack at all. The SS men were attacked by the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Division in cooperation with the 42nd Guards Rifle and 9th Guards Airborne Divisions. It was the battle of these two corps with the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler tank battle that later received the name of an oncoming tank battle, and the place where it took place - a “tank field”.

190 T-34s, 120 T-70s, 18 British heavy Mk-4 Churchills and 20 self-propelled guns attacked the German positions. The Leibstandarte consisted of 56 tanks (4 Tigers, 47 Pz. IV, 5 Pz. III and 10 Stug. III self-propelled guns).

Having launched the attack at 8.30, Soviet tanks only reached German artillery positions by 12.00 and during this time were subjected to a powerful air raid by Ju-87Gs and Messerschmitt-110s. As a result, both corps lost about 200 tanks and self-propelled guns, while the Germans lost 10 times less. And how could it be otherwise? The commander of the Voronezh Front threw 2 tank corps into a suicidal frontal attack not on the German infantry, but on the SS tank deployed for the attack, reinforced with artillery. The Germans were in a very advantageous position - they fired from a standing position, taking full advantage of the excellent ballistic qualities of their long-barreled guns and the excellent optics of their sights. Being under the disastrously accurate fire of German armored vehicles, being subjected to strong attacks from the air and not having, in turn, proper support from their own aviation and artillery, Soviet tank crews had to grit their teeth and “break” the distance in order to get closer to the enemy as quickly as possible. The MK-4 Churchill tank under the command of Lieutenant Lupakhin received 4 through holes, but the crew continued to fight until the engine caught fire.

Only after this did the crew, all of whose members were wounded, leave the tank. The mechanic-driver of the T-34 of the 181st Tank Brigade, Alexander Nikolaev, saving a wounded battalion commander, managed to successfully ram a German tank in his damaged tank. The Soviet tankers fought literally until the last shell, until the last man, but no miracle happened - the remnants of the corps rolled back to their original positions, managing, however, to slow down the German offensive and paying an incredible price for it.

But everything could have been different if Vatutin had not moved the time of the attack from 10.00 to 8.30. The fact is that according to the plan, the Leibstandarte was supposed to begin attacking our positions at 9.10, and in this case, the Soviet tanks would have met the German tanks with fire from the spot. In the afternoon, the Germans launched a counterattack, concentrating their main efforts north of Prokhorovka, in the zone of the Totenkopf division. Here they were opposed by about 150 tanks from the 5th Guards Army and the 1st Guards Army, as well as 4 Guards Rifle Divisions of the 5th Guards Army. Here the Germans were stopped mainly due to the excellent actions of anti-tank artillery. "Das Reich" fought with two tank corps of the 5th Guards and practically with an open right flank, since the 3rd Tank Corps of the "Kempf" task force was unable to approach Prokhorovka from the southeast on time. Finally, the day of July 12th ended. The results for the Soviet side were disappointing - the 5th Guards, according to the combat log, lost 299 tanks and self-propelled guns that day, the 2nd SS Tank - 30.

The next day the battle resumed, but the main events no longer took place in the Prokhorovka area, but on the northern front, near Model. The commander of the 9th Army was planning on July 12 to make a decisive breakthrough in the area of ​​​​the village of Teploye, but instead was forced not only to abandon the offensive, but also to withdraw mobile formations from the front to repel a major offensive on Orel, undertaken by the troops of the Bryansk Front. But the most important thing was that on July 13, Hitler summoned von Manstein and von Kluge to his Headquarters in East Prussia. As soon as the field marshals appeared before him, the Fuhrer stunned them with the news that, in connection with the successful Allied landing in Sicily, he was stopping the Citadel and transferring the SS Panzer Corps to Italy. However, Hitler allowed Manstein, acting only on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, to try to bleed the Soviet troops as much as possible, but on July 17 he ordered him to stop the useless offensive, withdraw the SS Panzer Corps from the battle and, moreover, transfer 2 more tank divisions to von Kluge so that he could try hold Eagle.

It was on this day that the Battle of Prokhorov ended. At the beginning of August, Manstein was forced to retreat to his original starting positions, which he also failed to hold for any long time.

I.V. Stalin was extremely dissatisfied with the huge losses suffered by the 5th Guards in the battles near Prokhorovka. As part of the internal investigation P.A. Rotmistrov wrote several notes, one of which was addressed to G.K. Zhukov. In the end, the Soviet tank general literally miraculously managed to justify himself.

Sov. secret

To the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR - Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade. Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield there were T-V (Panther) tanks, a significant number of T-VI (Tiger) tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks. Having commanded tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons. The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks.

The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases. The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank. When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the effective range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach of ours. aimed tank fire.

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that have gone over to the defensive, we, as a general rule, suffer huge losses in tanks and are not successful. The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields. T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by the fire of German tanks. We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that occurred on the tanks of the first production, such as the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation, have not been completely eliminated to this day.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place, which they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war... Based on our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 were able to give even more The improved T-V "Panther" tank, which, in fact, is a copy of our T-34 tank, is significantly superior in quality to the T-34 tank, and especially in the quality of weapons. I, as an ardent patriot of the tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and raise with all urgency the issue of mass production by the winter of 1943 of new tanks, superior in their combat qualities and design design of currently existing types of German tanks.

Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Guard, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces - (Rotmistrov) signature “20” August 1943 active army

The actions of the Soviet command in the Battle of Kursk can hardly be called a role model - the losses were too great, but still the main thing was achieved - the power of the Wehrmacht tank units was broken, the army tank and infantry divisions were no longer full-fledged combat instruments - their decline was irreversible. And although the SS divisions retained high combat effectiveness, there were too few of them to radically influence the situation at the front. The strategic initiative in the war firmly passed after Kursk to the Soviet troops and remained with them until the complete defeat of the Third Reich.

Unknown pages of the Great Patriotic War

In July 1943, the world's attention was focused on Russia. The greatest battle unfolded on the Kursk Bulge, on the outcome of which the further course of the Second World War depended. It is a well-known fact that German military leaders in their memoirs regarded this battle as decisive, and their defeat in it as the complete collapse of the Third Reich. It would seem that everything in the history of the Battle of Kursk is completely clear. However, real historical facts indicate the possibility of a completely different development of events.

The Fuhrer's fatal decision

When planning the summer campaign of 1943, the German High Command was of the view that there was a real opportunity to seize the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front. The Stalingrad disaster seriously shook the position of German troops on the southern flank of the front, but did not lead to the complete defeat of Army Group South. In the battle for Kharkov that followed approximately six weeks after the surrender of Paulus’s army, the Germans managed to inflict a heavy defeat on the Soviet troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts and thereby stabilize the front line. These were the operational-strategic prerequisites for the plan for a grandiose offensive operation, which was developed at the Wehrmacht General Staff under the code name “Citadel”.

On May 3, 1943, in Munich, at a meeting chaired by Hitler, the first discussion of the plan for Operation Citadel took place.

The famous German military leader Heinz Guderian, who took a direct part in this meeting, recalled: “Among those present were all the heads of the OKW departments, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces with his main advisers, the commanders of Army Groups South von Manstein and Center von Kluge, commander 9th Army Model, Minister Speer and others. An extremely important issue was discussed - whether Army Groups South and Center would be able to launch a large-scale offensive in the summer of 1943. This issue was raised as a result of the proposal of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Zeitzler, which implied a double enveloping attack on a large Russian-held arc west of Kursk. If the operation had been successful, many Russian divisions would have been destroyed, which would have decisively weakened the offensive power of the Russian army and changed the situation on the Eastern Front in a direction favorable to Germany. This issue was already discussed in April, but in view of the blow recently received at Stalingrad, at that time the forces for large-scale offensive operations were clearly insufficient.”

It should be noted that, thanks to the effective work of intelligence, the Soviet command was aware in advance of the plans for the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge. Accordingly, a system of powerful, deeply echeloned defense was being prepared to meet this attack by German troops. The axiomatic rule of strategy is well known: revealing the enemy’s plans means half winning. This is exactly what one of the most talented front-line Wehrmacht generals, Walter Model, warned Hitler about.

Returning to the above-mentioned meeting at Führer Headquarters, let us pay attention to Guderian’s testimony: “Model cited information, based mainly on aerial photography, that the Russians had prepared strong, deeply echeloned defensive positions precisely where our two army groups were supposed to attack. The Russians have already withdrawn most of their mobile units from the front edge of the Kursk Bulge. Anticipating the possibility of an enveloping attack from our side, they strengthened the defense in the directions of our upcoming breakthrough with a large concentration of artillery and anti-tank weapons there. The model made the absolutely correct conclusion from this that the enemy expects just such an offensive from us and we should abandon this idea altogether.” Let us add that Model outlined his warnings in a memo to Hitler, who was greatly impressed by this document. First of all, for the reason that Model was one of the few military leaders who earned the Fuhrer’s complete trust. But he was far from the only general who clearly understood all the fatal consequences of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

Heinz Guderian spoke out against Operation Citadel in an even harsher and more decisive tone. He directly stated that the offensive was pointless.

The German army had just completed the reorganization and recruitment of units on the Eastern Front after the Stalingrad disaster. An offensive according to Zeiztler's plan will inevitably lead to heavy losses, which will not be able to be replenished throughout 1943. But mobile reserves are urgently needed on the Western Front so that they can be thrown against the Allied landings expected in 1944.

In this case, Guderian’s opinion completely coincided with the point of view of another experienced general - the head of the Operations Department of the Fuhrer Headquarters, Walter Warlimont, who noted in his memoirs: “Army formations maintained in combat readiness for operations in the Mediterranean theater were at the same time the core of the offensive forces for the only the major 1943 offensive in the East known as Operation Citadel. It became increasingly likely that this operation would coincide with the expected start of the Western Allied offensive in the Mediterranean. On June 18, the OKW operational headquarters presented Hitler with an assessment of the situation, which contained a proposal to cancel Operation Citadel." What was the Fuhrer's reaction? “On that day,” Warlimont recalled, “Hitler decided that although he appreciated this point of view, Operation Citadel must be carried out.”

At the end of June 1943, about two weeks before the start of the fateful offensive on Kursk, another general who was unconditionally trusted by Hitler, OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl, returned from vacation. According to Warlimont, Jodl “strongly objected to the premature entry into battle of the main reserves in the east; he argued both verbally and in writing that local success was all that could be expected from Operation Citadel for the situation as a whole.”

The Fuhrer could not ignore Jodl's opinion. “Hitler clearly wavered,” Warlimont recalled.

To complete this paradoxical picture, we note that on July 5, the day the Battle of Kursk began, Jodl gave instructions to the Wehrmacht propaganda department regarding Operation Citadel. The entry in the OKW combat log reads: “Present the operation as a counterattack, preventing the Russian advance and preparing the ground for the withdrawal of troops.” In addition to Jodl, the commander of Army Group South, Erich von Manstein, and the Minister of Armaments, Albert Speer, spoke out against the fatal offensive. In addition, on May 10, Guderian made another desperate attempt to convince Hitler to abandon Operation Citadel, and the Fuhrer seemed to listen to him...

But nevertheless, the German army launched a doomed offensive, suffering defeat and completely losing its chances for a successful outcome of the war. “It is still unclear how Hitler was persuaded to launch this offensive,” Guderian stated. What happened?

Intrigues at Hitler's Headquarters

It should be especially emphasized that the entire process of development and preparation of Operation Citadel was carried out by the main command of the ground forces (OKH) in its General Staff. In addition to the OKH, there was also the Luftwaffe High Command (OKL) and the Kriegsmarine High Command (OKM) with their own General Staffs. The nominally superior structure in relation to the OKH, OKL and OKM was the OKW - the Supreme High Command or Fuhrer Headquarters. At the same time, Hitler, after the resignation of Field Marshal Brauchitsch in December 1941, assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Thus, the leadership of all these structures obviously found themselves in a situation of mutual struggle for powers and influence over the Fuhrer, which he himself contributed to, following his favorite principle of “Divide and conquer.”

Even before the start of the war, relations between the OKW and OKH were extremely strained. The war only worsened this situation.

Let us give one typical example illustrating the general rule: in December 1943, the OKH, without the knowledge of the OKW, took to the Eastern Front all the assault guns from the airfield divisions concentrated in France and under the jurisdiction of the OKW. In the scandal that followed, Hitler took the side of the OKW, issuing a special directive on this matter.

The story of Operation Citadel was a classic case. General Zeitzler perceived the OKW generals' objections to the attack on Kursk... as intrigues against the OKH. Warlimont testifies: “Hitler considered it necessary to deal with Zeitzer’s complaint against Jodl - supposedly Jodl’s objections were nothing more than interference in the sphere of competence of the ground forces.” “Perhaps the decisive factor was the pressure from the Chief of the General Staff,” Guderian echoed Warlimont in his memoirs. Paradoxical but true: Zeitzler insisted on carrying out a doomed offensive operation in order to put his OKW competitors in their place and prevail over them in the struggle for the strategic reserves that both sides needed to carry out their plans!

Zeitzler's attitude towards Guderian's opinion has a similar explanation. The fact is that on February 28, 1943, Guderian was appointed to the post of Inspector General of Armored Forces, reporting directly to Hitler. It is not difficult to imagine Zeitzler's reaction, since previously all other inspector generals, including the inspector general of armored forces, were subordinate to the chief of the General Staff. In his memoirs, Albert Speer stated: “The relationship between these military leaders was extremely tense due to unresolved problems in the sphere of division of powers.” One more important point should be taken into account: the commander of Army Group Center von Kluge disliked Guderian much more strongly than Zeitzler. The old field marshal could not stand the young talented tank general since the campaign in France. In the summer of 1941, they both ended up in Army Group Center, and Kluge constantly put a spoke in Guderian’s wheels, even insisting that he be put on trial.

Moreover, it was in June 1943 that this hatred went so far that he decided to challenge Guderian to a duel and asked Hitler in writing to act as his second.

It is not surprising that at the meeting in Munich, where the fate of Operation Citadel was being decided, Kluge decided to annoy Guderian and began, as the latter recalled, to “ardently defend Zeitzler’s plan.”

As a result, ordinary soldiers at the front became the victims of all these intrigues.

Disagreements in the Soviet Headquarters

Our command knew absolutely everything about the enemy’s plans: the composition and number of strike groups, the directions of their upcoming attacks, the timing of the start of the offensive. At first glance, nothing stood in the way of making the only right decision. But even at Soviet Headquarters, events developed no less dramatically and could have followed a completely different scenario.

As soon as full information about Operation Citadel reached Stalin and the General Staff, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was faced with the dilemma of choosing between two mutually exclusive options. The fact is that the two military leaders, whose troops were to decide the outcome of the Battle of Kursk, had sharp disagreements, and each of them appealed to Stalin. Commander of the Central Front K.K. Rokossovsky (on the picture) proposed a transition to a deliberate defense in order to exhaust and bleed the advancing enemy, followed by a counteroffensive for his final defeat. But the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin insisted that our troops go on the offensive without any defensive actions. Both commanders also differed in the choice of directions for the main attack: Rokossovsky proposed the northern, Oryol direction as the main goal, while Vatutin considered the southern one - towards Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk. Since, due to intrigues at the Fuhrer Headquarters, the timing of Operation Citadel was postponed several times by Hitler, the struggle between two mutually exclusive opinions at the Supreme Command Headquarters became increasingly intense.

Being one of the most talented commanders of our army and possessing a genuine gift of strategic foresight, Rokossovsky was the first to absolutely correctly assess the situation.

Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov noted in his memoirs: “In April, when member of the State Defense Committee G.M. arrived to familiarize himself with the situation and needs of the Central Front. Malenkov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov, Rokossovsky directly expressed their thoughts to them - now they need to think not about the offensive, but to prepare and prepare as thoroughly as possible for defense, because the enemy will definitely use the front configuration that is favorable to him and will try to encircle the troops of both, Central and Voronezh, with attacks from the north and south, fronts in order to achieve decisive results in the conduct of the war. Malenkov suggested that Rokossovsky write a memo on this issue to Stalin, which was done... Rokossovsky’s note had an effect. Both fronts were given instructions to intensify work on organizing defense, and in May-June 1943, a Reserve Front was created in the rear of both fronts, which was later called Steppe when it was put into operation.”

However, Vatutin, despite the evidence, stood his ground, and Stalin began to hesitate. The bold offensive plans of the commander of the Voronezh Front clearly appealed to him. And the passive behavior of the Germans seemed to confirm Vatutin was right. Since his increasingly persistent proposals began to arrive at Headquarters on the eve of the German offensive, the question arose of revising the entire carefully developed plan for the operation to defeat the German troops on the Kursk Bulge, known as “Kutuzov”. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “The commander of the Voronezh Front, N.F., began to show particular impatience. Vatutin. My arguments that the enemy going on the offensive against us was a matter of the next few days and that our offensive would certainly be beneficial to the enemy did not convince him. One day, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief told me that Vatutin called him and insisted that we begin our offensive no later than the first days of July. Stalin further said that he considered this proposal worthy of the most serious attention.” Thus, the fate of the upcoming battle and our army hung in the balance.

What consequences would the adoption of Vatutin’s plan by the Supreme Command Headquarters entail? Without exaggeration, this would mean disaster for our army.

When advancing in a southern direction, Soviet troops would have to face the main forces of the enemy, since it was Army Group South, according to the plan for Operation Citadel, that delivered the main blow and had the maximum reserves. Manstein, being a generally recognized specialist in defensive operations in the Wehrmacht, would not have missed the chance to arrange another defeat for Vatutin, similar to the Kharkov one. According to A.E. Golovanov, Rokossovsky clearly understood this danger: “The organized defense gave Rokossovsky firm confidence that he would defeat the enemy, and our possible attack gave rise to speculation. Given the balance of forces and means that has developed now, it was difficult to hope for confident success in the event of our offensive actions.” Moreover, the advancing Soviet troops were threatened with a flank attack from Army Group Center. The then Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, S.M., wrote in his memoirs about the reality of such a threat. Shtemenko: “Vatutin’s plan did not affect the center of the Soviet-German front and the main, western strategic direction, did not neutralize Army Group Center, which in this case would threaten the flanks of our most important fronts.”

While Stalin was hesitating on which side to take, the Germans resolved his doubts by launching their offensive. A.E. Golovanov was present at the Supreme Command Headquarters on the night of July 4–5, 1943, and described in his memoirs the astonishing scene:

“Is Rokossovsky really mistaken?..” said the Supreme Commander.

It was already morning when a phone call stopped me. Without haste, Stalin picked up the HF receiver. Rokossovsky called. In a joyful voice he reported:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!

-What are you happy about? – the Supreme Commander asked somewhat surprised.

– Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! – answered Konstantin Konstantinovich.

The conversation was over."

“Still, Rokossovsky turned out to be right,” Stalin admitted.

But it could happen that he would eventually agree to a premature offensive according to Vatutin’s plan. As food for thought, we can recall how just two months later, in September 1943, new disagreements arose between the same commanders - Rokossovsky and Vatutin - on the question of which direction was best to take Kyiv. This time Stalin took Vatutin's side. The result was the infamous tragedy at the Bukrinsky bridgehead. But that's a completely different story.

Special for the Centenary

Operation Citadel is one of the most striking and terrible events of the Second World War. On July 5, 1943, German troops launched a full-scale offensive in the Kursk area. With the support of artillery and aviation, tank formations launched a powerful blow in the direction of Prokhorovka. Their task was to break through the defenses and encircle the Soviet group. This was the beginning of the end of the Second World War, Operation Citadel.

Revenge for the lost Stalingrad

1943 The Germans continue to retreat along the entire front. Having been defeated at Moscow and Stalingrad, they still hope to change the course of the war. Adolf Hitler wants to take revenge on the Kursk Bulge. The Fuhrer is personally involved in the development of the operation, which he called “Citadel”. With attacks from the north, west, south, the Germans want to destroy the powerful Soviet group, and then launch an offensive on the Don, Volga and Moscow.

The Fuhrer's strategic plans

The small Prokhorovka station of the Southern Railway of Russia... It was here, according to the plan of the German command, that the decisive battle was to take place. It was planned that German tanks would go behind the rear of the Soviet troops, encircle them and destroy them. For this purpose, a powerful tank armada was brought here. The tanks had already been brought to the front lines. The Germans were preparing for the decisive push, the plan for Operation Citadel was ready to be executed. They knew that the Soviet command had brought huge tank forces here. However, Soviet T-34 tanks were inferior in armor thickness and firepower to the latest German Tigers.

According to intelligence

The outcome of the battle could only be decided by accurate information about the enemy’s forces and plans. Even before the war, the British managed to get hold of the German Enigma encryption machine. With its help, they deciphered secret German codes and obtained extremely important military information.

According to the agreement between England and the USSR, which was concluded at the very beginning of the war, both sides undertook to inform each other about Hitler's plans. The secret center for deciphering German codes was located in Bletchley Park, 60 miles from London. Carefully vetted, qualified specialists processed the intercepted encoded information here.

It was impossible to imagine that a foreign intelligence agent could penetrate here. And yet he penetrated. His name was John Cairncross. This man belonged to the legendary group of Soviet intelligence officers, the “Cambridge Five”. The information that John Cairncross will convey to Moscow will be invaluable.

Secret information from Cairncross

943 At the Kursk Bulge, the fascists decided to take revenge for the defeats inflicted on them. This time they were confident of victory. But the German command did not yet know that Germany’s military operations were already known in the Kremlin. Top secret information from John Cairncross contained details of the latest German military technology. The Soviet command became aware of details about the power, maneuverability and armor protection of combat vehicles. The agent reported on the latest tests at German testing grounds.

For the first time, information was received about new and powerful Tiger tanks, which the Soviet command had no idea about. The Germans created a type of armor in which the armor-piercing shells of the Red Army were powerless. Thanks to such secret information, the Soviet Union was able to quickly produce new shells capable of making holes in fascist tank armor.

The intelligence officer's information about the metal composition of the armor and its properties was received in April 1943, three months before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Preparing for the upcoming battle

The Soviet side was able to take emergency measures to develop new weapons that would penetrate this armor. The tests were carried out in the strictest secrecy. At that time, the entire industry of the Soviet Union worked for the war. After the completion of the tests, mass production of shells capable of destroying German “tigers” began.

At the same time, Soviet tanks were modernized. In record time, the rear provided the army with the necessary weapons. There was a continuous stream of military equipment and military equipment heading to the site of the future battle. Thousands of German aircraft were based near the front line. The Fuhrer assigned a special role to Luftwaffe pilots in the operation on the Kursk Bulge.

"Citadel" (military operation) as the Wehrmacht's last chance

On July 1, 1943, Adolf Hitler returned to his "Wolf's Lair" command post in East Prussia. There will be no more delay. The day of Operation Citadel is set: July 4th. A. Hitler said: “We need a victory at Kursk to dispel the darkness in the hearts of our allies. Remembering the previous names of military operations, we can say that this is nothing. Only the Citadel will become the turning point of great Germany.”

Despite the intensifying Allied bombing, some Nazi troops were transferred to the east. Although many divisions were understrength, the total number of troops participating in Operation Citadel was quite impressive. Among them are the most experienced soldiers and officers, a large number of soldiers from the famous SS troops. The morale of the German military personnel was high.

Only victory will turn the tide of the war

Hitler decreed that Operation Citadel would be 100% a German affair. This confidence was reinforced by the large amount of modern equipment that arrived at the front every day. Unusually powerful Luftwaffe forces were concentrated at the airfields. In reality, all the weapons that Hitler intended to bring into battle in this battle were comparable to the amount prepared for the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941.

However, the sheer scale of the upcoming battle worried Adolf Hitler, and he ordered no public announcement of the upcoming Operation Citadel in advance. The Fuhrer said: “The mere thought of this turns me over, but I see no other way out.”

Morale of the Red Army

Germany faced an enemy that bore no resemblance to the pitiful battalions that had so easily surrendered in the early stages of the war. The myth of the invincibility of the German army was dispelled at Stalingrad. The defense capability of the Soviet side was strengthened. As a result, the superiority of our defense industry over the German military industry became noticeable. This superiority was manifested not only in quantity, but also in quality. In German military factories, products that did not meet accuracy standards were rejected. There was no culling at Soviet factories. Unusable shells were used as warheads for missiles. German infantrymen hardly cursed anything more than Soviet Katyushas.

Operation Citadel begins

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the Germans were waiting for the signal to attack. The first signal was given, but from the Soviet side. Having secret information about the start of the secret operation "Citadel", the Soviet command decided to strike first. More than 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns clashed in a decisive battle on both sides in the Battle of Prokhorovka. The Germans did not expect that our T-34 tanks would be able to hit the strong, heavy-duty armor of the Tigers. In fifty days, the Nazis lost half a million of their soldiers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 1,700 aircraft on these fields. These losses for Nazi Germany turned out to be irreparable.

Didn't take it by surprise

Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) learned quite early about the upcoming Operation Citadel. Zhukov's headquarters guessed about the offensive. Hitler was very tempted to take revenge after the Battle of Stalingrad.

During May and June 1943, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov ordered the laying of three deep belts of minefields along the perimeter of the arc.

Before the start of this monumental battle, Soviet troops had numerical superiority. Against 900 thousand German soldiers, G. K. Zhukov fielded 1 million 400 thousand. The superiority of the Soviet troops was especially noticeable in artillery. They had 20 thousand guns, which is twice as many as the enemy. The Red Army deployed 3,600 tanks against 2,700 German ones, 2,400 planes against 2,000 Luftwaffe planes.

Anxiety before the attack

By July 4, two large attacking groups were brought to full combat readiness. An atmosphere of gloomy anticipation reigned in the German troops, the reason for this was Operation Citadel. The Second World War gave many people the bitter taste of defeat and the sweet taste of victory. Everyone knew that even for the greatest victories, soldiers always pay a high price. Tomorrow may not always come.

Ten minutes before the German columns were supposed to begin moving, the Soviet side began artillery counter-preparation. It was an ominous warning.

Start of the offensive

Large attacking groups entered the battle. The skies filled with the roar of aircraft engines as thousands of aircraft from the two German fleets took to the air.

On the first day, the 9th Army, whose armored forces were commanded by Field Marshal Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891-1945), advanced from the north to the south, advancing seven miles. The movement of the army from the south was led by Field Marshal General Manstein, Erich von (1887-1973). She walked 11 miles deep into Soviet territory. It was an encouraging success that barely resembled a blitzkrieg. The Soviet minefields turned out to be very deep, and the troops dug in were well prepared for defense.

Imperfections of German technology

The offensive continued, and the German troops encountered increasing difficulties. First of all, it turned out that the technical characteristics of their tanks were worse than promised. The mechanical part of the “tigers” increasingly failed.

By the end of the first day, out of 200 of these tanks, only 40 were fully suitable for combat. In the air, numerical superiority gradually also passed to the Russians.

By the third day, the Germans had disabled more than 450 Soviet tanks. But the enemy still had superiority in armored forces. The Germans were especially disheartened by the fact that Soviet military technology, without any doubt, overtook the German one. The Soviets succeeded where Germany failed.

The T-34 tank, previously familiar to the Germans, was equipped with a heavy 122-mm cannon. The Nazis heard rumors of even more formidable machines. The German offensive was difficult. Although slowly, Hitler’s two armies gradually moved closer together. Especially Field Marshal Manstein, Erich von, had a slight advantage.

The Soviet style of command underwent noticeable radical changes. Marshal G. K. Zhukov's field commanders mastered the art of tactical withdrawal and probing counterattacks, and they lured German tanks into traps.

The Soviets also invented other methods. They created the so-called front package - a complex tactical grouping designed for both offense and defense.

His first line consisted of formidable Katyusha installations, followed by heavy artillery positions. When the latter did their job, the heavy tanks moved forward, carrying with them the infantry, which moved on board the lighter tanks. Operation Citadel began to crack. The constant order of attack of the front package allowed the Germans to develop the necessary countermeasures. But this did not help, such attacks still caused serious damage to the Wehrmacht soldiers.

After a week of brutal and uncompromising fighting, the German armored forces were significantly weakened, and the German command was forced to withdraw some of its units from the line of fire. This was required for a respite and regrouping of troops.

Battle of Prokhorovka

The Battle of Kursk (Operation Citadel) marked a decisive turning point in World War II. Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, and nothing could stop this impulse. From this moment on, Hitler's troops would never go on the offensive again. They will only retreat. Two large columns collided with each other. The result was a battle unprecedented in scale. Never before or since have such a number of tanks - more than one and a half thousand - taken part in one battle. This unprepared clash was not justified by strategic decisions.

Once the battle began, there was no tactical planning and no clear unified command. The tanks fought separately, firing directly. The equipment collided with the enemy’s equipment, mercilessly crushing it, or dying under its tracks. Among the tank crews of the Red Army, this battle became a legend and went down in history as a death raid.

Eternal memory to the heroes

From July 5 to July 16, 1943, Operation Citadel continued. The Second World War saw many glorious military victories. However, this battle occupies a special place in human memory.

Today only monuments remind of past battles on Kursk land. Thousands of people contributed to this momentous victory, earning the admiration and memory of posterity.

The German generals were also aware of this. Field Marshal E. von Manstein proposed sticking to defensive tactics on the Soviet-German front, gradually reducing the length of the front line. However, his concept of "maneuverable defense" was rejected by Hitler due to the plan to abandon the Donbass, as well as the lack of fuel and ammunition. Colonel General G. Guderian also adhered to defensive tactics. On May 10, at a meeting with Hitler, he convinced the Fuhrer to abandon the plan to attack Kursk due to the great difficulties of its implementation. Guderian rejected the remark of the head of the OKW (operational command of the Wehrmacht. - Note auto) Field Marshal W. Keitel that the Germans should attack Kursk for political reasons, and noted that “the world is completely indifferent whether Kursk is in our hands or not.” During the controversy, Hitler said that when he thought about this offensive, he felt a strong pain in his stomach. Perhaps Hitler did not have much faith in the success of the operation and postponed its implementation as long as he could, since in this way he was also postponing the inevitable Soviet offensive, which the Germans had practically no opportunity to repel.

The last excuse for delaying the start of the operation was the expectation of the arrival of new models of armored vehicles: heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger", self-propelled guns Sd.Kfz.184 "Ferdinand", tanks Pz.Kpfw.V Ausf.D2 "Panther". Possessing powerful artillery systems and armor protection, this technique significantly surpassed Soviet models (T-34, KV-1S) in terms of armor penetration, especially at long distances (subsequently, Soviet tank crews calculated that an average of 13 T-34s were required to destroy one Tiger. - Note auto). During May - June 1943, the necessary equipment finally arrived in the required quantities, and Hitler made the final decision - to attack. However, he himself was aware that this would be the last major German offensive on the Soviet-German front, and even if the operation was successful, Germany’s future tactics in the fight against the USSR would be strategic defense. In one of the speeches delivered by Hitler shortly before the start of the offensive to the senior command staff who were entrusted with carrying out the operation, he announced his firm decision to switch to a strategic defense. Germany, he said, must henceforth wear down the forces of her enemies in defensive battles in order to hold out longer than them; the upcoming offensive is not aimed at capturing significant territory, but only at straightening the arc, which is necessary in the interests of saving forces. The Soviet armies located on the Kursk Bulge must, according to him, be destroyed - the Russians must be forced to use up all their reserves in battles of attrition and thereby weaken their offensive power for the coming winter.

Thus, the German military-political leadership was already wary of the growing power of the USSR and the Red Army and did not expect to win the war in one battle.

The paradox was that, in turn, the Soviet military-political leadership, despite the victories won and the growing power of the Red Army, also feared repeating the mistakes of the spring and summer of 1942. In the report of the Soviet intelligence agencies of the Central Front “On the actions of the enemy’s motorized mechanized troops and his anti-tank defense system from July 5, 1943 to August 25, 1943,” prepared shortly after the end of the Battle of Kursk, the assessment of the enemy’s numerical forces was clearly exaggerated, which generally reflected the mood of the military -political leadership of the USSR.

Estimates and realities

The German group, deployed in the north of the Oryol-Kursk direction, consisted of the 9th and 2nd field armies of Army Group Center (about 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge). Reserves for the future German offensive began to arrive as early as March 1943. Basically, new formations and units were first transferred from other sectors of the front - from the regions of Rzhev and Vyazma, since there were no actual large formations in the reserve of the German command. In addition to Army Group Center, Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal General E. Mashptein) took part in the operation to eliminate the Kursk salient, which was code-named Citadel. In total, both strike groups of German troops included more than 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns and more than 2,000 aircraft.

In each of the offensive groupings, a special role was assigned to armored forces, the number of which was consistently increased from April to June 1943.

By April 1, 1943, according to Soviet estimates, the enemy concentrated 15 infantry divisions in front of the troops of the Central Front in the first line (299, 216, 383, 7, 78, 137, 102, 251, 45, 82, 88, 327, 340, 482 , 258); 4 tank divisions (18, 20, 12, 4); 1 cavdnvision (1 cd SS); 1 separate regiment (1 pdp 7 adp), i.e. up to 29 divisions in total. The combat and numerical strength of the troops in the first line, according to the estimates of the Soviet command, was: total people - 109,495 people; rifles - 58,610 pcs.; machine guns - 5595 pcs.; light machine guns - 4166 pcs.; heavy machine guns - 1190 pcs.; anti-tank guns - 687 pcs.; field guns - 722 pcs.; mortars - 1254 pcs.; tanks - 350 pcs.

The operational density of the German troops was about 15 km per division.

Tactical density per 1 km of front had the following parameters:

In addition to the troops operating in the first line, there were up to 10–11 divisions and up to 200 tanks in the second echelon. The divisions located in the second echelon included German divisions battered during the winter battles, security and punitive German units and formations, Italian units and Hungarian divisions (108, 105, 102 Hungarian infantry divisions). Thus, the divisions located in the second line , had exceptionally low combat effectiveness and were subsequently not used in Operation Citadel.

The main grouping of enemy troops during this period was concentrated against the troops of the 70th and 65th armies, since in this section of the southern wing of the Oryol part of the bulge the enemy was threatened by the troops of the Central Front. With the onset of the spring thaw, when it became impossible to conduct active combat operations, the enemy immediately began preparations for a summer offensive operation.

In April, the German command began to staff the divisions, battered during the winter battles. First of all, those divisions that occupied the defense in the area between the railroad and highway connecting the cities of Orel and Kursk were recruited. The tank divisions were removed from the front line and assigned to the second echelon for manning and training. Most of the tank formations put into reserve were located in a triangle bounded by the settlements of Kromy, Orel, and Glazunovka. A number of divisions that had previously operated in front of the center of the front were transferred to the Oryol-Kursk direction.

During April, May and the first half of June, a large number of railway trains with equipment, troops, fuel and ammunition passed through Bryansk to Oryol. The ineffective German divisions, which were in the second echelon, and the Hungarian formations were completely removed from the front or withdrawn to the Bryansk forests to fight the partisans and protect communications, and instead of these divisions, the enemy transferred a large number of tanks to the line of the Central Front, mainly to the area of ​​​​the intended breakthrough , motorized and infantry formations that previously operated in front of other fronts.

For more effective command and control of troops, part of the divisions subordinate to the 2nd Tank Army were transferred to the 9th Army, which arrived in the Orel area from the Vyazma area. In addition, in the preparatory period for the offensive, the German command carried out a number of operations against partisans in the Bryansk forests, trying to strengthen the position in the rear of their troops.

Enemy units and formations, concentrated to break through our defenses and develop success in the direction of Kursk, for a long time trained to storm a heavily fortified defensive line and operate in the operational space, mainly working out issues of interaction between different types of troops and the use of new equipment.

By July 5, 1943, in front of the Central Front (328 km long), the enemy concentrated 6 tank divisions (2, 4, 9, 12, 18, 20 TD); 2 motorized divisions (10, 36 md); up to 20 infantry formations and units (299, 383, 216, 78, 86, 292, 6, 31, 258, 102, 72, 45, 137, 251, 82, 340, 377, 327 infantry; 8, 9, 10, 11th, 13th Jaeger battalions).

In total, 28 divisions were concentrated in front of the Central Front, in addition to the troops operating against the partisans in the Bryansk forests. According to Soviet estimates, there were about 1,700–1,800 tanks and assault guns together with the reserve.

The combat and numerical strength of the enemy, according to Soviet intelligence data, was: people - 233,700; automatic machines - 8855; light machine guns - 7059; heavy machine guns - 1900; anti-tank guns - 1294; field guns - 1644; mortars - 1850. The operational density of German troops in front of the Central Front was already 12 km per division.

Tactical density per 1 km of front was equal to:

Of the 28 divisions in the area of ​​the planned breakthrough against the 13th Army, the left flank of the 48th Army and the right flank of the 70th Army on a front of 50 km, the enemy concentrated 8 infantry divisions (22, 16, 78, 292, 7, 258, 86, 6, 31 Infantry; 8th and 13th Jaeger Battalions); 2 motorized divisions (10, 36 md); 6 tank divisions (2, 4, 9, 12, 18, 20 td), as well as special armored units (505 brigade, 656 iptap self-propelled guns).

In total, 16 divisions were concentrated on the section of the planned breakthrough on the 50 km front (12 infantry divisions occupied the defense on the remaining 278 km section of the front). According to Soviet estimates, there were about 1,100–1,200 Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks; Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" tanks - about 80–100; heavy assault anti-tank guns "Ferdinand" - about 200; assault guns of caliber 75, 105, 150 mm - about 200.

The Soviet command believed that a total of 1,600–1,700 armored vehicles would be concentrated in this area. The artillery reinforcements of the German army were as follows: 422nd RGK division, 848th RGK division, RGK division of unspecified numbering, 61 ap RGK, RGK ap unidentified numbering, 105th RGK division, 43 ap RGK, 18th mortar RGK division (armed with captured Soviet 120 mm mortars).

Thus, the operational density in the area of ​​the planned breakthrough, according to Soviet estimates, was 3 km per division. Tactical density per 1 km of front is indicated in the table.

It was believed that the total concentration was: people - 163,800; mortars - 1089; light and heavy machine guns - 6573; guns of all systems - 2038; tanks - 1200–1300; heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" - 200; assault guns of caliber 75, 105, 150 mm - 200; aircraft - 700–800, of which: bombers - 500; attack aircraft - 110; fighters - 140; scouts - 50.

Enemy aviation was mainly based at the Bryansk and Oryol airfield hubs.

In conclusion, it should be said that the German command prepared for the summer offensive against the troops of the Central Front for a long time (April, May, June) and with great care. During this time, units and formations that were badly battered during the winter period were put in order and replenished, a large amount of ammunition and equipment was brought in, the system and nature of our defensive line were studied quite thoroughly, a number of exercises were held to put together and work out issues of interaction between different types of troops during a breakthrough a heavily fortified defensive zone and operations in the operational space.

To ensure a breakthrough of the defense, the enemy concentrated a large amount of new powerful equipment (Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" tanks, Sd.Kfz.184 "Ferdinand" heavy assault anti-tank guns, assault guns with 105 and 150 mm caliber artillery systems, ground-based guided "torpedoes" etc.), which were either not previously used on the battlefield at all, or were used in limited quantities. Along with the introduction of new technology, new tactics were thought out. The extensive work done to prepare for the offensive gave the Germans the right to count on the success of the operation to encircle the Soviet troops located along the Kursk Bulge.

In reality, when Soviet intelligence agencies assessed the forces and means of the German group preparing to carry out Operation Citadel in this sector of the front, the number of armored forces of Army Group Center was greatly overestimated.

By the beginning of the offensive, German armored forces in this section of the Soviet-German front were organized as follows. Army Group Center on July 7, 1943, according to German data, consisted of 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 18, 20 tank divisions with a total of 747 tanks. Organizationally, 4 of them were part of the 9th Field Army: the 18th Tank Division was subordinate to the 41st Tank Corps, and the 2nd, 9th, and 20th were included in the 47th Tank Corps. The Esbeck battle group included the 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions, the 5th and 12th Panzer Divisions were directly subordinate to the headquarters of Army Group Center.

In addition to the above formations, 31 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks were included in the 505th separate heavy tank battalion, 49 150-mm Brummbar self-propelled guns were part of the 216th assault tank battalion, 89 Ferdinand-type self-propelled guns were as part of the 656th heavy tank destroyer regiment. 141 of the tanks intended to replace those that were out of order arrived at units and subunits that were part of Army Group Center during the deployment of the operation. Of these, there were 98 tanks of the Pz.Kpfw.IV L/48 type, 14 Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" and 10 "Brummbar" assault tanks.

The 18th Tank Division, as part of the 18th Tank Battalion, had one company of medium and 3 companies of light tanks. In these units, as well as in the battalion headquarters on July 1, 1943, there were: 5 Pz.Kpfw.II 10 Pz.Kpfw.III(kz), 20 Pz Kpfw.III(75), 5 Pz.Kpfw.IV(kz ), 29 Pz.Kpfw.IV (lg) and 3 command tanks. The 2nd Tank Division included the 3rd Tank Regiment, which consisted of the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Tank Regiment and the battalion itself, consisting of one medium and two light tank companies. On July 1, 1943, the 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht included: 18 Pz.Kpfw.II, 8 Pz.Kpfw.III(kz), 12 Pz Kpfw.III(lg), 20 Pz.Kpfw.III(75), 1 Pz.Kpfw.IV(kz), 59 Pz Kpfw.IV(lg) and 6 command tanks.

The 9th Armored Division in the 2nd Battalion, 33rd Armored Regiment had tanks at the battalion headquarters and in one medium and three light companies. On July 1, 1943, the division included 1 Pz.Kpfw.II, 8 Pz.Kpfw.III(kz), 30 Pz.Kpfw.III(lg), 8 Pz.Kpfw.IV(kz), 30 Pz.Kpfw. IV(lg) and 6 command tanks.

The 20th Tank Division included the 21st Tank Battalion, consisting of a headquarters, one medium and three light tank companies. On July 1, 1943, the division had 9 Pz.Kpfw.38(t), 2 Pz.Kpfw.III(kz), 10 Pz.Kpfw.III(lg), 5 Pz.Kpfw.III(75), 9 Pz.Kpfw.IV(kz), 40 Pz.Kpfw.IV(lg) and 7 command tanks.

The 5th Tank Division consisted of the 31st Tank Regiment, which, in turn, had only one tank battalion (2nd Battalion of the 31st Tank Regiment - Note auto) from one medium and three light tank companies. On July 1, 1943, the division had 17 Pz.Kpfw.III(75), 76 Pz.Kpfw.IV(lg) and 9 command tanks.

The 8th Tank Division included the 1st Battalion of the 10th Tank Regiment, consisting of headquarters, medium and three light tank companies. On July 1, 1943, the division had 14 Pz.Kpfw.II, 3 Pz.Kpfw.38(t), 5 Pz.Kpfw.III(kz), 30 Pz.Kpfw.III(lg), 4 Pz.Kpfw.III (75), 8 Pz.Kpfw.IV(kz), 14 Pz.Kpfw.IV(lg) and 6 command tanks.

The 4th Tank Division included the 1st Tank Battalion of the 35th Tank Regiment of four companies (all companies of medium tanks). On July 1, 1943, the division had 15 Pz.Kpfw.III(75), 79 Pz.Kpfw.IV(lg), 1 Pz.Kpfw.IV(kz) and 5 command tanks.

The 12th Tank Division included the 29th Tank Regiment, which consisted of a tank regiment command, a separate 8th medium tank company and the 2nd battalion of the 29th Tank Regiment itself, consisting of a battalion command, a medium and two light tank companies . On July 1, 1943, the 12th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht included 6 Pz.Kpfw.II, 15 Pz.Kpfw.III(lg), 6 Pz.Kpfw.III(75), 1 Pz.Kpfw.IV(kz), 36 Pz.Kpfw.IV(lg) and 4 command tanks.

Organizing the introduction of such a quantity of armored vehicles into battle, the German command this time carefully thought through all the details of the operation, paying attention even to such elements as the camouflage of military equipment.

Most of the tanks of the above-mentioned Wehrmacht tank divisions, according to the new instructions of February 18, 1943, were painted with dark yellow Dunkel Gelb paint. But depending on the type and time of production of the vehicles, the general appearance of the camouflage of individual tanks differed significantly from each other. The vast majority of Pz.Kpfw.II and Pz.Kpfw.III tanks of various modifications were produced at the enterprises before February 18, 1943 (the time of the transition to a new type of protective paint. - Note auto), so they were painted in various shades of gray paint - from dark gray Schwarz Grau (RAL 7021) to a light gray shade intended for the North African theater. In preparation for Operation Citadel, these tanks were painted with yellow (Dunkel Gelb) and dark green (Olive Gruen) spots on top of the gray base color. This is exactly what the Pz.Kpfw.II, Pz.Kpfw.III tanks of the 2nd Wehrmacht Panzer Division looked like, which can be easily identified by the characteristic emblem of the regiment in the form of a double-headed Austrian imperial eagle in black (this Wehrmacht formation was created after the Anschluss on the basis of the Austrian part .- Note auto). The division's insignia - a small trident, as well as tactical numbers - were most likely white.

If the tanks (especially the Pz.Kpfw.IV of the latest modifications) were produced after February 1943, then their base color was dark yellow. Therefore, when creating the camouflage scheme, dark green spots and stripes were applied to the basic Dunkel Gelb. The configuration of the digits of the tactical numbers was different, for example, in the 5th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, the small digits of the number were red-brown (Braun RAL 8017). Often, and this is quite typical for German tanks during Operation Citadel, German armored vehicles were not camouflaged at all, retaining only a protective camouflage color of a dark yellow hue. The sign of national identification remained the “beam cross” with a white border.

The 656th heavy tank destroyer regiment consisted of two divisions (653rd and 654th). Each division, according to the state, was supposed to consist of 1000 personnel, 45 Ferdinand self-propelled guns, 1 Sd.Kfz.251/8 armored personnel carrier, 6 8-ton Sd.Kfz half-track tractors. 7/1, 15 18-ton tractors and two repair and recovery vehicles Zgkw.35(t) Sd.Kfz.20. Before the start of Operation Citadel, the regiment was included in the 41st Panzer Corps of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht. In addition to self-propelled guns of the Ferdinand type, the regiment had 25 tanks: 22 Pz.Kpfw.III, 3 Pz.Kpfw.II. The 656th regiment was quickly subordinated to the 216th battalion of assault tanks (49 self-propelled guns "Brummbar"), as well as the 313th and 314th companies of radio-controlled tanks, consisting of 10 Pz.Kpfw.III/StuG III control vehicles and 24 radio-controlled B-IV tankettes, with which the German command intended to break through Soviet minefields.

Regarding the companies of radio-controlled tanks, it should be noted that they were part of the 301st separate tank battalion (radio-controlled tanks), which organizationally consisted of the 314th, 313th, 312th tank companies of radio-controlled tanks. According to the state, on July 1, 1943, the battalion had 7 Pz.Kpfw.III(lg), 3 Pz.Kpfw.III(75) tanks and 17 StuG III assault guns. Each radio control vehicle was supposed to have 3 B-IV wedges. In total, a company of radio-controlled tanks was supposed to have 2 Pz.Kpfw.III in the control platoon, 2 line platoons of 4 Pz.Kpfw.III (8 tanks in total) and 12 tankettes (24 B-IV in total). One of the companies of radio-controlled tanks was assigned to the 505th battalion of heavy Tiger tanks, the other two, as already mentioned, to the 656th heavy tank destroyer regiment.

The regular organization of the 656th heavy tank destroyer regiment was determined by the regular organization of the 653rd and 654th divisions. Structurally, each division consisted of 4 batteries of 14 self-propelled guns; the battery included 3 platoons of 4 vehicles each and 2 control vehicles.

The 653rd division consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd batteries. Self-propelled guns of this division were designated using three-digit numbers: the first digit indicated the company number, the second - the platoon number, the third - the number of the vehicle in the platoon (for example, 122, 232, 331). The “Ferdinands” of the command also had three-digit numbers: the first battery - 101, 102, the second - 201, 202, the third - 301, 302. The numbers were painted with black paint as contour lines on the side and stern armor plates of the hull deck. In addition, in the 653rd division there were 3 Ferdinands without numbers. Initially they were intended for division headquarters, but were then assigned to the third battery as reserve vehicles. In addition to numbers, self-propelled guns of the 653rd division also had original tactical markings in the form of color rectangles at the rear of the wheelhouse. A set of combinations of geometric shapes and colors made it possible to determine whether “Ferdinand” belonged to a particular battery or platoon. The three reserve self-propelled guns of the third battery did not have numbers or tactical markings.

The 654th Division had a similar organization with the only difference being that instead of reserve vehicles, 3 Ferdinands were transferred to the division headquarters. It is worth noting an important feature of the identification of self-propelled guns - the numbering of batteries in the 654th division began with the 5th battery, and the fourth was missing for unknown reasons. The designation system for the Ferdinands in the batteries was similar to the 653rd Division and consisted of three-digit numbers painted in white and black paint on the sides of the wheelhouse. The “Ferdinands” of the division headquarters were designated by the Roman numeral II and the numbers “01”, “02”, “03”. The numbers were painted in white on the side and rear armor plates of the wheelhouse.

All self-propelled guns of the 654th division had their own tactical designation in the form of the Latin letter “N” (after the surname of the battalion commander Noak). This letter was applied on the front plate of the body or on the front wings. The “Ferdinands” of the division headquarters were additionally designated by two letters “NS” (S - headquarters).

Subsequently, all Ferdinand self-propelled guns that took part in Operation Citadel had a basic dark yellow coloration, over which dark green camouflage was applied in the form of stripes of various shapes (654th Division) or large spots (653rd Division) . In addition, at least one vehicle of the 653rd Division (No. 231) had a three-color camouflage pattern in the form of green and brown stripes.

During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the 653rd division irretrievably lost 13 self-propelled guns, and the 654th - 26 Ferdinands. The battalion commander, Major Noack, was also killed. Therefore, in August 1943, the remaining Ferdinands of the 654th division were transferred to the 653rd.

The camouflage and tactical markings applied to the Ferdinand self-propelled guns during Operation Citadel were found on self-propelled guns of the 653rd Division until November 1943, after which they were replaced by other models.

The tanks and assault guns of the 301st RC Tank Battalion were painted dark yellow Dunkel Gelb, but the tracked B-IV Sprengstrofftraeger tankettes themselves were both gray and yellow.

The 150-mm Brummbar guns of the 216th battalion of assault tanks (three-company strength) had single-digit or double-digit tactical numbers indicating the serial number of the combat vehicle in the battalion: from 1 to 14 - in the 1st company, from 15 to 28 - in the 2nd 1st company, from 29 to 42 - in the 3rd company. The battalion's control equipment (3 Sturmpanzer IV) was marked with Roman numerals: “I”, “II”, “III”. On July 18, 10 new combat vehicles, numbered 46 to 55, were received to replenish the 216th battalion of assault tanks. In addition to the assault tanks, the battalion had a platoon of BREM vehicles built on the basis of the Pz.Kpfw.IV tank.

The numbers of the Sturmpanzer IV assault tanks were painted in red (staff) and white paint over tan or yellow-green-brown camouflage.

The 505th separate heavy tank battalion was formed on February 12, 1943. On July 1, 1943, the battalion included 8 Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.N tanks, 7 Pz.Kpfw.III tanks with a long-barreled 50-mm cannon, and 31 Pz.Kpfw.VI(N) heavy tanks. The 3rd company of the battalion, which began to be formed on April 3, 1943 (since the staffing structure of the heavy tank battalion changed in March. - Note auto), arrived at the disposal of the unit only on July 7, 1943.

The battalion's tanks had a camouflage pattern of large brown spots (Braun RAL 8017) applied over a basic dark yellow Dunkel Gelb protective paint. Three-digit numbers, highlighted with a white solid border, were applied on both sides of the turret; command vehicles of the battalion headquarters had Roman numbers I, II, III. The battalion's emblem was an image of a rushing bull, but it was not applied to the front of all vehicles. This type of symbolism was stenciled or drawn by hand with white paint.

According to the plan for Operation Citadel, Army Group Center included the 177th and 185th assault gun divisions.

The 177th assault gun division operated in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Zmievka, Krasnaya Gorka and Glebovsky in the Oryol direction. The division included 31 StuG III Ausf.F8 / StuG III Ausf.G assault guns, as well as half-track armored personnel carriers for control and combat support of various modifications. The color of the assault guns was dark yellow (Dunkel Gelb) with different camouflage: the StuG III Ausf modifications had a gray-yellow camouflage. F8 (since yellow paint was sprayed onto a basic gray background); yellow-green camouflage - on the StuG III Ausf.G (when the basic Dunkel Gelb was sprayed with dark green spots). Armored personnel carriers were typically yellow and gray. Tactical two-digit or three-digit numbers were painted with white paint on a dark gray background or black paint on a dark yellow background.

The 185th assault gun division operated northwest of Kursk: first in the area of ​​Zmievka and Borisovsky, then in the area of ​​Glazunovka and Maloarkhangelsk. This unit was equipped with new StuG III Ausf.G/StuH 42 assault guns (31 assault guns in total) and armored personnel carriers of the Sd.Kfz.250 family. All equipment of the division was painted with Dunkel Gelb camouflage paint with the addition of green camouflage spots. Tactical designations, sometimes duplicated with corresponding inscriptions, as well as two or three-digit tactical numbers were painted in white paint in accordance with existing rules. The division's insignia, a black fortress tower inscribed within a red shield, was also regularly painted on the front and rear of armored personnel carriers and the sides of assault gun towers.

The main task of the assault gun crews was to suppress the anti-tank firing points of the Red Army in order to reduce the losses of the 656th regiment of heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", ensuring the implementation of the main stages of the Operation Citadel plan on the northern flank of the German offensive.

Actions of the Soviet command

The command of Army Group Center did not intend to use tank divisions in the first massive attack on the morning of July 5, 1943. It was going to place the main emphasis on using the heavily armored vehicles of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion and the 656th Heavy Tank Destroyer Regiment to create gaps in the defensive formations of the Soviet troops in order to develop a successful offensive by tank divisions. How events unfolded can be learned from subsequent chapters of this book.

Taught by the bitter experience of the spring and summer of 1942, when the Red Army suffered a series of crushing defeats from the Germans, the Soviet command was extremely cautious. On April 8, 1943, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, who was at that time on instructions from Headquarters in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, outlined his thoughts on the plan for the upcoming actions of the Soviet troops to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He wrote: “It would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group.” Most Soviet military leaders, including the commander of the Central Front, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky (a member of the Military Council of the Central Front was General K.F. Telegin, the chief of staff was General M.S. Malinin) spoke in favor of deliberate defense. The central front, defending the northern and northwestern parts of the Kursk ledge, was supposed to repel the enemy's attack south of Orel. Just like the Voronezh Front, which defended the southern and southwestern parts of the bulge, it had 5 combined arms (48, 13, 70, 65, 60 armies), 1 tank, 1 air army and 2 tank corps. The main efforts of the Central Front were concentrated in the zone of the 13th and partially 70th armies. The second echelon (2nd Tank Army) and the front reserve (9th and 19th Tank Corps) were also located here. Having a front width of 308 km, 34% of rifle divisions, 46.6% of artillery and mortars, and 70% of tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in a 40 km area of ​​probable enemy attack (13% of the total width of the front). The troops of the Central Front prepared 8 defensive zones and lines connected by intermediate and cut-off positions. The total depth of the area's engineering equipment reached 250–300 km. The main line of defense consisted, as a rule, of two or three positions. Each of them had 2–3 trenches connected to each other by many communication passages. Behind the main (first) line, a second line was built, almost identically dug with trenches, followed by a third (army) line. Finally, 2–3 more front lines were built. In fact, in the Central Front zone, the depth of defense was 150–190 km. Next, defensive lines were built by the troops of the Steppe Front, and behind them, a state defense line was built along the Don.

In the future defensive operation, a special role was assigned to artillery. The Central Front (artillery commander Lieutenant General of Artillery V.I. Kazakov) received for reinforcement the 4th Artillery Corps and the 1st Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division, 10 regiments and the 1st, 2nd and 13th Anti-Tank Destruction Brigades, 4 1st and 14th fighter brigades. The destruction brigade consisted of one anti-tank artillery regiment consisting of 4 batteries of 76-mm guns and 3 batteries of 45-mm guns, two anti-tank battalions of 72 anti-tank guns each, a mortar battalion of 12 mortars, an engineering mine battalion, a company of machine gunners, as well as an anti-aircraft battery of 4 37-mm guns - a total of 8,791 guns and mortars. Of these, 2,575 were anti-tank artillery systems (45, 57, 76 mm), 1,990 were long-range artillery systems (76, 122, 152, 203 mm), 4,226 were 82 mm and 120 mm mortars. Also included in the Central Front were 224 BM-13 and BM-8 rocket artillery combat vehicles and 432 launch frames for the M-30/M-31.

In the supposed area of ​​the German attack in the 13th Army’s defense zone, which occupied 10% of the total length of the front, the following were concentrated: 2,718 guns and mortars, or about 35% of the entire artillery of the front, including the entire 4th breakthrough artillery corps; 105 RA combat vehicles and all launch frames for the M-30. As a result of this massing of artillery assets in the zone of the 13th Army and on the adjacent flanks of its neighboring armies, the artillery density reached 85–90 guns and mortars, 3.5 M-8 and M-13 combat vehicles, as well as 13.5 launchers (frame) M-30 for 1 km of front.

This was the maximum density of artillery in defense during the entire Great Patriotic War! At the same time, on the rest of the front, the artillery density did not exceed 10–14 guns and mortars per 1 km of front.

In the sector of the 13th Army, as part of the main defense line, there were 13 anti-tank districts, consisting of 44 strong points, in the second zone - 9 districts, uniting 37 strong points, and on the rear line - 15 districts, including 60 anti-tank strong points.

On the Central Front, an anti-tank stronghold, as a rule, consisted of 3-6 guns with a caliber of 45-76 mm, 2-3 squads of anti-tank rifles, as well as fire weapons to combat enemy infantry, a platoon-battery of mortars and up to a squad of machine gunners. Sometimes it included separate 122 mm and 152 mm caliber guns to fight heavy tanks, as well as before the sapper squad and, less often, 1–2 tanks or self-propelled artillery units.

In the depths of the defense, independent anti-tank artillery areas were prepared, usually by artillery units and formations that were in the anti-tank artillery reserve. The artillery anti-tank reserve of the Central Front contained 87% of the anti-tank artillery (50% in the front and 37% in the armies). It included 1 and 13 iptabrs, 4 ibr and 2 iptap.

Possible options for maneuvering artillery reserves were planned in advance by the relevant headquarters. Movement routes and their deployment headquarters were scouted and equipped in advance. For example, 13 iptabrs from the APTR of the Central region had 6, 1 brigade - 5 such lines.

In order to weaken the initial attack of the enemy and inflict losses on him in manpower and military equipment even before the start of the offensive, artillery counter-preparation was planned in advance on the Central Front. It was organized according to several options on the entire front of the 13th Army and on the adjacent fronts of the 48th and 70th armies. In the 13th Army, 967 guns and mortars and 100 M-13 rocket launchers were involved in the full countertraining. This made it possible to create an average density of artillery during preparation: 30 guns and mortars and 3 rocket artillery installations per 1 km. In the most important areas, the density reached 60–70 guns and mortars. The duration of the counter-preparation was planned to be 30 minutes. It was supposed to begin and end with 5-minute fire raids, between which the targets would be suppressed by methodical fire for 20 minutes.

The main object of suppression during the period of counterpreparation on the Central Front was the enemy’s artillery, which had a fairly strong group here and was quite well exposed by Soviet intelligence (in total it was planned to suppress 104 artillery and mortar batteries and 59 observation points. - Note auto). Preparations were also being made to suppress enemy personnel and tanks in places where they were likely to be concentrated in 58 areas.

The armored forces of the Central Front were preparing to fulfill their role in the Red Army's defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge. On July 5, 1943, the BT and MB TsF included one tank army (2 tank tanks), two separate tank corps (9 and 19 tank tanks), twelve separate tank regiments (45, 193, 229, 58, 43, 237, 240, 251, 259, 40, 84, 355 detachment), three guards separate breakthrough tank regiments (27, 29, 30 guard detachment), two heavy self-propelled artillery regiments SU-152 (1540, 1541 tsap), 4 self-propelled artillery regiments SU- 122 (1454, 1455, 1441, 1442 glanders) .

Large armored formations were a mobile reserve of the Soviet command, capable of delaying enemy tank groups in the event of the latter breaking through into operational space.

The drawing of the front line of the Kursk salient and the concentration of large enemy groups in the areas south of Orel and Belgorod for operations along directions converging in the Kursk area dictated the need to deploy large tank and mechanized formations of the front reserve, taking into account possible maneuver in various directions.

In accordance with the current situation, 2 TA and 9 TK were located in areas north and south of Kursk, occupying an advantageous position for maneuver in the northern, western or southern directions in order to launch a counterattack in case of a breakthrough into the depth of our defense by enemy mobile groups and subsequent transition to decisive counteroffensive.

The 2nd Tank Army organizationally consisted of the 3rd and 16th Tank Corps and the 11th Separate Guards Tank Brigade. 3rd Tank Corps (9961 personnel l/s, 122 T-34, 70 T-70, 12 85 mm, 24 76 mm, 32 45 mm, 16 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, 80 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 94 mortars, 314 machine guns) consisted of the 50, 51, 103rd tank brigades, 57th motorized rifle brigade, as well as reinforcement units: 234th mortar regiment, 881st anti-tank fighter regiment, 728th separate anti-tank fighter division, 121st anti-aircraft artillery regiment. 16th Tank Corps (9461 personnel l/s, 139 T-34, 45 T-70, 17 T-60, 12 85 mm, 24 76 mm, 32 45 mm guns, 52 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 94 mortar, 296 machine guns) consisted of the 107th, 109th, 164th tank brigades and the 15th motorized rifle brigade. The reinforcement units included the 226th mortar regiment, the 614th anti-tank artillery regiment, the 729th separate anti-tank artillery division and an anti-aircraft artillery regiment. The 11th Separate Guards Tank Brigade had 1,104 people, 44 T-34 tanks, 10 T-70 tanks, 4 76 mm guns, 6 mortars and 34 machine guns. All of the listed tank formations were fully provided with fuel (at least 3 refills), ammunition (at least 2 rounds of ammunition) and food (at least 6 daily supply).

Located in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Kondrinka, Brekhovo, Kochetki, the 2nd Tank Army was intended to operate against the main enemy group located south of Orel. 2 TA, in the opinion of the Soviet command, had 3 main directions of probable actions: a) option one - in case of an enemy attack along the Trosna-Fatezh highway; b) option two - in case of an enemy attack in the direction of Ponyri station, Zolotukhino, Kursk; c) option three - in case of an enemy attack in the direction of Maloarkhangelsk, Khmelevaya.

The distances allowed the main forces of the tank corps to leave the concentration areas to the initial areas in all three options in 5–6 hours and the operational deployment of the army 8–10 hours after receiving a combat order.

9th Tank Corps (8218 personnel l/s, 125 T-34, 68 T-60, 38 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 12 85-mm, 24 76-mm, 12 45-mm, 13 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 251 machine guns, 54 mortars) organizationally consisted of the 23rd, 95th, 108th tank brigades and the 8th motorized rifle brigade, as well as the 730th separate anti-tank fighter division. It was located in the area of ​​​​Tsvetovo, Mokva, Maslovo, Sukhodolovka (15 km southwest of Kursk) and was ready for action in the following directions: a) Oryol direction - with the main forces of the corps leaving the initial areas - Kosorma, Bely Kolodez - in 8–10 hours; to the area north of Zolotukhino - 8 hours later, to the Fatezh area - 12 hours after receiving the combat order; b) Lgovsko-Rylsk direction - with access to the Fitin, Gustomoy, Iznoskovo, Artakovo areas - in 6–8 hours; c) Belgorod direction - with access to the areas of Ivnya, Kruglik, Vladimirovka, Kurasovka - 10 hours after receiving the combat order.

19th Tank Corps (8156 personnel l/s, 107 T-34, 25 T-70, 36 T-60, 19 MKIII “Valentine” and MKII “Matilda”, 39 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 30 76-mm, 12 45-mm, 2 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 271 machine guns, 64 mortars) were located in the area of ​​Verkhniy Leban, Putchina, Troitskoye directly behind the third line of defense. 19 Tank Tank, together with 2 Tank Tank and 9 Tank Tank, also formed the front reserve, but its task in the upcoming operation was significantly different from the other formations listed above.

The presence of a large number of tanks by the enemy directly in the tactical depth of his defense obligated the Soviet command to have a “tank fist” designed to deliver short counterattacks in close cooperation with the reserves of the 70th Army and the rifle corps of the front commander’s reserve, based on the third line of defense, in the initial period of the battle in case the enemy manages to break into the defense of the Soviet troops.

Thus, 19 Tank Tank, according to the plan of the Soviet command, was supposed to wear down the enemy in the depths of our defense, ensuring the systematic deployment of front reserves for the transition to a decisive counteroffensive. Separate tank brigades and regiments were part of combined arms armies: the 48th Army included the 45th (30 M3s, 9 M3l, 8 SU-76), 193rd (55 M3s, 3 SU-76) and 229- th (38 М4А2) separate tank regiments; 13th Army - 129th (10 KB, 21 T-34, 8 T-70, 10 T-60) separate tank brigade, 27th (24 KB-1S, 5 tractors) separate guards breakthrough tank regiment, 30 1st (20 KV-1S) separate guards breakthrough tank regiment, 58th (31 T-34, 7 T-70), 43rd (30 T-34, 16 T-70) and 237th (32 T -34, 7 T-70) separate tank regiments; 70th Army - 240th (32 T-34, 7 T-70), 251st (31 T-34, 7 T-70), 259th (34 T-34, 6 T-70) separate tank regiments; 65th Army - 29th (19 KV-1S) separate guards breakthrough tank regiment, 40th (29 T-34, 7 T-70), 84th (30 T-34, 3 T-70), 255th (33 T-34, 6 T-70) separate tank regiments; 60th Army - 150th (40 T-34, 22 T-70, 4 T-60) separate tank brigade.

In 1943, many of the corps and division commanders already had rich combat experience, which made it possible to avoid the common mistake of past years - keeping tank units during periods of calm on the front line of defense or in close proximity to it, supposedly to strengthen defensive positions. This apparent strengthening in fact led to hampering the maneuver of tank units, to unjustified losses of materiel from enemy artillery fire after an artillery raid; it also harmed secrecy, since the main efforts of military reconnaissance were focused on determining the presence and size of a tank group.

Before the start of Operation Citadel, tank regiments and brigades were located, as a rule, behind the second and sometimes behind the third line of defense and were ready for action in any way in the zone of the division or corps to which they were assigned.

The distribution of tank regiments and brigades was fully consistent with the existing situation. The overwhelming number of units were concentrated in the northern part of the Kursk ledge, from where the enemy attack was most likely to come. The 13th and 48th combined arms armies, which could bear the brunt of the German tank armada, were reinforced with self-propelled artillery regiments. The 48th Army included the 1540th (12 SU-152.1 KB-1S) heavy self-propelled artillery regiment, as well as the 1454th (16 SU-122, 1 T-34), 1455th (15 SU-122, 1 T-34) self-propelled artillery regiments. The 13th Army received the 1541st (12 SU-152, 1 KV-1S) heavy self-propelled artillery regiment, 1441st (14 SU-122), 1442nd (16 SU-122) self-propelled artillery regiments. Possessing powerful artillery systems, the SU-152 and SU-122 self-propelled guns could somehow fight and win the fight against the new German tanks: Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther", Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger", self-propelled gun Sd.Kfz .184 "Ferdinand".

Thus, the activities carried out on the Kursk salient by the Soviet command made it possible to create a multi-echelon defense using various branches of the Red Army, which enemy troops could break through only in the most unfavorable scenario.

Army	Front length, km	otbr	otp	Guards otpp	tsap	glanders	Tanks	self-propelled guns	Total	Density per 1 km
48 A	43	-	3	-	1	2	135	54	109	4,4
13 A	33	1	3	2	1	2	215	32	247	7,5
70 A	65	-	3	-	-	-	115	-	117	1,8
65 A	92	-	3	1	-	-	127	-	127	1,4
60 A	95	1	-	-	-	-	66	-	66	0,7

Progress of hostilities

Having concentrated a large number of units and formations, many of which were almost completely brought up to standard, the German command set itself the task of encircling and destroying the Red Army formations located in the Kursk Bulge area. A group of enemy troops concentrated against the right wing of the Central Front was supposed to operate in a southern direction, advancing on Kursk and having the ultimate task of connecting with the Belgorod group of German troops moving north in the direction of Oboyan, Kursk. The main blow of the northern group of German troops deployed against the formations of the Central Front was to be delivered in the Kursk direction between the railway and the highway in the direction of Kromy, Kursk, which would make it easier for the German command to supply ammunition and replenishment in the event of successful development of the planned operation. The main battles on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge took place at the junction of the 13th and 70th Soviet armies.

July 5, 1943. The defensive battle near Kursk for the Soviet armies began with a powerful counter-preparation of our artillery, which forestalled the start of the enemy’s counter-offensive. The command of both fronts was warned by a special telegram on July 2 by the Supreme High Command about the enemy’s possible transition to the offensive between July 3 and July 6. On the night of July 5, reconnaissance of the 15th Infantry Division of the 13th Army encountered a group of German sappers making passages in minefields. In the ensuing skirmish, one of them was captured and indicated that the German offensive should begin on July 5 at 02.30 am. The commander of the Central Front decided to preempt the German attack by conducting artillery and aviation preparations. The artillery strike began on the sector of the 81st and 15th rifle divisions at 02.20, ahead of enemy actions by 10 minutes. 595 guns and mortars took part in it. In contrast to the planned schedule, no methodical suppression was carried out; two fire raids were carried out one after the other. In addition to the artillery units, all fire weapons of the rifle units also took part in the counterpreparation.

The powerful fire strikes of the Soviet artillery were unexpected for the enemy. As a result of our counter-preparation, the enemy began his artillery preparation 2 hours late, disorganized and scattered. This made it possible to repeat the artillery raid at 04.35 according to the same plan, but in full form on the entire front of the 13th Army. In total, 0.5 rounds of ammunition were spent on artillery counter-preparation. During the period of artillery counter-preparation, the artillery of the Central Front suppressed 90 artillery and mortar batteries and up to 60 observation points (OP), 10 warehouses with ammunition and fuel were blown up, up to three enemy infantry regiments were scattered and partially destroyed.

Repeated counter-preparation found the enemy strike forces in their original position, in dense combat formations. “These 30 minutes,” testified the captured commander of the 9th German Panzer Division, “were a real nightmare. We didn't understand what happened. The officers, distraught with fear, asked each other: who is going to attack - us or the Russians? The company lost 20 people killed and 38 wounded... Our battalion commander was killed... Six tanks went out of action without firing a single shot.”

At 05.30, the enemy launched an offensive in the auxiliary direction at the junction of the 13th and 48th armies in the defense zones of the 148th, 8th and 16th divisions. Prepared in advance LZO (stationary barrage fire. - Note auto) our artillery cut off the enemy infantry from his tanks. The first enemy attack was repelled by Soviet troops. However, the enemy continued to stubbornly counterattack. To strengthen the anti-tank defense at the junction of the two armies, 13 iptabrs were put at the disposal of the commander of the 48th Army from the front reserve by the artillery commander, which deployed at a predetermined line and part of the forces (1180 iptabrs) took part in repelling enemy tank attacks. All enemy attacks were again repulsed.

At 07.30 the main attack of the German troops followed - on Olkhovatka, along the left flank of the 13th Army, and by the 46th Tank Corps - on Gnilets, at the junction of the 13th and 70th Armies in the defense zones 81, 15 and 132- th rifle divisions.

In total, according to Soviet military intelligence, the 18th, 9th and 20th tank divisions, the 656th tank destroyer regiment, the 505th separate battalion of heavy tanks "Tiger", 78, 86, 6, were deployed on a 45 km front. 7, 258, 216th Infantry Divisions, 36th Motorized Division, 8th and 13th Jaeger Battalions. The offensive of the ground forces was covered and accompanied by aviation, which acted massively along the battle formations of the Red Army.

On July 5, the enemy simultaneously brought up to 160 tanks into battle, of which up to 120 were in the Olkhovat direction. Tanks and self-propelled guns operated in small assault groups in close cooperation with infantry, serving as a means of breaking through Soviet defenses. Taking a key position on the line Maloarkhangelsk, Olkhovatka - height 257.7 (in German sources it is often called “tank height.” - Note auto) was entrusted to the battle group of Major Bruno Kahl, who was also the commander of the 216th Brummbar assault tank battalion. In this section of the offensive, which was bare ground with sparse tufts of grass, completely mined by Soviet sappers, the Germans tried to use radio-controlled tracked wedges - Borgward B-IV torpedoes. They were intended to break through minefields and undermine long-term strongholds of the Soviet defense. But, disabled by Soviet artillerymen and infantrymen, the tankettes and the following Ferdinands and Brummbars advanced with great difficulty (for example, by the end of this day, 5 Sturmpanzer IV Brummbars were completely destroyed, and 17 were seriously damaged by mines. - Note auto).

Until 10.30, German troops were not able to get close to the positions of the Soviet infantry, and only after overcoming the minefields did they break through to Podolyan. Units of our 15th and 81st divisions were partially encircled, but successfully repelled attacks by German motorized infantry. According to various reports, it later became clear that during July 5, the Germans lost from 48 to 62 tanks and assault guns in minefields and from Soviet artillery fire.

When the direction of the enemy's main attack was determined, the 13th iptabr was withdrawn from the 48th Army and transferred to the area of ​​responsibility of the 13th Army. It deployed on the right flank of 13 A to cover the Soglasny, Maloarkhangelsk direction, where the enemy began the offensive.

German troops continued to rush forward. In connection with the enemy's penetration into the main line of defense of the 13th Army, all light artillery regiments of the 4th Artillery Corps, as well as part of the batteries of howitzer and cannon regiments, joined the fight against his tanks.

On the right flank of the 70th Army, in order to eliminate the enemy breakthrough, the 206th and 167th Guards Light Artillery Regiments of the 1st Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division were deployed for direct fire. As a result of the artillery maneuver and its bold advance for direct fire, as well as massive artillery fire from indirect firing positions, heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy tanks.

But there were also serious shortcomings in the use of artillery anti-tank reserves. Thus, the 13th iptabr, after regrouping from the 48th to the 13th Army, was initially deployed not where the main group of enemy tanks was operating, so a new regrouping was soon required. However, parts of the brigade found themselves pushed closely to the front edge. This made it difficult for the unit to exit the battle to maneuver to a new deployment area and subsequently led to unnecessary losses.

Enemy tanks hiding in the folds of the terrain were inaccessible to direct fire; they were destroyed by massive artillery fire from indirect positions. Thus, the 24th cannon artillery brigade, with massive fire in areas where tanks and infantry were concentrated, on the day of the battle on July 5, knocked out and destroyed 40 enemy vehicles and up to 350 tank landing troops.

Rocket artillery was no less effective in destroying tanks. Even in the morning hours, the 6th, 37th, 65th, 86th and 324th Katyusha regiments rained down their shells on the concentrations of enemy manpower and equipment in the immediate depths of the battle formations. 7 divisional and 7 battery salvoes thundered, more than 1,300 shells came off the combat installations. At 11.00 the enemy penetrated the defenses of the 81st Rifle Division in the area of ​​Ozerki, threatening to encircle its 467th Regiment. The commander of the 65th Guards Marine Division attached, Major Kochulanov, moved the 1313th Division to open firing positions and fired a divisional salvo at enemy tanks and infantry that had broken through to the western outskirts of the Ponyri station. 3 tanks were set on fire, 30 enemy soldiers were killed. After 10 minutes, a new salvo was fired at the attacking tanks and infantry. The division destroyed another 5 tanks. The enemy infantry was scattered. Artillery fire thwarted an attempt to encircle the 467th Infantry Regiment of our troops.

Only towards the end of the day, after many hours of fighting, the enemy managed to break through the main defense line in the Olkhovat direction and advance to a depth of 8 km. On the flanks, his success was limited to a minor penetration into our defense.

Fierce fighting took place at the line: the northern outskirts of Protasovo, Buzuluk, the northern outskirts of the Shirokoye Boloto settlement, height 235.0, Bobrik, northern outskirts of the Gnilets settlement, southern outskirts of the village of Awakening, northern outskirts of Obidenki-Izmailovo, height mark 257.0. All attempts of the 36th motorized division (according to other German data, it was infantry. - Note auto) and the 216th Infantry Division were unsuccessful in advancing in the direction of Maloarkhangelsk.

July 6, 1943. On this day the fighting flared up with renewed vigor. To disrupt the enemy's offensive and restore the situation, following the order of the General Staff, by decision of the commander of the Central Front, on the morning of July 6, a counterattack was launched against the main enemy grouping by part of the second echelon forces of the 13th Army (17th Guards Rifle Corps). To ensure the counterattack, all the artillery of the formations participating in it and the bulk of the guns of the 5th Artillery Breakthrough Division were involved. Together with formations of the second echelon of the army, the 86th and 89th heavy howitzer artillery brigades were brought up to the second zone. At the same time, to strengthen the anti-tank defense of the starting line, 1 infantry brigade was moved into the defense zone of the 13th Army from the front reserve, and 3 infantry brigades and 378 infantry brigades were transferred to the Samodurovka area to ensure the junction of the 13th and 70th armies on the night of July 6 anti-tank reserve of the 70th Army.

Ultimately, the counterattack involved artillery formations and units, a mortar brigade, 2 rocket mortar regiments, 2 self-propelled artillery regiments, a rifle corps and 3 rifle divisions.

At 05.00 on July 6, 1943, 16 Tank Tank on a front 34 km wide with forces of 164 and 107 Tank Brigades, having 109 Tank Brigades in reserve, in cooperation with 17 Infantry Corps launched a counterattack in the general direction of Olkhovatka, Steppe, Kutyrki. Before the offensive, our artillery, trying to suppress enemy strongholds, carried out a fire raid on his positions. Apparently, the artillery shelling did not achieve the desired result, since, having encountered sudden fire from German heavy tanks "Tiger" and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" from the Kutyrki, Okop, Stepnaya area, the corps, having lost 89 tanks, retreated and fought on the line during the day: 109 tbr - mark 246.9, Olkhovatka; 164 tbr - Kashara, mark 231.5, mark 230.4; and the 107th brigade, after suffering losses (30 T-34, 17 T-70), was withdrawn to the second echelon.

The battle of the 107th Tank Brigade deserves a more detailed consideration.

At 20.55 on July 5, 1943, from the received combat order from the corps headquarters, it became known that the brigade, in cooperation with the 75th Guards Rifle Division, had the task of attacking the enemy in the direction: mark 257.0, Kutyrki, Novy Khutor and capturing the Ozerki, Novy Khutor line. The attack was initially scheduled to be ready for 21.00. Then, by additional order from corps headquarters, the attack was to begin at 03.50 on July 6, 1943.

By the evening of July 5, units of the 75th Guards Rifle Division were just on the approaches to the concentration site. The location of the headquarters was established only at 22.30. Linking issues of interaction with the 75th Guards. The SD was made more difficult by its commanders not knowing the exact hour of the attack. By order of the commander of the 17th Guards. sk commanders of the 107th brigade and 75th guards. SD went to the command post of the commander of the 6th Guards. SD to receive the mission, but after waiting 2 hours, they returned to their units, having received a telephone order from the corps commander to begin the attack at 03.00 on July 6, 1943. Formally, the issues of interaction between the brigade and infantry and artillery were worked out: signals for interaction between infantry, artillery and tanks were established, a landmark diagram was drawn up, a communications diagram was drawn up, but in fact, the 75th Guards. The SD was not ready to attack at the set time. Communication with the regiments and artillery was not ensured, the minefields were not explored and cleared (the head of the division's engineering service did not even know where the division's engineer battalion was located). Based on the realities of the current situation, the commanders of the 107th Tank Brigade and 75th Guards. The SD independently decided to postpone the attack to 05.00, which was promptly reported to the corps commander. At 04.45 on July 6, 1943, the 107th Tank Brigade set out in full strength from its initial positions, having 307 Tank Brigades on the right flank, 308 Tank Brigades to the left, the motorized rifle and machine-gun battalion advanced behind the infantry of the 75th Guards Rifle Division. At 05.00 the tanks passed the deployment line in the direction of individual houses, which is 1 km northwest of the village of Snova.

The attacking vehicles were met with hurricane artillery fire and fire from Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks, which were buried in the ground near the settlements of Aleksandrovka and Kutyrka. Infantry 75th Guards The SD, under the influence of artillery fire, stopped its advance, and the brigade's tanks, firing intensely on the move, continued their advance. However, by 06.45 4 tanks of 307 TB were knocked out and 5 tanks were on fire. At 07.00 307 TB tanks burst into Aleksandrovna, but on the orders of the battalion commander they returned to the lagging infantry, drew them forward and continued the joint offensive.

At 07.10, up to 50 enemy tanks began moving out of the Kutyrki, Aleksandrovka, and Okop areas, including 10 heavy tanks from the Aleksandrovka area and 10 Pz.Kpfw.VI heavy tanks from the Okop area. Head-on fire from our tanks against the Tigers did not produce any results, since the available armor-piercing shells did not penetrate the frontal armor of heavy German tanks.

Taking advantage of their advantage, the German heavy tanks continued to move forward and shot at the combat vehicles of the 107th Tank Brigade with direct fire. 10 Tiger tanks, which had moved out of the Trench settlement area, had by this time reached the flank of the brigade.

The tankmen of the 107th Tank Brigade courageously fought off the advancing German tanks, inflicting heavy losses on them and not retreating a single step. The brigade's flanks were completely open. The 164th Tank Brigade, advancing to the left of the 107th Tank Brigade, was also stopped by enemy fire.

Due to the obvious superiority of the German material unit, the commander of the 107th Tank Brigade requested permission from the corps commander to withdraw the remaining tanks from the battle. Having received permission, the brigade began to retreat, fiercely fighting off the enemy and inflicting heavy losses on him.

After the battle, in which 21 T-34 and 14 T-70 were burned, 5 T-34 and 1 T-70 were knocked out, and 3 T-34 and 1 T-70 were stuck in a swamp (and were subsequently burned by the enemy), The 107th Tank Brigade, having 4 tanks in service, actually lost its combat effectiveness. 32 people were killed, 47 people were wounded, 47 people were missing. However, in this battle the brigade destroyed about 30 German tanks, including 4 heavy Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks.

The 107th Tank Brigade, following orders from the command, fought an unequal battle with the new German Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger combat vehicles, which were technically superior to Soviet tanks, and, despite heavy losses, thanks to the heroism of its personnel, it fought selflessly, without retreating a single step. without orders. Observing the heroism of the tankers, the infantry of the 75th Guards Rifle Division also staunchly defended their positions.

The situation was less tense to the right, in the defense zone of the 3rd Tank Corps, which successfully repulsed several weak enemy attacks.

At 10.00 on July 6, about 30 enemy tanks broke through the infantry battle formations in the area of ​​​​the Ponyri settlement, but, met by 881 iptap and a counterattack by 103 tank brigade, they retreated to their original positions.

At 11.30, under the cover of artillery fire and air strikes, the enemy attack was repeated with the support of 40 tanks. However, the repeated attack was not successful. 3 Tank successfully repelled all attempts of the enemy to break into its position. During the day, 881 iptap and 103 tbr destroyed up to 40 enemy tanks.

By this time, the plan of the German command was already clearly defined, striving to break through to the south at any cost. In order to avoid a possible breakthrough by the enemy, the 11th Separate Guards Tank Brigade, by order of the commander of the 2nd Tank Army, moved to the area of ​​height 274.5 by 16.30 on July 6, 1943 and began organizing defense.

After our troops went on the defensive, German troops again resumed their attack on Olkhovatka. From 170 to 230 tanks and self-propelled guns were thrown here. The positions of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps here were reinforced by the 1st Guards Artillery Division, one tank regiment and a tank regiment, and the Soviet tanks on the defensive were dug into the ground. Fierce fighting took place near Olkhovatka.

The Germans quickly regrouped and launched short powerful attacks with tank groups, between attacks of which German dive bombers dropped bombs on the heads of the infantrymen of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps. At 16:00, the counterattacking Soviet infantry retreated to their original positions, and the 19th Tank Corps prepared to launch a counterattack. On July 5, he received instructions to launch counterattacks against the attacking German troops, but due to the constantly changing situation and the sappers who were making passages in the minefields until 16.00, the offensive operation was constantly postponed. Finally, at 17.00, the corps launched an attack and, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, reached the line by 20.00: 79 Tank Brigade - 1 km northwest of the village of Kashara, 101 Tank Brigade - 2 km west of Saborovka, 202 Tank Brigade - mark 231.7, 26 Motorized Rifle Brigade - 1.5 km east of mark 183.4. Further advance was stopped by organized and stubborn enemy resistance. During the day, units of 19 Tank Corps suffered the following losses: 101 Tank Brigade - 5 T-34s, 2 T-70s; 202 TBR - 15 T-34 (11 irrevocable), 4 MKII, 3 MKIII; 79 TBR - 9 T-34, 8 T-60. 23 tanks, 14 self-propelled guns, 13 vehicles, 22 field guns, 36 anti-tank guns, 21 mortars, 1,900 soldiers and officers were destroyed, 2 aircraft were shot down.

Despite the fact that the counterattacks of the 16th and 19th Tank Corps did not restore the front line, the enemy’s breakthrough to Olkhovatka and to the Ponyri station was stopped.

Describing the events in the area of ​​the Ponyri station, it must be said that the station was well prepared for defense. It was surrounded by controlled and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells, converted into tension-action landmines, were installed. The defense was reinforced with tanks dug into the ground and a large amount of anti-tank artillery (13 iptabrs, 46th light artillery brigade).

Against the village of 1st Ponyri on July 6, the Germans threw up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns (including up to 40 Tigers of the 505th heavy tank battalion) and infantry of the 86th and 292nd divisions. Having broken through the defenses of the 81st Rifle Division, German troops captured the 1st Ponyri and quickly advanced south to the second defense line of the 2nd Ponyri and the Ponyri station. Until the end of the day, they tried to break into the station three times, but their attacks were repulsed, and after counterattacks by the 16th and 19th Tank Corps, another day was won to regroup and strengthen the defense.

The decisive role in repelling enemy tank attacks at the junction of the 70th and 13th armies on July 6 was played by the 3rd Destroyer Brigade and the artillery of the already mentioned 1st Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division, which were promptly deployed from the artillery anti-tank reserve. The 3rd IBR, under the command of Colonel V.I. Rukosuev, deployed on a previously explored line southeast of Samodurovka, organizing 2 anti-tank areas. The first area included two 76 mm batteries, one 45 mm battery, one battery of 82 mm mortars and an anti-tank rifle battalion. Another area had the same composition of artillery and two anti-tank rifle companies. One 45-mm battery, a mortar battery and a company of anti-tank rifles were left in the reserve of the brigade commander. Each artillery battery formed an anti-tank stronghold. The entire battle formation of the brigade occupied a front of 4 km and a depth of up to 5 km.

By 18:00 on July 6, the enemy concentrated up to 240 tanks and self-propelled guns at the junction of the two armies. Over the course of 2 hours, he attacked the brigade’s combat formations three times, throwing into battle in narrow areas from 50 to 150 armored units with machine gunners. The tank attacks were supported by artillery and aircraft.

The first blow was taken by the 4th battery under the command of Captain Igishev, which opened fire on the tanks at a range of 900–1000 m. The gun commander, senior sergeant Sklyarov, destroyed the German “Tiger” with the first two shots. As the tanks came closer, the 6th battery opened fire on their side armor. Having lost 5 heavy tanks, the enemy retreated to their original position. The second attack was directed against the 5th battery. The direction of movement of the tanks now created favorable conditions for firing at the side armor of the vehicles of the guns of the 4th battery. As a result of a heavy battle, the enemy lost another 14 tanks and retreated. The third enemy attack was also successfully repelled. During the day of battle, the brigade destroyed 29 German tanks, of which 14 were heavy.

Already on the second day of fighting, it became obvious that the Germans could not achieve the desired results, and talk began to spread among German soldiers and officers about the unfavorable outcome of this operation. Thus, a pilot from a downed Ju-88 plane testified: the German operation was aimed at capturing the city of Kursk with actions along the Kursk-Orel railway. The German command expected to carry out the operation in a short time, but today one of the senior officers told the pilots that the operation was developing slowly, and there were miscalculations in assessing the strength of the Russian defense. On the second day of the German offensive, the massive introduction of tanks and self-propelled guns into the battle was apparently due to the fact that, having gone 4–6 km deep into the Soviet defense, the Germans believed that the main line of resistance had been passed, the units had reached the artillery area positions and timely development of the offensive will make it easier for the motorized mechanized troops to completely destroy the defense of our troops and enter the operational space to complete the task of encircling and destroying the Red Army group located in the Kursk salient. On the next day of the offensive, the German command decided to concentrate the main efforts in the area of ​​the Ponyri station, intending to break through the second line of defense of the 13th Army here. Stubborn fighting continued.

July 7, 1943. Having failed to achieve success in the Olkhovat direction, the German command, in search of a weak point in the Soviet defense, on the morning of July 7 shifted its main efforts in the direction of the Ponyri station and attempted to break through the second line of defense of the 13th Army here.

The command of the Central Front, trying to repel the attacks of the Germans, regrouped 13 iptabrs in the Ponyri area from July 6, and on the night of July 7, 2 iptabrs were transferred from the 48th Army to the left flank of the 13th Army and from the right flank of the 13th Army - 46 Labres and 11 Minbres of the 12th Artillery Breakthrough Division. In total, 15 artillery regiments, a heavy howitzer brigade and two anti-tank artillery brigades were concentrated in this area. The regiments of the 13th iptabr and the light artillery regiments of the 5th adp were preparing to create a “fire bag”, in which the artillerymen were supposed to shoot the German tanks that entered it with flanking fire on the side armor.

At 8 o'clock in the morning the attack of the German troops began (in addition, on this day the Germans brought into battle 2, 4 TD, as well as 31, 292 Infantry - Note auto). Up to 40 German Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks, supported by assault guns, advanced to the defense line and opened fire on the positions of the Soviet troops. At the same time, the 2nd Ponyri settlement was subjected to an air strike. About half an hour later, heavy Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks began to approach the forward trenches occupied by infantry. German assault guns fired from the spot to support the advance of their troops.

The 307th Rifle Division and the 27th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, which defended the Ponyri area, repelled 5 enemy attacks. However, at 12.30 two battalions of German infantry, supported by tanks and assault guns, managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of the village of 2-e Ponyri. The reserve of the commander of the 307th Infantry Division, consisting of two infantry battalions and the 103rd Tank Brigade, brought into battle, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. There were up to 40 destroyed German tanks left on the battlefield.

German attacks followed one after another. By 3 p.m., the Germans managed to take possession of the 1st May state farm and come close to the station. However, all further attempts to break into the territory of the village and station were unsuccessful.

The battle also unfolded on the right flank of the 70th Army. At 09.00, after a powerful artillery barrage and air assault, enemy infantry, supported by 150 tanks and self-propelled guns, repeatedly attacked our units from the Samodurovka, Gnilets, Obidenki, Izmailovo areas. The most fierce battles took place in the area of ​​the villages of Kutyrki and Teploye in the defense zone of the 70th Army. Here the 3rd Destroyer Brigade bore the brunt of the attack from German tanks, which was located in two anti-tank areas, in each of which, in turn, three artillery batteries (76-mm guns and 45-mm cannons), one mortar battery (120 mm mortars) and a battalion of anti-tank rifles. During July 6–7, the brigade successfully held back enemy attacks, destroying and knocking out 47 tanks here.

Interestingly, the commander of one of the batteries of 45-mm guns, Captain Gorlitsin, positioned his guns behind the reverse slope of the ridge and hit the emerging German tanks in the opening bottom before the tank could respond with aimed fire. Thus, in one day, his battery damaged and destroyed 17 tanks, without losing a single person from enemy fire.

In this section of the Central Front the situation developed as follows. At 13.00, 15 Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" tanks from the 505th heavy tank battalion attacked the positions of the 19th Tank Corps. The attack was repulsed. Having lost three tanks, the enemy retreated. At this time, the advanced units of the 132nd Infantry Division left heights 231.7 and 236.7.

At 13.30, up to 250 tanks from the 4th and 20th tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, with the support of infantry, went on the offensive from the Podsoborovka area in the direction of Kashara, height 238.1.

The 79th Tank Brigade, together with the 140th Rifle Division, met the attacking enemy with fire from the spot and, with the active support of Soviet units operating to the right (16 Tank Tank, 11 Guards Tank Brigade), repelled the attack.

At the same time, 16th Tank Corps repelled the fierce attacks of enemy tanks, which were brought into battle in groups of 100 to 150 vehicles from the Saborovka, Podsoborovka area in the direction of height 257.0 and the settlement of Kashara. During the day, many German tanks were knocked out in this area, including 16 heavy ones.

At 17.00, the enemy, in the area of ​​heights 244.2, 227.2, 238.5, with a force of up to 100 tanks with motorized infantry, with air support from 40 aircraft, again attacked in a southern direction. Individual tanks and groups of soldiers broke through to the area of ​​Kashara. In the area of ​​Samodurovka and Ponyri, front reconnaissance agencies noted active operations of Tiger tanks 505 detachment.

During the afternoon of July 7, 1943, 19 Tank Corps repulsed three more enemy tank attacks with a force of 40–60 tanks each. All the enemy's attempts to break through were unsuccessful. In the corps' defense zone, 22 German heavy and medium tanks were knocked out.

In total, the 2nd Tank Army, to which the 16th and 19th Tank Corps were operationally subordinate on July 7, 1943, lost 52 T-34s, 17 T-70s, 8 T-60s, 7 MKII/IIIs, knocked out and burned.

Along with 2 TA, separate tank formations and units of the 13th, 70th and 48th armies took part in the battles on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, which supported the Soviet infantry during counterattacks on German positions.

17 sk also took part in the hostilities with two divisions, repelling large attacks by enemy infantry and tanks. The 140th and 162nd Rifle Division of the Red Army advanced from the reserve to the Kutyrki, Nikolskoye, Sergeevka line.

By the end of the day, enemy units were fighting at the line: the western outskirts of Protasovo, Pavlovka, Semenovka, a branch of the Ponyrovsky state farm, a booth north of the Ponyri station, Berezovyi Log, Bityug, the northern outskirts of the village of Kashara, mark 225.4 (northwest of Saborovka ), height 250.2, Solozhenki, mark 240.1 (northwest of Solozhenki), Rudovo. These days became critical for the Soviet defense of the Central Front. By evening, fearing unnecessary losses, tank units of the Red Army in the Kursk area were ordered to fight the enemy only from equipped positions or from ambushes.

During the day, observation of reconnaissance posts and aerial reconnaissance noted the accumulation of up to 150 tanks in the area north of the village of Kashara. Up to 50 tanks were concentrated on the western outskirts of Protasovo, 150 tanks were located in the Buzluk area. From Podolyan to Saborovka there were up to 40 tanks on the move. Up to 100 tanks, mostly Pz.Kpfw.IV, were moving southeast of Podolyan. There were 120 tanks in the Saborovka area, and 30 tanks in the New Khutor area. The largest concentration - up to 200 tanks and self-propelled guns - was located in the area of ​​​​Saborovka, Bobrik, Gnilets. 80 tanks were located in the Sinkovo ​​area.

July 8, 1943. On July 8, the enemy, again continuing to operate with the forces of 7 infantry and 5 tank divisions, transferred the main efforts to the Olkhovat direction, closer to the junction of the 13th and 70th armies. To prevent a breakthrough at the junction of the two armies in the Teply area, Samodurovka was pulled up and placed for direct fire by 2 light regiments of the 1st Guards Artillery Division and 2 iptabrs, subordinate to the 13th Army. Here the 3rd Brigade still occupied firing positions.

In the morning, German troops (78, 292, 86, 6th Infantry Divisions, 18, 9, 12th Panzer Divisions), supported by 25 medium tanks, 15 heavy Tiger tanks and up to 20 Ferdinand assault guns, again attacked the northern the outskirts of Ponyri station. When repelling the attack with fire from 1180 and 1188 iptap, 22 tanks were knocked out, including 5 Tiger tanks. The soldiers of the 307th Infantry Division defended desperately. Two Tiger tanks were set on fire by KS bottles thrown by infantrymen Kuliev and Prokhorov from the 1019th Infantry Regiment. The 307th Infantry Division was supported with its fire by the 129th Separate Tank Brigade, which on July 8 had 10 KB, 18 T-34, 11 T-70, 11 T-60, 21 SU-122, as well as the 27th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, in which had 6 KV-1S tanks left.

On the same day at 06.30, adhering to the strategy of active defense, formations of the 2nd Tank Army themselves counterattacked the enemy in the area of ​​Ponyri. The 51st and 103rd Tank Brigades of the 3rd Tank Corps and the 307th Rifle Division took part in the operation. By 09.30 on July 8, 1943, the above formations were fighting: the 51st tank brigade - on the northern outskirts of the May 1st state farm, the 103rd tank brigade - on the northwestern outskirts of the village of Ponyri. 16 Tank Corps repelled strong attacks by large enemy forces from the directions: height 257.0, Kashara, height 230.1. The 11th separate brigade fought a fire battle with enemy tanks that had broken through in the Teploye area, height 240.0. By the end of the day, formations of 2 TA had the following composition: 3 TK - 16 T-34, 44 T-70; 16 TK - 91 T-34, 38 T-70, 15 T-60; 11th Guards TBR - 44 T-34, 10 T-70.

In the afternoon, German troops again tried to break through bypassing the Ponyri station - through the state farm "1 May". However, here, through the efforts of 1180 iptap and 768 paws, with the support of infantry and a battery of “portable jet guns,” the attack was repulsed. On the battlefield, the Germans left 11 burned out and 5 damaged medium tanks, as well as 4 assault guns and several armored vehicles. Moreover, according to reports from the infantry command and artillery reconnaissance, the “rocket guns” accounted for 3 German combat vehicles (probably, the rocket guns meant the PC M-30/31 launchers, which were used to fire at tanks in the Battle of Kursk. - Note auto).

In the defense zone of the 70th Army, on July 8 at 08.30, a group of German tanks and assault guns in the amount of up to 70 pieces with machine gunners on armored personnel carriers (4, 20th tank divisions, 7, 31, 258th infantry divisions) reached the outskirts of the village of Samodurovka and, with the support of dive bombers, carried out an attack in the direction of Teploye, Molotychi. And again the 3rd Fighter Brigade distinguished itself in battle. The artillerymen, showing exceptional restraint, brought the tanks within 400–600 meters and destroyed them with well-aimed fire. By 12.30, the 4th and 7th batteries of the 3rd IBR, located at the junction of two anti-tank areas, were completely disabled. German tanks and motorized infantry tried to break through the gap that had formed. After the third attack on Soviet positions, German troops managed to occupy the settlements of Kashara, Kutyrki, Pogoreltsy and Samodurovka. Only on the northern outskirts of the Teploe settlement did the 6th battery hold out, and in the area of ​​height 238.1 the remnants of the 1st battery and mortars fired, and on the outskirts of the village of Kutyrki the remnants of an armor-piercing unit, supported by two captured tanks, fired at the German infantry that had broken through. The brigade commander moved the reserve 5th battery here, which played a decisive role in eliminating the breakthrough. Enemy tanks, having stumbled upon a new strong point (3 light batteries of 45-mm guns and a battalion of anti-tank rifles were also brought there. - Note auto), were forced to stop further offensive. In total, 4 attacks were repulsed on the 3rd day.

The personnel of the 3rd Fighter Brigade fought heroically. During the day of battle, the 4th battery alone burned 19 enemy tanks, losing all its guns from enemy fire. The tenacity of our artillerymen is also evidenced by this fact - two enemy tanks were knocked out by fire from the already damaged gun of Senior Sergeant Sklyarov. The gun's wheel was broken. But instead of a wheel, they placed a box under the axle and continued to fire.

The artillerymen of the 3rd IBR were supported by the 19th Tank Corps.

On the night of July 8, 1943, by order of the commander of the Central Front, the 19th Tank Tank was withdrawn from the 2nd Tank Army and reassigned to the commander of the 70th Army. The commander of 70 A, by his order, subordinated the 19th Tank Corps to the 140th Infantry Division and the 3rd Fighter Artillery Brigade, already mentioned in this chapter.

The corps was given the following task:

2. Firmly defending the strip of Olkhovatka, (lawsuit) Kashara, Samodurovka, (lawsuit) Nikolskoye, (lawsuit) Berezovka, Molotychi, high. 274, 5 to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the direction of Podsoborivka, Khmelevoye.

3. Have two tank brigades in reserve in the area of ​​Teploye, Samodurovka (medium), Molotychi, high. 253, 5. Have the 26th motorized rifle brigade in reserve in the area of ​​Nikolskoye, Krasnopavlovsky, height 219.1 behind the left demarcation line of the corps in the zone of the neighboring 28th rifle corps.

Despite this order, the 26th Motorized Rifle Brigade was not replaced by units of the 28th Rifle Corps and continued to defend the Krasavka line, height 250.2, until July 14, 1943.

When a critical situation was created in the defense sectors of the 3rd IBR and 140th Rifle Division as a result of a breakthrough by German troops, the 79th Tank Brigade entered the battle. For 3 hours she participated in repelling enemy attacks and destroyed 30 tanks and up to 400 enemy officer soldiers.

At 13.00, 10 tanks arrived from the front technical reserve were brought into battle. At a critical moment, this significantly strengthened the 101st Tank Brigade, which suffered significant losses and had difficulty holding the heights northeast of the village of Molotychi. The next enemy attack at 14.00 was also repulsed by 79 Tank Brigades. After heavy losses, in order to occupy a more advantageous position, the brigade left the northeastern outskirts of the village of Teploye and took up defense along the southern outskirts of this settlement, with a front to the north and east.

After a series of unsuccessful attacks at 17.30, up to 100 enemy tanks, lined up on the northern slopes of height 238.1 in two combat echelons, with 10 heavy Tiger tanks in front, attacked height 274.5.

The attack was preceded by a raid of 90 bombers, which struck the Teploye, Molotychi areas and the heights north of these settlements. With flanking fire from the spot, as well as a counterattack by tanks from the 101st and 11th Guards Tank Brigades, the enemy was driven back beyond the height of 238.1.

As already mentioned, during the day 4 strong enemy attacks were repulsed in this area. Each attack was supported by the heavy Tiger tanks of the 505th Independent Heavy Tank Battalion, which operated from great distances using the power of their weapons. 10–20 Tiger tanks stopped 1–1.5 km from the Soviet positions and fired from the spot, providing an attack on the medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV. In case of an unsuccessful attack, the Tigers covered their exit from the battlefield.

The enemy launched auxiliary attacks on the left flank of the corps from the Gnilets area to a height of 250.2 with a force of up to an infantry battalion supported by 11 tanks, as well as from Saborovka to Krasavka with a force of up to two infantry companies and 11 tanks, including 4 heavy Pz.Kpfw tanks. VI.

Three such attacks were repulsed by the 26th Motorized Rifle Brigade. Three times the battle at an altitude of 250.2 ended with a bayonet strike by the 1st battalion, and two times hand-to-hand combat broke out on the eastern outskirts of Krasavka, which was defended by the 2nd battalion. The brigade did not give up its positions. Having suffered heavy losses, the enemy stopped the attack.

In the Zmievsky direction against the troops of the 43rd Army, the enemy did not show activity; he improved the previous lines of defense in engineering terms.

Observation and aerial reconnaissance of the Red Army noticed the following accumulations of enemy equipment: the movement of 22 medium tanks and self-propelled guns from the settlement of Sorochi Kusty to Borisoglebskoye (Mokren); up to 20 camouflaged tanks in the area of ​​Bityug, Kashara and up to 150 tanks northeast of the village of Samodurovka. To the west of the village of Bityug, there were up to 70 tanks and self-propelled guns on the move to the 2nd Ponyri (in the area of ​​the Maloarkhangelsk station, Buzuluk, Shirokoe Pole).

Aerial reconnaissance noted the accumulation of up to 150 tanks and vehicles in the Druzhovsky area and up to 100 tanks and vehicles in the forest east of the village of Snova. 150 enemy tanks were spotted in the forest north of Podolyan. 227 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in the area of ​​height 238.1 (northeast of the village of Teploye).

July 9, 1943. On this day, the German command, having interrupted the general offensive on the Central Front to regroup forces, continued to attack the Ponyri station. The offensive was carried out by a reserve strike group consisting of Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" tanks of the 505th separate heavy tank battalion, Sd.Kfz.184 "Ferdinand" self-propelled guns of the 654th heavy assault gun division, and 150-mm Brummbar assault tanks » 216th battalion (assault tanks), as well as one of the StuG III assault gun divisions. The command of the group of 30 tanks and self-propelled guns, as before, was carried out by the commander of the 216th assault tank battalion, Knight of the Order of the Iron Cross, Major Bruno Kahl. Directly behind the breakthrough group were medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. 2 hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the 1st May state farm to the village of Goreloye. In these battles, German troops used a new tactical formation, when in the first ranks of the strike group a line of Ferdinand assault guns moved (rolling in two echelons), followed by Tigers, covering the assault guns and medium tanks. But near the village of Goreloye, Soviet artillerymen and infantrymen allowed German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared artillery fire bag formed by 768, 697 and 546 paws and 1180 iptap, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Finding themselves under powerful concentrated artillery fire from different directions, having also found themselves in a powerful minefield (most of the field was mined by captured aerial bombs or land mines containing 10–50 kg of land mines buried in the ground) and subjected to air strikes from Pe-2 dive bombers, the Germans the tanks stopped. Some of the tanks left on the battlefield turned out to be serviceable, and 6 of them were evacuated at night by Soviet repairmen, after which they were transferred to the disposal of 19 tanks to replenish the lost materiel.

The 19th Tank Corps took part in the battles on July 9, 1943 with the 101st and 79th Tank Brigades. At 05.30, up to 40 enemy tanks attacked the positions of the 101st Tank Brigade on the Kruglaya height northeast of the village of Molotychi. Having lost 16 tanks, the enemy retreated. The motorized rifle and machine gun battalion of the 79th Tank Brigade with a sudden counterattack at 16.00 on July 9, 1943, completely captured the village of Teploye, destroying 2 tanks and up to 100 enemy soldiers.

In the defense sector of the 2nd Tank Army, the enemy did not show much activity. On the night of July 9, 1943, scouts from the 3rd Tank Corps, while trying to capture the “tongue,” shot a German motorcyclist from the 52nd Motorized Regiment of the 18th Tank Division. An order was found on the dead man indicating the time of a new attack on Soviet positions - 06.15 on July 9, 1943. Knowing this information, as well as other movements of German troops in the area of ​​​​the Ponyri station (castling of 10 infantry divisions was established from the area northeast of the Ponyri station to the area west of this station, the same order confirmed the actions of 9 infantry divisions to the west and 292 infantry divisions to the east of 18 tank divisions. - Note auto), the Soviet command launched an air assault strike on German positions. A raid by our aviation on concentrations of German equipment and motorized infantry upset German plans; the enemy managed to prepare for a new attack only at 11.00. The 292nd Wehrmacht Infantry Division, supported by tanks from the 18th and 9th Tank Divisions, took part in the attack on the area of ​​Goreloye, Ponyri station. The 3rd Tank Corps and the 307th Rifle Division of the Red Army repelled this attack.

Attacks from the direction of height 257.0 on the location of the 16th Tank Corps were also accompanied by heavy losses for the enemy and were not successful.

The heaviest fighting broke out in the defense sector of the 129th Separate Tank Brigade.

At 08.00 on July 9, 1943, up to 20 tanks and two infantry battalions resumed the attack from the area of ​​the Ponyrovsky state farm, height 256.5 in the general direction to heights 253.5 and 226.5. The attack was repulsed. At 08.45, a company of infantry and 5 tanks from the area of ​​the 1st May state farm broke into the battle formations of the motorized rifle and machine-gun battalion of the brigade in the area of ​​226.5.

Our infantry cut off the enemy infantry from the accompanying tanks and inflicted heavy losses on the German units. The tanks, followed by the remnants of the German infantry, retreated to their original positions.

At 9.00 on July 9, the enemy, consisting of several companies of infantry and 12 Tiger tanks, again attempted an attack on the positions of the 2nd tank battalion. The fire battle lasted for two and a half hours. At the same time, 1 TB repelled another attack by German troops with a force of up to an infantry battalion supported by 20 tanks.

At 13.00 the battle ended. 6 attacks were repelled and 40 enemy tanks were destroyed.

At 19.00, from the area of ​​the state farm "1 May" in the direction of height 226.5, the enemy with a force of up to an infantry regiment, supported by 32 heavy and medium tanks, unsuccessfully tried to break the resistance of 2 TB and MSPB of the 129th Tank Brigade. This battle was also exceptionally fierce.

The enemy rushed forward, regardless of any losses, but everything was unsuccessful. Only through the efforts of 2 TB 129 brigade were 21 tanks destroyed, of which 12 Tiger tanks.

The 129th Separate Tank Brigade held its positions on July 9, 1943 and, interacting with the 4th Guards Rifle Division, prepared to launch a counterattack.

On July 9, the enemy, having suffered huge losses, suspended the offensive against the troops of the Central Front in order to resume their attacks the next day, having regrouped their forces.

July 10, 1943. On this day, using almost all available aircraft to support ground forces, operating on a narrow sector of the front with the support of 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, the enemy launched one of his most fierce attacks, trying to break through to the south at any cost.

At the cost of huge losses, the German troops managed to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet troops in the direction of the village of Molotychi, but by the end of the day the 140th Infantry Division, the 164th Tank Brigade and part of the forces of the 19th Tank Corps counterattacked the Germans in the direction of Teploye and closed the gap overnight between the villages of Kutyrki and Samodurovka. In this direction, during the day of the battle, according to Soviet data, the enemy lost about 150 tanks. This is how this battle is described in the reporting documents of the 19th Tank Corps: “Having concentrated in the area of ​​Samodurovka, Saborovka, Bobrik up to 300 tanks of the 2nd, 4th and 20th tank divisions, as well as infantry units, at 05.00 on July 10, 1943, the enemy resumed the offensive in the direction of heights 238.1, 240.0, moving towards the eastern outskirts of the village of Molotychi. The tanks traveled in trains of 50–60 vehicles each. Up to three infantry battalions moved with each echelon. Tank control in battle was mainly carried out by radio. The interaction of the infantry with the tanks was carried out according to pre-established signals for the tanks to overtake the infantry and return to it in the event of a failure of the attack. As a rule, in battle there was a desire to place all the infantry that followed the armored vehicles on armored personnel carriers or tanks in the form of a tank landing force, which moved in combat or behind the combat formations of tanks. The assault and self-propelled guns that carried out the task of providing fire support for the offensive operations of the tanks also kept in touch with the commanders of the tank formations by radio.”

Artillery fire supporting the tank advance was corrected from a specially equipped vehicle based on the Pz.Kpfw.III tank (Bf.Pz.Wg.III - it also contained an artillery spotter. - Note auto), who moved behind the battle formations of tanks at some distance, allowing him to see the battlefield. This tank did not fire, but was a mobile observation post. There were 5–6 such tanks in each tank division.

The battle formations of the 19th Tank Corps were subjected to continuous bombardment by enemy aircraft, which operated in groups of 40–60 aircraft. Four attacks were repulsed by the 140th Infantry Division and motorized rifle battalions of tank brigades. The artillerymen of the 3rd artillery brigade rolled out their guns to open positions and shot enemy tanks at point-blank range with direct fire.

Tanks of the 79th and 101st brigades fired from the spot. By 12.30 about 60 German combat vehicles were destroyed. At altitude 238.1, one battalion of the 140th Infantry Division was almost completely lost. In this sector, only by the end of the day the enemy managed to advance 1–2 km.

After another intense air raid, in which up to 200 German aircraft took part, and a 30-minute intensive artillery preparation, the enemy again resumed attacks in the direction of height 240.0, Teploe settlement, Kruglaya height, bringing into battle up to 200 tanks and an infantry regiment . Within an hour, all attacks were repulsed.

The battle of July 10, 1943 was distinguished by the exceptional onslaught of the enemy and the no less stubborn defense of the Soviet troops.

By mid-day, the situation at 19 Tk was extremely difficult. At 16.30, the last reserves of the corps were thrown into battle - the sapper and motorcycle battalions and even command tanks. By 19.00, the defense on the northeastern slopes of height 253.5 was strengthened by the 251st Tank Regiment (25 T-34, 9 T-70) urgently assigned to the 19th Tank Corps.

By 18.00, 6 T-34 202 armored brigade tanks were transferred from the area of ​​the eastern outskirts of Nikolskoye to help our troops. By the end of the day, the 40th Tank Regiment, attached to the corps from the front reserve, approached the battle area. This regiment occupied an area 1 km south of Molotychi (west), being the reserve of the corps commander.

The ferocity of the fighting on July 10 can be judged by the losses of our tanks. So, for example, the 101st brigade, having tanks dug into the ground in very advantageous positions, still lost 32 tanks during the day of battle (14 of them burned down).

The attacking enemy suffered even greater losses, since the corps' tanks were replenished with ammunition 2-3 times per day.

During the day of the battle on July 10, 1943, corps units lost: 101 Tank Brigade - 20 T-34, 12 T-70; 79 TBR - 10 T-34, 2 T-60. In total, losses amounted to 44 tanks.

By the end of July 10, 1943, the brigades had the following number of combat-ready vehicles: 101 TBR - 9 T-34, 13 T-70; 202 TBR - 7 T-34, 3 MKII, 11 MKIII; 79 TBR - 7 T-34, 8 T-60, 1 T-70.

During the day of the battle, the enemy suffered 19 tanks (without reinforcement parts) on July 10, and suffered the following damage. Burnt and destroyed: 96 tanks (of which 13 Tigers), 6 self-propelled guns, 30 field guns, 27 mortars. About 1,700 soldiers and officers were captured. 6 Luftwaffe aircraft shot down.

In the area of ​​Ponyri station on July 10, enemy offensives also continued, but unlike the previous days they were of a constraining nature. All enemy attacks were repelled. A major role in the battles was played by the barrage fire deployed by the special purpose artillery division (203 mm howitzers and 152 mm howitzer guns). By noon, the Germans withdrew, leaving 7 more tanks and 2 assault guns on the battlefield. The state farm "May 1st" was recaptured by our troops, and the German command failed to regain control over this settlement during July 10th.

Despite the concentration of forces in narrow areas of the offensive, the enemy’s attempts to break through in the southeast direction were again unsuccessful.

July 11–12, 1943. During these days, German troops continued their offensive only in the defense zone of the 70th Army. The attacks were carried out by separate units of tanks and motorized infantry. However, now the advantage in the air was with Soviet aviation, and the strikes of Soviet aircraft mixed up the battle formation of the German tanks deployed to attack. In addition, the defending Red Army units received reinforcements. Along with the 140th Rifle Division, the 3rd Fighter Artillery Brigade, the 19th Tank Corps with the 251st and 40th separate tank regiments attached to it, the positions of the Soviet troops were reinforced at night by the 162nd Rifle Division, and at 12.00 arrived 1st Guards Fighter Artillery Brigade.

Thus, on July 11, the 19th Tank Corps, which occupied the main defensive position in the Kashara, Samodurovka, Molotychi zone, was reinforced with two rifle divisions, two artillery brigades, and two separate tank regiments. The 162nd infantry division and 40th infantry regiment were in reserve. Anti-aircraft guns were deployed in one of the defense areas, including captured German 88-mm cannons.

During July 11–12, 1943, Soviet troops repulsed 17 enemy attacks. Only one 1st brigade during these days knocked out 6 heavy vehicles, including 2 Pz.Kpfw.VI “Tiger” (since according to Soviet terminology at that time Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks were considered heavy. - Note auto), as well as 17 light and medium tanks. In total, in the defense area between the settlements of Samodurovka, Kashara, Kutyrki, Teploye, height 238.1 on a field measuring 2 by 3 km, after the battles, 74 burnt and damaged German tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored vehicles were discovered. Including 4 Tigers and 2 Ferdinands.

If on July 11 the enemy was still supported by its own aviation (800 aircraft on July 11, 1943 - Note auto), then on July 12 German planes limited themselves to reconnaissance flights only.

On July 11, local battles also took place in the defense zone of the 13th Army in the area of ​​Ponyri station. On July 12 and then July 13, the Germans, not hoping to continue the offensive, began to carry out an operation to evacuate their damaged tanks and self-propelled guns.

The evacuation was covered by the 654th Ferdinand self-propelled gun division and aviation. The operation as a whole was a success, but the number of Ferdinand Sd.Kfz.184 left on the battlefield with the undercarriage damaged by mines and artillery fire increased to 17. In total, after the fighting in the area of ​​the Ponyri station, the state farm "1 May" there were 21 assault guns left Sd.Kfz.184 "Ferdinand" with a damaged chassis, a significant part of which was set on fire by its crews or the advancing Soviet troops. The counterattack of our infantrymen, supported by a battalion of T-34 tanks and a battalion of T-70 tanks from the 3rd Tank Corps that arrived here, pushed back the German units that had approached the outskirts of Ponyri. The Soviet tank crews supporting the infantry counterattack suffered heavy losses not only from the fire of German assault guns, but also because, as they approached, a company of T-70 tanks and several T-34s mistakenly ended up in their own minefield. In the firefight, the Ferdinands actually did not receive any damage; only one Sd.Kfz.184 received a hole in the side near the brake drum, although it was fired upon by 7 T-34 tanks from all directions.

The 27th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment took part in the battles in this area, which fired its tanks (as of July 13, 10 serviceable vehicles. - Note auto) scattered small groups of Germans trying to advance to the front line under the cover of artillery fire and a smoke screen.

The most active battles on July 11, 1943 took place near Maloarkhangelsk, in the area of ​​the village of Sidorovka. The 15th Rifle Corps of the Red Army, as well as the 229th Separate Tank Regiment and the 30th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment attached to it, were supposed to defend their positions and, if possible, counterattack the enemy. At 10.00 on July 11, 1943, German troops captured the village of Protasovo and continued their offensive in an eastern direction.

The commander of the 15th infantry regiment ordered the 229th detachment to march and capture the height areas with marks 255.6 and 238.6, Trosna settlement. The captured line had to be held until the infantry of the 360th infantry regiment of the 74th infantry division approached.

Fulfilling the order of the corps commander, the regiment began combat operations, the 1st tank company, having the task of reaching a height of 255.6 at the intersection of the Grinevka - Vavilovka road, came under heavy fire and lost 3 tanks burnt out at a height of 248.8. Maneuvering, the company rapidly continued the attack in the direction of height 255.6.

Having advanced to the eastern outskirts of Protasovo, German tanks began shelling the 1st company. At the same time, the 2nd tank company, which had the task of supporting the 1st company and occupying height 238.6, was late with its advance and did not provide support to the advance of the 1st company. Deprived of the support of the 2nd company, the tanks of the 1st troop began to retreat to the area of ​​the village of Vavilovka under the cover of fire from the 3rd troop, which by this time had reached the area of ​​height 244.2 and opened ineffective fire on the German troops. Even before her arrival, 1 tr departed to Vavilovka. 3 tr advanced to the southwestern slopes of 260.3 and fired from the spot, and then retreated beyond the ridge of the height.

By order of the chief of staff of the 15th Infantry Corps, who was located at the OP of the 229th Infantry Regiment at an altitude of 260.3, the 3rd and 4th tank companies at 19.00 quickly attacked the enemy and captured the altitude of 256.6. The regiment's machine gun company was used as a tank landing force. As a result of this attack, the situation in this sector of the front was restored.

On July 12, the enemy broke through on the northern outskirts of the village of Grinevka. On the same day, the 2nd tank company, in cooperation with the 78th rifle regiment, knocked out the enemy from this settlement, but later, continuing the offensive, coming under concentrated enemy fire and losing 8 tanks, it retreated to Vavilovka. On the night of the 13th, all companies of the 229th detachment were withdrawn there.

At this time, 30 OGVTTPP was performing another task. Back on July 10, the commander of the 15th infantry regiment decided: the 1st tank company, together with the infantry, would capture the height at 249.7, which was located west of Trosna; The 2nd Tank Company was to support the attack with local fire; 3rd Tank Company - support this attack with fire from the spot.

At 03.00 on July 11, the regiment began to fulfill the task of the corps commander. Already by 03.30, the 1st tank company reached a height of 249.7, where its tanks were fired upon by German artillery from the flank. The Soviet infantry lagged behind the tanks and never reached the heights, and artillery fire support turned out to be ineffective. Having lost 3 tanks, 1 troop retreated from a height. The 3rd tank company, having set out from its initial positions, was not supported by artillery at all, and the infantry, encountered by enemy fire, immediately lay down. The KB tanks did not reach the enemy positions and continued to fire from the spot.

At 10.00, after strong artillery preparation, up to two enemy infantry regiments, supported by 40 tanks, attacked Soviet positions from heights 237.7 and 255.6, as well as the Protasovo settlement in the general direction of Maloarkhangelsk. The Soviet infantry, pressed by the enemy from all sides, began a slow retreat. Therefore, the tanks of the 30th OGVTTPP took the brunt of the attack, which, after a difficult battle, stopped the enemy on the southeastern slopes of height 263.3, the western outskirts of the villages of Vavilonovka and Grinevka. The enemy suffered heavy losses: 8 Tiger tanks, 9 Pz.Kpfw.III/IV tanks, 6 self-propelled guns, 7 anti-tank guns, 5 mortar batteries were destroyed. The regiment itself lost 12 tanks burned out and 5 KV tanks destroyed. 16 were killed, 23 were wounded, and 14 were missing.

At the end of the fighting, having 5 tanks in service, the regiment was withdrawn to the Vavilovka area, where it received 10 combat vehicles from the 27th OGVTTPP.

After July 12, 1943, the German command no longer undertook major offensive operations on the Central Front. On July 14, in connection with the successful start of the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, the enemy began a hasty transfer of its mechanized troops in a northern direction. Thus, the offensive of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht in the Oryol-Kursk direction, which cost the Germans such huge losses in manpower and equipment, completely failed.

The troops of the Central Front were preparing for active operations and accumulating reserves for the subsequent operation.

Results of the operation

Despite the concentration of a huge amount of manpower and equipment, advancing on a relatively small section of the Central Front with massive support from aviation and artillery, the German command failed to fulfill its objectives - to cut off and destroy the Soviet troops located on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge.

Fierce battles that broke out in different sectors on the first day of the offensive continued to unfold with unabated force for several days, and only on July 11, 1943, the onslaught of the enemy, who lost the battle, began to subside. Even the involvement of a large number of new models of armored vehicles in the operation did not save the German command, which made mistakes in assessing the strength of the Soviet defense, from an unsuccessful outcome of the operation for the Germans.

During the defensive battles, the troops of the Central and Voronezh (operated on the southern flank of the “Kursk ledge.” - Note auto) the fronts were bled dry, and then they stopped the advance of the German army’s strike groups and created favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. Hitler's plan to defeat Soviet troops on the Kursk salient was a complete failure. However, the Red Army paid a high price for the victory. The Central Front from July 5 to July 12, 1943, with a total number of troops of 738 thousand people, lost 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable losses.

1. Report of the headquarters of the BT and MB of the Central Front on the actions of the enemy’s motorized mechanized troops and its anti-tank defense system from July 5 to August 25, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 226, op. 412, d. 20, pp. 138–163).

2. Report of the commander of the BT and MB of the Central Front on the combat operations of armored and mechanized forces from July 5 to August 10, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 233, op. 2309, d. 2, pp. 137–260).

3. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces. M., Olma-Press, 2001. 608 p.

4. Degtyarev P. A., Ionov P. P.. "Katyusha" on the battlefield. M., Voenizdat, 1991. 238 p.

5. Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. M., 1960. 800 p.

6. Tippelskirch K. History of World War II 1943–1945. St. Petersburg, 1994, vol. 2. 300 p.

7. Kolomiets M., Svirin M., Baronov O., Nedogonov D. Kursk Bulge July 5 - August 23, 1943. M., Eksprint NV, 1998. 72 p.

8. Müller-Hillebrand B. German Land Army 1933–1945. M., Voenizdat, 1976. 416 p.

9. Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen 1933–1945. Schiffer Military History, 1996. 287 p.

Troops of the opposing sides in the defense zone of the Central Front (July 5–12, 1943)

The course of the defensive battle and the maneuver of formations and units of the Central Front from July 5 to July 12, 1943

Notes:

Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943). Under the leadership of Zamyatin N.M. General Staff of the Red Army. Military-historical department. M., Military Publishing House of the People's Commissar of Defense, 1944, p. 19.

Report on the combat operations of the 22nd Tank Corps of the 4th Tank Army from July 27 to August 15, 1942 (TsAMO RF, f. 220, op. 220, d. 8, l. 302).

Report on the actions of the armored forces of the South-Eastern Front from August 7 to September 10, 1942 (TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 80038 ss, d. 44, l. 54).

TsAMO RF, f. 233, op. 2309, no. 2, no. 39, 40.

Ibid., ll. 48, 49.

Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. M., 1960, p. 221.

TsAMO RF, f. 233, op. 2309, d. 2, l. 42.

Ibid., ll. 61, 73.

Ibid., l. 42.

Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. M., 1960, p. 223–224.

TsAMO RF, f. 233, op. 2309, d. 2, l. 52.

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces. M., Olma-Press, 2001, p. 285.

Operation Citadel is one of the most striking and terrible events of the Second World War. On July 5, 1943, German troops launched a full-scale offensive in the Kursk area. With the support of artillery and aviation, tank formations launched a powerful blow in the direction of Prokhorovka. Their task was to break through the defenses and encircle the Soviet group. This was the beginning of the end of the Second World War, Operation Citadel.

Revenge for the lost Stalingrad

1943 The Germans continue to retreat along the entire front. Having been defeated at Moscow and Stalingrad, they still hope to change the course of the war. Adolf Hitler wants to take revenge on the Kursk Bulge. The Fuhrer is personally involved in the development of the operation, which he called “Citadel”. With attacks from the north, west, south, the Germans want to destroy the powerful Soviet group, and then launch an offensive on the Don, Volga and Moscow.

The Fuhrer's strategic plans

The small Prokhorovka station of the Southern Railway of Russia... It was here, according to the plan of the German command, that the decisive battle was to take place. It was planned that German tanks would go behind the rear of the Soviet troops, encircle them and destroy them. For this purpose, a powerful tank armada was brought here. The tanks had already been brought to the front lines. The Germans were preparing for the decisive push, the plan for Operation Citadel was ready to be executed. They knew that the Soviet command had brought huge tank forces here. However, Soviet T-34 tanks were inferior in armor thickness and firepower to the latest German Tigers.

According to intelligence

The outcome of the battle could only be decided by accurate information about the enemy’s forces and plans. Even before the war, the British managed to get hold of the German Enigma encryption machine. With its help, they deciphered secret German codes and obtained extremely important military information.

According to the agreement between England and the USSR, which was concluded at the very beginning of the war, both sides undertook to inform each other about Hitler's plans. The secret center for deciphering German codes was located in Bletchley Park, 60 miles from London. Carefully vetted, qualified specialists processed the intercepted encoded information here.

It was impossible to imagine that a foreign intelligence agent could penetrate here. And yet he penetrated. His name was John Cairncross. This man belonged to the legendary group of Soviet intelligence officers, the “Cambridge Five”. The information that John Cairncross will convey to Moscow will be invaluable.

Secret information from Cairncross

943 At the Kursk Bulge, the fascists decided to take revenge for the defeats inflicted on them. This time they were confident of victory. But the German command did not yet know that Germany’s military operations were already known in the Kremlin. Top secret information from John Cairncross contained details of the latest German military technology. The Soviet command became aware of details about the power, maneuverability and armor protection of combat vehicles. The agent reported on the latest tests at German testing grounds.

For the first time, information was received about new and powerful Tiger tanks, which the Soviet command had no idea about. The Germans created a type of armor in which the armor-piercing shells of the Red Army were powerless. Thanks to such secret information, the Soviet Union was able to quickly produce new shells capable of making holes in fascist tank armor.

The intelligence officer's information about the metal composition of the armor and its properties was received in April 1943, three months before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Preparing for the upcoming battle

The Soviet side was able to take emergency measures to develop new weapons that would penetrate this armor. The tests were carried out in the strictest secrecy. At that time, the entire industry of the Soviet Union worked for the war. After the completion of the tests, mass production of shells capable of destroying German “tigers” began.

At the same time, Soviet tanks were modernized. In record time, the rear provided the army with the necessary weapons. There was a continuous stream of military equipment and military equipment heading to the site of the future battle. Thousands of German aircraft were based near the front line. The Fuhrer assigned a special role to Luftwaffe pilots in the operation on the Kursk Bulge.

"Citadel" (military operation) as the Wehrmacht's last chance

On July 1, 1943, Adolf Hitler returned to his "Wolf's Lair" command post in East Prussia. There will be no more delay. The day of Operation Citadel is set: July 4th. A. Hitler said: “We need a victory at Kursk to dispel the darkness in the hearts of our allies. Remembering the previous names of military operations, we can say that this is nothing. Only the Citadel will become the turning point of great Germany.”

Despite the intensifying Allied bombing, some Nazi troops were transferred to the east. Although many divisions were understrength, the total number of troops participating in Operation Citadel was quite impressive. Among them are the most experienced soldiers and officers, a large number of soldiers from the famous SS troops. The morale of the German military personnel was high.

Only victory will turn the tide of the war

Hitler decreed that Operation Citadel would be 100% a German affair. This confidence was reinforced by the large amount of modern equipment that arrived at the front every day. Unusually powerful Luftwaffe forces were concentrated at the airfields. In reality, all the weapons that Hitler intended to bring into battle in this battle were comparable to the amount prepared for the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941.

However, the sheer scale of the upcoming battle worried Adolf Hitler, and he ordered no public announcement of the upcoming Operation Citadel in advance. The Fuhrer said: “The mere thought of this turns me over, but I see no other way out.”

Morale of the Red Army

Germany faced an enemy that bore no resemblance to the pitiful battalions that had so easily surrendered in the early stages of the war. The myth of the invincibility of the German army was dispelled at Stalingrad. The defense capability of the Soviet side was strengthened. As a result, the superiority of our defense industry over the German military industry became noticeable. This superiority was manifested not only in quantity, but also in quality. In German military factories, products that did not meet accuracy standards were rejected. There was no culling at Soviet factories. Unusable shells were used as warheads for missiles. German infantrymen hardly cursed anything more than Soviet Katyushas.

Operation Citadel begins

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the Germans were waiting for the signal to attack. The first signal was given, but from the Soviet side. Having secret information about the start of the secret operation "Citadel", the Soviet command decided to strike first. More than 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns clashed in a decisive battle on both sides in the Battle of Prokhorovka. The Germans did not expect that our T-34 tanks would be able to hit the strong, heavy-duty armor of the Tigers. In fifty days, the Nazis lost half a million of their soldiers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 1,700 aircraft on these fields. These losses for Nazi Germany turned out to be irreparable.

Didn't take it by surprise

Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) learned quite early about the upcoming Operation Citadel. Zhukov's headquarters guessed about the offensive. Hitler was very tempted to take revenge after the Battle of Stalingrad.

During May and June 1943, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov ordered the laying of three deep belts of minefields along the perimeter of the arc.

Before the start of this monumental battle, Soviet troops had numerical superiority. Against 900 thousand German soldiers, G. K. Zhukov fielded 1 million 400 thousand. The superiority of the Soviet troops was especially noticeable in artillery. They had 20 thousand guns, which is twice as many as the enemy. The Red Army deployed 3,600 tanks against 2,700 German ones, 2,400 planes against 2,000 Luftwaffe planes.

Anxiety before the attack

By July 4, two large attacking groups were brought to full combat readiness. An atmosphere of gloomy anticipation reigned in the German troops, the reason for this was Operation Citadel. The Second World War gave many people the bitter taste of defeat and the sweet taste of victory. Everyone knew that even for the greatest victories, soldiers always pay a high price. Tomorrow may not always come.

Ten minutes before the German columns were supposed to begin moving, the Soviet side began artillery counter-preparation. It was an ominous warning.

Start of the offensive

Large attacking groups entered the battle. The skies filled with the roar of aircraft engines as thousands of aircraft from the two German fleets took to the air.

On the first day, the 9th Army, whose armored forces were commanded by Field Marshal Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891-1945), advanced from the north to the south, advancing seven miles. The movement of the army from the south was led by Field Marshal General Manstein, Erich von (1887-1973). She walked 11 miles deep into Soviet territory. It was an encouraging success that barely resembled a blitzkrieg. The Soviet minefields turned out to be very deep, and the troops dug in were well prepared for defense.

Imperfections of German technology

The offensive continued, and the German troops encountered increasing difficulties. First of all, it turned out that the technical characteristics of their tanks were worse than promised. The mechanical part of the “tigers” increasingly failed.

By the end of the first day, out of 200 of these tanks, only 40 were fully suitable for combat. In the air, numerical superiority gradually also passed to the Russians.

By the third day, the Germans had disabled more than 450 Soviet tanks. But the enemy still had superiority in armored forces. The Germans were especially disheartened by the fact that Soviet military technology, without any doubt, overtook the German one. The Soviets succeeded where Germany failed.

The T-34 tank, previously familiar to the Germans, was equipped with a heavy 122-mm cannon. The Nazis heard rumors of even more formidable machines. The German offensive was difficult. Although slowly, Hitler’s two armies gradually moved closer together. Especially Field Marshal Manstein, Erich von, had a slight advantage.

The Soviet style of command underwent noticeable radical changes. Marshal G. K. Zhukov's field commanders mastered the art of tactical withdrawal and probing counterattacks, and they lured German tanks into traps.

The Soviets also invented other methods. They created the so-called front package - a complex tactical grouping designed for both offense and defense.

His first line consisted of formidable Katyusha installations, followed by heavy artillery positions. When the latter did their job, the heavy tanks moved forward, carrying with them the infantry, which moved on board the lighter tanks. Operation Citadel began to crack. The constant order of attack of the front package allowed the Germans to develop the necessary countermeasures. But this did not help, such attacks still caused serious damage to the Wehrmacht soldiers.

After a week of brutal and uncompromising fighting, the German armored forces were significantly weakened, and the German command was forced to withdraw some of its units from the line of fire. This was required for a respite and regrouping of troops.

Battle of Prokhorovka

The Battle of Kursk (Operation Citadel) marked a decisive turning point in World War II. Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, and nothing could stop this impulse. From this moment on, Hitler's troops would never go on the offensive again. They will only retreat. Two large columns collided with each other. The result was a battle unprecedented in scale. Never before or since have such a number of tanks - more than one and a half thousand - taken part in one battle. This unprepared clash was not justified by strategic decisions.

Once the battle began, there was no tactical planning and no clear unified command. The tanks fought separately, firing directly. The equipment collided with the enemy’s equipment, mercilessly crushing it, or dying under its tracks. Among the tank crews of the Red Army, this battle became a legend and went down in history as a death raid.

Eternal memory to the heroes

From July 5 to July 16, 1943, Operation Citadel continued. The Second World War saw many glorious military victories. However, this battle occupies a special place in human memory.

Today only monuments remind of past battles on Kursk land. Thousands of people contributed to this momentous victory, earning the admiration and memory of posterity.