The collapse of the USSR was inevitable. The collapse of the USSR: historical inevitability or betrayal

In December 1991, the heads of the republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement on the creation of the GCC in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. This document actually meant the collapse of the Soviet Union. The political map of the world began to look different.

First, you need to decide what caused the global catastrophe in order to try to objectively assess the situation. There are many such reasons. This includes the degradation of the power elites of the “era of funerals,” which turned a powerful state into a not very powerful one, and problems in the economy that have long required effective reforms. This also includes strict censorship, deep internal crises, including increased nationalism in the republics.

It is naive to believe that the stars aligned and the state collapsed due to coincidental events. The main political opponent of the Soviet Union was also on the alert, imposing an arms race in which the USSR, given all the existing problems, did not have the opportunity to succeed. We must pay tribute to the intelligence and insight of Western geopoliticians who managed to undermine and destroy the seemingly unshakable “Soviet machine.”

The USSR collapsed into 15 states. In 1991, the following countries appeared on the world map: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan.

The Cold War, which resulted in the collapse of the USSR, was by no means reduced solely to indirect skirmishes on various fronts in countries such as Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. The Cold War took place in the heads and hearts of citizens of the USSR and the USA. Western propaganda was more sophisticated. The United States and its allies turned all their mass riots and discontent into a show. Hippies could preach love instead of war, and the authorities calmly allowed them to express their point of view, nevertheless continuing to pursue their policies. In the Soviet Union, dissent was harshly suppressed. And when they were allowed to think “otherwise,” it was too late. The wave of discontent fueled from outside (and the fifth column took an active part) was unstoppable.

There were many reasons for the collapse, but if we simplify everything, we can come to the conclusion that the USSR collapsed because of jeans, chewing gum and Coca-Cola. There were too many “forbidden fruits” that in reality turned out to be empty.

Options for resolving the situation.

It was probably possible to prevent the collapse of the USSR. It is difficult to say what solution would be ideal for the state, for the country, for the people, without knowing all the unknown factors. As an example, we can consider the People's Republic of China, which, thanks to the flexible actions of the authorities, managed to overcome the crisis of the socialist system.

However, do not underestimate the national component. Although both the Soviet Union and the PRC are multinational states, the peoples of China and the Soviet Union are by no means identical. The difference in culture and history makes itself felt.

We needed an idea for the people. It was necessary to come up with an alternative to the “American Dream”, which was teasing Soviet citizens from overseas. In the 30s, when the inhabitants of the USSR believed in the ideals of communism, the country turned from an agricultural one into an industrial one in record time. In the 40s It was not without faith in a just cause that the USSR defeated the enemy, who was stronger in military power at that time. In the 50s people were ready to raise virgin soil with sheer enthusiasm for the common good. In the 60s The Soviet Union was the first to send a man into space. Soviet people conquered mountain peaks, made scientific discoveries, and broke world records. All this happened largely because of faith in a bright future and for the good of his people.

For more than 20 years, according to most economic and social indicators, the newly formed countries have rolled back significantly.

Then the situation gradually began to worsen. The people began to understand the utopian ideals of the past. The country's government blindly continued to follow its line, without thinking about possible development alternatives. The aging leaders of the USSR reacted primitively to Western provocations, getting involved in unnecessary military conflicts. The outrageously expanding bureaucracy thought primarily about its own welfare rather than about the needs of the people, for whom all these “people’s” bodies were originally created.

There was no need to “tighten the screws” where the situation did not require it. Then the “forbidden fruits” would not have become so desirable, and the intriguers of the West would have lost their main weapon. Instead of mindlessly following obviously utopian ideals, it was necessary to pay attention in time to the needs of the people even at that time. And under no circumstances should you alternate “thaws” and other liberalities with strict prohibitions. Domestic and foreign policy had to be pursued justifiably strictly for the benefit of national interests, but without excesses.

For a long time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was, along with the United States of America, one of the two superpowers. In many important economic indicators, it ranked second in the world, second only to the United States, and in some cases even surpassed them.

The USSR achieved enormous success in the space program, in mining, and in the development of remote areas of Siberia and the Far North. Its collapse occurred very unexpectedly in December 1991. For the same reasons this happened?

The main socio-ideological reasons for the collapse of the USSR

The USSR included 15 national republics, which were very different in all respects, industry and agriculture, ethnicity, languages, religion, mentality, etc. Such a heterogeneous composition was fraught with a time bomb. To unite, consisting of such different parts, a common ideology was used - Marxism-Leninism, which declared its goal to build a classless society of “abundance”.

However, everyday reality, especially since the second half of the 70s of the last century, was very different from program slogans. It was especially difficult to combine the idea of ​​future “abundance” with commodity shortages.

As a result, the overwhelming majority of residents of the USSR stopped believing in ideological cliches.

The natural consequence of this was apathy, indifference, disbelief in the words of the country's leaders, as well as the growth of nationalist sentiments in the union republics. Gradually, more and more people began to come to the conclusion that they could continue to live like this.

The main military-political reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed

The USSR actually had to bear the gigantic burden of military expenses alone in order to maintain the balance of the Warsaw Pact it headed with the NATO bloc, since its allies were immeasurably weaker economically.

As military equipment became more complex and expensive, such costs became increasingly difficult to bear.

Prerequisites for the crisis of the system

The USSR was formed as a great one in 1922. At first it was an entity, but over time it turned into a state with power concentrated exclusively in Moscow. The republican authorities, in fact, received orders to carry out from Moscow. The natural process was their dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, timid at first, over time turning into open confrontation. The surge occurred during perestroika, for example, events in Georgia. But even then the problems were not solved, but were pushed even further inside, the solution to the problems was postponed “for later”, information about discontent was inaccessible, because it was carefully hidden by the authorities.

The USSR was initially created on the basis of recognition of the right of national republics to self-determination, that is, the state was built on the national-territorial principle. This right was enshrined in the Constitutions of 1922, 1936 and 1977. It was precisely this that prompted the republics to secede from the USSR.

The collapse of the USSR was also facilitated by the crisis that overtook the central government in the late 80s. The Republican political elites decided to take advantage of the opportunity to free themselves from the “Moscow yoke.” This is exactly how the actions of the central Moscow government towards them were considered in many republics of the former Soviet Union. And in the modern political world this same opinion still exists.

The significance of the collapse of the USSR

The significance of the collapse of the USSR cannot be overestimated even after more than 20 years. Yes, of such a scale, their possibility or impossibility is difficult to determine “hot on the heels.” Today we can say that, most likely, the collapse of the Union was irreversible due to the fact that the catalysts were many processes occurring during the 60-80s. 20th century.

Video on the topic

At twenty, turning forty seems so far away. But there comes a time when a woman after thirty “something” begins to ask herself questions whether at forty years old it is possible to still look twenty. What should you do so that others do not notice your age and continue to address you exclusively with the word “girl”?

Instructions

In reality, nothing is impossible. It has been proven that the correct selection and use of hormonal contraceptives for a long time gives a woman a second youth. Including external, not only physical. Women who have used new generation oral contraceptives for a long time experience skin aging at a much later age than those who were protected by other types of contraception. But here it is very important to choose the right reliable hormonal drug that is right for you. And this needs to be done with the help of a gynecologist-endocrinologist.

At thirty, you should definitely take a blood test at least once a year to determine the state of your hormonal levels. Menopause and its consequences, when the skin of the body inexorably ages, can occur at an early age. And normal levels of hormones in the blood will prevent its occurrence. If the state of hormones in a woman’s blood is not at the proper level, the doctor will select hormonal drugs for her that will supplement the body with the missing hormones. In this case, rejuvenation and the postponement of old age will not keep you waiting.

When a woman believes that without difficulty, just on genetics alone, she will be able to keep her appearance “in check,” she is mistaken. Stick to a normal diet that contains an abundance of vegetables, fruits, berries, and herbs. Drink plenty of regular drinking water every day, at least one and a half liters. Water maintains water balance inside the body and saturates skin cells with moisture.

After thirty years, purchase cosmetics with anti-aging effects. It is advisable to use creams, tonics and masks of the same line. If it seems weak to you and does not suit your skin, change the cosmetics manufacturer. Cleanse your face and neck of makeup and dirt every day in the evening, refresh it in the morning with pieces of ice from herbal infusions or water with drops of lemon juice.

Avoid visiting solariums and prolonged exposure to the sun. These procedures significantly age the skin. And if at 20 years old it will be practically unnoticeable, then at 30-40 you will notice that with an intense tan you look older than your age. If you go outside, always apply sunscreen to your face.

At forty, reconsider your makeup. Talk to your stylist about how best to take care of your skin and apply decorative cosmetics to it now. Makeup truly works wonders and can either add years to its owner or rejuvenate her face by several years.

Haircut and hair color will play a huge role in your appearance for visual rejuvenation. Do not suddenly change your color from dark brown-haired or brunette to blonde. If you decide, do it gradually, tone by tone. On the contrary, do not dye light curls in deep dark tones. As for hair length, there is an opinion that a short haircut reduces age. However, this is a misconception. Elongated hair hides the emerging double chin and neck skin, which becomes flabby over time. Choose a short haircut only if your hair has thinned and deteriorated over the years.

Be sure to lose weight to a normal weight. In turn, you should not lose weight from your body norm. Excess weight and severe thinness visually add extra years to a woman’s appearance.


Perestroika, initiated by Gorbachev, was not a transition of the state to another. Socialism was supposed to remain a state system. Perestroika was understood as the global modernization of the economy within the framework of the socialist economic model and the renewal of the ideological foundations of the state.

The leadership did not understand that a movement should be started, although there was a collective confidence in the need for change. Subsequently, this led to the collapse of a huge state, which occupied 1/6 of the land. However, one should not assume that if reforms are carried out effectively, sooner or later this collapse will not occur. Society was too much in need of new trends and changes, and the level of mistrust was at a critical level.

Consequences for the state

During perestroika, it became clear that the model of socialism created in the Soviet Union was practically unreformable. A perfect attempt to reform the system initiated a deep economic crisis in the state, which subsequently led the country to a dead end. Changes in policy, which made it possible to make the country more open and free, only led to the fact that the discontent that had been accumulating for many years among the masses was more than splashed out.

The belated perestroika of 1985-1991 is a disastrous example of what can happen to the state if the government hesitates to carry out reforms.

Mikhail Gorbachev is confident that the breakthrough made during perestroika is still relevant for most post-Soviet countries. New states still need powerful impulses and active government actions aimed at democratizing society, which will have to complete the processes begun back in 1985.

It is generally accepted that the collapse of the USSR was inevitable, and this point of view is held not only by those who considered it a “prison of nations”, or “the last of the endangered species - a relic” - a “multinational empire”, as an expert on problems of interethnic relations in the USSR put it M. Mandelbaum in the preface to the almanac of articles published by the American Council on Foreign Relations on the eve of the collapse of the USSR.* However, it is more correct to apply the term “dismemberment” to what happened, although it carries a certain charge of emotional assessment. Disintegration, that is, natural separation from a body that has not become a single fused organism, could be called a process in which the state would lose precisely those ethno-territorial units, those that existed before the entry into Russia of statehood, which were collected during Russian history. However, the division occurred in the overwhelming majority of cases not along those historical seams, which almost everywhere have almost completely dissolved, but along completely different lines. It can hardly be denied that, despite the abundance of problems, a certain blow was dealt along those lines that had already been cut by an arbitrary decision on the body of the state and many of its peoples in accordance with the historical ideology and political tasks of the creators of the socialist federation. It is appropriate to quote A. Motyl’s judgment that “contrary to widespread belief, the peoples of the Soviet Union are not so much awakening themselves as they are awakening them. They are asserting themselves to the point of demanding independence because perestroika forced them to do so. Ironically, none other than Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, a home-grown proletarian internationalist par excellence, should be considered the father of nationalism in the USSR."

In 1991, the main argument for recognizing the existing internal borders between the union republics as international and inviolable was the thesis of the need for peaceful and conflict-free dismantling, as well as the doctrine of the right of self-determining nations to secede. However, in the real conditions of a centuries-old unified state and the political ambitions of the elites, these tools turned out to be unsuitable for a consistent legitimate and conflict-free solution.

Thus, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, the blood in Bendery and the categorical reluctance of Transnistria to submit to the dictates of Chisinau, the war between the Abkhazians and Georgians, the persistent reluctance of the Russian population of Crimea to turn into Ukrainians showed that it was the adopted approach that inherently contained the potential for conflict and clash of interests, which continues to characterize the geopolitical the situation on the territory of the historical Russian state. Each of the union republics, in fact, represented a reduced copy of the Union - also a multinational entity. Moreover, unlike the country as a whole, which took shape over centuries, some republics were often created not at all along the boundaries of the ethnic or historical unity of the population. The titular nations of these republics, having proclaimed their right to self-determination, showed complete unwillingness to grant the same right that they achieved for themselves to nations falling into the position of national minorities within previously non-existent states.

The explanation for this, as a rule, came down to the impossibility of following the path of endless fragmentation of the country, although in reality such a prospect would not affect all republics. But it was obvious that dismantling the USSR by leaving it through a constitutional procedure would objectively contribute to a greater extent to the interests of Russia, the Russians and the peoples gravitating towards them. In this case, the Russian Federation itself would not even be affected. Contrary to the widespread illusion, the Russian Federation did not declare secession from the USSR, and even if everyone else declared secession, it would remain its legal successor, and its autonomy would not have the right to secede under the constitution, and the problem of choice would legally arise only before the peoples of the secessionists republics

From the very beginning, the CIS did not inspire hope that its institutions would implement a mechanism with the characteristics of a subject of world politics, preserving in a new form the geostrategic appearance of the historical state of Russia or the USSR. The reasons lie in the non-random amorphousness of the original legal instruments, and in the deep centrifugal tendencies that have become obvious. Nevertheless, the potential of the centripetal impulses of the peoples included in it, contrary to popular opinion, is also obvious. However, the specificity of the formation of new subjects of international relations in 1991 was such that it was the integration potential that was constrained, if not legally paralyzed, since the peoples gravitating towards Russia (except Belarus) were deprived of legal personality. This far from accidental reality not only made it difficult for Russia to maintain its geopolitical area, which immediately became the object of the foreign policy of surrounding interests, but also made the new states internally unstable, gave rise to armed conflicts, and inconsistency among governments.

It is now quite obvious that one of the deep and hardly removable reasons for both tragic clashes and contradictory integration and disintegration trends in the CIS is the double (in 1917 and 1991) redrawing of the historical Russian statehood, carried out according to the doctrine of the right of nations to self-determination, adopted by both Bolshevism and militant liberalism, two doctrines that historically strive for the destruction of nations and borders. “From the days of Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin throughout the century, the idea that ethnicity gives the right to lay claim to cultural and political rights and territory has had a wide resonance,” admits the American author R. G. Suny.

The national principle of organizing the Soviet state by identifying a titular nation on an arbitrarily defined territory and endowing it with special rights (state language, priority in the development of culture, the formation of governing bodies, the management of resources and capital, tax revenues) is a natural fruit of both the teachings of Locke and historical materialism as a philosophy , as well as a specific political doctrine of building “the world’s first state of workers and peasants,” carried out by Russian Bolsheviks and liberals on the ruins of historical Russia, declared a “prison of nations” for the success of the revolution.

The theory and practice contained antinomies and mutually exclusive tasks. On the one hand, the political slogan was to ensure the identity, preservation and “equal conditions” for the state development of all large and small nations, although equal representation of small and large people meant the opportunity for tiny nations to dictate their will to multi-million peoples. However, both from the point of view of small and from the point of view of the interests of large nations, the separation of titular nations did not eliminate, but only aggravated the problem, since not a single ethnic group is localized within one autonomous entity, and is sometimes specifically divided for political reasons.

“Socialist nations” and “socialist peoples” were constructed on the basis of real or imagined ethnocultural differences and “attached to a certain territory,” writes M. Strezhneva, and “members of the ethnic nation, which gave the name to the corresponding republic ... belonged to the titular population if they lived in "their" republic, and to national minorities if they permanently lived elsewhere within the Union. At the same time, ethnic Russians were essentially a transnational Soviet ethnos and the category of non-titular population in the Soviet Union consisted primarily of Russians." In the territories of these formations, not only Russians, but also many other peoples fell into the second class. In many formations, Russians made up the majority, and in some the titular nation was even in third place (in Bashkiria, for example, there are fewer Bashkirs than Russians and Tatars).

However, this problem was of little interest to architects, because historical materialism does not consider the nation to be a subject of history and assigns it only temporary significance, based on the movement towards a single communist model until the merger and disappearance of all nations. Therefore, the creation of quasi-state autonomous and republican formations along arbitrary borders with the Marxist goal of a general leveling of the spirit while preserving only the national form (the slogan of culture - socialist content - national form), in combination with the never-cancelled slogan “on the right of nations to self-determination up to and including secession”, at the beginning of the twentieth century laid a charge of enormous destructive force into the very foundation of Russian statehood.

It must be borne in mind that the number of peoples and nationalities once united in the Russian Empire was much greater than the number of arbitrarily designated “socialist” autonomies and quasi-state entities. With multiple redistributions of republican borders, both the Russian people and some other peoples, either completely or in parts, found themselves arbitrarily included in the newly created federal subjects, in violation of the agreements they had once independently concluded with Russia. These are the cases of Abkhazia and Ossetia, which independently entered Russia and were then made part of socialist Georgia, the dismemberment of the Lezgin people, the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the obvious situation of Crimea and Transnistria. Such an arbitrary division did not have a decisive significance for life in the USSR, but it turned into a drama of separation from Russia or the dismemberment of the nation in two during its collapse. This must be taken into account when judging the causes of conflicts, the prospects for the entire geopolitical space of the CIS, the relationships between its participants, and the role of external forces that are very interested in drawing new entities into their orbit and using conflicts between them for their own purposes.

Treating the dismemberment of the USSR as an accomplished fact of history, one cannot help but realize when considering the processes in its space that the circumstances of its liquidation largely laid the foundation for many of today’s conflicts and trends, and also programmed the most interested participation of the outside world in the processes. Strictly according to legal norms, the seceding union republics could be considered constituted as states only with the consensus of all their constituent peoples and after procedures that ensured that on the territory of the union republic that declared the desire for independence, each people and territory had the opportunity to freely choose their state affiliation.

In some republics the situation generally satisfied these criteria, but in a number of them the situation was far from such from the very beginning. Nevertheless, these new formations were immediately recognized by the international community, and the conflicts that arose precisely on the issue of secession from the USSR and the constitution of an independent state, which arose before the fact of recognition and formalization of independence, were declared “separatist”, as if they had arisen on the territory of long-established and legitimate recognized states.

Failure to provide a constitutional procedure for secession from the Union allows parties to conflicts today to challenge the historical fate imposed on them. It is for these reasons that the process of national-state reorganization of the post-Soviet space in these states themselves is not considered complete by everyone, and the territorial and legal status of its former republics is considered final. But one way or another, and this is also a given, Moscow, in accordance with the internal political circumstances of its own chosen method of liquidating the USSR, as well as in connection with external pressure, recognized the existing administrative borders as international.

Thus, the potential for conflict was inherent in the ongoing process of disintegration of a single state along non-historical borders. It has not been overcome, only changing its forms and dynamics depending on the orientation of new states on the world stage. Here we come to a very important and defining aspect of the problems of the CIS and the entire geopolitical area of ​​the historical Russian state.

It makes no sense to deny that the revolution of 1917 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 had internal preconditions. However, it is also indisputable that the external context in 1991 played a greater role in the internal political life of Russia than at any other time in history. Moreover, in the twentieth century. “Realpolitik,” unlike the times of “tyrants,” hides under ideological clichés, as demonstrated by communist universalism, and now repeated by the “one world” philosophy.

Parallels with the revolution are obvious in the policies of the West, especially Anglo-Saxon interests. It is curious that the United States responded to the dramatic events of 1991 in the spirit of its strategy of 1917 and welcomed the destruction of the communist power with the same words as the collapse of the Russian power at the beginning of the century. The policy of omnipresent American interests in the mid-90s showed distinctly “neo-Wilsonian” features. When the protagonist of “freedom and democracy” in Moscow, Kiev and Tbilisi, President Bush, having promised recognition to Ukraine, blessed the Belovezh Accords, when the United States recognized Georgia without waiting for the legitimization of the Tbilisi regime, we involuntarily recalled the times of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, House and W. Wilson with their Program from XIV points, Lloyd George's plan for the dismemberment of Russia, an attempt to immediately recognize all the "de facto" existing governments on the territory of the "former" Russian Empire, etc. But behind all this is H. Mackinder’s scheme - a belt of small and weak states from the Baltic to the Black Sea, confirmed by the conclusion of the American Council on Foreign Relations of August 1941 on the need for a “buffer zone between the Slavs and the Teutons,” controlled by the Anglo-Saxons through multilateral structures and supranational mechanisms .

D.E. Sorokin

For Russia, the transition to the 21st century. coincided with a geopolitical catastrophe - the collapse of the state. Discussions about the causes of this collapse and the possibilities of preventing it are apparently destined for a long life. However, it seems that at the heart of the system-wide crisis that struck Russia at the end of the 20th century was a “failure” in the functioning of its economic system.

In this regard, the question inevitably arises: are there not some deep-seated (fundamental) reasons behind the subjective actions that led to a severe economic crisis, but which, by definition, could have been prevented (prevented, changed), which led to the fact that the economy, possessing colossal natural resource, production, scientific, technical, military, human, etc. potential and therefore turning the USSR into the second (after the USA) superpower, essentially self-destructed? The author wanted to express his point of view on this issue.

1. Model of administrative-command, or mobilization, economy

The economic system in question was created at the turn of the 20-30s of the twentieth century. Of course, throughout its functioning it changed its forms, but its essential features remained practically unchanged. It was a system built on the principle of a single factory operating according to a single plan, where each enterprise played the role of one of the “shops” of such a factory, which, in essence, turned it into a monopolist. 1

Accordingly, the mechanism for regulating such a system required building a rigid management vertical, where each hierarchical level of management had unlimited power in relation to the managed object. Such a system was inevitably based on non-economic methods of stimulating the activities of management objects - be it individuals or entire teams - which served as the basis for giving it the name “command-administrative” Although, of course, this is not entirely correct, since methods were used to a lesser extent moral stimulation, including those based on the enthusiasm of people, many of whom considered themselves the creators of a new history of mankind. Economic incentives were also used, primarily in the field of material incentives. But the main ones remained command and administrative levers.

Nowadays, the reasons why this system was created are not important: the theoretical and ideological views of its creators, their personal qualities, multiplied by the struggle for power, the specific historical conditions that developed in Russia and in the world at that time, etc. Apparently , both played a role, and the third. What is important now is the very fact of creating such a system, which existed for 60 years, during which the country turned into a powerful industrial power, carried out a cultural revolution, created systems of mass health care and social protection for the population for the first time in the world, eliminated unemployment, bore the brunt of World War II and finally became the second superpower. It is clear that all this would have been impossible to achieve if the created economic system had not ensured the creation of an appropriate resource base.

Of course, from a moral and ethical point of view, one cannot but agree with the fairness of the harsh assessments of those forms, methods, mechanisms, including political ones, that led to colossal irreversible human losses that were used to achieve these results. However, we must not forget that socio-economic progress, at least until the second half of the 20th century, both in Russia and in the world, was carried out on the same basis. Consider the history of colonial conquest, land enclosure and anti-vagrancy laws in England during the formation of the capitalist system, directed against its own citizens, the destruction of the indigenous population in North America and slave labor on its cotton plantations. Peter's industrialization in Russia was carried out in a similar way. Another question is that, due to a number of historical reasons, Russia went through the corresponding stages of its development at a time when the countries of Europe and America had already completed them, which allowed the so-called civilized world to condemn the mechanisms used here, forgetting about their own history.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Russian economic system was unable to respond to the challenges of modern times and disappeared from the historical stage. To answer the question whether there were objective grounds for this, let’s take a closer look at the history of the functioning of the created economic system.

On December 8, 1991, the collapse of the USSR was officially formalized. The document, which testified that the Soviet Union no longer exists, was signed by the heads of 3 countries: Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. The former Union included 15 countries. Now these republics became completely independent.

1991 was a fateful year. The political map of the world has lost a large country. Instead of one power, a number of independent states emerged. The collapse of the USSR did not happen immediately. The end of the 80s was characterized by perestroika. Perestroika was a set of reforms that were supposed to have a positive impact on the political and economic life of the Soviet Union. The new ideology did not live up to the expected results. The population was extremely unhappy. It wanted a change in leadership. But many did not want the collapse of the huge country. Reality dictated its terms. It was impossible to change the structure of the state without significant consequences.

On June 12, 1991, Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin became President of Russia. Vice-President G. Yanaev, Minister of Defense
D. Yazov, KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, Prime Minister V. Pavlov on August 19 created the State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP). A state of emergency was declared, and media and democratic organizations temporarily ceased their activities. There was a putsch. A putsch is an attempted coup or, in fact, a coup itself. It was the August putsch that helped disrupt the political system.

Prerequisites for the crisis of the system

The USSR was born in 1922. At first, this formation resembled a federation, but soon all power was concentrated in Moscow. The republics only received instructions from the capital. Of course, the authorities of other territories did not like this. At first it was hidden discontent, but gradually the conflict escalated. During perestroika the situation only worsened. An example of this was the events in Georgia. But the central government did not solve these problems. The devil-may-care attitude gave its results. Although ordinary citizens were completely unaware of political battles. All information was carefully hidden.

At the very beginning of their existence, the Soviet republics were promised the right to self-determination. This was included in the Constitutions of 1922, 1936 and 1977. It was this right that helped the republics secede from the USSR.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was also influenced by the crisis of power that was in Moscow. The republics of the former USSR took advantage of the weakness of the central government. They wanted to get rid of the “Moscow yoke.”

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In these August days, we traditionally hear from the lips of various anti-Soviet and anti-communists words about the supposed “inevitability” of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Here, in addition to outright lies and hatred of the Soviet past and socialism in general, we are faced with a deliberate confusion of concepts. It’s one thing, if we talk specifically about the situation that developed after Yeltsin’s coup on August 21-23, 1991 and the frank permanent connivance of the “democrats” on the part of the still President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev - then, perhaps, the great country really was doomed. But this was already the end of the tragic process that began with the breakthrough of the traitor Gorbachev to supreme power in the party and country in the spring of 1985. But is there any basis to assert that the Soviet Union was supposedly “doomed” even before the start of the disastrous “perestroika”?

WE WILL NOT dwell here on the frankly delusional fabrications of the remaining few "democrats" of the Yeltsin-Gaidar type regarding some supposedly "growing ethnic contradictions" in Soviet society in the 1970s - early 1980s. Suffice it to remember that in any living, developing organism - be it a person or a society - certain contradictions are inevitable. Another thing is that if we compare individual conflicts that arose in Soviet times on national grounds at the everyday level with those that are now literally multiplying before our eyes in the “developed” West, then Soviet contradictions will have to be examined under a microscope! Moreover, no sane person would talk about any kind of “increase” of them - of course, before Gorbachev’s team came to power. In general, it is very appropriate here to recall the more than indicative results of the all-Russian Levada Center survey conducted in December last year in connection with the 25th anniversary of the collapse of the USSR and the signing of the criminal Belovezhskaya Accords, published in the official Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Of particular interest are the answers to the question about the main reasons for the collapse of the USSR.

So, the first three places - with a large gap from the rest - were taken by the following answer options: “it was an irresponsible and unfounded conspiracy between Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich”, “it was a conspiracy of foreign forces hostile to the USSR”, “population’s dissatisfaction with the leadership of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage." As we can see, all three main reasons named by the Russians, albeit not completely and systematically, but, as V.I. Lenin, from a political point of view, absolutely correctly reflects the opinion of the majority of the people about the absence of any “inevitability” of the collapse of the Union.

It is especially noteworthy that only in sixth place is the option “complete exhaustion of communist ideology.” But we constantly hear on state television channels and from the mouths of high-ranking figures of the “party in power” the exact opposite - that is, exactly the same “exhaustion” that allegedly gripped the entire society and even the majority of members of the CPSU. Some time ago, the leader of United Russia himself, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, “marked his mark” in this field, declaring at one of his meetings with United Russia activists that by the 1980s, “there was no one any more (meaning members of the Communist Party. - O.Ch.) didn’t believe in anything.” Well, if at the department of Professor A. Sobchak at Leningrad University people gathered, to put it mildly, insincere, then this is not at all a reason to attribute such a quality to the entire Soviet people... Moreover, as we see, even today’s Russians clearly spoke out in favor of that in itself is a great ideology - in contrast to the main ideologists of Gorbachev’s Central Committee themselves! - not exhausted at all! fell herself. And therefore, despite the existing individual difficulties, the activities of certain individuals who discredited the party, on this side there were no objective grounds for the collapse of the USSR by March 1985.

And now - about the economy. The incantations about the “scientific and technological lag” of the USSR have already set people on edge. But what about the indisputable fact that by the beginning of the 1980s, for example, the Soviet machine tool industry was at the world level - both in terms of production organization and in terms of the quality of products? This is what Peter Nolan, a professor at the University of Cambridge and director of the Cambridge Center for Scientific Research on Development Problems, writes in the magazine “Free Economy”: “In the early 1990s, I was in Moscow at the Krasny Proletary plant. The most complex world-class equipment and advanced systems were installed there with numerical program control (emphasis mine. - O.Ch.)." We draw attention to the most important detail: one of the leading Moscow enterprises still had world-class equipment by the early 1990s, and yet it was installed just before the destructive processes of “perestroika”! Or, perhaps, for the gentlemen “democrats” in company with the “United Russia” members, the certificate from the University of Cambridge, in front of which they usually stand at attention, suddenly became unauthoritative?.. By the way, it would not be a bad idea to remember that only “Red” Proletarian" produced from its assembly lines monthly several thousand of the most advanced machines of various systems, some of which were exported to 32 countries of the world. Not crude oil and gas, mind you!.. For comparison: as Professor Yakov Mirkin from the Russian Academy of Sciences reminds, today all of Russia produces no more than 350 metal-cutting machines per month. Should I say something here or not?

Or, perhaps, remind the “reformers” whose scientific discoveries underlie the operation of all mobile phones, all kinds of smartphones, iPhones and iPads that they, their wives and children use? So, these discoveries were made in the 1960s - 1970s by outstanding Soviet physicists, Nobel laureates Zhores Alferov, now alive, and Vitaly Ginzburg, now deceased. Yes, the Soviet Union during the leadership of L.I. Brezhnev did not have the strength and opportunity to fully use these brilliant discoveries, but perhaps today’s, all “advanced” and “democratic” Russia is using them? Organized their production? But no, all these, as they say, fashionable gadgets, Russia, as well as almost the rest of the world, buys from China, led by the Communist Party! So, someone, but not today’s “democrats,” should broadcast something about “Soviet technical and technological backwardness.” And finally, another example concerning a subject that has become almost a symbol of life for today’s generations - the Internet. Professor of Communication Technologies at Tusla University (USA) Benjamin Peters testifies: “In the 60s of the 20th century, Soviet and American scientists almost simultaneously took important steps towards the development of computer technology. Moreover, the USSR often overtook the USA (emphasis added. - O.Ch .)".

In his book, “How Not to Network a Country: The Complicated History of the Soviet Internet,” published in the USA, Professor Peters writes: “So, at the end of 1969, the ARPANET computer network (the progenitor of the Internet) was launched in the United States. And in the USSR, the idea was to connect computers with a single network was first expressed by the Soviet scientist Anatoly Kitov back in 1959, and the first developments in this area appeared in 1962, when academician Viktor Glushkov presented the project of the National Automated System of Accounting and Information Processing (OGAS), which was intended for automated management of the entire economy of the USSR ( highlighted by me. - O.Ch.)".

“First proposed in 1962,” Professor Peters further writes, “OGAS was aimed at becoming a nationwide real-time remote access computer network, built on the existing telephone networks and their predecessors. The ambitious idea was to cover a large part of Eurasia - every factory, every enterprise of the Soviet planned economy is such a “nervous system” (emphasis added - O.Ch.)."

Yes, unfortunately, such brilliant proposals were not, as they say, put into production on time: they were in the way and insufficient - compared to the times of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin - the intellectual level of the post-Stalin leadership, which Pravda has repeatedly written about, and the exorbitant burden of military expenditures necessary to confront the United States and its allies on a global scale. But there were such proposals and discoveries, which indicated the highest level of scientific and technological development of the USSR. The problems mentioned were, in principle, solvable, and none of them made the collapse of the Soviet Union “inevitable,” no matter how today’s anti-Sovietists in company with Russophobes fluttered about this topic.