Complete defeat of German troops in Crimea and liberation of the peninsula.

In the fall of 1943, Soviet troops, having broken through the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus, captured a bridgehead on the southern shore of Sivash Bay, and also expanded the bridgehead in the Kerch region. The Crimea was blocked, but the 17th German Army was preparing to defend itself (commander - Colonel General Erwin Jäneke, from May 1 - General Karl Almendinger) consisting of five German and seven Romanian divisions, a total of about 200 thousand people, more than three and a half thousand guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns, about 150 aircraft. By holding Crimea, the enemy created a threat to the rear of Soviet troops on the right bank of Ukraine, while covering his own Balkan strategic flank and sea communications from the straits to the ports of the western coast of the Black Sea and up the Danube.

The Crimean operation was entrusted to the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (Army General Fedor Tolbukhin) and the Separate Primorsky Army (Army General Andrei Eremenko) in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet (Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky) and the Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral Sergei Gorshkov). The ground operational group included 30 rifle divisions and two marine brigades (470 thousand people, about six thousand guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,250 aircraft).

The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla included a battleship, four cruisers, six destroyers, 47 torpedo and 80 patrol boats, and 29 submarines. Organized partisan forces in Crimea united 4 thousand people.

The operation was coordinated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky.
Initially, the operation was planned to begin on February 18-19, but later the date was repeatedly postponed, both in order to link the offensive in Crimea with active operations in the Kherson-Nikolayev-Odessa direction, and because of the weather.

The idea was that the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north (from Perekop and Sivash) and the Separate Primorsky Army from the east (from Kerch) would launch a simultaneous attack in a general direction towards Simferopol and Sevastopol, dismember and destroy the enemy group, preventing its evacuation .

On the morning of April 8 (after five days of artillery preparation), units of the 51st Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front struck from a bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash and two days later broke through the enemy’s defenses, reaching the flank of the German group on Perekop. At the same time, the 2nd Guards Army liberated Armyansk, and on the morning of April 11, the 19th Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough, immediately captured Dzhankoy and moved to Simferopol. Fearing encirclement, the enemy left the fortifications on Perekop, and also began to retreat from the Kerch Peninsula. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, having launched an offensive on the night of April 11, captured Kerch in the morning.

The pursuit of enemy troops retreating to Sevastopol began in all directions. The 2nd Guards Army developed an offensive along the western coast towards Yevpatoria. The 51st Army, using the success of the 19th Tank Corps, moved across the steppe to Simferopol. A separate Primorsky army advanced through Feodosia to Sevastopol. On April 13, Evpatoria, Simferopol and Feodosia were liberated, on April 14-15 - Bakhchisarai, Alushta and Yalta, and on April 15-16, troops from three sides reached the Sevastopol area.

According to the plan for the assault on the Sevastopol fortified area, units of the 51st Army and the Primorsky Army, which became part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, struck from the southeast, from Balaklava to the Sapun Mountain area with the task of cutting off the enemy from the bays west of Sevastopol. An auxiliary strike from the north in the zone of the 2nd Guards Army in the direction of the Northern Bay was aimed at pinning the German group to the sea.

On May 5, after two unsuccessful attempts to break through and regroup, the 2nd Guards Army went on the offensive. On May 7, with the support of all front aviation, the decisive assault began. The strike forces broke through the enemy's defenses in a nine-kilometer area and captured Sapun Mountain. On May 9, troops from the north, east and southeast broke into Sevastopol.

The remnants of the German 17th Army, pursued by the 19th Tank Corps, retreated to Cape Chersonesus, where they were completely defeated. More than 20 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured on the cape alone, and in total, during the 35 days of the operation, the losses of the 17th Army exceeded 140 thousand people. Soviet troops and naval forces lost almost 18 thousand killed and 67 thousand wounded.

In honor of the liberation of Sevastopol in Moscow on May 10, a salute was given with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns.

As a result of the Crimean operation, 160 formations and units received the honorary names of Evpatoria, Kerch, Perekop, Sevastopol, Sivash, Simferopol, Feodosia and Yalta.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

The Crimean operation is an offensive operation of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander Army General F.I. Tolbukhin) and the Separate Primorsky Army (Army General A.I. Eremenko) in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet (Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky) and the Azov Military flotilla (Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov) April 8 - May 12 with the aim of liberating Crimea from Nazi troops during the Great Patriotic War of 1941/45. As a result of the Melitopol operation on September 26 - November 5, 1943 and the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation on October 31 - November 11, 1943, Soviet troops broke through the fortifications of the Turkish Wall on the Perekop Isthmus and captured bridgeheads on the southern coast of Sivash and on the Kerch Peninsula, but at that time liberated Crimea to them failed due to lack of strength. The 17th German Army was blocked and, relying on deeply echeloned defensive positions, continued to hold Crimea. In April 1944, it included 5 German and 7 Romanian divisions (about 200 thousand people, about 3,600 guns and mortars, over 200 tanks and assault guns, 150 aircraft).

Soviet troops consisted of 30 rifle divisions, 2 marine brigades, 2 fortified areas (in total about 400 thousand people, about 6,000 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,250 aircraft).

On April 8, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, with the support of aviation from the 8th Air Army and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, went on the offensive, the 2nd Guards Army captured Armyansk, and the 51st Army went to the flank of the Perekop enemy group, which began to retreat. On the night of April 11, the Separate Primorsky Army went on the offensive with the support of the aviation of the 4th Air Army and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet and captured the city of Kerch in the morning. The 19th Tank Corps, introduced into the zone of the 51st Army, captured Dzhankoy, which forced the Kerch enemy group to begin a hasty retreat to the west. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops reached Sevastopol on April 15-16...

Great Soviet Encyclopedia

THIS WAS OUR TASK ON MAY 9

I would like to dwell especially on the Crimean operation, because, in my opinion, it is not sufficiently covered...

If you look at the maps of the battles of 1855, 1920, 1942 and 1944, it is easy to see that in all four cases the defense of Sevastopol was built in approximately the same way. This is explained by the most important role that natural factors played here: the location of the mountains, the presence of the sea, the nature of the area. And now the enemy clung to points that were advantageous from the point of view of protecting the city. The new commander Allmendinger burst out with a special appeal to the search: “The Fuhrer entrusted me with command of the 17th Army... I received orders to defend every inch of the Sevastopol bridgehead. I demand that everyone defend themselves in the full sense of the word; so that no one would retreat and would hold every trench, every crater and every trench. In the event of a breakthrough by enemy tanks, the infantry must remain in their positions and destroy tanks both at the front line and in the depths of the defense with powerful anti-tank weapons... The honor of the army depends on protecting every meter of the territory entrusted to us. Germany expects us to do our duty. Long live the Fuhrer!

But already on the first day of the assault on the Sevastopol fortified area, the enemy suffered a major defeat and was forced to abandon the main defensive line and withdraw troops to the internal perimeter. To eliminate the defenses on it and finally liberate Sevastopol - that was our task on May 9. The fighting did not stop at night. Our bomber aviation was especially active. We decided to resume the general attack at 8 am on May 9th. We demanded from the commander of the 2nd Guards Zakharov to eliminate the enemy on the northern side of the city in a day and reach the coast of the Northern Bay along its entire length; with the left flank corps, strike at the Ship's side and take possession of it. The commander of the Primorsky Army, Melnik, was ordered to use night infantry actions to capture the Nameless Height southwest of state farm No. 10 and ensure the entry of the 19th Tank Corps into battle.

At exactly 8 o'clock the 4th Ukrainian resumed the general assault on Sevastopol. The fighting for the city continued all day, and by the end of it, our troops reached a defensive line prepared in advance by the enemy from Streletskaya Bay to the sea. Ahead lay the last strip of Crimea that still belonged to the Nazis - from Omega to Cape Chersonese.

On the morning of May 10, an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief followed: “To Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky. Army General Tolbukhin. The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, supported by massive air and artillery strikes, as a result of three-day offensive battles broke through the heavily fortified long-term German defenses, consisting of three strips of reinforced concrete defensive structures, and a few hours ago stormed the fortress and the most important naval base on Black Sea - the city of Sevastopol. Thus, the last center of German resistance in Crimea was eliminated and Crimea was completely cleared of Nazi invaders.” Next, all the troops who distinguished themselves in the battles for Sevastopol were listed, which were nominated for assignment of the name Sevastopol and for awarding orders.

On May 10, the capital of the Motherland saluted the valiant troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which liberated Sevastopol.

35 DAYS

On May 7 at 10:30, with massive support from all front aviation, Soviet troops began a general assault on the Sevastopol fortified area. The troops of the front's main strike group broke through the enemy defenses along a 9-kilometer stretch and captured Sapun Mountain during fierce battles. On May 9, front troops from the north, east and southeast broke into Sevastopol and liberated the city. The remnants of the German 17th Army, pursued by the 19th Tank Corps, retreated to Cape Khersones, where they were completely defeated. At the cape, 21 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured, and a large amount of equipment and weapons were captured.

On May 12, the Crimean offensive operation ended. If in 1941-1942. While it took German troops 250 days to capture heroically defended Sevastopol, in 1944 Soviet troops only needed 35 days to break through powerful fortifications in Crimea and clear almost the entire peninsula of the enemy.

The objectives of the operation were achieved. Soviet troops broke through the deeply echeloned defenses on the Perekop Isthmus, the Kerch Peninsula, in the Sevastopol region and defeated the 17th Field Army of the Wehrmacht. Its losses on land alone amounted to 100 thousand people, including over 61,580 people captured. During the Crimean operation, Soviet troops and naval forces lost 17,754 people killed and 67,065 people wounded.

As a result of the Crimean operation, the last large enemy bridgehead that threatened the rear of the fronts operating in Right Bank Ukraine was eliminated. Within five days, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, was liberated and favorable conditions were created for a further offensive in the Balkans.

The liberation of Crimea and Sevastopol in April-May 1944 was one of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War: the Soviet Union defeated the 200,000-strong German-Romanian group and regained control of the Black Sea. The last city on the peninsula to be liberated was Sevastopol, on May 9. But on May 10, 1944, Moscow saluted the soldiers, sailors and officers of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Primorsky Army also because this victory was symbolic: the liberators regained places that had always been and will be associated with the military glory of Russia. recalls how the Crimean offensive operation took place.

Kerch landing

The Red Army made attempts to enter Crimea on the move until 1944. In the fall of 1943, troops of the North Caucasus Front liberated the Taman Peninsula. The Supreme High Command set the task of seizing a bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula. In early November, ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla landed units of the 18th and 56th armies on the eastern outskirts of Crimea - soldiers and officers were transported on torpedo boats, longboats and fishing schooners. Soviet troops drove the Germans out of a small piece of land - from the edge of the coast to the outskirts of Kerch. The paratroopers held out on this bridgehead until the beginning of April, when the Crimean offensive operation began. By that time, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front had already occupied a bridgehead in the north of Crimea. Back in November 1943, they crossed the Sivash and made their way to Armyansk on the Perekop Isthmus.

“With the advance of our troops to the lower reaches of the Dnieper, to the Perekop Isthmus, to Sivash and with the simultaneous capture of a bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula, the enemy group (17th German Army and a number of Romanian formations), defending in the Crimea, found itself blocked and cut off from the rest of the enemy’s ground forces ", the marshal, who then held the post of chief, described the situation on the peninsula before the start of the Soviet offensive in his memoirs.

The defending Germans numbered about 200 thousand, with 3,600 guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns and 150 aircraft. The strike force of the Red Army consisted of 470 thousand people, a little less than 6 thousand guns and mortars, more than 500 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and 1,250 aircraft.

Behind enemy lines

According to the plans of the Soviet command, the offensive was to begin simultaneously from the north - with the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front, and from the east, from the bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula - by units of the separate Primorsky Army (the former 56th Army). The goal of the operation was to fragment the German-Romanian group and destroy it, preventing it from evacuating from the peninsula. Vasilevsky explained that the Soviet command decided to deliver the main blow from positions beyond Sivash, hoping to take the enemy by surprise. “In addition, the blow from Sivash, if successful, would bring our troops to the rear of all enemy fortifications on Perekop, and therefore allow us to break out into the vast expanses of Crimea much faster,” the marshal detailed in his memoirs.

The 4th Ukrainian Front, advancing from the north, was supposed to liberate Dzhankoy, and then attack in the direction of Simferopol. The separate Primorsky Army was tasked with attacking from the east on Simferopol and Sevastopol, and with part of its forces along the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula.

Due to bad weather and storms in the Sea of ​​Azov, the start of the operation was postponed. Finally, on April 8, after artillery preparation, the Red Army went on the offensive; A few days later, Soviet units reached the flank of a group of German troops at Perekop and took Dzhankoy. To avoid encirclement, parts of the Wehrmacht began to roll back. The fears of the Soviet command that the Wehrmacht would use the mountainous terrain of the peninsula for a stubborn defense were not confirmed: in general, the operation developed as planned.

At the same time, the Separate Primorsky Army was advancing through Karasubazar (Belogorsk - approx. "Tapes.ru") and Feodosia to Sevastopol. On April 13, Soviet troops liberated Yevpatoria, Simferopol and Feodosia; by April 16, the Wehrmacht was driven out of Bakhchisarai, Alushta and Yalta.

“The Red Army was strong in armored vehicles, and its command chose the direction of attack on tank-accessible terrain - along the Yalta Highway. The Germans abandoned such tactics in 1942 because they had more artillery and fewer tanks and feared the impact of the Black Sea Fleet firing on Soviet ships. In general, the Black Sea Fleet operated according to the principle of fleet on being, as the British say, - it was in action, it pinned down the enemy’s forces: having superiority at sea, the Soviet command could strike where it was convenient for it,” says the military historian, candidate of historical sciences.

General assault on Sevastopol

Two attempts to take Sevastopol on the move failed - the Germans repelled attacks on April 19 and 23. On May 7, after a regrouping of forces, the Red Army began a general assault on the Sevastopol fortified area, breaking through the enemy positions on the same day, and broke into Sapun Mountain. As Isaev notes, contrary to the legends about heavy losses, several dozen Red Army soldiers and officers were killed during the assault on Sapun Mountain - Soviet units wisely used their advantage in firepower and air superiority. “The impression was that on Sapun Mountain there was not a single square meter of clean land: it all seemed to consist of solid firing points... An avalanche of fire also fell on Sapun Mountain from the air. In this stream of metal, the attack pilots managed to fix the firing points and methodically suppressed them,” recalled the pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union, who then fought in the Crimea.

Communication by sea for the blocked group of German-Romanian troops became problematic at the very beginning of the assault on Sevastopol due to mistakes by its command. “When Soviet troops took the key height - Sapun Mountain, the commander of the German 17th Army, Karl Allmendinger, almost without a fight surrendered the northern side, where there were good positions: the 365th battery, the 30th battery, where the Red Army was in 1942 defended herself stubbornly. Soviet units reached the bay, German and Romanian ships entering the harbor were shot immediately from field cannons,” explains Isaev.

German units were driven out of the city on May 9. The next day, fireworks went off in Moscow in honor of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front who liberated Sevastopol. The remnants of the German 17th Army and Romanian units retreated to a piece of land near Cape Chersonese. As in the Battle of Stalingrad, in the last days of the liberation of Crimea, the evacuation became another tragedy for the German army and its Romanian allies. “The Germans began to evacuate everything that was in Crimea already in April 1944, until Hitler called Sevastopol a fortress and ordered to stay in it until the last. Only a small part of the group that defended Sevastopol was taken out. In addition, Soviet aviation created several “titanics” at sea: they sank several loaded transports, for example, four thousand German soldiers and officers on the Romanian motor ship Totila. If you look at this episode from the point of view of German documents - for example, the report of the commander of the German naval forces in the Black Sea, Helmut Brinkmann - then it was a disaster,” says Isaev.

Photo: Alexander Sokolenko / RIA Novosti

One of the German soldiers who survived the evacuation from Sevastopol recalled: “In order not to drown, we threw overboard all the weapons, ammunition, then all the dead, and all the same, when we arrived in Constanta, we stood in the water up to our necks in the holds, and the bedridden wounded all drowned... At the hospital, the doctor told me that most of the barges were half filled with the dead.”

In some ways, exactly the opposite situation was repeated when, on the 20th of June 1942, German units, having occupied the northern side of the city, excluded the possibility of normally supplying the city, which predetermined the collapse of its defense, and the remnants of the Primorsky Army, deprived of the opportunity to evacuate, fought on Cape Chersonesus. Thus ended more than six months of defense of Crimea by Soviet troops. In 1944, they would liberate the peninsula in 35 days.

“No name is pronounced in Russia with such reverence”

From the point of view of military art, the liberation of Crimea and the battles for Sevastopol are also interesting because there the Wehrmacht tried to apply Hitler’s new concept: to make fortresses out of defended cities. “The concept was outlined in order number 11 of March 8, 1944. The Fuhrer named the cities that the German army had to hold even in the event of encirclement. This was a reference to the experience of the 17th-19th centuries, the experience of the Napoleonic wars. For the Germans, theorists of maneuverable, lightning-fast warfare, this was a setback in the art of war. But, despite the catastrophic consequences of using this concept, during the defense of Crimea it was used until 1945, even on German territory - and with the same result,” says Isaev.

The historian emphasizes that the liberation of Crimea was one of the turning points in the war: “In August 1944, the Antonescu regime fell in Romania, Bucharest ceased to be an ally of Berlin. One of the impetus for this was the defeat of the Romanian army in Crimea with a large number of prisoners. The liberation of Sevastopol also influenced Turkey’s position towards the Germans: before this, Ankara, formally being a neutral party, secretly supplied the Reich with chrome ore. And for the Soviet Union, this meant not only the return of its land, but also the restoration of control over the Black Sea.”

The total irretrievable losses of German and Romanian troops on the peninsula amounted to about 100 thousand people, the 17th Wehrmacht Army virtually ceased to exist, and the Soviet Union regained control over the Black Sea. The successful completion of the Crimean offensive operation also had symbolic significance. “When General Karl Allmendinger took command of the 17th German Army in the Crimea, he appealed to the soldiers and officers to defend Sevastopol, because not a single name is pronounced in Russia with such reverence as the name of this city - this is an almost verbatim quote from his order,” says Isaev.

160 formations and units of the Red Army received honorary names associated with Crimea: Evpatoria, Kerch, Perekop, Sevastopol, Sivash, Simferopol, Feodosia and Yalta. More than two hundred Red Army soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In Soviet times, Sevastopol and Kerch were awarded the title of hero cities. Feodosia became the city of military glory of Russia in 2015, after the peninsula returned to its native harbor.

Due to its geographic location, the Crimean Peninsula represented an extremely important strategic position in the Black Sea basin. Possessing Crimea, the enemy kept the Soviet troops operating in the south of Ukraine under constant threat of attack from the rear, and hampered the actions of our Black Sea Fleet. The decision of the fascist German command to defend Crimea was also determined by political considerations. The loss of Crimea would mean for Germany a sharp drop in prestige in the countries of South-Eastern Europe and in “neutral” Turkey, which served as important sources of oil and other critically scarce strategic materials. In addition, Crimea covered the Balkan strategic flank of the troops of Nazi Germany and its important sea communications running along the Black Sea straits to the ports of the western coast of the Black Sea.

However, the defense of Crimea was a difficult problem for the enemy from the very beginning. While Army Group A managed to hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper, south of Nikopol, the fascist German command still hoped to organize counter strikes by the forces of the 17th Army, blocked in the Crimea, and the Nikopol group and restore land communications between them. But over time, these hopes became increasingly shaky, and after the defeat of the German troops near Nikopol and Krivoy Rog they collapsed completely. The exit of the Red Army to the Odessa region and to the Dniester estuary put the Nazi group in Crimea in an even more difficult situation. Its supply became more complicated, and the morale of soldiers and officers fell.

Enemy troops blocked in Crimea continued to dig in, build new ones and improve old defensive positions. The nature of the terrain in the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula and in the Kerch region contributed to the creation of a powerful, deeply echeloned defense. The enemy paid special attention to strengthening the defense in the northern part of Crimea. On the Perekop Isthmus, three strong defense lines were equipped to a depth of 35 kilometers. In front of the bridgehead of our troops on the southern bank of the Sivash, the enemy, using numerous inter-lake defiles and heights, created two or three defensive lines. Equipped with a dense network of trenches and communication passages, they had a large number of bunkers, pillboxes and were covered by engineering barriers. On the Kerch Peninsula, four defensive lines were built to a depth of 70 kilometers.

The enemy's 17th Army, blocked in Crimea in January - March 1944, was reinforced by two divisions and by the beginning of April numbered five German and seven Romanian divisions, as well as a large number of special units and subunits (engineering, security, construction, etc.). The main forces of the army - five divisions - were located in the northern part of Crimea, and four divisions and an infantry regiment operated on the Kerch Peninsula. Three Romanian divisions guarded the Crimean coast. The army had a total of more than 195 thousand people, about 3,600 guns and mortars, over 200 tanks and assault guns. They were supported by 150 aircraft located in Crimea, and part of the aviation based at Romanian airfields.

At the end of 1943, Soviet troops made an attempt to seize the Crimean Isthmus and break into Crimea. But she was not crowned with success. Considering the difficulties associated with conducting an operation against an enemy entrenched in advantageous positions, the Soviet Supreme High Command decided to carefully prepare this offensive. It was originally planned to begin the operation in March 1944, but unfavorable weather in the Crimea region and strong storms in the Sea of ​​Azov did not allow active combat operations to begin on time. Then it was decided to go on the offensive after the Red Army entered the Odessa region. At the same time, it was taken into account that with the advance of Soviet troops to Odessa, the position of the Crimean group would worsen even more, and the stability and morale of the fascist troops would sharply decrease. In addition, clearing the Black Sea coast between Crimea and Odessa from the enemy gave the Soviet fleet and aviation the opportunity for broader operations on enemy communications.

To carry out the operation to liberate Crimea, the 4th Ukrainian Front was brought in as part of the 2nd Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General G. F. Zakharov, the 51st Army under Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreizer, the 8th Air Army General - Aviation Lieutenant T. T. Khryukin, 19th Tank Corps, Lieutenant General I. D. Vasiliev; Separate Primorsky Army, commanded by Army General A.I. Eremenko; 4th Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation K. A. Vershinin; The Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky and the Azov Military Flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov. The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army at the beginning of the operation consisted of 30 rifle divisions, 2 fortified areas, 2 marine brigades and in total numbered about 470 thousand soldiers and officers, had 5982 guns and mortars (without rocket launchers and 50 -mm mortars), 772 military anti-aircraft artillery guns, 559 tanks and self-propelled artillery units. They were supported by 1,250 aircraft (including the Black Sea Fleet aviation). Thus, our troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 2.4 times, in guns and mortars by 1.7 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 2.6 times.

The balance of forces at sea was also in our favor. The main forces of the Black Sea Fleet were based at the ports of the Caucasian coast. The enemy fleet was based at the Crimean ports, as well as at Constanta, Sulina, Varna and Burgas.

The idea of ​​the operation was to use simultaneous attacks from the north - from Perekop and Sivash - and from the east - from the Kerch region - in the general direction to Simferopol - Sevastopol to dismember the enemy troops, to prevent their evacuation from Crimea, that is, to completely destroy the enemy group.

The 4th Ukrainian Front launched the main attack from a bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash with the forces of the 51st Army and the 19th Tank Corps in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol, and an auxiliary attack on the Perekop Isthmus with the forces of the 2nd Guards Army. The Separate Primorsky Army was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol, and part of the forces - along the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula.

The Black Sea Fleet was entrusted with the task of blockading Crimea, striking enemy communications, assisting ground forces on the coastal flanks and being ready for tactical landings. The forces of the fleet were distributed as follows: torpedo boats were to operate on the near approaches to Sevastopol, submarines, in cooperation with aviation, were to destroy warships, transports and other vessels on communications in the northwestern and western parts of the Black Sea. The Azov military flotilla was tasked with assisting the Separate Primorsky Army in its offensive on the Kerch Peninsula and continuing the transportation of troops and cargo through the Kerch Strait.

The Crimean partisans were ordered to attack enemy rear lines, destroy nodes and communication lines, prevent the planned withdrawal of enemy troops by destroying individual sections of railways, setting up blockages and ambushes on mountain roads, and also prevent the Nazis from destroying cities and industrial enterprises. In addition, the Southern Partisan Unit was entrusted with the task of disrupting the work of the Yalta port.

During the days of preparation for the operation, all types of reconnaissance carefully studied the enemy’s defenses and the grouping of his troops. Along with ground observation and searches for reconnaissance groups, enemy positions were photographed from the air. Serious importance was attached to the combat training of units and subunits, improving their skills in quickly breaking through heavily fortified enemy defenses.

The command and political department of the front paid special attention to promoting the glorious traditions of the Red Army associated with the fight for Crimea. These traditions began with the defeat of Wrangel’s troops and the liberation of Crimea by the Red Army in 1920. The heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, which developed these traditions, inspired Soviet soldiers throughout the war to perform feats in battles with the fascist invaders. Commanders and political workers introduced soldiers and officers to the experience of the breakthrough of troops of the Southern Front under the command of M. V. Frunze into the Crimea. Soviet soldiers listened with great attention to the stories of the participants in the legendary crossing of Sivash and the assault on Perekop. The heroic past of the Red Army was associated with the combat missions facing the troops. Political agencies and party organizations took into account the peculiarity of the upcoming battles - a breakthrough of the enemy’s heavily fortified positions. Communists and Komsomol members were deployed in accordance with the battle formations adopted for the assault.

Upon receiving the combat order, commanders and political workers, in the few hours that remained before the start of the offensive, introduced each soldier to his combat mission and gave instructions to the communists and Komsomol members. Where the situation allowed, party and Komsomol meetings and personnel rallies were held three to five hours before the start of the offensive.

The troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive on April 8. After powerful artillery and air preparation, the infantry rose to attack, despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, and wedged into his defenses. Already on the first day, the 2nd Guards Army captured Armyansk, but its further advance was stopped by a stubbornly resisting enemy. On this day, the 51st Army, advancing from a bridgehead south of Sivash, broke through the enemy’s main defense line on its left flank. This forced the fascist German command to decide to withdraw its troops on the night of April 9 from the Perekop Isthmus to the Ishun positions. The enemy, having retreated from the Armyansk area, intended to gain a foothold in the well-equipped Ishun positions. However, the offensive of the 51st Army created a threat of encirclement for the enemy defending here. Therefore, already on April 10, the Nazis began to retreat from the Ishun positions. On the morning of April 11, in the zone of the 51st Army, the 19th Tank Corps was introduced into the breakthrough, which began to pursue enemy troops and on the same day liberated the important road junction of the city of Dzhankoy. To pursue the enemy in other sectors, mobile detachments from combined arms formations were deployed.

The success achieved in the northern part of Crimea created favorable conditions for the offensive of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula. On the night of April 11, the Separate Primorsky Army went on the offensive, and in the morning of the same day Kerch was liberated. The enemy, defending on the Kerch Peninsula, began to hastily retreat to the west.

On April 12, a relentless pursuit of Nazi troops retreating to Sevastopol began throughout Crimea. On April 13, the enemy was driven out of Yevpatoria and Simferopol, on April 14 - from Bakhchisarai and Sudak, and on April 15, the mobile units of the 4th Ukrainian Front reached the outer defensive perimeter of Sevastopol. In the battles for Simferopol and Bakhchisaray, troops J of the 9th Tank Corps under the command of Lieutenant General I.D. Vasilyev and the 63rd Rifle Corps under the command of Major General P.K. Koshevoy acted skillfully and selflessly. At the same time, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army quickly advanced along the coastal highway, liberating the health resorts of the southern coast of Crimea. On April 16, they captured Yalta and approached Sevastopol from the east.

During the period of pursuit of the enemy, the aviation of the 8th and 4th Air Armies operated effectively. Soviet bombers, fighters and attack aircraft carried out massive attacks on retreating Nazi troops, enemy vehicles, highway and railway junctions, and also conducted continuous reconnaissance, which contributed to the rapid advance of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army.

With the start of the operation, aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet intensified their actions, striking enemy ships and transports in ports and communications connecting Crimea with the ports of the western part of the Black Sea. On April 11, bombers and attack aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet attacked enemy transports in Feodosia and Yalta. On April 13, 80 attack aircraft, accompanied by 42 fighters, attacked a concentration of enemy troops and transports in Sudak, sinking 5 self-propelled barges with troops and damaging 2 barges. The strikes of the Black Sea pilots against enemy ships on the open sea were no less effective. The enemy was also suddenly attacked by torpedo boats, the activity of which increased with the relocation to Yalta and Evpatoria.

The Crimean partisans fought courageously and bravely. Carrying out the tasks assigned to them, partisan formations suddenly attacked the enemy, inflicted damage on them in manpower and equipment, and prevented the Nazis from destroying industrial and municipal structures, bridges and residential buildings.

The Northern Partisan Unit operated on the roads leading from Simferopol to Alushta and Karasubazar. On April 13, the second brigade of this formation occupied the city of Karasubazar and held it until the arrival of the Red Army units. During the liberation of Simferopol, the 17th and 19th partisan detachments, led by the commander of the 1st brigade F.I. Fedorenko, interacted with the troops. They occupied a telephone exchange, garages, warehouses, mills and other objects, preventing the enemy from blowing them up.

The fighting on the roads between Yalta and Sevastopol was launched by the Southern Union. The 12th detachment of this formation captured the Massandra area and prevented the destruction of the famous Massandra wine cellars. The Eastern Connection was active on the Simferopol - Feodosia and Feodosia - Sudak highways. On April 11, the Komsomol youth detachment of this formation ambushed and attacked an enemy artillery column near the village of Izyumovka. Having captured the guns and captured the servants, the partisans opened fire on the city of Old Crimea and forced the Nazis to flee in panic. The underground fighters of Sevastopol transmitted by radio to the command of the Black Sea Fleet information about the entry and exit of enemy ships into the port, helping our aircraft and submarines destroy them. In Yevpatoria, combat groups of underground fighters shot fascist torchbearers who tried to set fire to buildings, and also helped the troops of the 2nd Guards Army liquidate the enemy garrison.

Having suffered a severe defeat and lost almost all of Crimea, the enemy decided to hold at least the Sevastopol bridgehead, where the remnants of the Crimean group retreated. To reinforce these troops, the enemy sent about 6 thousand soldiers and officers by air and sea. For defense, a powerful system of fortifications was used on the approaches to the city, consisting of three stripes. The strongest point of resistance was Sapun Mountain, on which there were six tiers of continuous trenches, covered with anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields and several rows of barbed wire. Mekenziev Mountains, Sugarloaf, and Inkerman were also powerful centers of resistance.

Having reached the approaches to Sevastopol, our troops began to prepare for the assault on the city. It was decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the left flank of the 51st Army and the Primorsky Army in the Sapun Gora - Karan sector, break through the enemy defenses and reach the main piers of Sevastopol, which the enemy could use for evacuation. An auxiliary blow was delivered by the 2nd Guards Army from the east and northeast, and somewhat earlier, in order to divert enemy forces from the direction of the main attack. The Black Sea Fleet, through active actions of aircraft and ships, was supposed to disrupt the evacuation of fascist troops.

Preparations for the assault on Sevastopol included a wide range of important and complex issues. It was necessary to thoroughly reconnoiter the enemy's defensive structures and firepower, to organize aviation and artillery training well, and to skillfully build battle formations of infantry and tanks. During the preparation period, assault groups were created in all units, which were trained in fighting in the mountains and in the city. The assault groups included strong party and Komsomol organizations. The best communist and Komsomol soldiers were entrusted with the honorable task of hoisting red flags at key heights near Sevastopol, on administrative buildings in the city itself.

Six days before the start of the assault on Sevastopol, long-range aviation bombers and the 8th Air Army conducted preliminary air preparation for the offensive. They dropped over two thousand tons of bombs on enemy fortifications.

On May 5, after artillery and aviation preparation, the 2nd Guards Army went on the offensive. In two-day battles, the troops broke through two, and in some places three, lines of trenches. Believing that the main blow was being delivered here, the enemy began to transfer infantry and artillery to this area from the right flank of their defense.

The offensive of the Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack began on May 7 after an hour and a half of artillery and air preparation. From the very first minutes, heavy bloody battles ensued. However, the fierce resistance of the enemy could not contain the offensive impulse of the troops of the 51st and Primorsky armies. By the end of the day, the enemy was knocked out from Sapun Mountain.

The assault on Sapun Mountain is one of the brilliant pages in the annals of the Great Patriotic War. From generation to generation, an exciting story will be passed on about how heroically, with unshakable courage and perseverance, the soldiers of the 63rd Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General P.K. Koshevoy, and the 11th Guards Corps carried red flags to the crest of Sapun Mountain Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General S.E. Rozhdestvensky. The standard bearers were out of action, but the red flags, passed from hand to hand under hurricane fire from the enemy, steadily moved forward, calling the soldiers who stormed the enemy fortifications to heroism. Captain N.V. Shilov, senior lieutenant P.M. Kalinichenko, lieutenants V.F. Zhukov and M.Ya. Dzigunsky, junior lieutenant V.F. Gromakov, sergeant major A.M. Fisenko, senior sergeant distinguished themselves in the battles for Sapungora F. N. Skoryatin, Corporal V. I. Drobyazko, privates S. P. Evglevsky, I. K. Yatsunenko, Dadash Babajanov, Ashot Markaryan and many other brave soldiers and officers of the 51st and Primorsky armies.

On the same day, the Sugar Loaf height, covering the entrance to the Inkerman Valley, was occupied. The troops of the 2nd Guards Army, having captured the Mekenzievy Gory station after a four-hour battle, advanced to the Northern Bay.

On May 8, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front reached the inner perimeter of Sevastopol. The next day they broke enemy resistance here, crossed the Northern Bay and broke into the city. With coordinated attacks from the north, east and southeast, our troops defeated the enemy and on May 9 completely liberated the city of Russian, Soviet glory - Sevastopol - from the fascist invaders. The scattered remnants of enemy troops fled to Cape Chersonesos, where they were soon liquidated.

The Crimean offensive operation ended on May 12 with the victory of the Red Army. The German 17th Army, consisting of 12 divisions, suffered a crushing defeat. 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were killed or captured. Soviet troops captured all enemy military equipment. In addition, our aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet sank a large number of ships with troops and military cargo. If in 1941-1942. It took Hitler’s troops 250 days to capture Sevastopol, which was selflessly defended by Soviet soldiers, then in 1944 the Red Army in just 35 days broke through the enemy’s powerful fortifications in the Crimea and completely defeated a two-hundred-thousand-strong enemy group.

The heroic feat of the Soviet troops was highly appreciated by the Motherland. Moscow saluted five times the valiant soldiers of the army and navy who liberated Crimea from the Nazi invaders. Many formations and units were given the honorary names “Perekop”, “Sivash”, “Kerch”, “Feodosia”, “Simferopol” and “Sevastopol”. 126 Soviet soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, among them Major General E. Ya. Savitsky, Captain F. D. Dibrov, Senior Lieutenant L. I. Beda, Lieutenants M. Ya. Dzigunsky, V. F. Zhukov, Sergeant Major F. I. Ozerin, privates I. I. Polikakhin, I. K. Yatsunenko. Squadron commander Hero of the Soviet Union V.D. Lavrinenkov was awarded the second Gold Star medal. Thousands received government awards. In the 2nd Guards Army alone, 5,229 soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals, of which 3,743 were communists and Komsomol members. All this testified to the massive heroism of Soviet soldiers, who turned out to be worthy successors to the glorious traditions of the Red Army. Crimea, the most important strategic position on the Black Sea, was wrested from the hands of the enemy. The situation in the Black Sea basin has changed dramatically. The liberation of Sevastopol - the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet - and Odessa allowed our fleet to take more advantageous positions to participate in subsequent operations of Soviet troops in the Balkans. After the expulsion of the fascist invaders from Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet intensified operations on enemy communications, using aircraft, submarines and torpedo boats.

The military actions of the USSR Armed Forces to liberate Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea were of enormous political, economic and strategic importance.

In interconnected operations carried out during January - May 1944, Soviet troops defeated the enemy's largest strategic grouping, pushed it back 250 - 400 kilometers to the west, and liberated Crimea. From January 1 to May 12, 22 enemy divisions and 1 brigade were destroyed, 8 divisions and 1 brigade were disbanded, 8 divisions lost up to 75 percent and 61 divisions lost up to 50 percent of their strength. According to K. Tippelskirch, this was the largest defeat “since the time when the German armies walked the thorny path from the Volga and the Caucasus, retreating to the Dnieper.”

Such large losses could not pass without a trace for the enemy. They seriously weakened his forces not only on the Soviet-German front, but also in European countries. To restore the front in the southern sector, the fascist command was forced to bring up during January - April 34 divisions and 4 brigades from Romania, Hungary, France, Yugoslavia, Denmark and Germany, as well as 9 divisions from other sections of the Soviet-German front, not counting the current replenishment of the troops operating here with people, military equipment and weapons.

As a result of the successful offensive of the Red Army, the metallurgy of the South, ore of Krivoy Rog, Nikopol and Kerch, fertile lands between the Dnieper and Prut, Crimea, first-class ports on the Black Sea - Sevastopol, Odessa, Nikolaev were returned to the Motherland. Our troops liberated a significant territory of Soviet Moldova and the western regions of Ukraine. Millions of Soviet people were rescued from fascist slavery. Carrying out the historical mission of liberating Soviet land occupied by the enemy, the Red Army reached the southwestern border of the Soviet Union and transferred hostilities to the territory of Romania.

The defeat of the largest Nazi group and the clearing of Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea from the occupiers radically changed the strategic situation in the south. By reaching the Carpathians, our troops split the enemy’s strategic front, as a result of which the interaction of the army groups “Northern Ukraine” and “Southern Ukraine” was greatly hampered. Soviet troops were able to develop attacks in the Ljubljana direction - to the flank and rear of Army Group Center, to Lvov, and also through Romania to the Balkans. The liberation of Crimea and Odessa provided favorable conditions for the basing and operations of our fleet in the Black Sea. Red Army troops found themselves on the approaches to sources of Romanian oil and Balkan raw materials that were vital for Germany.

The entry of the Soviet Armed Forces into Romania sharply aggravated the political situation in the countries allied with Germany in South-Eastern Europe and caused panic and confusion among the ruling classes of these countries. Hitler's puppets in power realized how close and inevitable the collapse of Nazi Germany was. They began to look for ways to leave the Hitler bloc. At the same time, the victorious offensive of the Red Army greatly contributed to the strengthening of the national liberation struggle in these states.

Political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations played a major role in achieving victories, all of whose activities were aimed at carrying out combat missions. Communists and Komsomol members were the true inspirers of the soldiers, the cementing force of units and subunits. In the most difficult moments of the battle, in the most crucial sectors of the battles, they were always ahead, inspiring the fighters to heroic deeds by personal example. Countless examples of courage and courage shown by our soldiers in the battles for the Motherland are a vivid expression of the Soviet patriotism of soldiers, sailors, officers, generals and admirals of the Red Army and Navy, their boundless devotion to their people, their native Communist Party and the Soviet government.

The successes achieved by the Armed Forces of the USSR testified to the high level of Soviet military art. They overturned the previously existing idea that it was impossible to conduct military operations on a large scale in conditions of spring thaw. During the liberation of Right Bank Ukraine, the Red Army carried out a complex of simultaneous and sequential offensive operations, the largest of which were Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Proskurovsko-Chernivtsi, Uman-Botoshansky, Odessa. The operations of the Soviet troops were characterized by great scope, decisiveness and swiftness, a variety of forms of combat operations, and good support. During the offensive, a method of action was used to encircle and destroy enemy groups. A striking example of this is the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. In addition, strikes were also carried out on a wide front in order to fragment the enemy and destroy him piece by piece. This is exactly how the offensive of the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts was organized in March 1944. The attacks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, delivered to great depths, led to the dismemberment of the entire strategic front of the enemy.

The use of large forces of armored and mechanized troops is very typical for offensive operations in Right Bank Ukraine. In the history of the Great Patriotic War, there is no other strategic operation in which six tank armies simultaneously participated. Despite the muddy roads and the relatively weak strength of the tank armies, their combat operations were distinguished by high maneuverability and great depth of penetration of enemy defenses. Tank armies, as well as separate tank and mechanized corps

were used massively to solve the main tasks of encircling the enemy, rapidly developing success in depth, capturing important lines and objects, and repelling attacks from large enemy tank groups.

During operations, the Soviet command skillfully interacted with the fronts, as well as ground forces with aviation and navy, coordinating their efforts in time and purpose. This pinned down the enemy on a wide front, deprived him of freedom of maneuver, and ensured the rapid defeat of enemy groups. This was the case in the Korsun-Shevchenko and Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operations, and this was also the case in the March offensive. Clear coordination of the efforts of the ground forces, aviation and the Black Sea Fleet made it possible to defeat the Nazi group in Crimea. The Black Sea Fleet played an important role in solving the operational and strategic tasks facing the Red Army troops. Aviation, submarines and torpedo boats of the fleet, operating on enemy communications, disrupted the delivery of troops and military equipment to Crimea, as well as the evacuation of the remnants of the defeated enemy group. The Azov military flotilla transported troops and military equipment of the Separate Primorsky Army. From January to May, she transported more than 77 thousand people, a lot of military equipment and various cargo to the Kerch Peninsula.

The success of the offensive in Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea was largely determined by the activities of the rear, which took place in extremely difficult conditions. A difficult problem was supplying troops. To solve it, military councils, rear services of fronts and armies took, first of all, the most decisive measures for the speedy restoration of railways. The personnel of the railway troops and special formations of the NKPS of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, despite the muddy roads, restored about 7 thousand kilometers of railway lines during January-May. During February-April, 400 thousand wagons with troops and cargo were supplied to the Ukrainian fronts. The spring thaw made the work of vehicles extremely difficult. In some areas, the average daily mileage of vehicles was 70-80 kilometers, and in some cases only 10-15 kilometers. Sometimes it was necessary to tow cars, for which all means were used, including tanks. And yet, vehicles transported a significant amount of material assets. During the Uman-Botoshan operation, the 20th Automobile Brigade alone delivered over 100 thousand tons of cargo to the troops. Particularly great difficulties arose when transporting goods from army warehouses. Therefore, almost all armies created horse-drawn and horse-pack columns, and special teams from the local population. Ammunition, fuel and food were delivered to troops and aircraft. From March 12 to 17 alone, aviation from the 2nd Air Army carried out about 1,200 sorties to deliver supplies to the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank armies. From April 7 to April 15, 2 million 160 thousand rounds of ammunition, more than 27 thousand shells and mines were transferred to the 1st Tank Army. over 50 tons of fuel, 24 76-mm guns and other cargo. On return flights the planes carried out the wounded.

During the liberation of Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea, partisans blew up railway tracks and bridges on roads behind enemy lines, making it difficult to transport fascist troops and the delivery of ammunition, food, and fuel. They attacked retreating enemy troops, destroyed their rear areas, captured river crossings, holding them until the Red Army units arrived, and conducted reconnaissance behind enemy lines. This intelligence data, transmitted across the front line, helped our command make more appropriate decisions. Ukrainian partisans saved hundreds of thousands of Soviet people from being taken into fascist slavery and prevented the German invaders from completely removing looted property and food.

The workers of the liberated cities and villages joyfully greeted the Soviet troops and provided them with active support: they restored roads and bridges, transported and supplied ammunition and food, and helped care for the wounded. Residents of the liberated areas voluntarily joined the ranks of the Red Army in order to contribute, arms in hand, to the common cause of defeating the enemy.

In 1903, the French writer L. Boussenard, the author of famous adventure novels, argued: “The masters of the Crimea will always be the rulers of the Black Sea.” 40 years later, representatives of the military command of the USSR and Germany agreed with his opinion. The Crimean offensive operation of 1944 was designed to provide the Soviet fleet with unambiguous dominance in the local waters and finally turn the tide of the war in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Preliminary schedule

The situation that developed in Crimea at the beginning of 1944 was somewhat reminiscent of the situation in which he found himself. The forces of the aggressive bloc were blocked from land as a result of the successful USSR carrying out two landing operations - Melitopol and Kerch-Etilgen at the end of 1943. But they had reliable fortification systems and were numerous, about 200 thousand people in total:

• 17th Army,
• several mountain rifle and cavalry corps and divisions,
• 215 tanks,
• more than 3,500 pieces of artillery.

True, almost half of the personnel represented Romanian units, and Romanian leader Antonescu protested against their use in Taurida and even demanded evacuation. The Odessa operation put an end to these demands - it became simply impossible to withdraw the Romanians from Crimea.

Disposition of forces before the start of the Crimean operation

Some German soldiers also suggested that Hitler leave Crimea. But he resisted, saying that then Romania, Bulgaria, etc. would inevitably fall away from Germany. In this he was absolutely right.

The Union troops were in a much better position than in 1920. By the beginning of the year, they already had bridgeheads in the Kerch region and on the southern shore of the Rotten Sea, and also crossed the. Naval power was important - the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov flotilla operated from the sea coast.

They all had a significant advantage over the enemy in the number of soldiers who had the appropriate attitude - during the year the Red Army won significant victories. The Union sought to return Crimea as an ideal base for the Black Sea Flotilla - then it would really be possible to control the Black Sea region. Ideology also played a role - the Nazis should have “remembered” the 255 days of the Second Sevastopol Defense.

Strategic plans

The leadership of the operation was entrusted to experienced commanders. The main force was to be the 4th Ukrainian Front (under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin) and the Primorsky Army (with General A.I. Eremenko). Troops, guardsmen and a tank corps also took part. General management and control from the headquarters was carried out by marshals K.E. Voroshilov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Initially, the start of the operation was planned for mid-February. But then it was postponed several times - both for tactical and natural reasons. First, it was decided to finally gain a foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper region (the Odessa operation can also be considered a part of this idea). Then a storm and prolonged heavy rains interfered, preventing the crossing of troops.

The balance of power of Nazi Germany

The last option for launching the offensive was a new date - April 8. By this time, Odessa was almost over: the “pearl by the sea” was taken by the Red Army on the 9th, therefore, enemy units were completely blocked in Crimea.

Wide grip

The beginning of the operation also resembled the actions of M.V. Frunze in 1920. After a powerful artillery barrage, on 8.04 the Fourth Ukrainian Front went on the offensive simultaneously from the Sivash bridgehead and on Perekop. On the 11th, the coastal army attacked and took the city on the same day.

In a week (from April 8 to April 16), our troops also liberated Armyansk and Evpatoria and Simferopol, and Dzhankoy, Belogorsk, and Sudak, and reached Sevastopol. The last city on the list required three assaults. Attempts made on April 19 and 23 did not produce tangible results, bringing only minor success. The greatest difficulty was the capture, from where the Germans were firing artillery.

The final assault was scheduled for May 5th. By this time, the USSR could already afford to regroup its troops, since a significant part of the combat missions in Crimea had already been resolved. The 2nd Guards Army went to the forefront of the attack - such detachments did not retreat. But still, the final liberation of the “pride of Russian sailors” took 4 days. The remnants of the Nazis retreated to the Chersonesus region. They were promised evacuation, but the attack aircraft of the Land of the Soviets thwarted all plans - instead of saving the Nazis, the Black Sea became the grave for 42 thousand of them.

The Crimean partisans made a huge contribution to the success of the offensive. They cut communication channels and lines of communication, obtained intelligence information, and prevented the destruction of enterprises and infrastructure. One of the formations liberated the city of Old Crimea; the partisan scouts did not give it up, although the Nazis, when attempting a counteroffensive, captured one city block and killed everyone they found there - almost 600 people. On May 12, 1944, the Crimean operation ended with the unconditional victory of the Soviet troops.

Further, to the west!

The results of the operation were impressive. In general, the aggressor's losses in Crimea are estimated at 140,000 irretrievable losses (killed and captured). Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the losses of the Red Army soldiers were noticeably less - about 40 thousand killed and less than 70 thousand wounded. The entire operation took 35 days. At one time, one resisted the enemy for more than 250 days.

Hitler was not mistaken - Germany’s authority among the allies fell sharply after the defeat in Crimea. And the Red Army, on the contrary, once again proved its strength. Now safe rear areas and a reliable base for the fleet opened up opportunities for further advancement - to the Balkans, beyond the Danube, to the west. It’s symbolic - the day of liberation of Sevastopol is celebrated on May 9! So convincingly the Crimean operation predicted the Great Victory over fascism and Nazism!