Barbarossa Fall"), the code name for Germany's war plan against the USSR (named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa).
In 1940, after the defeat of the French army, the moment came that Hitler and his associates considered convenient for the implementation of their aggressive plans in the East. On July 22, 1940, the day of the French surrender, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Franz Halder, received instructions from Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Walter von Brauchitsch, to develop a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The command of the ground forces (OKH) in July-December simultaneously developed several options, each independently. One of the options was developed by the German High Command (OKW) under the leadership of Alfred Jodl and his deputy, General Walter Warlimont, and was codenamed “Lossberg Study.” It was completed by September 15 and differed from the other option - General Marx - in that the main blow in it was determined on the northern sector of the front. When making the final decision, Hitler agreed with Jodl's considerations. By the time work on the plan options was completed, General Friedrich Paulus was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who was tasked with bringing all the plans together and taking into account the comments made by the Fuhrer. Under the leadership of General Paulus, in mid-December 1940, staff games and meetings of the military and Nazi leadership took place, where the final version of the Barbarossa plan was worked out. Paulus wrote in his memoirs: “The preparatory game for Operation Barbarossa was carried out under my leadership in mid-December 1940 for two days at the headquarters of the ground forces command in Zossen.
The main goal was Moscow. To achieve this goal and eliminate the threat from the north, Russian troops in the Baltic republics had to be destroyed. Then it was planned to take Leningrad and Kronstadt, and deprive the Russian Baltic Fleet of its base. In the south, the first target was Ukraine with the Donbass, and later the Caucasus with its oil sources. Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow in the OKW plans. However, the capture of Moscow had to be preceded by the capture of Leningrad. The capture of Leningrad served several military purposes: the elimination of the main bases of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the disabling of the city's military industry, and the elimination of Leningrad as a concentration point for a counteroffensive against German troops advancing on Moscow. When I say that a decision was made, I do not mean that there was complete unity in the opinions of the responsible commanders and staff officers.
On the other hand, although little was said about this, the opinion was expressed that a rapid collapse of the Soviet resistance should be expected as a consequence of internal political difficulties, organizational and material weaknesses of the so-called “colossus with feet of clay...
“The entire territory in which operations will take place is divided by the Pripyat swamps into the northern and southern halves. The latter has a poor road network. The best roads and railways are on the Warsaw-Moscow line. Therefore, in the northern half there are more favorable conditions for the use of large numbers of troops than in the south. In addition, a significant concentration of troops is planned in the Russian grouping in the direction of the Russian-German demarcation line. It should be assumed that immediately beyond the former Russian-Polish border there is a Russian supply base, covered by field fortifications. The Dnieper and Western Dvina represent the easternmost line where the Russians will be forced to give battle.
If they retreat further, they will no longer be able to protect their industrial areas. As a result, our plan should be to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous defensive front west of these two rivers with the help of tank wedges. A particularly large strike force should advance from the Warsaw area towards Moscow. Of the three army groups envisaged, the northern one will need to be sent to Leningrad, and the southern forces will need to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kyiv. The final goal of the operation is the Volga and the Arkhangelsk region. A total of 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions should be used, of which large forces (two armies) will initially follow in the second echelon."
“We moved through frozen swamps, often the ice cracked and icy water got into my boots. My gloves were soaked through, I had to take them off and wrap my numb hands with a towel. I wanted to howl in pain.” From a letter from a German soldier, a participant in the Russian campaign of 1941-42.
“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from retreating while maintaining the integrity of the front. The offensive should be carried out so far to the east that Russian aircraft cannot carry out raids on the territory of the German Reich and so that, on the other hand, German aircraft can launch air strikes against the Russians military-industrial regions. To do this, it is necessary to achieve the defeat of the Russian armed forces and prevent their reconstruction. Already the first blows must be delivered by such units that it is possible to destroy large enemy forces. Therefore, mobile troops should be used on the adjacent flanks of both northern army groups, where there will be deliver the main blow.
In the north, it is necessary to achieve encirclement of enemy forces located in the Baltic countries. To do this, the army group that will advance on Moscow must have enough troops to be able to turn a significant part of its forces to the north. The army group advancing south of the Pripyat marshes must move out later and achieve encirclement of large enemy forces in Ukraine by performing an enveloping maneuver from the north... The number of troops of 130-140 divisions provided for the entire operation is sufficient."
The final version of the plan is set out in the directive of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) ´21 of December 18, 1940 (see.
Directive 21) and the “Directive for the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of Troops” of the OKH of January 31, 1941. The Barbarossa plan provided for “defeating Soviet Russia in a short-lived campaign even before the war against England is over.” The idea was “to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, to destroy disunited groups of enemy troops.” At the same time, the main forces of the Soviet army were supposed to be destroyed west of the Dnieper, Western Dvina line, preventing them from retreating into the interior of the country. In the future, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and reach the line Astrakhan, Volga, Arkhangelsk (see "A-A"). The Barbarossa plan outlined in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them, the tasks of the Air Force and Navy, issues of cooperation with allied states, etc.
It was planned to begin its implementation in May 1941, but due to operations against Yugoslavia and Greece, this date was postponed. In April 1941, the final order was given for the day of the attack - June 22.
A number of additional documents were developed to the OKW and OKH directives, incl.
part of the disinformation directive, which required that “the strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa be presented as the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of war, aimed at diverting attention from the final preparations for the invasion of England.”
In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, by June 22, 1941, 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) of Germany and its allies were concentrated near the borders of the USSR. They were supported by 4 air fleets, as well as Finnish and Romanian aviation. The troops concentrated for the offensive numbered 5.5 million.
people, about 4,300 tanks, over 47 thousand field guns and mortars, about 5,000 combat aircraft. Army groups were deployed: "North" consisting of 29 divisions (all German) - in the zone from Memel (Klaipeda) to Gołdap; "Center" consisting of 50 divisions and 2 brigades (all German) - in the zone from Goldap to the Pripyat marshes; "South" consisting of 57 divisions and 13 brigades (including 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades) - in the strip from the Pripyat swamps to the Black Sea. The army groups had the task of advancing respectively in general directions towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The German Army Norway and 2 Finnish armies were concentrated in Finland and Norway - a total of 21 divisions and 3 brigades, supported by the 5th Air Fleet and Finnish aviation.
They were given the task of reaching Murmansk and Leningrad. There were 24 divisions left in the OKH reserve.
Despite the initial significant successes of the German troops, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be untenable, since it was based on the false premise of the weakness of the Soviet Union and its armed forces.
Excellent definition
Incomplete definition ↓
The war with Nazi Germany is one of the most tragic periods in the history of our country and the whole world. Hitler’s strategy to capture and enslave peoples gave different results in European countries, and the war on the territory of the Soviet Union turned out to be completely different from what the fascist invaders imagined it to be, already at its first stage. Anyone familiar with , should be able to describe the Barbarossa plan briefly, know why it got its name, and the reasons for the plan's failure.
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Blitzkrieg
So what was Barbarossa's plan? Its other name is blitzkrieg, “lightning war.” The attack on the USSR, planned for June 22, 1941, was supposed to be sudden and quick.
To confuse the enemy and deprive him of the possibility of defense, the attack was planned simultaneously on all fronts: first air force, then in several directions on the ground. Having quickly defeated the enemy, the fascist army was supposed to head towards Moscow and completely subjugate the country within two months.
Important! Do you know why the plan is named this way? Barbarossa, Frederick I of Hohenstaufen, King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor, legendary ruler, became a classic of medieval military art.
Why was Hitler so confident in the success of the operation? He considered the Red Army weak and poorly prepared. German technology, according to his information, won both in quantity and quality. In addition, the “lightning war” has already become proven strategy, thanks to which many European countries admitted their defeat in the shortest possible time, and the map of occupied territories was constantly updated.
The essence of the plan was simple. The gradual takeover of our country was to take place as follows:
- Attack the USSR in the border zone. The main attack was planned on the territory of Belarus, where the main forces were concentrated. Open the way for traffic to Moscow.
- Having deprived the enemy of the opportunity to resist, move towards Ukraine, where the main goal was Kyiv and the sea routes. If the operation is successful, Russia will be cut off from the Dnieper, and the path to the southern regions of the country will open.
- At the same time, send armed forces to Murmansk from the countries of Northern Europe. Thus, the path to the northern capital, Leningrad, opened.
- Continue the offensive from the north and west, moving towards Moscow without encountering sufficient resistance.
- Within 2 months, capture Moscow.
These were the main steps of Operation Barbarossa, and the German command was confident of its success. Why did she fail?
The essence of Barbarossa's plan
Progress of the operation
The lightning attack on the Soviet Union, called Barbarossa, was launched on June 22, 1941 at about 4 a.m. on several fronts.
Beginning of the invasion
After a sudden artillery attack, the effect of which was achieved - the population of the country and the troops were taken by surprise- deployed an offensive front to the border areas with a length of 3,000 kilometers.
- Northern direction - tank groups advanced on the North-Western Front in the direction of Leningrad and Lithuania. In a few days, the Germans occupied the Western Dvina, Libau, Riga, and Vilnius.
- Central - offensive on the Western Front, attack on Grodno, Brest, Vitebsk, Polotsk. In this direction, at the beginning of the invasion, Soviet troops were unable to contain the attack, but held the defense much longer than expected under the “lightning war” plan.
- Yuzhnoye - attack by aviation and navy forces. As a result of the attack, Berdichev, Zhitomir, and Prut were captured. Fascist troops managed to reach the Dniester.
Important! The Germans considered the first phase of Operation Barbarossa successful: they managed to take the enemy by surprise and deprive him of his main military forces. Many cities held out longer than expected, but, according to forecasts, there were no further serious obstacles to the capture of Moscow.
The first part of the German plan was successful
Offensive
The German offensive against the Soviet Union continued on several fronts throughout July and August 1941.
- Northern direction. Throughout July, the German offensive continued, targeting Leningrad and Tallinn. Due to counterattacks, movement inland was slower than planned, and only by August did the Germans approach the Narva River and then the Gulf of Finland. On August 19, Novgorod was captured, but the Nazis were stopped at the Voronka River for almost a week. Then the opponents finally reached the Neva, and a series of attacks on Leningrad began. The war ceased to be lightning fast, the northern capital could not be subjugated from the first attack. With the arrival of autumn, one of the most difficult and difficult periods of the war begins - the siege of Leningrad.
- Central direction. This is a movement with the goal of capturing Moscow, which also did not go as expected. It took German troops a month to reach Smolensk. Also, battles for Velikiye Luki were fought for a whole month. When trying to take Bobruisk, most of the divisions were attacked by Soviet soldiers. Thus, the movement of the Center group was forced to switch from offensive to defensive, and Moscow turned out to be not such an easy prey. The capture of Gomel was a major victory for the fascist army in this direction, and the movement towards Moscow continued.
- Yuzhnoe. The first major victory in this direction was the capture of Chisinau, but this was followed by the siege of Odessa for more than two months. Kyiv was not taken, which meant the failure of the movement in the southern direction. The Center armies were forced to provide assistance, and as a result of the interaction of the two armies, Crimea was cut off from the rest of the territory, and Ukraine on the eastern side of the Dnieper was in German hands. In mid-October Odessa surrendered. By the beginning of November, Crimea was completely occupied by fascist invaders, and Sevastopol was cut off from the rest of the world.
Important! Barbarossa was brought to life, but it was very difficult to call what was happening a “lightning war.” Soviet cities did not surrender without a long, exhausting defense on both sides, or repelled the offensive. According to the plan of the German command, Moscow was supposed to fall by the end of August. But in fact, by mid-November, German troops had not yet even managed to approach the capital. The harsh Russian winter was approaching...
The German offensive against the Soviet Union continued in several directions
Operation failure
Already at the end of July, it became clear that Barbarossa’s plan would not be briefly implemented; the deadlines that were given for its implementation had long passed. Only in the northern direction did the actual offensive hardly diverge from the plan; in the central and southern directions there were delays, operations unfolded much more slower than the German command planned.
As a result of such a slow advance into the interior of the country, at the end of July Hitler changed the plan: not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of Crimea and blocking communications with the Caucasus in the near future became the goal of the German army.
It was not possible to capture Moscow, the situation of which was very difficult, within 2 months, as planned. Autumn has come. Weather conditions and serious resistance from the Soviet army caused the failure of the Barbarossa plan and the plight of the German army on the eve of winter. Traffic towards Moscow was stopped.
Serious resistance to the Soviet army is one of the reasons for the failure of the plan
Reasons for failure
The German command could not even imagine that such a well-thought-out Barbarossa plan, which gave excellent results in European countries, could not be implemented in the Soviet Union. The cities offered heroic resistance. It took Germany a little more than a day to take France. And about the same amount of time - to move from one street to another in a besieged Soviet city.
Why did Hitler's plan Barbarossa fail?
- The level of training of the Soviet army actually turned out to be much better than the German command expected. Yes, the quality of technology and its novelty were inferior, but ability to fight, distribute forces wisely, think through a strategy - this undoubtedly bore fruit.
- Excellent awareness. Because of the heroic work of the intelligence officers, the Soviet command knew or could predict every move of the German army. Thanks to this, it was possible to give a worthy “response” to enemy attacks and assaults.
- Natural and weather conditions. Barbarossa's plan was supposed to be implemented in the favorable summer months. But the operation dragged on, and the weather began to play into the hands of the Soviet soldiers. Impassable, wooded and mountainous territories, inclement weather, and then severe cold - all this disorientated the German army, while the Soviet soldiers fought in familiar conditions.
- Losing control over the course of the war. If at first all the actions of the fascist army were offensive, then after a short period they turned defensive, and the German command was no longer able to control events.
Thus, the implementation of Barbarossa in the USSR met with serious obstacles, and the operation was not carried out. Moscow was not taken within 2 months, as planned. The “Lightning War” unsettled the Soviet army only for a short time, after which the German offensive movement was stopped. Russian soldiers fought on their native land, which they knew very well. Cold, slush, dirt, wind, rain - all this was familiar to the defenders, but created significant obstacles for the German army.
Plan Barbarossa
PLAN “BARBAROSSA” is the code name for the plan of attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, approved by Hitler in secret directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940. Named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa.
The destruction of the USSR was central to a series of German war plans based on the concept of lightning war. By attacking the USSR, the Nazi leadership after the surrender of France hoped to remove the last obstacle to the establishment of German domination over Europe and provide favorable preconditions for continuing the war for world domination. Already on July 3, 1940, the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces took up the question of “how to deliver a decisive blow to Russia in order to force it to recognize Germany’s dominant role in Europe.”
Based on the initial calculations of this headquarters, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal General V. Brauchitsch, on July 21, 1940, at a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters, expressed his readiness to launch a campaign against the USSR even before the end of the current year. However, on July 31, 1940, Hitler decided to attack the USSR around mid-May 1941 in order to give the Wehrmacht the opportunity to better prepare for “the destruction of the life force of Russia” within five months. By that time, the transfer of German troops from Western Europe to the borders of the USSR and the careful development of a plan for its defeat had already begun. On August 9, 1940, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) issued the Aufbau Ost directive on the equipment of areas of strategic concentration and deployment of a group of German troops in the east, intended to attack the USSR.
The main role in developing the plan for the Wehrmacht’s “eastern campaign” was played by the General Staff of the Ground Forces. Its first options, presented by the operational department, provided for the offensive of a strike group of German troops, first in the direction of Kyiv, and then striking from Ukraine to the north with the aim of capturing the capital of the USSR. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces proposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Moscow and only after its capture to launch strikes from the north against the rear of the Soviet troops in Ukraine. In accordance with his instructions, Major General E. Marx prepared the “Operational Plan East” on August 5, 1940. It was based on the idea of an offensive by the main German forces north of the Pripyat marshes in the Moscow direction. After capturing Moscow, they had to turn south in order to, in cooperation with another group of German troops advancing south of the Pripyat marshes, occupy Ukraine. Another group was supposed to advance in the Leningrad direction and cover the northern flank of the main group during its breakthrough to Moscow.
On September 3, 1940, further development of the Wehrmacht’s “eastern campaign” plan was entrusted to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 1st Oberquartermaster, Lieutenant General F. Paulus. Under his leadership, the plan for an attack on the USSR was refined and approved by Hitler on December 18, 1940.
From intelligence reports and other sources of information, the Soviet Union knew about the existence of the plan, but Stalin refused to believe in the possibility of a German attack on the USSR. The general idea of the plan was to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army concentrated in the western part of Russia and defeat them even before reaching the Dnieper-Western Dvina line through deep, rapid advances of tank wedges. Then develop an offensive in the direction of Leningrad (Army Group North), Moscow (Army Group Center) and Kyiv (Army Group South). The main blow was delivered in the zone from the Baltic Sea to the Pripyat marshes by the forces of Army Groups “North” and “Center”. The most numerous and powerful Army Group Center was supposed to destroy Soviet troops in Belarus, assist Army Group North and Finnish troops in capturing Leningrad, and then capture Moscow. The capture of the capital of the USSR, as was believed by the General Staff, was supposed to bring decisive success to the entire eastern campaign of the Wehrmacht. Army Group South, reinforced by Romanian troops, was supposed to defeat Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine and capture Kiev and the Donetsk basin. It was assumed that with the entry of German troops to the Astrakhan-Volga-Arkhangelsk line, the war would be ended victoriously. However, soon after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the Barbarossa plan began to fail. Despite the rapid advance into the interior of the USSR, the Wehrmacht was unable to achieve decisive success in any sector of the Soviet-German front until the winter of 1941-1942, and in the Battle of Moscow suffered its first major defeat since the beginning of World War II.
When developing the Barbarossa plan, Hitler and his generals overestimated their capabilities and underestimated the strength of the Soviet Union, the dedication of Soviet soldiers and officers, and their ability to improve their military skills during the battles and battles imposed by the invader.
Historical sources:
Dashichev V.I. Hitler's strategy. The path to disaster 1933 - 1945: historical essays, documents and materials: in 4 volumes. T.3. The bankruptcy of the offensive strategy in the war against the USSR. 1941 - 1943. M., 2005
Halder F. War diary. Per. with him. T. 2. M., 1969.
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On the evening of December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 (Plan Barbarossa). It was so secret that only nine copies were made, of which three were given to the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, air force and navy, and six were locked in the safe of the main headquarters of the high command.
The next day, December 19, at 12 noon, Hitler gave an official reception to the Soviet ambassador to Germany Dekanozov on the occasion of his assumption of this position, although the ambassador had already been in Berlin for about a month and was awaiting a reception to present his credentials. The reception lasted 35 minutes. Hitler was kind to Dekanozov and did not skimp on compliments. He even apologized that, due to wartime conditions, he could not receive the Soviet ambassador earlier. Hitler, skillfully playing out the scene of mutual trust and understanding between Germany and the USSR, assured the ambassador that Germany had no claims to the Soviet Union.
While Dekanozov was peacefully talking with Hitler, right there in the Imperial Chancellery, as well as in the Ribbentrop Ministry and Keitel’s headquarters, intense secret work was going on to prepare plans for war against the USSR. Hitler, having made such an important decision, went to the troops in the West to celebrate the Christmas holidays with them.
The wound-up spring of the military machine was doing its insidious work. The Fuhrer's top secret directive No. 21 was soon sent to the troops. It set out the main political and strategic credo of fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. Below we present this directive in full.
DIRECTIVE No. 21 (Barbarossa Option)
The German armed forces must be prepared to win the war even before the end of the war with England. through a quick military operation Soviet Russia(variant "Barbarossa").
For this army will have to use all the formations at its disposal with the only limitation that the occupied areas must be protected from any surprises.
Task air force will be to free up for the eastern front the forces necessary to support the army, so that the ground operation can be counted on quickly, and so that the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft will be least significant.
The main requirement is that the areas of combat operations and combat support under our authority be completely protected from enemy air attack and that offensive actions against England and especially against her supply routes should not weaken at all.
Application center of gravity navy remains during the eastern campaign directed primarily against England.
Order on offensive I will give to Soviet Russia, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled start of the operation.
Preparations that require more time should be started (if they have not already begun) now and completed by 15.V-41.
Particular attention should be paid to ensure that the intention to carry out an attack is not revealed.
The preparations of the Supreme High Command should be based on the following basic principles:
common goal
The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advance of tank units. The retreat of combat-ready units into the vastness of Russian territory should be prevented.
Then, by rapid pursuit, a line must be reached from which Russian aircraft will no longer be able to launch attacks on German areas. The ultimate goal of the operation is to isolate itself from Asian Russia along the common Arkhangelsk-Volga line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial area remaining in Russia in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation.
During these operations, the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its strongholds and thus cease to be combat-ready.
Already at the beginning of the operation, it is necessary to prevent the possibility of effective intervention from Russian aviation by means of powerful strikes.
Allies and their missions
1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count on the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.
The High Command of the German Army will promptly coordinate and establish in what form the armed forces of both countries will be subordinated to the German command upon their entry into the war.
2. Romania's task will be to pin down the enemy forces opposing it, together with the group of armed forces advancing there, and otherwise to carry out auxiliary service in the rear area.
3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German airborne northern group (part of the XXI group), which should arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, the liquidation of Russian forces in Hanko is assigned to Finland.
4. It can be counted on that no later than the start of the operation, Swedish railways and highways will be made available for the advance of the German northern group.
Carrying out the operation
Army in accordance with the above goals:
In the area of military operations, divided by the swamps of the river. Pripyat into the northern and southern halves, the center of gravity of the operation should be outlined north of this area. Two army groups should be provided here.
The southern of these two groups, forming the center of the common front, will have the task, with the help of especially reinforced tank and motorized units, to advance from the Warsaw area and north of it and destroy the Russian armed forces in Belarus. Thus, the preconditions must be created for the penetration of large forces of mobile troops to the north in order to, in cooperation with the northern army group advancing from East Prussia in the direction of Leningrad, destroy the enemy troops fighting in the Baltic states. Only after achieving this urgent task, which should end with the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should offensive operations be continued to capture the most important center of communications and defense industry - Moscow.
Only the unexpectedly rapid destruction of the resistance of the Russian army could make it possible to strive for the simultaneous completion of both stages of the operation.
The main task of the XXI Group during the eastern operation remains the defense of Norway. The forces available in addition to this should be directed in the north (mountain corps) first of all to securing the Petsamo region and its ore mines, as well as the Arctic Ocean route, and then, together with the Finnish armed forces, advance to the Murmansk railway in order to interrupt the supply by land to the Murmansk areas.
Whether such an operation can be carried out with the help of more powerful German armed forces (2-3 divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and south of it depends on Sweden's willingness to provide its railways for this offensive.
The main forces of the Finnish army will be tasked, in accordance with the successes of the German northern flank, to pin down as many Russian forces as possible by attacking to the west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga, and also to capture Hanko.
The main task of the army group, located south of the Pripyat swamps, is to advance from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kyiv in order to quickly advance with powerful tank forces to the flank and rear of the Russian forces and then attack them as they retreat to the Dnieper.
The German-Romanian army group on the right flank has a task:
a) defend Romanian territory and thus the southern flank of the entire operation;
c) during an attack on the northern flank of the southern army group, pin down the enemy forces opposing it, and in the event of successful developments, through pursuit, in cooperation with air forces, prevent the organized withdrawal of the Russians across the Dniester.
In the north - quick access to Moscow. The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will be deprived of their most important railway junction.
Air Forces:
Their task will be to paralyze and eliminate the impact of Russian aviation if possible, as well as to support the army’s operations in its decisive directions, namely the central army group and in the decisive flank direction of the southern army group. Russian railways should be cut depending on their importance for the operation, mainly at their most important nearby objectives (bridges over rivers) by capturing them by a bold landing of parachute and airborne units.
In order to concentrate all forces to fight against enemy aircraft and directly support the army, attacks on the defense industry should not be carried out during main operations. Only after the end of the operation against means of communication will such attacks become the order of the day, and primarily against the Ural region.
Navy:
In the war against Soviet Russia, the Navy will have the task of preventing enemy naval forces from leaving the Baltic Sea, while defending its own coast. In view of the fact that upon reaching Leningrad the Russian Baltic Fleet will lose its last stronghold and find itself in a hopeless situation, more significant naval operations should be avoided before this.
After the liquidation of the Russian fleet, the task will be to fully ensure the supply of the northern flank of the army by sea (clearing mines!).
All orders that will be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this instruction must clearly proceed from the fact that we are talking about precautions in case Russia changes its attitude towards us, which it has adhered to until now.
The number of officers recruited for preliminary training should be as limited as possible, and further officers should be recruited as late as possible and devoted only to the extent necessary for the immediate activities of each individual. Otherwise, there is a danger that due to the publicity of our preparations, the implementation of which has not yet been decided at all, dire political and military consequences may arise.
I expect reports from the commanders-in-chief on their further intentions based on this instruction.
Report to me about the planned preparations and their progress in all military units through the Supreme High Command (OKW).
Endorsed Yodel, Keitel.
Signed: Hitler
From the above document it is clear that the main strategic plan of the Barbarossa plan was to destroy the Soviet troops located in the west of the USSR with a sudden powerful blow, followed by a deep advance of German tank units to prevent the retreat of the Red Army troops into the interior of the country.
It should be noted that these plans did not remain unchanged. Hitler, in his numerous speeches and directives that he gave to the Wehrmacht, more than once returned to defining the goals of the war against the USSR, as well as the means and methods of achieving them. He spoke about this both before and after the attack. Hitler alternately clarified and explained individual military-political and strategic aspects of the attack plan.
And even when the main forces of the Wehrmacht were involved in the cycle of war, when Nazi troops had already invaded the territory of the Soviet Union, Hitler continued to “explain” to his generals the goals and objectives of the invasion. Notable in this regard is his note dated August 22, 1941. It appeared in connection with the disagreements that arose between the OKW command (Keitel and Jodl) and the OKH command (Brauchitsch and Halder). This prompted Hitler to once again consider the fundamental issues of the war against the USSR.
What was their essence in Hitler’s interpretation?
The goal of the present campaign, he emphasized in his note, was to completely destroy the Soviet Union as a continental power. Not to conquer, not to seize, but to destroy as a socialist state with all its political and social institutions.
Hitler pointed out two ways to achieve this goal: first, the destruction of the human resources of the Soviet Armed Forces (not only the existing armed forces, but also their resources); secondly, the seizure or destruction of an economic base that could serve to recreate the armed forces. The note emphasized that this is more decisive than the seizure and destruction of enterprises involved in processing raw materials, since enterprises can be restored, but it is absolutely impossible to compensate for the losses of coal, oil, and iron.
Speaking about the tasks of waging war against the USSR, Hitler demanded that the Soviet Armed Forces be destroyed and not allowed to be recreated. To do this, it is necessary first of all to capture or destroy sources of raw materials and industrial enterprises.
In addition, Hitler pointed out, it is necessary to take into account such points that are important for Germany. Namely: firstly, a quick capture of the Baltic states is possible in order to protect Germany from attacks by Soviet aviation and the navy from these areas; secondly, the speedy liquidation of Russian air bases on the Black Sea coast, primarily in the Odessa region and Crimea. The note further emphasized: “This event for Germany, under certain circumstances, may be of vital importance, because no one can guarantee that as a result of an enemy air raid the only oil fields at our disposal will not be destroyed (we are talking about the Romanian oil fields - P.Zh.). And this could have consequences for the continuation of the war that are difficult to foresee. Finally, for political reasons, it is imperative to reach the areas where Russia receives oil as quickly as possible, not only in order to deprive it of this oil, but above all in order to give Iran hope that it will be possible to receive practical assistance from Russia in the near future. Germans in case of resistance to threats from the Russians and British.
In the light of the above-mentioned task which we have to carry out in the north of this theater of war, and also in the light of the task facing us in the south, the problem of Moscow essentially recedes into the background in its importance. I categorically draw attention to the fact that all this is not a new installation, it was already precisely and clearly formulated by me before the start of the operation.”
But if this was not a new installation, then why did Hitler write so extensively and nervously about this to his generals at the moment when German troops had already invaded the territory of the USSR?
One circumstance must be taken into account here. There was no unity among the top generals in determining strategic directions and means for solving military-political problems. If Hitler believed that first of all it was necessary to achieve economic goals - to seize Ukraine, the Donetsk basin, the North Caucasus and thus obtain bread, coal and oil, then Brauchitsch and Halder put forward the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces, hoping that after this there would be It is no longer difficult to achieve political and economic goals.
Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South, was confident that it was impossible to win the war with one campaign in a few months. The war could drag on for a long time, he said, and therefore in 1941 all efforts should be concentrated in one northern direction, to capture Leningrad and its region. The troops of Army Groups “South” and “Center” must reach the line Odessa-Kyiv-Orsha-Lake Ilmen.
Hitler rejected such considerations in the most decisive manner, since they destroyed the basic concept of the Blitzkrieg doctrine.
But the problem of Moscow remained painful for him. Capturing the capital of the Soviet Union would have a huge international resonance. Hitler understood this very well and strived towards this goal in every possible way. But how to achieve it? Follow Napoleon's path? Dangerous. A frontal attack can ruin an army and not achieve the desired results. In military affairs, the direct path is not always the shortest. Understanding this forced Hitler and his generals to maneuver and look for the most rational way to solve the problem.
The existence of different views indicated serious disagreements among the top generals of the Nazi army on strategic issues of waging war against the Soviet Union. Although the General Staff prepared most carefully for the war and everything that could be done before the start of the campaign was done, the first difficulties led to new clashes between the high command of the armed forces and the command of the ground forces.
The unforeseen course of the war forced Hitler and his strategists to make major changes to the original plans and calculations. After capturing Smolensk, the Nazi command was forced to solve the problem: where to advance next - to Moscow or to turn a significant part of the forces from the Moscow direction to the south and achieve decisive successes in the Kyiv region?
The growing resistance of the Soviet troops in front of Moscow inclined Hitler to the second path, which, in his opinion, allowed, without stopping the offensive in other directions, to quickly capture the Donetsk basin and the rich agricultural regions of Ukraine.
Brauchitsch and Halder were naturally unhappy with this decision. They tried to object to Hitler and in a special report they argued to him that it was necessary to concentrate the main efforts on the central direction and strive for the fastest possible capture of Moscow. Hitler’s response came immediately: “The considerations of the ground forces command regarding the further course of operations in the east on August 18 do not agree with my decisions. I order the following: the main task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Don and depriving the Russians of the opportunity to receive oil from the Caucasus; in the north - the encirclement of Leningrad and the connection with the Finns."
Hitler explained to Brauchitsch that the capture of Crimea was of enormous importance for ensuring oil supplies from Romania, and that only after achieving this goal, as well as the encirclement of Leningrad and joining the Finnish troops, would sufficient forces be freed up and the preconditions would be created for a new attack on Moscow.
But the general plan had to be concretely embodied in strategic, operational and tactical plans so that it would take the form of action that should, according to the calculations of German strategists, lead to the successful achievement of their goals.
2
Plan "Barbarossa" is not only Hitler's Directive No. 21, which outlined only the main political and strategic goals of the war against the USSR. This plan included a whole range of additional directives and orders from the main headquarters of the OKW and the General Staff of the OKH on the planning and practical preparation of an attack on the Soviet Union.
Hitler's signing of the Barbarossa plan marked the beginning of the second period of preparation for the war against the USSR. At this time, preparations for the attack took on a wider scope. Now it included the detailed development of plans for all types of armed forces, plans for the concentration and deployment of military units, preparation of the theater of military operations and troops for the offensive.
The most important of these documents were: directives on the concentration of troops and on disinformation, instructions on special areas to directive No. 21 (plan "Barbarossa"), instructions on the use of propaganda according to the "Barbarossa" option, directive to the commander-in-chief of the occupation forces in Norway on his tasks according to plan "Barbarossa".
An important planning document was the “Troop Concentration Directive,” issued on January 31, 1941, by the Army High Command and sent to all commanders of army groups, tank groups, and army commanders. It defined the general goals of the war, the tasks of army groups and the field armies and tank groups that were part of them, established dividing lines between them, provided for methods of interaction between ground forces and air and naval forces, and defined general principles of cooperation with Romanian and Finnish troops . The directive had 12 annexes containing the distribution of forces, a plan for the transfer of troops, a map of unloading areas, a schedule for the transfer of forces from deployment areas and unloading them into initial areas, data on the position of Soviet troops, maps with objects for aviation flights, orders for communications and supply.
The Headquarters of the High Command of the German Ground Forces especially strictly warned about the secrecy and strictest secrecy of all activities related to preparations for an attack on the USSR. The directive specified the need to limit the number of officers involved in developing plans, and they should be knowledgeable only enough to be able to solve the specific task assigned to them. The circle of fully informed persons was limited to the commanders of army groups, commanders of armies and corps, their chiefs of staff, chief quartermasters and first officers of the general staff.
Two days after the signing of the “Troop Concentration Directive,” on February 3, 1941, at a meeting held in Berchtesgaden, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, heard a detailed report from Brauchitsch and Paulus (Halder was on vacation). It lasted six hours. Hitler, having generally approved the operational plan developed by the General Staff, said: “When Operation Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.”
In development of the Barbarossa plan, the OKW main headquarters developed and on April 7, 1941 issued a directive to the commander of the troops in Norway on the tasks of the German occupation forces and the Finnish army. The directive proposed, firstly, with the beginning of the invasion of the USSR by the main forces of the German army, to defend the Petsamo region and, together with Finnish troops, to ensure its protection from attack from the air, sea and land, and especially emphasized the importance of nickel mines, which were of great importance for the military industry in Germany; secondly, to capture Murmansk - an important stronghold of the Red Army in the North - and not allow any connection with it; thirdly, occupy the Hanko Peninsula as quickly as possible.
The commander of the troops in Norway was instructed: the Petsamo region, which is a stronghold on the right flank of the northern Norwegian coast, should in no case be abandoned due to the great importance of the nickel mines located there;
The Russian base of Murmansk in the summer and especially with the beginning of Russia’s cooperation with England acquired greater importance than it had in the last Finnish-Russian war. Therefore, it is important not only to cut communications leading to the city, but also to capture it, because the sea communications connecting Murmansk with Arkhangelsk cannot be cut in any other way;
It is advisable to master the Hanko Peninsula as early as possible. If its capture cannot be achieved without the help of German armed forces, then Finnish troops must wait until German troops, especially attack aircraft, are able to assist them;
the navy, along with transporting troops for the regrouping of forces in Norway and the Baltic Sea, is obliged to ensure the defense of the coast and port of Petsamo and the maintenance of ships in combat readiness for Operation Reindeer in Northern Norway;
aviation was to support operations carried out from Finland, as well as systematically destroy port facilities in Murmansk, block the Arctic Ocean channel by laying mines and sinking ships.
In accordance with the directive of the OKW main headquarters, the command and headquarters of the occupation forces in Norway developed a plan for the concentration, deployment and conduct of operations to capture Murmansk, Kandalaksha and access to the White Sea.
All these rather detailed invasion plans were approved by Hitler. But one problem still remained unresolved. Hitler was tormented by the question: how to keep secret the preparations for an attack on the USSR? And although the Barbarossa plan focused on maintaining the strictest secrecy and emphasized that “due to the publicity of our preparations... dire political and military consequences may arise,” although instructions were given to the commanders about the secrecy of the transfer of troops from the West to the East, all this was clearly not enough. After all, it was not about transferring a division or corps. It was necessary to bring a multi-million army with a huge number of tanks, guns, and vehicles to the Soviet borders. It was impossible to hide it.
There was only one way out - to deceive and mislead public opinion both within the country and abroad. To this end, the main headquarters of the OKW, by order of Hitler, developed a whole system of disinformation measures.
On February 15, 1941, the main headquarters of the High Command issued a special “Disinformation Directive.” It noted that disinformation activities should be carried out in order to disguise preparations for Operation Barbarossa. This main goal was the basis for all disinformation activities. At the first stage (until approximately April 1941), the concentration and deployment of troops under the Barbarossa plan should be explained as an exchange of forces between West and East Germany and the pull-up of echelons for Operation Marita. In the second stage (from April to the invasion of Soviet territory), the strategic deployment was portrayed as a great disinformation maneuver, which was allegedly carried out with the aim of diverting attention from preparations for the invasion of England.
The disinformation directive stated: “Despite the significant weakening of preparations for Operation Sea Lion, everything possible must be done to maintain within one’s troops the impression that preparations for a landing in England, even if in a completely new form, are being made.” , although troops trained for this purpose are withdrawn to the rear up to a certain point. It is necessary to keep even those troops destined for operations directly in the East in confusion as long as possible about the actual plans.”
General management of the implementation of disinformation was entrusted to the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the main headquarters of the armed forces. His boss, Canaris, personally determined the forms and methods of disseminating disinformation, as well as the channels through which it should be carried out. He also supervised the production and transmission of expedient disinformation information to his attaches in neutral countries and the attaches of these countries in Berlin. “In general,” the directive noted, “disinformation should take the form of a mosaic pattern that is determined by the general trend.”
The General Staff of the Armed Forces was charged with ensuring the coordination of actions carried out for the purpose of disinformation by the main commands of the ground forces, air force and naval forces with the activities of the information service. By agreement with the main commands and intelligence and counterintelligence departments, the main headquarters of the armed forces was supposed to periodically, depending on the situation, supplement the existing general instructions with new instructions on disinformation. In particular, he was instructed to determine:
over what period of time the proposed transport of troops by rail should be presented in the light of the normal exchange of troops between the West - Germany - the East;
what transportation in the direction of the West can be used in counter-espionage as disinformation “Invasion”;
how rumors should be spread that the navy and air force have lately refrained from acting according to plan, regardless of weather conditions, in order to conserve forces for the big offensive associated with the invasion of England;
how preparations should be made for the events that are to begin on the Albion signal.
The High Command of the Ground Forces was charged with the responsibility of monitoring whether it would be possible to link the events related to the preparation for Operation Barbarossa - the introduction of a maximum transportation schedule for the purpose of misinformation, the ban on vacations, etc. - in time with the beginning of Operation Marita.
Particularly important importance was attached to the dissemination of disinformation information about the airborne corps, which was supposedly intended against England (the secondment of English translators, the release of new English topographical materials from the press, etc.). The disinformation directive emphasized: “The greater the concentration of forces in the East, the greater the need to try to maintain uncertainty in public opinion about our plans. To this end, the main command of the ground forces, together with the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the main headquarters of the armed forces, must prepare everything necessary for a sudden “cordon” of certain areas on the Channel and in Norway. At the same time, it is not so important to carry out the cordon exactly with the introduction of large forces, as it is important to create a sensation with appropriate measures. By carrying out this demonstration, as well as other events, such as the installation of technical equipment, which enemy intelligence may mistake for hitherto unknown “missile batteries”, one goal is pursued - to create the appearance of upcoming “surprises” against the English island.
The more preparations are made for Operation Barbarossa, the more difficult it will become to maintain the success of disinformation. But, despite the fact that in addition to secrecy, everything possible should be done in this regard in the light of the above instructions, it is desirable that all authorities involved in the upcoming operation show their own initiative and make their proposals.”
The Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces did a great job of disseminating false information related to the transfer of troops to the East and their concentration near the Soviet-German border. To deceive the population of Germany and the peoples of other countries, as well as to keep their troops in the dark for the time being, radio, the press, diplomatic correspondence, and the dissemination of deliberately false information were used.
It should be recognized that disinformation carried out on a large scale, combined with the secrecy of the transfer and concentration of troops, allowed the Hitlerite command to achieve positive results in preparing a surprise invasion of the territory of the USSR.
In the winter and spring of 1941, preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union took on an ever wider scope. It covered all the main links of the military apparatus. Brauchitsch and Halder had continuous meetings. The commanders-in-chief of groups of troops and their chiefs of staff were called here every now and then. Representatives of the Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian armies arrived one after another. Plans were coordinated and refined at headquarters. On February 20, a discussion of the operational plans of the army groups took place at the General Staff of the Ground Forces. They were given a generally positive assessment. Halder wrote in his diary that day: “Our joint discussion had the best results.”
In the headquarters of army groups in February - March, war games were held, in which the actions of the troops and the order of organizing their supply were played out stage by stage. A large war game involving Chief of the General Staff Halder, the commanders and chiefs of staff of the armies was held at the headquarters of Army Group A (South) in Saint-Germain (near Paris). The actions of Guderian's tank group were played out separately.
After finalization, the plans of army groups and individual armies were reported to Hitler on March 17, 1941. Having made general remarks, he pointed out the need to build plans for the operation taking into account the forces that Germany had, since the Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian troops had limited offensive capabilities. “We can only count with confidence on German troops,” Hitler declared.
While monitoring the planning of offensive operations of army groups and armies, the General Staff simultaneously carried out a lot of work on organizing reconnaissance and obtaining information about the state of the USSR economy, about the quantity and quality of the Soviet Armed Forces, about the grouping of the Red Army on the western borders, and about the nature of the fortifications. The aerial photographic reconnaissance department of the Air Force headquarters periodically carried out aerial photography of the border areas, reporting data on its results to the OKH General Staff and the headquarters of the army groups.
However, despite the efforts made by German intelligence, personally by Admiral Canaris and Colonel Kinzel to organize an intelligence network, they were unable to obtain the information that the General Staff was interested in.
In Halder's diary, there are often notes indicating the vagueness of the overall picture of the grouping of Soviet troops, the lack of accurate information about fortifications, etc. General Blumentritt, who was then close to the general staff, complained that in preparation for the attack on the USSR (Blumentritt in the fall of 1940 g. was appointed chief of staff of the 4th Army) it was very difficult for them to get a clear picture of Soviet Russia and its army. “We,” he wrote, “had little information regarding Russian tanks. We had no idea how many tanks Russian industry was capable of producing per month... We also did not have accurate data on the combat power of the Russian army » .
True, according to Halder, by the beginning of March 1941, the grouping of Soviet troops became somewhat clearer to the General Staff. But now, when the General Staff had some generalized data on the grouping of Soviet troops and aerial photography materials, it had no reason to believe that the Soviet troops were preparing to strike first. Halder, as a result of an analysis of all the materials available to him, came to the conclusion that such an opinion was untenable. On April 6, 1941, he wrote in his diary: “The Commander-in-Chief believes that the possibility of a Russian invasion of Hungary and Bukovina cannot be ruled out. I find this completely incredible."
At the final stage of Germany's preparation for war against the Soviet Union (May-June 1941), the General Staff dealt with issues of concentration and deployment of troops. A feature of the strategic deployment of the Nazi army was that it was carried out unevenly. If in three and a half months 42 divisions were transferred from West to East, then in the last month before the start of the invasion (from May 25 to June 22) - 47 divisions. The General Staff developed schedules for the transfer of troops, took care of creating reserves of ammunition, fuel and food, providing engineer-sapper and road-building units with engineering, and above all pavement, equipment, and organizing stable communications between all army units.
It is worth noting another area of activity of the German General Staff related to preparations for the war against the USSR, namely measures to organize control in the occupied territory and propaganda among German and Soviet troops and the population.
The special instructions on special areas to Directive No. 21, signed on March 13, 1941 by Chief of the General Staff Keitel, stipulated that the captured areas of the Soviet Union should, as soon as the situation allows, be divided into separate states and governed by their own governments. Reichsführer SS Himmler, on behalf of Hitler, was preparing a system of political administration here, resulting from the final and decisive struggle of two opposing political systems.
In particular, as Operation Barbarossa developed, it was envisaged to divide the occupied territories, taking into account nationality, initially into three regions: Northern (which should include the Baltic republics), Central (Belarus) and Southern (Ukraine). In these areas, located outside the area of combat operations, as soon as they were occupied, their own political departments were to be organized, headed by Reichskommissars appointed by the Fuhrer and personally subordinate to him. To carry out military activities (mainly the fight against partisans), commanders of the occupation forces were appointed and quite significant police forces were allocated.
The main task of the occupation authorities, as emphasized in special instructions, was to use the economy, all material assets, and human resources for the needs of the German economy and to provide and supply the troops with everything necessary. At the same time, measures of military significance had to be carried out first and carried out unquestioningly.
Unified management of the exploitation of the economy of the occupied regions (robbery of all material assets, food, livestock, deportation of Soviet people to Germany, etc.) was entrusted to Goering, who had at his disposal the Office of War Economy and Industry for this purpose. A meeting held on April 3, 1941 at OKW headquarters recognized the need to have general instructions that would define the tasks and rights of the commander in occupied territory. The participants of this meeting were presented with draft structures and personnel for the military organization of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union.
The highest unit was the corps, whose composition was mainly drawn from the army. The formation of corps headquarters was carried out in Stettin, Berlin and Vienna in advance in mobilization order and was supposed to end on June 1, 1941.
Executive power in the theater of military operations was transferred to the command of the German army. “To carry out all military tasks in new areas organized in the rear of the theater of military operations, commanders of the armed forces are established, who are subordinate to the chief of staff of the Supreme High Command of the armed forces. The commander of the armed forces is the highest representative of the armed forces in the relevant field and exercises supreme military authority."
The commander of the occupation forces was entrusted with the following tasks: to carry out close cooperation with the SS and police, to fully use the economic resources of the region for the needs of the German economy and to supply troops, to protect communications and military facilities, to fight against sabotage, sabotage and partisans. It is known that the Nazis took full advantage of the rights granted to them. They mercilessly plundered the population, committed massacres and terror.
On May 12, 1941, Keitel signed another directive, in which he demanded the destruction of all captured Soviet political workers.
It is not difficult to understand how far from the truth V. Gerlitz’s reasoning about the deep ideological and political-ideological disagreements that allegedly arose within the General Staff in connection with the appearance of these documents. “The order on the commissars,” wrote V. Gerlitz, “terrified many generals... they found themselves in a dilemma: fulfilling their duty according to the oath or following the dictates of their conscience.” The generals invariably tried to justify the brutal reprisals against communists, executions and hanging of commissars with a salutary thesis: we stood outside politics, but only fulfilled our soldier’s duty.
Currently, researchers have another document from the German General Staff, which reveals not its military, but its propaganda activities. At the beginning of June 1941, the main headquarters of the OKW issued and sent out “Instructions on the use of propaganda according to the Barbarossa option,” signed by Jodl. This document outlined the main lines of anti-Soviet propaganda among the troops and among the population of the occupied territory through the press, radio, leaflets, and appeals to the population. Special propaganda companies were created, formed from experienced Nazi propagandists and war journalists, equipped with technology and equipment (radio transmitters, loudspeaker installations, film installations, printing houses, etc.). Several such companies were assigned to army groups “North”, “Center”, “South” and air fleets (17 companies in total). These were independent troops, united in the department of the “chief of propaganda units,” which was headed by Major General Hasso von Wedel.
The propaganda troops were assigned mainly two tasks: to provide information about military events at the front and to conduct anti-Soviet propaganda among Soviet troops and the population of the occupied territory. The second task was the main one, and it was given particular importance. “The use of all means of active propaganda,” wrote Jodl, “in the fight against the Red Army promises greater success than in the fight against all previous opponents of the German armed forces. Therefore, there is an intention to apply it on a large scale."
3
In addition to preparing its armed forces for an attack on the USSR, the German General Staff played an active role in preparing the armies of the satellite countries: Romania, Hungary and Finland for war.
The issue of involving Romania in the war against the Soviet Union and using it as a springboard for offensives was decided in the fall of 1940. Former Romanian Prime Minister Antonescu in his testimony confirmed that in November 1940, Romania, having joined the Tripartite Pact, began to intensively prepare to a joint attack with Germany on the USSR.
Already the first meeting between Hitler and Antonescu, which took place in November 1940 in Berlin, served as the beginning of a conspiracy between Germany and Romania to prepare for war against the Soviet Union. Antonescu wrote: “Hitler and I agreed that the German military mission located in Romania would continue to carry out work on restructuring the Romanian army according to the German model, and also concluded an economic agreement, according to which the Germans would subsequently supply Messerschmidt-109 aircraft and tanks to Romania , tractors, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery, machine guns and other weapons, receiving in return bread and gasoline from Romania for the needs of the German army.
To the question posed, whether my first conversation with Hitler can be considered as the beginning of my conspiracy with the Germans in preparing a war against the Soviet Union, I answer in the affirmative.”
In September 1940, a military mission was sent to Romania with the aim of reorganizing the Romanian army along the German model and preparing it for an attack on the USSR. The mission, headed by generals Hansen and Speidel and consisting of a large staff of military instructors, was the link between the German and Romanian general staffs.
Upon the arrival of the military mission in Romania, the chief of the general staff of the Romanian army, General Moanitsiu, gave an order to the army for the admission of German instructor officers to units and formations for their reorganization and retraining in accordance with the regulations of the German army. According to the former Romanian Minister of War Pantazi, the entire Romanian army was reorganized and retrained by the start of the war against the Soviet Union.
The German General Staff began active efforts to involve Hungary in the war and prepare its army for this. Back in November 1940, Halder, through the military attaché in Budapest, Colonel G. Krappe, informed the chief of the Hungarian general staff, Werth, about the preparations for a war against the Soviet Union, in which Hungary was to take part.
G. Krappe, who by the end of the war became a lieutenant general, commander of the X SS Corps of the Vistula Army Group, reported the following:
“At the end of August 1940, I was summoned to Berlin for a meeting of all military attaches. This meeting was convened on Hitler's instructions and was chaired by General von Tippelskirch and the head of the department, Colonel von Meulenthin. It took place in the ground forces command building. On August 30, all participants in the meeting were received by Hitler in the building of the new Imperial Chancellery.
Upon returning to Hungary, I informed the chief of the operations department of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, about these reports. With the consent of his chief of staff, General Werth, Laszlo asked me to make a report on this to the Hungarian General Staff and officers from the War Ministry. For my part, I received permission for this from General von Tippelskirch. I made a report in one of the halls of the War Ministry in front of 40 specially selected officers and heads of departments of the General Staff. Among others present were: General Werth, Minister of War von Bartha, Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Nadai and General Barabash.
In October 1940, I received an assignment from the OKH to report on the state of the fortifications of the region bordering Russia (Carpathian Ukraine). The head of the operations department, Colonel Laszlo, told me that so far there are only simple anti-tank obstacles located 1-2 meters deep. km, and that the construction of barracks to house the units had begun. The surveys necessary for the construction of concrete pillboxes along the border and roads will be carried out in the winter and construction can begin in the spring of 1941. But first of all, it is necessary to allocate funds for this construction. It was as if it was about 6,000,000 pengo.
General Werth allowed me to travel in a car through Mukachevo to the Uzhok Pass; to accompany me they gave me an officer with the rank of senior lieutenant.
I reported the result of my inspection trip and the information received from Colonel Laszlo to Berlin. After some time, Colonel Laszlo informed me that the necessary amounts had already been allocated for the construction of these fortifications.”
After signing the Barbarossa plan, Keitel in December 1940 invited the Hungarian Minister of Defense K. Barth to develop a plan for military-political cooperation between Germany and Hungary. The Hungarian commission, which arrived in Berlin in January 1941, consisting of Colonel General K. Barth, the head of the operational department of the general staff, Colonel Laszlo and the head of the 2nd department of the general staff, Colonel Uysasi, conducted lengthy negotiations with Keitel, Kesselring, Halder, Jodl and Canaris. During negotiations with Laszlo, Halder emphasized that the German General Staff would welcome it if Hungary took part in the war against the Soviet Union. As a result of these negotiations, an agreement was reached on the allocation of at least 15 divisions for this purpose.
At the beginning of March 1941, the head of the department of foreign armies of the East, Colonel Kinzel, visited Hungary, and at the end of March, Lieutenant General Paulus and a group of general staff officers visited Hungary. The military mission, headed by Paulus, negotiated with the Hungarian General Staff regarding the determination of specific military measures necessary for joint action. These negotiations, according to Paulus, took place in a business-like atmosphere and led to a general quick agreement on both sides.
The German General Staff paid great attention to securing the left wing of the front in the preparations for the war against the Soviet Union. Finland was assigned a significant role in offensive operations in the North.
In order to preliminary probe Finland's position, the Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, was invited to Berlin in December 1940. In Zossen, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of army groups and individual armies, convened by the OKH General Staff to familiarize themselves with the Barbarossa plan, he made a report on the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939/40. During his stay in Zossen, Heinrichs had several meetings with Halder , with whom he discussed the problems of cooperation between Finnish and German troops in the event of a German-Soviet war. On January 30, 1941, Halder and Heinrichs discussed more specific issues related to conducting covert mobilization and choosing directions for attacks on both sides of Lake Ladoga.
At the same time, the commander of the occupying German forces in Norway, Falkenhorst, was summoned to Zossen. He was ordered to report his thoughts on conducting offensive operations in the areas of Petsamo and Murmansk and to develop an operational plan for the Finnish-German offensive between Lakes Ladoga and Onega.
Colonel Buschenhagen, the chief of staff of the German occupation forces in Norway, who was present in Zossen at that time and later became a general, reported the following:
“At the end of December 1940 (approximately the 20th), being the chief of staff of the German troops in Norway with the rank of colonel, I was invited to a several-day meeting of the chiefs of staff of the armies in the OKH (High Command of the Army) in Zossen (near Berlin), at in which the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Halder, outlined the Barbarossa plan, which included an attack on the Soviet Union. During the same period, the Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army, General Heinrichs, was in Zossen, who negotiated there with Colonel General Halder. Although I did not take part in them, I assume that they concerned joint German-Finnish actions in Germany’s war against the USSR. At the same time, General Heinrichs made a report to senior German officers at the OKH about the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939.
In December 1940 or January 1941, I negotiated at the OKW with generals Jodl and Warlimont about the possible interaction of German troops in Norway and the Finnish army with the outbreak of war against the USSR. Then a plan for an attack on Murmansk was outlined.
In accordance with these tasks, I was authorized by the OKW to travel to Helsinki in February 1941 to negotiate with the Finnish General Staff on joint operations against the Soviet Union."
Colonel Buschenhagen, on behalf of the OKW main headquarters, was sent to Helsinki in February 1941, where he negotiated with the Finnish general staff on joint operations against the USSR. From the Finnish side, the negotiations were attended by: Chief of the General Staff Heinrichs, his deputy General Aire and Chief of the Operations Department Colonel Topola. At the same time, Bushenhagen, accompanied by Colonel Topol, made a ten-day trip with the aim of reconnaissance of the area in the border zone and determining the possibilities of deploying troops in an attack on the Soviet Union. As a result of Bushenhagen's visit to Finland, an operational plan for joint operations from Finnish territory was developed, called the Blue Fox.
In May 1941, Heinrichs and a group of officers of the Finnish General Staff were again invited to Hitler's headquarters - Berchtesgaden. The OKW headquarters developed in advance a detailed program of negotiations with representatives of the Finnish General Staff on Finland’s participation in preparations for Operation Barbarossa. The program provided for holding meetings with the chief of staff of the operational leadership, familiarizing the Finnish delegation with the general plans of Germany and the tasks of Finland arising from these plans.
The instructions on the scope of the negotiations, signed on May 1, 1941 by Keitel, especially emphasized the need to motivate the preparation of the armed forces by the fact that the large offensive operations supposedly planned by Germany in the West required increased readiness for defense in the East.
In the theses of the negotiations between the chief of staff of the operational leadership and representatives of Finland, they were given the following tasks: by urgently carrying out covert mobilization, prepare for defense on the Finnish-Soviet border; participate in the offensive together with German troops on both sides of Lake Ladoga; capture the Hanko Peninsula in order to prevent the Baltic Fleet from leaving this stronghold.
Based on the negotiation program developed on May 25 in Salzburg at a meeting with the participation of Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont, plans for joint operations of Finnish and German troops in the war against the USSR, the timing of the mobilization and offensive of the Finnish army were finally established.
What can you say about Japan? Were any calculations made for its strength, for its participation in the war with the Soviet Union? Japan was Germany's most loyal ally. Hitler, of course, could not help but take into account the hostility of the Japanese imperialists towards the USSR, and therefore counted on their active cooperation in aggression. But Japan also had its own aggressive goals. Hitler understood this too.
Back in March 1941, in connection with the ongoing preparations for the war against the USSR, Hitler, through Keitel, gave instructions on the basic principles of cooperation with Japan in connection with the implementation of the Barbarossa plan (in this regard, special directive No. 24 of March 5, 1941 was issued .).
These instructions boiled down to the following: to force Japan as quickly as possible to take active military action in the Far East in order, firstly, to pin down large British forces there and shift the center of gravity of US interests to the Pacific Ocean; secondly, without revealing the Barbarossa plan, to strengthen Japan’s confidence that the sooner it switches to offensive actions, the more it can count on success. “Operation Barbarossa,” the directive noted, “creates particularly favorable political and military preconditions for this.”
New documents have been published in Japan that make it possible to more clearly present the policy of Japanese imperialism towards the Soviet Union in connection with the impending German aggression. First of all, it is clear from the documents that Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka knew about the impending German attack on the USSR long before April 13, 1941, i.e., before the signing of the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. The head of government, Konoe, also knew about this. The conclusion of a neutrality pact with the USSR was only a diplomatic maneuver for the Japanese government. It was ready to break it at any favorable moment.
The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, who received first-hand information, informed his government in detail about Hitler's plans. On April 16, 1941, he sent a telegram to Tokyo, in which, citing a conversation with Ribbentrop, he reported that Germany would start a war against the USSR within that year. Ribbentrop told him directly: “Germany currently has enough strength to attack the Soviet Union. It’s calculated: if war starts, the operation will end in a few months.”
Oshima learned even more definitely about the inevitability of a German-Soviet war from a conversation with Hitler and Ribbentrop on June 3 and 4, 1941. Both Hitler and Ribbentrop told him that “the possibility of war has become extremely great.” In a telegram, Oshima reported on this conversation: “As for the date for the start of the war, none of them made a statement on this matter, however, judging by Hitler’s actions in the past ... it can be assumed that it will follow in the near future.”
The Japanese government and the General Staff began to vigorously debate the question of the position of the empire in the conditions of the German-Soviet war. During the discussion, two positions were determined: the first - as soon as the German-Soviet war begins, immediately oppose the USSR. Its ardent supporter was Foreign Minister Matsuoka; and the second is to adhere to the tactic of waiting for a “favorable opportunity,” i.e., when a favorable situation is created on the Soviet-German front, then move against the USSR and finish off the Far Eastern Red Army with one blow. The leaders of the War Ministry adhered to this position. And in the end they prevailed.
The Japanese imperialists were preparing to invade Soviet territory. The General Staff developed a plan for an attack on the USSR (the Kantokuen plan), which determined the deadline for the invasion of Soviet territory - the end of August - the beginning of September 1941. The Japanese aggressors were only waiting for an “opportunity”, but they never got it.
Hitler also envisaged joint actions in the Pacific Ocean by German and Japanese naval forces with the goal of quickly suppressing England and keeping the United States out of the war; a trade war in the Pacific, which could support the German trade war; the capture of Singapore, which is England's key position in the Far East, which would mean a major success for the joint military leadership of the three powers.
In addition, an attack on the system of other strongholds of the Anglo-American naval forces was envisaged (if it was not possible to prevent the United States from entering the war), which was supposed to undermine the enemy’s system and, when attacking sea communications, pin down significant forces of all branches of the military. Otherwise, the directive said, Germany in the Far East had neither political nor military-economic interests that would make a reservation about Japan’s plans.
At the same time, Hitler gave orders to strengthen military assistance to Japan in every possible way, to fully satisfy its requests for the transfer of military combat experience, for military-economic and technical support. In a word, Hitler ordered that all conditions be created so that the Japanese imperialists could proceed to active hostilities as soon as possible.
Thus, in the general plan of aggression, including in terms of the war against the USSR, Japan was assigned an important role both in the direct development of armed struggle in the Far East and in pinning down significant Soviet Armed Forces.
The special mutual interest of Germany and Japan in starting a war against the USSR was clearly stated at a meeting of the Privy Council by Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka. “Although there is,” he said, “a non-aggression pact (between the USSR and Germany. - P.Zh.), however, Japan will provide assistance to Germany in the event of a Soviet-German war, and Germany will provide assistance to Japan in the event of a Russo-Japanese war."
4
The preparation of Nazi Germany for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union ended with a series of inspection trips by the leaders of the Wehrmacht and the General Staff. On May 6, 1941, Hitler, accompanied by Keitel and General Staff officers, went to East Prussia, where he checked the condition of the troops and visited a new headquarters - the “Lair of the Wolf” near Rastenburg.
In mid-May, troops from Army Groups Center and South visited Brauchitsch. In the first half of June, he, accompanied by Heusinger, again made a trip to the East, checking the readiness of the troops for the offensive. Upon his return to Zossen, Brauchitsch said: “The overall impression is gratifying. The troops are excellent. The preparation of the operation by the headquarters was generally well thought out.” In June, Halder visited the troops of the eastern front twice, who also concluded that they were “all well instructed and in excellent spirits.”
On June 14, 1941, Hitler held his last major military meeting before the attack on the USSR. It heard detailed reports from the commanders of army groups, armies and tank groups on the readiness of troops for an invasion. The meeting lasted from morning until late evening. After lunch, Hitler gave a big farewell speech. He once again outlined the “political credo” of the war against the USSR, declaring that this would be the last great campaign that would open the way for Germany to achieve world domination.
And by some fatal coincidence, it was on June 14, when Hitler’s generals reported to their Fuhrer that they were fully prepared to attack the USSR, that a TASS message was published in the Soviet press. It said: “... in the English and generally in the foreign press, rumors began to circulate about the “proximity of war between the USSR and Germany”... Despite the obvious meaninglessness of these rumors, responsible circles in Moscow still considered it necessary, in view of the persistent exaggeration of these rumors, authorize TASS to declare that these rumors are clumsily concocted propaganda of forces hostile to the USSR and Germany, interested in further expansion and outbreak of war.
TASS states that: 1) Germany did not make any claims to the USSR and does not offer any new, closer agreement, which is why negotiations on this subject could not take place; 2) according to the USSR, Germany also steadily complies with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, like the Soviet Union, which is why, according to Soviet circles, rumors about Germany’s intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any basis, and what is happening in the last At the time, the transfer of German troops, freed from operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany is connected, presumably, with other motives that have nothing to do with Soviet-German relations...”
Of course, such a responsible government statement could not but have a calming effect on the Soviet people and the army. But it, as it soon became quite obvious, was based on Stalin’s deeply erroneous assessment of the military-political situation.
It should be noted that the TASS message was not published in any German newspaper, and the dissemination in Germany of information about its publication in the Soviet press was strictly prohibited. Hitler, of course, immediately became aware of the TASS message. And he was certainly satisfied that his disinformation maneuvers had done their job.
During this period, the Nazi command finally formulated the tasks of the troops in the upcoming war against the Soviet Union. They boiled down to the following: with quick and deep strikes from powerful tank groups north and south of Polesie, split the front of the Red Army, concentrated in the west of the USSR, into two parts, and, using this breakthrough, destroy the disunited Soviet troops. The operations were planned to be carried out in such a way that, through a deep penetration of German tank units, the entire mass of Soviet troops located in the western part of the USSR would be destroyed. At the same time, the need was emphasized to prevent the possibility of retreat of combat-ready units of the Red Army into the vast interior regions of the country.
To this end, as a result of long and painstaking work and comparison of various options, three main strategic directions of advance of the Nazi troops were chosen: the first - from East Prussia through the Baltic states to Pskov-Leningrad; the second - from the Warsaw region to Minsk-Smolensk and further to Moscow; the third - from the Lublin area in the general direction to Zhitomir - Kyiv. In addition, it was planned to launch auxiliary strikes: from Finland - on Leningrad and Murmansk and from Romania - on Chisinau.
In accordance with these directions, three army groups of Nazi troops were created: “North”, “Center” and “South”. In addition, the active participation in the war of the armed forces of Romania and Finland was envisaged.
To ensure a surprise attack on the territory of the USSR, it was planned to transport troops in five echelons. The first four echelons transported troops and military equipment that were directly part of the army groups. The 5th echelon transferred 24 divisions that were part of the reserve of the main command of the ground forces. The directive of January 31, 1941 emphasized that “the advance of concentrated troops to the border should occur, if possible, at the last moment and unexpectedly for the enemy. Formations included in the 1st and 2nd echelons, in general, should not cross the Tarnow-Warsaw-Konigsberg line until April 25, 1941.”
In its final form, the grouping of armies of Germany and its satellites, intended for the invasion of the territory of the USSR, was as follows.
Two Finnish armies (“Southeastern” and “Karelian”) and the fascist German army “Norway” were deployed on the territory of Finland - a total of 21 infantry divisions. Finnish troops were supposed to advance on the Karelian Isthmus, between Lakes Ladoga and Onega, in order to connect with units of Army Group North in the Leningrad area. Army Norway was aimed at Murmansk and Kandalaksha. To support the offensive of the Finnish and Nazi troops, about 900 aircraft from the 5th German Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force were allocated.
The troops of Army North (16th, 18th Armies and 4th Tank Group - 29 divisions in total) were deployed along a 230-kilometer front from Klaipeda to Gołdap. Their task was to destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states and capture ports on the Baltic Sea. Concentrating the main efforts on the Daugavpils-Opochka-Pskov direction and rapidly moving in this direction, units of the North group were supposed to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states and create conditions for further unhindered advance to Leningrad. The offensive was supported by the 1st Air Fleet (1,070 aircraft).
Army Group Center (9, 4th Army and 3, 2nd Panzer Group - a total of 50 divisions and 2 brigades), deployed on a 550-kilometer front from Gołdap to Włodawa, with simultaneous attacks by the 2nd Panzer Group in cooperation with The 4th Army in the general direction of Brest-Minsk and the 3rd Tank Group, in cooperation with the 9th Army in the direction of Grodno-Minsk, were supposed to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in Belarus, develop an attack on Smolensk, capture the city and the region south of it, thus ensuring Army Group Center freedom of action to carry out subsequent tasks. Support for the offensive was assigned to the 2nd Air Fleet (1,680 aircraft).
The troops of Army Group South (6th, 17th, 11th armies, 1st tank group, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, one Hungarian corps - a total of 57 divisions and 13 brigades) were deployed from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube on a front length of 780 km. They were given the task of a strike group (6th Army and 1st Tank Group) to break through the defenses in the Kovel-Rava Russkaya sector and, rapidly developing an offensive in the direction of Zhitomir - Kiev, to capture the Kiev region and crossings across the Dnieper. Subsequently, the 6th and 17th Armies and the 1st Tank Group were to go on the offensive in the south-eastern direction, prevent the Soviet troops from retreating beyond the Dnieper and destroy them with a blow from the rear. The 11th German, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies were faced with the task of pinning down the Soviet troops opposing them, and then, as the general offensive developed, go on the offensive and, in cooperation with aviation, prevent the organized withdrawal of Soviet units. Air support for the offensive of Army Group South was entrusted to the 4th German Air Fleet and Romanian aviation (about 1,300 aircraft).
The German command attached great importance to the Black Sea and the capture of the naval base of Sevastopol and the seaport of Odessa. The Black Sea was given an important place in the plans for Operation Barbarossa because, firstly, German strategists considered it the most reliable communication between the USSR and England, which would inevitably communicate during the war, and, secondly, in the event of the loss of Sevastopol and Odessa, the Black Sea Fleet will be able to leave through the straits to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.
A document drawn up at the General Headquarters of the German Armed Forces on April 28, 1941, entitled “The Significance of the Black Sea and Straits in Operation Barbarossa,” outlined the following considerations:
1. If Turkey strictly fulfills its obligations, then the Soviet warships of the Black Sea Fleet will not leave through the straits, and British ships will not be able to penetrate the Black Sea to provide assistance to them. Passage through the straits against the will of Turkey will be excluded if it shows serious resistance. The penetration of British military ships into the Black Sea is also unlikely for the reason that the British do not have more or less serious objects in the Black Sea. However, it should be borne in mind that the Soviet command will try to withdraw its ships from the Black Sea, using Turkish territorial waters whenever possible, regardless of the losses, since with the development of Operation Barbarossa, these ships can still be considered lost to the USSR.
2. The Axis countries use the right of passage through the straits after Operation Marita for communications between the Black and Aegean Seas. In the interests of supplying Italy with fuel, this maritime communication will receive special importance in the future. During Operation Barbarossa, German ships will not sail at all, and if they do, then only along the coast until the capture of Soviet naval bases. Based on the interest of the German fleet in the passage through the Dardanelles, as well as economic and military necessity, Soviet ships should not be allowed to leave the Black Sea.
3. It is possible to place minefields in front of the entrance to the Bosphorus, using the Romanian fleet, German aviation and Italian fleet in order to prevent the departure of Soviet ships. However, by these means, especially if we take into account Turkish territorial waters, it is only possible to interfere with Russian maritime communication, but not to stop it completely. In addition, in this way it is possible to deprive the USSR of ships, while Germany is interested in getting as many ships as possible for its maritime transport.
4. During Operation Barbarossa, German interests in the straits recede into the background before the demand to prevent Soviet ships from leaving the Black Sea. After this operation, the Axis countries need unhindered passage through the straits. From the above it follows that with the start of Operation Barbarossa, Turkey should be required to close the straits to all maritime communications.
5. The Turkish government may retain the right to provide Soviet ships with the opportunity to enter the ports of the Black Sea, including the Bosphorus. But Germany must ensure that after the end of the operation these ships are transferred to it. Such a decision would be in Germany's interests better than if the Soviet ships had been destroyed by the Russians themselves before Germany intervened.
The less time remained before the invasion of the German armed forces into the territory of the USSR, the more specific the planning of the operation, preparation, concentration and deployment of troops became. If earlier it was of a general, fundamental nature, then starting from June 1, 1941, i.e. three weeks before the start of Operation Barbarossa, the main headquarters of the armed forces developed a calculation of the training time for the ground forces, air force and naval forces forces, as well as the work of the main headquarters. This calculation of time by day, after approval by Hitler, was secretly communicated to the command of the branches of the armed forces and army groups. We present it in full (see table below).
The fascist leaders were so confident in the rapid and successful achievement of their political and economic goals that, simultaneously with the development of the Barbarossa plan, they outlined further stages of their path to world domination.
In the official diary of the high command of the German armed forces there is the following entry, dated February 17, 1941: “After the end of the Eastern campaign, it is necessary to think over a plan for the capture of Afghanistan and the organization of an attack on India.” Directive No. 32 of the German High Command of June 11, 1941 set out even broader plans for conquering the countries of the Near and Middle East with a subsequent invasion of England. This document stated that “after the defeat of the Russian armed forces, Germany and Italy will establish military dominance over the European continent... Any serious threat to European territory on land will then no longer exist.” The fascist leaders hoped that already in the fall of 1941 they would be able to begin capturing Iran, Iraq, Egypt and the Suez Canal. After capturing Spain and Portugal, they intended to capture Gibraltar, cut off England from its sources of raw materials and begin the siege of the metropolis.
Such were the far-reaching calculations of German imperialism. They indicate that the attack on the USSR and the seizure of its territory was considered by the leaders of Nazi Germany as the most important, decisive link in the overall chain of aggression. The fate of not only the Soviet people, but also the peoples of the whole world depended on the outcome of this struggle.
From time to time, the German General Staff compiled reports on the state of preparation for Operation Barbarossa. We have at our disposal such reports as of May 1 and June 1, 1941. They are of some interest, primarily for clarifying the General Staff's assessment of the balance of armed forces.
TIME CALCULATION FOR OPERATION BARBAROSSA. Event plan
| Time | No. | Ground troops | Air Force | Navy | Supreme Command of the Armed Forces | Note |
| C 1.6 | 1 | Transfer of echelon 4 "b" (until 22.6). Sending four corps, fourteen tank divisions, twelve motorized divisions to the East | The main place in echelon 4 "b" in the first period is occupied by air force units, and in the second period (from about 10.6) - by mobile formations of ground forces Air Force combat activities With the transfer of flying units to the East, the combat activity of aviation against England and in the Atlantic is weakened. With the transfer of anti-aircraft artillery units, the defense of the central air defense zone will weaken |
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| 2 | The ships "Schlesien" and "Schleswig-Holstein", intended for use as floating batteries, are in full combat readiness | The commander of the troops in Norway, until 22.6, transfers the last eighteen batteries of the reserve of the main command for the defense of the coast | ||||
| 3 | The Tirpitz floating submarine school and training squadron are transferred to Trondheim | The movement of naval units for the offensive is disguised as a strategic deployment for Operation Harpoon. | ||||
| 4 | Minelayers from the western region enter the North group Minelayers of the "North" group change their parking places. Concentration of destroyers in the Baltic Sea |
Disguise: training sessions during unsuitable times (as in the German text. - Ed.) for mining in the summer months | ||||
| C 1.6 | 5 | The special purpose headquarters (German assistance in the construction of the cruiser "L") is gradually withdrawn from Russia in echelons | ||||
| 5.6 | 6 | See Supreme Command of the Armed Forces | Commander of troops in Norway: 5-14.6. Traffic between the port of Stettin and the ports of the Gulf of Bothnia | |||
| 7.6 | 7 | It is planned to begin sending formations and units of the 8th Aviation Corps and anti-aircraft artillery | ||||
| 7.6 | 8 | Commander of the troops in Norway: the beginning of the march of the SS Kampfgruppe North from Kirkenes to the south | ||||
| From 8.6 | 9 | The installation of the planned barriers to protect the ports of the eastern and middle parts of the Baltic Sea and the anti-submarine net barrier in Gesser begins | ||||
| 8.6 | 10 | Commander of the troops in Norway: the first landing from transports arriving from Germany to Finland | Warning for Russia. The capture of the Petsamo area must | |||
| 9.6 | 11 | First disembarkation from transports in Finland arriving from Norway | be immediately carried out in the event of a Russian attack on Finland | |||
| From 10.6 | 12 | The working bodies for the four commanders' headquarters are in readiness | Provided for administrative and political management of regions in the East | |||
| 10.6 | 13 | Commander of the troops in Norway: the beginning of the march on foot and transport by rail from the ports of the Gulf of Bothnia to the north | ||||
| 12.6 | 14 | The intended minelayers and anti-submarine warfare ships are being transferred to Finland | Camouflage: quick transfer to Northern Norway via Finland | |||
| Approximately 12.6 | 15 | Decision on negotiations on Operation Barbarossa with Romania | ||||
| 14.6 | 16 | Hungary: instructions to the Hungarian military authorities to strengthen border security with the Soviet Union | ||||
| 17 | Using disguised actions, prevent Russian ships from entering the Kiel Canal (from 17.6) and the port of Danzig | |||||
| 15.6 | 18 | Preliminary order to clarify day “B” | ||||
| From 17.6 | 19 | School closures in the Eastern region | Secret withdrawal of German ships from Soviet ports | |||
| 20 | Preventing the further dispatch of ships to the ports of the Soviet Union. Warn the Finns about the same events through the military attache | |||||
| 21 | Submarines of the North group are secretly heading to the Baltic Sea to positions | |||||
| 22 | The beginning of systematic aerial reconnaissance of the Baltic Sea | The decision on this is made depending on the general situation | ||||
| Until 18.6 | 23 | It is still possible to concentrate troops on the directions of the main attacks while maintaining camouflage | ||||
| 18.6 | 24 | End of strategic deployment of the Air Force (without 8th Air Corps) | Commander of the troops in Norway: advance of the 36th Corps to the East | The intention to attack is no longer disguised | ||
| 25 | Order for the protection of the Fuhrer's headquarters | |||||
| 19.6 | 26 | Provided for the return to German ports of ships transporting troops to Finland | Shortly before the start of the operation. Ground Forces: Cessation of water traffic crossing the border Air Force: Order prohibiting launch for civil aviation of the Navy: Order prohibiting the departure of merchant ships |
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| 20.6 | 27 | Anticipated end to the deployment of the 8th Air Corps | ||||
| 21.6 | 28 | Destroyers and minelayers are ready to go to sea. Leave their ports at different times | at sea from the Baltic ports Supreme Command of the Armed Forces: Order prohibiting all communication with foreign states (foreign department) | |||
| 21.6 | 29 | Tentative deadline until 13.00 | Delay at the Altona signal or re-confirmation of the start of the attack with the Dortmund signal | It is necessary to take into account the complete unmasking of the concentration of ground forces (pay attention to the deployment of armored forces and artillery) | ||
| 21-22.6 | 30 | Carrying out the prescribed barrier measures at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga | In the event of a clash with enemy armed forces, the armed forces are given freedom of action | |||
| 22.6 | 31 | Day of the offensive The start time of the offensive of the ground army and the crossing of the border by air force units is 3 hours 30 minutes |
The infantry advance does not depend on the possible delay in the launch of aircraft due to weather | |||
| 32 | Closing of state borders with the Barbarossa region | Delay of ships belonging to the Barbarossa region, which are located in German, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian ports | The borders of state territory and occupied regions are closed to all citizens of the area of Operation Barbarossa (foreign department) | |||
| 33 | The Mountain Corps occupies the Petsamo region | The White Sea, the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea are declared by radio as areas of operation, the extent of the minefield area is reported (the announcement time is appointed by the foreign department) | ||||
| 34 | Information from the highest state authorities and party bodies about the closure of the German state border with the area of Operation Barbarossa (operational command headquarters, IV department of the country's defense) | |||||
| 22.6 | 35 | Ground troops Distribution of forces for Operation Barbarossa on the day of the offensive |
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| Total strength (excluding formations subordinate to the commander of the troops in Norway): eighty infantry divisions, one cavalry division, seventeen tank divisions, twelve motorized divisions, nine security divisions, two formations of the 15th wave and two infantry divisions of the reserve of the main command (already arrived from echelon 4 "b") | 4th Air Fleet with three reconnaissance air squadrons, twelve combat air groups, of which one is temporary, six fighter air groups; 2nd Air Fleet with three reconnaissance squadrons, ten battle groups, eight dive bomber air groups, two fighter-bomber air groups, 1⅛ attack aircraft air groups and ten fighter air groups, two of them temporary; 1st Air Fleet with two reconnaissance squadrons, ten combat air groups, 3⅔ fighter air groups, of which ⅔ are temporary |
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| From about 23.6 | 36 | Beginning of the transfer of the 5th echelon (reserve of the main command of the ground forces). Deadline: approximately until 20.7. In total there are: twenty-two infantry divisions, two tank divisions and one motorized division, one police division (of which nine infantry divisions, one police division are from the West). In addition, the arrival of two formations of the 15th wave is expected | Sweden: Negotiations regarding the use of Swedish railways for: a) transfer of the 163rd Infantry Division from Southern Norway to Rovaniemi; b) delivery of supplies. Use of the German transport authority and one liaison officer |
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| 37 | Seek diplomatic means from Japan, Manchukuo, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan to stop any imports into Russia | |||||
| 38 | To the commander of the troops in Norway: 23-27.6 (or 28.6) preparations for the attack on Murmansk 23-30.6 preparations for the attack on Kandalaksha | |||||
| Not earlier than 28.6 | 39 | Finland: Strike group “Ladoga” is ready for action | The decision whether the main attack will be directed west or east of Lake Ladoga must be made five days before the start of the offensive | |||
| 28.6 or 29.6 | 40 | Commander of the Troops in Norway: Offensive on Murmansk | ||||
| 1.7 | 41 | Commander of the troops in Norway: Offensive on Kandalaksha | ||||
| 2.7 | 42 | Four commanders' headquarters are ready to move on demand | ||||
Northern section- German and Soviet forces are approximately the same,
Central section- strong superiority of German forces,
Southern section- superiority of Soviet forces.
This report noted the movement of large numbers of Soviet troops to the western border of the USSR; an assessment was given of the Russian soldier who would fight at his post to the last; The opinion of the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch, was cited, who believed that stubborn battles with the Red Army would take place during the first four weeks, and in the future one could count on weaker resistance.
The report for 1 June 1941 gives an idea of the general distribution of the German armed forces in the theaters of war.
In the West there were 40 infantry, 1 motorized, 1 police divisions and 1 tank brigade. In the North, 6 infantry, 2 mountain, 1 security divisions, the SS battle group North and 140 batteries of the main command for coastal defense were concentrated. In addition, it was planned to send one reinforced infantry division with corps units from Germany to Norway and Finland. After the start of operations, it was planned to raise another 1 infantry division for an attack on the Hanko Peninsula. In the Balkans, in addition to the formations provided for the final occupation, there were 8 infantry and 1 tank divisions, which were the reserve of the main command. In the future, they were to be transferred to the Barbarossa concentration area.
In the East, the total strength of troops increased by 76 infantry, 1 cavalry and 3 tank divisions. Army groups and armies took command of their sectors partly through disguised work headquarters. The “North” group was assigned security units received from the West. The 3rd Air Fleet took command of the air war against England. The 2nd Air Fleet was reorganized and transferred to the East. The 8th Aviation Corps, intended for Operation Barbarossa, was transferred to the East as quickly as possible.
In the part of the report where the state of camouflage was reported, it was emphasized that from June 1, the second phase of disinformation of the enemy would begin (Operations Shark and Harpoon) in order to create the impression of preparations for an amphibious landing from the coast of Norway, the English Channel and Pa. de Calais and from the coast of Brittany. The concentration of forces in the East was seen as a disinformation maneuver in order to conceal the landing in England.
It should be noted that activities related to the disinformation maneuver throughout the preparation of Operation Barbarossa were the focus of attention of Hitler and the high command and were widely carried out through various channels.
And although the general meaning of these disinformation activities was aimed at deceiving public opinion regarding the actual nature of the Wehrmacht’s activities and creating a “mosaic picture,” the main camouflage actions were carried out in two directions.
The first is to convince the people and the army that Germany was, in fact, seriously preparing to land troops in England and was generally preparing to start a big war against it. True, Hitler, back in July 1940 and later, in a narrow circle, repeatedly expressed the idea that an amphibious operation was a very risky undertaking. It could only be carried out if no other ways were found to put an end to England. Hitler long ago abandoned the landing in England, but as a means of disinformation, it was promoted on a wide scale. This was believed both in Germany itself and beyond its borders.
The second was to create a false public opinion about the threat from the Soviet Union, whose armed forces were allegedly preparing to launch a preemptive strike, and in connection with this, Germany was forced to strengthen and strengthen its defenses in the East. These were the instructions given by Hitler, Keitel and Jodl to those who negotiated with the military representatives of Romania, Hungary and Finland. The instructions on the scope of negotiations with foreign states regarding their participation in the preparation of Operation Barbarossa dated May 1, 1941, signed by Keitel, stated: “The following instructions serve as a camouflage for negotiations: the large offensive operations we have planned in the West require us (taking into account experience of past wars) increased readiness for defense in the East. Therefore, the purpose of the negotiations is to demand from the named states (Finland, Hungary, Romania) to carry out defensive measures, the preparation of which they must begin now.”
The purely defensive measures of these states were also discussed at a meeting with the chief of defense of the country on April 30, 1941. But Jodl, who negotiated with representatives of Finland, was recommended to say something different, namely: that the USSR had offensive plans, which forced Germany to take countermeasures, prevent the plans of the Soviet Union by launching an offensive in which Finland was to take an active part.
Such instructions were given in a directive dated May 1, 1941. And a month later, in a report on the state of preparations for an attack on the USSR on June 1, it was noted that Romania, at the direction of the commander of German troops in Romania, began secret mobilization in order to be able to protect its border from the supposed advance of the Red Army. Army.
This version was persistently propagated by Hitler until the invasion of Nazi troops in the USSR. This is evidenced by the testimony of Goering, Keitel and Jodl. Hitler instilled this idea in the Duce in a message sent a few hours before the start of the operation.
Finally, there is another document of the same plan. On May 25, 1941, a top secret telephone message was sent from Hitler's headquarters to the commanders in chief of the ground forces, air force, navy, the commander of the German troops in Norway and the German military mission in Romania. This document stated: “The Fuhrer once again draws attention to the fact that preventive actions may be taken by the Russians in the coming weeks and therefore it is necessary to fully ensure their prevention.”
The lie about the threat from the Soviet Union and its widespread dissemination were extremely necessary for Hitler. And here he achieved considerable success. Even now, a quarter of a century later, this thoughtful and cleverly planted version is in circulation in Western anti-Soviet literature.
Thus, fascist Germany, which had been preparing for a war against the Soviet Union for a long time, by mid-June 1941 concentrated enormous armed forces on the western borders of the USSR, numbering 190 divisions (together with satellite troops). The total number of personnel of the German armed forces deployed to invade the territory of the USSR was 4,600 thousand people, and with the Allied troops - up to 5.5 million people. The fascist army had the latest military equipment. 4,950 aircraft, 2,800 tanks and assault guns, and over 48,000 guns and mortars were aimed against the Soviet Union. The navy consisted of 193 warships and boats.
And this entire 5-million-strong mass of troops, a huge number of tanks, guns, and vehicles had to be secretly brought to the borders of the USSR in a very short time, mainly at night.
A formidable military armada, ready to unleash deadly blows on peaceful Soviet cities and villages, occupied its starting positions along the entire western border of the USSR. She was only waiting for Hitler's order.
One question remained unresolved: when to begin the invasion of the territory of the USSR? Initially, Directive No. 21 determined the readiness of troops for the invasion on May 15, 1941. But then changes occurred. Mussolini was unable to take control of Greece, where Italian troops encountered serious resistance. Hitler decided to help his partner in aggression and send part of the troops intended to attack the USSR to Greece. In addition, and this is the main thing, Hitler sought to seize Yugoslavia with a surprise attack and thereby firmly secure his strategic positions in South-Eastern Europe. This was all the more necessary for him, since the Yugoslav people, having overthrown the pro-fascist government of Cvetkovic, forced the new government to conclude a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with the Soviet Union on April 5, 1941.
Events in Yugoslavia developed as follows. On March 4, 1941, Hitler summoned Yugoslav Prince Regent Paul to Berchtesgaden and demanded that Yugoslavia join the Tripartite Pact and allow German troops to enter Greece. Under pressure, Paul agreed to fulfill these demands of Hitler. On March 25, 1941, Yugoslav Prime Minister Cvetkovic and Foreign Minister Zintzof-Markovic signed an agreement on accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact in Vienna. But when they returned to Belgrade, they found themselves out of power. On March 27, the Yugoslav people overthrew the pro-fascist government of Cvetkovic. Events in Yugoslavia were completely unexpected for Hitler. They disrupted his aggressive plans.
On March 27, 1941, Hitler convened an emergency, strictly secret military meeting, which was attended by Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger and 10 other military staff officials. At this meeting, Hitler, irritated that the coup in Belgrade had confused his cards, furiously attacked the Yugoslav government, the Serbs and Slovenes, who, in his opinion, had never been friendly towards Germany. He convened this meeting not to discuss the current situation, but to announce his decision. He stated that,
firstly, if a government coup in Yugoslavia had occurred after the start of Operation Barbarossa, it would have had much more dire consequences;
secondly, the coup in Yugoslavia radically changed the situation in the Balkans. He jeopardized the success of Operation Barbarossa, and therefore its start had to be delayed by about four weeks, and finally
thirdly, it is urgent to break up Yugoslavia and destroy it as a state.
Hitler demanded quick and decisive action. Italy, Hungary, and in some respects also Bulgaria were tasked with providing military support to Germany in the fight against Yugoslavia. Romania was supposed to provide rear cover from the USSR.
Politically, Hitler attached particular importance to inexorable cruelty in striking Yugoslavia and its lightning military defeat. The task was to speed up all preparations and assignments for the action of large forces in such a way as to achieve the defeat of Yugoslavia in the shortest possible time.
The meeting also discussed the main strategic and operational issues of the use of ground forces and aviation. To carry out this event, it was decided to take the necessary sufficiently powerful forces from among the formations concentrated for Operation Barbarossa.
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Brauchitsch said that Operation Marita could begin, depending on weather conditions, on April 1, and the appearance of other strike groups between April 3 and 10. Air Force Commander Goering reported that air raids from the 8th Air Corps from Bulgaria could begin immediately, but that it would take another two to three days to concentrate larger air forces.
On the same day, March 27, Hitler signed Directive No. 25, the first paragraph of which read: “The military putsch in Yugoslavia caused changes in the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia, even if it declares its loyalty, must be considered an enemy and therefore must be defeated as quickly as possible."
Next came the order: with a concentric strike from the Fiume-Graz region, on the one hand, and from the Sofia region, on the other, adhering to the general direction of Belgrade and further south, to invade Yugoslavia and deliver a devastating blow to its armed forces, in addition, to cut off the extreme southern part of Yugoslavia from the rest of the territory and seize it as a base for the continuation of the German-Italian offensive against Greece.
Thus, at a time when preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were in full swing and were close to completion, and a month and a half remained before the scheduled date for the invasion (May 15), Hitler was completely unexpectedly forced to cancel the previously scheduled date for the invasion (later some believed this was his fatal mistake) and sent part of his forces to capture Yugoslavia, especially tanks from the group aimed against the USSR.
The fact that Hitler rushed to the Balkans in April 1941 was, of course, the main reason for the postponement of the attack on the Soviet Union. The order given by Keitel on April 3 stated that “the start of Operation Barbarossa will be delayed by at least four weeks as a result of the operation in the Balkans.” At the same time, Keitel warned that, despite the postponement of the invasion, all preparations should continue to be disguised and explained to the troops as cover of the rear by the USSR. All events, he indicated, that are directly related to the offensive, will be delayed as far as possible. Rail transport must continue to operate on peacetime schedules. Only when the campaign in the Southeast is over will the railroads move to a peak schedule for the final wave of strategic deployment. The High Command was asked to submit appropriate new data for the table calculating the time, order and timing of the concentration of forces on the border with Soviet territory.
When was the day of the invasion finally established? In the documents that we have, the date June 22 as the day of the start of Operation Barbarossa was first mentioned on April 30, 1941 at a meeting with the head of the German defense department, i.e., when the operation in Yugoslavia and Greece was essentially already completed. In the list of issues discussed at this meeting, the first question was the timing of Operation Barbarossa. It said: “The Fuhrer decided: June 22 should be considered the start of Operation Barbarossa.”
This date was not chosen by chance. June 22, 1941 was Sunday. The Nazis understood that after a week of work, the Soviet people would rest peacefully. In order to catch the Soviet troops by surprise, the Nazis also chose the appropriate time to launch the first strikes. After visiting the troops, Brauchitsch considered it desirable to launch the offensive at dawn - at 3 hours 5 minutes. Some of the corps commanders insisted on this. However, soon a dispute arose between the command of Army Groups “North” and “Center” about the start time of the offensive. Then the OKW main headquarters, having once again considered this issue, finally determined the time of the invasion, setting it for 3 hours 30 minutes on June 22, 1941.
The fateful hour “H” was approaching. Hitler was waiting for him with impatience and anxiety. And when there were only a few hours left before the start of the offensive, the Fuhrer sent a special courier von Kleist to Rome with a message to his partner in aggression, Mussolini.
This letter is of some interest. It began with the words: “I am writing you this letter at the moment when months of difficult thoughts, as well as eternal nervous anticipation, ended in making the most difficult decision in my life” (to invade the Soviet Union. - P.Zh.).
And then there were false arguments about why Hitler was forced to take such a step. He painted a gloomy picture of the supposed danger looming over Europe caused by the Bolshevik tendency to expand the Soviet state. To eliminate this danger, Hitler wrote, there is only one way - to launch an invasion of the USSR, since “further waiting will lead to disastrous consequences at the latest this or next year.”
Hitler sought to convince the Duce that he had taken upon himself the historic mission of defending Europe from Bolshevism, or, as he put it, “he had decided to put an end to the hypocritical game of the Kremlin.” But what this hypocritical game consisted of, Hitler did not say, and could not say, since he had no excuse for treachery.
How did Hitler imagine the general situation then and how did he assess it? The most important thing for him was that Germany managed to avoid a war on two fronts - against England and the Soviet Union at the same time. This was what Hitler feared most. After the defeat of France, England lost any ability to fight, since it could only wage war with the help of continental countries. Now she relied only on the Soviet Union, which, according to Hitler, was pursuing a cautious and smart policy of pinning down the German armed forces in the East in order to prevent the German command from deciding on a major offensive in the West.
Of course, Hitler reasoned, the Soviet Union has enormous forces. And if Germany began to continue the air war with England, then the USSR could move them against Germany. Then the most unpleasant thing would happen - a war on two fronts. In addition, it must be borne in mind, Hitler noted, that in the position of instigator there is also the United States, which will carry out massive supplies of military materials. “Therefore,” he concluded, “after much reflection, I have come to the conclusion that it is better to break this noose before it is tightened. I believe, Duce, that by doing so I will render our joint conduct of the war this year perhaps the greatest service that is possible.”
It seemed to Hitler that the general situation for an attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941 was the most favorable. He reasoned like this: France is depressed and can be discounted. England, with the despair of a drowning man, clutches at every straw that can serve as an anchor of salvation for her. Who is she counting on? To the USA and USSR. It is impossible to eliminate the United States of America, “but to exclude Russia is in our power.” The liquidation of the Soviet state would simultaneously mean a tremendous relief of Japan's position in East Asia.
In this regard, attention should be paid to some of Hitler’s statements in Mussolini’s message related to the war against the USSR. He wrote:
“As for the struggle in the East, Duce, it will definitely be difficult. But I don’t doubt for a second that it will be a major success. First of all, I hope that as a result we will be able to ensure a common food supply in Ukraine for a long time. It will serve as our supplier of those resources that we may need in the future. I dare add that, as we can now judge, the current German harvest promises to be very good. It is quite possible that Russia will try to destroy Romanian oil sources. We have created defenses that I hope will protect us from this. The task of our armies is to eliminate this threat as quickly as possible.
If I am only now sending this message to you, Duce, it is only because the final decision will be made only today at 7 pm. Therefore, I ask you cordially not to inform anyone about this, especially your ambassador in Moscow, since there is no absolute certainty that our coded reports cannot be deciphered. I ordered my own ambassador to be informed of the decisions made only at the last minute.
Whatever happens now, Duce, our situation will not worsen from this step; it can only get better. Even if I were forced to leave 60 and 70 divisions in Russia by the end of this year, it would still be only a part of the forces that I must now constantly maintain on the eastern border. Let England try not to draw conclusions from the terrible facts that confront her. Then we will be able to free our rear and attack the enemy with triple force in order to destroy him. What depends on us Germans, I dare to assure you, Duce, will be done.
In conclusion, I would like to tell you one more thing. I feel internally free again after coming to this decision. Cooperation with the Soviet Union, despite all my sincere desire to achieve final detente, often weighed heavily on me. For it seemed to me a break with my whole past, my worldview and my previous commitments. I am happy that I have been freed from this moral burden."
These are the main principles of Hitler's message to Mussolini. They contained both frankness and disguised lies, which consisted primarily in the assertion that the Soviet Union threatened Germany and Western Europe as a whole. Hitler needed such a version in order, firstly, to portray himself as a “savior from the communist threat”, and, secondly, to justify the preventive nature of the attack on the USSR. Hitler was intensively preparing for the dissemination of this version. In the same message to Mussolini, he wrote: “The material that I intend to gradually publish is so extensive that the world will be more surprised by our long-suffering than by our decision, unless it belongs to a part of society hostile to us, for which arguments in advance have no meaning.” meanings."
It was also a lie that by attacking the USSR, Hitler allegedly sought first of all to undermine Great Britain’s hopes of organizing a war against Germany on two fronts and to deprive it of its last chance in the fight.
This version is meaningless. Nevertheless, it is still in use today. There are people who spread it and try to claim that the attack on the USSR was supposedly of secondary importance for Hitler, and the main goal was England. This thesis was presented in Moscow in 1965 at the International Conference dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany by the West German historian G. Jacobsen. He stated that Hitler decided to attack the USSR not with aggressive goals, but because he wanted to achieve victory over England, bring it to its knees and deprive it of any opportunity to have an ally. Although G. Jacobsen went on to talk about Hitler’s desire to destroy Bolshevism and about the exploitation of the Soviet economy, all this was supposedly subordinated to the main thing - victory over England. It is not difficult to guess where such statements come from. They feed on the lies that Hitler spread.
By June 21, all German troops occupied their original positions. Hitler was in a new underground headquarters near Rostenburg, aptly named the Wolf's Lair. Commanders of army groups, commanders of all formations and units led the troops from command and observation posts. Thus, the observation post of Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group was located opposite the Brest Fortress on the opposite bank of the Bug. Guderian, who visited here in 1939, knew this area very well and feared that tanks would not be able to capture the Brest Fortress on their own. The Bug River and ditches filled with water presented an impassable barrier for tanks.
From observation points, German officers could establish that normal life was going on in the garrison: the soldiers were engaged in drill training and playing volleyball. In the evenings a brass band played. On June 22 at 2 hours 10 minutes, when it was still dark, Guderian, accompanied by a group of staff officers, arrived at an observation post located northwest of Brest. And an hour later, when dawn was just breaking, the first volleys of German artillery guns rang out, the roar of engines and the grinding of tank tracks echoed. The first Messerschmitts and Junkers flew over the Bug.
The name of the operation to invade Yugoslavia.
The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.
Napoleon
Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.
Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.
Number of troops to implement the plan
Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.
The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.
Direction of the main attack
Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:
- Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
- Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
- Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.
| SOUTH | CENTER | NORTH | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus | Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow | Baltic states, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk |
| Number | 57 divisions and 13 brigades | 50 divisions and 2 brigades | 29th Division + Army "Norway" |
| Commanding | Field Marshal von Rundstedt | Field Marshal von Bock | Field Marshal von Leeb |
| common goal | Get on line: Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan (Northern Dvina) |
||
Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.
Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.
Implementation of the plan
The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:
- 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
- 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
- 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).
Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.
By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kiev. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.
Germany's failures in the North
Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.
Army Failures Center
Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.
Historians today assess the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.
The advance of the German army deep into the country was complicated by the partisan movement of Belarus.
Failures of the South Army
Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.
Map of the German advance plan
Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.
General state of affairs
- In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
- It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
- In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.
Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed
Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.
The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.
In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.
Did Barbarossa's plan fail?
I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.
Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.