In the battle on the ice, Novgorod troops met with. The Battle of Lake Peipsi (“Battle of the Ice”) took place

April 18 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia, the day of the victory of Russian soldiers of Prince Alexander Nevsky over the German knights on Lake Peipus (the so-called Battle of the Ice, 1242). The date is celebrated in accordance with the Federal Law “On the Days of Military Glory (Victory Days) of Russia” dated March 13, 1995 No. 32-FZ.

In the early 40s. XIII century, taking advantage of the weakening of Rus', which occurred as a result of the devastating invasion of the Mongol-Tatars, German crusaders, Swedish and Danish feudal lords decided to seize its northeastern lands. By joint efforts they hoped to conquer the Novgorod feudal republic. The Swedes, with the support of the Danish knights, tried to capture the mouth of the Neva, but were defeated by the Novgorod army in the Battle of the Neva in 1240.

At the end of August - beginning of September 1240, the Pskov land was invaded by the crusaders of the Livonian Order, which was formed by the German knights of the Teutonic Order in 1237 in the Eastern Baltic on the territory inhabited by the Livonian and Estonian tribes. After a short siege, German knights captured the city of Izborsk. Then they besieged Pskov and, with the assistance of the traitor boyars, soon occupied it too. After this, the crusaders invaded the Novgorod land, captured the coast of the Gulf of Finland and built their own on the site of the ancient Russian fortress of Koporye. Having not reached Novgorod 40 km, the knights began plundering its surroundings.

(Military encyclopedia. Military publishing house. Moscow. in 8 volumes - 2004)

An embassy was sent from Novgorod to the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yaroslav, so that he would release his son Alexander (Prince Alexander Nevsky) to help them. Alexander Yaroslavovich ruled in Novgorod from 1236, but due to the machinations of the Novgorod nobility, he left Novgorod and went to reign in Pereyaslavl-Zalessky. Yaroslav, realizing the danger of the threat emanating from the West, agreed: the matter concerned not only Novgorod, but all of Rus'.

In 1241, Prince Alexander Nevsky, returning to Novgorod, gathered an army of Novgorodians, Ladoga, Izhora and Karelians. Having secretly made a quick transition to Koporye, it took this strong fortress by storm. By capturing Koporye, Alexander Nevsky secured the northwestern borders of the Novgorod lands, secured his rear and northern flank for further struggle against the German crusaders. At the call of Alexander Nevsky, troops from Vladimir and Suzdal under the command of his brother Prince Andrei arrived to help the Novgorodians. United Novgorod-Vladimir army in the winter of 1241-1242. undertook a campaign in the Pskov land and, cutting off all roads from Livonia to Pskov, took this city, as well as Izborsk, by storm.

After this defeat, the Livonian knights, having gathered a large army, marched to the Pskov and Peipsi lakes. The basis of the army of the Livonian Order was the heavily armed knightly cavalry, as well as infantry (bollards) - detachments of peoples enslaved by the Germans (Estonians, Livonians, etc.), which many times outnumbered the knights.

Having found out the direction of movement of the enemy’s main forces, Alexander Nevsky sent his army there too. Having reached Lake Peipsi, Alexander Nevsky’s army found itself in the center of possible enemy routes to Novgorod. At this place it was decided to give battle to the enemy. The opposing armies converged on the shores of Lake Peipsi near the Crow Stone and the Uzmen tract. Here, on April 5, 1242, a battle took place that went down in history as the Battle of the Ice.

At dawn, the crusaders approached the Russian position on the ice of the lake at a slow trot. The army of the Livonian Order, according to established military tradition, advanced with an “iron wedge”, which appears in Russian chronicles under the name “pigs”. At the forefront was the main group of knights, some of them covered the flanks and rear of the “wedge”, in the center of which the infantry was located. The wedge had as its task the fragmentation and breakthrough of the central part of the enemy troops, and the columns following the wedge were supposed to defeat the enemy's flanks. In chain mail and helmets, with long swords, they seemed invulnerable.

Alexander Nevsky contrasted this stereotypical tactics of knights with the new formation of Russian troops. He concentrated his main forces not in the center ("chele"), as Russian troops always did, but on the flanks. In front was an advanced regiment of light cavalry, archers and slingers. The Russian battle formation was turned with its rear to the steep, steep eastern shore of the lake, and the princely cavalry squad hid in ambush behind the left flank. The chosen position was advantageous in that the Germans, advancing on open ice, were deprived of the opportunity to determine the location, number and composition of the Russian army.

The knight's wedge broke through the center of the Russian army. Having stumbled upon the steep shore of the lake, the sedentary, armor-clad knights were unable to develop their success. The flanks of the Russian battle formation ("wings") squeezed the wedge into pincers. At this time, Alexander Nevsky's squad struck from the rear and completed the encirclement of the enemy.

Under the onslaught of Russian regiments, the knights mixed their ranks and, having lost freedom of maneuver, were forced to defend themselves. A brutal battle ensued. Russian infantrymen pulled the knights off their horses with hooks and chopped them down with axes. Hemmed in on all sides in a limited space, the crusaders fought desperately. But their resistance gradually weakened, it became disorganized, and the battle broke up into separate centers. Where large groups of knights accumulated, the ice could not withstand their weight and broke. Many knights drowned. The Russian cavalry pursued the defeated enemy over 7 km, to the opposite shore of Lake Peipsi.

The army of the Livonian Order suffered a complete defeat and suffered huge losses for those times: up to 450 knights died and 50 were captured. Several thousand knechts were killed. The Livonian Order was faced with the need to conclude a peace, according to which the crusaders renounced their claims to Russian lands, and also renounced part of Latgale (a region in eastern Latvia).

The victory of the Russian army on the ice of Lake Peipus was of great political and military significance. The Livonian Order was dealt a crushing blow, and the crusaders' advance to the East stopped. The Battle of the Ice was the first example in history of the defeat of knights by an army consisting mainly of infantry, which testified to the advanced nature of Russian military art.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

And the Vladimir people led by Alexander Nevsky, on the one hand, and the army of the Livonian Order, on the other hand.

The opposing armies met on the morning of April 5, 1242. The Rhymed Chronicle describes the moment the battle began as follows:

Thus, the news from the Chronicle about the Russian battle order as a whole is combined with reports from Russian chronicles about the allocation of a separate rifle regiment in front of the center of the main forces (since 1185).

In the center, the Germans broke through the Russian line:

But then the troops of the Teutonic Order were surrounded by the Russians from the flanks and destroyed, and other German troops retreated to avoid the same fate: the Russians pursued those running on the ice for 7 miles. It is noteworthy that, unlike the Battle of Omovzha in 1234, sources close to the time of the battle do not report that the Germans fell through the ice; according to Donald Ostrowski, this information penetrated into later sources from the description of the battle of 1016 between Yaroslav and Svyatopolk in The Tale of Bygone Years and The Tale of Boris and Gleb.

In the same year, the Teutonic Order concluded a peace treaty with Novgorod, abandoning all of its recent seizures not only in Rus', but also in Letgol. An exchange of prisoners was also carried out. Only 10 years later the Teutons tried to recapture Pskov.

Scale and significance of the battle

The “Chronicle” says that in the battle there were 60 Russians for every German (which is recognized as an exaggeration), and about the loss of 20 knights killed and 6 captured in the battle. “Chronicle of the Grand Masters” (“Die jungere Hochmeisterchronik”, sometimes translated as “Chronicle of the Teutonic Order”), the official history of the Teutonic Order, written much later, speaks of the death of 70 order knights (literally “70 order gentlemen”, “seuentich Ordens Herenn” ), but unites those who died during the capture of Pskov by Alexander and on Lake Peipus.

According to the traditional point of view in Russian historiography, this battle, together with the victories of Prince Alexander over the Swedes (July 15, 1240 on the Neva) and over the Lithuanians (in 1245 near Toropets, near Lake Zhitsa and near Usvyat), was of great importance for Pskov and Novgorod, delaying the onslaught of three serious enemies from the west - at the very time when the rest of Rus' was greatly weakened by the Mongol invasion. In Novgorod, the Battle of the Ice, together with the Neva victory over the Swedes, was remembered in litanies in all Novgorod churches back in the 16th century. In Soviet historiography, the Battle of the Ice was considered one of the largest battles in the entire history of German knightly aggression in the Baltic states, and the number of troops on Lake Peipsi was estimated at 10-12 thousand people for the Order and 15-17 thousand people from Novgorod and their allies (the last figure corresponds to Henry of Latvia’s assessment of the number of Russian troops when describing their campaigns in the Baltic states in the 1210-1220s), that is, approximately at the same level as in the Battle of Grunwald () - up to 11 thousand people for the Order and 16-17 thousand people in the Polish-Lithuanian army. The Chronicle, as a rule, reports on the small number of Germans in those battles that they lost, but even in it the Battle of the Ice is clearly described as a defeat of the Germans, in contrast, for example, to the Battle of Rakovor ().

As a rule, the minimum estimates of the number of troops and losses of the Order in the battle correspond to the historical role that specific researchers assign to this battle and the figure of Alexander Nevsky as a whole (for more details, see Assessments of the activities of Alexander Nevsky). V. O. Klyuchevsky and M. N. Pokrovsky did not mention the battle at all in their works.

The English researcher J. Fennell believes that the significance of the Battle of the Ice (and the Battle of the Neva) is greatly exaggerated: “Alexander did only what numerous defenders of Novgorod and Pskov did before him and what many did after him - namely, rushed to protect the extended and vulnerable borders from invaders." Russian professor I. N. Danilevsky also agrees with this opinion. He notes, in particular, that the battle was inferior in scale to the Battle of Saul (1236), in which the Lithuanians killed the master of the order and 48 knights, and the battle of Rakovor; Contemporary sources even describe the Battle of the Neva in more detail and give it greater significance. However, in Russian historiography it is not customary to remember the defeat at Saul, since the Pskovites took part in it on the side of the defeated knights.

German historians believe that, while fighting on the western borders, Alexander Nevsky did not pursue any coherent political program, but successes in the West provided some compensation for the horrors of the Mongol invasion. Many researchers believe that the very scale of the threat that the West posed to Rus' is exaggerated. On the other hand, L. N. Gumilyov, on the contrary, believed that it was not the Tatar-Mongol “yoke”, but rather Catholic Western Europe represented by the Teutonic Order and the Riga Archbishopric that posed a mortal threat to the very existence of Rus', and therefore the role of Alexander Nevsky’s victories in Russian history is especially great.

The Battle of the Ice played a role in the formation of the Russian national myth, in which Alexander Nevsky was assigned the role of “defender of Orthodoxy and the Russian land” in the face of the “Western threat”; victory in the battle was considered to justify the prince's political moves in the 1250s. The cult of Nevsky became especially relevant during the Stalin era, serving as a kind of clear historical example for the cult of Stalin himself. The cornerstone of the Stalinist myth about Alexander Yaroslavich and the Battle of the Ice was the film by Sergei Eisenstein (see below).

On the other hand, it is incorrect to assume that the Battle of the Ice became popular in the scientific community and among the general public only after the appearance of Eisenstein’s film. “Schlacht auf dem Eise”, “Schlacht auf dem Peipussee”, “Prœlium glaciale” [Battle on the Ice (US), Battle of Lake Peipus (German), Battle of the Ice (Latin).] - such established concepts are found in Western sources long before the director’s works. This battle was and will forever remain in the memory of the Russian people just like, say, the Battle of Borodino, which strictly speaking cannot be called victorious - the Russian army abandoned the battlefield. And for us this is a great battle, which played an important role in the outcome of the war.

Memory of the battle

Movies

Music

• The musical score for Eisenstein's film, composed by Sergei Prokofiev, is a cantata focusing on the events of the battle.

Literature

Monuments

Monument to the squads of Alexander Nevsky on Mount Sokolikha

Monument to Alexander Nevsky and Worship Cross

The bronze worship cross was cast in St. Petersburg at the expense of patrons of the Baltic Steel Group (A. V. Ostapenko). The prototype was the Novgorod Alekseevsky Cross. The author of the project is A. A. Seleznev. The bronze sign was cast under the direction of D. Gochiyaev by the foundry workers of NTCCT CJSC, architects B. Kostygov and S. Kryukov. When implementing the project, fragments from the lost wooden cross by sculptor V. Reshchikov were used.

Commemorative cross for prince "s armed force of Alexander Nevsky (Kobylie Gorodishe).jpg

Memorial cross to the squads of Alexander Nevsky

Monument in honor of the 750th anniversary of the battle

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Monument in honor of the 750th anniversary of the battle (fragment)

In philately and on coins

Data

Due to the incorrect calculation of the date of the battle according to the new style, the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Victory of Russian soldiers of Prince Alexander Nevsky over the Crusaders (established by Federal Law No. 32-FZ of March 13, 1995 “On Days of Military Glory and Memorable Dates of Russia”) is celebrated on 18 April instead of the correct new style April 12. The difference between the old (Julian) and new (Gregorian, first introduced in 1582) style in the 13th century would have been 7 days (counting from April 5, 1242), and the difference between them of 13 days occurs only in the period 03/14/1900-14/03 .2100 (new style). In other words, Victory Day on Lake Peipsi (April 5, old style) is celebrated on April 18, which actually falls on April 5, old style, but only at the present time (1900-2099).

At the end of the 20th century in Russia and some republics of the former USSR, many political organizations celebrated the unofficial holiday Russian Nation Day (April 5), intended to become a date for the unity of all patriotic forces.

On April 22, 2012, on the occasion of the 770th anniversary of the Battle of the Ice, the Museum of the History of the Expedition of the USSR Academy of Sciences to clarify the location of the Battle of the Ice in 1242 was opened in the village of Samolva, Gdovsky District, Pskov Region.

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Notes

2. Razin E. A.
3. Uzhankov A.
6. Battle of the Ice 1242: Proceedings of a complex expedition to clarify the location of the Battle of the Ice. - M.-L., 1966. - 253 p. - P. 60-64.
7. . Its date is considered more preferable, since in addition to the number it also contains a link to the day of the week and church holidays (the day of remembrance of the martyr Claudius and the day of praise to the Virgin Mary). In the Pskov Chronicles the date is April 1.
8. Donald Ostrowski(English) // Russian History/Histoire Russe. - 2006. - Vol. 33, no. 2-3-4. - P. 304-307.
9. .
10. .
11. Henry of Latvia. .
12. Razin E. A. .
13. Danilevsky, I.. Polit.ru April 15, 2005.
14. Dittmar Dahlmann. Der russische Sieg über die “teutonische Ritter” auf der Peipussee 1242 // Schlachtenmythen: Ereignis - Erzählung - Erinnerung. Herausgegeben von Gerd Krumeich und Susanne Brandt. (Europäische Geschichtsdarstellungen. Herausgegeben von Johannes Laudage. - Band 2.) - Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2003. - S. 63-76.
15. Werner Philipp. Heiligkeit und Herrschaft in der Vita Aleksandr Nevskijs // Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte. - Band 18. - Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1973. - S. 55-72.
16. Janet Martin. Medieval Russia 980-1584. Second edition. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. - P. 181.
17. . gumilevica.kulichki.net. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
20. // Gdovskaya Zarya: newspaper. - 30.3.2007.
24. (inaccessible link since 05/25/2013 (2114 days) - story , copy) //Official website of the Pskov region, July 12, 2006 ]
27. .
28. .
29. .

Literature

• Lipitsky S. V. Battle on the Ice. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1964. - 68 p. - (The heroic past of our Motherland).
• Mansikka V.Y. Life of Alexander Nevsky: Analysis of editions and text. - St. Petersburg, 1913. - “Monuments of ancient writing.” - Vol. 180.
• Life of Alexander Nevsky / Prep. text, translation and comm. V. I. Okhotnikova // Monuments of literature of Ancient Rus': XIII century. - M.: Fiction, 1981.
• Begunov Yu. K. Monument of Russian literature of the 13th century: “The Tale of the Death of the Russian Land” - M.-L.: Nauka, 1965.
• Pashuto V.T. Alexander Nevsky - M.: Young Guard, 1974. - 160 p. - Series “Life of Remarkable People”.
• Karpov A. Yu. Alexander Nevsky - M.: Young Guard, 2010. - 352 p. - Series “Life of Remarkable People”.
• Khitrov M. Holy Blessed Grand Duke Alexander Yaroslavovich Nevsky. Detailed biography. - Minsk: Panorama, 1991. - 288 p. - Reprint edition.
• Klepinin N. A. Holy Blessed and Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky. - St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2004. - 288 p. - Series “Slavic Library”.
• Prince Alexander Nevsky and his era: Research and materials / Ed. Yu. K. Begunova and A. N. Kirpichnikov. - St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 1995. - 214 p.
• Fennell J. The crisis of medieval Rus'. 1200-1304 - M.: Progress, 1989. - 296 p.
• Battle of the Ice 1242: Proceedings of a complex expedition to clarify the location of the Battle of the Ice / Rep. ed. G. N. Karaev. - M.-L.: Nauka, 1966. - 241 p.
• Tikhomirov M. N. About the place of the Battle of the Ice // Tikhomirov M. N. Ancient Rus': Sat. Art. / Ed. A. V. Artsikhovsky and M. T. Belyavsky, with the participation of N. B. Shelamanova. - M.: Science, 1975. - P. 368-374. - 432 s. - 16,000 copies.(in lane, superreg.)
• Nesterenko A. N. Alexander Nevsky. Who won the Battle of the Ice., 2006. Olma-Press.

Links

An excerpt characterizing the Battle of the Ice

His illness took its own physical course, but what Natasha called: this happened to him happened to him two days before Princess Marya’s arrival. This was the last moral struggle between life and death, in which death won. It was the unexpected consciousness that he still valued the life that seemed to him in love for Natasha, and the last, subdued fit of horror in front of the unknown.
It was in the evening. He was, as usual after dinner, in a slight feverish state, and his thoughts were extremely clear. Sonya was sitting at the table. He dozed off. Suddenly a feeling of happiness overwhelmed him.
“Oh, she came in!” - he thought.
Indeed, sitting in Sonya’s place was Natasha, who had just entered with silent steps.
Since she began following him, he had always experienced this physical sensation of her closeness. She sat on an armchair, sideways to him, blocking the light of the candle from him, and knitted a stocking. (She learned to knit stockings since Prince Andrei told her that no one knows how to take care of the sick like old nannies who knit stockings, and that there is something soothing in knitting a stocking.) Thin fingers quickly fingered her from time to time the clashing spokes, and the pensive profile of her downcast face was clearly visible to him. She made a movement and the ball rolled off her lap. She shuddered, looked back at him and, shielding the candle with her hand, with a careful, flexible and precise movement, she bent, raised the ball and sat down in her previous position.
He looked at her without moving, and saw that after her movement she needed to take a deep breath, but she did not dare to do this and carefully took a breath.
In the Trinity Lavra they talked about the past, and he told her that if he were alive, he would forever thank God for his wound, which brought him back to her; but since then they never spoke about the future.
“Could it or could it not have happened? - he thought now, looking at her and listening to the light steel sound of the knitting needles. - Was it really only then that fate brought me so strangely together with her that I might die?.. Was the truth of life revealed to me only so that I could live in a lie? I love her more than anything in the world. But what should I do if I love her? - he said, and he suddenly groaned involuntarily, according to the habit that he acquired during his suffering.
Hearing this sound, Natasha put down the stocking, leaned closer to him and suddenly, noticing his glowing eyes, walked up to him with a light step and bent down.
- You are not asleep?
- No, I’ve been looking at you for a long time; I felt it when you came in. No one like you, but gives me that soft silence... that light. I just want to cry with joy.
Natasha moved closer to him. Her face shone with rapturous joy.
- Natasha, I love you too much. More than anything else.
- And I? “She turned away for a moment. - Why too much? - she said.
- Why too much?.. Well, what do you think, how do you feel in your soul, in your whole soul, will I be alive? What do you think?
- I'm sure, I'm sure! – Natasha almost screamed, taking both his hands with a passionate movement.
He paused.
- How good it would be! - And, taking her hand, he kissed it.
Natasha was happy and excited; and immediately she remembered that this was impossible, that he needed calm.
“But you didn’t sleep,” she said, suppressing her joy. – Try to sleep... please.
He released her hand, shaking it; she moved to the candle and sat down again in her previous position. She looked back at him twice, his eyes shining towards her. She gave herself a lesson on the stocking and told herself that she wouldn't look back until she finished it.
Indeed, soon after that he closed his eyes and fell asleep. He did not sleep for long and suddenly woke up in a cold sweat.
As he fell asleep, he kept thinking about the same thing he had been thinking about all the time - about life and death. And more about death. He felt closer to her.
"Love? What is love? - he thought. – Love interferes with death. Love is life. Everything, everything that I understand, I understand only because I love. Everything is, everything exists only because I love. Everything is connected by one thing. Love is God, and to die means for me, a particle of love, to return to the common and eternal source.” These thoughts seemed comforting to him. But these were just thoughts. Something was missing in them, something was one-sided, personal, mental - it was not obvious. And there was the same anxiety and uncertainty. He fell asleep.
He saw in a dream that he was lying in the same room in which he was actually lying, but that he was not wounded, but healthy. Many different faces, insignificant, indifferent, appear before Prince Andrei. He talks to them, argues about something unnecessary. They are getting ready to go somewhere. Prince Andrey vaguely remembers that all this is insignificant and that he has other, more important concerns, but continues to speak, surprising them, some empty, witty words. Little by little, imperceptibly, all these faces begin to disappear, and everything is replaced by one question about the closed door. He gets up and goes to the door to slide the bolt and lock it. Everything depends on whether he has time or not time to lock her. He walks, he hurries, his legs don’t move, and he knows that he won’t have time to lock the door, but still he painfully strains all his strength. And a painful fear seizes him. And this fear is the fear of death: it stands behind the door. But at the same time, as he powerlessly and awkwardly crawls towards the door, something terrible, on the other hand, is already, pressing, breaking into it. Something inhuman - death - is breaking at the door, and we must hold it back. He grabs the door, strains his last efforts - it is no longer possible to lock it - at least to hold it; but his strength is weak, clumsy, and, pressed by the terrible, the door opens and closes again.
Once again it pressed from there. The last, supernatural efforts were in vain, and both halves opened silently. It has entered, and it is death. And Prince Andrei died.
But at the same moment as he died, Prince Andrei remembered that he was sleeping, and at the same moment as he died, he, making an effort on himself, woke up.
“Yes, it was death. I died - I woke up. Yes, death is awakening! - his soul suddenly brightened, and the veil that had hitherto hidden the unknown was lifted before his spiritual gaze. He felt a kind of liberation of the strength previously bound in him and that strange lightness that has not left him since then.
When he woke up in a cold sweat and stirred on the sofa, Natasha came up to him and asked what was wrong with him. He did not answer her and, not understanding her, looked at her with a strange look.
This was what happened to him two days before the arrival of Princess Marya. From that very day, as the doctor said, the debilitating fever took on a bad character, but Natasha was not interested in what the doctor said: she saw these terrible, more undoubted moral signs for her.
From this day on, for Prince Andrei, along with awakening from sleep, awakening from life began. And in relation to the duration of life, it did not seem to him slower than awakening from sleep in relation to the duration of the dream.

There was nothing scary or abrupt in this relatively slow awakening.
His last days and hours passed as usual and simply. And Princess Marya and Natasha, who did not leave his side, felt it. They did not cry, did not shudder, and lately, feeling this themselves, they no longer walked after him (he was no longer there, he left them), but after the closest memory of him - his body. The feelings of both were so strong that the external, terrible side of death did not affect them, and they did not find it necessary to indulge their grief. They did not cry either in front of him or without him, but they never talked about him among themselves. They felt that they could not put into words what they understood.
They both saw him sink deeper and deeper, slowly and calmly, away from them somewhere, and they both knew that this was how it should be and that it was good.
He was confessed and given communion; everyone came to say goodbye to him. When their son was brought to him, he put his lips to him and turned away, not because he felt hard or sorry (Princess Marya and Natasha understood this), but only because he believed that this was all that was required of him; but when they told him to bless him, he did what was required and looked around, as if asking if anything else needed to be done.
When the last convulsions of the body, abandoned by the spirit, took place, Princess Marya and Natasha were here.
– Is it over?! - said Princess Marya, after his body had been lying motionless and cold in front of them for several minutes. Natasha came up, looked into the dead eyes and hurried to close them. She closed them and did not kiss them, but kissed what was her closest memory of him.
“Where did he go? Where is he now?..”

When the dressed, washed body lay in a coffin on the table, everyone came up to him to say goodbye, and everyone cried.
Nikolushka cried from the painful bewilderment that tore his heart. The Countess and Sonya cried out of pity for Natasha and that he was no more. The old count cried that soon, he felt, he would have to take the same terrible step.
Natasha and Princess Marya were also crying now, but they were not crying from their personal grief; they wept from the reverent emotion that gripped their souls before the consciousness of the simple and solemn mystery of death that had taken place before them.

The totality of causes of phenomena is inaccessible to the human mind. But the need to find reasons is embedded in the human soul. And the human mind, without delving into the innumerability and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, each of which separately can be represented as a cause, grabs the first, most understandable convergence and says: this is the cause. In historical events (where the object of observation is the actions of people), the most primitive convergence seems to be the will of the gods, then the will of those people who stand in the most prominent historical place - historical heroes. But one has only to delve into the essence of each historical event, that is, into the activities of the entire mass of people who participated in the event, to be convinced that the will of the historical hero not only does not guide the actions of the masses, but is itself constantly guided. It would seem that it is all the same to understand the significance of the historical event one way or another. But between the man who says that the peoples of the West went to the East because Napoleon wanted it, and the man who says that it happened because it had to happen, there is the same difference that existed between the people who argued that the earth stands firmly and the planets move around it, and those who said that they do not know what the earth rests on, but they know that there are laws governing the movement of it and other planets. There are no and cannot be reasons for a historical event, except for the only cause of all reasons. But there are laws that govern events, partly unknown, partly groped by us. The discovery of these laws is possible only when we completely renounce the search for causes in the will of one person, just as the discovery of the laws of planetary motion became possible only when people renounced the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe affirmation of the earth.

After the Battle of Borodino, the enemy’s occupation of Moscow and its burning, historians recognize the most important episode of the War of 1812 as the movement of the Russian army from the Ryazan to the Kaluga road and to the Tarutino camp - the so-called flank march behind Krasnaya Pakhra. Historians attribute the glory of this ingenious feat to various individuals and argue about who, in fact, it belongs to. Even foreign, even French historians recognize the genius of the Russian commanders when speaking about this flank march. But why military writers, and everyone after them, believe that this flank march is a very thoughtful invention of some one person, which saved Russia and destroyed Napoleon, is very difficult to understand. In the first place, it is difficult to understand wherein lies the profundity and genius of this movement; for in order to guess that the best position of the army (when it is not attacked) is where there is more food, it does not require much mental effort. And everyone, even a stupid thirteen-year-old boy, could easily guess that in 1812 the most advantageous position of the army, after the retreat from Moscow, was on the Kaluga road. So, it is impossible to understand, firstly, by what conclusions historians reach the point of seeing something profound in this maneuver. Secondly, it is even more difficult to understand exactly what historians see as the salvation of this maneuver for the Russians and its detrimental nature for the French; for this flank march, under other preceding, accompanying and subsequent circumstances, could have been disastrous for the Russians and salutary for the French army. If from the time this movement took place, the position of the Russian army began to improve, then it does not follow from this that this movement was the reason for this.
This flank march not only could not have brought any benefits, but could have destroyed the Russian army if other conditions had not coincided. What would have happened if Moscow had not burned down? If Murat had not lost sight of the Russians? If Napoleon had not been inactive? What if the Russian army, on the advice of Bennigsen and Barclay, had given battle at Krasnaya Pakhra? What would have happened if the French had attacked the Russians when they were going after Pakhra? What would have happened if Napoleon had subsequently approached Tarutin and attacked the Russians with at least one tenth of the energy with which he attacked in Smolensk? What would have happened if the French had marched on St. Petersburg?.. With all these assumptions, the salvation of a flank march could turn into destruction.
Thirdly, and the most incomprehensible, is that people who study history deliberately do not want to see that the flank march cannot be attributed to any one person, that no one ever foresaw it, that this maneuver, just like the retreat in Filyakh, in the present, was never presented to anyone in its entirety, but step by step, event by event, moment by moment, flowed from a countless number of very diverse conditions, and only then was presented in all its entirety, when it was completed and became the past.
At the council in Fili, the dominant thought among the Russian authorities was a self-evident retreat in a direct direction back, that is, along the Nizhny Novgorod road. Evidence of this is that the majority of votes at the council were cast in this sense, and, most importantly, the well-known conversation after the council of the commander-in-chief with Lansky, who was in charge of the provisions department. Lanskoy reported to the commander-in-chief that food for the army was collected mainly along the Oka, in the Tula and Kaluga provinces, and that in the event of a retreat to Nizhny, food supplies would be separated from the army by the large Oka River, through which transportation in the first winter was impossible. This was the first sign of the need to deviate from what had previously seemed the most natural direct direction to Nizhny. The army stayed further south, along the Ryazan road, and closer to the reserves. Subsequently, the inaction of the French, who even lost sight of the Russian army, concerns about protecting the Tula plant and, most importantly, the benefits of getting closer to their reserves, forced the army to deviate even further south, onto the Tula road. Having crossed in a desperate movement beyond Pakhra to the Tula road, the military leaders of the Russian army thought to remain near Podolsk, and there was no thought about the Tarutino position; but countless circumstances and the appearance again of French troops, who had previously lost sight of the Russians, and battle plans, and, most importantly, the abundance of provisions in Kaluga, forced our army to deviate even more to the south and move to the middle of the routes for their food supplies, from the Tula to the Kaluga road, to Tarutin. Just as it is impossible to answer the question of when Moscow was abandoned, it is also impossible to answer when exactly and by whom it was decided to go to Tarutin. Only when the troops had already arrived at Tarutin as a result of countless differential forces, then people began to assure themselves that they had wanted this and had long foreseen it.

The famous flank march consisted only in the fact that the Russian army, retreating straight back in the opposite direction of advance, after the French offensive had ceased, deviated from the direct direction initially adopted and, not seeing pursuit behind itself, naturally moved in the direction where it attracted by an abundance of food.
If we were to imagine not brilliant commanders at the head of the Russian army, but simply one army without leaders, then this army could not do anything other than move back to Moscow, describing an arc from the side on which there was more food and the edge was more abundantly.
This movement from the Nizhny Novgorod to the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads was so natural that the marauders of the Russian army ran away in this very direction and that in this very direction it was required from St. Petersburg that Kutuzov move his army. In Tarutino, Kutuzov almost received a reprimand from the sovereign for withdrawing the army to the Ryazan road, and he was pointed out the same situation against Kaluga in which he was already at the time he received the sovereign’s letter.
Rolling back in the direction of the push given to it during the entire campaign and in the Battle of Borodino, the ball of the Russian army, having destroyed the force of the push and not receiving new shocks, took the position that was natural to it.
Kutuzov's merit did not lie in some brilliant, as they call it, strategic maneuver, but in the fact that he alone understood the significance of the event that was taking place. He alone understood even then the meaning of the inaction of the French army, he alone continued to assert that the Battle of Borodino was a victory; he alone - the one who, it would seem, due to his position as commander-in-chief, should have been called to the offensive - he alone used all his strength to keep the Russian army from useless battles.
The killed animal near Borodino lay somewhere where the hunter who ran away had left it; but whether he was alive, whether he was strong, or whether he was just hiding, the hunter did not know. Suddenly the groan of this beast was heard.
The groan of this wounded beast, the French army, which exposed its destruction, was the sending of Lauriston to Kutuzov’s camp with a request for peace.
Napoleon, with his confidence that it is not only good that is good, but what came into his head that is good, wrote to Kutuzov the words that first came to his mind and had no meaning. He wrote:

“Monsieur le prince Koutouzov,” he wrote, “j"envoie pres de vous un de mes aides de camps generaux pour vous entretenir de plusieurs objets interessants. Je desire que Votre Altesse ajoute foi a ce qu"il lui dira, surtout lorsqu" il exprimera les sentiments d"estime et de particuliere consideration que j"ai depuis longtemps pour sa personne... Cette lettre n"etant a autre fin, je prie Dieu, Monsieur le prince Koutouzov, qu"il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde ,
Moscou, le 3 Octobre, 1812. Signe:
Napoleon."
[Prince Kutuzov, I am sending you one of my general adjutants to negotiate with you on many important subjects. I ask Your Lordship to believe everything that he tells you, especially when he begins to express to you the feelings of respect and special reverence that I have had for you for a long time. Therefore, I pray to God to keep you under his sacred roof.
Moscow, October 3, 1812.
Napoleon. ]

“Je serais maudit par la posterite si l"on me regardait comme le premier moteur d"un accommodation quelconque. Tel est l "esprit actuel de ma nation", [I would be damned if they looked at me as the first instigator of any deal; such is the will of our people.] - answered Kutuzov and continued to use all his strength for that to keep troops from advancing.
In the month of the robbery of the French army in Moscow and the quiet stop of the Russian army near Tarutin, a change occurred in the strength of both troops (spirit and number), as a result of which the advantage of strength was on the side of the Russians. Despite the fact that the position of the French army and its strength were unknown to the Russians, how soon the attitude changed, the need for an offensive was immediately expressed in countless signs. These signs were: the sending of Lauriston, and the abundance of provisions in Tarutino, and information coming from all sides about the inaction and disorder of the French, and the recruitment of our regiments with recruits, and good weather, and the long rest of Russian soldiers, and the rest that usually arises in the troops as a result of rest. impatience to carry out the task for which everyone was gathered, and curiosity about what was happening in the French army, so long lost from sight, and the courage with which Russian outposts were now snooping around the French stationed in Tarutino, and news of easy victories over the French by the peasants and the partisans, and the envy aroused by this, and the feeling of revenge that lay in the soul of every person as long as the French were in Moscow, and (most importantly) the unclear, but arose in the soul of every soldier, consciousness that the relationship of force had now changed and the advantage is on our side. The essential balance of forces changed, and an offensive became necessary. And immediately, just as surely as the chimes begin to strike and play in a clock, when the hand has made a full circle, in the higher spheres, in accordance with a significant change in forces, the increased movement, hissing and play of the chimes was reflected.

The Russian army was controlled by Kutuzov with his headquarters and the sovereign from St. Petersburg. In St. Petersburg, even before receiving news of the abandonment of Moscow, a detailed plan for the entire war was drawn up and sent to Kutuzov for guidance. Despite the fact that this plan was drawn up on the assumption that Moscow was still in our hands, this plan was approved by headquarters and accepted for execution. Kutuzov only wrote that long-range sabotage is always difficult to carry out. And to resolve the difficulties encountered, new instructions and persons were sent who were supposed to monitor his actions and report on them.
In addition, now the entire headquarters in the Russian army has been transformed. The places of the murdered Bagration and the offended, retired Barclay were replaced. They thought very seriously about what would be better: to place A. in B.’s place, and B. in D.’s place, or, on the contrary, D. in A.’s place, etc., as if anything other than the pleasure of A. and B., it could depend on this.
At the army headquarters, on the occasion of Kutuzov’s hostility with his chief of staff, Bennigsen, and the presence of the sovereign’s trusted representatives and these movements, a more than usual complex game of parties was going on: A. undermined B., D. under S., etc. ., in all possible movements and combinations. With all these undermining, the subject of intrigue was mostly the military matter that all these people thought to lead; but this military matter went on independently of them, exactly as it should have gone, that is, never coinciding with what people came up with, but flowing from the essence of the attitude of the masses. All these inventions, crossing and intertwining, represented in the higher spheres only a true reflection of what was about to happen.

One of the most significant events in medieval Russian history was the Battle of the Ice of 1242, which took place on April 5 on the ice of Lake Peipsi. The battle summed up the war that lasted almost two years between the Livonian Order and the northern Russian lands - the Novgorod and Pskov republics. This battle went down in history as a vivid example of the heroism of Russian soldiers who defended the freedom and independence of the country from foreign invaders.

Historical context and beginning of the war

The end of the first half of the 13th century was very difficult and tragic for Rus'. In 1237-1238, it swept through the northeastern principalities. Dozens of cities were destroyed and burned, people were killed or taken prisoner. The territory of the country was in severe desolation. In 1240, the western campaign of the Mongols began, during which the blow fell on the southern principalities. The western and northern neighbors of Rus' - the Livonian Order, Sweden and Denmark - decided to take advantage of this situation.

Back in 1237, Pope Gregory IX declared another crusade against the “pagans” who inhabited Finland. The fighting of the Order of the Sword against the local population in the Baltics continued throughout the first half of the 13th century. Repeatedly, German knights undertook campaigns against Pskov and Novgorod. In 1236, the Swordsmen became part of the more powerful Teutonic Order. The new formation was named the Livonian Order.

In July 1240, the Swedes attacked Rus'. Novgorod Prince Alexander Yaroslavich quickly set out with his army and defeated the invaders at the mouth of the Neva. It was for this feat of arms that the commander received the honorary nickname Nevsky. In August of the same year, the Livonian knights also began fighting. First they captured the Izborsk fortress, and after the siege, Pskov. They left their governors in Pskov. The following year, the Germans began to devastate the Novgorod lands, rob merchants, and take the population captive. Under these conditions, the Novgorodians asked the Vladimir prince Yaroslav to send his son Alexander, who reigned in Pereyaslavl.

Actions of Alexander Yaroslavich

Arriving in Novgorod, Alexander first decided to avert the immediate threat. For this purpose, a campaign was undertaken against the Livonian fortress of Koporye, built near the Gulf of Finland, on the territory of the Vod tribe. The fortress was taken and destroyed, and the remnants of the German garrison were taken prisoner.

Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich Nevsky. Years of life 1221 - 1263

In the spring of 1242, Alexander set out on a campaign against Pskov. In addition to his squad, with him was the Vladimir-Suzdal squad of his younger brother Andrei and a regiment of the Novgorod militia. Having liberated Pskov from the Livonians, Alexander strengthened his army with the joining Pskovites and continued the campaign. Having crossed into the territory of the Order, reconnaissance was sent ahead. The main forces were deployed “in the villages,” that is, in local villages and hamlets.

Progress of the battle

The advance detachment met the German knights and entered into battle with them. Before superior forces, Russian soldiers had to retreat. After the return of reconnaissance, Alexander turned his troops, “backing up” back to the shore of Lake Peipsi. A convenient place for the battle was chosen here. Russian troops stood on the eastern shore of Uzmen (a small lake or strait between Lake Peipus and Pskov Lake), not far from the Crow Stone.

Battle map

The location was chosen in such a way that right behind the warriors there was a wooded snow-covered bank, on which the movement of cavalry was difficult. At the same time, the Russian troops were in shallow water, which was frozen to the very bottom and could easily withstand many armed people. But on the territory of the lake itself there were areas with loose ice - whitefish.

The battle began with a ramming attack by heavy Livonian cavalry directly into the center of the Russian formation. It is believed that Alexander stationed the weaker Novgorod militia here, and placed professional squads on the flanks. This construction provided a serious advantage. After the attack, the knights got stuck in the center; having broken through the ranks of the defenders, they could not turn around on the shore, having no room to maneuver. At this time, the Russian cavalry struck the flanks, surrounding the enemy.

The Chud warriors, allied to the Livonians, walked behind the knights and were the first to scatter. The chronicle notes that in total 400 Germans were killed, 50 were taken prisoner, and the Chuds died “innumerable.” The Sofia Chronicle says that some of the Livonians died in the lake. Having defeated the enemy, the Russian army returned to Novgorod, taking prisoners.

The meaning of the battle

The first brief information about the battle is contained in the Novgorod Chronicle. Subsequent chronicles and lives of Nevsky provide additional information. Today there is a lot of popular literature devoted to the description of the battle. Here the emphasis is often placed on colorful pictures rather than on correspondence with real events. The summary of books for children rarely allows us to fully describe the entire historical outline of the battle.

Historians assess the strengths of the parties differently. Traditionally, the number of troops is approximately 12-15 thousand people on each side. At that time these were very serious armies. True, German sources claim that only a few dozen “brothers” died in the battle. However, here we are talking only about members of the Order, of whom there were never many. In fact, these were officers, under whose command were ordinary knights and auxiliary warriors - bollards. In addition, along with the Germans, allies from Chud took part in the war, which Livonian sources did not take into account.

The defeat of the German knights in 1242 was of great importance for the situation in northwestern Rus'. Under the conditions, it was very important to stop the Order’s advance on Russian lands for a long time. The next serious war with the Livonians will take place only in more than 20 years.

Prince Alexander Nevsky, who commanded the combined forces, was subsequently canonized. In the history of Russia, an order named after the famous commander was established twice - the first time, the second time - during the Great Patriotic War.

Of course, it is worth saying that the roots of this event go back to the era of the Crusades. And it is not possible to analyze them in more detail within the text. However, in our training courses there is a 1.5 hour video lesson, which in the form of a presentation examines all the nuances of this difficult topic. Become a participant in our training courses

Battle on the Ice. Background.

But Albert, who had not yet sailed far, was notified in time of the betrayal of the Russian prince, and returned with the knights to Riga, preparing for defense. True, the Germans did not have to defend themselves: the valiant Vyachko, having learned about Albert’s return, simply set fire to Kukenois and fled with his squad somewhere to Rus'. This time the Germans decided not to tempt fate and took control of Kukenois.

And then a strange thing happens: in 1210, the Germans sent ambassadors to the Prince of Polotsk, who were supposed to offer him peace. And Polotsk agrees to this peace on the condition that the Livonians, who were subordinate to Riga, will pay tribute to Polotsk and the bishop will be responsible for this. It’s amazing: Polotsk agrees to peace with the Germans, who captured two of its appanage principalities and are also spreading their influence over the pagans. However, on the other hand, what’s strange about this: contrary to the statements of our historians, who shout at every corner that the Russians from ancient times helped the Baltic tribes fight the Western occupiers, Polotsk did not care about these tribes from a high bell tower. The only thing he was interested in was profit.

In 1216, the first clash between the Germans and Novgorod took place. And again, the conflict was initiated by the Russian princes: the Novgorodians and Pskovites at the end of the year attacked the Estonian city of Odenpe (at that time already belonging to the Germans) and plundered it. In January 1217, the Estonians, with the help of the Germans, carried out a retaliatory attack on the Novgorod lands. But there was no talk of any territorial acquisitions - the Germans, having robbed the Novgorodians, went home. In the same year, the Novgorodians again gathered on a campaign against Odempe. Novgorod troops besieged the city, but were unable to take it, so the Novgorodians had to limit themselves to plundering the surrounding area. A hastily assembled army hurried to the aid of the besieged Odempe garrison.

However, due to its small numbers, it was unable to provide serious assistance to the Livonians in Odempe. All that this army had the strength to do was to break through to Odempe. As a result, the number of people in the city turned out to be quite large, but supplies were extremely scarce. Therefore, the Livonians were forced to ask for peace from the Russians. They, having taken a ransom from the Germans, left Livonia. What is characteristic: the Novgorodians, if they were really afraid of the excessive activity of the Catholic Church or fought for the freedom of the Baltic tribes, could quite easily simply starve out all the Germans in Odenpe, thereby destroying most of the Livonian army and stopping Catholic expansion for a long time.

However, the Novgorodians did not even think of doing this. The Catholics did not interfere with them in any way. On the contrary, they had even more money than the pagans, which means it was doubly fun to rob. So the Russians didn’t try to cut the branch they were sitting on - why kill the Germans, who in a year or two could again accumulate money, which could then be taken away from them in the next campaign? Actually, this is exactly what the Novgorodians did: in 1218, the Novgorod army again invaded Livonia. Once again, the Russians find themselves unable to take a single Livonian castle and again, having ravaged the surrounding area, return home with loot.

But in 1222 a significant event occurred: the Estonians rebelled against the Germans. Realizing that they cannot cope with the knights on their own, the Estonians turn to Novgorod for help. And the Novgorodians really come, plunder the surrounding area, and leave, leaving small garrisons in the castles donated by the Estonians. That is, the Novgorodians had little interest in annexing the Livonian lands. As usual, they were driven only by the thirst for profit. Of course, the few Russian troops left in German castles could not resist the retaliatory actions of the Livonians for long, and by 1224 the Germans cleared the Estonian lands from the Russians. What is interesting is that while the Germans were destroying the Russian garrisons, the Novgorodians did not give a damn and did not even intend to help their comrades.

But when the Germans, having returned to themselves the lands captured by the Russians in 1223, asked Novgorod for peace, paying tribute at the same time, the Novgorodians happily agreed - of course, a freebie after all. Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, who was at that time the prince of Novgorod, decided to carry out the next campaign in 1228. However, Yaroslav was not very popular either in Novgorod or in Pskov, as a result of which first the Pskovites, and then the Novgorodians, refused to participate in the campaign. But the year 1233 became, to a certain extent, significant for Russian-Livonian relations, since it was a kind of forerunner of the events of 1240-1242.

In 1233, with the help of the Livonian army, the former Pskov prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich (expelled from the city, apparently on the initiative of the pro-Suzdal group that supported Yaroslav Vsevolodovich) captured Izborsk. Apparently, Izborsk surrendered to the prince without a fight, because if this perfectly fortified fortress decided to resist, it would have taken the Germans at least several weeks to take it, and during this time the Pskov fortress would have managed to approach the city. and the Novgorod militia, which would not leave a stone unturned from the “Western invaders.”

But the city fell quickly, which means that the Izborsk residents did not want to fight with their prince. And now the Livonians are given an excellent opportunity to begin the seizure of Novgorod lands, because Izborsk, a key point of the Pskov land and a wonderful fortress, is already in their hands. However, the Germans do not want to defend Izborsk, and in the same year the Pskovites (probably with the support of the same pro-Suzdal party inside the city) again captured Izborsk and captured Yaroslav Vladimirovich. Yaroslav Vladimirovich was sent first to Novgorod to Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, and then to Pereyaslavl, from where after some time he somehow managed to escape, which played an important role in the “crusader aggression” of 1240-1242.

So what can we conclude? Livonia never pursued an aggressive policy towards the Russian principalities. She simply didn't have the strength for it. Neither before nor after 1242 was Livonia able to compete with Novgorod in economic and military potential. The Russian principalities constantly took advantage of the weakness of their western neighbor, conducting large and not very large raids. It should be noted that the Russian principalities were never interested in destroying the bridgehead of “Western aggression” in the Baltic states, although the Russians had plenty of opportunities to crush weak Livonia (especially in the initial period of its existence). However, the leitmotif of Rus'’s relations with Livonia was not at all the fight against “foreign invaders,” but profit from plunder.

Battle on the Ice. From the capture of Izborsk to the Battle of Lake Peipsi.

So, Yaroslav Vladimirovich somehow managed to escape from Pereyaslavl. And where is he running? Back to our “sworn enemies” - the Germans. And in 1240, Yaroslav is trying to repeat what he did not succeed in 1233. An extremely accurate (albeit somewhat anachronistic) definition of the actions of the Germans in 1233 and 1240 was given by Belitsky and Satyreva: “The so-called “captures” by the troops of the Order of Izborsk and Pskov in 1233 and 1240 can, in the light of the above, be considered as a temporary entry of a limited contingent of order troops into the Pskov Principality, carried out at the request of the legal ruler of Pskov, Prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich." ("Pskov and the Order in the first third of the 13th century").

Indeed, the actions of the Germans cannot be considered as an attempt to seize Russian lands or, even more so, an attempt to conquer Novgorod (for the Livonians this would be no less (and even more) a murderous undertaking than for the Swedes) - the Germans only sought to help Yaroslav Vladimirovich in the fight at the princely table. Someone may wonder: why did they need this? It's simple: the Livonians wanted to see in place of the Pskov Principality a kind of buffer state that would protect the Baltic states from the constant raids of the Novgorodians. The desire is quite understandable, it should be noted. What’s interesting is that both the Pskovians and the Novgorodians were also not at all opposed to being part of “Western civilization,” fortunately, they had much more in common with the West than with the Horde, to which they were not very happy to pay tribute.

And the power of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and his son, our hero, Alexander Yaroslavovich, who tried to curtail Novgorod liberties at every opportunity, had already had enough of them. Therefore, when in the fall of 1240 Yaroslav Vladimirovich, with the support of the Livonian army, invaded the Pskov lands and approached Izborsk, the city, apparently, again offered no resistance. Otherwise, how can one explain the fact that the Germans managed to take it at all? As mentioned above, Izborsk was an excellent fortress, which could only be taken as a result of a long siege. But the distance from Izborsk to Pskov is 30 km, that is, one day’s journey. That is, if the Germans had not managed to take Izborsk on the move, they would not have been able to take it at all, since the Pskov army that arrived in time would simply have defeated the invaders.

Thus, it can be assumed that Izborsk surrendered without a fight. However, in Pskov, where separatist sentiments were apparently also strong, supporters of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich are making an attempt to save their power: the Pskov army is sent to Izborsk. Under the walls of Izborsk, the Germans attack the Pskovites and defeat them, killing 800 people (according to the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle). Next, the Germans advance to Pskov and besiege it. Once again, the Russians show little desire to fight: after only a week's siege, Pskov surrenders. It is significant that Novgorod did not at all strive to help the Pskovites: instead of sending an army to help Pskov, the Novgorodians calmly wait for the Germans to take the city.

Apparently, the Novgorodians did not consider the restoration of the princely power of Yaroslav Vladimirovich in Pskov to be an evil. What do the “crusaders” do after capturing such a large and significant center as Pskov? Nothing. According to LRH, the Germans are just leaving two Vogt knights there. Based on this, we can draw a completely logical conclusion: the Germans did not at all seek to seize the Novgorod lands - their only goal was to establish the power they needed in Pskov. That's all. That's the whole "deadly threat hanging over Russia."

After the capture of Izborsk and Pskov, the Germans commit the next “act of aggression” - they build the “fortress” of Koporye on the lands of the Vod tribe. Of course, our historians tried to present this fact as a clear demonstration that the Germans were trying to gain a foothold in new lands. However, it is not. It’s just that the leaders, apparently, declared their intention to accept Catholicism and the patronage of the Livonian Church, after which the Germans built a small fort for them. The fact is that the Germans built fortifications for all the pagans who converted to Catholicism. This was the tradition in the Baltics.

After the founding of this terrible stronghold of Catholic aggression, the Germans took the city of Tesov and, in fact, that’s all. This is where all aggression ends. Having plundered the outskirts of Novgorod, the Germans and Estonians left the Novgorod lands, leaving Pskov in the possession of their old ally Yaroslav Vladimirovich. The entire German “occupation army” consisted of the two knights already mentioned above. However, our historians shout at the top of their voices that these two knights posed a terrible threat to the independence of Rus'.

As we see, the Germans did not come to Rus' with the goal of Catholicizing Pskov or, God forbid, capturing Novgorod. The Germans were just trying to protect themselves from the devastating raids of the Novgorodians. However, the theory of Catholic expansion continues to be persistently imposed on us. But, as in the case of the Swedes, there is not a single documentary evidence that the Pope called on the Livonians for a crusade against Rus'. Quite the opposite: the details of this campaign tell us that it was of a completely different nature.

The only hostile actions of the Pope against Novgorod were that he transferred the Russian lands captured by the Germans (and some others) under the jurisdiction of the Ezel bishopric. True, it is completely unclear what is special about this. We should not forget that the Russian Orthodox Church a priori supported any Russian campaigns in the same Livonia, but for some reason no one believes that these campaigns were provoked precisely by the Church. So there was no “crusade against Rus'”. And it couldn't be.

Paradoxically, Novgorod felt the threat looming over it only after the Germans left the Novgorod lands. Until this moment, the pro-German party in the city hoped that Novgorod would repeat the fate of Pskov. This party also hoped that the German knights would provide at least some assistance to Novgorod in the fight against Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and the Tatars. However, as it turned out, the Germans were not going to take Novgorod, much less provide any kind of support to the Russians in anything - they didn’t even want to leave a garrison in Pskov.

In addition, after the capture of Pskov, Novgorod, which had previously been reliably protected from the Baltic tribes by the lands of the Pskov Principality, now found itself open to Estonian raids, and this also could not please the Novgorodians. As a result, they turn to Yaroslav Vsevolodovich with a request to send them a prince (Alexander was kicked out by the Novgorodians a few months after the Battle of the Neva). Yaroslav first sends Andrei, but for some reason he did not suit the Novgorodians, and they ask Alexander.

On the second try, Yaroslav grants their request. The first thing Alexander does upon arrival is destroy the opposition. What is characteristic: when the Germans took Pskov, they did not carry out any punitive measures - on the contrary, everyone who did not like the new government was free to leave the city, which many did. But in Rus', those who disagreed were always treated harshly, and the Russian national hero Alexander was no exception.

After destroying the rivals inside his domains, Alexander goes to the external opponents: gathering an army. He advances to Koporye, which he immediately takes. Many of the leaders who were in the prison were hanged, and the “fortress” itself was razed. Alexander's next goal was Pskov. But the prince did not have to storm this citadel: Pskov surrendered himself. Apparently, Yaroslav Vladimirovich sensed the change in the situation in time, considered it more reasonable to remain without a principality, but with his head on his shoulders, he surrendered the city to the Novgorodians without a fight. For which, apparently, he was awarded the reign in Torzhok instead of the gallows that was due to him according to the logic of things and the tradition established by Alexander.

But the two knights who were in the city were less fortunate: according to LRH, they were expelled from the city. True, some of our historians are still sincerely confident that there were not even 2 knights in the city, but some countless number. For example, Yu. Ozerov writes about the capture of Pskov: “In the battle, 70 noble order brothers and many ordinary knights were killed” (“Like a “pig” ran into a “regimental” row”). I wonder what sacred meaning Ozerov puts into the term “ordinary knights”. But this, in general, is not so important, if only because there could not be 70 knights in Pskov by definition, since then it is necessary to admit that all the brothers of the German House of St. Mary in Livonia (as the Order came to be called) were in Pskov. Mechenostsev after joining the Teutonic Order in 1237), and then there was simply no one to fight on Lake Peipsi.

Apparently, the myth about 70 knights killed in Pskov goes back to the Chronicle of the Teutonic Order, which contains the following passage: “This prince Alexander gathered with a large army and with great strength came to Pskov and took it. Despite the fact that the Christians bravely defended themselves , the Germans were defeated and captured and subjected to severe torture, and seventy order knights were killed there. Prince Alexander was glad of his victory, and the brother knights with their people who were killed there became martyrs in the name of God, glorified among Christians ".

However, as we see, in this chronicle the author put together the capture of Pskov and the Battle of the Ice, thus we should talk about 70 knights who died in both of these battles. But this would also be incorrect, since the author of the KhTO borrowed information about events in the Russian lands in 1240-1242 from LRH, and all the differences between the text of the KhTO and the text of LRH are solely a figment of the imagination of the chronicler of the KhTO. Begunov, Kleinenberg and Shaskolsky, in their work devoted to the study of Russian and Western sources about the Battle of the Ice, wrote the following in relation to late European chronicles: “From the above texts and from the comments it is completely obvious that all the texts of the late Baltic chronicles of the 14th - 16th centuries ., describing German aggression against Rus' in 1240 - 1242, go back to the corresponding part of the “Rhymed Chronicle” and are its greatly abbreviated retellings.

In the above texts there are several pieces of information that are missing from the Rhymed Chronicle, but, as was shown in the comments, none of these pieces of information can be traced back to any reliable additional source (written or oral); Apparently, all the discrepancies between the texts of the later chronicles and the text of the “Rhymed Chronicle” are simply the fruits of the literary creativity of the later chroniclers, who here and there added individual details from themselves (and according to their own understanding) to the coverage of events, entirely borrowed from the “Rhymed Chronicle” ( "Written sources about the Battle of the Ice"). That is, the only real and reasonable number of knights in Pskov should be considered to be the two Vogts mentioned in LRH.

The next stage of Alexander's campaign, apparently, was Izborsk. Not a single chronicle or chronicle reports about his fate. Apparently, this fortress, like Pskov, surrendered to the prince without a fight. Which, in general, is not surprising given the complete absence of Germans in this extremely strategically important city. And after the “foreign invaders” were finally expelled from the Russian lands, the Novgorodians began their favorite pastime: plundering the Livonian lands.

In the spring of 1242, Alexander’s army crossed to the western shore of Lake Peipus (possession of Livonia) and began to plunder the property of local residents. And it was during this glorious occupation that one of the Russian detachments under the command of the brother of the Novgorod mayor Domash Tverdislavovich was attacked by a knightly army and the Chud militia. The Novgorod detachment was defeated, many, including Domash himself, were killed, and the rest fled to Alexander’s main forces. After which the prince retreated to the eastern shore of the lake. The hastily assembled Livonian troops, apparently, decided to catch up with the Novgorodians in order to take away the loot from them. And that’s when the ice battle took place.

From the above events it clearly follows that there was no memory of any terrible “Western aggression” or “deadly threat to Novgorod”. The Germans came to the Novgorod lands with a single goal: to create a new state friendly to Livonia on the territory of the Pskov Principality under the rule of their longtime ally Prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich. This state was supposed to serve as a kind of shield of the Baltic states from the devastating raids of the Novgorodians.

Having completed their mission and established the power of Yaroslav in Pskov, the Germans left the Russian lands, leaving only two observers. This is where the “aggressive” actions of the Livonians ended. Of course, the Novgorodians were not satisfied with this state of affairs, and in 1241 Alexander set off on his “liberation campaign” through Koporye, Pskov and Izborsk straight to the lands of Livonia to plunder. A reasonable question: who threatened whom in 1242: Livonia to Novgorod or vice versa?

Battle on the Ice. Number of participants.

For some reason, in Russian historiography, the following figures are most often taken as an axiom: Germans 10-12 thousand, Russians 15-17. However, where these thousands came from is completely unclear. Let's start with the Novgorodians: according to Tikhomirov, at the beginning of the 13th century, the population of Novgorod reached 30 thousand people. Of course, the population of the entire Novgorod land was several times greater. However, it is likely that by the period of interest to us the real population of Novgorod and the Novgorod principality was lower. Than at the beginning of the century.

S.A. Nefedov in the article “On demographic cycles in the history of medieval Rus'” writes: “In the years 1207-1230, characteristic signs of an eco-social crisis were observed in the Novgorod land: famine, epidemics, uprisings, the death of large masses of the population, taking on the character of a demographic catastrophe, the decline of crafts and trade, high prices for bread, the death of a significant number of large owners and the redistribution of property."

The famine of 1230 claimed the lives of 48 thousand people in Novgorod alone, including residents of the surrounding lands who came to Novgorod in the hope of escaping this disaster. How many residents of the Novgorod principality died? Thus, the number in Novgorod land by 1242 had dropped significantly compared to the beginning of the 13th century. In the city itself, a third of the population died. That is, in 1230 the population of Novgorod did not exceed 20,000 people. It is unlikely that in 10 years it will again reach the 30 thousand mark. Thus, Novgorod itself could field an army of 3-5 thousand people with the maximum strain of all mobilization resources.

However, this could only happen in case of extreme danger for Novgorod (for example, if suddenly Batu’s army did not limit itself to the plunder of Torzhok, but reached the walls of Novgorod). And as we have already established above, there was absolutely no danger to the city in 1242. Therefore, the army that Novgorod itself would have assembled would not have exceeded 2,000 people (besides, do not forget that in Novgorod there was serious opposition to the prince, which would hardly have joined his army - however, the thirst for profit could make the Novgorodians forget about their enmity with the prince).

However, Alexander was planning a relatively large campaign in Livonia, so the army was gathered from all over the principality, and not just from Novgorod. But he did not collect it for long - no more than a few months, therefore, apparently, the total number of the Novgorod army did not exceed 6-8 thousand people. For example: if you believe the Chronicle of Henry, in 1218 the number of Russian troops that invaded Livonia was 16 thousand people, and this army was assembled over the course of two years.

So, the number of Novgorodians was 6-8 thousand. Several hundred more soldiers are Alexander's squad. And besides, Andrei Yaroslavovich also arrived from Suzdal to help his brother with some army (apparently, again, several hundred). Thus, the size of the Russian army was 7-10 thousand people. There was no time, and, apparently, no desire to recruit more troops.

With the German army, everything is much more interesting: there is no talk of any 12 thousand there. Let's start in order: in 1236, an important event for Livonia took place - the Battle of Saul. In this battle, the Order army was completely defeated by the Lithuanians. 48 knights of the Order of the Sword were killed along with the master. In essence, it was the complete destruction of the Order, of which no more than 10 people remained. For the first and only time in the Baltic states, the Knightly Order was completely destroyed. It would seem that our historians should in every possible way explain this fact, talking about how our allies in the fight against Catholic expansion - the Lithuanians - destroyed the entire order.

However, no, the ordinary Russian does not know about this battle. Why? But because, together with the army of “dog knights”, a detachment of Pskovites of 200 people fought with the Lithuanians (with the total number of the German army not exceeding 3000, the contribution was quite significant), but that’s not the point. So, in 1236, the Order of the Swordsmen was destroyed, after which, with the participation of the pope, the remnants of the order in 1237 joined the Teutonic Order and became the German House of St. Mary in Livonia. In the same year, the new Landmaster of the Order, Herman Balke, arrived in Livonia along with 54 new knights.

Thus, the number of the Order increased to about 70 knights. As a result, we can say with confidence that the number of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order by 1242 could not have exceeded 100 people. Begunov, Kleinenberg and Shaskolsky write about this (op. cit.). However, there could have been even fewer knights, due to their rapid decline: for example, in 1238, the knights lost more than 20 of their brothers at Dorogichin. However, even if the number of knights was close to a hundred, not all of them could participate in the Battle of the Ice, since the order had other matters: only in 1241 the Estonian uprising on the island was suppressed. Saaremaa.

In 1242, a Curonian uprising broke out, which diverted significant forces of the Order. The master of the technical department in Livonia, Dietrich von Grüningen, did not participate in the battle on Lake Peipus precisely because of his busyness with the affairs of Courland. As a result, we come to the conclusion that the number of the order’s army in the battle could not exceed 40-50 knights. Considering that there were 8 so-called half-brothers per knight in the Order, the total number of the Order’s army was 350-450 people. The Bishop of Dorpat could field a militia of a maximum of 300 people. The Danish Revel could provide several hundred more men to the allies. That's all, there were no more Europeans in the army. In total there is a maximum of 1000 people. In addition, in the “German” army there were militiamen from Chud - about another fifteen hundred. Total: 2500 people.

This was the maximum that the Order and Dorpat were able to put up at that time and under those conditions. There is no question of any 12,000. There were not so many warriors in all of Livonia. The Teutonic Order was also unable to help its Livonian branch: in 1242 all its forces were thrown into suppressing the uprising that broke out in Prussia. And the Order was pretty battered: in 1241, its army, which was part of the army of the Silesian prince Henry II, was recruited from Germans, Poles and Teutons to repel the Mongol army that was making its victorious march across Europe. On April 9, 1241, at the Battle of Legnica, the horde of Khan Kaidu completely defeated the Europeans. The combined forces, including the order, suffered huge losses.

The battle was truly enormous in scale, unlike our dwarf “Battle on the Ice.” However, our historians rarely remember her. Apparently, this fact does not fit into another favorite Russian theory: that Rus' allegedly took the brunt of the Mongol hordes and thereby saved Europe from this disaster. They say that the Mongols did not dare to go further than Rus', being afraid to leave huge and completely unconquered spaces in their rear. However, this is just another myth - the Mongols were not afraid of anything.

In fact, by the summer of 1241 they had already conquered all of Eastern Europe, occupying Hungary, Silesia, Romania, Poland, Serbia, Bulgaria, etc. defeating European armies one after another, taking Krakow and Pest, destroying European troops at Legnica and Chaillot. In a word, the Mongols quite calmly, without fear of any “attacks from the rear,” subjugated all of Europe to the Adriatic Sea. By the way, in all these glorious achievements the Mongol khans were helped by Russian troops, who also took part in battles with the Europeans (these are the “saviors of Europe”).

In the summer and autumn of 1241, the Mongols suppressed all pockets of resistance in the already captured part of Europe, and in the winter of 1242 they began new conquests: their troops had already invaded Northern Italy and moved towards Vienna, but here a saving event for Europe happened: the great Khan Ogedei. Therefore, all the Chingizids left Europe and went home to fight for the vacant position. Naturally, their army also left Europe for the khans.

There was only one tumen left in Europe under the command of Khan Baydar - he passed through Northern Italy and Southern France, invaded the Iberian Peninsula, and, having passed through it, reached the Atlantic Ocean, only after that going to Karakorum. Thus, the Mongols were able to make their way through the whole of Europe, and no Russia interfered with this, and Ögedei became the true “savior of Europe”.

But we digress. Let's return to the Teutonic Order. As we see, the Teutons were unable to help the Livonians in any way. They had neither the strength nor the time for this (after all, do not forget that Livonia was separated from the possessions of the military Lithuania, so it would have taken a lot of time to transfer at least some troops to the Baltic States, and that was precisely what was not there ). What do we end up with? The number of opponents in the ice battle was as follows: Germans 2000 - 2500, Russians 7-10 thousand people.

Battle on the Ice. German "pigs".

Of course, I would really like to talk about the course of the Battle of Peipus, however, this is not possible. We, in fact, have practically no data on how this battle took place, and we can only fantasize about a “weakened center,” “spare shelves,” “falling through the ice,” etc. somehow I don’t want to. Let's leave this to the science fiction writers of history, of whom there have always been many. It only makes sense to draw attention to what is perhaps the most noticeable flaw in the description of the battle by our historians. We will talk about the knightly “wedge” (in the Russian tradition - “pig”).

For some reason, the opinion became stronger in the minds of Russian historians that the Germans, having formed a wedge, attacked the Russian troops with this wedge, thereby “pushing through the center” of Alexander’s army, who then surrounded the knights with a flanking maneuver. Everything is great, only the knights never attacked the enemy with a wedge. This would be a completely pointless and suicidal operation. If the knights had actually attacked the enemy with a wedge, then only three knights in the front rank and the flanking knights would have participated in the battle. The rest would be in the center of the formation, not participating in the battle in any way.

But mounted knights are the main striking force of the army, and such irrational use of them could lead to very serious consequences for the entire army as a whole. Therefore, the cavalry army never attacked with a wedge. The wedge was used for a completely different purpose - getting closer to the enemy. Why was a wedge used for this?

Firstly, the knightly troops were distinguished by extremely low discipline (whatever one may say, they are only feudal lords, what is discipline for them), therefore, if the rapprochement was carried out by a standard line, then there would be no question of any coordination of actions - the knights would simply disperse throughout battlefield in search of the enemy and prey. But in the wedge the knight had nowhere to go, and he was forced to follow the three most experienced horsemen who were in the first row.

Secondly, the wedge had a narrow front, which reduced losses from archer fire. Thus, the knights approached the enemy in an organized manner, and 100 meters before the enemy ranks, the wedge was rebuilt into a banal, but extremely effective line, with which the knights struck at the enemy. When attacking in a line, all cavalry participated in the battle, and thus they could inflict maximum damage on the enemy. Moreover, it should be noted that the wedge approached the enemy at a step, as Matvey Parish wrote, “as if someone was riding on horseback, with his bride seated in front of him on the saddle.” I think there is no need to explain why this was necessary.

Horses are not able to gallop at the same speed, so a wedge moving at a gallop would soon fall apart, with half the riders falling from the saddle due to numerous collisions. The situation would have been aggravated by the falls of knights who died from enemy arrows, horses that would have fallen victims to the florists’ guns (which were also in the Russian army, only their devices were called not backs and flowers, but ragulki) and would certainly have resulted in the fall and other knights. Thus, the wedge would have died without even reaching the enemy ranks.

Battle on the Ice. About losses.

In Russian historiography, the opinion has become stronger that 400 knights were killed in the battle, 50 were taken prisoner, and we don’t know how many fighters of a lower rank were killed. However, even the NPL contains slightly different information: “And Chudi fell into disgrace, and N?mets 400, and with 50 hands he brought him to Novgorod.” That is, the chronicle says that 400 Germans fell. And now this seems to be true. If you consider that there were about 800 Germans in total on the lake, then such losses seem quite real.

And we find data on losses among knights in LRH, where it is said that 26 knights died in the battle and 6 were captured. And again, the number of fallen knights fully corresponds to the number of brothers who participated in the battle. As for the losses of the Chud, apparently they also amounted to several hundred people. However, given that the Chud fled from the battlefield as soon as she had the opportunity, we must admit that it is unlikely that her losses exceeded 500 people. Thus, we can conclude that the total losses of the Livonian army were less than 1000 people.

It is difficult to talk about the losses of the Novgorodians due to the lack of any information on this matter.

Battle on the Ice. Consequences.

Actually, there is no need to talk about any consequences of this battle, due to its mediocrity. In 1242, the Germans made peace with the Novgorodians, which they, in general, did all the time). After 1242, Novgorod still continued to disturb the Baltic states with raids. For example, in 1262 the Novgorodians plundered Dorpat. True, a fortress. Around which the city was built, they failed to take it, as usual - and they didn’t need it: the campaign paid off anyway.

In 1268, seven Russian princes again embarked on a campaign to the Baltic states, this time heading to the Danish Rakovor. Only now the strengthened Livonia also remained on the sidelines and carried out its raids on the Novgorod lands. For example, in 1253 the Germans besieged Pskov. In a word, relations between Livonia and Novgorod after 1242 did not undergo any changes.

Afterword.

So, having examined the history of the Neva and Chud battles in more detail, we can confidently speak about a significant exaggeration of their scope and significance for Russian history. In reality, these were completely ordinary battles, pale in comparison to other battles even in the same region. In the same way, theories about the exploits of Alexander, the “savior of Russia,” are only myths. Alexander did not save anyone or anything (fortunately, no one threatened Russia or even Novgorod at that time, neither the Swedes nor the Germans).

Alexander only won two relatively small victories. Against the background of the actions of his predecessors, descendants and contemporaries (Pskov prince Dovmont, Russian king Daniil of Galitsky, Novgorod prince Mstislav the Udal, etc.), this seems like a trifle. In the history of Russia there were dozens of princes who did more for Russia than Alexander, and fought much greater battles than the two we have discussed. However, the memory of these princes and their achievements is completely crowded out of the people's memory by the “exploits” of Alexander Yaroslavovich.

The “exploits” of a man who collaborated with the Tatars, a man who, for the sake of receiving the Vladimir label, brought Nevryuev’s army to Rus', which in terms of the scale of the disasters brought to the Russian lands is comparable to Batu’s invasion; the person who. Probably destroyed the coalition of Andrei Yaroslavovich and Daniil Galitsky, who did not want to live under the khan's yoke.

A man who was ready to sacrifice anything to quench his own thirst for power. And all these actions of his are presented as committed “for the good” of Rus'. It becomes a shame for Russian history, from which all the pages of its glory miraculously disappear, and in their place comes admiration for such figures.

Sutulin Pavel Ilyich

April 18th The next Day of Military Glory of Russia is celebrated - the Day of the victory of Russian soldiers of Prince Alexander Nevsky over the German knights on Lake Peipsi (Battle of the Ice, 1242). The holiday was established by Federal Law No. 32-FZ of March 13, 1995 “On the days of military glory and memorable dates of Russia.”

According to the definition of all modern historical reference books and encyclopedias,

Battle on the Ice(Schlacht auf dem Eise (German), Prœlium glaciale (Latin), also called Ice battle or Battle of Lake Peipus- the battle of the Novgorodians and Vladimirites led by Alexander Nevsky against the knights of the Livonian Order on the ice of Lake Peipus - took place on April 5 (in terms of the Gregorian calendar - April 12) 1242.

In 1995, Russian parliamentarians, when adopting a federal law, did not particularly think about the dating of this event. They simply added 13 days to April 5 (as is traditionally done to recalculate the events of the 19th century from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar), completely forgetting that the Battle of the Ice did not happen at all in the 19th century, but in the distant 13th century. Accordingly, the “correction” to the modern calendar is only 7 days.

Today, anyone who has studied in high school is sure that the Battle of the Ice or the Battle of Lake Peipsi is considered the general battle of the conquest campaign of the Teutonic Order in 1240-1242. The Livonian Order, as is known, was the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, and was formed from the remnants of the Order of the Sword in 1237. The Order waged wars against Lithuania and Rus'. Members of the order were "brothers-knights" (warriors), "brothers-priests" (clergy) and "brothers-servants" (squires-artisans). The Knights of the Order were given the rights of the Knights Templar (templars). The distinctive sign of its members was a white robe with a red cross and a sword on it. The battle between the Livonians and the Novgorod army on Lake Peipus decided the outcome of the campaign in favor of the Russians. It also marked the actual death of the Livonian Order itself. Every schoolchild will enthusiastically tell how, during the battle, the famous Prince Alexander Nevsky and his comrades killed and drowned almost all the clumsy, ponderous knights in the lake and liberated the Russian lands from the German conquerors.

If we abstract from the traditional version set out in all school and some university textbooks, it turns out that practically nothing is known about the famous battle, which went down in history as the Battle of the Ice.

Historians to this day break their spears in disputes about what were the reasons for the battle? Where exactly did the battle take place? Who took part in it? And did she exist at all?..

Next, I would like to present two not entirely traditional versions, one of which is based on an analysis of well-known chronicle sources about the Battle of the Ice and concerns the assessment of its role and significance by contemporaries. The other was born as a result of a search by amateur enthusiasts for the immediate site of the battle, about which neither archaeologists nor specialist historians still have a clear opinion.

An imaginary battle?

The “Battle on the Ice” is reflected in a lot of sources. First of all, this is a complex of Novgorod-Pskov chronicles and the “Life” of Alexander Nevsky, which exists in more than twenty editions; then - the most complete and ancient Laurentian Chronicle, which included a number of chronicles of the 13th century, as well as Western sources - numerous Livonian Chronicles.

However, having analyzed domestic and foreign sources for many centuries, historians have not been able to come to a common opinion: do they tell about a specific battle that took place in 1242 on Lake Peipsi, or are they about different ones?

Most domestic sources record that some kind of battle took place on Lake Peipus (or in its area) on April 5, 1242. But it is not possible to reliably establish its causes, the number of troops, their formation, composition on the basis of annals and chronicles. How did the battle develop, who distinguished himself in the battle, how many Livonians and Russians died? No data. How did Alexander Nevsky, who is still called “the savior of the fatherland”, finally show himself in the battle? Alas! There are still no answers to any of these questions.

Domestic sources about the Battle of the Ice

The obvious contradictions contained in the Novgorod-Pskov and Suzdal chronicles telling about the Battle of the Ice can be explained by the constant rivalry between Novgorod and the Vladimir-Suzdal lands, as well as the difficult relationship between the Yaroslavich brothers - Alexander and Andrey.

The Grand Duke of Vladimir Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, as you know, saw his youngest son, Andrei, as his successor. In Russian historiography, there is a version that the father wanted to get rid of the elder Alexander, and therefore sent him to reign in Novgorod. The Novgorod “table” at that time was considered almost a chopping block for the Vladimir princes. The political life of the city was ruled by the boyar “veche”, and the prince was only a governor, who in case of external danger must lead the squad and militia.

According to the official version of the Novgorod First Chronicle (NPL), for some reason the Novgorodians expelled Alexander from Novgorod after the victorious Battle of the Neva (1240). And when the knights of the Livonian Order captured Pskov and Koporye, they again asked the Vladimir prince to send them Alexander.

Yaroslav, on the contrary, intended to send Andrei, whom he trusted more, to resolve the difficult situation, but the Novgorodians insisted on Nevsky’s candidacy. There is also a version that the story of the “expulsion” of Alexander from Novgorod is fictitious and of a later nature. Perhaps it was invented by Nevsky’s “biographers” to justify the surrender of Izborsk, Pskov and Koporye to the Germans. Yaroslav feared that Alexander would open the Novgorod gates to the enemy in the same way, but in 1241 he managed to recapture the Koporye fortress from the Livonians, and then take Pskov. However, some sources date the liberation of Pskov to the beginning of 1242, when the Vladimir-Suzdal army led by his brother Andrei Yaroslavich had already arrived to help Nevsky, and some - to 1244.

According to modern researchers, based on the Livonian Chronicles and other foreign sources, the Koporye fortress surrendered to Alexander Nevsky without a fight, and the Pskov garrison consisted of only two Livonian knights with their squires, armed servants and some militias from local peoples who joined them (Chud, water, etc.). The composition of the entire Livonian Order in the 40s of the 13th century could not exceed 85-90 knights. That is exactly how many castles existed on the territory of the Order at that moment. One castle, as a rule, fielded one knight with squires.

The earliest surviving domestic source mentioning the “Battle of the Ice” is the Laurentian Chronicle, written by a Suzdal chronicler. It does not mention the participation of the Novgorodians in the battle at all, and Prince Andrei appears as the main character:

“Grand Duke Yaroslav sent his son Andrei to Novgorod to help Alexander against the Germans. Having won on the lake beyond Pskov and taken many prisoners, Andrei returned with honor to his father.”

The authors of numerous editions of Alexander Nevsky’s Life, on the contrary, argue that it was after “The Battle of the Ice” made the name of Alexander famous “across all countries from the Varangian Sea and to the Pontic Sea, and to the Egyptian Sea, and to the country of Tiberias, and to the Ararat Mountains, even to Rome the Great...”.

According to the Laurentian Chronicle, it turns out that even his closest relatives did not suspect Alexander’s worldwide fame.

The most detailed account of the battle is contained in the Novgorod First Chronicle (NPL). It is believed that in the earliest list of this chronicle (Synodal) the entry about the “Battle on the Ice” was made already in the 30s of the 14th century. The Novgorod chronicler does not mention a word about the participation of Prince Andrei and the Vladimir-Suzdal squad in the battle:

“Alexander and the Novgorodians built regiments on Lake Peipus on Uzmen near the Crow Stone. And the Germans and Chud drove into the regiment, and fought their way through the regiment like a pig. And there was a great slaughter of the Germans and Chuds. God helped Prince Alexander. The enemy was driven and beaten seven miles to the Subolichi coast. And countless Chuds fell, and 400 Germans(later scribes rounded this figure to 500, and in this form it was included in history textbooks). Fifty prisoners were brought to Novgorod. The battle took place on Saturday, April 5th.”

In later versions of the “Life” of Alexander Nevsky (late 16th century), discrepancies with the chronicle information are deliberately eliminated, details borrowed from the NPL are added: the location of the battle, its course and data on losses. The number of killed enemies increases from edition to edition to 900 (!). In some editions of the “Life” (and there are more than twenty of them in total) there are reports about the participation of the Master of the Order in the battle and his capture, as well as the absurd fiction that the knights drowned in the water because they were too heavy.

Many historians who analyzed in detail the texts of the “Life” of Alexander Nevsky noted that the description of the massacre in the “Life” gives the impression of obvious literary borrowing. V.I. Mansikka (“The Life of Alexander Nevsky”, St. Petersburg, 1913) believed that the story about the Battle of the Ice used a description of the battle between Yaroslav the Wise and Svyatopolk the Accursed. Georgy Fedorov notes that the “Life” of Alexander “is a military heroic story inspired by Roman-Byzantine historical literature (Palea, Josephus),” and the description of the “Battle on the Ice” is a tracing of Titus’ victory over the Jews at Lake Gennesaret from the third book of the “History of the Jews.” wars" by Josephus.

I. Grekov and F. Shakhmagonov believe that “the appearance of the battle in all its positions is very similar to the famous Battle of Cannes” (“World of History”, p. 78). In general, the story about the “Battle of the Ice” from the early edition of Alexander Nevsky’s “Life” is just a general place that can be successfully applied to the description of any battle.

In the 13th century there were many battles that could have become a source of “literary borrowing” for the authors of the story about the “Battle on the Ice.” For example, about ten years before the expected date of writing the “Life” (80s of the 13th century), on February 16, 1270, a major battle took place between the Livonian knights and the Lithuanians at Karusen. It also took place on ice, but not on a lake, but on the Gulf of Riga. And its description in the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle is exactly like the description of the “Battle on the Ice” in the NPL.

In the Battle of Karusen, as in the Battle of the Ice, the knightly cavalry attacks the center, there the cavalry “gets stuck” in the convoys, and by going around the flanks the enemy completes their defeat. Moreover, in neither case do the winners try to take advantage of the result of the defeat of the enemy army in any way, but calmly go home with the spoils.

"Livonians" version

The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle (LRH), telling about a certain battle with the Novgorod-Suzdal army, tends to make the aggressors not the knights of the order, but their opponents - Prince Alexander and his brother Andrei. The authors of the chronicle constantly emphasize the superior forces of the Russians and the small number of the knightly army. According to LRH, the Order's losses in the Battle of the Ice amounted to twenty knights. Six were captured. This chronicle says nothing about the date or place of the battle, but the minstrel’s words that the dead fell on the grass (ground) allows us to conclude that the battle was fought not on the ice of the lake, but on land. If the author of the Chronicle understands “grass” not figuratively (the German idiomatic expression is “to fall on the battlefield”), but literally, then it turns out that the battle took place when the ice on the lakes had already melted, or the opponents fought not on the ice, but in coastal reed thickets:

“In Dorpat they learned that Prince Alexander had come with an army to the land of the brother knights, causing robberies and fires. The bishop ordered the men of the bishopric to rush into the army of the brother knights to fight against the Russians. They brought too few people, the army of the brother knights was also too small. However, they came to a consensus to attack the Russians. The Russians had many shooters who bravely accepted the first onslaught. It was seen how a detachment of brother knights defeated the shooters; there the clanking of swords could be heard, and helmets could be seen being cut apart. On both sides the dead fell onto the grass. Those who were in the army of the brother knights were surrounded. The Russians had such an army that each German was attacked by perhaps sixty people. The brother knights stubbornly resisted, but were defeated there. Some of the Derpt residents escaped by leaving the battlefield. Twenty brother knights were killed there, and six were captured. This was the course of the battle."

The author LRH does not express the slightest admiration for Alexander’s military leadership talents. The Russians managed to encircle part of the Livonian army not thanks to Alexander’s talent, but because there were much more Russians than Livonians. Even with an overwhelming numerical superiority over the enemy, according to LRH, the Novgorodian troops were not able to encircle the entire Livonian army: some of the Dorpattians escaped by retreating from the battlefield. Only a small part of the “Germans” were surrounded - 26 brother knights who preferred death to shameful flight.

A later source in terms of the time of writing - “The Chronicle of Hermann Wartberg” was written one hundred and fifty years after the events of 1240-1242. It contains, rather, an assessment by the descendants of the defeated knights of the significance that the war with the Novgorodians had on the fate of the Order. The author of the chronicle talks about the capture and subsequent loss of Izborsk and Pskov by the Order as major events of this war. However, the Chronicle does not mention any battle on the ice of Lake Peipsi.

The Livonian Chronicle of Ryussow, published in 1848 on the basis of earlier editions, states that during the time of Master Conrad (Grand Master of the Teutonic Order in 1239-1241. Died from wounds received in the battle with the Prussians on April 9, 1241) there was King Alexander. He (Alexander) learned that under Master Hermann von Salt (Master of the Teutonic Order in 1210-1239), the Teutons captured Pskov. With a large army, Alexander takes Pskov. The Germans fight hard, but are defeated. Seventy knights and many Germans died. Six brother knights are captured and tortured to death.

Some Russian historians interpret the messages of the Chronicle of Ryussov in the sense that the seventy knights whose deaths he mentions fell during the capture of Pskov. But it's not right. In the Chronicle of Ryussow, all the events of 1240-1242 are combined into one whole. This Chronicle does not mention such events as the capture of Izborsk, the defeat of the Pskov army near Izborsk, the construction of a fortress in Koporye and its capture by the Novgorodians, the Russian invasion of Livonia. Thus, “seventy knights and many Germans” are the total losses of the Order (more precisely, the Livonians and Danes) during the entire war.

Another difference between the Livonian Chronicles and the NPL is the number and fate of captured knights. The Ryussov Chronicle reports six prisoners, and the Novgorod Chronicle reports fifty. The captured knights, whom Alexander proposes to exchange for soap in Eisenstein’s film, were “tortured to death,” according to LRH. NPL writes that the Germans offered peace to the Novgorodians, one of the conditions of which was the exchange of prisoners: “what if we captured your husbands, we will exchange them: we will let yours go, and you will let ours go.” But did the captured knights live to see the exchange? There is no information about their fate in Western sources.

Judging by the Livonian Chronicles, the clash with the Russians in Livonia was a minor event for the knights of the Teutonic Order. It is reported only in passing, and the death of the Livonian Lordship of the Teutons (Livonian Order) in the battle on Lake Peipsi does not find any confirmation at all. The order continued to exist successfully until the 16th century (destroyed during the Livonian War in 1561).

Battle site

according to I.E. Koltsov

Until the end of the 20th century, the burial places of soldiers who died during the Battle of the Ice, as well as the location of the battle itself, remained unknown. The landmarks of the place where the battle took place are indicated in the Novgorod First Chronicle (NPL): “On Lake Peipsi, near the Uzmen tract, at the Crow Stone.” Local legends specify that the battle took place just outside the village of Samolva. In ancient chronicles there is no mention of Voronii Island (or any other island) near the site of the battle. They talk about fighting on the ground, on the grass. Ice is mentioned only in later editions of the “Life” of Alexander Nevsky.

The past centuries have erased from history and human memory information about the location of mass graves, the Crow Stone, the Uzmen tract and the degree of population of these places. Over many centuries, the Crow Stone and other buildings in these places have been wiped off the face of the earth. The elevations and monuments of mass graves were leveled with the surface of the earth. The attention of historians was attracted by the name of Voroniy Island, where they hoped to find the Raven Stone. The hypothesis that the massacre took place near Voronii Island was accepted as the main version, although it contradicted chronicle sources and common sense. The question remained unclear which way Nevsky went to Livonia (after the liberation of Pskov), and from there to the site of the upcoming battle at the Crow Stone, near the Uzmen tract, behind the village of Samolva (one must understand that on the opposite side of Pskov).

Reading the existing interpretation of the Battle of the Ice, the question involuntarily arises: why did Nevsky’s troops, as well as the heavy cavalry of knights, have to go through Lake Peipus on the spring ice to Voronii Island, where even in severe frosts the water does not freeze in many places? It is necessary to take into account that the beginning of April for these places is a warm period of time. Testing the hypothesis about the location of the battle at Voronii Island dragged on for many decades. This time was enough for it to take a firm place in all history textbooks, including military ones. Our future historians, military men, and generals gain knowledge from these textbooks... Considering the low validity of this version, in 1958 a comprehensive expedition of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created to determine the true location of the battle of April 5, 1242. The expedition worked from 1958 to 1966. Large-scale research was carried out, a number of interesting discoveries were made that expanded knowledge about this region, about the presence of an extensive network of ancient waterways between Lakes Peipus and Ilmen. However, it was not possible to find the burial places of the soldiers who died in the Battle of the Ice, as well as the Voronye Stone, the Uzmen tract and traces of the battle (including at Voronii Island). This is clearly stated in the report of the complex expedition of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The mystery remained unsolved.

After this, allegations appeared that in ancient times the dead were taken with them for burial in their homeland, therefore, they say, burials cannot be found. But did they take all the dead with them? How did they deal with the dead enemy soldiers and the dead horses? A clear answer was not given to the question of why Prince Alexander went from Livonia not to the protection of the walls of Pskov, but to the region of Lake Peipsi - to the site of the upcoming battle. At the same time, historians for some reason paved the way for Alexander Nevsky and the knights through Lake Peipus, ignoring the presence of an ancient crossing near the village of Mosty in the south of Lake Warm. The history of the Battle of the Ice is of interest to many local historians and lovers of Russian history.

For many years, a group of Moscow enthusiasts and lovers of the ancient history of Rus', with the direct participation of I.E., also independently studied the Battle of Peipus. Koltsova. The task before this group was seemingly almost insurmountable. It was necessary to find burials hidden in the ground related to this battle, the remains of the Crow Stone, the Uzmen tract, etc., on a large territory of the Gdovsky district of the Pskov region. It was necessary to “look” inside the earth and choose what was directly related to the Battle of the Ice. Using methods and instruments widely used in geology and archeology (including dowsing, etc.), the group members marked on the terrain plan the supposed locations of the mass graves of soldiers of both sides who died in this battle. These burials are located in two zones east of the village of Samolva. One of the zones is located half a kilometer north of the village of Tabory and one and a half kilometers from Samolva. The second zone with the largest number of burials is 1.5-2 km north of the village of Tabory and approximately 2 km east of Samolva.

It can be assumed that the wedge of knights into the ranks of Russian soldiers occurred in the area of ​​the first burial (first zone), and in the area of ​​the second zone the main battle and the encirclement of the knights took place. The encirclement and defeat of the knights was facilitated by additional troops from the Suzdal archers, who arrived here the day before from Novgorod, led by A. Nevsky’s brother, Andrei Yaroslavich, but were in ambush before the battle. Research has shown that in those distant times, in the area south of the now existing village of Kozlovo (more precisely, between Kozlov and Tabory) there was some kind of fortified outpost of the Novgorodians. It is possible that there was an old “gorodets” here (before the transfer, or the construction of a new town on the site where Kobylye Settlement is now located). This outpost (gorodets) was located 1.5-2 km from the village of Tabory. It was hidden behind the trees. Here, behind the earthen ramparts of a now defunct fortification, was the detachment of Andrei Yaroslavich, hidden in ambush before the battle. It was here and only here that Prince Alexander Nevsky sought to unite with him. At a critical moment in the battle, an ambush regiment could go behind the knights' rear, surround them and ensure victory. This happened again later during the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380.

The discovery of the burial area of ​​the dead soldiers allowed us to confidently conclude that the battle took place here, between the villages of Tabory, Kozlovo and Samolva. This place is relatively flat. Nevsky's troops on the northwestern side (on the right hand) were protected by the weak spring ice of Lake Peipus, and on the eastern side (on the left) by the wooded part, where the fresh forces of the Novgorodians and Suzdalians, entrenched in a fortified town, were in ambush. The knights advanced from the southern side (from the village of Tabory). Not knowing about the Novgorod reinforcements and feeling their military superiority in strength, they, without hesitation, rushed into battle, falling into the “nets” that had been placed. From here it can be seen that the battle itself took place on land, not far from the shore of Lake Peipsi. By the end of the battle, the knightly army was pushed back onto the spring ice of the Zhelchinskaya Bay of Lake Peipsi, where many of them died. Their remains and weapons are now located half a kilometer northwest of the Kobylye Settlement Church at the bottom of this bay.

Our research has also determined the location of the former Crow Stone on the northern outskirts of the village of Tabory - one of the main landmarks of the Battle of the Ice. Centuries have destroyed the stone, but its underground part still rests under the strata of cultural layers of the earth. This stone is presented in the miniature of the chronicle of the Battle of the Ice in the form of a stylized statue of a raven. In ancient times, it had a cult purpose, symbolizing wisdom and longevity, like the legendary Blue Stone, which is located in the city of Pereslavl-Zalessky on the shore of Lake Pleshcheevo.

In the area where the remains of the Crow Stone were located, there was an ancient temple with underground passages that led to the Uzmen tract, where there were fortifications. Traces of former ancient underground structures indicate that there were once above-ground religious and other structures made of stone and brick here.

Now, knowing the burial places of the soldiers of the Battle of the Ice (the place of the battle) and again turning to the chronicle materials, it can be argued that Alexander Nevsky with his troops walked to the area of ​​​​the upcoming battle (to the Samolva area) from the south side, followed on the heels of the knights. In the “Novgorod First Chronicle of the Senior and Younger Editions” it is said that, having freed Pskov from the knights, Nevsky himself went to the possessions of the Livonian Order (pursuing the knights west of Lake Pskov), where he allowed his warriors to live. The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle testifies that the invasion was accompanied by fires and the removal of people and livestock. Having learned about this, the Livonian bishop sent troops of knights to meet him. The Nevsky stopping place was somewhere halfway between Pskov and Dorpat, not far from the border of the confluence of the Pskov and Tyoploye lakes. Here was the traditional crossing near the village of Mosty. A. Nevsky, in turn, having heard about the performance of the knights, did not return to Pskov, but, having crossed to the eastern shore of Lake Warm, hurried in a northern direction to the Uzmen tract, leaving a detachment of Domash and Kerbet in the rear guard. This detachment entered into battle with the knights and was defeated. The burial place of warriors from the detachment of Domash and Kerbet is located at the south-eastern outskirts of Chudskiye Zakhody.

Academician Tikhomirov M.N. believed that the first skirmish of the detachment of Domash and Kerbet with the knights took place on the eastern shore of Lake Warm near the village of Chudskaya Rudnitsa (see “Battle of the Ice”, published by the USSR Academy of Sciences, series “History and Philosophy”, M., 1951, No. 1 , vol. VII, pp. 89-91). This area is significantly south of the village. Samolva. The knights also crossed at Mosty, pursuing A. Nevsky to the village of Tabory, where the battle began.

The site of the Battle of the Ice in our time is located away from busy roads. You can get here by transport and then on foot. This is probably why many authors of numerous articles and scientific works about this battle have never been to Lake Peipus, preferring the silence of the office and a fantasy far from life. It is curious that this area near Lake Peipus is interesting from historical, archaeological and other points of view. In these places there are ancient burial mounds, mysterious dungeons, etc. There are also periodic sightings of UFOs and the mysterious “Bigfoot” (north of the Zhelcha River). So, an important stage of work has been carried out to determine the location of the mass graves (burials) of soldiers who died in the Battle of the Ice, the remains of the Crow Stone, the area of ​​​​the old and new settlements and a number of other objects associated with the battle. Now more detailed studies of the battle area are needed. It's up to archaeologists.