The first great success in decapitating Chechen separatism after the murder of Dzhokhar Dudayev was the capture of terrorist No. 2 Salman Raduev, who was arrested by FSB representatives on the territory of Chechnya in March 2000. Raduev became widely known in 1996, after on January 9, under his leadership, militants attacked the Dagestan city of Kizlyar. True, the “laurels of fame” in Kizlyar went to Raduev “by accident.” At the last stage, he replaced the wounded field commander Khunkarpasha Israpilov, who was the leader of the operation.
The capture of Raduev was carried out masterfully by counterintelligence officers and in such a top-secrecy regime that the bandit “did not expect anything and was shocked,” said FSB director Nikolai Patrushev. According to some reports, Raduev was “tied up” the moment he left his shelter “out of need.” There is a version that Raduev was betrayed by an agent who promised to sell him a large batch of weapons cheaply.
On December 25, 2001, the Supreme Court of Dagestan found Raduev guilty of all charges except “organizing illegal armed groups.” The demands of the state prosecutor, Vladimir Ustinov, were fulfilled, and Salman Raduev was sentenced to life imprisonment. Raduev served his sentence in the Solikamsk penitentiary, in the famous White Swan colony.
In December 2002, Raduev began to complain about his health. On December 6, he developed bruising under his left eye and abdominal pain. A few days later, Raduev became worse, and on December 10, GUIN doctors decided to place him in a prison hospital in a separate ward. Raduev was in the hospital and died on December 14 at 5.30 am. The forensic medical report on death states the following: “DIC syndrome, multiple hemorrhages, retroperitoneal hematoma, hemorrhage in the brain and left eye.”
Raduev's body was buried in the general Solikamsk cemetery.
In April 2002, it became known that the field commander Khattab, who was known as an ideologist and organizer of terrorist activities, was killed in Chechnya. He was liquidated as a result of an “undercover combat operation” by the FSB back in March 2002. The top-secret operation to destroy Khattab was prepared for almost a year. According to the FSB, Khattab was poisoned by one of his confidants. The death of the terrorist was one of the most serious blows for the militants, since after the liquidation of Khattab the entire system of financing gangs in Chechnya was disrupted.
In June 2001, in Chechnya, as a result of a special operation, the leader of one of the most combat-ready units of Chechen militants, Arbi Barayev, was killed. Along with him, 17 people from his inner circle were destroyed. A large number of militants were captured. Barayev was identified by his relatives. The special operation was carried out in the area of Baraev’s native village of Ermolovka for six days - from June 19 to 24. During the operation, which was carried out by the regional operational headquarters with the involvement of special forces of the FSB and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in particular the Vityaz group, one Russian serviceman was killed and six were injured. After Barayev was mortally wounded, the militants carried his body into one of the houses and covered it with bricks in the hope that the federal forces would not find him. However, with the help of a search dog, Barayev's body was discovered.
In November 2003, FSB representatives officially admitted that one of the leaders of the Chechen militants, the Arab terrorist Abu al-Walid, was killed on April 14. According to intelligence services, on April 13, information appeared about a detachment of militants who, together with several Arab mercenaries, stopped in the forest between Ishkha-Yurt and Alleroy. This area was immediately attacked from helicopters, and special forces shot at the bandits’ camp using grenade launchers and flamethrowers. On April 17, soldiers combed the area between Ishkhoy-Yurt and Meskety, and about 3-4 kilometers from these villages in the forest they found six killed militants. They were all able to be identified - they turned out to be Chechens. A kilometer from those six corpses they found a dead Arab. With him, in particular, they found a map of the area made from a satellite and a satellite navigator for moving around the area. The body was badly burned. In April, al-Walid's body could not be identified. The intelligence services did not have the terrorist’s fingerprints, his relatives did not respond to investigators’ requests, and the detained militants who met him could not say with certainty that the body was his. All doubts disappeared only in November.
On February 13, 2004, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, whom Chechen separatists declared the president of Ichkeria after the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev, was killed in Qatar. Yandarbiev's car was blown up in the Qatari capital Doha. In this case, two people from his escort died. The separatist leader himself was seriously injured and died some time later in the hospital. Yandarbiev has lived in Qatar for the past three years and has been on the international wanted list all this time as the organizer of the attack on Dagestan. The Russian Prosecutor General's Office demanded his extradition from Qatar.
The Qatari special services immediately started talking about a Russian trace in the murder of Yandarbiev, and already on February 19, three employees of the Russian embassy were arrested on suspicion of committing a terrorist attack. One of them, who is the first secretary of the embassy and has diplomatic status, was released and expelled from the country, while the other two were sentenced to life imprisonment by a Qatari court, and the court concluded that the order to liquidate Yandarbiev was given by top officials of the Russian leadership. Moscow denied the accusations in every possible way, and Russian diplomats did everything possible to take the unlucky bombers home as soon as possible.
They were sentenced to life imprisonment, which under Qatari law means a 25-year prison term, which can later be reduced to 10 years. A month after the trial, an agreement was reached that the convicted Russians would be taken to their homeland, where they would serve their sentences. The return of Russian intelligence officers actually took place; Anatoly Yablochkov and Vasily Pugachev flew to Russia on a special flight of the Rossiya State Transport Company in December 2004.
In March 2004, it became known about the death of an equally odious militant leader, Ruslan Gelayev, who in May 2002 was again appointed by Aslan Maskhadov as commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Ichkeria and restored to the rank of “brigadier general.” True, he was killed not as a result of a special operation by the special services, but in a banal shootout with border guards. Gelayev was killed by a border guard consisting of only two people in the mountains of Dagestan on the Avaro-Kakheti road leading to Georgia. At the same time, the border guards themselves were killed in the shootout. The field commander's corpse was found in the snow a hundred meters from the bodies of the border guards. This happened, apparently, on Sunday (February 28, 2004). A day later, Gelayev’s body was taken to Makhachkala and identified by previously arrested militants.
Thus, only one “odious militant” remains alive among the major Chechen leaders - Shamil Basayev.
Alexander Alyabyev
In December 1991, former Soviet Army General D. Dudayev, elected president of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, announced the creation of the Republic of Ichkeria and its secession from Russia. Since the summer of 1994, fighting between “pro-Dudaev” militants and opposition forces has returned in Chechnya. December 9 President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin signed the Decree “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”
Photographer V. Podlegaev. Commander of the United Group of Federal Forces of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Lieutenant General A.A. Romanov (center) and Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic A. Maskhadov (left) during negotiations. Chechen Republic. June 16, 1995. RIA Novosti
Two days later, units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered the territory of Chechnya, and on December 31, bloody battles for Grozny began. Using aviation and heavy weapons, the United Group of Forces (OGV) gradually expanded the territories it controlled, pushing the militants into the mountains. In June 1995, a detachment of militants took hundreds of people hostage in a hospital in Budennovsk (Stavropol Territory). In order to save the lives of citizens, the Russian government agreed to begin peace negotiations with representatives of Ichkeria.
However, negotiations broke down in October 1995, and hostilities continued. The conflict has become a difficult test for Russia and its security forces. In the eyes of the world community, Russia's authority has suffered serious damage. Anti-war sentiment increased within the country. In August 1996, taking advantage of the lack of clear political instructions to the OGV command from the Russian leadership, the militants captured Grozny. Under these conditions, President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin decided to hold peace negotiations. On August 30, an agreement was signed in Khasavyurt on the withdrawal of troops and the “freezing” of the status of Chechnya for five years.
Photographer V. Vyatkin. Paratroopers of a separate artillery battalion of the 247th Stavropol Airborne Regiment of the Russian Federation at the forefront. Chechen Republic. November 1, 1999. RIA Novosti
Continuous terrorist acts, attacks, and kidnappings have turned the south of Russia into a front-line zone. In August 1999, Chechen militants invaded Dagestan and captured several villages in the border areas. As a result of the military operation of the North Caucasus Military District in August-September 1999, the bulk of the militants were eliminated.
Photographer I. Mikhalev. A Russian soldier before the start of hostilities. Chechen Republic. May 12, 1996. RIA Novosti
In retaliation for the losses, in September the militants carried out a series of terrorist attacks with hundreds of casualties, blowing up residential buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk. In October 1999, a counter-terrorist operation began in Chechnya. During the winter-spring period of 1999/2000, troops created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation of the United Group of Forces (OGV(s)) pushed Chechen extremists to the south, cutting off the mountainous regions of Chechnya from the flat part of the republic.
Photographer H. Bradner. The movement of militants towards the presidential palace under artillery fire. Grozny. Chechen Republic. January 1995. Photo courtesy of J. Butler (UK)
On February 7, 2000, Grozny was liberated. Russian troops were faced with the task of eliminating numerous groups of militants in mountainous areas. The enemy introduced guerrilla warfare tactics, operating in the territories of both Chechnya and neighboring republics. As a result of the operation, the illegal armed formations of Ichkeria were defeated. However, battles with gangs continued for another eight long years.
Photographer Yu. Pirogov. Russian military personnel killed in battle. Area of the Severny airport, Chechen Republic. January 10, 1995. RIA Novosti
The regime of counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was canceled only on April 16, 2009. According to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, in total during the period of military operations in 1992-2009, without return, the losses of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other law enforcement agencies in Chechnya amounted to more than 8,500 people killed and killed, prisoners and missing - 510 people, wounded - over 70,000 people.
Dzhokhar Dudayev congratulates his guards on Independence Day. Chechen Republic, Grozny. 1994
A column of armored vehicles enters Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (Otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. December 12, 1994.
Chechen women during an anti-Russian rally in front of the parliament building. Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (Otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. December 15, 1994.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers say goodbye to their fallen comrade. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995
The separatist rests during the fighting. Grozny, Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1995.
Photographer Yu. Tutov. Russian soldiers during a break between battles. Chechen Republic. January 12, 1995. RIA Novosti
Photographer N. Ignatiev. Engineering reconnaissance of the railway track on the bridge over the river. Terek. Chechen Republic. January 1995. Photo courtesy of J. Butler (UK)
Photographer Christopher Morris. Chechen militants in the basement of a residential building. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. January 1995.
Federal soldiers during breaks between battles. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1995.
Russian soldiers during the assault on Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. January-February 1995.
Crossing of Russian army units across the Sunzha River. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. February 7, 1995.
Photographer Yu. Tutov. Presidential palace. Grozny. Chechen Republic. February 17, 1995. RIA Novosti
A combined detachment of fighters from the Tyumen OMON, SOBR, and Ural RUBOP is conducting a counter-terrorism operation in the combat zone. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. April 1995.
Sergeant Misunov. 7th Guards Airborne Division. Neighborhood of Shatoy. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995
Tank driver Alexey Stepanov. 7th Guards Airborne Division. Near Shatoi. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995
Photographer Oleg Klimov. Federal checkpoint. Grozny. Chechen Republic. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Life on the city streets. Grozny, Chechen Republic, Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer I. Mikhalev. Soldiers of the United Group of Federal Forces of the Russian Federation at a rest stop. Chechen Republic. May 25, 1996. RIA Novosti
Photographer V. Podlegaev. Handing over weapons to illegal armed groups. S. Zandag. Chechen Republic. August 16, 1995. RIA Novosti
Photographer I. Mikhalev. Russian soldiers before the start of hostilities. Chechen Republic. May 12, 1996. RIA Novosti
Photographer S. Gutsiev. View of Minutka Square in Grozny. Chechen Republic. May 15, 1996. RIA Novosti
The commander of a detachment of Chechen militants, terrorist Shamil Basayev during the seizure of a hospital in Budennovsk. Budennovsky district. Stavropol region, Russian Federation. June 19, 1995.
Photographer Alexander Nemenov. Russian soldier. Chechen Republic. RF. 1996
Photographer D. Donskoy. Meeting of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin with soldiers and officers of the 205th motorized rifle brigade of the federal forces of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus. Chechen Republic. May 28, 1996. RIA Novosti
Child on Mira Street. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. August 1996.
Photographer - Thomas Dworzak. Punishment for drunkenness according to Sharia law. Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. August 1996.
Photographer I. Mikhalev. Member of illegal armed groups during a battle. Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny, Chechen Republic, August 14, 1996, RIA Novosti
Chairman of the ChRI government Shamil Basayev presents a personalized pistol to Joseph Kobzon “For support of the ChRI.” Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. Summer 1997.
Pupils of the Military College of the Armed Forces of ChRI. The unrecognized republic of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. 1999
Photographer: Vladimir Vyatkin. During the entry of federal forces into the city. Gudermes. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1999.
Photographer: Oleg Lastochkin. Residents of the village of Znamenskoye in the Nadterechny district, located in the combat zone, are leaving their homes. Chechen Republic. RF. October 1999.
Photographer O. Lastochkin. A Mi-24 combat helicopter is patrolling over the location of Russian troops. Chechen Republic, October 16, 1999. RIA Novosti
The crew of the BMP-2 near the road to Grozny. Samashki village. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. December 1999.
Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Russian paratroopers repulse an attack by Chechen militants after being ambushed near Tsentoroy. Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev
Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Carrying the wounded out of the battle. Tsentoroy district. Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev
Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Carrying the wounded out of the battle. Tsentoroy district, Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev
Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Paratroopers after the battle. Tsentoroy district, Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev
Photographer A. Kondratyev. And about. President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin among the fighters of the Russian federal forces in the North Caucasus. Chechen Republic. December 31, 1999, RIA Novosti
Photographer Yuri Kozyrev. Russian soldiers during a break between battles. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 2000.
Photographer Natalya Medvedeva. Combined detachment of the 2nd separate special-purpose brigade of the GRU. Shatoi district. Chechen Republic. RF. February 2000.
Soldiers of the 101st Special Operational Brigade of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. The inscription on the BMP - “Even if she is wrong - she is my Motherland!” Grozny. Chechen Republic. February 9, 2000.
Scouts of the Guard platoon of Lieutenant Kozhemyakin D.S. shortly before the battle at Hill 776. Shatoi district. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. February 29, 2000.
Photographer Sergey Maximishin. A child plays with a cat at one of the checkpoints. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. year 2000.
The 45th Separate Special Purpose Guards Regiment patrols in the mountain gorge of the Bass River. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. March-April 2000.
Photographer V. Vyatkin. The death of Sergei Timoshin, a serviceman of the 6th company of the 10th regiment of the Russian Airborne Forces. Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti
Photographer V. Vyatkin. Rest after a combat operation. Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti
After the assault on the village of Komsomolskoye. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. year 2000.
Photographer V. Vyatkin. A special operation of a unit of the Russian Airborne Forces to identify and destroy the base camps of Chechen gangs in the mountain gorge of the river. Bass, Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti
Photographer V. Vyatkin. An operation of a special reconnaissance detachment of the 45th Airborne Regiment of the Russian Federation to identify and destroy gangs in the mountain gorge of the river. Bass, Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000, RIA Novosti
Militia from among local residents at a parade in memory of the fallen Dagestani soldiers and local residents during the invasion of Chechen militants. Agvali village. Tsumadinsky district. The Republic of Dagestan. RF. October 2000.
Raid of a special forces reconnaissance group of airborne troops in the vicinity of the Baath River. The vicinity of the villages of Khatuni, Kirov-Yurt and Makhkety. Vedensky district. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. October 5, 2000.
Some of the photographs are taken from the book: Military Chronicle of Russia in Photographs. 1850s - 2000s: Album. - M.: Golden-Bi, 2009.
Currently, the development of new combat manuals for the Russian Armed Forces is in full swing. In this regard, I would like to bring up for discussion a rather interesting document that came into my hands during a business trip to the Chechen Republic. This is a letter from a mercenary fighter who fought in Chechnya. He addresses not just anyone, but the general of the Russian Army. Of course, some thoughts expressed by a former member of illegal armed groups can be questioned. But on the whole he is right. We do not always take into account the experience of combat operations and continue to suffer losses. It's a pity. Perhaps this letter, while new combat regulations have not yet been approved, will help some commanders avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The letter is published with virtually no editing. Only spelling errors have been corrected.
- Citizen General! I can say that I am a former fighter. But first of all, I am a former SA senior sergeant who was thrown onto the battlefield in the DRA a few weeks before (as I later learned) the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.
So, with three fractures of limbs, ribs, and a severe concussion, at the age of 27 I became a gray-haired Muslim. I was “sheltered” by a Khazarian who once lived in the USSR and knew a little Russian. He walked me out. When I began to understand Pashto a little, I learned that the war in Afghanistan was over, the USSR was gone, and so on.
Soon I became a member of his family, but this did not last long. With the death of Najib, everything changed. First, my father-in-law did not return from a trip to Pakistan. By that time we had moved from near Kandahar to Kunduz. And when I returned to my house with spare parts at night, the neighbor’s boy told me in confidence that they were asking and looking for me. Two days later the Taliban took me too. So I became a “voluntary” mercenary fighter.
There was a war in Chechnya - the first. People like me, Arab-Chechens, began to be trained for jihad in Chechnya. They were prepared in camps near Mazar-i-Sharif, then sent to Kandahar. Among us there were Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, many Jordanians, and so on.
After preparation, the final instructions were given by NATO instructors. They transferred us to Turkey, where there are camps for transfer, rest and treatment of “Chechens”. They said that highly qualified doctors were also former Soviet citizens.
We were transported across the state border by rail. They drove us non-stop across Georgia. There we were given Russian passports. In Georgia we were treated like heroes. We went through acclimatization, but then the first war in Chechnya ended.
They continued to prepare us. Combat training began in the camp - mountain training. Then they transported weapons to Chechnya - through Azerbaijan, Dagestan, the Argun Gorge, the Pankisi Gorge and through Ingushetia.
Soon they started talking about a new war. Europe and the USA gave the go-ahead and guaranteed political support. The Chechens should have started. The Ingush were ready to support them. The final preparations began - studying the region, entering it, bases, warehouses (we did many of them ourselves), issued uniforms, satellite phones. The Chechen-NATO command wanted to forestall events. They were afraid that before the start of hostilities the borders with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ingushetia and Dagestan would be closed. The strike was expected along the Terek. Department of the plain part. Destruction enveloping the outer ring and the inner mesh - with a general seizure, a general search of buildings, farmsteads, etc. But no one did this. Then they expected that, having narrowed the outer ring along the Terek with captured crossings, dividing three directions along the ridges, the Russian Federation would move along the gorges to the already tightly closed border. But that didn't happen either. Apparently, our generals, excuse the freethinking, neither in the DRA nor in Chechnya have ever learned to fight in the mountains, especially not in open battle, but with gangs that know the terrain well, are well armed, and most importantly, knowledgeable. Observation and reconnaissance are carried out by absolutely everyone - women, children, who are ready to die for the praise of a Wahhabi - he is a horseman!!!
Even on the way to Chechnya, I decided that at the slightest opportunity I would return home. I took almost all my savings out of Afghanistan and hoped that 11 thousand dollars would be enough for me.
Back in Georgia, I was appointed assistant field commander. With the beginning of the second war, our group was first abandoned near Gudermes, then we entered Shali. Many of the gang were locals. They received money for the fight and went home. You search, and he sits, waits for a signal, and bargains for food from the rear for money received in battle - dry rations, stewed meat, and sometimes ammunition “for self-defense from bandits.”
I was in battles, but I didn’t kill. Mostly he carried out the wounded and dead. After one battle they tried to pursue us, and then he slapped the Arab cashier, and before dawn he left through the Kharami to Shamilka. Then for 250 bucks he sailed to Kazakhstan, then moved to Bishkek. Called himself a refugee. After working a little, I settled in and went to Alma-Ata. My colleagues lived there, and I hoped to find them. I even met Afghans, they helped me.
This is all good, but the main thing is about the tactics of both sides:
1. The bandits know the tactics of the Soviet army well, starting with the Benderaites. NATO analysts studied it, summarized it and gave us instructions back at the bases. They know and directly say that “the Russians do not study or take these issues into account,” but it’s a pity, it’s very bad.
2. The bandits know that the Russian Army is not prepared for night operations. Neither soldiers nor officers are trained to operate at night, and there is no material support. During the first war, entire gangs of 200-300 people passed through the battle formations. They know that the Russian Army does not have PSNR (ground reconnaissance radars), no night vision devices, or silent firing devices. And if so, the bandits carry out all their attacks and prepare them at night - the Russians sleep. During the day, bandits carry out forays only if they are well prepared and for sure, but otherwise they are serving time, resting, collecting information is carried out, as I already said, by children and women, especially from among the “victims,” that is, those whose husband, brother, son, etc. have already been killed. etc.
These children are undergoing intense ideological indoctrination, after which they may even commit self-sacrifice (jihad, ghazavat). And the ambushes come out at dawn. At the appointed time or on a signal - from the cache the weapon and forward. They put up “beacons” - they stand on the road or on a high-rise, from where everything can be seen. How our troops appeared and left is a signal. Almost all field commanders have satellite radio stations. Data received from NATO bases in Turkey from satellites is immediately transmitted to field workers, and they know when which column went where, what is being done in the places of deployment. Indicate the direction of exit from the battle, etc. All movements are controlled. As the instructors said, the Russians do not carry out radio control and direction finding, and Yeltsin “helped” them with this by destroying the KGB.
3. Why the huge losses of our troops on the march? Because you transport living corpses in a car, that is, under an awning. Remove awnings from vehicles in combat areas. Turn the fighters to face the enemy. Seat people facing the board, benches in the middle. The weapon is at the ready, and not like firewood, at random. The bandits' tactics are an ambush with a two-echelon arrangement: the 1st echelon opens fire first. In
The 2nd are snipers. Having killed the airborne ones, they blocked the exit, and no one will get out from under the awning, but if they try, they finish off the 1st echelon. Under the awning, people, as if in a bag, do not see who is shooting and from where. And they themselves cannot shoot. By the time we turn around, we’re ready.
Next: the first echelon shoots one at a time: one shoots, the second reloads - continuous fire is created and the effect of “many bandits”, etc. As a rule, this spreads fear and panic. As soon as the ammunition, 2-3 magazines, is consumed, the 1st echelon retreats, carries out the dead and wounded, and the 2nd echelon finishes off and covers the retreat. Therefore, it seems that there were many militants, and before they knew it, there were no bandits, and if there were, then they were 70-100 meters away, and there was not a single corpse on the battlefield.
In each echelon, carriers are appointed, who do not shoot so much as monitor the battle and immediately pull out the wounded and dead. They appoint strong men. And if they had pursued the gang after the battle, there would have been corpses, and the gang would not have left. But sometimes there is no one left to pursue. Everyone is resting in the back under the awning. That's all the tactics.
4. Taking hostages and prisoners. There are instructions for this too. It says to watch out for "wet chicken." This is what bazaar lovers are called. Since the rear doesn’t work, take a careless, careless scoundrel with a weapon “by the back” and back to the market, get lost in the crowd. And they were like that. This was the same in Afghanistan. Here is your experience, father commanders.
5. Command error - and the bandits were afraid of it. It is necessary to immediately conduct a population census along with the “cleansing operations.” We came to the village and wrote down in each house how many were where, and along the way, through the remains of documents in the administrations and through neighbors, it was necessary to clarify the actual situation in each yard. Control - the police or the same troops came to the village and checked - there were no men. Here is a list of a ready-made gang. New ones have arrived - who are you, “brothers”, and where will you be from? Inspecting them and searching the house - where did he hide the gun?!
Any departure and arrival is through registration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He joined the gang - fuck him! Wait - come - spanked. To do this, it was necessary to assign populated areas to each unit and establish control over any movement, especially at night with night vision devices, and the systematic shooting of bandits going out to gather. No one else will come out at night, no one will come from the gang.
Half of the bandits feed themselves at home thanks to this, so there are fewer problems with food. The rest is decided by our rear people, selling products on the sly. And if there was a zone of responsibility, the army commander, the military and the Ministry of Internal Affairs would control the situation through mutual efforts, and the appearance of any new one would be taken away (look for Khattab, Basayev and others from their wives, they are there in winter).
And again, don't disperse the gangs. You plant them like seedlings in a garden. Example: in the gang I was in, we were once told to urgently go out and destroy a convoy. But the informants gave inaccurate information (the observer had a walkie-talkie about the exit of the first cars, he reported and left, the rest were delayed, apparently). So the battalion hit the gang, “scattered” and “defeated”. Yeah! Each subgroup always has the task of retreating to the general gathering area of the gang. And if they chased us, there was almost “0” ammunition - they fired. You need to drag two wounded and a dead man. If they hadn’t gone far, of course they would have abandoned everyone and then, perhaps, they would have left.
And so in Ingushetia, in a former sanatorium, the wounded were treated - and back into service. This is the result of “dispersion” - sowing - after 1 month the gang, rested, is assembled. This is why warlords remain alive and elusive for so long. There would be rapid response teams, with dogs, in a helicopter, and urgently to the area of the collision with the support of the “beaten” - that is, those who were fired upon, and in pursuit. There are none.
MASKHADOV Aslan (Khalid) Alievich Elected in 1997, President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Born on September 21, 1951 in Kazakhstan. In 1957, together with his parents, he returned from Kazakhstan to his homeland, to the village of Zebir-Yurt, Nadterechny district of Chechnya. In 1972 he graduated from the Tbilisi Higher Artillery School and was sent to the Far East. He went through all the steps of the army hierarchical ladder from platoon commander to division chief of staff.
In 1981 he graduated from the Leningrad Artillery Academy named after. M.I.Kalinina. After graduating from the academy, he was sent to the Central Group of Forces in Hungary, where he served as a division commander, then as a regiment commander. Lithuania follows Hungary: commander of a self-propelled artillery regiment, chief of staff of the missile forces and artillery of the garrison of the city of Vilnius in Lithuania, deputy commander of the seventh division in the Baltic Military District.
In January 1990, during protests by supporters of Lithuanian independence, Maskhadov was in Vilnius.
Since 1991 - Head of the Civil Defense of the Chechen Republic, Deputy Head of the Main Staff of the Supreme Council of the Chechen Republic.
In 1992, Colonel Maskhadov retired from the Russian army and took the post of first deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Chechen Republic.
Since March 1994 - Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic.
From December 1994 to January 1995, he headed the defense of the presidential palace in Grozny.
In the spring of 1995, Aslan Maskhadov led the military operations of the armed formations from the headquarters in Nozhai-Yurt.
In June 1995, he headed the headquarters of Dudayev’s formations in Dargo.
In August-October 1995, he headed a group of military representatives of the Dudayev delegation at the Russian-Chechen negotiations.
In August 1996, he represented Chechen separatists in negotiations with Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed
On October 17, 1996, he was appointed to the post of Prime Minister of the coalition government of Chechnya with the wording “for the transition period.”
In December 1996, in accordance with the election law, he resigned from official posts - prime minister of the coalition government, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, deputy commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, in order to have the right to run for the post of president of Chechnya.
Since July 1998, he served as acting prime minister of Chechnya, combining this position with the post of president.
In December 1998, “field commanders” Shamil Basayev, Salman Raduev and Khunkar Israpilov tried to challenge Maskhadov’s constitutional powers under the pretext of his “pro-Russian position.” The “Council of Commanders of Chechnya,” headed by them, demanded that the Supreme Sharia Court remove Maskhadov from office. The Sharia court suggested that Maskhadov unilaterally sever relations with Russia. However, the court did not find sufficient grounds to remove the President of the Chechen Republic from office, although he was found guilty of selecting persons “who collaborated with the occupation regime” for leadership positions.
Destroyed on March 8, 2005 by Russian FSB special forces in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, Grozny district.
BARAEV Arbi. He was suspected of organizing the kidnappings of FSB officers Gribov and Lebedinsky, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in Chechnya Vlasov, Red Cross employees, as well as the murder of four citizens of Great Britain and New Zealand (Peter Kennedy, Darren Hickey, Rudolf Pestchi and Stanley Shaw). The Ministry of Internal Affairs put Baraev on the federal wanted list in a criminal case regarding the abduction in Chechnya of NTV television journalists - Masyuk, Mordyukov, Olchev and OPT television journalists - Bogatyrev and Chernyaev. In total, he personally accounts for the death of about two hundred Russians - military personnel and civilians.
On June 23-24, 2001, in the ancestral village of Alkhan-Kala and Kulary, a special joint detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB conducted a special operation to eliminate a detachment of militants from Arbi Barayev. 15 militants and Barayev himself were killed.
BARAEV Movsar, nephew of Arbi Barayev. Movsar received his first baptism of fire in the summer of 1998 in Gudermes, when the Barayevites, together with the Urus-Martan Wahhabis, clashed with fighters from the detachment of the Yamadayev brothers. Then Movsar was wounded.
After the entry of federal troops into Chechnya, Arbi Barayev appointed his nephew as commander of a sabotage detachment and sent him to Argun. In the summer of 2001, when Arbi Barayev was killed in the village of Alkhan-Kala, Grozny rural district, Movsar proclaimed himself, instead of his uncle, emir of the Alkhan-Kala jamaat. Organized several attacks on federal convoys and a series of explosions in Grozny, Urus-Martan and Gudermes.
In October 2002, terrorists led by Movsar Barayev seized the building of the House of Culture of the State Bearing Plant on Melnikova Street (Theater Center on Dubrovka), during the musical "Nord-Ost". Spectators and actors (up to 1000 people) were taken hostage. On October 26, the hostages were released, Movsar Barayev and 43 terrorists were killed.
SULEIMENOV Movsan. Nephew of Arbi Barayev. Killed on August 25, 2001 in the city of Argun during a special operation by officers of the Russian FSB Directorate for Chechnya. The operation was carried out with the aim of establishing the exact location and detention of Suleimenov. However, during the operation, Movsan Suleimenov and three other mid-level commanders offered armed resistance. As a result, they were destroyed.
ABU Umar. Native of Saudi Arabia. One of Khattab's most famous assistants. Mine explosives expert. Mined the approaches to Grozny in 1995. Participated in organizing explosions in Buinaksk in 1998, and was wounded in the explosion. Organized an explosion in Volgograd on May 31, 2000, in which 2 people were killed and 12 were injured.
Abu Umar trained almost all the organizers of the explosions in Chechnya and the North Caucasus.
In addition to preparing terrorist attacks, Abu-Umar dealt with financing issues
militants, including the transfer of mercenaries to Chechnya through the channels of one of
international Islamic organizations.
Destroyed on July 11, 2001 in the village of Mayrup, Shalinsky district, during a special operation by the FSB and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Emir Ibn Al Khattab. Professional terrorist, one of the most irreconcilable militants in Chechnya.
Some of the most “well-known” operations carried out under the leadership or with the direct participation of Khattab and his militants include:
Terrorist attack in the city of Budennovsk (70 people were allocated from Khattab’s detachment, there were no losses among them);
Providing a “corridor” for S. Raduev’s gang to exit the village. Pervomayskoye - an operation prepared and carried out personally by Khattab to destroy the column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment near the village. Yaryshmards;
Direct participation in the preparation and attack on Grozny in August 1996.
Terrorist attack in Buinaksk on December 22, 1997. During an armed attack on a military unit in Buinaksk, he was wounded in his right shoulder.
RADUEV Salman. From April 1996 to June 1997, Raduev was the commander of the armed unit "General Dudayev's Army".
In 1996-1997, Salman Raduev repeatedly took responsibility for terrorist attacks committed on Russian territory and made threats against Russia.
In 1998, he took responsibility for the assassination attempt on Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. He also took responsibility for the explosions at train stations in Armavir and Pyatigorsk. The Raduevskaya gang was engaged in robberies on the railways; it was guilty of theft of public funds in the amount of 600 - 700 thousand rubles, intended to pay salaries to teachers in the Chechen Republic.
On March 12, 2000, he was captured in the village of Novogroznensky during a special operation by FSB officers.
The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation has charged Salman Raduev under 18 articles of the Criminal Code of Russia (including "terrorism", "murder", "banditry"). The sentence is life imprisonment.
Died on December 14, 2002. Diagnosis: hemorrhagic vasculitis (incoagulability of blood). He was buried on December 17 at the city cemetery of Solikamsk (Perm region).
ATGERIEV Turpal-Ali. Former employee of the 21st company of the Grozny traffic police. During the hostilities, he was the commander of the Novogroznensky regiment, which, together with Salman Raduev, participated in the Kizlyar and May Day events.
Based on this fact, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation opened a criminal case under Art. 77 (banditry), Art. 126 (hostage-taking) and Art. 213-3, part 3 (terrorism). Put on the federal wanted list.
On December 25, 2002, the Supreme Court of Dagestan sentenced Atgeriev to 15 years in prison for participating in the attack on the Dagestan city of Kizlyar in January 1996. Atgeriev was found guilty of terrorism, organizing illegal armed groups, kidnapping and hostage-taking, and robbery.
Died on August 18, 2002. The cause of death was leukemia. In addition, it was established that Atgeriev had a stroke.
GELAEV Ruslan (Khamzat). Former commander of the special forces regiment "BORZ" of the Armed Forces of ChRI, lieutenant colonel of the Army of Ichkeria.
During combat operations - commander of the Shatoevsky garrison, commander of the "Abkhaz battalion". Gelayev’s formation consisted of eight hundred to nine hundred well-armed militants, including about fifty snipers from Lithuania and ten to fifteen snipers from Estonia. The so-called special-purpose regiment was stationed in the areas of Sharoy, Itum-Kale, and Khalkina.
In 2002, he announced his intention to obtain the post of President of Ichkeria; he was supported by the former head of Dudayev’s foreign intelligence service, the famous criminal oil businessman Khozhi Nukhaev.
On August 20, 2002, Ruslan Gelayev’s gang attempted an armed transition from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia through the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia to Chechnya.
On March 1, 2004, the territorial department "Makhachkala" of the North Caucasus branch of the border service department distributed reports of the death of Ruslan Gelayev in the mountains of Dagestan (reports of his death were heard repeatedly).
MUNAEV Isa. Chechen field commander. He led detachments operating in the Chechen capital, and was appointed military commandant of the city of Grozny by Aslan Maskhadov in early 1999.
Killed on October 1, 2000 during a military clash in the Stapropromyslovsky district of Grozny (according to the press center of the United Group of Russian Forces in Chechnya, 2000).
MOVSAEV Abu. Deputy Minister of Sharia Security of Ichkeria.
After the attack on Budennovsk (1995), they began to claim that Abu Movsaev was one of the organizers of the action. After Budennovsk he received the rank of brigadier general. In 1996 - July 1997 - Head of the State Security Department of Ichkeria. During the armed conflict in Chechnya, for some time in 1996 he served as chief of the main headquarters of the Chechen formations.
KARIEV (KORIEV) Magomed. Chechen field commander.
Until September 1998, Kariev was deputy head of the Security Service of Ichkeria. He was then appointed head of the 6th Department of the Ministry of Sharia Security, responsible for the fight against organized crime.
Kariev was involved in kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom.
He was killed on May 22, 2001 by several shots at the door of the apartment he rented in Baku under the guise of a refugee.
TSAGARAEV Magomad. One of the leaders of Chechen gangs. Tsagarayev was Movzan Akhmadov’s deputy and directly led military operations; was Khattab's closest confidant.
In March 2001, Tsagaraev was wounded, but managed to escape and penetrate abroad. At the beginning of July 2001, he returned to Chechnya and organized gang groups in Grozny to carry out terrorist attacks.
MALIK Abdul. Famous field commander. He was part of the inner circle of the leaders of illegal armed groups in Chechnya, Emir Khattab and Shamil Basayev. Killed on August 13, 2001 during a special operation in the Vedeno region of the Chechen Republic.
KHAIHAROEV Ruslan. Famous Chechen field commander. During the war in Chechnya (1994-1996) he commanded detachments of defenders of the village of Bamut and the southeastern front of the Chechen army.
After 1996, Khaikharoev had extensive connections in the criminal world of the North Caucasus, controlling two types of criminal business: transporting hostages from Ingushetia and North Ossetia to the Chechen Republic, as well as smuggling of petroleum products. Former employee of Dudayev's personal security.
It is assumed that he was involved in the disappearance without a trace of journalists of the Nevskoe Vremya newspaper Maxim Shablin and Felix Titov, and also ordered two explosions in Moscow trolleybuses on July 11 and 12, 1996. Accused by the Russian Security Service of organizing the explosion of an intercity passenger bus in Nalchik.
The organizer of the abduction on May 1, 1998 of the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Valentin Vlasov (this fact was established by Russian law enforcement agencies).
He died on September 8, 1999 in the district hospital of the city of Urus-Martan, Chechen Republic. He died from wounds received on the night of August 23-24, 1999 during the fighting in the Botlikh region of Dagestan (he fought as part of Arbi Barayev’s units).
According to another version, Khaikharoev was mortally wounded by fellow villagers who were blood relatives of Bamut. The news of his death was confirmed by the press service of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
KHACHUKAEV Khizir. Brigadier General, Deputy of Ruslan Gelayev. Commanded the South-Eastern Defense Sector in Grozny. Demoted to private by Maskhadov for participating in negotiations with Akhmad Kadyrov and Vladimir Bokovikov in Nazran. Destroyed on February 15, 2002 during an operation in the Shali region of Chechnya.
UMALATOV Adam. Nickname - "Tehran". One of the leaders of Chechen militants. He was a member of Khattab's gang. Killed on November 5, 2001 as a result of an operation carried out by special forces.
IRISKHANOV Shamil. An influential field commander from Basayev's inner circle. Together with Basayev, he took part in the raid on Budenovsk and the taking of hostages in a city hospital there in 1995. He led a detachment of about 100 militants in the summer of 2001, after his older brother, the so-called Brigadier General Khizir IRISKHANOV, Basayev’s first deputy, was killed in a special operation. “For the operation” in Budenovsk, Dzhokhar Dudayev awarded the Iriskhanov brothers the highest order of “Ichkeria” - “Honor of the Nation”.
SALTAMIRZAEV Adam. An influential member of illegal armed groups. He was the emir (spiritual leader) of the Wahhabis of the village of Mesker-Yurt. Nickname - "Black Adam". Destroyed on May 28, 2002 as a result of a special operation by Federal forces in the Shali region of Chechnya. During an attempt to be detained in Mesker-Yurt, he resisted and was killed during a shootout.
Rizvan AKHMADOV. Field commander, nickname "Dadu". He was a member of the so-called “Majlis-ul-Shura of the Mujahideen of the Caucasus.”
Akhmadov took command of his brother Ramzan's militant detachment in February 2001 after his liquidation. This detachment operated in Grozny, in the Grozny rural, Urus-Martan and Shalinsky districts, relying on accomplices in the ranks of the Chechen riot police operating in Grozny. On January 10, 2001, it was a group of militants subordinate to Dadu who took hostage a representative of the international organization Doctors Without Borders, Kenneth Gluck.
ABDUKHAJIEV Aslanbek. One of the leaders of Chechen militants, Shamil Basayev’s deputy for intelligence and sabotage work. Nickname - "Big Aslanbek". As part of the Basayev and Raduev gangs, he took an active part in armed attacks on the cities of Budennovsk and Kizlyar. During the reign of Maskhadov, he was the military commandant of the Shali region of Chechnya. In Basayev’s gang, he personally developed plans for sabotage and terrorist activities.
Since the day of the attack on Budennovsk, he has been on the federal wanted list.
On August 26, 2002, employees of the operational group of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Shali region and one of the SOBR detachments, together with soldiers from the military commandant’s office of the Shali region, carried out an operation in the regional center of Shali to detain a militant. When detained, he offered armed resistance and was killed.
Demiev Adlan. Leader of a gang. Involved in a series of sabotage and terrorist acts on the territory of Chechnya.
Liquidated on February 18, 2003 by federal forces of Chechnya as a result of a counter-terrorist operation carried out in the city of Argun.
After being blocked by a unit of federal forces, Demiev resisted and tried to escape in a car. However, it was destroyed by retaliatory fire from federal forces. When examining the dead man, a PM pistol, grenades, radios and a fake passport were found.
BATAEV Khamzat. A well-known field commander, considered the “commander of the Bamut direction” of the resistance of Chechen militants. He was killed in March 2000 in the village of Komsomolskoye. (This was reported by the commander of the group of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, General Mikhail Lagunets).
9
January 1996, militants attacked the Russian city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan).
The militants, numbering about 350 people, acted under the command of Salman Raduev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov. The initial goal is to eliminate the helicopter base of the federal forces and take hostages among the federal security forces. However, it didn’t work out. As a result of a clash with federal forces and local police, the militants tried to capture the city, train station and airport. After local battles throughout the city, the militants took hostages among the civilian population (about 3,000 people) and established themselves in the local maternity hospital, because it is much more convenient to fight behind the backs of pregnant women - the militants managed to repeat the Budyonnovsky scenario...
The next day troops entered the city. Some of the militants remained to hold the bridge over the Terek on the approach to the city. By the end of the day, 32 people were killed and 64 were injured.
At that time, the militants never entered into negotiations with the command of the federal forces, who blocked the neighborhoods near the hospital.
Taking advantage of the situation, Salman Raduev demanded that the Russian leadership withdraw troops from the territory of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Of course, no one agreed to this, but the militants were released on buses with hostages from the maternity hospital. It would be madness to storm it. For every Chechen killed, the militants threatened to shoot 15 civilians.
The return route of Raduev’s group passed through the territory of Dagestan along the border with Chechnya. The militants wanted to switch to their side in the area of the village of Pervomaiskoye, located 300 meters from the border.
Near the border Aksai River, a convoy of buses with militants and hostages (165 people) was stopped by warning fire from helicopters (which hit an escort vehicle of the Dagestani traffic police). The federal authorities were not going to allow the militants with hostages into the territory of Chechnya: it was assumed that they would free the people at the border. The militants intended to travel further with the hostages, to Dudayev’s headquarters in the village of Novogroznensky.
After the shelling, the convoy returned to the village of Pervomaiskoye, where the militants, hiding behind hostages, disarmed the Russian police checkpoint. The riot police had orders not to shoot at the buses. As a result, the number of prisoners from the militants increased by 37 policemen from Novosibirsk, they grabbed their weapons, communications and armored personnel carriers.
On January 11-14, militants fortified themselves in Pervomaisky. The village was blocked by federal troops. The militants began to prepare for the assault, forcing the prisoners to dig trenches. Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov and FSB Director Mikhail Barsukov arrived at the scene of the events. Negotiations have reached a dead end. Raduev constantly changed his demands. He insisted that Grigory Yavlinsky, Boris Gromov, Alexander Lebed and Yegor Gaidar become either mediators in the negotiations or voluntary hostages. He demanded that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin participate in the negotiations.
On January 16, 1996, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ferry Aurasia, threatening to shoot the Russian hostages and then blow up the ship. The terrorists demanded to stop the assault on the village of Pervomaiskoye, where the surrounded bandit group of Salman Raduev was located.
On the night of January 18, a group of militants approached from the direction of Pervomaisky and tried to unblock Raduev’s group. She pulled the forces onto herself, forcing the Dagestan riot police to move away from Pervomaisky.
In the same place, at 3 o’clock in the morning, the militants made a breakthrough. The bandits carried out a powerful three-minute fire raid, and then shouted “Allahu Akbar!” rushed to attack. On the rampart where our trenches were located, it came to hand-to-hand combat. They chopped with knives and spatulas. 150 militants in this area were opposed by no more than fifty special forces from the 22nd brigade of the North Caucasus Military District. (memoirs of Colonel General Gennady Troshev). When the terrible picture of the night battle opened up in the morning, it turned out that they had killed the entire first wave of militants. During the breakthrough, 39 militants were killed. 153 corpses of militants were found at the battle site and on the outskirts of the village, and 28 bandits were captured.
On January 18, the village was stormed. The decision to launch the operation was made after the news of the execution of elders and several policemen. Federal troops lost 26 killed and 93 military personnel wounded during the operation. In those days, nothing was known about the fate of the militant leader Salman Raduev.
Scheme of the assault on the village of Pervomaisky.
It later turned out that Raduev and a small group of militants with hostages still managed to get through the ring and escape to Chechnya. The militants escaped the encirclement using a gas pipe laid over the Aksai River.
The GRU Alpha detachment lost five killed and six seriously wounded. And that’s from our own people. After the battle in Pervomaisky, they were handing over equipment to conscripts and one of the soldiers accidentally leaned in the wrong place and pressed the electric trigger of the Thunder gun. The shot immediately “blown away” several people. By that time, Barsukov had already reported that there were no losses in Alpha...
On February 9, 1996, the State Duma decided to grant amnesty to participants in “illegal actions” in Kizlyar and Pervomaisky, subject to the release of the remaining hostages. During the terrorist attack, the militants executed about 200 hostages, mostly Avars and Lezgins.
For the attack on the maternity hospital, the Dagestanis nicknamed Raduev “Gynecologist,” and the authorities sentenced the leader to death. There were hotheads in Dgestan who were planning a similar campaign to plunder populated areas in Chechnya.
In March 2000, Salman Raduev was arrested by the FSB and transported to Moscow to the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center. A year and a half later, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, and in December 2002 he died in a maximum security colony in Perm from internal hemorrhage in the backside.
According to the Moscow News publication, the authorities allocated 250 million non-denominated rubles as compensation to residents of Pervomaisky, and each family received a VAZ-2106 car...
Happy memory to those who died at the hands of terrorists...
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