The key issue for understanding the course of military operations, both in the initial period and in the war as a whole, is determining the ratio of forces and means (formations, weapons, military equipment) of the warring parties to its beginning. The answer to this question is an objective indicator of the combat power and operational capabilities of the warring parties, allowing one to determine the degree of superiority of one armed group over another.
The balance of forces and means of the warring parties on the Soviet-German front on June 22, 1941 (1st and 2nd strategic echelons)
Notes: * The number of serviceable equipment and the ratio for it are indicated in parentheses.
The balance of forces and means of the first strategic echelons of the warring parties on the Eastern Front on June 22, 1941
So, German command Having deployed the main part of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, it was unable to achieve overwhelming superiority in the means of armed struggle not only of its first echelon, but of the entire future front. However Red Army, which clearly had an advantage in the number of military equipment, was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, parts of the first echelon of covering troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly near the border. This arrangement of the Soviet troops made it possible to destroy them piece by piece. In the directions of the main attacks of the army groups, the German command managed to create a superiority over the Red Army troops, which was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of forces developed for the Wehrmacht in the zone of Army Group Center, since it was in this direction that the main blow of the entire Eastern Campaign was delivered. The general balance of forces clearly allowed the Soviet command to prevent enemy superiority even in the directions of its main attacks. But in reality the opposite happened.
Historiography of this issue: In Russian historiography over the sixty-odd years since the start of the Great Patriotic War, unfortunately, this issue continues to be controversial. See Appendix 1 for the dissertation research of A.V. Tolmacheva. Thus, an analysis of the combat strength of the Soviet Armed Forces at the beginning of the war showed that the number of combined arms armies in different publications is given in the range from 14 to 16. In 1961, in the work “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945.” it is indicated that on June 22, 1941, there were 14 combined arms formations in the western border districts. Twenty-seven goals later - in 1988 - in the work “The Second World War: Figures and Facts” the number of combined arms armies was brought to 15, and another fourteen years later - in 2002 - the authors of the four-volume book “World Wars of the 20th Century” report on 16 armies on the Soviet-German border. Strategic outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945. M., 1961. S. 146 - 147; World War II: Figures and facts. M., 1988. P.276; World wars of the twentieth century. Book 3. M., 2002. P.136. The number of divisional formations in the Soviet western districts is also disputed. The smallest number of divisions located on the Soviet-German border on June 22, 1941 was named by the authors of the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century” - 167 divisions (plus another 9 brigades). Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: A statistical study. M., 2001. P. 221. Most works on the history of the Great Patriotic War indicate that the Soviet Union began the war with Nazi Germany with 170 divisions on the western border. The Second World War. Results and lessons. M., 1985. P.49; World War II: Figures and facts. M., 1988. P.276; World wars of the twentieth century. Book 3. M., 2002. P. 136; Soviet military encyclopedia. T. 2. M., 1976. S. 55 - 69; Strategic essay of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945. M., 1961. P. 150; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. M., 1992. S. 93, 170; 50 years of the USSR Armed Forces. M., 1968. P. 252. Two more works - “History of the Second World War” and “The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: A Brief History” - provided data on 171 Soviet divisions. History of the Second World War. T.4. M., 1975. P. 25; The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: A Brief History. M., 1984. P. 50. Apparently, the number of settlement units was immediately indicated here, since the authors do not give the number of teams - Note author. And in the Military Encyclopedia and works “The Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945. Military-historical essays" and "War and Society, 1941 - 1945" already talk about 186 divisions of the western border districts. Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945 Military historical essays. Book 1. M., 1998. P. 123; Military encyclopedia. T.2. M., 1994. S. 32 - 47.; War and Society, 1941 - 1945. Book. 1. M., 2004. P. 52.
The situation is no better with the determination of the number of enemy divisional formations deployed against the USSR. The smallest number of enemy divisions concentrated on the Eastern Front on June 22, 1941 - 153 - is shown in the work “The Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945.” Military-historical essays." Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945 Military historical essays. Book 1. M., 1998. P. 123. According to other information, the enemy fielded 181 - 182 divisions, Strategic essay of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945. M., 1961. P. 52; World War II: Figures and facts. M., 1988. P.276; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. M., 1992. P. 18; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: A statistical study. M., 2001. P. 221; Military encyclopedia. T.2. M., 1994. S. 32 - 47.; World wars of the twentieth century. Book 3. M., 2002. P. 132. but most often in domestic historiography we are talking about 190 enemy divisions. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945. T.2. M., 1961. S. 9; 50 years of the USSR Armed Forces. M., 1968. P. 249; History of the Second World War. T.4. M., 1975. S. 21; Soviet military encyclopedia. T. 2. M., 1976. S. 55 - 69; The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: A Brief History. M., 1984. P. 35; The Second World War. Short story. M., 1984. P. 115; The Second World War. Results and lessons. M., 1985. P.49; War and Society, 1941 - 1945. Book. 1. M., 2004. P. 52.
And since the question of the combat composition of the warring parties’ groups remains unresolved, the question of the number of troops and the amount of weapons and military equipment concentrated on June 22, 1941 on both sides of the Soviet-German border also remains unresolved. Information on the number of Soviet troops concentrated in the western border districts ranges from 2,583 - 2,680 - 2,900 thousand people. - 3.0 - 3.1 million people. Data on the size of the enemy of the Soviet Union also vary: 4.4 - 5 - 5.5 million people. According to various estimates, the enemy's arsenal consisted of: guns and mortars - 39 - 47 - 47.2 - 50 thousand; tanks and assault guns - 3.5 thousand - 3712 - 4 thousand - 4260 - 4300 - 4.5 thousand; combat aircraft - 4.3 thousand - 4.4 thousand - 4900 - 4950 - 4980 - 5 thousand units. The number of weapons and military equipment of the Red Army in domestic historiography is given as follows: guns and mortars - 32.9 - 34.7 - 37.5 - 37.7 - 39.4 - 46.8 - 52.5 thousand; tanks and self-propelled artillery units - 1470 - 1475 - 1800 - 10534 - 11 thousand - 12378 - 12.8 thousand - 14.3 thousand; combat aircraft - 1540 - 7133 - 7.5 thousand - 8453 - 9.1 thousand - 9.2 thousand units. See: Appendix 2 of the dissertation research by A.V. Tolmacheva.
Progress of hostilities In the first three weeks of the war, their main result was clearly stated in the textbook - the almost complete defeat of the first strategic echelon of the Red Army and the seizure of the strategic initiative by the Wehrmacht.
Modern domestic historiography of the initial period of the war (main problems)
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Problem |
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The USSR's preparations for a preemptive strike against Germany in 1941. |
V. Suvorov (later this point of view was supported by some domestic historians: V. Nevezhin, B. Sokolov, etc.) |
He was the first to raise this question, starting a discussion in 1993; however, he made the reservation that he was not personally familiar with archival documents and based his point of view on studying the structure of the armed forces, information about their movements in 1941 and his own conclusions. A similar version (note back in 1946 - 1949) was put forward by American researchers of the Second World War. |
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M. Meltyukhov |
In his work “Stalin’s Missed Chance...” he substantiated V. Suvorov’s point of view from the position of increasing the number of offensive weapons of the Red Army in the pre-war years. As a result, he did not rule out that the political leadership of the USSR had plans to seize Europe. |
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M. Gareev, V. Zolotarev, O. Vishlev, Y. Nikiforov, |
They sharply criticized V. Suvorov’s point of view. They believe that the nature of Soviet plans was exclusively defensive, which does not exclude, however, the choice of offensive forms of combat operations, which was recorded in the Field Manual of 1939. |
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Disputes about the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war |
A. Mertsalov, B. Sokolov, V. Safir |
All the reasons for the defeat are reduced only to a subjective factor - the role of I.V. Stalin and G.K. Zhukov. Accusing Stalin and Zhukov of untimely issuing the order to bring troops to combat readiness and mobilization, they turn a blind eye to the objective reasons for the defeat. |
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V. Beshanov |
It all boils down to the technical backwardness of Soviet equipment and poor training of military personnel. |
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V. Zolotarev, M. Gareev, A. Isaev |
They consider the problem in its entirety - as a combination of reasons: the unfinished construction of the new border, the untimely bringing of troops to combat readiness, inadequate determination of the directions of the enemy's main attacks, distrust of intelligence data about the dates of the German attack on the USSR, the unfinished process of technical reorganization of troops, inconsistency of personnel policy in the Armed Forces, etc. .R. |
The military fire that broke out in September 1939 in the center of Europe engulfed one state after another. From Poland the flames of war
soon spread to the countries of Northern and Western Europe, and then to the Balkans. Military operations took place in the Atlantic, North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. In Asia, Japan continued its aggression in China and sought to establish itself in French Indochina. By June 1941, the Second World War had drawn into its orbit some 30 states with a population of more than a billion people and consumed hundreds of thousands of lives.
By that time, Nazi Germany had already achieved major military successes in Europe. It successively occupied nine states, including such a strong capitalist power as France. The Nazi "new order" was established in Poland, Denmark, the Netherlands (Holland), Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece and large parts of France. Great Britain, the only one of Germany's opponents, managed to avoid complete defeat. But after the disaster at Dunkirk, left without its European allies, it was significantly weakened.
The United States of America has not yet participated in the war, but provided political, economic and partly military assistance to the British.
Thus, in the capitalist world there was no force that could stop the military machine of fascism, which set out on a campaign for world domination.
The situation in the world in the spring of 1941 was characterized by the complexity of interstate relations, fraught with the danger of a further expansion of the scale of the world war.
By June 1941, the aggressive bloc expanded and strengthened. The most reactionary forces of world imperialism - Germany, Italy and Japan - concluded a triple military-political alliance (Berlin Pact) in the fall of 1940 with the aim of more closely coordinating their actions. It was then joined by royal Romania, Horthy Hungary, imperial Bulgaria and the puppet states of Slovakia and Croatia. Finland also entered into a military agreement with Germany. The participants in the tripartite pact recognized the leading role of Germany and Italy in establishing a “new order” in Europe and Africa, and Japan in creating a “sphere of co-prosperity for a great East Asia.”
The fascist-militarist bloc posed a mortal threat to humanity.
The political and military leadership of Germany, planning and preparing the expansion of aggression, was based on the proven method of crushing opponents one by one, believing that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America would not be able to combine their efforts to organize a rebuff.
The next military-political goal of the war in the plans of the Nazis was the destruction of the main enemy of fascism - the Soviet Union, in whom they saw the main obstacle to the conquest of world domination. For this purpose, the Nazis postponed the task of defeating Great Britain to a later date and took measures to diplomatically temporarily exclude it from the war. The German government sought by any means to delay the direct intervention of the United States of America in the war in Europe, counting on the fact that in the near future they would find themselves involved in a military conflict with Japan. And by that time, it believed, it would be possible to deal with the USSR, strengthen its power and again attack England and its colonial possessions in Africa, the Near and Middle East. Aggressive plans were also hatched against America, which were later reflected in additions to Directive No. 32 of July 14, 1941 ( The Second World War. Materials of the scientific conference dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. Book 1. General problems. M., 1966, pp. 316-317.).
This was the perspective of the struggle for world domination for Hitler and his circle.
Germany, the strongest member of the aggressive bloc, had a developed economy adapted for warfare. By redistributing human, production and raw materials resources in favor of industries working for the war, updating industrial equipment and increasing the exploitation of workers, the Nazi leadership in 1940 - in the first half of 1941 managed to increase the output of industrial products, especially military ones.
In addition, Germany had at its disposal the material and human resources of the European countries it occupied, almost 6.5 thousand enterprises of which in June 1941 worked for the Wehrmacht, fulfilling military orders worth 4.6 billion marks ( Militärarchiv der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (hereinafter referred to as MA DDR), W 61.10/11, B1. 79-80.). German industry employed 3.1 million foreign workers, mostly Poles, Italians and French, accounting for about 9 percent of the total workforce ( V. Bleier and others. Germany in the Second World War (1939-1945). Translation from German. M., 1971, p. 93.).
Germany also made extensive use of the economic resources of its European allies. Romania met 60 percent of the Reich's fuel needs ( Auf antisowjetischem Kriegskurs. Studien zur militärischen Vorbereitug des deutschen Imperialismus auf Aggression gegen die UdSSR (1933-1941). Berlin, 1970, S. 282.), Hungary supplied him with bauxite and food, Bulgaria became his agricultural appendage. Germany received various strategic raw materials from Sweden, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey.
The second participant in the tripartite pact, fascist Italy, experienced serious difficulties due to its defeat in Africa and an acute shortage of raw materials. Nevertheless, receiving some help from Germany, it continued to militarize the economy. Mussolini's government intended to take an active part in the upcoming war against the Soviet Union. Concentrating its main efforts on the Mediterranean Sea, North Africa and the Balkans, it was preparing an expeditionary force to be sent to the Soviet-German front.
By mid-1941, the aggressive bloc in Europe had an impressive military force, the basis of which was the German Wehrmacht; its personnel had almost two years of experience in conducting military operations, were ideologically indoctrinated in the spirit of Nazism and anti-Sovietism, and were psychologically prepared for the blind implementation of aggressive plans. In total, the armed forces of this bloc in Europe numbered 10.4 million people, of which about 70 percent were in Germany and 17 percent in Italy (Table 1).
(Note. The German armed forces, together with civilian personnel, numbered 8,500 thousand people. The Finnish armed forces also included security troops (schutzkor), border guards and the paramilitary women's organization "Lottasvärd" with a total number of up to 180 thousand people. In addition, the Romanian armed forces had 20 thousand people in the border troops and 40 thousand in the gendarmerie. In addition to the forces shown in the table, Italy had national security troops (800 thousand people). In total, the armed forces of the states presented in the table, together with border troops and other military formations, numbered about 13 million people. The number of German ground forces in the table is given taking into account the SS troops (150 thousand people), as well as the reserve army (1,200 thousand people) and foreign formations (20 thousand people). For the German armed forces, the number of guns and mortars is given without 50 mm mortars (but taking into account anti-aircraft guns 37 mm and larger - 16,108); tanks and assault guns - excluding captured and training vehicles; combat aircraft - along with reserve and training aircraft; warships of the main classes (battleships, cruisers, battleships, destroyers, destroyers, submarines) - along with captured ships.)
The third main participant in the aggressor bloc, Japan, continued military operations in China and intensively prepared for a major war in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. Its direct military expenditures in 1941 increased 1.6 times compared to the previous year and amounted to 12.5 billion ( yen Taiheiyo senso shi (History of the Pacific War). See T. 4. Taiheiyo senso (War in the Pacific), 1940-1942. Tokyo, 1972,).
The Japanese militarists sought to make maximum use of their raw materials and continued to expand the production of weapons and military equipment in every possible way. Preparing aggression against major maritime powers - the USA and Great Britain, Japan paid special attention to increasing its navy and aviation. In 1941, compared to 1940, it built almost 1.8 times more warships and aircraft ( Taiheiyo senso shuketsu ron (End of the Pacific War). Tokyo, 1958, p. 318b (table)) The deployment of her army also continued. By the end of 1940, the number of Japanese armed forces reached almost 1.7 million people ( J. Cohen. Japan's war economy. Translation from English. M., 1951, p. 290.), of which 1.35 million are in the ground forces ( Hattori Takushiro. Daitoa senso zen shi (The Complete History of the War in Greater East Asia). Tokyo, 1970, p. 185.). The navy had 202 warships of the main classes, including 52 submarines 4 (J. Cohen. Japan's War Economy, p. 257.), and 1049 combat aircraft ( L. Morton. Strategy and Command: the First Two Years. Washington, 1962, b. 57. In total, the armed forces had more than 2,200 combat aircraft.).
In general, the bloc of aggressive states united by aggressive goals posed a serious danger to the peoples of the whole world. However, within this aggressive alliance, primarily between Germany, Italy and Japan, there were significant contradictions. Each of these states pursued, first of all, its own goals and, speaking under the common flag of redividing the world and establishing dominance over it, brought its own interests to the fore. Neither Italy, nor especially Japan, were going to “pull chestnuts out of the fire” for Germany, just as Germany did not think of sharing with them the fruits of future conquests. The Japanese militarists, pursuing an aggressive policy, firmly adhered to the course of establishing their dominance in Asia. Their efforts were aimed at creating a colonial empire where Japan would reign supreme. Its political leaders maneuvered, avoiding specific obligations to Germany, and did not at all intend to enter the war at the first request of the Nazis. Japan made the start of its aggression against the Soviet Union dependent on Germany's success in the eastern campaign. Hitler's leadership, while formally recognizing Japan's leading role in creating a “new order” in Asia, in fact did not want to establish its undivided dominance in this region of the world.
Unlike the countries of the fascist-militarist bloc, the capitalist states that opposed them were not united in any union for organized resistance to aggression. In those countries where the Nazi “new order” dominated, protests against the Nazi occupiers were scattered, and so far only a small part of the population participated in them. The struggle of the popular masses, which later resulted in the Resistance movement and played a significant role in the Second World War, was just beginning to unfold.
The expanding national patriotic movements were led by communist parties.
The British people, having survived continuous two-month aerial bombardments in the autumn of 1940 and massive winter raids on the country's industrial centers, were ready to withstand new tests and decisively repel the enemy in the event of an invasion of the metropolitan islands by German troops. The British government took this into account in its domestic and foreign policy and sought to maximally mobilize internal resources to strengthen the defense of the mother country and preserve colonial possessions and maritime communications with them.
The British government, headed by W. Churchill, did not intend to enter into negotiations with Germany to end the war. At the same time, it understood that in the current situation, without effective outside help - from the USA and the USSR - England would not be able to count on victory in the war ( W. With Churchill. The Second World War. Vol. III. London, 1950, b. 106.). Of primary importance to her was the position of the Soviet Union - the only continental state capable of providing effective resistance to Nazi Germany. Therefore, in British foreign policy there was an increasingly clear trend towards political, military and economic rapprochement with the USSR.
The British government also showed great concern for strengthening military-economic cooperation with the United States in order to obtain maximum assistance. England was interested in the United States entering the war on its side.
By mid-1941, in connection with Germany's preparations for an attack on the USSR, the danger of an invasion of England by fascist troops had practically disappeared. Massive aerial bombing of English cities by German aircraft almost ceased. England could now deploy its war economy and armed forces in a more relaxed environment. The growth of its military potential was facilitated by material and financial assistance from the United States, as well as the wider use of the resources of its colonial possessions and the foreign exchange reserves of the countries occupied by Germany, whose governments were located in London.
At the same time, although not legally formalized, allied relations were established between the United States and Great Britain, which were expressed in the exchange of scientific and intelligence information, as well as in military cooperation. American ships guarded the sea routes in the Western Atlantic, replacing the English fleet there; Some English ships were repaired at American shipyards. Plans were being developed for the occupation of Iceland, the Azores, and Martinique by American armed forces. An important manifestation of the rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain were the meetings of the American and British headquarters to develop a common strategy in the event of America's entry into the war.
By the summer of 1941, the number of British forces proper reached 3-278 thousand people (2,221 thousand in the army, 662 thousand in the air force and 395 thousand in the navy) ( Statistical Digest of the War. History of the Second World War. London, 1951, b. 9 (without 105 thousand people of the women's auxiliary corps).). The British army had 33 divisions (including 7 armored) and 29 separate infantry brigades ( Calculated by: N. Joslen. Orders of Battle. United Kingdom and Colonial Formations and Units in the Second World II 1939-1945. Vol. I, II. London, 1960.). The British Navy consisted of 392 warships of the main classes (15 battleships and battlecruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 68 cruisers, 248 destroyers and destroyers and 54 submarines) ( Marine-atlas. T. III. Part 2. M., 1963, l. 29; S. Roskill. Fleet and war. Translation from English. T. 1. M., 1967, p. 418.).
At this time, the British government already had information that Nazi Germany’s preparations for an attack on the USSR were being completed. It believed that the new aggressive act of the Nazis would radically change the situation in the world, and developed an appropriate line of behavior based on two possible options for the further development of events. As the British Foreign Minister A. Eden told the Soviet ambassador on June 13, 1941, Great Britain, in the event of a German attack on the USSR, was ready to send a military mission to Moscow and urgently consider the issue of providing economic assistance to the USSR. At the same time, the British government believed that if the Soviet Union, under the threat of war, was inclined to make concessions to Germany, then it would be possible, through pressure, even the use of military action, to force the Soviet government to refuse to fulfill demands that could be put forward by the German side ( J. B a t l e r. Big strategy. September 1939 - June 1941. Translation from English. M., 1959, p. 497.)
The United States of America, which had enormous military and economic potential, under the influence of the ever-deepening crisis of the system of international relations, increasingly moved away from the policy of neutrality, not considering it possible to remain an outside observer of the extremely dangerous changes taking place in the world as a result of the aggression of the countries of the fascist bloc.
The aggressive aspirations of Nazi Germany affected the interests of the United States. Therefore, the government of F. Roosevelt, increasing assistance from England, sought to prevent the establishment of German domination in Europe and the Atlantic.
At the same time, the United States of America took into account the threat to its interests in the Pacific from Japan. To protect them, the American government, as part of an “undeclared war,” carried out a number of military-economic measures: adopted a law on conscription, sharply increased allocations for military purposes, etc. The expansion of military production was stimulated by British orders and its own defense measures. The total strength of the US armed forces from June 1940 to June 1941 increased almost 4 times and amounted to 1,800 thousand people, of which over 1,460 thousand in the army (including 167 thousand in the Air Force) and about 340 thousand in the Navy (including the Marine Corps - 54 thousand people) ( The National Archives of the United States, Record Group 179, 201, 5. 1942-1944.) The American fleet consisted of 340 warships of the main classes, including 113 submarines Table 1. The number and technical equipment of the armed forces of the main European states of the fascist-militarist bloc (June 1941) Table 1. The number and technical equipment of the armed forces of the main European states fascist-militarist bloc (June 1941) ( Calculated from: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1942. Washington, 1943, p. 178.). Plans were being developed for the further deployment of the army and navy.
By the summer of 1941, tensions in relations between the United States and the main countries of the aggressive bloc increased. In mid-June, assets were frozen and the consulates of Germany and Italy in the United States were closed.
On June 21, the Japanese ambassador was handed a note with which the American leadership confirmed its strong objections to Japanese expansion ( Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers (hereinafter referred to as FRUS). Jaran. 1931 - 1941. Vo1. II. Washington, 1943, b. 485-492.).
The expansion of the aggression of the fascist bloc forced the American government to move closer not only to England, but also to the Soviet Union. However, the anti-Soviet tendencies that persisted in US policy complicated the Soviet-American negotiations, which had been held in Washington since the summer of 1940. Nevertheless, a week before the German attack on the USSR, Secretary of State C. Hull, in a telegram to the American Ambassador in Moscow L. Shteynhardt, ordered to “make it clear To the Soviet Government that we consider improved relations to be as important to the Soviet Union as to the United States, if not more important to the Soviet Union" ( FRUS. 1941. Vo1. I. General. Soviet Union. Washington, 1958, b. 758.). On June 20, 1941, President Roosevelt, through the American Ambassador in London, J. Winant, informed Churchill that he would immediately support “any statement that the Prime Minister may make welcoming Russia as an ally...” ( W. Churchill. The Second World War, vо1. III, b. 330; J. Winant. Letter from Grosvenor Square. Boston, 1947, p. 203.). One of the large states that opposed the fascist-militarist bloc in East Asia was China. However, the internal political situation of this country was extremely difficult. Economic backwardness, Japanese occupation of about a third of the territory where important economic and military-industrial centers were located, the danger of a new civil war - all this extremely limited China's capabilities in the fight against aggression.
In June 1941, Kuomintang troops numbered almost 2.3 million people, and troops and partisans operating under the leadership of the CPC numbered up to 900 thousand ( Kangzhap dilu zhounyanji nianze (Notes on the 6th anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War). Chongqing, 1943, pp. 40, 41; Kanzhi zhanzheng shiqi jiefangqu gaikuang (The situation in the liberated areas during the anti-Japanese war). Beijing, 1953, pp. 116-117.). All of them were poorly armed and had low combat training. The government of Chiang Kai-shek pursued a reactionary, anti-democratic policy, which interfered with the unity of action of the various forces of China and led to a deepening of the conflict between the CPC and the Kuomintang. In turn, the CPC leadership did not look for effective ways to improve relations with the Kuomintang. The fundamental interests of the nation required the unification of the efforts of all classes and parties in the fight against the common enemy - Japanese imperialism.
A group of neutral countries occupied a certain place in the balance of socio-political forces in the world. States that were remote from the outbreaks of war and were politically and economically dependent on the United States and England (including Latin American ones) gravitated towards these powers. Countries such as Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden and Switzerland, which were formally considered neutral, despite German pressure, were in no hurry to openly join the aggressor bloc. These states tried to avoid direct participation in the war, although they supplied Germany with strategic raw materials and military materials, and Spain, in addition, provided it with military assistance. Turkey, which was previously in an alliance with England and France, limited itself to concluding a pact of friendship and non-aggression with Germany on June 18, 1941. The influence of the Nazis in Iran, which was actually turned into an anti-Soviet springboard, was strong.
Although the policy of the governments of European neutral countries at this stage did not entirely suit the Nazis, in fact it served to the benefit of Germany. The Nazi leadership quite rightly believed that neutral states would not oppose Germany both on the eve of the war with the USSR and during it. According to his plan, in the future, after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, most of these states were to become the next object of German aggression on the path to conquest of world domination. The Tannenbaum plan was intended to capture Switzerland, and the Polarfuchs plan was to capture Sweden. The Nazis' intentions towards Spain and Portugal are revealed by the plans for Operation Felix and Isabella, which envisaged the introduction of German troops into these countries ( The Second World War, book. 1, p. 314.).
The Soviet Union was a powerful socio-political force that resisted the aggressive machinations of imperialism and persistently sought the creation of a system of collective security in Europe.
At the end of the 30s, in the context of military conflicts and small wars in different parts of the world, including aggressive actions against the country of socialism, and especially with the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was forced to intensify preparations to repel the impending aggression from Germany and Japan.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government, taking into account the peculiarities of the international situation, fraught with the danger of a fascist attack, carried out major measures to strengthen the defense capability of the USSR. The population of the country and the personnel of the Armed Forces were brought up in the spirit of readiness to repel any aggressor who would try to attack the socialist state.
By mid-1941, the Soviet state had a material and technical base that, when mobilized, ensured the mass production of military equipment and weapons. In the first half of 1941, the military industry produced on average monthly: small arms (rifles, carbines, machine guns and machine guns) - about 150 thousand, artillery pieces - 840 (including 76 mm and larger - 700). 82-mm mortars and larger - about 570, tanks - 280, combat aircraft - 690, ammunition (shells, bombs and mines) - about 5 million ( Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense (hereinafter referred to as the Archive of the Ministry of Defense), f. 81, op. 12076, no. 5, no. 3-4; f. 38, op. 11353, no. 908, pp. 89-90; Central State Archive of the National Economy of the USSR (hereinafter referred to as TsGANKh), f. 8044, d. 2951, l. 67; f. 8177, op. 1, no. 262, pp. 6 - 17.).
In accordance with the country's defense plan, the size of the Soviet Army and Navy increased. In June 1941, the strength of the Armed Forces reached 5,373 thousand people: in the ground forces and air defense forces - 4,553 thousand, in the air force - 476 thousand, in the Navy - 344 thousand people. The army was armed with over 67 thousand field guns and mortars, 1861 tanks and over 2700 new types of combat aircraft. In addition, the troops had a large amount of outdated armored and aircraft combat equipment. The Navy consisted of 276 warships of the main classes, including 212 submarines ( Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense (hereinafter referred to as IVI). Documents and materials, inv. No. 7875, pp. 1-3.).
Simultaneously with the increase in the number of the Armed Forces, they were equipped with new, modern small arms, artillery, tank and aviation weapons and military equipment, samples of which were developed, tested and introduced into mass production.
In the total volume of production of the tank industry, the production of new types of tanks (KV and T-34) already accounted for 89 percent; The aviation industry, which produced 45 percent of modern aircraft, was completing restructuring to produce only new types of combat vehicles.
Major measures were also taken in the field of building the country's Armed Forces. Mechanized and airborne corps, aviation and other units and formations of the new organization were formed, and command personnel were trained.
In the last pre-war half of the year, this important and enormous-scale work was in full swing. However, much remained to be done. A large volume of complex defense activities required time to complete.
So, by mid-1941, the process of the balance of power in the world had not yet ended. The forces that opposed the existing bloc of aggressor countries and were potentially more powerful still remained scattered. There was only a tendency towards their unification, and before this process was completed, many peoples and states in the fight against fascism had to go through difficult trials, endure the bitterness of failures and defeats.
So, by the summer of 1941, everything was ready for the “liberation” campaign in Europe. According to V. Suvorov, the “liberation” campaign was thwarted by Hitler’s preventive strike at the last moment. And we ask ourselves: could it have been otherwise? After all, it wasn’t Hitler who could have been ahead of Stalin by a couple of weeks, but vice versa! In search of an answer, let's look at some numbers and facts. Let's start with a table characterizing the balance of forces of the parties on June 22, 1941 (compiled by me from “The Thunderstorm” by I. Bunich, the works of V. Suvorov, as well as from the following works: Conquest R. The Great Terror. Florence, 1978 Hoffman I. Preparation of the Soviet Union to an offensive war. 1941 // Domestic History. 1993. No. 4).
In addition to overwhelming quantitative, the Red Army also had enormous qualitative superiority. Some facts are simply amazing - for example, on June 23, 1941, near the Lithuanian city of Raseiniai, one KB tank held back the 4th German tank group of Colonel General Hoepner for 24 hours (i.e., a quarter of all German armored forces). And there are plenty of other facts - for example, our troops discovered one damaged KB, and around there were ten destroyed German tanks; KB met with a group of German tanks, received more than 70 shells, but none penetrated its armor; KB destroyed eight German tanks, itself received more than 30 shells, but remained unharmed (quoted from: Suvorov V. The Last Republic. pp. 356–358). Or here’s another: one KB tank resisted 50 German tanks for several days, supported by infantry, artillery, etc. (Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov. P. 15).
In the early days of the war, Soviet tank armadas counterattacked the troops of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group in Ukraine. It was there (and not near Prokhorovka two years later) that the largest tank battle of the Second World War took place. 5,000 Soviet tanks (that is, more than Hitler had in total) inflicted such blows on the enemy that already on June 26, F. Halder wrote in his diary about this battle: “Let us trust in God.” The German prisoners taken in this battle looked depressed and were close to panic; Again, our commanders will have a chance to observe such a psychological state of the Germans very, very not soon - only after Stalingrad and Kursk (Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov. P. 25).
And this happened not only in tank forces. Here are entries from F. Halder's diary. August 1: “There are 0 divisions in the reserve of the High Command of Divisions” (this is on the 41st day of the war!). August 7: “Given the current situation with fuel, it is impossible to carry out major operations” (this is a month and a half later. How did they prepare for war - I want to exclaim after V. Suvorov). August 16: “Ammunition consumption. During the period from August 1, the amount of ammunition was delivered that was provided for by the entire Barbarossa plan (quoted from: Suvorov V. Purification. P. 324). And so on - V. Suvorov alone cites similar quotes from Halder’s diary (and not only from him) in batches.
Further more. An entry from the diary of the same Halder dated August 10: “The exhausted German infantry will not be able to counter these enemy attempts with decisive offensive actions.” August 11: “What we are now doing is the last and at the same time dubious attempt to prevent the transition to trench warfare. The command has extremely limited means... Our last forces have been thrown into battle.” August 22: “...In the afternoon, our disputes and discussions were interrupted by a telephone conversation with Field Marshal von Bock (Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center), who again emphasized that his troops were at the point that they had reached in anticipation of attacking Moscow will not be able to defend itself for a long time.” It's not about the offensive. Not about blitzkrieg. Not to the point of trying to keep what was captured (Suicide. pp. 342–343).
The question arises: how, with all this, did the Germans manage to advance so far into Russia? How were they able, having already been stopped by the end of the summer, and having suffered defeat at Yelnya in early September, to begin the attack on Moscow again on September 30? A sudden blow alone cannot explain this. Perhaps I. Bunich is right, who believes that given the existing balance of forces, by July 1 at the latest, the Germans, despite all the tactical surprise of their attack, should have been stopped and then quickly defeated. Let me remind you once again that the Barbarossa plan as such was based on the premise that all the troops available to Stalin were concentrated at the very border and after the defeat of these troops the campaign could be considered won. The troops of the Second and subsequent strategic echelons, not provided for by German plans, inevitably had to stop and defeat the Germans, who were not ready to fight them. By the way, this is exactly how Zhukov reassured Stalin when he nevertheless expressed fears that the Germans would attack (if you believe I. Bunich): even if the Germans themselves attack us, we, with our superiority in strength, will immediately stop them, surround them and destroy them (Thunderstorm. P. 549). This would have happened, continues I. Bunich, if the Red Army had resisted (Ibid. pp. 556–557).
For decades, Soviet historians attributed the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 to the surprise of the attack and the numerical superiority of German forces. Thus, in the book “The Second World War. A Brief History” states that 5.5 million people, more than 47 thousand guns and mortars, about 4,300 tanks and assault guns, up to 5 thousand aircraft took part in the ensuing battles on the part of the aggressor, and they were opposed by the troops of the Soviet Western military districts, numbering 2.9 million people, 37.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 1,470 new tanks and 1,540 new types of combat aircraft.
It turns out that the Nazis outnumbered the Red Army in personnel by two times, in tanks by almost three times, and in aviation by 3.2 times. However, such calculations are not entirely legitimate. First of all, the troops of the Soviet western military districts are compared with all the forces of Germany and its allies sent to the Eastern Front. The first echelon of Hitler's troops, which directly invaded Soviet territory on June 22, 1941, numbered about 4.3 million people. Thus, in terms of personnel at the time of the invasion, German troops outnumbered the Red Army by approximately 1.5 times. The total number of armed forces of the USSR by June 1941 was 5.4 million people, Germany - 7.3 million people. But Germany had already completed mobilization, and a significant part of its troops were in the west. Regarding tanks and aircraft, the situation was much more favorable for the Soviet troops. If the German invasion army had 4,300 tanks, then the troops of the Soviet western districts had 13,600. In total, the Red Army then had 22.6 thousand tanks. True, among them there were only 1864 combat vehicles of new brands - KV and T-34. Light Soviet tanks T-26 and BT were approximately equal to the German T-I and T-II. The T-28 medium tank was inferior in armor thickness to the German T-III and T-IV, but surpassed them in weapon power. The Germans did not have heavy tanks similar to the KV, and the technical characteristics of the T-34 remained unattainable for them. German General E. Schneider testified: “The T-34 tank caused a sensation. This Russian tank was armed with a 76-mm cannon, the shells of which penetrated the armor of German tanks from 1.5 - 2 thousand m, while German tanks could hit Russians from a distance of no more than 500 m, and even then only if the shells hit the side or rear armor of the T-34 tank." Thus, the Red Army had a threefold superiority in tanks. True, a significant part of Soviet tanks of old designs required repairs (29% - major and 44% - medium). Among the 4,980 aircraft available to the invading army, there were 3,900 German, 307 Finnish and over 600 Romanian. Soviet aviation in the western military districts, including aircraft of older designs, numbered 7,200 aircraft. In total, the Soviet Air Force had 17.7 thousand combat aircraft, including 3,719 new ones. Of course, the old Soviet aircraft were seriously inferior to the German ones in speed and armament, but not so much that they were not taken into account at all. Thus, the SB bomber was superior in speed to the German Yu-87 and He-111, and the I-16 fighter, while inferior to the German Me-109E in speed, surpassed it in flight range and had more powerful weapons. The new Soviet fighters, created in 1939-1940, flew much faster and further than the German ones, and had more powerful weapons. German aviation did not have an attack aircraft similar to the “flying pillbox” Il-2.
As for artillery, according to the latest data, the USSR had 115.9 thousand guns and mortars, including 53 thousand in the troops of the western districts. The Red Army significantly surpassed the enemy in the number of machine guns, but was inferior in the number of machine guns, since before the war, the Soviet military leadership slowed down their release, fearing excessive consumption of ammunition and relying on the high quality of the rifle.
The widespread opinion in our country that the Wehrmacht in the war against the USSR used the economic potential of all the captured countries of Europe also requires adjustment. The Germans did not use captured equipment against the USSR (with the exception of some Czech tanks), but used it only in the West. By the summer of 1941, the Nazis simply did not have time to launch military production in the factories of the conquered countries.
Thus, in general, the Red Army had significant military-technical superiority, especially in tanks. However, it was not possible to use it.
Here it is necessary to emphasize that throughout almost the entire period from the Civil War to the Great Patriotic War, our military development was carried out in accordance with the political attitude of an inevitable armed conflict with world imperialism. Huge amounts of money were spent on the production of weapons and military equipment. For example, in 1940, our military expenditures amounted to 56.8 billion rubles, that is, 32.6% of the total state budget. At the beginning of forty-one - 43.4 percent. It seemed that our army was ready for anything...
How could it happen that by July 10, fascist German troops had advanced in decisive directions from 350 to 600 km? They captured the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, and a significant part of Ukraine. During three weeks of the war, Soviet troops lost 3,500 aircraft, tanks, and more than 20,000 guns and mortars. The enemy managed to completely defeat 28 of our divisions (12 rifle, 10 tank, 4 motorized and 2 cavalry). In addition, more than 72 divisions suffered losses in men and equipment of 50% or more. Our total losses in divisions alone, excluding reinforcement units and combat support during this time, amounted to about 850 thousand people, while enemy losses amounted to about 100 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 1,700 tanks and assault guns, 950 aircraft.
There were 200 warehouses located in enemy-occupied territory, which accounted for 52% of the district warehouses and warehouses of the People's Commissariat of Defense located in the border districts. Since the Red Army was preparing to fight on foreign territory, a large amount of weapons, ammunition and fuel were concentrated near the border. As a result of such a short-sighted policy, in the first week of the war alone, 25 thousand wagons of ammunition (30% of all army reserves), 50% of all fuel and food reserves were either destroyed or captured by the advancing German units.
A catastrophic situation developed for the Soviet Union. There is still no complete analysis of the causes of the tragedy in the first months of the war. Where to look for the causes of defeats?
Unfortunately, first of all in the activities of the highest leaders of the state.
As a result of Stalin's gross miscalculation in assessing the possible timing of an enemy attack, fascist aggression was carried out suddenly, which put the Red Army troops in an exceptionally difficult situation. It is enough to note only the fact that on the first day of the war alone, as a result of an unexpected attack by the German Air Force, Soviet aviation lost more than 1,200 aircraft out of 5,434, of which 800 aircraft were destroyed at airfields.
What is suddenness? After the war, Marshal Zhukov noted that “the main danger was not that the Germans crossed the border, but that their six- and eight-fold superiority in forces in decisive directions was a surprise to us; We were surprised by both the scale of the concentration of their troops and the force of their strike. This is the main thing that predetermined our losses in the first period of the war, and not only and not so much their sudden crossing of the border.”
In a radio speech on July 3, 1941, Stalin argued that “Nazi Germany unexpectedly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact.” He called this one of the main reasons for our defeats at the beginning of the war. At the same time, Stalin did not name himself as its main creator. But it was he, because of his manic confidence that there would be no military clash with Hitler in the summer of 1941, who, until the late evening of June 21, did not give permission to the command to bring the troops to full combat readiness. Thus, it was Stalin who provided the enemy with this surprise both in operational-tactical and strategic and other terms. But it was the “leader of the peoples” who said: “We are not afraid of threats from aggressors and are ready to respond with a double blow to the blow of warmongers trying to violate the inviolability of Soviet borders.” Mehlis: “If the second imperialist war turns its edge against the world’s first socialist state, then we must transfer military operations to enemy territory, fulfill our international responsibilities and increase the number of Soviet republics.” “We have radically improved the entire border defense system” (Voroshilov). And all this was said from the rostrum of the XVIII Party Congress.
At the extraordinary fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (August 28 - September 1), 1939, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov assured the deputies of the Supreme Council that “the non-aggression treaty with Germany is a turning point in the history of Europe and that a strong Germany is a necessary condition for lasting peace in Europe." But, in fact, only Germany took advantage of the benefits of this treaty. With his help, it was not we who won two years of peace, but Hitler was given time to prepare for war with us. Thus, there is a gross tactical miscalculation in concluding the treaty and a short-sighted approach to assessing its possible consequences.
A significant superiority of the aggressor in military terms. The fully mobilized and deployed 5.5 million-strong fascist German invasion army was equipped with the most modern weapons and military equipment, and had two years of experience in conducting military operations. At the same time, the re-equipment of our army has essentially just begun.
Thirdly, errors of an operational-strategic nature. All calculations were based on the fact that the war would begin with border battles and only after that the main enemy forces would be brought in. It was believed that these forces had yet to be fully deployed, when in fact they were already deployed and were in fact ready for invasion. Their offensive actions began the aggression. A serious miscalculation was also made in determining the timing of bringing its troops to combat readiness in the border zone and the mobilization deployment of part of the Armed Forces in the internal military districts. The transfer of five armies from the depths of the country to the western borders began belatedly, and the construction of fortified areas was not completed. The transition in 1940 from a mixed territorial-militia system to a personnel recruitment system was also belated, which negatively affected the quality of the mobilization resources that replenished the army at the beginning of the war. war defeat german attack
One of the most important reasons for our defeats at the beginning of the war was the repression of military personnel. The repressions swept away all the commanders of military districts and their deputies, 80-90% of the commanders of divisions, regiments and their deputies. Many teachers of military academies and schools were killed, and their works were removed from circulation as “enemy.” The total number of those destroyed is about 44 thousand. In history, there has never been a case before when the leadership of any country, faced with the threat of an enemy attack, systematically destroyed its military personnel.
As a result, by the beginning of the war, only 7% of the commanders of our Armed Forces had a higher military education, and 37% did not complete the full course of study even in secondary military educational institutions. Captains became division commanders. By 1941, the ground forces alone lacked 66,900 commanders at headquarters. The shortfall in the air force's flight technical personnel reached 32.3%; in the navy, more than 22% of commanders were missing. Thus the army was greatly weakened. For example, to train a major of the General Staff, it takes at least 10-12 years. And the army commander? 20 years. And almost all of them were destroyed. After all, even Zhukov at the beginning of the war was in no way equal in training to Tukhachevsky or Egorov.
The beginning of the war was also critical because Nazi Germany was superior to the USSR in economic potential. Thus, by the time of the attack on the Soviet Union, it was approximately twice as large as our country in the production of electricity, coal, cast iron, and steel, and four times greater in the production of automobiles. The economy of Nazi Germany had long been transferred to a war footing, and its allies were completing such a transfer. In addition, all the resources of conquered Europe were put at the service of aggression. Although in our country in 1940 almost every third ruble from the state budget went to strengthening defense, there was not enough time. One more thing. The soldiers from the village, who remembered the terrible famine of 1933, the death of relatives or friends, who understood who was the culprit of this tragedy, did not have a feeling of devotion either to Stalin or to his regime.
With his policy, the “leader of the peoples” undermined the feeling of Soviet patriotism among the peasant masses, and not only among them. When the war began, it affected the tenacity of the Red Army soldiers in battle. This was one of the reasons for the catastrophic course of the war in 1941. Marshal G.K. Zhukov subsequently noted that Soviet troops acquired high resistance only in the autumn of 1942. A healthy sense of patriotism in the face of mortal danger looming over the Motherland could not help but take over superior to all political antipathies.
It is also impossible not to take into account the fact that at the beginning of the war, adherence to traditional ideological myths had a negative impact, according to which the popular masses of capitalist countries are deeply hostile to their governments under all circumstances and will immediately go over to their side in the event of war in the USSR. The full might of the German military machine fell upon our country, the invaders walked across Soviet soil, thousands of people died, and the address delivered by V. Molotov spoke of the suffering of German workers, peasants and intelligentsia, which “we understand well.” J.V. Stalin, in a radio speech on July 3, when fascist German troops had already occupied Lithuania, a significant part of Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine, included the German people, “enslaved by Hitler’s bosses,” among our potential “loyal allies” in the war. Even on November 6, 1941, when Hitler’s hordes stood on the outskirts of Moscow, Stalin declared that the German people had experienced a “deep turning point against the continuation of the war, for the elimination of the war,” that “the German rear of the German troops represents a volcano, ready to explode and bury Hitler's adventurers." All this not only did not contribute to the mobilization of all the forces of the people, but also supported the peacetime mood of those far from the front, the belief in the fatal predetermination of victory. Such attitudes also had a detrimental effect on the morale of the troops.
And finally, on the eve of the war, it was believed that combat operations would be conducted exclusively on enemy territory. The military regulations did not provide for defensive battles. As a result, reality severely punished us for everything.
And Hitler decided to make the first move. Knowing about Stalin's plans, he prepared the Barbarossa plan. Knowing that Stalin did not believe in a German attack, he used his confidence and decided on madness. And, hoping for the weakness of the Stalinist army, confirmed in Finland, for the factor of surprise, Hitler takes this step.
He believes: this will give him a lightning victory, for only it can save him.
Stalin still does not believe in Hitler's crazy step. He is sure: he has time. In those pre-war days, Stalin, as always, was involved in everything. A scientific expedition worked in Uzbekistan. The famous anthropologist Mikhail Gerasimov, who reconstructed people's faces from skulls, proposed opening the tomb of Timur. Stalin agreed - he wanted to see the face of the great conqueror...
Timur was buried in Samarkand - in the Gur-Emir mausoleum. Even at the beginning of the expedition, Stalin was informed of a local legend: one must not disturb the peace of the god of war, otherwise expect trouble - on the third day Timur will return with war. This is what the old people said at the bazaar in Samarkand. But Stalin, who saw how the relics of Russian saints were thrown out of tombs, churches were blown up, priests were killed, had only to smile. He himself was an eastern god. What is Timur's bones to him!
On the night of June 20, 1941, the crypt of the Gur-Emir mausoleum was illuminated by spotlights. The newsreel filmed the opening of the grave. A giant marble slab weighing 240 pounds was moved; in the darkness of the sarcophagus stood a black coffin, covered with a decayed golden blanket. Timur died far from Samarkand, and he was brought to the burial place in this coffin. The old man who worked in the mausoleum begged not to open the coffin lid - they laughed at him. Huge nails were knocked out of the lid... Gerasimov solemnly took out Timur’s skull and demonstrated it in front of the camera. The film was taken to Moscow.
It was the third day after the opening of Timur’s tomb...
On a sunny Sunday, June 22, 1941 became perhaps the most tragic in Russian history. At dawn, German troops invaded the territory of the Soviet Union without declaring war. Behind the Nazis lay conquered Europe. All the states that were attacked by Germany collapsed like houses of cards in a matter of weeks. Hitler and his entourage, convinced of the invincibility of the German army, counted on a blitzkrieg in the war against the USSR.
The plan for the war against the Soviet Union began to be developed in the summer of 1940. Hitler told his generals: “Russia must be liquidated. Deadline: spring 1941." In December 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, codenamed Barbarossa. The attack was originally planned for May 15, 1941, but at the end of April, due to operations in the Balkans, it was postponed to June 22. This already rules out any attempt to justify Hitler’s invasion by considerations of a “preventive strike” - regardless of whether Stalin, in turn, planned attacks on Germany.
Back in March 1941, Hitler declared that the war against Russia “should not be waged according to the laws of chivalry.” The Nazi Fuehrer argued: “This is above all a struggle of ideologies and races, and therefore it must be waged with unprecedented, inexorable cruelty. All officers must free themselves from outdated views... The commissars are carriers of an ideology directly opposed to National Socialism, so they must be eliminated. German soldiers guilty of violating international law... will be acquitted. Russia does not participate in the Hague Convention, therefore the provisions of the convention do not apply to it.”
At four o'clock in the morning on June 22, residents of Kyiv, Minsk, Odessa, Sevastopol, Kaunas and many other Soviet cities woke up to the roar of explosions and the wail of sirens. Bombs hit airfields, railway junctions, military camps, headquarters, ammunition depots, fuel and military equipment. Border outposts, fortifications under construction, and military installations along the entire western border of the USSR were subjected to massive artillery fire.
The Soviet armed forces were unable to repel the first onslaught of the enemy - the attack turned out to be sudden. The troops of the border districts were scattered over a vast territory, located far from the border: in the Western Special Military District - up to 100-300 km, in Kiev - up to 400-600. Each first-line division had to defend a front 25-50 km wide, while military science believed that the division's defense line should not exceed 8-12 km. Border defense plans were not even communicated to army headquarters, let alone corps and divisions.
Only late at night on June 21, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff, Army General G.K. Zhukov, transmitted directives to the western military districts that warned of the possibility of a German attack on June 22-23. The directive was completely unrealistic: it was necessary to disperse and camouflage aircraft in a few hours, while for the most part the planes were on the airfield without ammunition and even without fuel. Moreover, this last pre-war directive prescribed: “An attack may begin with provocative actions. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.” It is not surprising that in the first hours of the war, the advanced units of the Red Army, attacked by German troops, only asked the command what to do.
One of the important problems of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, which is directly related to the discussion about the causes of the defeats of the Red Army, is the question of the balance of forces of the parties by June 22, 1941. For a long time, the development of this issue in domestic historiography was carried out in line with the official policy formulated back in 1941 in the speeches of I.V. Stalin, who in a speech on July 3 said that Germany sent 170 divisions against the USSR, and in a speech on November 6 - about “our lack of tanks and partly aviation.” It is quite obvious that such a version easily and simply explained the reasons for the “temporary failures” of the Soviet troops, so it was actively used in the literature, which emphasized the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the enemy’s weapons, adjusting all statistical data to this thesis.
True, in the first decade after 1945, Soviet historiography tried to generally pass over in silence the question of specific indicators of the number of troops of the parties, limiting itself to the ritual phrase about the superiority of the enemy in forces. Thus, in the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia it was stated that “in total, fascist Germany concentrated more than 200 divisions on the western borders of the USSR, of which 170 were German (including 19 tank and 14 motorized), not counting auxiliary units”. It was further emphasized that “The multimillion-strong army of the Nazis, equipped with a large amount of modern military equipment, at the time of the surprise attack on the Soviet Union, had a numerical superiority of mobilized and battle-ready troops, had a quantitative superiority in tanks, aircraft, as well as mortars and machine guns”. As a result “On the very first day of the war, the small Soviet covering troops were struck by the Nazi hordes, who had 2 years of combat experience in modern warfare in the West and numerical superiority, especially in tanks and aircraft.”
Gradually, specific figures began to appear in Soviet historiography characterizing the state of the troops of the parties. Analysis of domestic literature allows us to trace how ideas on this issue have changed.
Probably, we should start considering this problem with the German armed forces, since there is widespread confidence that there are accurate digital data compiled with German pedantry, which have long been introduced into scientific circulation. Unfortunately, the information given in the domestic historical literature does not correspond to this opinion. For the first time in Soviet historiography, some figures on the total number of German armed forces appeared in “Essays on the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.” This work indicated that by the summer of 1941, the Wehrmacht had 215 divisions and 6,500 aircraft, of which 170 divisions were allocated to attack the USSR, as well as 38 divisions of Germany’s allies, supported by almost 5 thousand aircraft. Three years later, in the military-historical essay “The Second World War 1939–1945.” with reference to data published in German literature, it was indicated that by mid-1941 the Wehrmacht had 214 divisions and 7 brigades, and the total number of German armed forces was 7234 thousand people. In total, 152 divisions and 2 brigades of the Wehrmacht, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of its allies, which were supported by almost 4,900 aircraft, were allocated to attack the Soviet Union.
The first military-historical study in Soviet historiography, in which the issues of the number of troops of the parties were considered much more specifically and systematically, was the “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945,” published by the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army under the heading “top secret.” " Estimating the strength of the Wehrmacht by the summer of 1941, the authors of this study do not cite specific sources, limiting themselves to indicating that “data on the strength of the armed forces was derived by calculation based on German captured documents.” As a result, the estimates given in the book, as far as we know, are the maximum (Table 1).
Table 1
Options for estimating the total strength of the Wehrmacht
However, in volume 1 published in the early 1960s. 6-volume “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945.” Somewhat different information was already provided about the total strength of the German armed forces - probably adjusted according to data published in German literature (see Table 1). In 1965, a brief history of the war was published, which, without citing sources, provided new information about the total strength of the Wehrmacht, which was clearly borrowed from the above-mentioned “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War” (see table 1). In 1971, this information was published in the third edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. New clarifications of information about the total strength of the Wehrmacht appeared in volumes 3 and 4 of a 12-volume fundamental study on the history of the Second World War (see table 1). The figures published in this work actually became canonical and were widely used in various works until the second half of the 1980s.
However, in the 1990s, these data were revised again. New figures first appeared in 1994 in volume 2 of the Military Encyclopedia (see Table 1). The same information is given in the latest general work on the history of the war by Russian military historians (see table 1), as well as in volume 4 of the Great Russian Encyclopedia and the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. Thus, on the question of the total strength of the Wehrmacht by the summer of 1941, domestic historiography uses information gleaned from German literature, but does not directly use authentic documents of the former enemy.
A similar process took place on the issue of assessing the size of the group allocated by Germany and its allies to attack the USSR. The figures published in the “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War” were based either on calculated data or on materials published in German literature (see table 2). True, these figures in Volume 1 of the 6-volume “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union” were slightly changed (see Table 2). At the same time, on the issue of the number of tanks in the German troops deployed for Operation Barbarossa, various information was given not only in volumes 1 and 2 of this publication, but also in different editions of volume 2. Thus, initially the number of German tanks was estimated at 3,500 vehicles, but then was increased to 3,700 vehicles. True, in neither case were any references to sources made. The first edition of the brief history of the war, without references to sources, provided new information about the group allocated for the war with the USSR (see table 2). Some more updated figures on the size of the group of troops of Germany and its allies by June 22, 1941 were given in the anniversary publication on the history of the Soviet armed forces (see table 2). In 1970, the same data, indicating that the 3,712 German tanks included 2,786 medium and 926 light, were published in volume 5 of the History of the CPSU. However, a short popular science essay on the history of the war, published in the same year, cited a version of the corresponding figures from a short history of 1965. True, the next year, in the third edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, figures from the History of the CPSU were given, which were also used in the fundamental multi-volume History of the USSR.
Somewhat more precise figures on the size of the enemy group allocated for the attack on the Soviet Union were given in volumes 3 and 4 of the 12-volume fundamental work on the history of the Second World War (see Table 2). In later publications up to the second half of the 1980s, this information was used.
table 2
Options for estimating the number of troops deployed to attack the USSR
Some clarification of the corresponding figures occurred in the 1990s based on the use of materials that appeared in German historiography. This information was first used in 1991 in an article by M.I. Meltyukhov, who also pointed out that not all the troops of Germany and its allies were deployed on the border with the USSR by June 22, and therefore information about the total number of these troops distorts the real balance of forces at the beginning of the war. The first official publication, in which somewhat updated data on enemy troops by June 22, 1941 appeared, was volume 2 of the Military Encyclopedia (see Table 2). More detailed figures on this issue are given in Book 1 of military-historical essays on the Great Patriotic War (see Table 2). In addition, it should be noted that it was in this work that it was clearly stated that by June 22, 1941, there were 153 divisions and 19 brigades on the border of the Soviet Union (of which 125 German divisions and 2 brigades), about 4.4 million people, about 39 thousand guns and mortars, over 4 thousand tanks and about 4.4 thousand combat aircraft. Subsequently, digital data from these works was used in the study “World Wars of the 20th Century”, in the “Great Russian Encyclopedia” and in other works. True, it should be noted that in a recent statistical study, the size of the enemy group, without any explanation or reference to the source, was again determined at 5.5 million people, 181 divisions and 18 brigades, 47,260 guns and mortars, 4,260 tanks and assault guns and 4,980 aircraft
Thus, it is quite obvious that over time, the information given in Russian historiography about the number of troops of Germany and its allies is increasingly clearly borrowed from German literature, and not at all from the reporting documents of the Wehrmacht. Despite the presence of a fairly large number of studies that examined the issue of the composition and strength of the Wehrmacht group and its allies by June 22, 1941, domestic historiography provides virtually no information about the number of enemy troops in strategic directions. For the first time, not only in Soviet, but also in foreign historiography, such calculated data on the distribution of German troops among army groups and OKH reserve forces were presented in the secret “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War” (see Table 3). However, in this case, the source of information was not indicated at all. Moreover, the calculation of personnel was given only based on the regular number of divisions and brigades, which reduced the total number of troops (including 24 OKH reserve divisions and troops of Finland and Romania) to 2993 thousand people. Thus, the team of authors of this work did not have specific data at their disposal that would have been taken directly from the documents of the former enemy. However, it should be noted that this information remained inaccessible to the vast majority of researchers. The only thing that was initially used in the open press was the numbers on the number of enemy air force groups from Table 3.
Table 3
Thus, oddly enough, domestic historiography does not directly use Wehrmacht documents that would detail the number of troops at the start of Operation Barbarossa.
Now let's turn to German historiography. It seems that most readers are confident that German authors have covered all these issues in detail. However, this is not the case at all. Until now, German historiography does not have a single detailed study of the size and distribution of the Wehrmacht in the theaters of military operations during the Second World War. The questions of the combat strength of the German armed forces and general information about their strength during the war are examined in most detail. These data allow us to obtain a fairly accurate idea of the composition and strength of the German armed forces by the summer of 1941. However, there is no such clarity on the issue of the number of troops allocated for Operation Barbarossa. There is not even a simple breakdown of the number of troops by army group by June 22, 1941. At the same time, there are several options for data on the total number of this group.
For the first time, data on the deployment of a 3.3 million group of German ground forces for the war against the Soviet Union were published in 1956 in the now classic work of B. Müller-Hillebrand, and then repeatedly repeated in German literature. However, German historiography provided other information on this issue. Thus, in the work published in 1959 by H.-A. Jacobsen, the number of German ground forces allocated for the attack on the USSR was determined as 153 divisions, 3050 thousand people, 7184 guns, 3580 tanks and 600 thousand vehicles. The modern fundamental publication “The German Reich and the Second World War” provides similar information taken from the report of the artillery inspector and quartermaster general dated June 20, 1941, which reported the presence of 3,050 thousand people and 625 thousand horses in the ground forces in the East , 600 thousand cars and armored vehicles, 3350 tanks (without assault and self-propelled guns) and 7146 guns. At the same time, the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, indicates that the number of troops in the East is 2.5 million people. Probably, in this case we are talking about troops that directly fought on Soviet territory, without taking into account OKH reserves.
Traditionally, in German historiography, a significant part of the artillery of the troops in the East is not taken into account at all. However, the information given in the book by B. Müller-Hillebrand about the organization and main types of weapons in divisions as of May 15, 1941 allows us to obtain indicative information on this issue. Likewise, in German literature there is no consensus on the number of tanks and assault guns that were in service with the troops deployed to attack the USSR (see Table 4). Comparing the information given in the table with the above-mentioned report of the Quartermaster General, we can conclude that, apparently, the figures given in the fundamental work “The German Reich and the Second World War” are closest to reality. Moreover, the total number of tanks indicated in it corresponds well with the data on the number of tanks in tank divisions from the document of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces published by B. Müller-Hillebrand. The information given by T. Jentz without indicating the source often diverges from already known data available in German historiography. In addition, foreign historiography contains slightly different information on the number of Wehrmacht tank divisions by June 22.
Table 4
Options for the number of tanks in the troops allocated for an attack on the USSR
Similar disagreements exist regarding the size of the Luftwaffe allocated for Operation Barbarossa. Thus, in the first edition of his work, H.-A. Jacobsen gave a figure of 2000 aircraft, in later editions this number increased first to 2150 and then to 2740 aircraft. According to data published in 1981 by GDR researcher O. Gröler, the German Air Force, taking into account the reserve, allocated 3519 aircraft for the operation, and Germany's allies deployed 1019 aircraft (including Finland - 307, Romania - 423, Slovakia - 51, Hungary - 100 , Italy - 83 and Croatia - 55). Thus, the total strength of the German and its allied air forces by June 22 was 4,538 aircraft. However, in 1988, the same author cited other data, according to which the Luftwaffe allocated 3604 aircraft, and their allies - 1177 aircraft (of which 307 Finnish, 560 Romanian, 100 Hungarian, 100 Italian, 60 Croatian and 50 Slovakian). Accordingly, the total number of aircraft increased to 4,781. Apparently, the most complete data on the size of the Luftwaffe aircraft fleet is given in volume 4 of the study “The German Reich and the Second World War”, according to which on June 21, 1941, there were 3904 aircraft in the Air Force allocated for actions against the USSR. Unfortunately, no documentary materials have yet been published on the issue of distribution of Luftwaffe personnel.
Thus, in German historiography there is also no comprehensive information that interests us about the number of Wehrmacht troops allocated for the war with the Soviet Union. Therefore, when determining the number of personnel and artillery of the Wehrmacht, it is necessary to use calculated data. Information about the staffing strength of divisions is usually used, but the question of how much the staffing and payroll numbers coincided has never been discussed in historiography. In addition, it is quite obvious that the regular number of divisions allocated for Operation Barbarossa is clearly less than the total number of ground forces allocated for the war in the East. Based on the differences in these data, it was necessary to introduce a constant coefficient of 6690 people for each division in the army groups deployed between the Baltic and Black Seas. Thus, it is possible to more fully assess the number of personnel of specific ground forces groups.
Naturally, these data cannot be considered final and, most likely, are somewhat overestimated. In the same way, the data on the number of Air Force personnel, obtained on the basis of the share of flying units, air defense units, communications units, etc. deployed for Operation Barbarossa, are also calculated. As already indicated, the estimate of the number of artillery was also calculated based on indirect data, so the obtained the numbers may also be somewhat inflated.
Using information and calculation materials published in German historiography, one can obtain the following data on the number of enemy troops. As of June 15, 1941, 7,329 thousand people served in the Wehrmacht, of which 3,960 thousand were in the active army, 1,240 thousand in the reserve army, 1,545 thousand in the Air Force, 160 thousand in the SS troops, 404 thousand - in the Navy, about 20 thousand - in foreign formations. In addition, up to 900 thousand people were civilian personnel of the Wehrmacht and various paramilitary forces. The ground forces had 208 divisions (152 infantry, 5 light infantry, 6 mountain infantry, 1 cavalry, 10 motorized, 20 tank, 9 security, 1 police, as well as 3 divisions and 1 SS combat group), Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", 1 motorized and 2 tank brigades, 2 infantry regiments, 11 divisions and 5 batteries of assault guns, 6 tank battalions, 14 motorized anti-tank divisions, 38 cannon, 12 mixed, 39 howitzer, 22 mortar divisions, 20 batteries of railway artillery, 7 divisions and 5 regiments of six-barreled chemical mortars, 10 mixed anti-aircraft divisions, 9 anti-aircraft battalions, 10 anti-aircraft divisions, 29 anti-aircraft batteries, 14 armored trains, as well as other support and logistics units. As of June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 88,251 guns and mortars, 6,292 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns, and 6,852 aircraft in service. Taking advantage of the absence of a land front in Europe, Germany was able to deploy the most combat-ready part of its armed forces on the border with the USSR.
The basis of Germany’s “Eastern Army” was, naturally, the ground forces, which contributed 3,300,000 people. For Operation Barbarossa, of the four available army group headquarters, three were deployed (North, Center and South), 8 (61.5%) of the 13 field army headquarters, which led the actions of 34 army corps headquarters (73, 9%) out of 46 available in the Wehrmacht. In total, 101 infantry, 4 light infantry, 4 mountain infantry, 10 motorized, 19 tank, 1 cavalry, 1 police, 9 security divisions, 3 divisions, 1 SS combat group, Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", as well as 1 motorized brigade, 1 motorized infantry regiment and combined SS formation - in total over 155 calculated divisions, which accounted for 73.5% of their total number. Most of the troops had combat experience gained in previous military campaigns. Thus, out of 155 divisions in military operations in Europe in 1939–1941. 127 participated, and the remaining 28 were partially staffed by personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht.
Here, in the East, 92.8% of the units of the High Command Reserve (RGK) were deployed, including all divisions and batteries of assault guns, 3 of 4 battalions of flamethrower tanks, 11 of 14 armored trains, 92.1% of cannon, mixed, mortar, howitzer divisions, railway batteries, tethered balloon batteries, Karl installations, AIR divisions, chemical mortar divisions and regiments, motorized reconnaissance, machine gun, anti-aircraft battalions, anti-aircraft batteries, anti-tank fighter and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the RGK, and also 94.2% of sapper, bridge-building, construction, road-building, scooter battalions, decontamination and road decontamination detachments. Of these RGC units, 23% were deployed in Army Group North, 42.2% in Army Group Center, 31% in Army Group South, 3% in German forces operating in Finland, and 0 .8% was in the OKH reserve. The main striking force of the troops in the East were 11 motorized corps out of 12 available in the Wehrmacht (91.7%). 10 of them were united into four tank groups by June 22, 1941, the composition of which is indicated in Table 5. In addition, in the 11 divisions and 5 batteries of assault guns of the RGK, there were 228 combat vehicles, and 30 assault guns were in service with the SS divisions " Reich" and "Totenkopf", Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", 900th motorized brigade and motorized regiment "Grossdeutschland" (258 assault guns in total). For operations in Finland, two tank battalions were allocated (40th and 211th), which consisted of 106 tanks, and three battalions of flamethrower tanks (100th, 101st and 300th) had up to 117 combat vehicles . In addition, the 701st, 702nd, 705th and 706th companies of self-propelled 150-mm guns assigned to the 9th, 1st, 7th and 10th tank divisions, respectively, had 24 combat vehicles, and in service with the 521st, 529th, 559th, 561st, 611th, 616th, 643rd and 670th anti-tank fighter divisions of the RGK and anti-tank companies of the SS Viking division and the SS Leibstandarte The Adolf Hitler carried 156 self-propelled 47 mm anti-tank guns. Thus, by June 22, 1941, the Eastern Army included up to 4058 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns, and the OKH reserve in Germany included 2 tank divisions (about 350 tanks).
Table 5
By June 22, 1941, on the border with the USSR, out of 155 divisions in three army groups and Army Norway, there were 127 divisions, 2 brigades and 1 regiment (see table 6). These troops numbered 2,812,400 men, 37,099 guns and mortars, and 4,058 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns.
* SS Combat Group Nord.
** Including the 900th motorized brigade.
*** The consolidated SS formation, temporarily subordinate to the army group, was taken into account, consisting of 4 motorized infantry and 2 cavalry regiments.**** Including the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler".
The German Air Force deployed 60.8% of flying units, 16.9% of air defense troops and over 48% of signal troops and other units to support Operation Barbarossa. Each army group received one air fleet. Army Group North was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, consisting of the 1st Air Corps, the Baltic Air Command and the Koenigsberg Air District. The 2nd Air Fleet, consisting of the 8th and 2nd Air Corps, the 1st Anti-Aircraft Corps and the Posen Air District, supported Army Group Center. To support Army Group South, the 4th Air Fleet was allocated, consisting of the 5th and 4th Air Corps, the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Corps, two air districts - Breslau and Vienna - and the Air Force mission in Romania. The actions of the Army "Norway" were supported by part of the forces of the 5th Air Fleet, subordinate to the "Inspector General of the Northern Norwegian Air Force" and the Kirkenes Air Command. In addition, 51 aircraft were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command (OKL). The composition of the air fleets is shown in Table 7.
Table 7
In total, the German command allocated 4,050,000 people for the attack on the Soviet Union (3,300,000 in the ground forces and SS troops, 650,000 in the Air Force and about 100,000 in the Navy). The "Eastern Army" consisted of 155 crew divisions, 43,812 guns and mortars, 4,408 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 3,909 aircraft. However, of these forces, on June 22, 1941, 128 divisions were deployed on the Eastern Front, and the German group consisted of 3,562,400 people, 37,099 guns and mortars, 4,058 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 3,909 aircraft.
Together with Germany, its allies were preparing for war against the Soviet Union: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Italy, which allocated the following forces to wage the war (see Table 8). In addition, Croatia contributed 56 aircraft and up to 1.6 thousand people. By June 22, 1941, there were no Slovak and Italian troops on the border, which arrived later. Consequently, the German Allied forces deployed there included 767,100 men, 37 crew divisions, 5,502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks and 886 aircraft.
Table 8
In total, by June 22, 1941, the forces of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front numbered 4,329,500 people, 166 crew divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4,364 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 4,795 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the main command The Air Force and together with 8.5 thousand Air Force personnel are not taken into account in further calculations).
* * *
The question of the size of the Soviet armed forces by the summer of 1941 was resolved in an equally complex way in Russian historiography. Naturally, all this data remained secret for a long time and was not published. Thus, neither in volume 7 of the second edition of the “Great Soviet Encyclopedia”, nor in “Essays on the History of the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945”, nor in the military-historical essay “World War II 1939–1945”, not even in 6 -volume “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945.” the size of the Red Army was not indicated at all. The latest work published either percentage data from unknown figures, or individual information that did not make it possible to imagine the real size of the Soviet armed forces. For example, it was indicated that in the western border districts there were 1,475 KV and T-34 tanks. " True, the troops had a significant number of older types of tanks (BT-5, BT-7, T-26, etc.), which were planned to be removed from service over time. But many of these tanks were faulty» .
As far as one can judge, for the first time specific data on the size of the Red Army were published in the aforementioned secret “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War.” These figures clearly did not fit into the established version of the enemy’s complete superiority (see tables 9 and 12). Moreover, this work was the first to provide information on the number of troops in all western border districts (see Table 10), which made it possible to give a fairly detailed picture of the balance of forces not only in general (see Table 11), but also in strategic directions. However, it should be taken into account that the information on the number of personnel given in Table 10 refers only to the ground forces, excluding the personnel of the Air Force, Air Defense and Navy.
Table 9
Options for estimating the size of the Soviet armed forces
Table 10
Table 11
It is quite obvious that the open publication of such figures would clearly contradict the version of overwhelming enemy superiority, therefore, works accessible to the general reader provided slightly different information, which was nevertheless based on data from the “Strategic Essay.” In the anniversary work on the history of the Soviet armed forces, the corresponding digital data on the size of the Soviet group in the western border districts, corrected for the general reader, were published for the first time (see Table 12). At the same time, it was indicated that “in addition, the border districts had a significant number of light tanks of outdated designs with limited engine life.” On the question of the total number of Soviet armed forces, only the total number of divisions (303), as well as guns and mortars (91,493), was indicated, clearly borrowed from the “Strategic Outline.”
In the same 1968, the work of Marshal M.V. Zakharov “On the Eve of the Great Trials” was published under the heading “secret”, which provided a number of more objective data on the size of the Soviet armed forces, which numbered 5,421,122 people at the beginning of the war and were in service according to data as of June 1, 1941, 13,088 serviceable tanks (excluding T-37, T-38, T-40 and flamethrower tanks). In addition, the appendices to the work provided information from the mobilization plan on the availability of military equipment as of January 1, 1941. Accordingly, by that time the Red Army had 95,039 guns and mortars, 22,531 tanks and 26,263 aircraft. It is clear that all this information was also not used in the open press. The book itself became available to a wide range of researchers only in 2005.
Meanwhile, information about the size of the group of Soviet troops in the western border districts from the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR” was given in a short popular science essay on the history of the Great Patriotic War published two years later, in the second edition of a brief history of the war, as well as in the third edition of the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia". At the same time, in the fundamental "History of the CPSU" data were published that by June 22, 1941, the Soviet troops on the western border, which were largely in a state of reorganization and formation, numbered 170 divisions, 2.9 million people, 18.2% of new tanks and 21.3% of new aircraft. The same information was published three years later in the multi-volume History of the USSR. It should be noted that based on these data, using previously published figures on the number of KV and T-34 tanks (1475) and new aircraft (1540) in the western border districts, a simple arithmetic operation made it possible to establish that these troops had at least 8104 tanks and at least 7230 aircraft. However, such assessments did not have a chance to appear in open Soviet literature.
Table 12
Options for estimating the number of troops in the western border districts
* - without 50 mm mortars.
** - heavy and medium tanks. *** - tanks and aircraft of new designs.
In 1972, the Academy of the General Staff published a scanty edition of 20 copies of S. P. Ivanov’s brochure “Causes of temporary failures of the Soviet Army in the summer of 1941 (Historical background).” In it, the author tried to combine already published figures and his own calculations, obtaining the following balance of forces (see table 13). However, such research was apparently considered inappropriate, and previously published figures were cited in an open work published in 1974, edited by S.P. Ivanov.
Table 13
At the same time, it should be noted that during the preparation of the 4th volume of “History of the Second World War 1939–1945.” the authors tried to use some of the figures published in the Strategic Essay, but the Main Editorial Board forbade this. In particular, the following remark was made at the appropriate place in the manuscript: “There is no qualitative description of the parties’ military equipment. The figures for the Armed Forces of the USSR, especially for tanks - 18,600, aircraft - 15,990, are too high. Without a qualitative description, the reader may get a false impression of the strength of the parties on the eve of the war. It is known that in the Soviet Army the vast majority of tanks and aircraft were outdated systems.”. As a result, in a 12-volume fundamental work on the history of the Second World War, somewhat updated information was published on the total strength of the Red Army and the Soviet group on the western borders of the USSR (see tables 9 and 12). At the same time, the established formula continued to be used that, in addition to the specified number of tanks and aircraft of new types, the troops also had “a significant number of light tanks and combat aircraft of outdated designs.” In fact, these data became canonical and were widely used in Russian historiography in the second half of the 1970s-1980s. Only in the late 1980s. In Soviet historiography, during the ongoing discussion about the problems of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, new digital data gradually began to appear in the open press, characterizing the state of the Soviet armed forces by the summer of 1941. In 1987, in an article by A.G. Khorkov, the now traditional phrase about “a significant number of obsolete tanks” was for the first time replaced by an indication that there were “more than 20 thousand tanks of obsolete designs, many of which needed major and medium repairs.” In 1988–1989 on the pages of the Military Historical Journal and in history
Table 14
Leningrad Military District, new information was published on the number of western border districts (see Table 14), and as a result it became obvious that the usual figures were only a part (sometimes very small) of the general data for the Red Army.
In 1992, a new work was published, devoted mainly to the problems of military operations on the Soviet-German front in 1941. Although this work was published under the heading “for official use,” it almost immediately became available to a wide range of researchers. It widely used materials from the “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War” and new information extracted from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (see tables 9 and 12). It also provided new data on the number of troops in the western border military districts (see Table 15). In Volume 2 of the Military Encyclopedia, published in 1994, new digital data were published on the total number of Soviet armed forces and the grouping of troops on the western borders (see tables 9 and 12). All these digital data were somewhat clarified in the military-historical essays of the Great Patriotic War (see tables 9 and 12).
Table 15
Subsequently, the relevant information from these publications was used in the multi-volume work “World Wars of the 20th Century” and “The Great Russian Encyclopedia” (see Table 9).
Meanwhile, in the 1990s, the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation developed a statistical study of the size of the Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War, which is apparently the most comprehensive to date. Given that the relevant archival documents containing this information are still inaccessible to most researchers, this work is a unique compilation of data. Unfortunately, it was published in a meager circulation and is inaccessible to a wide range of researchers, however, the data presented in this study were used in the preparation of military-historical essays on the history of the war and were partially published in a number of reference books. True, it should be taken into account that the information on the total strength of the active army as of June 22, 1941 does not take into account almost 48% of the number of troops in the Odessa Military District - which, naturally, underestimates the total strength of the Soviet group in the western border districts.
However, the literature continues to use other data on the number of troops in the western border military districts. For example, in 2001, a book was published whose authors, without any explanation, returned to the figures from The History of the Second World War. At the same time, there are publications that do not provide specific figures on the size of the Red Army group on the western border, noting only that it was inferior to the enemy in the number of personnel, but superior in the quantity of military equipment, which was inferior in quality to the enemy’s equipment. Nevertheless, the digital data available in Russian historiography allows us to obtain a fairly detailed idea of the size of the Soviet armed forces and the balance of forces of the parties at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The armed forces of the Soviet Union continued to grow in the conditions of the outbreak of war in Europe and by the summer of 1941 they were the largest army in the world. By the beginning of the war, 5,774,211 people served in the Soviet armed forces, of which 4,605,321 were in the ground forces, 475,656 in the Air Force, 353,752 in the Navy, 167,582 in the border troops and 171,900 in the internal troops of the NKVD. The ground forces included directorates of 4 fronts, 27 army directorates, 62 rifle, 4 cavalry, 29 mechanized, 5 airborne corps, 303 divisions (198 rifle, 13 cavalry, 61 tank and 31 motorized), 16 airborne, 1 motorized armored, 5 rifle and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 94 corps, 14 cannon, 29 howitzer, 32 high-power howitzer artillery regiments of the RGK, 12 separate special-power artillery divisions, 45 separate anti-aircraft artillery artillery divisions, 8 separate mortar battalions, 3 air defense corps, 9 air defense brigades, 40 air defense brigade areas, 29 motorcycle regiments, 1 separate tank battalion, 8 armored train divisions, as well as other support and logistics units. The troops were armed with 117,581 guns and mortars, 25,786 tanks and 24,488 aircraft. Of these troops, 174 contingent divisions were stationed in the five western border districts, constituting 56.1% of the ground forces (see Table 16).
Table 16
Grouping of Soviet troops in the western border districts
* The airborne corps is equivalent to 0.75 rifle division.
The NKVD troops consisted of 14 divisions, 18 brigades and 21 separate regiments for various purposes, of which 7 divisions, 2 brigades and 11 operational regiments of internal troops were located in the western districts, on the basis of which the formation of the 21st began in the LVO, PribOVO and KOVO before the war , 22nd and 23rd motorized rifle divisions of the NKVD. The border troops consisted of 18 districts, 94 border detachments, 8 separate detachments of border courts and other units. By the summer of 1941, there were 8 districts, 49 border detachments, 7 separate detachments of border courts and other units on the western border of the USSR. The grouping of Soviet troops in the western border districts numbered 3,061,160 people (2,691,674 in the Red Army, 215,878 in the Navy and 153,608 in the NKVD troops), 57,041 guns and mortars, 13,924 tanks (of which 11,135 were operational) and 8,974 aircraft (of which 7593 are operational). In addition, the aviation of the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea fleets and the Pinsk military flotilla had 1,769 aircraft (of which 1,506 were serviceable). Unfortunately, the technical equipment of the NKVD troops is still unknown. In addition, in May 1941, the concentration of 71 divisions from internal military districts and the Far East began in the Western theater of operations. Of these troops, by June 22, 16 divisions (10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized), which numbered 201,691 people, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tanks, arrived in the western districts.
Table 17
The grouping of Soviet troops in the Western theater of operations was quite powerful. The general balance of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941 is presented in Table 17, according to which the enemy surpassed the Red Army only in the number of personnel, because its troops were mobilized.
Although the above data gives a general idea of the strength of the opposing factions, it should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht completed its strategic concentration and deployment in the theater of operations, while in the Red Army this process was in full swing. As A.V. Shubin figuratively described this situation, “a dense body was moving from West to East at high speed. A more massive, but looser block was slowly advancing from the East, the mass of which was increasing, but not at a fast enough pace.” Therefore, it is necessary to consider the balance of forces at two more levels. Firstly, this is the balance of forces of the parties in various strategic directions on a district (front) - army group scale, and secondly, on individual operational directions in the border zone on an army - army scale. In this case, in the first case, only ground forces and air forces are taken into account, and for the Soviet side, border troops, artillery and naval aviation are taken into account, but without information on the personnel of the fleet and internal troops of the NKVD. In the second case, only ground forces are taken into account for both sides.
Let's start with North-Western direction, where Army Group North and the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front) opposed each other (see Table 18). The Wehrmacht had a fairly significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery, but was inferior in tanks and aircraft. However, it should be taken into account that only 8 Soviet divisions were located directly in the 50-km border strip, and another 10 were located 50-100 km from the border. In mid-June, the advance of Soviet troops to the border began, but by June 22 this process could not be completed. The 23rd, 48th, and 126th rifle divisions advanced to the border, the 11th rifle division arrived from the LVO to the Siauliai region, and the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps were withdrawn to concentration areas according to a cover plan. As a result, in the direction main attack Army Group North, the enemy managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces for him (see Table 19). On West direction Army Group Center and troops of the Western Special Military District (Western Front) with part of the forces of the 11th Army of the PribOVO opposed each other. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire front. 40% of all German divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea were concentrated here (including 50% motorized and 52.9% tank).
Table 18
Balance of power in the Baltics
Table 19
The army group was supported by the largest air fleet, the Luftwaffe. In the offensive zone of Army Group Center in the immediate vicinity of the border there were only 15 Soviet divisions, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. The remaining troops began concentrating towards the border in mid-June, and by June 22, troops of the 2nd (100th, 161st rifle divisions), 47th (55th, 121st, 143rd rifle divisions) were on the move ), 44th (64th, 108th rifle divisions) and 21st (17th, 37th, 50th rifle divisions) rifle corps. In addition, troops of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District were concentrated on the territory of the district in the Polotsk region, from which, by June 22, 1941, 3 rifle divisions arrived in place, and the 21st Mechanized Corps from the Moscow Military District - with a total number of 72,016 people, 1,241 guns and mortar and 692 tanks. As a result, the ZAPOVO troops maintained at peacetime levels were inferior to the enemy only in personnel, but superior to him in tanks, aircraft, and slightly in artillery (see Table 20). However, unlike the troops of Army Group Center, they did not complete their concentration, which made it possible to defeat them piecemeal. Army Group Center was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the troops of the Western District located in the Bialystok ledge, with a blow from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, so the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. The main blow was struck from the south (from Brest). The 3rd Wehrmacht Tank Group was deployed on the northern flank (Suwalki), which was opposed by units of the 11th Army of the PribOVO (see Table 21). Troops of the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Tank Group were deployed in the zone of the Soviet 4th Army. In this sector, the enemy was also able to achieve significant superiority (see Table 22).
Table 20 Balance of forces in Belarus
Table 21
Table 22
On South-Western direction Army Group South, which united German, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, was opposed by parts of the Kyiv Special and Odessa Military Districts (Southwestern and Southern Fronts). The Soviet group in the South-Western direction was the strongest on the entire front, since, according to the pre-war operational plan, it was it that was supposed to deliver the main blow to the enemy. However, even here the Soviet troops did not complete their concentration and deployment. Thus, in KOVO there were only 16 divisions in the immediate vicinity of the border, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. From mid-June, troops of the 31st (193rd, 195th, 200th rifle divisions), 36th (140th, 146th, 228th rifle divisions), 37th ( 80th, 139th, 141st rifle divisions), 49th (190th, 109th, 198th rifle divisions) and 55th (130th, 169th, 189th rifle divisions) divisions) rifle corps. In the OdVO there were 9 divisions in the 50-km border strip, and 6 were located in the 50-100-km strip. In addition, troops of the 16th and 19th armies arrived on the territory of the districts, of which by June 22, 10 divisions were concentrated (7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized), with a total number of 129,675 people, 1,505 guns and mortars and 1,071 tanks . Even without being at wartime strength, Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy group (see Table 23), but they did not complete concentration and deployment.
On June 22, 1941, A. Hitler’s personal adjutant, Colonel N. von Below, recalled that in the last days before the attack on the Soviet Union, “the Fuhrer became increasingly nervous and restless. He talked a lot, walked back and forth and seemed urgently waiting for something. Only at night
From the book Myths of the Great Patriotic War - 1-2 [military historical collection] author Isaev Alexey ValerievichEvents of June 24, 1941 The fact that many crews of the 2nd and 40th regiments managed to get out of difficult situations with honor the day before strengthened the confidence of the flight personnel in their abilities. Photographs confirmed the high results of the first raids. Therefore, the command’s decision is understandable
From the book 1941. A completely different war [collection] author Team of authorsMikhail Meltyukhov. In August 1944 The myth of the deliberate stop of the Red Army near Warsaw The history of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 has become one of many subjects in the historiography of the Second World War, around which there are fierce political discussions. Already in progress
From the book Forgotten Heroes of War author Smyslov Oleg SergeevichMikhail Meltyukhov. Germany in Soviet military planning in 1940–1941 In the specific military preparations of the USSR, a key place was occupied by the activities of the General Staff on military planning, which, unfortunately, still contains a significant number of “whites”
From the book Luftwaffe Fighters in the Skies of the USSR. Operation Barbarossa June–December 1941 author Ivanov S.V.JUNE 22, 1941 Pyotr Mikhailovich Gavrilov found himself within the walls of the Brest Fortress on that fateful day by accident. We can say that fate itself decreed this. How could it be otherwise? “On Saturday evening, June 21,” the commander of the 44th regiment recalls, “I came to visit my sick wife and son.
From the book Great Heroes of the Great War [Chronicle of a People's Feat, 1941–1942] author Suldin Andrey Vasilievich From the author's bookJune 22, 1941 Operation Barbarossa began in the early hours of June 22, 1941, with a massive Luftwaffe attack on 31 major Soviet airfields from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Besides the fact that the attack was sudden, most of the airfields were at the
From the author's bookOn June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began, which lasted 1,418 days and nights. Thousands of German guns at 03:30-04:00 opened fire on Soviet border outposts, headquarters, fortifications, and communications centers. Simultaneously 900 dive bombers and 200 fighters
From the author's bookOn June 23, 1941, the 99th Infantry Division of Colonel N.I. Dementyev, together with the border guards, drove the Nazis out of Przemysl and held the city until June 27. Mobilization. Columns of fighters are moving to the front. Moscow, June 23, 1941
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From the author's bookOn June 25, 1941, the 100th Division stood in the way of a German tank mechanized wedge that rushed towards Minsk. Its commander, Major General Ivan Russiyanov, recalled: “Our division was well trained, had combat experience in the Finnish campaign... However, they immediately stood in front of us
From the author's bookOn June 26, 1941, units of the Border Troops of the NKVD and the Red Army, with the support of the 4th Black Sea Detachment of Border Courts and the Danube Flotilla, crossed the Danube and entered the territory of the Kingdom of Romania. A 33-year-old pilot, commander of a bomber squadron, was killed.
From the author's bookOn June 27, 1941, the Leningrad City Party Committee and the Military Council of the Northern Front were the first in the country to adopt a resolution on the formation of a people's militia. Thus, at the P.F. Lesgaft Institute in the first days of the war, partisan detachments consisting of 268 people were formed for
From the author's bookJune 29, 1941 The Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody ended - one of the largest tank battles in history, which took place during the Great Patriotic War in June 1941. Also known as the Battle of Brody, the tank battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Rivne. In battle with
From the author's bookJune 30, 1941 German troops broke into Lviv on June 30. The very first days of their rule in the captured city were marked by bloody orgies and unheard-of abuse of the civilian population. From the materials of the Nuremberg trials it is known that even before the capture