Russian Crimean War 1877 1878. About the war won, but unsuccessful

Armament of the Russian army in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877

The extremely intense activity of Russian gunsmiths after the Sevastopol War did not prove fruitless; The Russian army had one of the best systems of that time, namely Berdan No. 2. Rearmament, however, proceeded very slowly. Berdan rifle No. 2 was approved in 1870, and meanwhile by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878. Due to the industrial backwardness of Tsarist Russia, most of the army was armed with converted Krnka and Karle rifles. In addition to rifle units, only a few corps, and primarily the guards and grenadiers, managed to receive Berdan rifles. They, however, were sent to the front only in the middle of the war, after the failures suffered by the Russians.

The Turkish army was also armed with two systems: converted Snyder rifles, caliber 14.7 mm (5.77 lin.), with a folding bolt similar to the Krnka bolt action, and new, caliber 11.43 mm (4.5 lin.), Peabody systems -Martini with swing bolt, weighing 4.8 kg with bayonet (Fig. 82 and 83 show this rifle with a closed and open bolt).

Russian and Turkish rifles were quite similar in their qualities, the only difference was in the cutting of the sight distances. As already mentioned above, for 6-line infantry rifles a sight was adopted with a maximum sighting range of up to 600 steps and for small arms - up to 1,200 steps; among the Turkish troops, Snyder's converted rifles had a range of up to 1,400 steps; the new Berdan rifles had a scope of up to 1,500 steps, and the new Turkish - Peabody-Martini rifles - up to 1,800 steps.

Turkish troops were able to open fire from longer distances, inflicting great defeats on our troops. The experience of the war showed the complete fallacy of the backward views of the Russian command, that the main type of fire is still volley fire from a closed formation at close ranges; Soon after the war, the sight for the Berdanka was changed to shoot up to 2,250 steps.

Some deficiencies in weapons and hopes of defeating the Turkish armies, having an insufficient number of troops, were the cause of some of the failures of this campaign; These failures mainly occurred during repeated bloody attacks on the Plevna positions, which were occupied by the army of Osman Pasha, which threatened the right flank of the Russian troops advancing in a southern direction.

The third assault was undertaken by the commander-in-chief of the Russian army - the brother of Emperor Alexander II, who arrived at the position in time for the fighting - on his name day. During the days of this unsuccessful assault (September 7-13, 1877), Russian troops suffered horrific losses. A song known at that time was composed about them:

“A brother prepares a birthday cake from human filling for the sovereign brother, And a dashing wind walks across Rus' And destroys peasant huts...”

Despite these individual failures, the Russian people showed their former fighting qualities in this war - selfless courage, exceptional valor and endurance. This is confirmed by the glorious operations of the Russian army: the crossing of the Danube under the fire of Turkish troops with battles at Sistov, the capture of the Nikopol fortress, as well as the city of Tyrnov - the ancient capital of Bulgaria - at the foot of the Balkan Mountains, the final assault on Plevna in November 1877 with the capture of Osman's army Pasha, the winter passage through the Balkan steeps and gorges, the famous “Shipka seat”, when small Russian forces were attacked by the army of Suleiman Pasha.

“They stand more fearlessly than a rock And proudly await a bloody, terrible meeting. Under a hail of bullets and cannonballs and buckshot They stand, Balkan eagles. The days rumble, the nights blaze with fire, Tirelessly the struggle rages all around, But the enemies cannot break their wondrous power, Nor can they take possession of the nest that threatens them...” Golenishchev-Kutuzov, “Eagles”

After the defeat of all Turkish armies, peace was concluded in San Stefano, near the capital of Turkey - Constantinople (now Istanbul).

None of the people knows anything in advance. And the greatest misfortune can befall a person in the best place, and the greatest happiness can find him - in the worst place...

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

In the foreign policy of the Russian Empire in the 19th century, there were four wars with the Ottoman Empire. Russia won three of them and lost one. The last war in the 19th century between the two countries was the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, in which Russia won. The victory was one of the results of the military reform of Alexander 2. As a result of the war, the Russian Empire regained a number of territories, and also helped to gain the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania. In addition, for non-intervention in the war, Austria-Hungary received Bosnia, and England received Cyprus. The article is devoted to a description of the causes of the war between Russia and Turkey, its stages and main battles, the results and historical consequences of the war, as well as an analysis of the reaction of Western European countries to the increasing influence of Russia in the Balkans.

What were the causes of the Russo-Turkish War?

Historians identify the following reasons for the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878:

1. Exacerbation of the “Balkan” issue.
2. Russia's desire to regain its status as an influential player in the foreign arena.
3. Russian support for the national movement of Slavic peoples in the Balkans, seeking to expand its influence in this region. This caused intense resistance from European countries and the Ottoman Empire.
4. The conflict between Russia and Turkey over the status of the straits, as well as the desire for revenge for the defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-1856.
5. Turkey's unwillingness to compromise, ignoring not only the demands of Russia, but also the European community.

Now let's look at the reasons for the war between Russia and Turkey in more detail, since it is important to know them and interpret them correctly. Despite the lost Crimean War, Russia, thanks to some reforms (primarily military) of Alexander 2, again became an influential and strong state in Europe. This forced many politicians in Russia to think about revenge for the lost war. But this was not even the most important thing - much more important was the desire to regain the right to have the Black Sea Fleet. In many ways, it was to achieve this goal that the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was unleashed, which we will talk briefly about later.

In 1875, an uprising against Turkish rule began in Bosnia. The army of the Ottoman Empire brutally suppressed it, but already in April 1876 an uprising began in Bulgaria. Türkiye also cracked down on this national movement. As a sign of protest against the policy towards the southern Slavs, and also wanting to realize its territorial goals, Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in June 1876. The Serbian army was much weaker than the Turkish one. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Russia has positioned itself as the protector of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans, so Chernyaev, as well as several thousand Russian volunteers, went to Serbia.

After the defeat of the Serbian army in October 1876 near Dyuniš, Russia called on Turkey to stop hostilities and guarantee cultural rights to the Slavic people. The Ottomans, feeling the support of Britain, ignored the ideas of Russia. Despite the obviousness of the conflict, the Russian Empire tried to resolve the issue peacefully. Proof of this are several conferences convened by Alexander 2, in particular in January 1877 in Istanbul. Ambassadors and representatives of key European countries gathered there, but did not come to a common decision.

In March, an agreement was signed in London, which obligated Turkey to carry out reforms, but the latter completely ignored it. Thus, Russia has only one option left for resolving the conflict - military. Until recently, Alexander 2 did not dare to start a war with Turkey, because he was worried that the war would again turn into resistance of European countries to Russian foreign policy. On April 12, 1877, Alexander 2 signed a manifesto declaring war on the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the emperor concluded an agreement with Austria-Hungary on the latter’s non-entry on the side of Turkey. In exchange for neutrality, Austria-Hungary was to receive Bosnia.

Map of the Russian-Turkish War 1877-1878

Main battles of the war

Several important battles took place between April and August 1877:

• Already on the first day of the war, Russian troops captured key Turkish fortresses on the Danube and also crossed the Caucasian border.
• On April 18, Russian troops captured Boyazet, an important Turkish fortress in Armenia. However, already in the period June 7-28, the Turks tried to carry out a counter-offensive; Russian troops survived the heroic struggle.
• At the beginning of the summer, General Gurko's troops captured the ancient Bulgarian capital of Tarnovo, and on July 5 they established control over the Shipka Pass, through which the road to Istanbul went.
• During May-August, Romanians and Bulgarians began to massively create partisan detachments to help the Russians in the war with the Ottomans.

Battle of Plevna in 1877

The main problem for Russia was that the emperor’s inexperienced brother, Nikolai Nikolaevich, commanded the troops. Therefore, individual Russian troops actually acted without a center, which means they acted as uncoordinated units. As a result, on July 7-18, two unsuccessful attempts were made to storm Plevna, as a result of which about 10 thousand Russians died. In August, the third assault began, which turned into a protracted blockade. At the same time, from August 9 until December 28, the heroic defense of the Shipka Pass lasted. In this sense, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, even briefly, seems very contradictory in events and personalities.

In the autumn of 1877, the key battle took place near the Plevna fortress. By order of the Minister of War D. Milyutin, the army abandoned the assault on the fortress and moved on to a systematic siege. The army of Russia, as well as its ally Romania, numbered about 83 thousand people, and the garrison of the fortress consisted of 34 thousand soldiers. The last battle near Plevna took place on November 28, the Russian army emerged victorious and was finally able to capture the impregnable fortress. This was one of the largest defeats of the Turkish army: 10 generals and several thousand officers were captured. In addition, Russia was establishing control over an important fortress, opening its way to Sofia. This was the beginning of a turning point in the Russian-Turkish war.

Eastern front

On the eastern front, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 also developed rapidly. At the beginning of November, another important strategic fortress was captured - Kars. Due to simultaneous failures on two fronts, Turkey completely lost control over the movement of its own troops. On December 23, the Russian army entered Sofia.

Russia entered 1878 with a complete advantage over the enemy. On January 3, the assault on Phillipopolis began, and already on the 5th the city was taken, and the road to Istanbul was opened for the Russian Empire. On January 10, Russia enters Adrianople, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire is a fact, the Sultan is ready to sign peace on Russia’s terms. Already on January 19, the parties agreed on a preliminary agreement, which significantly strengthened Russia’s role in the Black and Marmara Seas, as well as in the Balkans. This caused great concern in European countries.

Reaction of major European powers to the successes of Russian troops

England expressed its dissatisfaction most of all, which already at the end of January sent a fleet into the Sea of ​​Marmara, threatening an attack in the event of a Russian invasion of Istanbul. England demanded that Russian troops be withdrawn from the Turkish capital, and also begin to develop a new treaty. Russia found itself in a difficult situation, which threatened to repeat the scenario of 1853-1856, when the entry of European troops violated Russia's advantage, which led to defeat. Taking this into account, Alexander 2 agreed to revise the treaty.

On February 19, 1878, in a suburb of Istanbul, San Stefano, a new treaty was signed with the participation of England.

The main results of the war were recorded in the San Stefano Peace Treaty:

• Russia annexed Bessarabia, as well as part of Turkish Armenia.
• Türkiye paid an indemnity of 310 million rubles to the Russian Empire.
• Russia received the right to have a Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol.
• Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained independence, and Bulgaria received this status 2 years later, after the final withdrawal of Russian troops from there (who were there in case Turkey tried to return the territory).
• Bosnia and Herzegovina received autonomy status, but were actually occupied by Austria-Hungary.
• In peacetime, Turkey was supposed to open ports to all ships heading to Russia.
• Turkey was obliged to organize reforms in the cultural sphere (in particular for the Slavs and Armenians).

However, these conditions did not suit the European states. As a result, in June-July 1878, a congress was held in Berlin, at which some decisions were revised:

1. Bulgaria was divided into several parts, and only the northern part received independence, while the southern part was returned to Turkey.
2. The amount of indemnity decreased.
3. England received Cyprus, and Austria-Hungary received the official right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Heroes of War

The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 traditionally became a “minute of glory” for many soldiers and military leaders. In particular, several Russian generals became famous:

• Joseph Gurko. Hero of the capture of the Shipka Pass, as well as the capture of Adrianople.
• Mikhail Skobilev. He led the heroic defense of the Shipka Pass, as well as the capture of Sofia. He received the nickname “White General”, and is considered a national hero among the Bulgarians.
• Mikhail Loris-Melikov. Hero of the battles for Boyazet in the Caucasus.

In Bulgaria there are over 400 monuments erected in honor of the Russians who fought in the war with the Ottomans in 1877-1878. There are many memorial plaques, mass graves, etc. One of the most famous monuments is the Freedom Monument on the Shipka Pass. There is also a monument to Emperor Alexander 2. There are also many settlements named after Russians. Thus, the Bulgarian people thank the Russians for the liberation of Bulgaria from Turkey, and the end of Muslim rule, which lasted more than five centuries. During the war, the Bulgarians called the Russians themselves “brothers,” and this word remained in the Bulgarian language as a synonym for “Russians.”

Historical reference

Historical significance of the war

The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 ended with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian Empire, however, despite the military success, European states quickly resisted the strengthening of Russia's role in Europe. In an effort to weaken Russia, England and Turkey insisted that not all the aspirations of the southern Slavs were realized, in particular, not the entire territory of Bulgaria received independence, and Bosnia passed from Ottoman occupation to Austrian occupation. As a result, the national problems of the Balkans became even more complicated, eventually turning the region into the “powder keg of Europe.” It was here that the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne took place, becoming the reason for the outbreak of the First World War. This is generally a funny and paradoxical situation - Russia wins victories on the battlefields, but over and over again suffers defeats in the diplomatic fields.

Russia regained its lost territories and the Black Sea Fleet, but never achieved the desire to dominate the Balkan Peninsula. This factor was also used by Russia when entering the First World War. For the Ottoman Empire, which was completely defeated, the idea of ​​revenge persisted, which forced it to enter into a world war against Russia. These were the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which we briefly reviewed today.

Relying on the friendly neutrality of Russia, Prussia from 1864 to 1871 won victories over Denmark, Austria and France, and then unified Germany and created the German Empire. The defeat of France by the Prussian army allowed, in turn, Russia to abandon the restrictive articles of the Paris Agreement (primarily the ban on having a navy in the Black Sea). The pinnacle of German-Russian rapprochement was the creation in 1873 of the “Union of Three Emperors” (Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary). The alliance with Germany, with the weakening of France, allowed Russia to intensify its policy in the Balkans. The reason for intervention in Balkan affairs was the Bosnian uprising of 1875 and the Serbo-Turkish war of 1876. The defeat of Serbia by the Turks and their brutal suppression of the uprising in Bosnia aroused strong sympathy in Russian society, which wanted to help the “brother Slavs.” But there were disagreements among the Russian leadership about the advisability of war with Turkey. Thus, Foreign Minister A.M. Gorchakov, Finance Minister M.H. Reitern and others considered Russia unprepared for a serious conflict, which could cause a financial crisis and a new conflict with the West, primarily with Austria-Hungary and England. Throughout 1876, diplomats sought a compromise, which Türkiye avoided at all costs. She was supported by England, which saw in starting a military fire in the Balkans an opportunity to distract Russia from affairs in Central Asia. Ultimately, following the Sultan's refusal to reform his European provinces, Emperor Alexander II declared war on Turkey on April 12, 1877. Previously (in January 1877), Russian diplomacy managed to settle tensions with Austria-Hungary. She maintained neutrality for the right to occupy Turkish possessions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia regained the territory of southern Bessarabia, lost in the Crimean campaign. It was also decided not to create a large Slavic state in the Balkans.

The plan of the Russian command provided for the end of the war within a few months, so that Europe would not have time to interfere in the course of events. Since Russia had almost no fleet on the Black Sea, repeating the route of Dibich’s campaign to Constantinople through the eastern regions of Bulgaria (near the coast) became difficult. Moreover, in this area there were powerful fortresses of Silistria, Shumla, Varna, Rushchuk, forming a quadrangle, in which the main forces of the Turkish army were located. Advancement in this direction threatened the Russian army with protracted battles. Therefore, it was decided to bypass the ominous quadrangle through the central regions of Bulgaria and go to Constantinople through the Shipka Pass (a pass in the Stara Planina mountains, on the Gabrovo - Kazanlak road. Height 1185 m).

Two main theaters of military operations can be distinguished: Balkan and Caucasian. The main one was the Balkan, where military operations can be divided into three stages. The first (until mid-July 1877) included the crossing of the Danube and the Balkans by Russian troops. The second stage (from the second half of July to the end of November 1877), during which the Turks carried out a number of offensive operations, and the Russians, in general, were in a state of positional defense. The third, final stage (December 1877 - January 1878) is associated with the advance of the Russian army through the Balkans and the victorious end of the war.

First stage

After the start of the war, Romania took the side of Russia and allowed Russian troops to pass through its territory. By the beginning of June 1877, the Russian army, led by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (185 thousand people), concentrated on the left bank of the Danube. She was opposed by troops of approximately equal numbers under the command of Abdul Kerim Pasha. Most of them were located in the already mentioned quadrangle of fortresses. The main forces of the Russian army concentrated somewhat to the west, at Zimnitsa. The main crossing of the Danube was being prepared there. Even further west, along the river, from Nikopol to Vidin, Romanian troops (45 thousand people) were stationed. In terms of combat training, the Russian army was superior to the Turkish one. But the Turks were superior to the Russians in the quality of weapons. In particular, they were armed with the latest American and British rifles. The Turkish infantry had more ammunition and entrenching tools. Russian soldiers had to save shots. An infantryman who spent more than 30 rounds of ammunition (more than half of his cartridge bag) during a battle faced punishment. A strong spring flood of the Danube prevented the crossing. In addition, the Turks had up to 20 battleships on the river, controlling the coastal zone. April and May passed in the fight against them. In the end, Russian troops, with the help of coastal batteries and mine boats, inflicted damage on the Turkish squadron and forced it to take refuge in Silistria. Only after this did it become possible to cross. On June 10, units of General Zimmermann's XIV Corps crossed the river at Galati. They occupied Northern Dobruja, where they remained idle until the end of the war. It was a red herring. Meanwhile, the main forces secretly accumulated at Zimnitsa. Opposite it, on the right bank, lay the fortified Turkish point of Sistovo.

Crossing near Sistovo (1877). On the night of June 15, the 14th division of General Mikhail Dragomirov crossed the river between Zimnitsa and Sistovo. The soldiers crossed in black winter uniforms to remain undetected in the dark. The first to land on the right bank without firing a single shot was the 3rd Volyn company, led by Captain Fok. The following units crossed the river under heavy fire and immediately entered the battle. After a fierce assault, the Sistov fortifications fell. Russian losses during the crossing amounted to 1.1 thousand people. (killed, wounded and drowned). By June 21, 1877, sappers built a floating bridge at Sistovo, along which the Russian army crossed to the right bank of the Danube. The further plan was as follows. An advance detachment under the command of General Joseph Gurko (12 thousand people) was intended for the offensive through the Balkans. To secure the flanks, two detachments were created - Eastern (40 thousand people) and Western (35 thousand people). The eastern detachment, led by the heir, Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich (future Emperor Alexander III), held back the main Turkish troops from the east (from the side of the fortress quadrangle). The western detachment, led by General Nikolai Kridiger, had the goal of expanding the invasion zone to the west.

Capture of Nikopol and first assault on Plevna (1877). Fulfilling the assigned task, Kridiger attacked Nikopol on July 3, which was defended by a 7,000-strong Turkish garrison. After a two-day assault, the Turks capitulated. Russian losses during the attack amounted to about 1.3 thousand people. The fall of Nikopol reduced the threat of a flank attack on Russian crossings at Sistovo. On the western flank, the Turks had the last large detachment in the Vidin fortress. It was commanded by Osman Pasha, who managed to change the initial stage of the war, which was favorable for the Russians. Osman Pasha did not wait in Vidin for further actions of Kridiger. Taking advantage of the passivity of the Romanian army on the right flank of the allied forces, the Turkish commander left Vidin on July 1 and moved towards the Western detachment of the Russians. Having covered 200 km in 6 days. Osman Pasha took up defensive positions with a 17,000-strong detachment in the Plevna area. This decisive maneuver came as a complete surprise to Kridiger, who, after the capture of Nikopol, decided that the Turks were finished in this area. Therefore, the Russian commander remained inactive for two days, instead of immediately capturing Plevna. When he realized it, it was already too late. Danger loomed over the Russian right flank and over their crossing (Plevna was 60 km from Sistovo). As a result of the occupation of Plevna by the Turks, the corridor for the advance of Russian troops in a southern direction narrowed to 100-125 km (from Plevna to Rushchuk). Kridiger decided to correct the situation and immediately sent the 5th division of General Schilder-Schulder (9 thousand people) against Plevna. However, the allocated forces were not enough, and the assault on Plevna on July 8 ended in failure. Having lost about a third of his forces during the attack, Schilder-Schulder was forced to retreat. The damage to the Turks amounted to 2 thousand people. This failure influenced the actions of the Eastern detachment. He abandoned the blockade of the Rushuk fortress and went on the defensive, since reserves to strengthen it were now transferred to Plevna.

Gurko's first Trans-Balkan campaign (1877). While the Eastern and Western detachments were settling down in the Sistov patch, General Gurko’s units quickly moved south to the Balkans. On June 25, the Russians occupied Tarnovo, and on July 2, they crossed the Balkans through the Heineken Pass. To the right, through the Shipka Pass, a Russian-Bulgarian detachment led by General Nikolai Stoletov (about 5 thousand people) was advancing. On July 5-6 he attacked Shipka, but was repulsed. However, on July 7, the Turks, having learned about the capture of the Heineken Pass and their movement to the rear of Gurko’s units, left Shipka. The path through the Balkans was open. Russian regiments and detachments of Bulgarian volunteers descended into the Valley of Roses, enthusiastically greeted by the local population. The message of the Russian Tsar to the Bulgarian people also contained the following words: “Bulgarians, my troops have crossed the Danube, where they have fought more than once to alleviate the plight of the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula... Russia’s task is to create, not to destroy. It is called by the Almighty providence to agree and to pacify all nationalities and all confessions in those parts of Bulgaria where people of different origins and different faiths live together..." Advanced Russian units appeared 50 km from Adrianople. But this was where Gurko’s promotion ended. He did not have enough forces for a successful massive offensive that could decide the outcome of the war. The Turkish command had reserves to repel this bold, but largely improvised onslaught. To protect this direction, the corps of Suleiman Pasha (20 thousand people) was transferred by sea from Montenegro, which closed the road to Gurko’s units on the Eski-Zagra - Yeni-Zagra line. In fierce battles on July 18-19, Gurko, who did not receive sufficient reinforcements, managed to defeat the Turkish division of Reuf Pasha near Yeni Zagra, but suffered a heavy defeat near Eski Zagra, where the Bulgarian militia was defeated. Gurko's detachment retreated to the passes. This completed the First Trans-Balkan Campaign.

Second assault on Plevna (1877). On the day when Gurko’s units fought under two Zagras, General Kridiger with a 26,000-strong detachment launched a second assault on Plevna (July 18). Its garrison had reached 24 thousand people by that time. Thanks to the efforts of Osman Pasha and the talented engineer Tevtik Pasha, Plevna turned into a formidable stronghold, surrounded by defensive fortifications and redoubts. The scattered frontal onslaught of the Russians from the east and south crashed against the powerful Turkish defense system. Having lost over 7 thousand people in fruitless attacks, Kridiger’s troops retreated. The Turks lost about 4 thousand people. At the Sistov crossing, panic broke out at the news of this defeat. An approaching detachment of Cossacks was mistaken for the Turkish vanguard of Osman Pasha. There was a shootout. But Osman Pasha did not advance on Sistovo. He limited himself to an attack in the southern direction and the occupation of Lovchi, hoping from here to come into contact with the troops of Suleiman Pasha advancing from the Balkans. The Second Plevna, along with the defeat of Gurko’s detachment at Eski Zagra, forced Russian troops to go on the defensive in the Balkans. The Guards Corps was called from St. Petersburg to the Balkans.

Balkan theater of operations

Second phase

In the second half of July, Russian troops in Bulgaria took up defensive positions in a semicircle, the rear of which abutted the Danube. Their borders passed in the region of Plevna (in the west), Shipka (in the south) and east of the Yantra River (in the east). On the right flank against the corps of Osman Pasha (26 thousand people) in Plevna stood the Western detachment (32 thousand people). In the Balkan section, 150 km long, the army of Suleiman Pasha (increased to 45 thousand people by August) was held back by the Southern detachment of General Fyodor Radetzky (40 thousand people). On the eastern flank, 50 km long, against the army of Mehmet Ali Pasha (100 thousand people), the Eastern detachment (45 thousand people) was located. In addition, the 14th Russian Corps (25 thousand people) in Northern Dobruja was held back on the Chernavoda - Kyustendzhi line by approximately equal numbers of Turkish units. After the success at Plevna and Eski Zagra, the Turkish command lost two weeks to agree on the offensive plan, thereby missing a favorable opportunity to inflict a serious defeat on the frustrated Russian units in Bulgaria. Finally, on August 9-10, Turkish troops launched an offensive in the southern and eastern directions. The Turkish command planned to break through the positions of the Southern and Eastern detachments, and then, combining the forces of the armies of Suleiman and Mehmet Ali, with the support of the corps of Osman Pasha, throw the Russians into the Danube.

First assault on Shipka (1877). First, Suleiman Pasha went on the offensive. He struck the main blow at the Shipka Pass to open the road to Northern Bulgaria and connect with Osman Pasha and Mehmet Ali. While the Russians held Shipka, the three Turkish troops remained separated. The pass was occupied by the Oryol regiment and the remnants of the Bulgarian militia (4.8 thousand people) under the command of General Stoletov. Due to the arrival of reinforcements, his detachment increased to 7.2 thousand people. Suleiman singled out the shock forces of his army (25 thousand people) against them. On August 9, the Turks launched an assault on Shipka. Thus began the famous six-day Battle of Shipka, which glorified this war. The most brutal battles took place near the Eagle's Nest rock, where the Turks, regardless of losses, attacked the strongest part of the Russian positions head-on. Having fired the cartridges, the defenders of Orliny, suffering from terrible thirst, fought off the Turkish soldiers climbing the pass with stones and rifle butts. After three days of furious onslaught, Suleiman Pasha was preparing for the evening of August 11 to finally destroy the handful of still resisting heroes, when suddenly the mountains resounded with a booming “Hurray!” The advanced units of the 14th division of General Dragomirov (9 thousand people) arrived to help the last defenders of Shipka. Having quickly marched more than 60 km in the summer heat, they frantically attacked the Turks and drove them back from the pass with a bayonet strike. The defense of Shipka was led by General Radetzky, who arrived at the pass. On August 12-14, the battle flared up with renewed vigor. Having received reinforcements, the Russians launched a counter-offensive and tried (August 13-14) to capture the heights west of the pass, but were repulsed. The battles took place in incredibly difficult conditions. Particularly painful in the summer heat was the lack of water, which had to be delivered 17 miles away. But despite everything, the defenders of Shipka, who fought desperately from privates to generals (Radetsky personally led the soldiers in attacks), managed to defend the pass. In the battles of August 9-14, the Russians and Bulgarians lost about 4 thousand people, the Turks (according to their data) - 6.6 thousand people.

Battle of the Lom River (1877). While the fighting raged on Shipka, an equally serious threat loomed over the positions of the Eastern Detachment. On August 10, the main Turkish army, twice its size, under the command of Mehmet Ali, went on the offensive. If successful, Turkish troops could break through to the Sistov crossing and Plevna, as well as go to the rear of the defenders of Shipka, which threatened the Russians with a real disaster. The Turkish army delivered the main blow in the center, in the Byala region, trying to cut the positions of the Eastern detachment in two. After fierce fighting, the Turks captured a strong position on the heights near Katselev and crossed the Cherni-Lom river. Only the courage of the commander of the 33rd division, General Timofeev, who personally led the soldiers into a counterattack, made it possible to stop the dangerous breakthrough. Nevertheless, the heir, Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, decided to withdraw his battered troops to a position in Byala, near the Yantra River. On August 25-26, the Eastern detachment skillfully retreated to a new defensive line. Having regrouped their forces here, the Russians reliably covered the Pleven and Balkan directions. Mehmet Ali's advance was stopped. During the onslaught of Turkish troops on Byala, Osman Pasha tried on August 19 to go on the offensive towards Mehmet Ali in order to squeeze the Russians from both sides. But his strength was not enough, and he was repelled. So, the August offensive of the Turks was repulsed, which allowed the Russians to take active action again. The main target of the attack was Plevna.

Capture of Lovchi and third assault on Plevna (1877). It was decided to begin the Pleven operation with the capture of Lovcha (35 km south of Plevna). From here the Turks threatened the Russian rear at Plevna and Shipka. On August 22, a detachment of Prince Imereti (27 thousand people) attacked Lovcha. It was defended by an 8,000-strong garrison led by Rifat Pasha. The assault on the fortress lasted 12 hours. The detachment of General Mikhail Skobelev distinguished himself in it. By shifting his attack from the right flank to the left, he disorganized the Turkish defense and finally decided the outcome of the intense battle. The Turks' losses amounted to 2.2 thousand people, the Russians - over 1.5 thousand people. The fall of Lovchi eliminated the threat to the southern rear of the Western Detachment and allowed the third assault on Plevna to begin. By that time, Plevna, well fortified by the Turks, the garrison which had increased to 34 thousand people, had turned into the central nerve of the war. Without taking the fortress, the Russians could not advance beyond the Balkans, since they faced a constant threat of a flank attack from it. The siege troops were brought to 85 thousand people by the end of August. (including 32 thousand Romanians). The Romanian King Carol I took overall command of them. The third assault took place on August 30-31. The Romanians, advancing from the eastern side, took the Grivitsky redoubts. The detachment of General Skobelev, who led his soldiers into an attack on a white horse, broke through close to the city from the southwestern side. Despite the murderous fire, Skobelev’s warriors captured two redoubts (Kavanlek and Issa-aga). The path to Plevna was open. Osman threw his last reserves against the units that had broken through. All day on August 31, a fierce battle raged here. The Russian command had reserves (less than half of all battalions went to the assault), but Skobelev did not receive them. As a result, the Turks recaptured the redoubts. The remnants of the Skobelev detachment had to retreat. The third assault on Plevna cost the Allies 16 thousand people. (of which over 12 thousand are Russian.). This was the bloodiest battle for the Russians in all the previous Russian-Turkish wars. The Turks lost 3 thousand people. After this failure, Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Nikolaevich proposed to withdraw beyond the Danube. He was supported by a number of military leaders. However, War Minister Milyutin spoke out sharply against it, saying that such a step would deal a huge blow to the prestige of Russia and its army. Emperor Alexander II agreed with Milyutin. It was decided to proceed to the blockade of Plevna. The blockade work was led by the hero of Sevastopol, Totleben.

Autumn offensive of the Turks (1877). A new failure near Plevna forced the Russian command to abandon active operations and wait for reinforcements. The initiative again passed to the Turkish army. On September 5, Suleiman again attacked Shipka, but was repulsed. The Turks lost 2 thousand people, the Russians - 1 thousand. On September 9, the positions of the Eastern detachment were attacked by the army of Mehmet-Ali. However, her entire offensive was reduced to an assault on Russian positions at Chair-kioi. After a two-day battle, the Turkish army retreated to its original positions. After this, Mehmet Ali was replaced by Suleiman Pasha. In general, the September offensive of the Turks was quite passive and did not cause any special complications. The energetic Suleiman Pasha, who took command, developed a plan for a new November offensive. It provided for a three-pronged attack. The army of Mehmet-Ali (35 thousand people) was supposed to advance from Sofia to Lovcha. The southern army, led by Wessel Pasha, was to capture Shipka and move to Tarnovo. The main Eastern army of Suleiman Pasha struck at Elena and Tarnovo. The first attack was supposed to be on Lovcha. But Mehmet-Ali delayed his speech, and in the two-day battle of Novachin (November 10-11), Gurko’s detachment defeated his advanced units. The Turkish onslaught on Shipka on the night of November 9 (in the area of ​​Mount St. Nicholas) was also repelled. After these unsuccessful attempts, the army of Suleiman Pasha went on the offensive. On November 14, Suleiman Pasha launched a diversionary attack on the left flank of the Eastern detachment, and then went to his strike group (35 thousand people). It was intended to attack Elena in order to interrupt communication between the Eastern and Southern detachments of the Russians. On November 22, the Turks unleashed a powerful blow on Elena and defeated the detachment of Svyatopolk-Mirsky 2nd (5 thousand people) stationed here.

The positions of the Eastern Detachment were broken through, and the path to Tarnovo, where large Russian warehouses were located, was open. But Suleiman did not continue the offensive the next day, which allowed the heir, Tsarevich Alexander, to transfer reinforcements here. They attacked the Turks and closed the gap. The capture of Elena was the last success of the Turkish army in this war. Then Suleiman again moved the attack to the left flank of the Eastern detachment. On November 30, 1877, a Turkish strike group (40 thousand people) attacked units of the Eastern detachment (28 thousand people) near the village of Mechka. The main blow fell on the positions of the 12th Corps, commanded by Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich. After a fierce battle, the Turkish onslaught was stopped. The Russians launched a counterattack and drove back the attackers beyond Lom. The damage to the Turks amounted to 3 thousand people, to the Russians - about 1 thousand people. For the Sword, the heir, Tsarevich Alexander, received the Star of St. George. In general, the Eastern detachment had to hold back the main Turkish onslaught. In carrying out this task, considerable credit belongs to the heir, Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, who showed undoubted military leadership talents in this war. It is interesting that he was a staunch opponent of wars and became famous for the fact that Russia never fought a war during his reign. While ruling the country, Alexander III showed his military abilities not on the battlefield, but in the field of solidly strengthening the Russian armed forces. He believed that for a peaceful life Russia needs two loyal allies - the army and the navy. The Battle of Mechka was the last major attempt by the Turkish army to defeat Russian troops in Bulgaria. At the end of this battle, the sad news of the surrender of Plevna came to the headquarters of Suleiman Pasha, which radically changed the situation on the Russian-Turkish front.

Siege and fall of Plevna (1877). Totleben, who led the siege of Plevna, spoke out decisively against a new assault. He considered the main thing to be to achieve a complete blockade of the fortress. To do this, it was necessary to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the besieged garrison received reinforcements. The approaches to it were guarded by the Turkish redoubts Gorny Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish. To take them, a special detachment was formed led by General Gurko (22 thousand people). On October 12, 1877, after a powerful artillery barrage, the Russians launched an attack on Gorny Dubnyak. It was defended by a garrison led by Ahmet Hivzi Pasha (4.5 thousand people). The assault was distinguished by persistence and bloodshed. The Russians lost over 3.5 thousand people, the Turks - 3.8 thousand people. (including 2.3 thousand prisoners). At the same time, an attack was carried out on the Telish fortifications, which surrendered only 4 days later. About 5 thousand people were captured. After the fall of Gorny Dubnyak and Telish, the garrison of Dolny Dubnyak abandoned their positions and retreated to Plevna, which was now completely blocked. By mid-November, the number of troops near Plevna exceeded 100 thousand people. against a 50,000-strong garrison whose food supplies were running out. By the end of November, there was only 5 days' worth of food left in the fortress. Under these conditions, Osman Pasha tried to break out of the fortress on November 28. The honor of repelling this desperate onslaught belonged to the grenadiers of General Ivan Ganetsky. Having lost 6 thousand people, Osman Pasha surrendered. The fall of Plevna changed the situation dramatically. The Turks lost an army of 50 thousand, and the Russians freed 100 thousand people. for the offensive. The victory came at a high price. The total Russian losses near Plevna amounted to 32 thousand people.

Shipka seat (1877). While Osman Pasha was still holding out in Plevna, the famous winter sitting began in November on Shipka, the former southern point of the Russian front. Snow fell in the mountains, the passes were snowy, and severe frosts struck. It was during this period that the Russians suffered their most severe losses at Shipka. And not from bullets, but from a more terrible enemy - icy cold. During the “sitting” period, the Russian losses amounted to: 700 people from battles, 9.5 thousand people from diseases and frostbite. Thus, the 24th Division, sent to Shipka without warm boots and short fur coats, lost up to 2/3 of its strength (6.2 thousand people) from frostbite in two weeks. Despite extremely difficult conditions, Radetzky and his soldiers continued to hold the pass. The Shipka sitting, which required extraordinary stamina from the Russian soldiers, ended with the beginning of the general offensive of the Russian army.

Balkan theater of operations

Third stage

By the end of the year, favorable preconditions had developed in the Balkans for the Russian army to go on the offensive. Its number reached 314 thousand people. against 183 thousand people. from the Turks. In addition, the capture of Plevna and the victory at Mechka secured the flanks of the Russian troops. However, the onset of winter sharply reduced the possibilities of offensive actions. The Balkans were already covered in deep snow and were considered impassable at this time of year. Nevertheless, at the military council on November 30, 1877, it was decided to cross the Balkans in winter. Wintering in the mountains threatened the soldiers with death. But if the army had left the passes for winter quarters, then in the spring they would have had to storm the Balkan steeps again. Therefore, it was decided to descend from the mountains, but in a different direction - to Constantinople. For this purpose, several detachments were allocated, of which the two main ones were Western and Southern. The Western one, led by Gurko (60 thousand people), was supposed to go to Sofia, going behind the rear of the Turkish troops at Shipka. Radetzky's southern detachment (over 40 thousand people) advanced in the Shipka area. Two more detachments led by generals Kartsev (5 thousand people) and Dellingshausen (22 thousand people) advanced respectively through the Trajan Val and Tvarditsky Pass. A breakthrough in several places at once did not give the Turkish command the opportunity to concentrate its forces in any one direction. Thus began the most striking operation of this war. After almost six months of trampling under Plevna, the Russians unexpectedly took off and decided the outcome of the campaign in just a month, stunning Europe and Turkey.

Battle of the Shanes (1877). South of the Shipka Pass, in the area of ​​the village of Sheinovo, there was the Turkish army of Wessel Pasha (30-35 thousand people). Radetsky's plan consisted of double coverage of Wessel Pasha's army with columns of generals Skobelev (16.5 thousand people) and Svyatopolk-Mirsky (19 thousand people). They had to overcome the Balkan passes (Imitli and Tryavnensky), and then, reaching the Sheinovo area, launch flank attacks on the Turkish army located there. Radetzky himself, with the units remaining on Shipka, launched a diversionary attack in the center. A winter crossing through the Balkans (often waist-deep in snow) in 20-degree frost was fraught with great risk. However, the Russians managed to overcome the snow-covered steep slopes. The column of Svyatopolk-Mirsky was the first to reach Sheinovo on December 27. She immediately entered the battle and captured the front line of Turkish fortifications. Skobelev's right column was delayed in leaving. She had to overcome deep snow in harsh weather conditions, climbing narrow mountain paths. Skobelev's lateness gave the Turks a chance to defeat Svyatopolk-Mirsky's detachment. But their attacks on the morning of January 28 were repulsed. To help their own, Radetzky's detachment rushed from Shipka into a frontal attack on the Turks. This bold onslaught was repulsed, but pinned down part of the Turkish forces. Finally, having overcome the snow drifts, Skobelev’s units entered the battle area. They quickly attacked the Turkish camp and broke into Sheinovo from the west. This onslaught decided the outcome of the battle. At 15:00 the surrounded Turkish troops capitulated. 22 thousand people surrendered. Turkish losses in killed and wounded amounted to 1 thousand people. The Russians lost about 5 thousand people. The victory at Sheinovo ensured a breakthrough in the Balkans and opened the way for the Russians to Adrianople.

Battle of Philippolis (1878). Due to a blizzard in the mountains, Gurko’s detachment, moving in a roundabout way, spent 8 days instead of the intended two. Local residents familiar with the mountains believed that the Russians were heading to certain death. But they eventually came to victory. In the battles of December 19-20, advancing waist-deep in snow, Russian soldiers knocked down Turkish troops from their positions on the passes, then descended from the Balkans and occupied Sofia on December 23 without a fight. Further, near Philippopolis (now Plovdiv), stood the army of Suleiman Pasha (50 thousand people) transferred from eastern Bulgaria. This was the last major barrier on the way to Adrianople. On the night of January 3, advanced Russian units forded the icy waters of the Maritsa River and entered into battle with Turkish outposts west of the city. On January 4, Gurko’s detachment continued the offensive and, bypassing Suleiman’s army, cut off its escape route to the east, to Adrianople. On January 5, the Turkish army began to hastily retreat along the last free road to the south, towards the Aegean Sea. In the battles near Philippopolis, she lost 20 thousand people. (killed, wounded, captured, deserted) and ceased to exist as a serious combat unit. The Russians lost 1.2 thousand people. This was the last major battle of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. In the battles of Sheinovo and Philippopolis, the Russians defeated the main forces of the Turks beyond the Balkans. A significant role in the success of the winter campaign was played by the fact that the troops were led by the most capable military leaders - Gurko and Radetzky. On January 14-16, their detachments united in Adrianople. It was first occupied by the vanguard, which was led by the third brilliant hero of that war - General Skobelev. On January 19, 1878, a truce was concluded here, which drew a line under the history of Russian-Turkish military rivalry in South-Eastern Europe.

Caucasian theater of military operations (1877-1878)

In the Caucasus, the forces of the parties were approximately equal. The Russian army under the overall command of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich numbered 100 thousand people. Turkish army under the command of Mukhtar Pasha - 90 thousand people. Russian forces were distributed as follows. In the west, the Black Sea coast area was guarded by the Kobuleti detachment under the command of General Oklobzhio (25 thousand people). Further, in the Akhaltsikhe-Akhalkalaki region, the Akhatsikhe detachment of General Devel (9 thousand people) was located. In the center, near Alexandropol, were the main forces led by General Loris-Melikov (50 thousand people). On the southern flank stood the Erivan detachment of General Tergukasov (11 thousand people). The last three detachments made up the Caucasian Corps, which was headed by Loris-Melikov. The war in the Caucasus developed similarly to the Balkan scenario. First there was an offensive by the Russian troops, then they went on the defensive, and then a new offensive and inflicted a complete defeat on the enemy. On the day war was declared, the Caucasian Corps immediately went on the offensive in three detachments. The offensive took Mukhtar Pasha by surprise. He did not have time to deploy his troops and retreated beyond Kars to cover the Erzurum direction. Loris-Melikov did not pursue the Turks. Having united his main forces with the Akhaltsikhe detachment, the Russian commander began the siege of Kars. A detachment under the command of General Gaiman (19 thousand people) was sent forward, in the direction of Erzurum. South of Kars the Erivan detachment of Tergukasov was advancing. He occupied Bayazet without a fight, and then moved along the Alashkert Valley towards Erzurum. On June 9, near Dayar, Tergukasov’s 7,000-strong detachment was attacked by Mukhtar Pasha’s 18,000-strong army. Tergukasov repelled the onslaught and began to wait for the actions of his northern colleague, Gaiman. He didn't have to wait long.

Battle of Zivin (1877). Retreat of the Erivan detachment (1877). On June 13, 1877, Geiman’s detachment (19 thousand people) attacked the fortified positions of the Turks in the Zivin area (halfway from Kars to Erzurum). They were defended by the Turkish detachment of Khaki Pasha (10 thousand people). The poorly prepared assault on the Zivin fortifications (only a quarter of the Russian detachment was brought into battle) was repulsed. The Russians lost 844 people, the Turks - 540 people. The Zivin failure had serious consequences. After it, Loris-Melikov lifted the siege of Kars and ordered a retreat to the Russian border. It was especially difficult for the Erivan detachment, which went far into Turkish territory. He had to return back through the sun-scorched valley, suffering from the heat and lack of food. “At that time, there were no camp kitchens,” recalled officer A.A. Brusilov, a participant in that war. “When the troops were on the move or without a convoy, like us, the food was distributed from hand to hand, and everyone cooked for themselves what they could. In this soldiers and officers suffered equally." In the rear of the Erivan detachment was the Turkish corps of Faik Pasha (10 thousand people), which besieged Bayazet. And the numerically superior Turkish army threatened from the front. The successful completion of this difficult 200-kilometer retreat was greatly facilitated by the heroic defense of the Bayazet fortress.

Defense of Bayazet (1877). In this citadel there was a Russian garrison, which consisted of 32 officers and 1587 lower ranks. The siege began on June 4. The assault on June 8 ended in failure for the Turks. Then Faik Pasha moved on to blockade, hoping that hunger and heat would cope with the besieged better than his soldiers. But despite the lack of water, the Russian garrison rejected offers to surrender. By the end of June, soldiers were given only one wooden spoon of water a day in the summer heat. The situation seemed so hopeless that the commandant of Bayazet, Lieutenant Colonel Patsevich, spoke at the military council in favor of surrender. But he was shot dead by officers outraged by this proposal. The defense was led by Major Shtokvich. The garrison continued to hold firm, hoping for rescue. And the hopes of the Bayazeti people came true. On June 28, units of General Tergukasov arrived to their aid, fought their way to the fortress and saved its defenders. The losses of the garrison during the siege amounted to 7 officers and 310 lower ranks. The heroic defense of Bayazet did not allow the Turks to reach the rear of the troops of General Tergukasov and cut off their retreat to the Russian border.

Battle of Aladzhi Heights (1877). After the Russians lifted the siege of Kars and retreated to the border, Mukhtar Pasha went on the offensive. However, he did not dare to give the Russian army a field battle, but took up heavily fortified positions on the Aladzhi Heights, east of Kars, where he stood throughout August. The standstill continued in September. Finally, on September 20, Loris-Melikov, who concentrated a 56,000-strong strike force against Aladzhi, himself went on the offensive against the troops of Mukhtar Pasha (38,000 people). The fierce battle lasted three days (until September 22) and ended in complete failure for Loris-Melikov. Having lost over 3 thousand people. In bloody frontal attacks, the Russians retreated to their original lines. Despite his success, Mukhtar Pasha decided to retreat to Kars on the eve of winter. As soon as the Turkish withdrawal became apparent, Loris-Melikov launched a second attack (October 2-3). This onslaught, combining a frontal attack with a flanking outflanking, was crowned with success. The Turkish army suffered a crushing defeat and lost more than half of its strength (killed, wounded, captured, deserted). Its remnants retreated in disorder to Kars and then to Erzurum. The Russians lost 1.5 thousand people during the second assault. The Battle of Aladzhia became decisive in the Caucasian theater of operations. After this victory, the initiative completely passed to the Russian army. At the Battle of Aladzha, the Russians made extensive use of the telegraph to control troops for the first time. |^

Battle of Devais Bonnoux (1877). After the defeat of the Turks on the Aladzhi Heights, the Russians again besieged Kare. Gaiman's detachment was again sent forward to Erzurum. But this time Mukhtar Pasha did not linger in the Zivin positions, but retreated further to the west. On October 15, he united near the town of Kepri-Key with the corps of Izmail Pasha, which was retreating from the Russian border, which had previously acted against the Erivan detachment of Tergukasov. Now the forces of Mukhtar Pasha have increased to 20 thousand people. Following Izmail’s corps was Tergukasov’s detachment, which on October 21 united with Geiman’s detachment, which led the joint forces (25 thousand people). Two days later, in the vicinity of Erzurum, near Deve Boynu, Geiman attacked the army of Mukhtar Pasha. Gaiman began a demonstration of an attack on the right flank of the Turks, where Mukhtar Pasha transferred all reserves. Meanwhile, Tergukasov decisively attacked the left flank of the Turks and inflicted a severe defeat on their army. Russian losses amounted to just over 600 people. The Turks would have lost a thousand people. (of which 3 thousand were prisoners). After this, the path to Erzurum was open. However, Gaiman remained inactive for three days and only approached the fortress on October 27. This allowed Mukhtar Pasha to strengthen himself and put his disordered units in order. The assault on October 28 was repulsed, forcing Gaiman to retreat from the fortress. In the conditions of the onset of cold weather, he withdrew his troops to the Passinskaya Valley for the winter.

Capture of Kars (1877). While Geiman and Tergukasov were marching towards Erzurum, Russian troops laid siege to Kars on October 9, 1877. The siege corps was headed by General Lazarev. (32 thousand people). The fortress was defended by a 25,000-strong Turkish garrison led by Hussein Pasha. The assault was preceded by a bombardment of the fortifications, which lasted intermittently for 8 days. On the night of November 6, Russian troops launched an attack, which ended with the capture of the fortress. General Lazarev himself played an important role in the assault. He led a detachment that captured the eastern forts of the fortress and repelled a counterattack by Hussein Pasha's units. The Turks lost 3 thousand killed and 5 thousand wounded. 17 thousand, people surrendered. Russian losses during the assault exceeded 2 thousand people. The capture of Kars actually ended the war in the Caucasian theater of military operations.

Peace of San Stefano and Congress of Berlin (1878)

Peace of San Stefano (1878). On February 19, 1878, a peace treaty was concluded in San Stefano (near Constantinople), ending the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Russia received back from Romania the southern part of Bessarabia, lost after the Crimean War, and from Turkey the port of Batum, the Kars region, the city of Bayazet and the Alashkert Valley. Romania took the Dobruja region from Turkey. Complete independence of Serbia and Montenegro was established with the provision of a number of territories to them. The main result of the agreement was the emergence of a new large and virtually independent state in the Balkans - the Bulgarian Principality.

Berlin Congress (1878). The terms of the treaty caused protest from England and Austria-Hungary. The threat of a new war forced St. Petersburg to reconsider the Treaty of San Stefano. Also in 1878, the Berlin Congress was convened, at which the leading powers changed the previous version of the territorial structure in the Balkans and Eastern Turkey. Acquisitions of Serbia and Montenegro were reduced, the area of ​​the Bulgarian Principality was cut almost threefold. Austria-Hungary occupied Turkish possessions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From its acquisitions in Eastern Turkey, Russia returned the Alashkert Valley and the city of Bayazet. Thus, the Russian side had, in general, to return to the version of the territorial structure agreed upon before the war with Austria-Hungary.

Despite the Berlin restrictions, Russia still regained the lands lost under the Treaty of Paris (with the exception of the mouth of the Danube), and achieved the implementation (although far from complete) of the Balkan strategy of Nicholas I. This Russian-Turkish clash completes Russia's implementation of its high missions for the liberation of Orthodox peoples from Turkish oppression. As a result of Russia's centuries-long struggle across the Danube, Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria gained independence. The Berlin Congress led to the gradual emergence of a new balance of power in Europe. Russian-German relations cooled noticeably. But the Austro-German alliance strengthened, in which there was no longer a place for Russia. Its traditional orientation toward Germany was coming to an end. In the 80s Germany forms a military-political alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. Berlin's hostility is pushing St. Petersburg towards a partnership with France, which, fearing new German aggression, is now actively seeking Russian support. In 1892-1894. A military-political Franco-Russian alliance is being formed. It became the main counterweight to the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy). These two blocs determined the new balance of power in Europe. Another important consequence of the Berlin Congress was the weakening of Russia’s prestige in the countries of the Balkan region. The Congress in Berlin dispelled Slavophile dreams of uniting the South Slavs into a union led by the Russian Empire.

The death toll in the Russian army was 105 thousand people. As in the previous Russian-Turkish wars, the main damage was caused by diseases (primarily typhus) - 82 thousand people. 75% of military losses occurred in the Balkan theater of operations.

Shefov N.A. The most famous wars and battles of Russia M. "Veche", 2000.
"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.

Actions in the Asian theater of war

Russian troops, gathered on the borders of Asian Turkey, occupied the following location at the beginning of April: the main forces - up to 30 thousand - stood at Alexandropol; Akhaltsykh detachment (up to 7 thousand) Lieutenant General Devely - at Alkhalkalak; Erivan detachment (up to 11.5 thousand) Lieutenant General Tergukasov - at Igdyr. These troops were under the main command of Admiral General Loris-Melikov. In addition, a special Kobulet detachment of Major General Oklobzhio was located at Ozurget, having minor posts along the Black Sea coast.

Fedor Danilovich Devel Arzas Artemyevich Tergukasov

Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov

By the day war was declared, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces in Asia Minor, Mukhtar Pasha, had at his disposal only 25-30 thousand, including the garrisons of fortresses; but in addition, almost the same number of troops were in Batum under the command of Dervish Pasha.

Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha

On April 12, the Russian side opened an offensive on all fronts: the main forces moved in small marches to Kars and on April 16 concentrated on a position near Yengikei.

Mukhtar had left the fortress the day before, having 7 battalions with him and, retreating before the Russian cavalry detachments sent for reconnaissance, managed to escape beyond the Saganlug mountain range. - Meanwhile, Devel approached Ardahan, which turned out to be so strongly fortified that to assist in its capture, part of the main forces was separated, entrusted to the superiors of General Gaiman.

Vasily Alexandrovich Gaiman

The capture of Ardahan is the first major success of the Russian army in the Caucasus in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878.

Ardahan is a city in Northeastern Turkey. It is located on the Ardagan Plateau in the upper reaches of the Kura River, which is divided into two parts. Ardahan had an important strategic position, covering the routes to Batum and the fortresses of Erzurum and Kars. The Turkish command turned Ardahan into a heavily fortified fortress with forts and lunettes. The main defense positions were the Gelyaverdinsky (Gyulyaverdinsky) heights from the east and Mount Manglas from the north. The fortress garrison numbered 8,100 people with 95 fortress guns. At the end of April 1877, the Akhaltsikhe detachment of the active Caucasian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General F.D. Devel (8.5 thousand infantry and cavalry men with 28 guns) approached Ardahan and surrounded it. Devel did not dare to storm the city on his own and turned for help to the corps commander, cavalry general M. T. Loris-Melikov. The latter singled out a detachment under the command of Lieutenant General V.A. Gaiman and together with him headed to the fortress to carry out general leadership of the assault. Together with the arriving reinforcements, the Akhaltsikhe detachment amounted to 15 thousand bayonets and sabers with 56 field and 20 siege guns.

On May 4 and 5, a reconnaissance was carried out and a plan was drawn up to storm the fortress, designed for two days - May 5 and 6. On the night of May 4, positions of 10 artillery batteries were equipped for shelling the fortifications. At dawn, the attack on the Gelyaverdyn Heights began, supported by massive fire from 20 guns. In the afternoon the fortifications were taken. Then preparations began for the assault on Ardahan. The first column of troops under the command of Devel was to carry out a demonstrative attack on the Ramazan fort; the second, led by V. A. Gaiman, delivered the main blow from the south, and part of the forces from the east from Gelyaverda (Gyulyaverdy). Before the assault, a massive artillery bombardment was carried out, and on May 5 the infantry went on the offensive. It began earlier than planned due to the fact that reconnaissance discovered the enemy’s hasty retreat into the mountains. By nightfall Ardahan was taken. The losses of the Russian troops amounted to 296 people killed and wounded, and the enemy - about 3,000 people.

Meanwhile, Lazarev’s detachment, which approached Kars, began siege work on October 13, and on November 6 the fortress was already in Russian hands. After this important event, the main goal of action seemed to be Erzerum, where the remnants of the enemy army were hiding and funds were collected for the formation of new troops. But here the Turks’ allies were the onset of cold weather and the extreme difficulty of delivering all kinds of supplies along mountain roads. Among the troops standing in front of the fortress, disease and mortality reached terrifying proportions.

On January 21, a truce was concluded, under the terms of which Erzurum was handed over to Russian troops on February 11.

During military operations near Aladzhi and near Kars, the Ardagan detachment was assigned to protect peace in the vicinity of Ardagan. After the fall of Kars, this detachment was strengthened and its commander, Colonel Komarov, was ordered to move to Ardanuch and Artvin to establish Russian influence in the river valley. Chorokh and to facilitate the proposed operation against Batum. The troops allocated for this, starting the movement on December 2, occupied Ardanuch, and on December 9 defeated the Turkish detachment at a position near Dolis Khan. The news of the truce stopped them at Artvin. The Kobuleti detachment, reduced in composition around mid-June, received a strictly defensive purpose and fortified itself on Mukha-Estat, and the enemy troops facing it occupied the heights of Khutsubani. On August 1 and 12 they tried to dislodge our detachment from its position, but both times they were unsuccessful.

On November 15, Dervish Pasha withdrew his troops beyond the river. Kintrishi and stopped at the heights of Tsikhijiri. On January 18, the Kobuleti detachment attacked him, but was repulsed, and on January 22, news was received of the conclusion of a truce. The eastern coast of the Black Sea also entered the area of ​​military operations, and here the Turks, thanks to the dominance of their fleet, could control almost unhindered, since there were no coastal fortified points. To counter enemy landings and maintain calm in the country, there were only small detachments in

Kuban Plastuns in the Caucasian Army in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878

Cossacks - participants in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878

BALKAN KNOT

More than 130 years ago, the battles of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878, which arose as a result of the rise of the liberation movement in the Balkans and the aggravation of international contradictions in the Middle East, died down. Russia supported the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples, and also sought to restore its prestige and influence, undermined by the Crimean War of 1853–1856.

By the beginning of the war, Russia deployed two armies: the Danube (185 thousand people, 810 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and the Caucasus (75 thousand people, 276 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich.

Both armies included mounted Cossack regiments of the Kuban Cossack Army (KKV) and battalions of Kuban Plastuns, who, as in previous years, made a worthy contribution to the Russian victories. The sabotage and reconnaissance parties of Plastuns acted courageously and skillfully in both theaters of military operations. However, if much is known about the military exploits of the Cossacks in the Balkans, then, in the author’s opinion, not enough has been said about the combat work of the Plastuns in the Caucasus.

The mobilization of the Caucasian Army was preceded by a preparatory period (September 1 - November 11, 1876) and the mobilization period itself (November 11, 1876 - April 12, 1877). Simultaneously with the mobilization of infantry, artillery and cavalry units of the Russian army, by order of the Minister of War, the following units of the Kuban Cossack army were subject to mobilization: 10 cavalry regiments, a squadron of His Imperial Majesty's Own convoy and 20 Plastun hundreds. In November, five battalions of four hundred strength were formed from the Plastun hundreds (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 battalions), the regiments were given the name of the second.

The formation of Cossack units was complicated by the fact that at the beginning of the mobilization of firearms to arm the Cossacks it turned out to be insufficient. Alas, the army’s insufficient preparedness for war was characteristic of both the Russo-Japanese and the First World Wars. As of September 1876, the KKV had 6,454 rifles of the Berdan system, 2,086 were missing. At the end of October, a transport with 10,387 rifles arrived from St. Petersburg to Yekaterinodar, which made it possible to arm only the regiments of the first set, the second set of Cossacks arrived at the assembly point with their own rifles of the system Tanner. Some Plastun battalions were armed with guns of the Karley system. At subsequent stages of mobilization, Plastun foot battalions were armed with dragoon rifles of the Krnka system. In general, Cossack units were armed with firearms of different systems, which created difficulties in providing ammunition.

Soon, the aggravation of the political situation, military preparations of the Turks and the mood of the highlanders required additional mobilization in early April 1877, including the conscription of the third stage of the KKV. Additionally, five prefabricated mounted Cossack regiments and five KKV foot battalions (8, 9, 10, 11 and 12th) were formed. In total, the KKV fielded 21,600 Cossacks, who took part in the defense of the Bayazet fortress, the capture of Kars and Erzurum, and in the battles on Shipka and on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.

WAR

In the Caucasus-Asia Minor Theater, after the declaration of war on April 12, 1877, the troops of the Active Corps and its detachments under the command of Adjutant General Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov (future Minister of Internal Affairs) crossed the border and entered enemy territory in several columns. Information has been preserved about the successful actions during this period of the Plastuns of the 2nd Plastun foot battalion and two hundred of the Poltava Cavalry Regiment of the KKV, who were tasked with removing the Turkish border posts and ensuring the unhindered passage of the main forces of Colonel Komarov’s detachment in the area of ​​​​the village of Vale. Plastuns and mounted Cossack hundreds were actively involved in flying and reconnaissance detachments to collect data on enemy fortifications, the strength of garrisons, the nature of the terrain, and damage to telegraph communication lines. Information was collected both through personal observation and by interviewing local residents and capturing prisoners.

So, for example, a hunting team consisting of 11 Plastuns and Cossacks of the Poltava Cavalry Regiment in May 1877 was tasked with reconnaissance of the heights of Gelyaverda (near Ardagan), determining the route for the approach of the main forces and obtaining the language. To disperse the attention of the Turks, distracting actions of other Plastun groups were simultaneously carried out. The hunting team, led by the centurion Kamensky, safely passed three enemy chains, carried out reconnaissance of the fortifications and “captured a sentry with a gun, whom they delivered to the camp as proof of their feat.” In July, while reconnaissance of Turkish forces near Dagor, a detachment consisting of 20 Plastun Cossacks and 20 Chechens from the Chechen Cavalry Irregular Regiment under the command of the General Staff of Colonel Malama crossed the Arpachay River at night, conducted a successful reconnaissance of the area and returned safely to their territory.

Plastuns were actively used in the coastal direction, where the actions of the Cossack cavalry regiments were hampered by mountainous and wooded terrain. For example, a summary of the military actions of the Sochi detachment from July 28 to August 28, 1877 speaks of a successful reconnaissance operation of hundreds of plastuns under the command of the cornet Nikitin: “... a party of plastuns in Sandripsha found enemy pickets, and near Gagra they noticed the movement of a significant mass of people, Moreover, the passage was guarded by two Turkish battleships. The detachment commander reported that the enemy had taken all measures to prevent our troops from advancing to the Gagrinsky fortification. The Plastuns were given instructions to conduct reconnaissance of bypass mountain paths.” Subsequently, the Plastuns were given the task of taking control of the largest possible area near Gagra, so that the enemy did not have time to occupy difficult-to-reach approaches, which would then have to be taken from him with great casualties. Subsequently, together with the riflemen, three hundred Plastuns took part in the successful assault on the Gagrinsky fortification.

Plast scouts sometimes obtained information that made it possible to expose some careless officers. For example, on May 31, 1877, Lieutenant General Geiman reported to his command the following fact, refuting the officer’s report on the incident at the Cossack picket: “Information was received from scouts that our picket at Ardost was attacked not by 300 bashi-bazouks, but by only 30–40 people; There was a complete mistake at the post: half of the Cossacks were sleeping, and the others were eating sour milk, which is why they did not have time to collect the horses, of which the enemies took them all. This information was given by the spies, and it is completely different from the officer’s report. We would have thought to carry out an investigation and bring the officer to justice, otherwise, due to the carelessness of our Cossacks, such cases could repeat.”

The command of the Russian troops skillfully used the outstanding fighting qualities of the plastuns when pursuing the retreating enemy. For example, by skillful maneuvers of our forces, detachments of retreating Turkish troops were led out to ambushed Plastuns and came under their well-aimed weapons fire. The effective actions of the plastuns suggested to the command of the Russian troops the idea of ​​​​forming prefabricated battalions of hunters, which, along with the plastuns who formed their basis, included the most intelligent and physically trained volunteers from the infantry regiments of the Russian army.

The Kuban Plastuns, as part of the 7th Plastun battalion under the command of Yesaul Bashtannik, the hero of the defense of Sevastopol, were involved in the Danube Army. From the coastal Sistovsky heights, which the battalion captured from the enemy with extraordinary courage and courage, thereby ensuring the crossing of the Russian army across the Danube, under the leadership of General Gurko, the Kuban plastuns began their glorious military journey to the legendary Shipka. For the exploits shown on the battlefields in Bulgaria, many plastuns were awarded the Cross of St. George, many lower ranks were awarded non-commissioned officer and officer ranks.

Interesting memories of the actions of plastuns during the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878 were left by the famous journalist and writer Vladimir Gilyarovsky. During that war, he volunteered to serve in the active army and, thanks to his restless and adventurous nature, found himself among the Kuban clay pigeon hunters who operated on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.

LOST WORLD

One way or another, the war was won. However, the subsequent development of events makes us think about the questions of how justified the sacrifices made by Russia were and who is to blame for the lost results of the victories of Russian weapons.

Russia's successes in the war with Turkey alarmed the ruling circles of England and Austria-Hungary. The British government sent a squadron to the Sea of ​​Marmara, which forced Russia to abandon the capture of Istanbul. In February, thanks to the efforts of Russian diplomacy, the Treaty of San Stefano, beneficial for Russia, was signed, which, it would seem, changed the entire political picture of the Balkans (and not only) in favor of Russian interests.

Serbia, Romania and Montenegro, previously vassals of Turkey, gained independence, Bulgaria acquired the status of a virtually independent principality, Turkey undertook to pay Russia an indemnity of 1,410 million rubles, and from this amount ceded Kapc, Ardahan, Bayazet and Batum in the Caucasus and even Southern Bessarabia, seized from Russia after the Crimean War. Russian weapons triumphed. How did Russian diplomacy use the victorious results of the war?

The Plastuns were still continuing skirmishes with the bashi-bazouks when the Berlin Congress, dominated by the “Big Five”: Germany, Russia, England, France and Austria-Hungary, began revising the results of the war on June 3, 1878. Its final act was signed on July 1(13), 1878. The head of the Russian delegation was formally considered the 80-year-old Prince Gorchakov, but he was already old and sick. In fact, the delegation was led by the former chief of gendarmes, Count Shuvalov, who, judging by the results, turned out to be a diplomat, much worse than a gendarme.

During the congress, it became clear that Germany, concerned about the excessive strengthening of Russia, did not want to support it. France, not yet recovered from the defeat of 1871, gravitated towards Russia, but was afraid of Germany and did not dare to actively support Russian demands. The current situation was skillfully used by England and Austria-Hungary, who imposed well-known decisions on the Congress that changed the Treaty of San Stefano to the detriment of Russia and the peoples of the Balkans.

Thus, the territory of the Bulgarian Principality was limited to only the northern half, and southern Bulgaria became an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire called Eastern Rumelia. Serbia was given part of Bulgaria, which quarreled the two Slavic peoples for a long time. Russia returned Bayazet to Turkey, and as an indemnity exacted not 1,410 million, but only 300 million rubles. Finally, Austria-Hungary negotiated for itself the “right” to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As a result, the Russian-Turkish war turned out to be a win for Russia, but unsuccessful. Chancellor Gorchakov, in a note to the Tsar about the results of the congress, admitted: “The Berlin Congress is the darkest page in my career.” Emperor Alexander II added: “And in mine too.”

Shortly after the end of the Russo-Turkish War, the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolai Obruchev, wrote in a memo to the emperor: “If Russia is poor and weak, if it is far behind Europe, then this is primarily because it very often incorrectly resolved the most fundamental political issues : where she should and where she should not sacrifice her property. If you follow the same path, you can completely perish and quickly complete your cycle of a great Power...”

Even taking into account the changes in the geopolitical situation that have occurred over the past more than 100 years, the words of General Obruchev have not lost their relevance today.