Currently, the development of new combat manuals for the Russian Armed Forces is in full swing. In this regard, I would like to bring up for discussion a rather interesting document that came into my hands during a business trip to the Chechen Republic. This is a letter from a mercenary fighter who fought in Chechnya. He addresses not just anyone, but the general of the Russian Army. Of course, some thoughts expressed by a former member of illegal armed groups can be questioned. But on the whole he is right. We do not always take into account the experience of combat operations and continue to suffer losses. It's a pity. Perhaps this letter, while new combat regulations have not yet been approved, will help some commanders avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The letter is published with virtually no editing. Only spelling errors have been corrected.
- Citizen General! I can say that I am a former fighter. But first of all, I am a former SA senior sergeant who was thrown onto the battlefield in the DRA a few weeks before (as I later learned) the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.
So, with three fractures of limbs, ribs, and a severe concussion, at the age of 27 I became a gray-haired Muslim. I was “sheltered” by a Khazarian who once lived in the USSR and knew a little Russian. He walked me out. When I began to understand Pashto a little, I learned that the war in Afghanistan was over, the USSR was gone, and so on.
Soon I became a member of his family, but this did not last long. With the death of Najib, everything changed. First, my father-in-law did not return from a trip to Pakistan. By that time we had moved from near Kandahar to Kunduz. And when I returned to my house with spare parts at night, the neighbor’s boy told me in confidence that they were asking and looking for me. Two days later the Taliban took me too. So I became a “voluntary” mercenary fighter.
There was a war in Chechnya - the first. People like me, Arab-Chechens, began to be trained for jihad in Chechnya. They were prepared in camps near Mazar-i-Sharif, then sent to Kandahar. Among us there were Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, many Jordanians, and so on.
After preparation, the final instructions were given by NATO instructors. They transferred us to Turkey, where there are camps for transfer, rest and treatment of “Chechens”. They said that highly qualified doctors were also former Soviet citizens.
We were transported across the state border by rail. They drove us non-stop across Georgia. There we were given Russian passports. In Georgia we were treated like heroes. We went through acclimatization, but then the first war in Chechnya ended.
They continued to prepare us. Combat training began in the camp - mountain training. Then they transported weapons to Chechnya - through Azerbaijan, Dagestan, the Argun Gorge, the Pankisi Gorge and through Ingushetia.
Soon they started talking about a new war. Europe and the USA gave the go-ahead and guaranteed political support. The Chechens should have started. The Ingush were ready to support them. The final preparations began - studying the region, entering it, bases, warehouses (we did many of them ourselves), issued uniforms, satellite phones. The Chechen-NATO command wanted to forestall events. They were afraid that before the start of hostilities the borders with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ingushetia and Dagestan would be closed. The strike was expected along the Terek. Department of the plain part. Destruction enveloping the outer ring and the inner mesh - with a general seizure, a general search of buildings, farmsteads, etc. But no one did this. Then they expected that, having narrowed the outer ring along the Terek with captured crossings, dividing three directions along the ridges, the Russian Federation would move along the gorges to the already tightly closed border. But that didn't happen either. Apparently, our generals, excuse the freethinking, neither in the DRA nor in Chechnya have ever learned to fight in the mountains, especially not in open battle, but with gangs that know the terrain well, are well armed, and most importantly, knowledgeable. Observation and reconnaissance are carried out by absolutely everyone - women, children, who are ready to die for the praise of a Wahhabi - he is a horseman!!!
Even on the way to Chechnya, I decided that at the slightest opportunity I would return home. I took almost all my savings out of Afghanistan and hoped that 11 thousand dollars would be enough for me.
Back in Georgia, I was appointed assistant field commander. With the beginning of the second war, our group was first abandoned near Gudermes, then we entered Shali. Many of the gang were locals. They received money for the fight and went home. You search, and he sits, waits for a signal, and bargains for food from the rear for money received in battle - dry rations, stewed meat, and sometimes ammunition “for self-defense from bandits.”
I was in battles, but I didn’t kill. Mostly he carried out the wounded and dead. After one battle they tried to pursue us, and then he slapped the Arab cashier, and before dawn he left through the Kharami to Shamilka. Then for 250 bucks he sailed to Kazakhstan, then moved to Bishkek. Called himself a refugee. After working a little, I settled in and went to Alma-Ata. My colleagues lived there, and I hoped to find them. I even met Afghans, they helped me.
This is all good, but the main thing is about the tactics of both sides:
1. The bandits know the tactics of the Soviet army well, starting with the Benderaites. NATO analysts studied it, summarized it and gave us instructions back at the bases. They know and directly say that “the Russians do not study or take these issues into account,” but it’s a pity, it’s very bad.
2. The bandits know that the Russian Army is not prepared for night operations. Neither soldiers nor officers are trained to operate at night, and there is no material support. During the first war, entire gangs of 200-300 people passed through the battle formations. They know that the Russian Army does not have PSNR (ground reconnaissance radars), no night vision devices, or silent firing devices. And if so, the bandits carry out all their attacks and prepare them at night - the Russians sleep. During the day, bandits carry out forays only if they are well prepared and for sure, but otherwise they are serving time, resting, collecting information is carried out, as I already said, by children and women, especially from among the “victims,” that is, those whose husband, brother, son, etc. have already been killed. etc.
These children are undergoing intense ideological indoctrination, after which they may even commit self-sacrifice (jihad, ghazavat). And the ambushes come out at dawn. At the appointed time or on a signal - from the cache the weapon and forward. They put up “beacons” - they stand on the road or on a high-rise, from where everything can be seen. How our troops appeared and left is a signal. Almost all field commanders have satellite radio stations. Data received from NATO bases in Turkey from satellites is immediately transmitted to field workers, and they know when which column went where, what is being done in the places of deployment. Indicate the direction of exit from the battle, etc. All movements are controlled. As the instructors said, the Russians do not carry out radio control and direction finding, and Yeltsin “helped” them with this by destroying the KGB.
3. Why the huge losses of our troops on the march? Because you transport living corpses in a car, that is, under an awning. Remove awnings from vehicles in combat areas. Turn the fighters to face the enemy. Seat people facing the board, benches in the middle. The weapon is at the ready, and not like firewood, at random. The bandits' tactics are an ambush with a two-echelon arrangement: the 1st echelon opens fire first. In
The 2nd are snipers. Having killed the airborne ones, they blocked the exit, and no one will get out from under the awning, but if they try, they finish off the 1st echelon. Under the awning, people, as if in a bag, do not see who is shooting and from where. And they themselves cannot shoot. By the time we turn around, we’re ready.
Next: the first echelon shoots one at a time: one shoots, the second reloads - continuous fire is created and the effect of “many bandits”, etc. As a rule, this spreads fear and panic. As soon as the ammunition, 2-3 magazines, is consumed, the 1st echelon retreats, carries out the dead and wounded, and the 2nd echelon finishes off and covers the retreat. Therefore, it seems that there were many militants, and before they knew it, there were no bandits, and if there were, then they were 70-100 meters away, and there was not a single corpse on the battlefield.
In each echelon, carriers are appointed, who do not shoot so much as monitor the battle and immediately pull out the wounded and dead. They appoint strong men. And if they had pursued the gang after the battle, there would have been corpses, and the gang would not have left. But sometimes there is no one left to pursue. Everyone is resting in the back under the awning. That's all the tactics.
4. Taking hostages and prisoners. There are instructions for this too. It says to watch out for "wet chicken." This is what bazaar lovers are called. Since the rear doesn’t work, take a careless, careless scoundrel with a weapon “by the back” and back to the market, get lost in the crowd. And they were like that. This was the same in Afghanistan. Here is your experience, father commanders.
5. Command error - and the bandits were afraid of it. It is necessary to immediately conduct a population census along with the “cleansing operations.” We came to the village and wrote down in each house how many were where, and along the way, through the remains of documents in the administrations and through neighbors, it was necessary to clarify the actual situation in each yard. Control - the police or the same troops came to the village and checked - there were no men. Here is a list of a ready-made gang. New ones have arrived - who are you, “brothers”, and where will you be from? Inspecting them and searching the house - where did he hide the gun?!
Any departure and arrival is through registration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He joined the gang - fuck him! Wait - come - spanked. To do this, it was necessary to assign populated areas to each unit and establish control over any movement, especially at night with night vision devices, and the systematic shooting of bandits going out to gather. No one else will come out at night, no one will come from the gang.
Half of the bandits feed themselves at home thanks to this, so there are fewer problems with food. The rest is decided by our rear people, selling products on the sly. And if there was a zone of responsibility, the army commander, the military and the Ministry of Internal Affairs would control the situation through mutual efforts, and the appearance of any new one would be taken away (look for Khattab, Basayev and others from their wives, they are there in winter).
And again, don't disperse the gangs. You plant them like seedlings in a garden. Example: in the gang I was in, we were once told to urgently go out and destroy a convoy. But the informants gave inaccurate information (the observer had a walkie-talkie about the exit of the first cars, he reported and left, the rest were delayed, apparently). So the battalion hit the gang, “scattered” and “defeated”. Yeah! Each subgroup always has the task of retreating to the general gathering area of ​​the gang. And if they chased us, there was almost “0” ammunition - they fired. You need to drag two wounded and a dead man. If they hadn’t gone far, of course they would have abandoned everyone and then, perhaps, they would have left.
And so in Ingushetia, in a former sanatorium, the wounded were treated - and back into service. This is the result of “dispersion” - sowing - after 1 month the gang, rested, is assembled. This is why warlords remain alive and elusive for so long. There would be rapid response teams, with dogs, in a helicopter, and urgently to the area of ​​​​the collision with the support of the “beaten” - that is, those who were fired upon, and in pursuit. There are none.

05.10.2004 - 09:52

Where does the guy get Caucasian sadness? Our information: UNA - UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly - Ukrainian National Self-Defense). The militants of this extremist organization of Ukrainian radicals participated (or at least declared their participation) in almost all armed conflicts in the CIS. They fought in Transnistria, in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, in both Chechen companies, participated in the attack on Dagestan, and were in Gelayev’s detachment, defeated in the fall of 2001. in the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. DEBUT

The Unsovites started at home, in Ukraine, as an ultra-radical wing of Ukrainian independent nationalists. In the early 90s, they were quite integrated into the public life of Ukraine, working closely with the “People's Movement”. The first steps of the organization were pogroms of Orthodox churches in Western Ukraine. Even then, the militants drew attention to themselves for the cruelty with which they beat clergy and parishioners.

The next step was actions in Crimea, where they tried to push the Crimean Tatars to “cleanse” the peninsula of Russian speakers. It was not possible to unleash hostilities, but working contacts with Tatar nationalists were established. In 95 UNSO instructors in secret military camps located in the Crimean mountains trained Tatar youth. In 1992 The Unsovites went to the warring Transnistria, hoping to turn the unrecognized republic into the main base of the UNA-UNSO. But no matter how much the staff propagandists later extolled the numerous exploits of the “self-defense fighters” on the banks of the Dniester, their real contribution was more than modest. Many did not even notice several dozen militants with chevrons decorated with the “Jerusalem cross” and a trident, against the backdrop of thousands of Cossacks and volunteers from Russia. In the same year, hot guys appeared in the Caucasus. One of the leaders of the organization, Anatoly Lupinos, a criminal who spent 25 years in camps, through his prison “sidekick” Jabu Ioseliani, the leader of the Georgian armed forces “Mkhedrioni,” organized the sending of militants for the war against Abkhazia. Moreover, Jaba took upon himself all expenses for the transfer, weapons and payment of mercenaries. A detachment "Argo" was formed from the Unsovites, headed by Valery Bobrovich - the head of the Ivano-Frankivsk UNSO, a former merchant marine sailor, written off for drunkenness and profiteering, but posing as an officer, a participant in the Vietnam War. Abkhaz sources claim that the detachment decided mainly propaganda tasks, demonstrating to the Georgian army that "abroad will help us". Nevertheless, the “Argonauts” managed to be seen participating in reprisals against civilians. Fourteen of the mercenaries received the Order of Vakhtang Gorgasal, the highest award in Georgia. As a form of gratitude, they received one of the Mkhedrioni bases in the Kakheti mountains under their jurisdiction.

UNSO IN CHECHNYA

The organization’s first contacts with Chechen rebels date back to 1993, when Lupinos handed over to Dzhokhar Dudayev instructions for organizing terrorist attacks against civilians, developed by “scientific circles close to the UNSO.” Contacts were continued when a number of UNSO leaders, led by its then leader Dmitry Korchinsky, arrived in Grozny. And although it was not possible to meet with Dudayev, meetings took place with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov. With the latter, Korchinsky agreed that the UNSO would recruit air defense and air force specialists in Ukraine. Ukrainian mercenaries were supposed to receive three thousand dollars a month. To begin recruitment, the Chechens transferred foreign currency funds to the account of the Unsovo Eurasia Center, which was headed by the current leader of the organization, Andrei Shkil. But the outbreak of war mixed up the plans: the rebel aircraft were destroyed at the airfields, and there was also no need to talk about any air defense system. It is known that at the time of the storming of Grozny by the opposition on November 24, 1994. Korchinsky was there, and subsequently took part in the interrogations of Russian tank crews taken prisoner by the militants.

After the outbreak of hostilities, the Prometheus detachment was sent to Chechnya at the expense of Eurasia, the backbone of which was made up of militants trained in Kakheti. According to information from the Russian special services, the bulk of Ukrainian mercenaries in the rebellious republic were not “ideological” party extremists, but marginalized criminal elements recruited to participate in hostilities by special structures of the UNSO. But this contingent is also undergoing political training.

As a rule, the combat value of these “soldiers of fortune” left much to be desired, and Chechen employers did not stand on ceremony with them. So, during the assault on Novogroznensky by federal troops in 1996, By order of Raduev, five Ukrainian mercenaries were shot. Based on the testimony of captured militants, it was possible to recreate the picture of the death of the unlucky Landsknechts. When the federals pressed the rebels hard, the mercenaries “suddenly remembered” that their contract had expired and came to Raduev for payment. He said that we first needed to hand over the machine guns and ammunition. When the Ukrainians disarmed, he ordered his nukers to take them out.

Strictly speaking, two categories of Ukrainian “volunteers” in Chechnya can be distinguished. The first is UNSO activists, such as the Prometheus fighters; they solved mainly propaganda problems, showing “the solidarity of the Ukrainian people with the struggling Ichkeria.”

PR people

Along with direct participation in hostilities, members of the UNSO provided the Chechen rebels with powerful propaganda support. On the basis of local UNSO organizations, committees “in support of Chechnya” and information centers “Chechen Press” were created in large cities of Ukraine. Most of these structures subsequently became legal “roofs” of Chechen criminal communities.

In 1998 Dmitry Korchinsky organized the Caucasus Institute, the goal of which was declared to be “the creation of a broad anti-Russian front” in this region. There is information that Magomed Tagaev’s well-known book “Our Struggle, or the Rebel Army of Islam” was written by specialists from this “institute.” Wahhabi literature published by this organization is still supplied to the Volga regions, where a significant part of the population is Muslim, distributed among the diasporas of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and supplied to Central Asia.

The Caucasus Institute and the Eurasia Center work closely with the Caucasus Center of Movladi Udugov and the Vainakh Congress of Ruslan Akaev, which controls the activities of Chechen communities in Europe.

THEIR CONNECTIONS

To this day, UNSO wields significant weight in the Ukrainian establishment. For example, a member of the UNA was Leonid Kuchma’s adviser on social protection of military personnel, chairman of the All-Ukrainian Association “Fatherland”, Major General Vilen Martirosyan. The organization receives great support from the Ukrainian self-sacred “patriarch” Filaret, who achieved registration of the UNA-UNSO, from which it was removed for extremism. The Unsovites also had serious connections in the apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. For a long time, the human rights commission of the Verkhovna Rada was headed by the former leader of the UNA Oleg Vitovich. Unsovites are looking for contacts with extremist organizations in Russia.

The attempt to “make friends” with the RNE failed - the Barkashovites refused any “consultations” with the UNSO. But they managed to establish interaction with a certain Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky, a failed film director and leader of the People’s National Party (whose emblem is also the “Jerusalem” cross). According to media reports, a couple of years ago, according to the idea of ​​​​Korchinsky and Udugov, Sukharevsky was going to lead the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA-!?) in Chechnya, which should be composed of Slavs fighting on the side of the rebels.

In addition, UNA-UNSO is trying to create its own cells in the Stavropol region, Kuban, and Rostov region. Through the underground Greek Catholic order, the UNSO interacts with the intelligence structures of the Vatican, is in contact with the leader of the Italian “Red Brigades” Pietro Danutzoo, and also (according to Korchinsky) with the Masonic lodge “P-2”. Since the mid-90s, contacts have been established with Algerian fundamentalists, the IRA, American and German neo-Nazis, and the South African Iron Guard. Interviews with the leaders of these organizations, analysis of their activities, and “exchange of experience” filled the pages of UNS newspapers and magazines. It is curious that almost simultaneously the UNSO established contacts with the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Turkish Gray Wolves.

Through the Turks, they reached out to the Afghan Mujahideen of Hekmatyar, and even suggested that they create an “International of the Offended,” which would include terrorist organizations from all over the world, but they did not meet with “understanding.” There is information that contact with the Taliban movement was once established through Udugov and Yandarbiev.

WHAT NOT TO BE TALKED ABOUT

Thus, Russian special services have information that the participation of UNSO militants in mass riots organized by the Belarusian opposition in Minsk was paid from a special fund created by Western “sponsors” to overthrow the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko. But these contacts, oddly enough, are not advertised.

Ukrainian volunteer Boris Sheludchenko Una-Unso, Mercenary in Chechnya since 1995. Sheludchenko, like many other mercenaries, fought for money, $800 a week. He killed Russian military personnel in battle, according to him. Was he kind? A terrorist was detained in Khasavyurt. Citizen of Ukraine,Born 1968, a resident of the city of Lugansk Boris Sheludchenko tied himself with explosives and was going to blow himself up at the Green Market of Khasavyurt. There would be enough explosives to kill more than a dozen people around. He was carrying out an assignment from one of the Chechen field commanders, but at the last moment, sensing surveillance, he voluntarily surrendered to the police.
Sheludchenko was trained at the UNA-UNSO Saturn military camp, then was transferred to Grozny, where he took part in hostilities against federal forces. He decided to become a kamikaze of his own free will. The future widow was promised a one-time benefit - only $1,500.

“Not only for one and a half thousand dollars - even for a million I would not agree to part with my husband”

This is what FACTS managed to find out about this information. Only one Boris Shelutchenko lived and still lives in Lugansk (Boris with the surname “Shelutchenko” and a suitable year of birth does not appear among the city’s residents). And B. Sheludchenko will turn 30 in February of this year and he has no intention of ending his life ahead of schedule. Boris has a wonderful family, his wonderful wife Evgenia and three-year-old daughter Natasha. (I admit, I felt extremely awkward explaining to the person that, according to Russian media, he is now not in Ukraine, but in a Russian prison and is accused of intending to commit a terrorist act. - O.T.).

We must pay tribute to Boris, who tactfully listened to the journalist who came to him with this incredible story. And, of course, like any normal person, he was extremely surprised that somewhere his name was associated with the terrorist attack.

The last time my future wife and I left Lugansk was back in 1994 - we went to the seaside,” says Boris. - After this, we spend our vacation at our place of residence, that is, at the dacha. So there can be no talk of any North Caucasus.

We have known Boris since 1993, got married in 1995 and have always been together since then,” says Boris’s wife Evgenia. - During this time he never had any troubles with the police. In short, Boris is a law-abiding citizen, and accusing him of terrorism is simply ridiculous.

According to the Russians, “Dagestan Boris” was supposed to blow up some object along with himself, for which his wife would receive one and a half thousand dollars in compensation.

Boris Lugansky and his wife work at one of the city’s large utility companies, where they actually met. Boris works as a mechanic, and Evgeniya works as an accountant. Zhenya’s salary is just over 200 hryvnia, and Boris’s is a little less than 200 hryvnia.

The money may be small,” says Evgenia, “but, nevertheless, not just for one and a half thousand dollars - even for a million, I would not agree to part with my husband.

Where in Russia information about him could have surfaced, Boris does not know. But there are still versions, although not many. He has several aspects of his biography associated with Russia. The most important thing is the place of birth. In February 1971, he was born in the village of Boguchary, Voronezh region (Interfax calls the Ukrainian terrorist terrorist a native of the Sumy region - O.T.). In 1990, he was drafted into the army and served near Moscow in the Domodedovo region in the signal troops. By the way, the army version of the biographical information about Boris seems to his family the most likely.

According to Boris’s brother, Vladimir, it is in the army that everyone knows about each other, not to mention last name, place of residence and occupation. The demobilization albums alone are worth it - they're just a godsend for a spy! In addition to photographs and addresses, they usually record almost all the biographical information of army friends and even habits.

“Perhaps I once knew this man who now decided to use my name.”

However, one can also assume another version of how Boris’s name “surfaced”: back in 1995, at the Lugansk bus station, he lost his driver’s license, and, as is known, it contains almost all the information about the identity of its owner.

Then we were told that someone (who worked in one of the station commercial stalls) found Bori’s documents and offered to return them to us through third parties for a fee,” recalls Evgeniya. “But by that time we had already restored our rights, and we no longer needed them.”

We are not going to go anywhere, much less blow up anyone,” says Evgenia. “We are simple, honest people, we don’t wish harm to anyone, we have no enemies, so we live peacefully at home.” And then suddenly, out of the blue, our name began to be associated with the crime. This conversation is quite unpleasant, so we don’t want everyone to find out through the newspaper exactly where we live or work, and we certainly don’t want to give our photograph to the newspaper.

But if a photograph of the “Dagestan Boris” appears,” adds Boris Sheludchenko, “then it is quite likely that I would be able to recognize him. Perhaps I once knew this man who now decided to use my name.

As for the “Lvov trace” of the Ukrainian kamikaze terrorist, the head of the Lvov regional organization UNA-UNSO Ostap Kozak told FACTS that this is the first time they have heard this name in this organization.

Moreover, no one from our organization has ever been involved in recruiting mercenaries for the war in Chechnya, no one has ever even campaigned in this direction. This is pure fiction, which is not the first time that Russians have tried to spread it.

We have no information about the recruitment of mercenary militants that allegedly took place in Lviv,” Anatoly Voitovich, head of the press center of the SBU department in the Lviv region, told FACTS. According to him, this is not the first time that the Russian media are trying to “attract” for some reason the residents of Western Ukraine to “participate” in the war in Chechnya on the side of the militants. However, their information was not confirmed every time.

The Unsovites who fought in Chechnya love to talk about their almost brotherly ties with the Chechens. However, this love is not based on maxims. It has deep material roots. It was the Kiev Chechen community that for a long time provided generous funding for the party activities of the UNA-UNSO, as well as a number of their adventurous enterprises. Although the money received by party leaders was not always used for its intended purpose.

How many Ukrainians actually fought in Chechnya? No one can answer this question today. In one of his interviews, the former leader of UNA-UNSO Dmitry Korchinsky stated that in his organization there were no more than 500 “real UNSO members”. It was they who made up the organization’s “combat units.” However, not all of them took part in hostilities.

In 1992, anyone could go to the war in Transnistria - the border was nearby. There is evidence that even high school students from Kyiv schools came to “fight” back then. Some of them in Transnistria received their first “baptism of fire,” but many, after the “shelling,” no longer had any illusions about the hardships and dangers of a soldier’s life.

Ukrainians went to Abkhazia prepared. UNA-UNSO had a strict selection of the contingent. First of all, military education, or an army background, as well as excellent physical training were welcomed. And this despite the fact that in Georgia the Unsov mercenaries underwent the KMB ("young fighter course"), which was conducted according to the training system of the American Rangers.

It is known that in the UNA-UNSO the late Ukrainian dissident Anatoly Lupynos (“Uncle Tolya”) was responsible for Caucasian relations. Jaba Iosseliani, the head of the Georgian Mkhedrioni detachments, financed the sending of the Unsovites to Abkhazia. The UNA-UNSO "Argo" detachment of 150 people was led by Valery Bobrovich ("Ustim"), an officer who served in the Vietnam War and was dismissed from the army "for nationalism."

Shortly before the start of the Chechen war, Unsovites underwent military sabotage training at one of the Mkhedrioni bases in the mountains of Kakheti. The militants practiced the actions of small maneuverable groups in mountainous conditions, learned to fire a grenade launcher, and underwent sniper training. Unsovites received training weapons, ammunition and food from Ukraine in exchange for participation in pumping gasoline and diesel fuel from Chechnya.

The Unsovites began establishing their first contacts with the Chechen leadership in 1993 through Lupynos. In August 1994, a number of UNSO leaders, led by Dmitry Korchinsky, arrived in Grozny. It was not possible to meet with Dudayev himself, but it is known for sure that the meetings were with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov. The latter turned out to be the most “constructive”.

Several detachments of Unsovites, with a total number of 200-300 people, took part in the war against Russian troops. The total "contract period" was a "standard" six months. However, after the arrest of A. Lupynos by Russian special services in June 1995, the leadership of UNA-UNSO decided to concentrate its efforts on helping the “brotherly Chechen people” in the field of information warfare and propaganda. Only volunteers and adventurers were traveling to Chechnya from Ukraine.

The UNA-UNSO was also forced to change the “party policy” due to the fact that at first Maskhadov and Korchinsky agreed that the UNSO, through its military trade union, would recruit air defense and air force specialists in Ukraine from among the returning former Soviet officers, whom the Armed Forces could not accept Ukrainian forces. In the Chechen army, Ukrainian mercenaries were supposed to receive 3 thousand dollars a month. The Unsovites insisted that the minimum contract period would be 6 months, and half of the amount due for it - $9 thousand - would be paid in advance.

To carry out recruitment work, the Chechens transferred foreign currency funds to the account of the Unsovo Eurasia Center. But the outbreak of war made adjustments to the plans of the UNSO: Chechen aviation was destroyed, and the creation of air defense in combat conditions was not realistic. At the same time, an agreement was put into motion to create “information centers” in Ukraine that would “correctly” cover the war in Chechnya. In addition, UNA-UNSO promised to shelter and provide treatment to wounded Chechen fighters. By the way, the money that came from the Chechen “brothers” to the accounts of “Eurasia” was not always used for its intended purpose...

What were the apartments bought for?

Memoirs of the “federals” and stories “a la Cossack prose” by former participants in that war help to recreate the realities of the military everyday life of Ukrainian mercenaries in Chechnya.

Gennady Troshev is a Russian “trench general” and one of the key figures in the events in the North Caucasus. He came to Chechnya at the end of 1994, actually before the start of the military campaign. He commanded a group of troops of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic, was deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District, and adviser to V. Putin. In 2002, Troshev published a book entitled “My War. The Chechen Diary of a Trench General.” The memoirs are also interesting because they not only describe “from the inside” all the vicissitudes of the Russian-Chechen war, but also provide biographical and characterological sketches of many participants in this campaign.

In Chapter 9 of "My War" there is a section called "Mercenaries". Several paragraphs are devoted to militants from the UNSO. According to G. Troshev, in 1999, “in Grozny, there were about 300 mercenaries from Ukraine under the arms of bandits. Some of them fought in the first Chechen war. First of all, these were representatives of the extremely nationalist organization UNA-UNSO, which actively supplied live goods to the “Chechen front".

“Lard in the trenches” - this is what the Russian “federals” called the Ukrainian mercenaries. Nevertheless, G. Troshev notes the heroism and “desperation” of the Unsovites during the battle: “as a rule, they do not surrender,” “they fight to the last bullet.” According to the trench general, in addition to UNA-UNSO, female snipers “from Poltava and Nikolaev” fought in Chechnya: “...they killed more than one Russian soldier with their rifles.”

To be fair, it is worth noting that not only Ukrainians fought for money in Chechnya. Gennady Troshev recalls that among the mercenaries there were Arabs, Kosovo Albanians, Afghans, Turks, and Balts. “The Russians who are fighting in Chechnya against the “federals” stand apart. These are mostly criminals hiding in territory not controlled by the Russian authorities... There are also drug addicts among the Russians who are addicted to the Chechen needle. Among them there are also former Russian military personnel, for one reason or another reasons, converted to Islam and fought on the side of the militants,” the general writes.

By the way, G. Troshev speaks of UNA-UNSO representatives as “romantics”: “Many of them, when signing a contract, were guided more by a thirst for adventure than by a desire to make money.”

Ukrainian participants in Russian-Chechen campaigns also often claim that they fought “for nothing,” saying that war is a drug. In fact, this motive is true only for a small part of the Unso “greens” who went to Chechnya in search of thrills. Other mercenaries fought specifically for money. At the military-historical forum of the Russian Journal, a certain UNA-UNSO activist under the nickname “Abrek” published his memories of Chechnya. According to him, he fought on the side of the Chechens mainly at the beginning of the war from December 24, 1994 to May 1995. Then I visited twice more, but for a couple of weeks each, without participating in hostilities.

Abrek claimed that “there were no contracts, there was no monetary reward, only the supply of food and ammunition on an equal basis with local volunteers (and then taking into account the peculiarities of supplying partisan detachments and the universal chaos there).” On the other hand, “there were a lot of “beaten” guys for whom this war was not the first, but of them, no more than one and a half to two dozen people worked on a permanent basis for money (that is, they were full-fledged mercenaries), really very cool professionals.” .

The author of the collection of works "kavkaz.ua" Andrey Mironyuk (the book was published in 2004 by the Kiev publishing house "Green Dog"), as stated in the annotation, fought in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Transnistria. The novel "Skif" tells the story of the fate of a Ukrainian mercenary who fought on the side of the Chechen separatists. If you believe the author and discard the literary frame of the memoirs, then the book contains several interesting episodes concerning the issues of remuneration for the “labor” of mercenaries.

Firstly, Mironyuk writes that dispatches and “further instructions” were received from Kyiv. In addition, permanent caravans were organized to transport the wounded. That is, this may be an indirect confirmation that the Ukrainian special services or individual high military ranks were behind the UNA-UNSO, who organized constantly functioning “communication channels.”

Secondly, the author of "Skif" at the end of the novel describes how the commander of "Ustim" gives the main character the money he earned. “Ustim handed him a sealed envelope. “Yours. Earned... The trophies also counted. You can count them.” As we see, Ukrainian mercenaries did not fight for an “idea” or in search of “thrill” sensations. Many had very selfish goals.

The stories that UNA-UNSO fought in Chechnya “for nothing” raise doubts and paragraphs from the book “War in the Crowd”, which was written by Dmitry Korchinsky together with his comrades. Unsovites remember with pleasure the times when they felt like “masters of life.” D. Korchinsky himself recalled that “in Kyiv, two Chechens were engaged in politics in support of the warring Chechnya - Kako Makhauri and Ruslan Badaev. Many contacts passed through them.”
Makhauri led the Kyiv Chechen community, but was shot dead in 1997. According to some sources, it was Kako who dealt with the issue of providing “salaries” for Unsov’s mercenaries in Chechnya. By the way, it was in 1997 that Dmitry Korchinsky left UNA-UNSO...

The book “War in the Crowd” also mentions an episode when “through the mediation of Korchinsky, they tried to sell a very sophisticated pistol to Shamil Basayeva for ... 40 thousand dollars.” Apparently, the Unsovites also earned money from the arms trade. It was after the first Russian-Chechen war that many UNA-UNSO leaders got their own apartments...

Money, robbery and guns

Former and current Unsovites love to talk more about their military adventures. They are reluctant to remember other “heroes” - criminal ones. Many of them were convicted of murder, hooliganism, robbery, weapons and drug possession. Some were also detained under the article “mercenarism,” which appeared in the Criminal Code of Ukraine only a few years after the state gained independence in 1993.

It has become a tradition for UNA-UNSO to hide from justice by adding their names to the electoral lists. Many of them managed to avoid punishment in this way: if a candidate for deputy received the “ksyva”, they received a “recognizance not to leave”, and meanwhile they themselves went to the bottom. Some hid in the Carpathians, lived in remote villages, some left again “to go to war,” some went to Spain, Portugal, or Russia for long-term work.

Although not everyone was lucky. As an example, the fate of Alexander Muzychko (pseudonym “Bely”). He was born in 1962 in the Rivne region, received a special secondary education. He joined the UNA-UNSO and was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Our Right”. He fought in Chechnya and led the Unsov Viking detachment. He was one of the few who received the highest award of Chechnya from the hands of D. Dudayev himself.

Returning to Ukraine, A. Muzychko became a regular “client” of law enforcement agencies. In 1995, he severely beat his longtime “enemy.” The victim had his kidney removed, but for some reason the case never came to trial. In 1997, an Unsovite was accused of firing a pistol in one of the entertainment establishments in Kyiv. However, then the capital’s police did not have enough evidence of Muzychko’s guilt, despite the fact that the case was returned several times by both the prosecutor’s office and the court for further investigation. The UNA party nominated its member as a candidate for deputy in the 154th electoral district, which ensured his “immunity.”

However, in 1999, A. Muzychko was caught. Together with a group of “comrades,” the Unsovite kidnapped a Rivne businessman. The criminals drove him around in a car all day, demanding a “ransom” of one thousand dollars. They beat the businessman until the poor fellow's entire back became a continuous hematoma. In the evening of the same day, they were all tied up in the local disco bar "Holiday". The leadership of UNA-UNSO, as usual, tried to present pure “criminalism” in the light of the “political order of opponents.” Then there were threats against the victims, and there were attempts to give bribes. It didn't work out. As prosecutor Ivan Tsap said after the trial: “The criminals must receive a well-deserved punishment...”. On March 25, 2014, A. Muzychko (Bily) was killed in Rivne near a restaurant.

Today it is unknown where and how else the “fighters” from UNA-UNSO, for whom war is their mother, and whose charter is the “Doctrine of Destabilization,” can manifest themselves. In which electoral blocs will former accomplices of Khattab and Basayev appear? Today, Ukrainian militants are about forty. It's time to go into big politics. And they will go. All that remains is to find a sponsor...

07/14/2003, Photo: AP, GAMMA, ITAR-TASS

Contract for terrorist attack

The practice of terrorist attacks using kamikazes was brought to Chechnya by Arab mercenaries. They are the ones behind the preparation and financing of the latest terrorist attack in Tushino. He talks about who is fighting in Chechnya and for how long and is training terrorists there. Olga Allenova .

There were three Arabs, they were lying on the frozen ground, next to the trench in which they had fought off the advancing federals for several days. There were spent cartridges, used syringes, some papers and brochures in Arabic lying everywhere. The Arabs had waxen faces, bare feet and torn trousers. All the rest of their clothes lay in a heap of rags nearby. It was in the fall of 1999 on the Tersky Ridge, which had just been recaptured by the federals.

Mercenaries,” explained the army officer assigned to accompany us. “It’s good that they died here, but would have fallen into our hands... Apparently, the Muslim god took pity on them.”

These Arabs came to the Tersky Range from the nearby Chechen village of Serzhen-Yurt, where for a long time there was the camp of the field commander Khattab, the man who opened the way to Chechnya for foreign mercenaries.

Khattab was enriched by the war

Mercenary as a phenomenon appeared on the territory of the former USSR in the early 90s, when the country was torn apart by local conflicts. Abkhazia, Transnistria, Fergana, Karabakh - wherever another interethnic war broke out, people appeared who were ready to sacrifice their lives for money. The Ukrainian organization UNA-UNSO was especially famous at that time: in 1992 it sent several detachments to protect the Ukrainians of Transnistria, in July 1993 it sent the Argo expeditionary force to Abkhazia, which fought near Sukhumi on the side of Georgia (seven “UNS members”, the Georgian government posthumously awarded the Order of Vakhtang Gorgasal); and in 1994, the UNA-UNSO Viking unit arrived in Chechnya. They were received everywhere with open arms, because they knew that the “Unsovites” were good, disciplined warriors, and it was not a pity to pay money to a good warrior. Ukrainians were used to create special units in the regular army of Ichkeria; they were used as instructors to train Chechen soldiers.

However, by that time, the “king of mercenaries”, the Jordanian Khattab, had already appeared in Chechnya, who brought with him 200 dark-skinned fighters - they became the main military force of young Ichkeria. These fighters, who went through the war in Afghanistan, were supposed to teach inexperienced Chechen soldiers all the rules of the art of war.

The peak of mercenary activity came at the beginning of the second Chechen war - Wahhabism dominated in Chechnya and the mountains of Dagestan, and a lot of money went to the Caucasus to maintain and spread it. By that time, several camps for training militants and terrorists (including suicide bombers) were already operating on the territory of the republic, the instructors of which were exclusively foreign mercenaries, mainly from Arab countries. According to operational data, these camps trained up to 40 people for suicide bombers alone. This “concern” was led directly by Khattab, who received money from international terrorist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. It was at the instigation of Khattab that the second Chechen war was especially bloody, more intelligent and protracted. During this war, the Jordanian became a wealthy man, earning, according to operational data, about $20 million, and his assistants Abubakar and Abu al-Walid, according to various estimates, about $5-7 million.

Road to hell

People become mercenaries deliberately. Those who are not afraid of risk and, in principle, are ready to die, but for good money, go for it. This method of earning money is especially common in the Middle East: the standard of living there is low, families are large, and not everyone has the opportunity to feed their family and provide it with a decent future.

It all starts with the recruiter gathering a small group and the recruits immediately receive an agreed amount to leave money for the family. Usually it’s $1-2 thousand. “If you become a real mujahideen, you will receive

Big money, enough to last a lifetime,” the recruiter promises the recruit. Then a group of future Mujahideen are transported “to the base”, where they will be molded into militants.

In a number of countries there are clandestine centers for training mercenaries. Almost all the mercenaries who ended up in Chechnya went through such centers in Afghanistan, not counting Khattab and his closest associates - they “received their education” in the United States.

Training lasts a couple of months, and by the end of this period, inexperienced recruits turn out to be real “dogs of war.” They wield any type of weapon, can make a landmine from a used artillery shell, and read and make maps. They have skills in contact combat, sniper and mine-sabotage warfare. They know how to fight in the city and in the mountains, how to lure them into a “sack” and break up a military column, and how to survive in a winter forest.

If someone shows technical ability, the instructor takes him to a special group specializing in sabotage activities. A demolition specialist is highly valued by commanders; he is paid more, because often the earnings of the entire squad depend on his work. As a rule, explosions and attacks on columns are recorded on film so that the customer can be sure that the work is done and the money paid is not in vain.

Graduates of the sabotage camp are divided into small groups and secretly transported to the conflict zone. In the case of Chechnya, the mercenaries used the routes Turkey-Georgia-Chechnya or Azerbaijan-Dagestan-Chechnya.

Mercenaries receive weapons, uniforms and medicines on the spot. A small first aid kit must contain potent drugs: sometimes they are used to relieve the pain of a wound, and sometimes before a battle to gain courage. They are taught this wisdom back in the camp: “If you want to kill fear, give an injection.” Many people can no longer do without these injections.

In the first battle, they are still checked to see if the hand will tremble, if the person will take pity on the wounded enemy, if he will not run away from the battlefield. However, for the frightened, awkward and insecure, the first battle still becomes the last: they get lost and fall under bullets. The survivors are formed into units that are already assigned complex tasks.

After each successful operation, the squad leader receives the money and distributes it among his men, usually keeping the lion's share for himself. For example, for the destruction of a military column, a detachment receives $40 thousand: the commander takes 20 of them for himself, 10 is divided between two or three of his deputies, and the rest is given to the soldiers. An ordinary militant who participated in the defeat of the convoy receives approximately $1 thousand for his work. And the one who plants a landmine on the road receives only a hundred dollars.

Most mercenaries realize after a couple of months that they won’t see the big money promised, but they have nowhere to go: when they try to escape, they can shoot their own as a traitor, or the federals will cover them. However, many fighters in civilian life would not be able to earn even a third of the amount they receive, so the thought of returning home rarely occurs to them.

Live to Die

In the winter of 2000, a detachment of Arab mercenaries was leaving the high-mountainous Shatoi region, heading towards the Russian-Georgian border, and was ambushed by FSB special forces. After a fierce battle, the detachment was left with six seriously wounded mercenaries, of which only one, a Yemeni, reached the military base in Khankala. His name was Abdu-Salam Zurka, his spine was crushed and his foot was torn off. He almost didn’t answer questions; it was useless to beat him: the military doctor who examined the prisoner said that he had a day or two to live. Therefore, the security officers postponed the usual interrogation procedure. In order to demonstrate the Arab mercenary to journalists, he was taken out of the FSB tent on a stretcher and laid on the ground. He didn't notice anything - neither the TV cameramen running around, nor the newspaper men looking at him like a rare animal - he simply crossed his arms over his chest and looked detachedly at the sky. Looking at his face, it was difficult to understand whether he was alive or already on his way to another world.

Zurka was the commander of a detachment of 50 people and reported to Khattab. In the winter of 2000, his detachment distinguished itself in the battles for Grozny and left the city only after the field commander Basayev, who commanded the defense of the Chechen capital, decided to do so. Together with Basayev's fighters, the Arabs fell into a trap set by General Shamanov - in a minefield, Zurka lost half of his squad, and he himself was wounded.

But the Yemeni spent most of his time in Chechnya in the vicinity of Serzhen-Yurt, where Khattab’s base was located. Zurka was quite close to the Jordanian himself: he received money for the detachment directly from him.

The military learned these details from captured Arabs who did not live to reach Khankala. They also named the amount that the Yemeni earned from this war - about $500 thousand.

The official army fiercely hates mercenaries, and they understand: if they fall into the hands of soldiers, the chances of getting out alive are reduced to zero. If a Chechen was captured, relatives brought money for him, organized rallies, and sometimes organized an exchange. Nobody asked for the captured mercenaries - they were captured mainly because their comrades abandoned them wounded on the battlefield. Moreover, even after the heaviest battle, the Chechens carried away their wounded and dead. And the wounded or killed mercenaries were left to the federales. However, the mercenaries never recognized the cult of death, widespread in Chechnya, otherwise they would hardly have gone to fight in a foreign country, where people like them were not even buried - they simply dumped their bodies in a hole and covered them with earth.

Their escape routes are also cut off. If a Chechen militant can change clothes and return home, where it will not be easy to identify him, then a mercenary who decides to relax for a couple of days in a village will probably fall into the hands of the special services: after all, it is difficult to explain what a foreigner is doing in a conflict zone.

Chinese chefs

In fact, it is virtually impossible to prove that a detained foreigner (if he is captured without weapons) is a mercenary. Not a single one of the detainees, even under torture, admits that they shot at representatives of the official authorities. Moreover, according to Russian laws, a foreigner detained in a combat zone must be released if guilt is not proven. But this irritated the military in Chechnya very much. “We know that this nit shot at our boys, and so that we let him go?!” - both soldiers and officers reasoned approximately this way. Therefore, few foreigners returned to their homeland: the lucky ones were those about whom the media managed to tell and in whom their embassies became interested. Although for some, returning to their homeland promises even more trouble.

In March 2000, after fierce fighting in the Chechen village of Komsomolskoye, FSB officers detained 11 militants from Ruslan Gelayev’s detachment, among whom were two Chinese citizens, ethnic Uyghurs. Saidi Aishan and Aymayerdzyan Amuti tried to get out of the encirclement under the guise of refugees. During interrogations, they said that they worked as cooks in Grozny: Saidi Aishan explained that he was the owner of a cafe, and the second Uighur helped him. When the bombing of Grozny began, they, together with the Chechens, went to the mountains and ended up in the Komsomolskoye area. When asked what the Uyghurs did in the militant group, the detainees replied: “We cooked food, we can’t do anything else.” They told journalists the same thing, and the story about the restaurant business in Grozny looked very plausible.

The feds were never able to prove their guilt, despite the fact that after a week of interrogation the Uighurs were barely moving. True, they were nevertheless charged with illegally crossing the state border. It turned out that before Chechnya, Aishan and Amuti lived in Alma-Ata, where a large Uighur diaspora settled - their compatriots recognized them. Here they were engaged in racketeering of Chinese shuttle traders trading in markets in Kazakhstan. Here they ended up in the underground terrorist organization “Liberation of East Turkestan”. After six months of consultations with the Chinese side, the FSB decided to transfer the Uighurs to the Chinese Embassy. For Aishan and Amuti, staying in Russia would be a blessing, because in their homeland they faced the death penalty for participating in gangs.

Court in uniform

But many of those with whom the Uyghurs shared bread in the Chechen mountains were not even dealt with. At the height of hostilities, these could easily be attributed to combat losses. During the battles for Komsomolskoye, either special forces, or the GRU, or the FSB brought three bloodied Arabs to Khankala: they were unloaded from a helicopter and taken to a special tent that served as a pre-trial detention center. In the evening, the guys from the special forces came to the journalists to call home on a satellite phone. We started asking them about the detainees.

We were working with a house that was on the edge; it was too early to go deeper,” the guys readily said. “The house was blown up, six people were taken, but we don’t know how many of them were there in total.”

But they only brought three,” we were surprised. “Where are the other three?”

Yes, they accidentally fell out of the helicopter,” the guys laughed.

And then I got into a conversation with one of these special forces.

“In my memory, there are at least four foreigners with whom we worked directly,” he said. “I can’t talk about the whole of Chechnya, because we worked point-by-point: we gave a tip that strangers had appeared in such and such a village, and we Let's move there. In one of these raids they took a gang of seven people - they came to the village to rest and pick up supplies that had already been prepared for them. Among them were two Arabs and one Jordanian. We held them for almost two months, but didn’t get anything out of them. They have a story they know by heart: “We came to help our brothers in faith, because we thought that the Russians were oppressing Islam, but then we realized that we were mistaken, and it was too late to leave, they were bombing all around.” We cross-examined them, and made threats, and made all sorts of promises, but they understand perfectly well: once you confess to being a mercenary, that’s it, you can’t get out. In short, two were sent to their homeland, where their relatives came to the rescue, and the third died, something happened to his heart. But the most interesting incident happened later, near Urus-Martan they captured three more - two Chechens and a Turk. The Turk claimed that he came to Chechnya to teach Islam in schools. We collected information, it turned out that he doesn’t even know Arabic, how did he read the Koran? Locals, however, confirmed that he actually taught before the war, but not in a regular school, but in a Wahhabi school, there was such a school in Urus-Martan. And when the war began, he went with the militants to the mountains. It is clear that he did not read books in the detachment. But it is impossible to prove this. He also stayed with us for several months, groveling, ready to crawl on his knees, but he never confessed. When asked if he had picked up a weapon, he swore that he had not. “I’m a scientist,” he said. We let him go. Yes, that’s how they released me, to Urus-Martan. Where should I put it? We can’t pay for his way home, but what should we do with him? He was in Urus-Martan for several days and then disappeared. Where? Don't know. I know that people from Gelayev came to the city and tried to take him to Georgia. Apparently he was a big man after all. But they didn’t find it. Someone must have swatted the poor guy.

Maybe he really didn’t fight? - I asked.

That's what they all say. Whoever you detain, he will either pretend to be a builder or a cook. Or even a hostage. Only we have radio interception data, we hear Arabic speech, we hear them discussing the operations they carried out. And they don’t hide about the money: for a small terrorist attack it’s 100 bucks, for a medium one - 500-1000, and a large one like blowing up an entire column will cost 15 “pieces”.

The end is just the beginning

With the death of the "black god of war" Khattab, the mercenary movement was decapitated. The Jordanian’s assistants tried to take the profitable business into their own hands, but their customers had less confidence in them, and many commanders who had their own ideas for vacant positions refused to obey them. In addition, the aggravated situation in Palestine and the war in Afghanistan and Iraq forced Arab “financiers” to switch to other territories. The Chechen resistance began to fade away. Today in the mountains of Chechnya there are no more than a dozen mercenaries who simply do not know how to get out of Chechnya, which is actually blocked by the federals. They are not included in the amnesty announced to members of gangs.

Mercenaries died, but not the war waged by mercenaries. The ranks of the resistance have been replenished with “ideological” fighters “for the freedom of Ichkeria,” and these fighters will not be stopped by hunger, cold, or empty pockets. This was confirmed by the latest terrorist attack at the festival in Tushino, where two Chechen women, who, according to operational data, had undergone combat and ideological training from Arab instructors, exploded in the crowd.

Achievement list. The most famous mercenary of Chechnya

Information about the life of Habib Abd-el-Rahman Khattab is very contradictory. Born in 1963 (according to other sources, in 1965, 1966, 1970) in Jordan or Saudi Arabia into a wealthy Chechen family.

In 1987, he graduated from high school and went to college in the United States (a number of media reported that Khattab “took part in hostilities in Afghanistan” and “served in the Circassian guard of King Hussein” since 1982). In the 90s, according to the media, he fought in Afghanistan (in mujahideen detachments), Tajikistan (on the side of the Islamic opposition), Iraq (with whom the war was fought is unknown). He was wounded several times and lost two fingers.

At the same time, he met bin Laden and the leading theoretician of Islamic extremism, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, Seyid Qutb. Allegedly graduated from the military academy in Amman. He became an expert in explosives and all types of light weapons, as well as sabotage operations. In 1994 or 1995 he arrived in Chechnya, where he became one of the field commanders. He became widely known in April 1996 after organizing an ambush on a convoy of the 245th motorized rifle regiment near the village of Yarysh-Mardy in the Argun Gorge. Then 53 soldiers were killed and 52 were wounded.

In the summer of 1998, he became close to Shamil Basayev on the basis of organizing the Islamic Imamate in the North Caucasus. He created a number of sabotage schools, in which women also studied, who later became martyrs. Together with Basayev, he led the invasion of Dagestan in August 1999. In September 1999, according to the Prosecutor General's Office, he organized explosions in Buinaksk, Volgodonsk and Moscow, earning about $700 thousand from this. And in March 2001 - terrorist attacks in Mineralnye Vody, Essentuki and Karachay-Cherkessia. Khattab's largest operation was the breakthrough of one and a half thousand Mujahideen from the Vedeno Gorge in February-March 2000.

Personnel. How many mercenaries are there in Chechnya?

According to the operational directorate of the North Caucasus Military District, during the first war (1994-1996), one large unit of up to 200 people from Khattab’s Arab mercenaries operated on the territory of Chechnya. In addition to this detachment, volunteers (mainly from Ukraine and the Baltic states) also fought in the rank and file of the armed forces of Ichkeria. Moreover, Khattab’s detachment, nicknamed “Indians” by the federal forces, continued sabotage activities even after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreement, not limiting itself to the borders of Chechnya. In 1997, he blew up and fired at a convoy in North Ossetia.

The most intense influx of mercenaries into Chechnya was observed in 1998-1999 before and during the militant invasion of Dagestan. Military analysts associate the increased interest of foreign mercenaries in the republic with the growing role of Wahhabi ideology in Chechnya. By that time, several training camps were already operating in the republic, the instructors of which were exclusively foreigners. The general management of the volunteers was carried out by the same Khattab.

From 1999 to 2000, the number of mercenaries in the republic remained unchanged - within 600-700 people. In 2000, a strong outflow of volunteers from Chechnya began due to the successful actions of federal troops and the strained relations between Khattab and Maskhadov. In addition, the aggravation of the situation in Palestine played a role - the main financial flows to fuel terrorism were redirected there.

By 2001, the number of mercenaries remaining in Chechnya had been reduced to 200-250 people. The intensification of the Afghan Taliban, which caused an even greater outflow of volunteers from Chechnya, and the intensified work of the special services after September 11 affected both the financing of mercenaries and their freedom of movement. Since 2000, the Pankisi Gorge has become the main base for volunteers, and clashes involving Arabs occurred mainly in the border regions of Chechnya.

Today, the total number of mercenaries operating on the territory of the Chechen Republic is negligible. After the liquidation of Khattab, the command of the units subordinate to him passed to his closest associate Abu al-Walid, and the flow of money to support volunteers in Chechnya practically ceased. In addition, some of the mercenaries who fought in Chechnya left Russia during the aggravation of the situation around Iraq.

A murderous chronicle. Suicide bombers and suicide bombers

Terrorist attacks using kamikazes were the hallmark of Arab extremists. In Russia, they began to take place after Arab instructors and preachers of Wahhabism appeared here.

June 6, 2000 In Chechnya, they carried out a suicide bombing attack for the first time. It was performed by Arbi Barayeva's niece Khava. She broke through to the commandant's office building in Alkhan-Yurt in a truck with TNT. Security shot up the truck. As a result of the explosion, two riot policemen and Barayev were killed.

June 11, 2000 At a checkpoint in Grozny, a suicide bomber blew up a car. Two servicemen were killed and one was wounded.

July 2, 2000 In Chechnya, suicide bombers carried out five terrorist attacks. Two explosions occurred in Gudermes, one each in Novogroznensky, Urus-Martan and Argun. 33 police officers were killed and 84 were injured.

December 19, 2000 Mareta Dudueva tried to break through with explosives to the building of the Leninsky regional police department in Grozny, but was wounded and did not carry out the explosion.

April 9, 2001 In the toilet of the Government House building in Grozny, an explosion killed a cleaner and injured two women. The deceased was a suicide bomber.

November 29, 2001 The suicide bomber blew herself up together with the commandant of Urus-Martan, Heydar Gadzhiev.

February 5, 2002 16-year-old Zarema Inarkaeva carried explosives into the building of the Zavodsky District Department of Internal Affairs in Grozny, but only she herself suffered from the explosion.

October 23, 2002 in Moscow, Movsar Barayev’s group, which included female suicide bombers, captured about 900 people in the theater center on Dubrovka. During the operation of the special services, all terrorists were destroyed. 129 hostages died.

December 27, 2002 A 15-year-old girl and two men blew up two cars near the Government House in Grozny. 72 people were killed, 210 were injured.

May 12, 2003 In the village of Znamenskoye, Nadterechny district of Chechnya, two women and a man blew up a KamAZ truck near the district administration building. 60 people were killed and more than 250 were injured.

May 14, 2003 near the village of Iliskhan-Yurt, Gudermes region of Chechnya, a terrorist blew herself up in a crowd of people at a religious holiday. 16 people were killed and more than 140 were injured.

June 5, 2003 In Mozdok, a woman blew herself up near a bus carrying personnel from a military airfield. 20 people were killed, 14 were injured.

June 20, 2003 In Grozny, a woman and a man blew up a KamAZ truck with explosives near the building of the operational search bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 36 people were injured. Only terrorists died.

July 5, 2003 In Moscow, two female suicide bombers blew themselves up at the rock festival in Tushino. 13 people were killed and 50 were injured.

A blue-eyed bearded guy in a camouflage jacket gives an interview. The image is blurry, the recording is rare, it is 20 years old. But on his hat you can see a green bandage with the inscription “Ukraine”. His brothers in arms wear the same ones. But their armbands say “Allahu Akbar.”

- What are you doing here? - the journalist asks him.

“We are stealing the freedom of the Chechen-Ukrainian people against Moscow aggression,” the guy answers confidently.

-Are there many of your people here?

“200 guys,” the fighter switches to Russian.

- How do they fight?

- As the others. Like the Chechens, so are the Ukrainians. They fight well. And when we attack Moscow, we will fight even better,” it’s not easy for him to speak perfect Russian. It is obvious that his native language is Ukrainian.

This person is Alexander Muzychko, aka Sashko Bily, a Rivne activist of the right-wing radical organization UNA-UNSO, who was killed by Kyiv special forces in March 2014 during his arrest. In the video, he is a little over 30, he is the commander of the Viking detachment, which fights against the Russian army during the first Chechen war.

If he had remained alive, he would probably have become one of the main defendants in the “large-scale criminal case about Ukrainian militants,” which began to be considered in the Grozny court this week.

According to Russian human rights activists, it was discovered back in 2001, but the investigation was not very active. Events on the Maidan, the situation in Crimea and the war in Donbass contributed to the fact that Russian investigators have shaken off the dust from the yellowed pages.

In the dock were the famous Unsovite, ally of Dmitry Yarosh Nikolai Karpyuk and journalist Stanislav Klykh. Karpyuk is accused of creating a gang of mercenaries to travel to Chechnya and killing Russian soldiers during the 1994-1995 war. Klykh is charged with participation in a gang and torture (Article 209 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - leadership and participation in a gang and Article 102 - murder of two or more military personnel).

For more than a year, neither lawyers nor human rights activists could approach both prisoners. Klykh has already stated that he gave all his confessions under torture.

Companions of those arrested unanimously assure that neither Karpyuk nor Klykh were in Chechnya during the war. But recently, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the Tyagnibok brothers and Dmitry Yarosh, who, according to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, also fought on the side of the Chechen militants, joined them in the same row. Their names gave the case of the “Caucasian captives” a political overtone.

In any case, Sashko Bily is far from the only Ukrainian who has made his mark in Chechnya. What were the Ukrainians looking for in that war? What do you remember about your comrades and enemies? Many participants in those events hid the details of their stay in Chechnya for a long time. While in Grozny, the Ukrainians tried not to be included in photographs and videos.

And amateur photographs were carefully stored in their photo archives. Excessive attention could cost them their freedom in Ukraine, where Article 447 “Mercenarism” appeared in the Criminal Code. In connection with the criminal case in Russia, some of them, without denying the “Chechen stage” in their lives, refuse to share their memories for fear of persecution. Those who agreed often avoid tough questions. But still, they shared their memories with journalists from the Reporter publication.

Road

Evgeny Diky, then a journalist and head of the humanitarian mission of the Ukrainian human rights committee “Helsinki-90,” recalls. He arrived in Grozny at the beginning of 1995. He accompanied a cargo of medicines, collected information as a journalist and human rights activist at the front and in the rear. He left Chechnya in April 1996, when the active phase of the war ended.

— The desire to go to Chechnya was spontaneous. When Ukraine learned that Russia did not recognize the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and was going to suppress the rebellion, those who wanted to go had only one question: who would be better at negotiating the transfer? The core of the “Ukrainian corps” is several dozen people with combat experience in Afghanistan, Transnistria, and Abkhazia. Ours reached the border of Dagestan with Chechnya. Transfer is a big word. In fact, they could drive through a mountain river at night on a tractor. This was done brazenly - there was a bridge a kilometer away that was controlled by the Russians.

Among the Ukrainians there were those who made themselves newspaper employee IDs, which were a good screen. They really made good reports without letting go of the machine gun.

“The day before New Year’s 1995, we arrived in Baku and met with Chechen friends there,” recalls Igor Mazur (call sign Topol), head of the Kyiv branch of UNA-UNSO, one of the defendants in the Russian criminal case. — At that time, tank columns were already heading towards Grozny, and it was possible to get to Chechnya through Dagestan. We drove through normally, but several of our guys were taken from Grozny by their parents. When they found out where their sons were going, they came to the leadership of UNA-UNSO and demanded that the children be returned back.

During the war, the Chechens found themselves under an information blockade. Ukrainian journalists tried to break through it

Motive

The main motive for the Ukrainians’ trip to Chechnya was cited by the Russian media as money, which the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev allegedly generously gifted to foreign specialists. But not everything is so simple. Some Ukrainians already had military experience, first gained in Afghanistan. UNSO activists, in turn, polished it in Transnistria and Abkhazia.

“Only a small part of the people who passed through Chechnya fall under the definition of “mercenaries,” says Evgeniy Dikiy. “They received a handsome reward.” But the overwhelming majority were ordinary volunteers who fought for free. They received clothing and food allowances, like other soldiers. The Chechens did not throw money away. What's the point of paying for something that a local will do for free? And to get money, you had to have unique skills. For example, to be a sapper or a MANPADS operator.

There were certainly such people among Ukrainians. We are talking about military personnel who went through Afghanistan. Obviously, it was not only money or an idea that forced them to change one war to another. But rather a post-war syndrome.

Azerbaijani photographer Tagi Jafarov, who worked in Grozny during the first Chechen war, wrote about one of these Ukrainians in his memoirs:

“Victor, on the contrary, is silent. He is originally from Kharkov. Victor does not make noise, does not share his emotional impressions of the battle. He speaks quietly, taking his time. He is a professional man, Afghanistan has passed. There is a wife and children at home... And not a crest, a Russian.

- Vit, how did you get here? Also for money?

“No, money has nothing to do with it,” pause. I'm waiting for him to speak. - You see, we put so many of them in Afghanistan. Villages were swept to the ground and burned. For what? In the name of what? There are many of them on my conscience. This is where I atone for Afghan sins. Maybe I’ll get credit for it.”

UNSO activists never denied that they went to Chechnya because of ideological anti-imperial views. They saw that war through the prism of Ukrainian independence, obtained bloodlessly. For the same reason, the passionate Balts ended up in Chechnya.

“Then it seemed to us like this: in order not to have a front in Crimea, we need to keep it in the Caucasus,” recalls former head of UNA-UNSO Dmitry Korchinsky.

“It may be difficult to understand now, but many were emotionally inclined to say: “You can’t crush people with tanks because they wanted independence!” - says Wild. — Ukraine and the Baltic countries also chose independence. So now they will be pressured like this too? That’s why they went to help, fearing the return of the empire.

“Hundreds of our wounded soldiers received treatment in Ukraine,” recalls Musa Taipov, a member of the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. — They brought us humanitarian aid. And Ukrainian journalists broke through the information blockade, telling the world about the true events in the Russian-Chechen war. It was extremely difficult to get to us and then take out the footage.

300 Ukrainians

Data on how many Ukrainians went to Chechnya as fighters varies.

The representative of the ChRI government, Musa Taipov, speaks of two dozen people, four of whom died. One was captured.

According to Evgeniy Diky’s calculations, about 300 Ukrainians visited Chechnya during the war, 70 of whom passed through the Unsov detachment. One of the UNSO commanders Valery Bobrovich, who fought
in Abkhazia (he led the Argo detachment), gives a figure of 100 people.

“They treated the wounded, provided security, sent out humanitarian aid,” Dmytro Yarosh, whose patriotic organization “Trizub” collaborated with Dzhokhar Dudayev, recalled in an interview with Hromadsky. “I turned to Dudayev with a request to form a Ukrainian unit. But I received the answer: “Thank you, but we have fewer weapons than people willing.” That's why we didn't go.

Igor Mazur assures that he, like other Ukrainians, accompanied foreign journalists more than he fought.

“The journalists still trusted us, the Slavs, more than the Caucasians,” recalls Mazur.

“The wounded were transported through Georgia,” he says. — In Ukraine, besides ours, Chechens were also treated. Mostly they received assistance in Western Ukraine. This was done seemingly secretly, but it only seemed so. Everyone knew. The official position of Ukraine was as follows: we categorically deny Ichkeria, have no contacts with them, condemn the participation of Ukrainians, and can give an article to mercenaries. In practice, there were no trials; no one was extradited to Russia.

Meeting

Evgeniy Dikiy recalls that in Chechnya any person of Slavic appearance raised a lot of questions. But as soon as they said that he was Ukrainian, he immediately became a dear guest.

“The Ukrainian passport was a universal pass,” says Diky. — The Chechens really appreciated the fact that Ukrainians were practically the only volunteers from non-Muslim countries who came to fight on their side. They understood that no one owed them anything, that coming here was the highest manifestation of friendship.

This same factor became the reason for hatred on the part of Russians.

“They could not understand why the Slavs turned against them, why they became traitors,” continues Evgeniy. “In order not to be captured by them, ours always had the last grenade with them.” They understood: if they were taken prisoner, there would be no trial.

And in order not to stand out among the Caucasians, Ukrainians grew beards. Following the example of the Chechens, green ribbons were tied to machine guns and uniforms.

Kharkov resident Oleg Chelnov (call sign Berkut) stood out more than others among the Ukrainians.
Among nationalists and participants in those events, he is considered an even more iconic figure than Sashko Bily. Both were awarded the highest award by Dzhokhar Dudayev - the Order of Honor of the Nation.

“He was not a member of the UNSO when he arrived in Chechnya,” recalls Igor Mazur. - But before this war, I went through hot spots, was a liquidator at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. I could never sit in one place: I wanted to figure out where the truth was and where the lies were.

There were legends about his dashing character in Chechnya.

When there were street battles and the Chechens and Russians were in the neighboring front doors, in this chaos and confusion Chelnov could fly up to the Russian paratroopers and shout: “Why are you still here? Behind me!"

“He was fair-haired, blue-eyed, dressed in a trophy uniform,” recalls Dikiy. - They believed him. And he brought these Russians to the Chechens, who then “packed” them. Chelnov also found out that many of the Russian military’s call signs have not changed since Afghanistan. He took advantage of it. He went on the air under the call sign of the commander and caused crossfire so that one battery “kneaded” the other.

Chelnov died in Grozny in 1996. Sashko Bily said in one of his interviews that
the government of Ichkeria named a street in honor of Oleg, and his daughter was given a lifelong allowance. Naturally, after the second Chechen war, these privileges for the Ukrainian family were eliminated. The street named after him, like the street named after Muzychko, no longer exists in Grozny.

A detachment of Unsovites arrived in Grozny in the winter of 1995. According to unofficial data, about 300 Ukrainians passed through Chechnya

Torture

In the Russian media, Sashko Bily appeared as the personal security guard of Dzhokhar Dudayev. He was portrayed as an extremely cruel person who practiced sophisticated torture on prisoners.

“You can’t call him an easy person,” Dikiy recalls. - Heavy character. A commander who does not spare himself, first of all, and then his soldiers. He didn’t give a damn about laws, but he didn’t give a damn about concepts. He did not torture prisoners. Moreover, it was an invaluable exchange fund. I can be a living witness to those events, I communicated with prisoners, including those who were with Bily.

“Bily was among the three dozen fighters who guarded the building of the Republican Committee,” says Dikiy. - But this is not Dudayev’s personal security. Moreover, Bily did not command her.

Ukrainian journalist Viktor Minyailo, who visited Chechnya twice during the 1994-1996 war, recalls how one of Chechnya’s military leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, wrote a note in which he addressed all his subordinates with the order to release any Ukrainian from captivity, no matter who he was.

“This concerned the Ukrainians fighting on the side of the federals,” says Minyailo. — Those who were born in Ukraine. They were indeed released unconditionally.

“The torture took place during the second Chechen war,” assures Musa Taipov. “But it was a different war - fierce and outside the rules. As for the first war, Ukrainian volunteers did not torture Russian soldiers.

“The brutality occurred as peaceful villages were bombed,” Dikiy recalls. “The secular Chechens, most of whom died in the first Chechen war, were replaced by “wolf cubs” - teenagers who grew up under bombs and listened to preachers instead of lessons. Their teenage cruelty
and low cultural level ultimately formed the image of a “Chechen bandit.”

Return

According to the recollections of the fighters, the UNSO detachment returned home in the spring of 1995, when the war turned from open to partisan.

Musa Taipov says that this was the desire of the Chechen military command.

“In the second Chechen war there were fewer Ukrainians—two to three dozen,” says Yevgeny Dikiy. “These are those who could not stand it and returned to the field commanders, under whose leadership they fought in the first Chechen war. Some of them already lived in Chechnya, having converted to Islam.

Members of the UNSO, recalling those days, say that their participation in the Chechen war, as well as their attitude
to them in Ukraine, was under the close attention of the SBU, which has not lost close ties with its Russian colleagues.

“Those who returned from Chechnya tried not to advertise their exploits,” recalls journalist Viktor Minyailo. — They were afraid of criminal liability.

And there really were no high-profile trials on this matter. Although the Ukrainians who participated in the Georgian-Abkhaz war served four months behind bars on suspicion of mercenarism.

“We were released at the request of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze,” recalls the head of the Ukrainian Argo detachment, Valery Bobrovich. “He said that keeping us, the heroes of Georgia, awarded with state awards, in custody is disrespectful on the part of Ukraine.

The past is with us again

The participation of Ukrainians in wars in the post-Soviet space after Afghanistan has long been an irrelevant topic in most Ukrainian media. There was no widespread support or condemnation on television.

“This was interesting only to those who were aware of the events,” says political scientist Mikhail Pogrebinsky. “The special services didn’t pay much attention to this either.

“Ukraine was a “sleeping” country then,” adds political scientist Vadim Karasev. — We were more concerned then about the issue of Crimea, “bagism” — Yuri Meshkov at that time was a representative of the pro-Russian bloc “Russia”, served as president of the Republic of Crimea in 1994-1995. And for us, the situation then unfolded according to the separatist scenario.

History develops in a spiral. The ideas of the UNSO radicals about the coming war, which were laughed at in Ukraine 20 years ago, have become a reality. Ukraine and Russia are not officially at war, but battles are taking place on all fronts - informational, economic, for territories and for the souls of those who live on them.

The paradox is that at that time passionate Ukrainians supported the Chechens’ right to self-determination, although for the majority of the population television painted a different picture. Today Russia, in justifying Crimea and Donbass, talks about the people’s right to self-determination. Historical parallels suggest themselves. The counterattack of Chechen militants on Grozny during Operation Jihad ended with the retreat of Russian troops and huge losses (about 2 thousand people). This defeat can be compared with the Ilovaisk tragedy. In 1996, Russia was forced to sign the Khasavyurt agreements, which actually opened the way to the independence of Ichkeria. After Ilovaisk, a battle that changed the course of the military campaign, Ukraine signed the Minsk agreements, which are comparable in meaning to the agreements in Khasavyurt.

Russia returned to Chechnya a few years later, starting the flywheel of a bloody and destructive war. When exiting the Ukrainian crisis, we must not repeat the mistakes of the past.