Good day, Soldiers! The activities of such an organization as the NKVD during the Second World War are fairly well covered in various publications on this topic. Much less has been said about the activities of SMERSH or military counterintelligence.
This, over time, led to the emergence of many different rumors and myths regarding this organization, as well as a “double” attitude towards it. This lack of information is primarily due to the specific nature of the organization itself, the archives of which are still closed to the general public.
And, basically, all publications dedicated to this organization are for the most part not of a research nature, but a description of various operations carried out by it, which are written on the basis of declassified documents of this organization.
The main opponent of SMERSH was the ABWERH, the intelligence and counterintelligence service, as well as the field gendarmerie and the RSHA, or translated from German, the Main Directorate of Imperial Security. SMERSH was also responsible for work in occupied Soviet territory.
Nowadays, many people do not know and have no idea what German Intelligence is, but the scale and ferocity of the war that it waged is unparalleled in history! So, for example, in the early spring of 1942, through her efforts, the Zeppelin organization was created, which was exclusively engaged in the transfer of its agents behind the front line, to the rear of the Soviet Union. A little later, about six months later, a network of special schools, simply huge in scale, was created that trained exclusively saboteurs and terrorists. These institutions were capable of training more than ten thousand agents of this kind in just one year, and all of them, of course, “worked” against the Soviet Union!
So the young intelligence service had enough work.
And the fact that the Abwehr did not live up to the hopes placed on it, just like other “secret organizations, such as Zeppelin and others, is the merit of SMERSH, and not someone else.
All SMERSH operations behind the front line involved infiltration of the German intelligence services, as well as the police and administrative apparatus. Their task also included the disintegration of the created anti-Soviet associations, which were created from among the traitors and prisoners of war driven into them on pain of death. Employees of the SMERSH Operations Department were also sent to all large partisan detachments for the purpose of carrying out coordination activities with other detachments and with the center, as well as with the proactive goal of preventing the introduction of German agents into the partisan detachments.
But one should not think that SMERSH immediately, from the first days of the war, began to carry out these tasks. The beginning of the war was very difficult for the Soviet Union, and the Red Army had practically no materials about German intelligence agencies, its special schools, forms and methods of preparing and carrying out subversive activities. The operatives themselves had absolutely no not only practical experience in conducting behind-the-front counterintelligence activities, not only training experience, but even the very idea of the essence of such work. A system for selecting personnel for the operational department was not developed, the formed counterintelligence brigades were not sufficiently qualified, the methods of “getting in touch” were extremely poorly developed, there was a clear underestimation of the re-recruitment of enemy agents, the “cover legends” themselves were extremely weak and unconvincing. About such things as, for example, the “double legend”, when an allegedly split operative presented it, the second fictional one; or such special methods as simulating fainting during interrogations of a failed SMERSH operative were never heard of at all.
Therefore, in the first year and a half of the war, counterintelligence was mainly engaged in intelligence activities rather than operational activities. She rather gained experience than actively worked, and they were carried out mainly in the interests of the command.
We all know what the beginning of the war was like: heavy defensive battles, a rapidly changing front line. In such conditions SMERSH worked more on the transfer of groups and individual agents behind the front line with the assigned task of reconnaissance of the front line and carrying out individual acts in the manner of sabotage.
The maximum that was done then was to carry out raids on the enemy’s front-line garrisons in order to destroy them or, if there was such a task, to capture prisoners or important documents, and sometimes both: before carrying out such special tasks, the operational department was additionally reinforced by Red Army soldiers or NKVD fighters.
The “birthday” of this organization can be considered April 1943, when the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) SMERSH was formed. In general, the organization was subordinate to Stalin, to whom, by the way, it owes its name, which is still “heard” by intelligence services around the world. Officially, she reported to Viktor Abakumov, a former NKVD employee, who in just ten years went from an ordinary employee to the head of the largest and most influential structure, which still commands respect, despite the “negative pages” of its history. 
The fourth department, responsible for conducting front-line counterintelligence activities, numbering twenty-five people, consisted of two departments: one was responsible for training agents and coordinating their actions. The responsibilities of the second department included processing materials about the activities of enemy intelligence agencies and schools.
The counterintelligence work itself behind enemy lines was carried out by the second departments of SMERSH: activities such as the re-recruitment of agents or the performance of particularly important tasks in the rear were sanctioned by the Center, but not on the “local” level.
Information about the enemy and the methods of work of the German intelligence services came mainly from interrogations of “identified” enemy agents and intelligence officers, as well as from information from people who escaped from captivity and were related to the enemy’s intelligence services.
Time passed and much-needed experience was gained: the quality of training of agents deployed to the rear improved, as did the quality of cover legends and the line of behavior of agents in extreme conditions. Errors and shortcomings were taken into account, which resulted in the fact that agents were no longer given tasks unrelated to their immediate responsibilities. The developed methods for coordinating the activities of intelligence officers working behind enemy lines began to produce positive results, which was reflected in the increased number of agents infiltrated in “key places”, and most of these agents, having managed to successfully complete tasks, returned back.
The infiltrated SMERSH agents provided almost complete information on 359 official employees of German military intelligence and on 978 military spies and saboteurs who were being prepared for transfer to the Red Army. Subsequently, 176 enemy intelligence officers were arrested by SMERSH people, 85 German agents turned themselves in, and five recruited German intelligence officers remained to work in their own intelligence units on instructions from Soviet counterintelligence. It was also possible to introduce several people into the ranks of the Russian Liberation Army (ROA), which was under the leadership of General Vlasov, in order to disintegrate it. The result of this work was that in ten months more than one thousand two hundred people crossed over to the Soviet side.
After the second half of 1943, SMERSH began to actively implement the deployment of Soviet intelligence groups behind the Germans, who were tasked with collecting specific information such as information about training methods and tasks of the SS or carrying out captures of personnel agents. Such groups, in terms of the number of people included in them, were small: three, maximum, six people, united by a common task, but, nevertheless, “tailored” to their own, individual task: directly, a person SMERSH, several experienced agents, with mandatory knowledge of the area where they were to work, as well as a radio operator.
From the beginning of 1943 to the middle of it, seven such intelligence groups were deployed with a total of forty-four people. The losses during the entire time of their stay there amounted to only four employees. From September 1943 to October 1944, there were already several times more such groups operating on enemy territory: fourteen radio operators, thirty-three agents and thirty-one SMERSH operational officers were very active, as a result of which one hundred and forty-two people went over to the side of the Union, six of our agents were able to infiltrate German intelligence and fifteen agents of Nazi Germany were identified.
These operations are still classics of operational art and are still studied in the corresponding “courses” in our intelligence service. For example, thanks only to an agent codenamed “Marta,” the SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate was able to detain German agents in August 1943 and seize two radio stations from them, which they did not manage to destroy. These radio stations were then used in radio wars to disorient the enemy.
In general, SMERSH joined the “radio games” and began to actively operate in the second half of 1943. The purpose of these “radio wars” was to transmit false information on behalf of the sent German agents. They were given enormous importance: after all, based on such information, German intelligence gave incorrect data to the higher “General Staff”, and there, accordingly, they made the same, incorrect decisions. Therefore, the number of such “games” with the enemy grew rapidly: by the end of 1943 alone, Smersh conducted 83 radio games. In total, from 1943 until the end of the war, about two hundred “radio games” were held. Thanks to them, it was possible to lure over 400 personnel and Nazi agents to our territory and seize tens of tons of cargo.
The experience accumulated by the special departments gave the Smersh organs an excellent opportunity to move from defense to attack, which consisted in disrupting the operations of the German intelligence services and disintegrating their mechanism “from the inside.” The main emphasis was placed on the penetration of intelligence officers into the Abwehr apparatus and the schools subordinate to it, as a result of which there was an excellent opportunity to find out all the plans in advance and act “proactively.”
One of the most striking examples of such highly professional work of front-line agents is the “development” of the intelligence school of Hitler’s agents, called “Saturn”. It is this operation of the security officers that serves as a model for all intelligence services in the world and formed the basis for the films “The Path to Saturn”, “Saturn is Almost Invisible” and “The End of Saturn”. The plot of these films was based on the following real events:
On June 22, 1943, in the Tula region near the village of Vysokoye, someone who identified himself as Captain Raevsky was detained. After his arrest, he asked to be urgently taken to the nearest counterintelligence department.
Once there, Captain Raevsky immediately announced that he was a courier agent for German intelligence, and he was sent to the Moscow region on a mission. Having come here, he asked for a confession to be issued.
It was found out that his real name was Kozlov Alexander Ivanovich, twenty-three years old. He is a former lieutenant of the Red Army and took an active part as a battalion commander in the most difficult battles near Vyazma. When the division, along with other formations, fell on the Western Front and fell into the enemy pocket, Kozlov, together with a group of soldiers and commanders, made several attempts to break out of the encirclement. When it became clear that this could not be done, he decided to get to Dorogobuzh, a small town in the Smolensk region, occupied by the Germans, with the aim of starting a partisan fight. Next, he was ambushed, captured and placed in a concentration camp.
About a month after he got there, he was summoned to the camp administration, where he was interrogated by a German officer, a representative of the Abwehr team-1B. After the conversation, Kozlov was sent to work in a German unit located nearby, where he stayed for a very short time: two days later he was called to the commandant’s office with an offer to become a German agent, having undergone preliminary training.
The school where Kozlov was sent specialized in training radio operators and intelligence agents. Here he, who received the pseudonym “Menshikov,” learned the radio business, the nuances of collecting the necessary information, and also attended courses on the organizational structure of the Soviet Army.
On June 20, 1943, he was dressed in the uniform of a Red Army captain, given cover documents in the name of Captain Raevsky and a task: to get to the village of Malakhovka near Moscow, contact the German agent “Aromatov”, give him food for the radio station, money and document forms.
A day later, on a bomber, Kozlov crossed the front line and was parachuted into the Tula region. When he was taken to SMERSH, he without hesitation agreed to the offer to return to the German side on a “reciprocal” mission.
The new agent, who received the pseudonym “Pathfinder”, for the third time in a short time, was given the following task: to infiltrate the Borisov intelligence school and collect information about Abwehr Team 103, which was in charge of the school, about its entire teaching staff, as well as students. It was also necessary to identify persons who were already German agents and who had already been abandoned behind Soviet lines.
On the seventeenth day of July, the Pathfinder successfully crossed the front line in the combat zone. As soon as Kozlov was “on the spot,” he called the agreed signal “Headquarters-Smolensk” and was immediately sent to Abwehr Team 103.
On the German side that day there was joy: they did not hide their joy at the successful return of “Menshikov”: a feast was even organized, which was attended by all the leaders of Abwehr Team 103 and the school teachers. At some point, Kozlov felt that they were trying to get him drunk in order to “untie” his tongue, but his body, trained for alcohol, turned out to be more resilient than the Germans expected, and Kozlov was able to control himself at that moment and not “say too much.”
In 1943, “Pathfinder” arrived in Borisov, where he was appointed as a teacher at the central school of human intelligence. After some time, he took the oath of allegiance to Hitler and received the rank of ROA captain.
After contact with the Soviet side through a courier was practically lost (due to the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Oryol-Kursk direction, the school moved to East Prussia), Alexander Ivanovich decided to persuade trained enemy agents to cooperate with Soviet counterintelligence.
As soon as the next batch of potential agents arrived at the school for training, Kozlov, as the person in charge of the educational process, personally met each one, immediately mentally dividing them into three categories: fanatics of fascism, neutrals and those opposed to them. He compromised and expelled those most devoted to the ideas of fascism from school, and attracted people from the first group to cooperate. There were also already trained professionals. For example, he managed to win over to the side of the Soviets a well-trained agent-radio operator under the pseudonym “Berezovsky”, a man, in Kozlov’s opinion, very cunning and intelligent. He managed to persuade him to confess, for which “Berezovsky” was even given a conditional password “Baikal-61”, which he had to tell any agent from SMERSH of any military unit.
By the way, in the history of SMERSH there is not a single case where it was “the other way around”: not once did German intelligence try to introduce “their” person into the organs of SMERSH, apparently considering this impracticable.
Professionalism and combat training of agents SMERSH was increasing all the time. If we take as an example only the Battle of Kursk, then during its course the Smershevites “figured out” and were able to neutralize more than one and a half thousand German agents and, most importantly, saboteurs. SMERSH counterintelligence of the Central Front neutralized 15 enemy enemy groups. By the way, these saboteurs included a group whose goal was to eliminate the front commander, General Rokossovsky.
During the Battle of the Dnieper, the SMERSH department of the 1st Ukrainian Front destroyed 200 Wehrmacht agents and 21 reconnaissance groups. A year later, an attempt was made to assassinate Stalin. During the Vistula-Oder operation (early 1945), with the participation of Smershevites of the 1st Belorussian Front, 68 enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups were eliminated. During the Koenigsberg operation (April 1945), Smershev men of the 3rd Belorussian Front stopped the activities of 21 sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
Smershevites of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in the “cleansing” of the Reichstag and the Reich Chancellery, they also took an active part in the search and detention of Nazi leaders, as well as in identifying the corpses of Hitler and Goebbels.
Moreover, all these operations were very well coordinated: sometimes up to many thousands of people were involved in such events!
Towards the end of the war, the re-recruitment of cadets and employees to the side of the Soviet Union became significantly easier. People, feeling that Germany was being defeated, made contact more willingly and easily, trying by any means to make amends for their Motherland.
After the Red Army entered the territory of Eastern European states, SMERSH began to curtail its front-line work. This was due to the very rapid advance of Soviet troops, which means that the front line changed every day, constantly shifting towards the West. Work in such conditions became ineffective. In addition, most of the intelligence agencies had already been destroyed, and those that remained were disbanded, and their personnel joined the ranks of the Wehrmacht defenders.
SMERSH itself existed until 1947, when the governing authorities reprofiled the organization “in accordance with the post-war period”: now the work of searching for Nazi criminals, occupiers and remaining enemy agents came to the fore. In addition, she had to deal with internal political affairs of a purely ideological nature: deportations, internment, and the fight against dissent.
In our time, a largely negative attitude has now been formed towards this organization, and this is primarily due to the work that it was engaged in immediately after the war. But, be that as it may, SMERSH was never the underworld, and its agents were demons. Firstly, this is a state organization and it carried out the orders of its superiors, and to whom it was subordinate has already been said. Secondly, now they somehow forget that the time was post-war, and therefore military counterintelligence continued to operate “according to the laws of war.” Her actions, of course, were also cruel, for example, execution at the scene of a crime, but it was these actions that deterred various looters and other dregs of society, who were just waiting for an opportunity to profit from the grief of others. We have all seen news footage of the war in Iraq. Didn’t looting immediately appear there, both among the local population and on the American side? And who plundered the museum when many valuable exhibits disappeared? What about robberies? What about bullying of the population? SMERSH also dealt with such things. The same film “Liquidation” was not shot from scratch, but has a real historical basis.
Well, if we generally summarize the work of SMERSH agents, then we can say that in fact, her work was not limited to forceful arrests with “swinging the pendulum” and shooting with both hands “Macedonian style.” For the most part, it was an analytical job of collecting and analyzing information, but, nevertheless, it was the most effective organization created in wartime. A job that bore little resemblance to the way it is shown in the films, but its effectiveness did not suffer from this. If the reader wants to get some idea about such work, then I recommend reading the series of books “Vow of Silence” by the author Ilyin, especially the first two. It is precisely in them that they describe the work of such a conspiratorial person and his jewelry methods and specific training, how he achieved his goals not by working with his fists, but by skillfully planned actions, which for an outsider are perceived as life’s accidents.
74 years ago, April 19, 1943 , the legendary Soviet military counterintelligence department SMERSH was created.
April 19, 1943 By decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the legendary directorate of Soviet military counterintelligence "SMERSH" was created. The name of the organization was adopted as an abbreviation for the slogan “Death to Spies.”
Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) "SMERSH" was transformed from the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR with the transfer to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. The head of the GUKR "SMERSH" was Commissar of State Security (GB) of the 2nd rank Viktor Abakumov, who headed the Directorate of Special Departments. GB Commissioners Nikolai became the deputy heads of "SMERSH" Selivanovsky, Pavel Meshik, Isai Babich, Ivan Vradiy. In addition to his deputies, the head of the GUKR had 16 assistants, each of whom oversaw the activities of one of the front-line Counterintelligence Directorates.
SMERSH did not last long, about three years - from April 1943 to May 1946. However, the experience accumulated by counterintelligence officers during these times is studied and applied by counterintelligence agencies around the world. It is noteworthy that during the three years of SMERSH’s existence, there were no cases of betrayal or defection to the enemy’s side in the ranks of counterintelligence officers. Not a single enemy agent was able to infiltrate their ranks.
SMERSH (from the abbreviation “Death to spies!”)- the name of a number of counterintelligence organizations independent from each other in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.
1. Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" in the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) of the USSR - military counterintelligence, head - V.S. Abakumov. Reported directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR I.V. Stalin.
2. Counterintelligence Directorate "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, head - Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service P.A. Gladkov. Subordinate to the People's Commissar of the Fleet, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov.
3. Counterintelligence Department "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, head - S.P. Yukhimovich. Subordinate to People's Commissar L.P. Beria.
Main Directorate "SMERSH" reported directly to Joseph Stalin as chairman of the State Defense Committee.
At the same time, on the basis of the 9th (naval) department of the NKVD, the SMERSH unit in the fleet was created - the Counterintelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy. The Navy Counterintelligence Directorate was headed by GB Commissioner Pyotr Gladkov. The unit was subordinate to the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov.
Organization
Transformed from the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD by a secret Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated April 19, 1943. The same Decree created the SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate of the NKVMF of the USSR and the SMERSH Counterintelligence Department of the NKVD of the USSR. On April 19, 1943, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" was created and transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.
On April 21, 1943, J.V. Stalin signed the State Defense Committee Resolution No. 3222 ss/s on approval of the regulations on the Smersh State Defense Committee of the USSR NPO. The text of the document consisted of one phrase:
Approve the regulations on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence “Smersh” - (Death to Spies) and its local bodies.
Appendix to the document revealed in detail the goals and objectives of the new structure, and also determined the status of its employees:
“The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO (Smersh) is the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense, subordinate directly to the People’s Commissar of Defense and carries out only his orders.”
"Smersh Organs" are a centralized organization: on the fronts and districts, the “Smersh” bodies (the “Smersh” Directorates of NCOs of the fronts and the “Smersh” departments of the NCOs of armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts and other formations and institutions of the Red Army) are subordinate only to their higher authorities.
“Smersh” bodies inform the Military Councils and the command of the relevant units, formations and institutions of the Red Army on issues of their work: about the results of the fight against enemy agents, about anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated into army units, about the results of the fight against treason and betrayal, desertion, self-mutilation.”
Problems to be solved:
a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;
b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated into units and institutions of the Red Army;
c) taking the necessary intelligence-operational and other [through the command] measures to create conditions at the fronts that exclude the possibility of unpunished passage of enemy agents through the front line in order to make the front line impenetrable for espionage and anti-Soviet elements;
d) the fight against betrayal and treason in units and institutions of the Red Army [switching to the enemy’s side, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter];
e) combating desertion and self-mutilation at the fronts;
f) checking military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;
g) fulfillment of special tasks of the People's Commissar of Defense.
"Smersh" bodies are exempt from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in this section"
Smersh bodies have the right:
a) conduct intelligence work;
b) carry out, in accordance with the procedure established by law, seizures, searches and arrests of military personnel of the Red Army, as well as associated civilians suspected of criminal activities [The procedure for making arrests of military personnel is defined in Section IV of this Appendix];
c) conduct an investigation into the cases of those arrested with the subsequent transfer of cases, in agreement with the prosecutor's office, for consideration by the relevant judicial authorities or a Special Meeting at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR;
d) apply various special measures aimed at identifying the criminal activities of foreign intelligence agents and anti-Soviet elements;
e) summon, without prior approval from the command, in cases of operational necessity and for interrogation, the rank and file and command and command staff of the Red Army.”
The first order regarding the personnel of the GUKR “Smersh”, April 29, 1943, (order No. 1/ssh) People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin established a new procedure for assigning ranks to the officers of the new Main Directorate, who had predominantly “Chekist” special ranks:
“In accordance with the regulations approved by the State Defense Committee on the Main Counterintelligence Directorate of the People’s Commissariat of Defense “SMERSH” and its local bodies, - INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Assign military ranks to the personnel of the SMERSH bodies established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the following order: TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SMERSH BODIES:
a) having the rank of junior lieutenant of state security - junior lieutenant;
b) having the rank of lieutenant of state security - LIEUTENANT;
c) having the rank of senior lieutenant of state security - ST. LIEUTENANT;
d) having the rank of captain of state security - CAPTAIN;
e) having the rank of state security major - MAJOR;
f) having the rank of lieutenant colonel of state security - LIEUTENANT COLONEL;
f) having the rank of State Security Colonel - COLONEL.
2. The rest of the commanding officers who have the rank of State Security Commissioner and above will be assigned military ranks on a personal basis.”
However, at the same time, there are enough examples when military counterintelligence officers - “Smershevites” (especially senior officers) held personal state security ranks. For example, GB Lieutenant Colonel G.I. Polyakov (rank awarded on February 11, 1943) from December 1943 to March 1945 headed the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 109th Infantry Division.
April 19, 1943 By Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 415-138ss, on the basis of the Office of Special Departments (DOO) of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the following were formed:
1. Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (head - GB Commissar 2nd Rank V. S. Abakumov).
2. Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy (head - GB Commissioner P. A. Gladkov).
A little later, on May 15, 1943, in accordance with the aforementioned resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, the Counterintelligence Department (OCR) "Smersh" of the NKVD of the USSR was created by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. GB Commissioner S.P. Yukhimovich).
Employees of all three Smersh departments were required to wear uniforms and insignia of the military units and formations they served.
So, during the Great Patriotic War There were three counterintelligence organizations in the Soviet Union called Smersh. They did not report to each other, were located in different departments, these were three independent counterintelligence bodies: the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence “Smersh” in the People’s Commissariat of Defense, which was headed by Abakumov and about which there are already quite a lot of publications. This "Smersh" was subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin. The second counterintelligence agency, which also bore the name “Smersh,” belonged to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the People’s Commissariat of the Navy, subordinate to the People’s Commissar of the Fleet Kuznetsov and no one else. There was also a counterintelligence department “Smersh” in the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which reported directly to Beria. When some researchers claim that Abakumov controlled Beria through counterintelligence “Smersh”, this is not so - there was no mutual control. Smersh did not control Beria Abakumov through these bodies, much less Abakumov could control Beria. These were three independent counterintelligence units in three law enforcement agencies.
May 26, 1943 By Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 592 of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (published in print), the leading employees of the Smersh bodies (NKO and NKVMF) were awarded general ranks. Head of the GUKR NPO USSR “Smersh” V.S. Abakumov, the only “army Smershevets”, despite his appointment, concurrently, as Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense (he held this post for just over a month - from April 19 to May 25, 1943), retained his “Chekist” status until July 1945 special rank GB COMMISSIONER 2nd rank.
Head of the Criminal Investigation Department of the NKVMF USSR “Smersh” P.A. On July 24, 1943, Gladkov became a major general in the coastal service, and the head of the ROC of the NKVD of the USSR “Smersh” S.P. Yukhimovich - remained until July 1945 as GB Commissioner.
At the same time, the reputation of SMERSH as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature. GUKR SMERSH had nothing to do with the persecution of the civilian population, and could not do this, since work with the civilian population was the prerogative of the territorial bodies of the NKVD-NKGB. Contrary to popular belief, SMERSH authorities could not sentence anyone to imprisonment or execution, since they were not judicial authorities. The verdicts were handed down by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting under the NKVD.
Detachments under the Smersh bodies were never created, and Smersh employees never headed them. At the beginning of the war, barrage measures were carried out by NKVD troops to protect the rear of the Army. In 1942, military barrage detachments began to be created for each army located at the front. In fact, they were intended to maintain order during battles. Only at the head of the detachments of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts in September-December 1942 were workers of special departments of the NKVD.
To ensure operational work, guarding places of deployment, convoying and guarding those arrested from units of the Red Army, the military counterintelligence bodies "Smersh" were allocated: for the front control of "Smersh" - a battalion, for the army department - a company, for the department of a corps, division and brigade - a platoon. As for the barrage detachments, the barrage services of the army were actively used by Smersh employees to search for enemy intelligence agents. For example, on the eve of offensive operations of the fronts, activities along the line of the defense service acquired great scope with the participation of Smersh organs. In particular, military garrisons, up to 500 or more settlements with adjacent forest areas were combed, non-residential premises and thousands of abandoned dugouts were inspected. During such “cleansing operations”, as a rule, a large number of undocumented persons, deserters, as well as military personnel who had documents in their hands were detained, with signs indicating their production in the Abwehr.
Military counterintelligence agents "Smersh" sometimes they not only carried out their direct duties, but also directly participated in battles, often at critical moments taking command of companies and battalions that had lost their commanders. Many army security officers died in the line of duty, assignments of the command of the Red Army and Navy.
For example, Art. Lieutenant A.F. Kalmykov, who quickly served the battalion of the 310th Infantry Division. was awarded posthumously the Order of the Red Banner for the following feat. In January 1944, the battalion personnel tried to storm the village of Osiya, Novgorod region. The advance was stopped by heavy enemy fire. Repeated attacks produced no results. By agreement with the command, Kalmykov led a group of fighters and from the rear entered the village, defended by a strong enemy garrison. The sudden attack caused confusion among the Germans, but their numerical superiority allowed them to surround the brave men. Then Kalmykov radioed for “fire on himself.” After the liberation of the village, in addition to our dead soldiers, about 300 corpses of the enemy were discovered on its streets, destroyed by Kalmykov’s group and the fire of our guns and mortars.
In total, during the war years only 4 SMERSH employees were awarded the highest award - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: senior lieutenant Pyotr Anfimovich Zhidkov, lieutenant Grigory Mikhailovich Kravtsov, lieutenant Mikhail Petrovich Krygin, lieutenant Vasily Mikhailovich Chebotarev. All four were awarded this title posthumously.
Activities and weapons
The activities of the GUKR SMERSH also included the filtration of soldiers returning from captivity, as well as the preliminary clearing of the front line from German agents and anti-Soviet elements (together with the NKVD Troops for protecting the rear of the Active Army and the territorial bodies of the NKVD). SMERSH took an active part in the search, detention and investigation of Soviet citizens who acted in anti-Soviet armed groups fighting on the side of Germany.
The main enemy of SMERSH in his counterintelligence activities were: the Abwehr department of the High Command of the Armed Forces - the German military intelligence and counterintelligence service in 1919-1944, the intelligence department "Foreign Armies of the East" of the High Command of the Ground Forces, the military field gendarmerie and the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of the RSHA, Finnish military intelligence.
The service of the GUKR SMERSH operational staff was extremely dangerous - on average, an operative served for 3 months, after which he dropped out due to death or injury. During the battles for the liberation of Belarus alone, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing. The first front-line counterintelligence officer awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) was Art. Lieutenant Zhidkov P.A. - detective officer of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the motorized rifle battalion of the 71st mechanized brigade of the 9th mechanized corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.
Activities of GUKR SMERSH characterized by obvious successes in the fight against foreign intelligence services; in terms of effectiveness, SMERSH was the most effective intelligence service during the Second World War. From 1943 until the end of the war, the central apparatus of the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR and its front-line departments held 186 radio games alone. During these games, they managed to bring over 400 personnel and German agents to our territory and seize tens of tons of cargo.
At the same time, SMERSH's reputation as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature. Contrary to popular belief, SMERSH authorities could not sentence anyone to imprisonment or execution, since they were not judicial authorities. The verdicts were handed down by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR. Counterintelligence officers had to receive authorization for arrests of mid-level command personnel from the Military Council of the army or front, and for senior and senior command personnel from the People's Commissar of Defense. At the same time, SMERSH performed the function of a security service in the troops; each unit had its own special officer, who conducted cases on soldiers and officers with problematic biographies, and recruited his own intelligence agents. SMERSH agents, like everyone else, also showed heroism on the battlefield, especially in a dangerous and difficult situation.
SMERSH operatives preferred individual firearms in search practice, since a lone officer with a machine gun always aroused the curiosity of others. The most popular weapons were:
Revolver of the "Nagan" system, self-cocking, model 1895, 7.62 mm caliber
TT pistol model 1933, caliber 7.62 mm
Walther PPK pistol caliber 7.65 mm
Pistol Luger (Parabellum-08) caliber 9 mm
Walther P38 9 mm pistol
Beretta M-34 pistol, 9 mm caliber.
Special small-sized Lignose pistol of 6.35 mm caliber.
Mauser pistol caliber 7.65 mm
Pistol "ChZ" caliber 7.65 mm.
Browning HP pistol model 1935, 9 mm caliber
Heads of GUKR SMERSH
Chief: Abakumov, Viktor Semyonovich (April 19, 1943 - May 4, 1946), GB commissar of the 2nd rank, since July 9, 1945 - Colonel General. The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) SMERSH reported directly to I.V. Stalin as People's Commissar of Defense.
Deputy Chiefs
Selivanovsky, Nikolai Nikolaevich (April 19, 1943 - May 4, 1946), GB commissar of the 3rd rank, from May 26, 1943 - Lieutenant General.
Meshik, Pavel Yakovlevich (April 19, 1943 - December 17, 1945), GB commissar of the 3rd rank, from May 26, 1943 - Lieutenant General.
Babich, Isai Yakovlevich (April 19, 1943 - May 4, 1946), GB Commissioner, from May 26, 1943 - Lieutenant General.
Vradiy, Ivan Ivanovich (May 26, 1943-May 4, 1946), major general, from September 25, 1944, lieutenant general.
Assistant Chiefs
In addition to his deputies, the head of GUKR SMERSH had 16 assistants, each of whom oversaw the activities of one of the front-line counterintelligence Directorates of SMERSH.
Avseevich, Alexander Alexandrovich (April-June 1943), GB Colonel, from May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Bolotin, Grigory Samoilovich (1943 - May 4, 1946), Colonel of the State Security Service, since May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Rogov, Vyacheslav Pavlovich (May 1943 - July 1945), major general.
Timofeev, Pyotr Petrovich (September 1943 - May 4, 1946), major general, from 1944 - lieutenant general (UKR SMERSH Stepnoy, from 10/16/1943 of the 2nd Ukrainian Front).
Prokhorenko, Konstantin Pavlovich (April 29, 1943 - October 4, 1944), Colonel of the State Security Service, since May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Moskalenko, Ivan Ivanovich (May 1943 - May 4, 1946) Colonel of the State Security Service, from May 6, 1943 - Major General, from July 21, 1944 - Lieutenant General.
Misyurev, Alexander Petrovich (April 29, 1943 - May 4, 1946), Colonel of the State Security Service, since May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Kozhevnikov, Sergei Fedorovich (April 29, 1943 - May 4, 1946), Colonel of the State Security Service, since May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Shirmanov, Viktor Timofeevich (as of July 1943), colonel, from July 31, 1944 - major general. (UKR SMERSH of the Central, from 10/16/1943 of the Belorussian Front).
Structure
Since April 1943, the structure of the GUKR "Smersh" included the following departments, the heads of which were approved on April 29, 1943 by order No. 3 / US People's Commissar of Defense I. Stalin:
1st department - intelligence and operational work in the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense (chief - Colonel of the State Security Service, then Major General Gorgonov Ivan Ivanovich)
2nd department - work among prisoners of war, checking of Red Army soldiers who were in captivity (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kartashev Sergey Nikolaevich)
3rd department - fight against agents sent to the rear of the Red Army (chief - GB Colonel Georgy Valentinovich Utekhin)
4th Department - work on the enemy’s side to identify agents dropped into Red Army units (chief - GB Colonel Petr Petrovich Timofeev)
5th Department - management of the work of Smersh bodies in military districts (chief - Colonel GB Zenichev Dmitry Semenovich)
6th department - investigative (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Leonov Alexander Georgievich)
7th department - operational accounting and statistics, verification of the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NGOs, NKVMF, code workers, access to top secret and secret work, verification of workers sent abroad (chief - Colonel A. E. Sidorov (appointed later, there is no data in the order))
8th department - operational equipment (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Sharikov Mikhail Petrovich)
9th department - searches, arrests, external surveillance (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kochetkov Alexander Evstafievich)
10th Department - Department “C” - special assignments (chief - Major GB Zbrailov Alexander Mikhailovich)
11th department - encryption (chief - Colonel GB Chertov Ivan Aleksandrovich)
Political Department - Colonel Sidenkov Nikifor Matveevich
Personnel Department - GB Colonel Vradiy Ivan Ivanovich
Administrative, financial and economic department - Lieutenant Colonel GB Polovnev Sergey Andreevich
Secretariat - Colonel Chernov Ivan Aleksandrovich
The headcount of the central office of the GUKR “Smersh” NPO was 646 people.
The history of SMERSH ended in May 1946. Then, by a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, SMERSH joined the Ministry of State Security of the USSR as an independent 3rd Main Directorate. The real activities of Soviet military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War still remain in the shadows.
Most of our contemporaries talk about the special service SMERSH they know either very little or know almost nothing. As a rule, information about it is drawn either from films and TV series, most of which have no real basis, or from pseudo-historical works, where SMERSH appears as a punitive body.
Much less is written about the real history of SMERSH. Counterintelligence officers generally do not like loud speeches and spotlights - their activities do not involve publicity. During the Soviet period, many brilliant operations carried out by SMERSH during the war were classified as “secret”.
Broken Abwehr card
It should be remembered that the Soviet counterintelligence officers were opposed by very experienced and inventive opponents from the German intelligence services, including from the Abwehr - German military intelligence. By the beginning of 1943, about 200 German intelligence schools were preparing agents for deployment to the Soviet rear. The fact that their activities ultimately failed to have a significant impact on the course of the war is entirely the merit of SMERSH.
Also in 1943, the Abwehr and SD developed a plan, according to which a full-scale civil war was to be launched in the Soviet rear, playing the “national card.” Kalmykia, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Crimea, according to the plans of German intelligence officers, were to become an arena in which radical nationalists would stab the USSR in the back.
During the Soviet period, historians tried not to focus attention on such painful issues, but you can’t erase a word from the song - thousands of Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Kalmyks and representatives of other peoples during the war took up arms against the Soviet regime, collaborating with German agents.
During the era of perestroika, the topic of “repressed peoples” was revealed rather one-sidedly, and what caused the extremely harsh government measures was not mentioned at all.
Meanwhile, on the territory of Karachay-Cherkessia alone there were at least three nationalist groups, whose activities were inspired by German intelligence - “Free Karachay”, “For the Religion of Karachay” and the “Balkarian Army”, and in neighboring Kabardino-Balkaria a national government was formed in led by Prince Shadov.
The fact that individual gangs did not turn into an entire army was ensured by the efforts of SMERSH.
A separate point in the history of SMERSH are “radio games”. These are operations where deliberate disinformation is transmitted to the enemy through previously captured agents. From 1943 to 1945, counterintelligence officers conducted 186 such radio games, essentially completely blocking the Germans’ access to Soviet military secrets and neutralizing over 400 German intelligence officers. No counterintelligence in the world can boast of anything like this.
SMERSH filter
Those who describe the history of SMERSH as a punitive and repressive body usually focus on such counterintelligence functions as “filtering” former prisoners of war. This implies that SMERSH employees mercilessly dealt with prisoners, sending them after Hitler’s directly to Stalin’s camps.
This is not entirely true. Here is an example related to 36 Soviet generals who were captured and who were checked by SMERSH in May-June 1945. All of them were delivered to Moscow, and for each a decision was made in accordance with the available materials about their behavior in captivity.
25 generals who were captured were not only completely acquitted, but also re-enlisted in the army, receiving assistance in treatment and living conditions. True, not all of them were able to continue serving - their health, undermined in captivity, did not allow it. And only 11 generals, in respect of whom the facts of collaboration with the Nazis were proven, were brought to trial.
If we talk about the results of “filtration” of persons of lower rank, then here, as an example, are the results of such activities at the SMERSH collection and transfer points of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the period from February 1 to May 4, 1945. 58,686 citizens who found themselves on enemy territory passed through the inspection sieve, of which 16,456 people were former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, and 12,160 people were Soviet citizens of military age, deported by the enemy to work in Germany.
Based on the results of the inspection, all persons those subject to conscription into the army were drafted into it, 1,117 citizens of other states were repatriated to their homeland, and 17,361 people not subject to military conscription returned to their home. Of the nearly 60 thousand people who passed the test, only 378 people were found to be involved in collaboration with the Nazis, in service in the ROA and other Nazi units. And all of them were... no, not hanged without trial, but handed over to investigators for a more in-depth investigation.
Dry statistics show that the vast majority of Soviet citizens who underwent SMERSH checks were not arrested or persecuted. Even those about whom there were doubts were checked more thoroughly by the investigative authorities. And we can say with confidence that SMERSH was not involved in political repression.
During the war years, counterintelligence officers managed to neutralize about 30 thousand enemy agents, more than 3,500 saboteurs and 6,000 terrorists. Up to 3,000 agents worked behind enemy lines, neutralizing the activities of his intelligence agencies. More than 6,000 military counterintelligence officers were killed in battles and while performing special missions. During the liberation of Belarus alone, 236 military counterintelligence officers died and 136 went missing.
Activities of SMERSH The unique operations carried out by Soviet counterintelligence officers have not yet received adequate reflection either in cinema or in literature. One of the few exceptions is Vladimir Bogomolov’s novel “The Moment of Truth” (“In August 1944”), where, probably for the first time, the difficult and extremely important routine activities of SMERSH in the field were shown.
Organs "SMERSH" could not sentence anyone to imprisonment or execution, since they were not judicial bodies. The verdicts were handed down by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting under the NKVD. If necessary, the SMERSH members were only called upon to provide security and escort for those arrested.
GUKR "SMERSH" is at its disposal there were units responsible for encryption communications, as well as for the selection and training of personnel for military counterintelligence, including the double recruitment of identified enemy agents.
SMERSH employees carried out counterintelligence work on the enemy’s side, were recruited into Abwehr schools and other special agencies of Nazi Germany. As a result, military counterintelligence officers were able to identify enemy plans in advance and act proactively.
The special role of Soviet intelligence officers played in the disruption of the German offensive operation "Citadel" in the summer of 1943, receiving and forwarding to the Center information about the deployment of large enemy tank forces in the area of Orel, Kursk and Belgorod.
Organs "SMERSH" They were engaged in exposing enemy agents in the liberated territories; they checked the reliability of Soviet military personnel who had escaped from captivity, emerged from encirclement and found themselves in territory occupied by German troops. With the transfer of the war to German territory, military counterintelligence was also assigned responsibilities for checking civilian repatriates.
On the eve of the Berlin offensive In the SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate, special operational groups were created according to the number of districts of Berlin, whose task was to search and arrest the leaders of the German government, as well as to establish storage facilities for valuables and documents of operational importance. In May-June 1945, the Berlin SMERSH task force discovered part of the RSHA archives, in particular, materials with information on the foreign policy of Nazi Germany and information about foreign agents. The Berlin operation "SMERSH" helped to capture prominent figures of the Nazi regime and punitive departments, some of whom were subsequently charged with committing crimes against humanity.
In modern history The activities of the military counterintelligence unit SMERSH are assessed ambiguously. However, the generally accepted result of the existence of the SMERSH GUKR was the complete defeat of the intelligence services of Germany, Japan, Romania and Finland in World War II.
In May 1946 As part of the general reform that took place in the People's Commissariats of State Security and Internal Affairs, the SMERSH counterintelligence agencies were reorganized into special departments and transferred to the jurisdiction of the newly created Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR.
On April 19, 1943, by decree of the USSR State Defense Committee, the legendary Soviet military counterintelligence directorate SMERSH was created. The name of the organization was adopted as an abbreviation for the slogan “Death to Spies.”
The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) "SMERSH" was transformed from the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.
The head of GUKR "SMERSH" was Commissar of State Security (GB) 2nd rank Viktor Abakumov, who headed the Directorate of Special Departments.
GB commissioners Nikolai Selivanovsky, Pavel Meshik, Isai Babich, Ivan Vradiy became deputy heads of SMERSH. In addition to his deputies, the head of the GUKR had 16 assistants, each of whom oversaw the activities of one of the front-line Counterintelligence Directorates.
The main directorate of SMERSH reported directly to Joseph Stalin as chairman of the State Defense Committee.
At the same time, on the basis of the 9th (naval) department of the NKVD, the SMERSH unit in the fleet was created - the Counterintelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy. The Navy Counterintelligence Directorate was headed by GB Commissioner Pyotr Gladkov. The unit was subordinate to the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov.
On May 15, 1943, for agent and operational service of border and internal troops and police, by order of the NKVD of the USSR, the SMERSH Counterintelligence Department of the NKVD of the USSR was created, the head of which was GB Commissioner Semyon Yukhimovich. The unit was subordinate to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Lavrentiy Beria.
For the purpose of secrecy, employees of all three SMERSH departments were required to wear uniforms and insignia of the military units and formations they served.
The main tasks of the SMERSH counterintelligence agencies were to combat espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army and Navy, as well as in the rear.
The main opponents of SMERSH in its counterintelligence activities were the German intelligence and counterintelligence service Abwehr, the field gendarmerie, the General Directorate of Reich Security (RSHA), as well as Finnish, Japanese and Romanian military intelligence.
On the front line, the SMershevites were called upon to prevent enemy agents from crossing the front line. The SMERSH special officers were also responsible for identifying cases of desertion and deliberate self-harm, and the defection of Soviet military personnel to the enemy’s side.
In the combat zone on the eve of offensive operations, SMERSH agencies combed military garrisons, populated areas with adjacent forest areas, and inspected abandoned and non-residential premises in order to detect possible saboteurs and deserters.
"SMERSH" actively worked in the search, detention and investigation of cases of Soviet citizens who acted on the side of the enemy as part of the units of the Wehrmacht "volunteer assistants" (Hilfswilliger), as well as anti-Soviet armed formations, such as the Russian Liberation Army (ROA), the "brigade Kaminsky", 15th Cossack SS Cavalry Corps, "national battalions".
All arrests of military personnel made by SMERSH employees were necessarily coordinated with the military councils and the prosecutor's office; the arrest of senior personnel required the approval of the People's Commissars of Defense, the Navy and the NKVD. The detention of ordinary military personnel and junior command personnel in emergency cases could be carried out by counterintelligence officers without prior approval.
The SMERSH bodies could not sentence anyone to imprisonment or execution, since they were not judicial bodies. The verdicts were handed down by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting under the NKVD. If necessary, the SMERSH members were only called upon to provide security and escort for those arrested.
GUKR "SMERSH" had at its disposal units responsible for encrypted communications, as well as for the selection and training of personnel for military counterintelligence, including the double recruitment of identified enemy agents.
From 1943 until the end of the war, the central apparatus of the GUKR SMERSH and its front-line departments conducted 186 radio games, during which intelligence officers, broadcasting from captured radio stations, misinformed the enemy. During these operations, over 400 agents and official employees of the Nazi intelligence agencies were identified and arrested, and tens of tons of cargo were seized.
SMERSH employees carried out counterintelligence work on the enemy’s side and were recruited into Abwehr schools and other special agencies of Nazi Germany. As a result, military counterintelligence officers were able to identify enemy plans in advance and act proactively.
Soviet intelligence officers played a special role by receiving and forwarding to the Center information about the deployment of large enemy tank forces in the area of Orel, Kursk and Belgorod.
Military counterintelligence officers were constantly in the combat formations of the troops, not only fulfilling their direct duties, but also directly participating in battles, often at critical moments taking command of companies and battalions that had lost their commanders.
SMERSH agencies were engaged in exposing enemy agents in the liberated territories, checking the reliability of Soviet military personnel who escaped from captivity, emerged from encirclement and found themselves in territory occupied by German troops. With the transfer of the war to German territory, military counterintelligence was also assigned responsibilities for checking civilian repatriates.
On the eve of the Berlin offensive operation, special operational groups were created in the SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate according to the number of districts of Berlin, whose task was to search for and arrest the leaders of the German government, as well as to establish storage facilities for valuables and documents of operational importance. In May-June 1945, the Berlin SMERSH task force discovered part of the RSHA archives, in particular, materials with information on the foreign policy of Nazi Germany and information about foreign agents. The Berlin operation "SMERSH" helped to capture prominent figures of the Nazi regime and punitive departments, some of whom were subsequently charged with committing crimes against humanity.
In modern history, the activities of the military counterintelligence unit SMERSH are assessed ambiguously. However, the generally accepted result of the existence of the SMERSH GUKR was the complete defeat of the intelligence services of Germany, Japan, Romania and Finland in World War II.
In May 1946, as part of the general reform taking place in the People's Commissariats of State Security and Internal Affairs, the counterintelligence agencies SMERSH were reorganized into special departments and transferred to the jurisdiction of the newly created Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR.
The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources
Breakfast from a spy
In the summer of 1944, it was extremely important to hide the preparations for an attack on Chisinau from the enemy. Through front-line agents and other channels, information was received about a dangerous Abwehr agent operating in the 49th Guards Rifle Division. His last name, first name, patronymic and the fact that before the war he worked as a cook in Moscow at the Metropol restaurant became known. The division’s counterintelligence department responded to the encrypted telegram 5 days later: there is no such thing in the 49th.
On the instructions of the head of the army department, I went to the division to a small bridgehead on the right bank of the Dniester, which was heavily and continuously shelled. The crossing was especially hard on us. With great difficulty we managed to cross and get to the Smersh 49th ROC, whose chief was Lieutenant Colonel Vasilyev. He gave the command to collect lists of all military personnel, as well as those killed, wounded, and those who went on business trips. I checked. There was no agent in them. There was nothing to do, so I decided to return at dawn.
Before leaving, we sat down to breakfast in the dugout. I noticed the amazing quality of food for combat conditions. I asked: who cooked? Vasiliev answered: he appeared in the security platoon of the Smersh ROC of the division of soldiers, who worked as a cook before the war. I instantly had a question: “Did we check the list of your security platoon?”
Vasiliev was literally petrified. Then he said: “The one we are looking for is him, the soldier cook who serves us breakfast!”
I said: “Calm down, no emotions, we’ll finish eating as usual.”
After breakfast, according to the platoon list, they were convinced that the soldier-cook was the same spy. But how to deliver him from a small bridgehead across the Dniester under German fire, so as not to frighten him away and to exclude an escape attempt?
I call the chef and say, “You cook great.” And at army headquarters there is a general with a stomach problem who needs a diet. Maybe you can work for him?
He agreed. And when they arrived at the army department, they immediately “split.” They caught the spy on time. He was preparing to go to the Germans with information about the preparations for an attack on Chisinau, intending at the last moment to also steal operational documents from the counterintelligence department.
How did a spy end up in the Smersh ROC security platoon of the division? Just. The platoon, like everyone else, suffered combat losses. They were replenished. The troops moved forward. In settlements liberated from the enemy, field military registration and enlistment offices mobilized men of military age. An Abwehr agent wormed his way among them and infiltrated the security platoon. After all, in combat conditions there was neither the opportunity nor the time to carefully check the conscripts. Despite these objective circumstances, Lieutenant Colonel Vasiliev, although he was a very experienced leader, was soon removed from his post as head of the department.
Counterintelligence actively worked not only in the troops, but also in the front line to create a regime that would complicate the actions of enemy agents and would be favorable for their identification and detention. For this purpose, barrier detachments, military field commandant's offices, road service, cable and pole companies (signalmen), rear services and others were actively used. In crowded places and on busy roads, operational search groups with identification agents who knew many spies by sight from intelligence school operated. These measures brought great success.
The fact is that the Germans gave many agents tasks not to penetrate the troops, but to act in their surroundings. Thus, of the 126 spies exposed in the 5th Shock Army from 1942 to March 1943, only 24 were in the troops. Therefore, in the front line, measures were taken to clear out enemy agents and other hostile elements with the involvement of troops and military counterintelligence officers. They produced significant results. Only from September 1 to September 6, 1944, during the clearing of the 3rd Belorussian Front, 20 spies, 116 bandits, and 163 armed deserters were captured. During the battle of Moscow, 200 German agents and 50 reconnaissance and sabotage groups were detained.
The operatives of the special departments knew the orientation of the wanted agents. There were special search books for Abwehr agents with testimonies of arrested spies and information from our intelligence officers operating behind enemy lines. According to this book, a certain Petrov, a radio operator of a German intelligence agency who had previously operated in Kherson, was identified in the troops of the 5th Shock Army. They sent a photo there. Petrov was identified by the owner of the house in which he lived. But Petrov claimed that during the occupation he was in Belarus, and not in Ukraine. It turns out he couldn’t have been in the enemy’s intelligence agency? It is dangerous to release, it is impossible to arrest. What to do?
I decided to interrogate him. During the conversation, he unexpectedly asked a question: did he have a second surname? I see he was confused and hesitated. Confessed: street nickname Bobok.
We checked the directions. Bobok in Belarus fled from a partisan detachment to the Germans, gave them partisan bases, became a policeman, took part in the executions of our fellow citizens, and rose to the rank of deputy. chief of the district police. Before the advance of the Soviet troops, he fled with the Germans near Koenigsberg.
I call him again and ask: “Why, brother, were you in a partisan detachment in Belarus, and aren’t you telling me?” He responded: “Well, you’re not asking about that.” He admitted to betrayal and that he was preparing to go behind the front line. It was possible to prevent serious consequences for our troops that could have resulted from the transfer of spy information to the enemy.
Smersh officers were the first representatives of state security agencies in the territory liberated from the enemy; they arrested Gestapo agents and fascist collaborators. During offensive operations
counterintelligence officers, knowing the direction of attacks, created task forces in advance to seize documents from intelligence schools, police agencies, and identify enemy agents based on fresh traces. The work of the task forces, as a rule, gave good results.
The Art of the Game
“Smersh” actively operated behind enemy lines, only in 1943 it introduced 52 of our intelligence officers into the fascist intelligence schools and intelligence agencies. Counterintelligence officers attached great importance to radio games with the enemy. They were conducted strictly centrally, texts were developed only in the Center together with the General Staff, and especially important ones - with the permission of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. For example, in May-June
1943 10 intelligence radio stations transmitted disinformation to the enemy in order to hide the preparation of an offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge.
In the summer of 1944, during a radio game at our call, the enemy dropped 40 bales of weapons, explosives and 27 agents in the Bryansk region. They were immediately neutralized.
Counterintelligence did a lot of work aimed at keeping the preparation of military operations secret. So, in 1941, during the defense of Odessa, at the beginning of October an order came to leave the city. But how to carry out an evacuation in secret?
At that time, a boy of 15-16 years old came to us and confessed. Sniffling, he said that he crossed the front line on instructions from the Germans to collect information about our defense. If he doesn’t fulfill it and doesn’t come back, the Nazis will shoot his parents.
We talked to him kindly, calmed him down, fed him and instructed him, when he returned, to inform the Germans that reinforcements were coming to the Russians, they were digging trenches and anti-tank ditches, and building barricades in the city. The boy readily agreed. With the same task, two women were sent to the Germans, who by the beginning of the fighting accidentally ended up in Odessa, and their relatives ended up in the occupied territory.
On our recommendation, during the day the command sent lorries along the dusty road to the front, mainly in the defense area of the famous 25th Chapaev Division. They raised clouds of dust, giving the enemy the illusion of active troop activity. Warships of the Black Sea Fleet additionally approached Odessa. Their artillery hit the enemy through the city. As a result, the Nazis did not realize our plans. Even after our troops left the city, they were afraid to enter it for another day, expecting a trick.
In all major military operations, military counterintelligence officers did their best to help our troops survive and defeat the enemy, keep the command’s plans secret, mislead the enemy and achieve surprise.
Frontline anti-terrorism
To kill our major military leaders, the Nazis sent in terrorists, such as a certain Tavrin. He was carefully prepared, equipped with the uniform of a Red Army major with the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the Order of the Red Banner and Alexander Nevsky, and armed with a silent pistol with poisoned bullets. The task is a terrorist attack against the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Tavrin was detained immediately after landing in our rear.
Few people know that the legendary intelligence officer Hero of the Soviet Union N.I. Kuznetsov, whose exploits behind enemy lines are widely known, was the first to inform the Center about the preparation of an assassination attempt on the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in Tehran in
1943 Kuznetsov learned about this from the Gestapo. He owed our intelligence officer a large sum and promised to repay the debt with an expensive fur coat, saying that he would buy it in Tehran when performing a particularly important task during a meeting of the Big Three. It became clear what we were talking about.
Unfortunately, the fascist collaborators, Ukrainian nationalists, managed to kill Nikolai Kuznetsov and mortally wound the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Army General N.F. Vatutina. In general, Ukrainian nationalists diligently served the fascists, caused great harm to our army, committed sabotage, broke communication lines, and killed our soldiers and civilians. I had the opportunity to come under their fire more than once in front-line Chernivtsi in June 1941. There, on one of the first days of the war, we were informed that an active member of the organization of Ukrainian nationalists, associated with the Abwehr, was spending the night on the outskirts of the city. I was assigned to lead a task force of three people.
At dawn we approached the house. I sent two officers behind him, and I tried to open the door and heard their voices: “Stop! We will shoot!” I ran out behind the house and saw a man running. He opened fire with a pistol, wounded our comrade Ustimenko in the arm and rushed towards the forest. Officer Mnevets threw a grenade. The bandit fell and continued to shoot. I gave my comrades the command to lie down. Our two shots finished off the enemy.
In the barn where he ran out, we saw a young man. Who is he and what does he do? Answer: student at Chernivtsi University, here preparing for exams. But the “textbooks” were unusual - weapons, ammunition and a walkie-talkie. They found out that the murdered man was a German intelligence agent, and the detainee was his contact.
During the war, “Smersh” actively opposed the terror of the fascists and their accomplices against our soldiers and civilians.
The battle for minds and hearts
In order to enslave our people, the fascists sought to kill their mind and soul, turn them into a herd, into trembling, insignificant creatures. They carried out a merciless psychological war, propaganda work to disintegrate our troops, praised life in Germany, persuaded our soldiers to switch to their side, desertion, and disobey command. Enemy agents spread false rumors, panic and defeatism.
At the beginning of the war, Hitler's propaganda was crude, primitive, and vulgar. In 1941, the enemy rained leaflets on the defenders of Odessa from airplanes: “Hit the commissar with a brick!” Or: “Give up! In three days, Antonescu will ride into Odessa on a white horse.” Over time, the Germans acted more and more sophisticatedly. The tone changed, the rudeness disappeared. Leaflets calling for surrender were issued in the form of passes to the enemy, sometimes similar to our party cards, so that a potential defector could keep it without arousing suspicion. On the enemy side, defectors through loudspeakers called on our fighters on the front line to go over to the fascists, promising good food, vodka, and the services of prostitutes.
The enemy also provoked desertion. Among other things, it was dangerous because deserters created armed gangs, attacked civilians, robbed, and killed. “Smersh” prevented and suppressed crimes, together with the command and political workers fought against Hitler’s propaganda, panic and defeatist sentiments, treason and desertion, to strengthen discipline and morale, and the combat effectiveness of units. This was a battle for the minds and hearts of our people, for our Motherland, for our Victory.
Nowadays, in the lies about the war, slander against the soldiers of the Great Victory, front-line counterintelligence soldiers, signs of the psychological war that fascism waged against us are discerned. Theses, arguments, and methods of distorting facts overlap. In 1941, the enemy called to “hit with a brick” those who led fighters into battle for the Motherland, and now they are trying to kill truth and memory, to equate the exploits of our people, millions of their heroes - liberators of the world from the fascist plague and the atrocities of the Nazis and their henchmen.
Traitors to the Motherland
It is striking and indignant that the “innocent victims of Stalin’s terror” now include fascist collaborators, spies and saboteurs, terrorists and policemen, punitive executioners who committed the most serious crimes against their people. It came down to articles in defense of the traitor, the creator of the so-called ROA - the army of traitors to the Motherland, General Vlasov.
What were these traitors really like?
During the war, we constantly encountered traces of their atrocities. The traitors, currying favor with the fascists, tried to surpass them in bloodthirstiness and atrocities of massacres of our compatriots and civilians.
Let me remind the “lawyers” of Vlasov and other traitors to the Motherland: throughout the world, betrayal has always been and will be the gravest crime against one’s people and one’s native country, for which there has never been and cannot be mercy. I declare to them: gentlemen, you are defending criminals, rapists and murderers, executioners-fanatics who have committed the most serious atrocities!
I will give typical examples.
Having liberated Kerch, at the beginning of 1942, in the central square we saw seven hanged residents, and in the ditch near Bagerovo, 8 km from the city, 7,000 Soviet people, mostly Jews, were shot. Together with other counterintelligence officers, I searched for the criminals who committed these atrocities.
In August 1942, in the Don steppes, in the city of Zimovniki, we encountered a motorcyclist in a fascist uniform. Detained. It turned out that the Russian, a native of Zimovniki, was serving the enemy. I thought that our troops had left and looked at my relatives. They found scary photos in his possession. In one, he shoots our compatriots; in another, holding a baby by the leg, he swings his arms to smash his head against a pole.
He ordered the soldiers to take him under guard. After some time, they come and embarrassedly say: they saw those photos and could not restrain themselves, they killed the monster. I understood the fighters. The Nazis killed many of their relatives. But still there was lynching, and as required by the Law, he reported it to the army prosecutor. He figured it out, but it didn’t lead to a criminal case.
The traitors fled to the enemy out of cowardice, so as not to risk their lives at the front, or out of hostile motives. Currying favor, the defectors revealed everything they knew and actually became spies. The Nazis sent them to intelligence schools and then to our rear, to the police, punitive detachments that burned villages and killed civilians.
We encountered terrible evidence of enemy atrocities in all liberated cities and many villages. Military counterintelligence officers searched for participants in these atrocities and fought against traitors to the Motherland.
Our compatriots who survived the fascist hell demanded retribution for the atrocities of the criminal executioners. The response to their atrocities in 1943 was a decree signed by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. Kalinin, who ordered the public hanging of the most active traitors, fascist collaborators, whose hands were in the blood of the Soviet people. "Smersh" was involved in the implementation of this decree. After the liberation of Voroshilovgrad, 7 active traitors, on whose conscience they had ruined lives, were publicly hanged there. They did the same in Odessa. There were other cases. But they did not punish indiscriminately; everyone was carefully dealt with according to the law, and guilt was proven.
Unfortunately, there were many cases of betrayal of the Motherland during the war, especially at the beginning, when we were retreating. Not only individuals, but also groups went to the Germans. There were cases when traitors killed the commander and went over to the enemy in entire units, defected from combat outposts and during the dispatch of reconnaissance groups behind the front line. Group treason was most often committed by fellow countrymen from the same village or region, whose wives and children remained in the occupied territory. Therefore, counterintelligence officers, having discovered compatriot groups, dispersed them through the command into different units, preventing treason, in essence, saving fighters from the temptation of a serious crime and retribution for it.
In view of the special danger of treason, the order was given to open fire on the defectors, because by betraying our plans to the enemy, they could cause the death of thousands of soldiers and the failure of military operations. It is no coincidence that the commander of the 5th Shock Army, Colonel General N.E. Berzarin, in preparation for the offensive in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, set me the task of not allowing a single betrayal.
In December 1944 and the first half of January 1945, I organized this work at the forefront. As a result, there was not a single traitor or defector in the army sector; the offensive became unexpected for the enemy. To thank me for this work and the exposure of a number of fascist agents, Colonel General Berzarin arrived at our department, presented me with the Order of the Red Banner of Battle and kissed me. By the way, in just one year of the war he awarded me four military orders.
Let me note: before the war, a talented commander and a wonderful person, Berzarin was unreasonably arrested by the NKVD and spent some time in prison, but despite this, he was extremely friendly towards military counterintelligence officers and very highly valued their contribution to the fight against the enemy.
In a fascist lair
Before the storming of Berlin, powerful military counterintelligence task forces were created to detect and arrest the main Nazi war criminals, employees of the enemy’s central intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, seize important documents, valuables, etc. It was a very responsible and intense job. We discovered and secured German archives, treasure warehouses and much more. In my hands were several Hitler’s jackets with gold fascist badges, the boots of the lame Goebbels, gold pens and other personal belongings of the fascist leaders.
Let me especially emphasize: none of the counterintelligence officers set their sights on them. The only thing we used from Hitler's personal supplies were three boxes of vitamins that looked like sugar cubes. The whole squad ate them for six months.
I was lucky enough, at the invitation of Army Commander Berzarin, to participate in the reception of the surrender of the German troops of the Berlin garrison on May 2, 1945. On the same day, I signed the Reichstag.
My last combat mission during the Great Patriotic War was participation in the counterintelligence task force “Smersh” of the 1st Belorussian Front to ensure the security of the signing of the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Germany. We met representatives of the Allied forces and the Keitel group at the Berlin Tempelhof airfield, guarded them during the move and during the signing of the Act in Karlshorst. There were enough difficulties. Berlin was broken, there were no normal roads. But we managed.
In Karlshorst I was responsible for the external security of the building in which the Act was signed. I was lucky enough to be in the hall when Keitel, Friedenburg and Stumpf entered. I noticed that they quickly glanced at each other. It turned out that the carpet on the floor was from Hitler's office. The Germans recognized him immediately.
After the signing of the Act of Surrender there was a magnificent banquet. Everything was brought from Moscow - vodka, cognac, sturgeon, caviar, salmon and much more. The question arose before him: should the German delegation be fed, and if so, how? We turned to G.K. Zhukov. The marshal responded in this spirit: give the Germans everything we have. Let them know Russians not only during the war, but also after it.
Allied representatives sat at the table until the morning. As the banquet participants told me, the head of the French delegation, de Tassigny, apparently got tipsy from joy and fell asleep at the table. Members of other delegations joked good-naturedly: they say that the French slept through the entire war, and the Victory too.
Unknown heroes
The whole country knew many front-line heroes during the war by sight and name. They were everyone's favorites, the personification of a national feat, the banner of our fighting and victorious people. Posters, press and newsreels told about their exploits. But in them you will not find mention of the many outstanding exploits of front-line counterintelligence soldiers.
The importance of counterintelligence, as well as intelligence, for the destinies of peoples and states, big politics, national security and defense is so great that in all countries their activities have always been and will be among the highest state secrets. The secrecy periods of some of them are measured in centuries.
In the 60 years after the Victory, our society has learned only a small fraction of the glorious military deeds and exploits of military counterintelligence officers during the Great Patriotic War. And, probably, it will not be long before the highest interests of the country will allow us to present to the public the complete history of the secret counterintelligence front of the Great Patriotic War and the exploits of military counterintelligence officers.
These unknown heroes fought on the front line and strengthened the fighting capacity of the warring army in every possible way, defeated the fascist aces of espionage, terror and sabotage, and protected the secrets of the Soviet command so that our blows would be sudden and crushing. In the enemy camp, counterintelligence officers obtained extremely important information about the strategic plans of the Nazis. Only on the Kursk Bulge three of our sources reported in a timely manner about the Germans’ preparations for an offensive. This was the case in many strategic operations.
The total combat score of Smersh during the war years was tens of thousands of neutralized spies, saboteurs and terrorists. Divide these figures by the number of days of the Great Patriotic War and make sure that counterintelligence officers at the fronts neutralized enemy agents, saboteurs and terrorists not just every day, but almost every hour(!). It is difficult to imagine what enormous damage they could cause to the active army and the rear. Military counterintelligence prevented it and made a truly invaluable contribution to our Victory.
Smersh veterans occupy a worthy place in the unified ranks of victorious front-line soldiers. They passed on to the current generation of military counterintelligence officers the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War, the tradition of courage and professionalism, faithful and selfless service to the Fatherland.
Most of our contemporaries know either very little or nothing at all about the SMERSH special service. As a rule, information about it is drawn either from films and TV series, most of which have no basis in reality, or from pseudo-historical works, where SMERSH appears as a punitive agency that destroyed tens of thousands of innocent citizens.
Direct reporting service
Much less is written about the real history of SMERSH. Counterintelligence officers generally do not like loud speeches and spotlights - their activities do not involve publicity. During the Soviet period, many brilliant operations carried out by SMERSH during the war were classified as “secret”, and in post-Soviet times, counterintelligence officers began to be accused of all mortal sins, attributing to them even things for which they, in principle, could not be guilty.
The decision to create the Main Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR was made on April 19, 1943.
By that time, a radical turning point had emerged in the war - the Germans suffered a crushing defeat at Stalingrad.
The enemy’s methods also changed: the Nazis began to pay great attention to reconnaissance and sabotage activities deep in the rear of the Soviet troops. It was up to the SMERSH employees to fight this new and extremely dangerous threat.
According to the decision of the State Defense Committee, SMERSH was created through the reorganization of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD.
Unlike the previous structure, the head of SMERSH received the position of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and reported directly to the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin, following only his orders. Accordingly, at the local level, SMERSH bodies also reported only to their superior structures.
Thanks to this scheme, military counterintelligence has become a powerful intelligence service, capable of solving the tasks assigned to it without bureaucratic interference.
The name "SMERSH" had an extremely formidable decoding - "Death to spies!" It is this phrase that will subsequently fascinate foreign writers, including the famous “Papa Bond,” who will begin to compose extremely wide-ranging “cranberries” about the activities of the Soviet intelligence service.
Against spies and traitors
The tasks of SMERSH were formulated as follows:
The fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;
The fight against anti-Soviet elements that have infiltrated the units and administrations of the Red Army;
Taking the necessary intelligence-operational and other (through the command) measures to create conditions at the fronts that exclude the possibility of unpunished passage of enemy agents through the front line in order to make the front line impenetrable for espionage and anti-Soviet elements;
The fight against betrayal and treason in units and institutions of the Red Army (switching to the enemy’s side, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter);
Combating desertion and self-harm at the front;
Checking military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;
Carrying out special tasks of the People's Commissar of Defense.
In accordance with the emergency conditions of wartime, the bodies of Smersh were endowed with broad rights and powers. They carried out a full range of operational investigative activities using all operational forces and means characteristic of a special service. Military counterintelligence officers could carry out seizures, searches and arrests of military personnel and associated civilians suspected of criminal activity.
General became the head of SMERSH Victor Semenovich Abakumov.
SMERSH demonstrated its strength for the first time during the Battle of Kursk. Thanks to the work of counterintelligence, the plans of the Soviet military command remained secret to the Nazis, and sabotage activity in the rear of the Soviet troops was reduced to a minimum.
Broken Abwehr card
It should be remembered that the Soviet counterintelligence officers were opposed by very experienced and inventive opponents from the German intelligence services, including from the Abwehr - German military intelligence. By the beginning of 1943, about 200 German intelligence schools were preparing agents for deployment to the Soviet rear. The fact that their activities ultimately failed to have a significant impact on the course of the war is entirely the merit of SMERSH.
In the same 1943, the Abwehr and SD developed a plan according to which a full-scale civil war was to be launched in the Soviet rear, playing the “national card.” Kalmykia, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Crimea, according to the plans of German intelligence officers, were to become an arena in which radical nationalists would stab the USSR in the back.
During the Soviet period, historians tried not to focus attention on such painful issues, but you can’t erase a word from the song - thousands of Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Kalmyks and representatives of other peoples during the war took up arms against the Soviet regime, collaborating with German agents.
During the era of perestroika, the topic of “repressed peoples” was discussed rather one-sidedly, and what caused the extremely harsh government measures was not discussed at all.
Meanwhile, on the territory of Karachay-Cherkessia alone there were at least three nationalist groups, whose activities were inspired by German intelligence - “Free Karachay”, “For the Religion of Karachay” and the “Balkarian Army”, and in neighboring Kabardino-Balkaria a national government was formed in led by Prince Shadov.
The fact that individual gangs did not turn into an entire army was ensured by the efforts of SMERSH.
A separate point in the history of SMERSH are “radio games”. These are operations where deliberate disinformation is transmitted to the enemy through previously captured agents. From 1943 to 1945, counterintelligence officers carried out 186 such radio games, essentially completely blocking the Germans’ access to Soviet military secrets, and neutralizing over 400 of Hitler’s intelligence officers. Not a single counterintelligence agency in the world can boast of anything like this.
SMERSH filter
Those who describe the history of SMERSH as a punitive and repressive body usually focus on such counterintelligence functions as “filtering” former prisoners of war. It is implied that SMERSH employees mercilessly dealt with prisoners, sending them instead of Hitler’s to Stalin’s camps.
This, to put it mildly, is not entirely true. Here is an example related to captured Soviet generals, of whom SMERSH employees discovered 36 in May-June 1945. All of them were taken to Moscow, and for each a decision was made in accordance with the available materials about their behavior in captivity. 25 generals who were captured were not only completely acquitted, but also re-enlisted in the army, receiving assistance in treatment and living conditions. True, not all of them were able to continue serving - their health, undermined in captivity, did not allow it. And only 11 generals, in respect of whom the facts of collaboration with the Nazis were proven, were brought to trial.
If we talk about the results of “filtration” of persons of lower rank, then here, as an example, are the results of such activities at the SMERSH collection and transfer points of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the period from February 1 to May 4, 1945. 58,686 citizens who found themselves on enemy territory passed through the inspection sieve, of which 16,456 people were former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, and 12,160 people were Soviet citizens of military age, deported by the enemy to work in Germany. According to the results of the inspection, all persons subject to conscription into the army were drafted into it, 1,117 citizens of other states were repatriated to their homeland, and 17,361 people not subject to conscription returned to their home. Of the nearly 60 thousand people who passed the test, only 378 people were found to be involved in collaboration with the Nazis, in service in the ROA and other Nazi units. And all of them were... no, not hanged without trial, but handed over to investigators until a more in-depth investigation was carried out.
Dry statistics show that the vast majority of Soviet citizens who underwent SMERSH checks were not arrested or persecuted. Even those about whom there were doubts were checked more thoroughly by the investigative authorities. All this, of course, does not exclude mistakes and abuses, but we can say with confidence that SMERSH was not involved in political repression.
Fleming never dreamed
During the war years, counterintelligence officers managed to neutralize about 30 thousand enemy agents, more than 3,500 saboteurs and 6,000 terrorists. Up to 3,000 agents worked behind enemy lines, neutralizing the activities of his intelligence agencies. More than 6,000 military counterintelligence officers were killed in battles and while performing special missions. During the liberation of Belarus alone, 236 military counterintelligence officers died and 136 went missing.
The activities of SMERSH, the unique operations carried out by Soviet counterintelligence officers, have not yet received adequate reflection either in cinema or in literature. One of the few exceptions is Vladimir Bogomolov’s novel “The Moment of Truth” (“In August 1944”), where, probably for the first time, the difficult and extremely important routine activities of SMERSH in the field were shown.
In 1946, SMERSH was included in the Ministry of State Security as its 3rd Main Directorate.
The short but glorious history of military counterintelligence as a special separate structure has ended. However, the army counterintelligence itself does not stop its work for a single day, even in peacetime.
And finally, one completely real fact that even an inventive person could not come up with. Ian Fleming.
Lieutenant served in the SMERSH military counterintelligence department of the Guards Cavalry Regiment Oleg Ivanovsky.
He worked professionally, fought bravely, ended the war in Czechoslovakia, and in 1946 was declared unfit for military service due to the consequences of his injuries. The medical verdict handed down to the 24-year-old officer was: “Fit for work in civilian institutions on reduced working hours without heavy physical and mental stress.”
15 years later, on April 12, 1961, the former SMERSH officer, and at that time the leading designer of Vostok-1, Oleg Ivanovsky, personally closed the spaceship hatch, sending it on a historic flight.