August 23 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The Red Army was led to this important victory by almost two months of intense and bloody battles, the outcome of which was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it in a little more detail.
Fact 1
The salient in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February–March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.
Battle of Kursk
Fact 2
The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of the Second World War, not only because of the scale of the fighting that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. Victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. This means that from now on we are advancing. The defense was over.
Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November–December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.
Scheme of the Battle of Kursk
Fact 3
1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if we attack, how large-scale tasks should we set ourselves? Both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.
Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent his report to Headquarters on possible military actions in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defense by destroying as many tanks as possible, and then bring in reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after it was discovered that Hitler's army was preparing for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge.
As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense on the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge.
In a situation with a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to maintain the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops intended to attack decisively.
Construction of defensive lines
Fact 4
Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.
Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger group would attack in the Orel area against the Central Front. In reality, the southern group operating against the Voronezh Front turned out to be stronger.
In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was not accurately determined.
Fact 5
Operation Citadel was the name of the German command’s plan to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies in the Kursk salient. It was planned to deliver converging attacks from the north from the Orel area and from the south from the Belgorod area. The impact wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Hoth's tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.
Soviet tank crews inspect a damaged Tiger
Fact 6
The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23–30) 1941 was larger in terms of the number of tanks participating. It occurred in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides fought at Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.
Fact 7
In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual new product was the “Goliath” wedges. This tracked self-propelled mine without a crew was controlled remotely via wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these wedges were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.
Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk
July '43... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the Nazi invaders. The front, in its configuration in the area near Kursk, resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command prepared the offensive operation as revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort developing the plan.
Hitler's operational order began with the words: “I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to carry out the Citadel offensive - the first offensive of this year... It must end with quick and decisive success.” Everything was gathered by the Nazis into a powerful fist. The fast-moving tanks “Tigers” and “Panthers” and super-heavy self-propelled guns “Ferdinands”, according to the Nazis’ plan, were supposed to crush, scatter the Soviet troops, and turn the tide of events.
Operation Citadel
The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German Operation Citadel would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle... The Military Council of the front had to make a very important decision, and it was made. On July 5, 1943, at two hours and twenty minutes, the silence exploded with the thunder of our guns... The battle that began lasted until August 23.
As a result, events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War resulted in the defeat of Hitler’s groups. The strategy of Operation Citadel of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead is crushing blows using surprise against the forces of the Soviet Army, encircling and destroying them. The triumph of the Citadel plan was to ensure the implementation of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To thwart the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.
Progress of the Battle of Kursk
The actions of the Army Group "Center" and the Task Force "Kempf" of the Armies "South", which came from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. Reflecting the attack from Orel was entrusted to the formations of the Central Front. Units of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from Belgorod.
The steppe front, consisting of rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, on the Russian field near the Prokhorovka railway station, the greatest end-to-end tank battle took place, noted by historians as unprecedented in the world, the largest end-to-end tank battle in terms of scale. Russian power on its own soil passed another test and turned the course of history towards victory.
One day of battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and almost 10 thousand human losses. Hitler's groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovsky field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, starting Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat enemy groups in the Orel area. From July 16 to 18, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts eliminated Nazi groups in the Kursk Triangle and began pursuing it with the support of air forces. With their combined forces, Hitler's formations were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.
The meaning of the Battle of Kursk
- Of unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was key in the development of further offensive actions in the Great Patriotic War;
- The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the plans of the 1943 campaign;
- As a result of the implementation of the “Kutuzov” plan and the “Commander Rumyantsev” operation, units of Hitler’s troops in the area of the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were defeated. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads have been liquidated;
- The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance to the West, liberating cities and towns.
Results of the Battle of Kursk
- The failure of the Wehrmacht's Operation Citadel presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union;
- A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and throughout as a result of the “fiery” Battle of Kursk;
- The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious; there was no longer confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.
The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, became one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Soviet and Russian historiography divides the battle into Kursk defensive (July 5–23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3–23) offensive operations.
Front on the eve of the battle
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide, facing west, was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front - the so-called Kursk Bulge (or salient). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient.
For this purpose, a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”) was developed and approved in April 1943.
To carry it out, the most combat-ready formations were involved - a total of 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized ones, as well as a large number of individual units included in the 9th and 2nd field armies of Army Group Center, in the 4th 1st Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South.
The group of German troops numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft.
Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) had been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense and then launch a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts included more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft.
Troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky defended the northern front (the area facing the enemy) of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Vatutin– southern. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, three tank, three motorized and three cavalry corps (commander - Colonel General Ivan Konev).
The actions of the fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
Progress of the battle
On July 5, 1943, German attack groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. During the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk On July 12, the largest tank battle in the history of the war took place on the Prokhorovsky field.
Up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it on both sides.
The battle near Prokhorovka station in the Belgorod region became the largest battle of the Kursk defensive operation, which went down in history as the Kursk Bulge.
The staff documents contain evidence of the first battle, which took place on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This battle was fought not by tanks, but by rifle units of the 69th Army, which, having exhausted the enemy, themselves suffered heavy losses and were replaced by the 9th Airborne Division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11 the Nazis were stopped at the outskirts of the station.
On July 12, a huge number of German and Soviet tanks collided on a narrow section of the front, only 11-12 kilometers wide.
Tank units “Adolf Hitler”, “Totenkopf”, division “Reich” and others were able to regroup their forces on the eve of the decisive battle. The Soviet command did not know about this.
The Soviet units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a notoriously difficult position: the tank strike group was located between the girders southwest of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy the tank group to its full width. Soviet tanks were forced to advance in a small area limited on one side by the railway and on the other by the floodplain of the Psel River.
The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Pyotr Skripnik was shot down. The crew, having pulled out their commander, took refuge in the crater. The tank was on fire. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved towards the Soviet tankers to crush them under its tracks. Then the mechanic, in order to save his comrades, rushed out of the saving trench. He ran to his burning car and pointed it at the German Tiger. Both tanks exploded.
Ivan Markin first wrote about a tank duel in the late 50s in his book. He called the battle of Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the 20th century.
In fierce battles, the Wehrmacht troops lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, went on the defensive, and on July 16 began to withdraw their forces.
July, 12 The next stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counter-offensive of Soviet troops.
5th of August As a result of operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev", Oryol and Belgorod were liberated; in the evening of the same day, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of this event for the first time during the war.
August 23 Kharkov was liberated. Soviet troops advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction and took up an advantageous position for launching a general offensive to liberate Left Bank Ukraine and reach the Dnieper. The Soviet Army finally consolidated its strategic initiative; the German command was forced to go on the defensive along the entire front.
In one of the largest battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War, more than 4 million people took part on both sides, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved.
Results of the battle
After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative into its own hands and continued its advance to the West.
After the Nazis failed to carry out their Operation Citadel, at the world level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
The fascists found themselves morally depressed, their confidence in their superiority disappeared.
The significance of the victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. It had a huge impact on the further course of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk forced the fascist German command to withdraw large formations of troops and aviation from the Mediterranean theater of operations.
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces and the transfer of new formations to the Soviet-German front, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and their advance to its central regions, which ultimately predetermined the country’s exit from the war. As a result of the victory at Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, a radical change was completed not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
For their exploits in the Battle of Kursk, more than 180 soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals.
About 130 formations and units received the guards rank, more than 20 received the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, and Kharkov.
For its contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Kursk region was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the city of Kursk was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.
On April 27, 2007, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Kursk was awarded the honorary title of the Russian Federation - City of Military Glory.
In 1983, the feat of Soviet soldiers on the Kursk Bulge was immortalized in Kursk - On May 9, a memorial to those killed during the Great Patriotic War was opened.
On May 9, 2000, in honor of the 55th anniversary of the victory in the battle, the Kursk Bulge memorial complex was opened.
The material was prepared according to TASS-Dossier data
Wounded Memory
Dedicated to Alexander Nikolaev,
the driver-mechanic of the T-34 tank, who carried out the first tank ramming in the battle of Prokhorovka.
The memory will not heal like a wound,
Let's not forget all the common soldiers,
That they entered this battle, dying,
And they remained alive forever.
No, not a step back, look straight ahead
Only the blood has drained from the face,
Only clenched teeth stubbornly -
We will stand here until the end!
Let any price be the life of a soldier,
We will all become armor today!
Your mother, your city, the honor of a soldier
Behind the boyish thin back.
Two steel avalanches - two forces
They merged among the fields of rye.
No you, no me - we are one,
We came together like a steel wall.
There are no maneuvers, no formation - there is strength,
The power of rage, the power of fire.
And a fierce battle mowed down
Both armor and soldier names.
The tank is hit, the battalion commander is wounded,
But again - I'm in battle - let the metal burn!
Shouting over the radio feat is equal to:
- All! Farewell! I'm going to ram!
Enemies are paralyzed, the choice is difficult -
You won't believe your eyes right away.
A burning tank flies without a miss -
He gave his life for his homeland.
Only the black funeral square
Will explain to mothers and relatives...
His heart is in the ground, like fragments...
He remained always young.
...On the burnt land there is not a blade of grass,
Tank on tank, armor on armor...
And there are wrinkles on the foreheads of the commanders -
The battle has nothing to compare with in war...
The earthly wound will not heal -
His feat is always with him.
Because he knew when he was dying
How easy it is to die young...
In the memorial temple it is quiet and sacred,
Your name is a scar on the wall...
You stayed to live here - yes, that’s how it should be,
So that the earth does not burn in fire.
On this land, once black,
The burning trail does not allow you to forget.
Your torn heart of a soldier
In spring it blooms with cornflowers...
Elena Mukhamedshina
Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In terms of scope, intensity and results, it ranks among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. During this time, in a relatively small area, there was a fierce clash between huge masses of troops using the most modern military equipment of that time. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the battles on both sides. From the Wehrmacht side, more than 100 divisions took part in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front. The tank battles that were victorious for the Soviet Army were the greatest in the Second World War. " If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster».
The hopes of the military-political leadership did not come true " third reich» for success Operation Citadel . During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.
Construction of defensive lines. Kursk Bulge, 1943
Particularly severe defeats were inflicted on the Nazi tank formations. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. Nazi Germany could no longer fully compensate for this damage. To the Inspector General of the German Armored Forces Colonel General Guderian I had to admit:
« As a result of the failure of the Citadel Offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment. Their timely restoration for conducting defensive actions on the eastern front, as well as for organizing defense in the West, in case of the landing that the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question... and there were no more calm days on the eastern front. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy...».
Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943
Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943
Soviet troops are ready to meet the enemy. Kursk Bulge, 1943 ( see comments to the article)
The failure of the offensive strategy in the East forced the Wehrmacht command to seek new ways of waging war in order to try to save fascism from the impending defeat. It hoped to transform the war into positional forms, to gain time, hoping to split the anti-Hitler coalition. West German historian W. Hubach writes: " On the eastern front, the Germans made a last attempt to seize the initiative, but to no avail. The failed Operation Citadel proved to be the beginning of the end for the German army. Since then, the German front in the East has never stabilized.».
The crushing defeat of the Nazi armies on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The victory at Kursk was the result of a great feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the selfless labor of the Soviet people. This was a new triumph of the wise policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.
Near Kursk. At the observation post of the commander of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. From left to right: N. S. Khrushchev, commander of the 6th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov, corps commander, Major General N. B. Ibyansky (July 1943)
Planning Operation Citadel , the Nazis had high hopes for new equipment - tanks " tiger" And " panther", assault guns " Ferdinand", airplanes " Focke-Wulf-190A" They believed that the new weapons entering the Wehrmacht would surpass Soviet military equipment and ensure victory. However, this did not happen. Soviet designers created new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery units, aircraft, and anti-tank artillery, which in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics were not inferior to, and often surpassed, similar enemy systems.
Fighting on the Kursk Bulge , Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grandiose battle, a metal worker, a designer, an engineer, and a grain grower fought shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, a tankman, an artilleryman, a pilot, and a sapper. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of home front workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the military successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Much credit for the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.
Battle of Kursk was of great importance for the course and outcome of events on the Soviet-German front in 1943. It created favorable conditions for the general offensive of the Soviet Army.
had the greatest international significance. It had a great influence on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy in early July 1943. The defeat of the Wehrmacht at Kursk directly influenced the plans of the fascist German command related to the occupation of Sweden. The previously developed plan for the invasion of Hitler's troops into this country was canceled due to the fact that the Soviet-German front absorbed all the enemy's reserves. Back on June 14, 1943, the Swedish envoy in Moscow stated: “ Sweden understands perfectly well that if it still remains out of the war, it is only thanks to the military successes of the USSR. Sweden is grateful to the Soviet Union for this and speaks directly about it».
Increased losses on the fronts, especially in the East, the severe consequences of total mobilization and the growing liberation movement in European countries affected the internal situation in Germany, the morale of German soldiers and the entire population. Distrust in the government increased in the country, critical statements against the fascist party and government leadership became more frequent, and doubts about achieving victory grew. Hitler further intensified repression to strengthen the “internal front.” But neither the bloody terror of the Gestapo nor the colossal efforts of Goebbels’s propaganda machine could neutralize the impact that the defeat at Kursk had on the morale of the population and the Wehrmacht soldiers.
Near Kursk. Direct fire at the advancing enemy
Huge losses of military equipment and weapons placed new demands on the German military industry and further complicated the situation with human resources. Attracting foreign workers into industry, agriculture and transport, for whom Hitler’s “ new order"was deeply hostile, undermined the rear of the fascist state.
After the defeat in Battle of Kursk Germany's influence on the states of the fascist bloc weakened even more, the internal political situation of the satellite countries worsened, and the foreign policy isolation of the Reich increased. The catastrophic result of the Battle of Kursk for the fascist elite predetermined the further cooling of relations between Germany and neutral countries. These countries have reduced supplies of raw materials and materials " third reich».
Victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk raised the authority of the Soviet Union even higher as a decisive force opposing fascism. The whole world looked with hope at the socialist power and its army, bringing deliverance to humanity from the Nazi plague.
Victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk strengthened the struggle of the peoples of enslaved Europe for freedom and independence, intensified the activities of numerous groups of the Resistance movement, including in Germany itself. Under the influence of the victories at Kursk, the peoples of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition began to demand even more decisively for the rapid opening of a second front in Europe.
The successes of the Soviet Army affected the position of the ruling circles of the USA and England. In the midst of the Battle of Kursk President Roosevelt in a special message to the head of the Soviet government he wrote: “ During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also launched a successful counter-offensive, which has far-reaching consequences..."
The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories. In the Battle of Kursk The superiority of Soviet military leadership and military art manifested itself with renewed vigor. It showed that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-coordinated organism in which all types and types of troops are harmoniously combined.
The defense of Soviet troops near Kursk withstood severe tests and achieved my goals. The Soviet Army was enriched with the experience of organizing a deeply layered defense, stable in anti-tank and anti-aircraft terms, as well as the experience of decisive maneuver of forces and means. Pre-created strategic reserves were widely used, most of which were included in the specially created Steppe District (front). His troops increased the depth of defense on a strategic scale and took an active part in the defensive battle and counter-offensive. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the total depth of the operational formation of defensive fronts reached 50–70 km. The massing of forces and assets in the directions of expected enemy attacks, as well as the overall operational density of troops in defense, have increased. The strength of defense has increased significantly due to the saturation of troops with military equipment and weapons.
Anti-tank defense reached a depth of up to 35 km, the density of artillery anti-tank fire increased, barriers, mining, anti-tank reserves and mobile barrage units found wider use.
German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943
German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943
A major role in increasing the stability of the defense was played by the maneuver of second echelons and reserves, which was carried out from the depths and along the front. For example, during the defensive operation on the Voronezh Front, the regrouping involved about 35 percent of all rifle divisions, over 40 percent of anti-tank artillery units and almost all individual tank and mechanized brigades.
In the Battle of Kursk For the third time during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces successfully carried out a strategic counteroffensive. If the preparation for a counteroffensive near Moscow and Stalingrad took place in a situation of heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, then different conditions developed near Kursk. Thanks to the successes of the Soviet military economy and targeted organizational measures to prepare reserves, the balance of forces had already developed in favor of the Soviet Army by the beginning of the defensive battle.
During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops showed high skill in organizing and conducting offensive operations in summer conditions. The correct choice of the moment of transition from defense to counteroffensive, close operational-strategic interaction of five fronts, a successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defense prepared in advance, the skillful conduct of a simultaneous offensive on a wide front with strikes in several directions, the massive use of armored forces, aviation and artillery - all this had of enormous importance for the defeat of the strategic groupings of the Wehrmacht.
In the counteroffensive, for the first time during the war, second echelons of fronts began to be created as part of one or two combined arms armies (Voronezh Front) and powerful groupings of mobile troops. This allowed the front commanders to build up attacks of the first echelon and develop success in depth or towards the flanks, break through intermediate defensive lines, and also repel strong counterattacks of Nazi troops.
The art of war was enriched in the Battle of Kursk all types of armed forces and branches of the military. In defense, artillery was more decisively massed in the direction of the enemy's main attacks, which ensured the creation of higher operational densities compared to previous defensive operations. The role of artillery in the counteroffensive increased. The density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops reached 150 - 230 guns, and the maximum was 250 guns per kilometer of front.
Soviet tank troops in the Battle of Kursk successfully solved the most complex and varied tasks both in defense and offensive. If until the summer of 1943 tank corps and armies were used in defensive operations primarily to carry out counterattacks, then in the Battle of Kursk they were also used to hold defensive lines. This achieved greater depth of operational defense and increased its stability.
During the counteroffensive, armored and mechanized troops were used en masse, being the main means of front and army commanders in completing a breakthrough of enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success. At the same time, the experience of combat operations in the Oryol operation showed the inexpediency of using tank corps and armies to break through positional defenses, since they suffered heavy losses in carrying out these tasks. In the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was carried out by advanced tank brigades, and the main forces of tank armies and corps were used for operations in operational depth.
Soviet military art in the use of aviation has risen to a new level. IN Battle of Kursk The massing of front-line and long-range aviation forces in the main axes was carried out more decisively, and their interaction with ground forces improved.
A new form of using aviation in a counteroffensive was fully applied - an air offensive, in which attack and bomber aircraft continuously impacted enemy groups and targets, providing support to ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation finally gained strategic air supremacy and thereby contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.
Successfully passed the test at the Battle of Kursk organizational forms of military branches and special forces. The tank armies of the new organization, as well as artillery corps and other formations, played an important role in achieving victory.
In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet command demonstrated a creative, innovative approach to solving the most important tasks of the strategy , operational art and tactics, its superiority over the Nazi military school.
Strategic, front-line, army and military logistics agencies have acquired extensive experience in providing comprehensive support to troops. A characteristic feature of the organization of the rear was the approach of rear units and institutions to the front line. This ensured an uninterrupted supply of troops with material resources and timely evacuation of the wounded and sick.
The enormous scope and intensity of the fighting required a large amount of material resources, primarily ammunition and fuel. During the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, Bryansk, South-Western and left wing of the Western Fronts were supplied by rail with 141,354 wagons with ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies from central bases and warehouses. By air, 1,828 tons of various supplies were delivered to the troops of the Central Front alone.
The medical service of the fronts, armies and formations has been enriched with experience in carrying out preventive and sanitary and hygienic measures, skillful maneuver of the forces and means of medical institutions, and the widespread use of specialized medical care. Despite the significant losses suffered by the troops, many wounded during the Battle of Kursk, thanks to the efforts of military doctors, returned to duty.
Hitler's strategists for planning, organizing and leading Operation Citadel used old, standard methods and methods that did not correspond to the new situation and were well known to the Soviet command. This is recognized by a number of bourgeois historians. So, the English historian A. Clark at work "Barbarossa" notes that the fascist German command again relied on a lightning strike with the widespread use of new military equipment: Junkers, short intensive artillery preparation, close interaction between a mass of tanks and infantry... without due consideration of the changed conditions, except for a simple arithmetic increase in the relevant components." West German historian W. Goerlitz writes that the attack on Kursk was basically carried out “in in accordance with the scheme of previous battles - tank wedges acted to cover from two directions».
Reactionary bourgeois researchers of the Second World War made great efforts to distort events near Kursk . They are trying to rehabilitate the Wehrmacht command, gloss over its mistakes and all the blame for failure of Operation Citadel blamed on Hitler and his closest associates. This position was put forward immediately after the end of the war and has been stubbornly defended to this day. Thus, the former chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel General Halder, was still at work in 1949 "Hitler as a commander", deliberately distorting the facts, claimed that in the spring of 1943, when developing a war plan on the Soviet-German front, “ The commanders of army groups and armies and Hitler's military advisers from the main command of the ground forces tried unsuccessfully to overcome the great operational threat created in the East, to direct him to the only path that promised success - the path of flexible operational leadership, which, like the art of fencing, lies in rapid alternation of cover and strike and compensates for the lack of strength with skillful operational leadership and high fighting qualities of the troops...».
Documents show that miscalculations in planning the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front were made by both the political and military leadership of Germany. The Wehrmacht intelligence service also failed to cope with its tasks. Statements about the non-involvement of the German generals in the development of the most important political and military decisions contradict the facts.
The thesis that the offensive of Hitler’s troops near Kursk had limited goals and that failure of Operation Citadel cannot be considered as a phenomenon of strategic importance.
In recent years, works have appeared that give a fairly close to objective assessment of a number of events of the Battle of Kursk. American historian M. Caidin in the book "Tigers" are burning" characterizes the Battle of Kursk as " greatest land battle ever fought in history”, and does not agree with the opinion of many researchers in the West that it pursued limited, auxiliary” goals. " History deeply doubts, - writes the author, - in German statements that they did not believe in the future. Everything was decided at Kursk. What happened there determined the future course of events" The same idea is reflected in the annotation to the book, where it is noted that the battle of Kursk “ broke the back of the German army in 1943 and changed the entire course of the Second World War... Few outside Russia understand the enormity of this stunning clash. In fact, even today the Soviets feel bitterness as they see Western historians downplaying the Russian triumph at Kursk».
Why did the last attempt of the fascist German command to carry out a major victorious offensive in the East and regain the lost strategic initiative fail? The main reasons for failure Operation Citadel the increasingly stronger economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union, the superiority of Soviet military art, and the boundless heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers appeared. In 1943, the Soviet military economy produced more military equipment and weapons than the industry of Nazi Germany, which used the resources of the enslaved countries of Europe.
But the growth of the military power of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces was ignored by Nazi political and military leaders. Underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Union and overestimating its own strengths were an expression of the adventurism of the fascist strategy.
From a purely military point of view, complete failure of Operation Citadel to a certain extent was due to the fact that the Wehrmacht failed to achieve surprise in the attack. Thanks to the efficient work of all types of reconnaissance, including airborne, the Soviet command knew about the impending offensive and took the necessary measures. The military leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that no defense could resist powerful tank rams, supported by massive air operations. But these predictions turned out to be unfounded; at the cost of huge losses, the tanks only slightly wedged themselves into the Soviet defenses north and south of Kursk and got stuck on the defensive.
An important reason collapse of Operation Citadel The secretiveness of the preparation of Soviet troops for both a defensive battle and a counteroffensive was revealed. The fascist leadership did not have a complete understanding of the plans of the Soviet command. In preparation for July 3, that is, the day before German offensive near Kursk, department for the study of the armies of the East “Assessment of enemy actions during Operation Citadel there is not even a mention of the possibility of a counteroffensive by Soviet troops against Wehrmacht strike forces.
The major miscalculations of fascist German intelligence in assessing the forces of the Soviet Army concentrated in the area of the Kursk salient are convincingly evidenced by the report card of the operational department of the General Staff of the German Army Ground Forces, prepared on July 4, 1943. It even contains information about the Soviet troops deployed in the first operational echelon are reflected inaccurately. German intelligence had very sketchy information about the reserves located in the Kursk direction.
At the beginning of July, the situation on the Soviet-German front and possible decisions of the Soviet command were assessed by the political and military leaders of Germany, essentially, from their previous positions. They firmly believed in the possibility of a major victory.
Soviet soldiers in the battles of Kursk showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. The Communist Party and the Soviet government highly appreciated the greatness of their feat. Military orders sparkled on the banners of many formations and units, 132 formations and units received the guards rank, 26 formations and units were awarded the honorary names of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. More than 100 thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including private V.E. Breusov, division commander Major General L.N. Gurtiev, platoon commander Lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, battalion Komsomol organizer Lieutenant N.M. Zverintsev, battery commander Captain G.I. Igishev, private A.M. Lomakin, platoon deputy commander, senior sergeant Kh.M. Mukhamadiev, squad commander Sergeant V.P. Petrishchev, gun commander Junior Sergeant A.I. Petrov, Senior Sergeant G.P. Pelikanov, Sergeant V.F. Chernenko and others.
Victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased role of party political work. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations helped the personnel understand the significance of the upcoming battles, their role in defeating the enemy. By personal example, the communists attracted the fighters with them. Political agencies took measures to maintain and replenish party organizations in their divisions. This ensured continuous party influence over all personnel.
An important means of mobilizing soldiers for military exploits was the promotion of advanced experience and the popularization of units and subunits that distinguished themselves in battle. The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, declaring gratitude to the personnel of distinguished troops, had great inspiring power - they were widely promoted in units and formations, read out at rallies, and distributed through leaflets. Extracts from the orders were given to each soldier.
The increase in the morale of Soviet soldiers and confidence in victory was facilitated by timely information from personnel about events in the world and in the country, about the successes of the Soviet troops and the defeats of the enemy. Political agencies and party organizations, carrying out active work to educate personnel, played an important role in achieving victories in defensive and offensive battles. Together with their commanders, they held high the banner of the party and were bearers of its spirit, discipline, steadfastness and courage. They mobilized and inspired soldiers to defeat the enemy.
« The giant battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943, noted L. I. Brezhnev , – broke the back of Nazi Germany and incinerated its armored shock troops. The superiority of our army in combat skills, weapons, and strategic leadership has become clear to the whole world.».
The victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk opened up new opportunities for the fight against German fascism and the liberation of Soviet lands temporarily captured by the enemy. Firmly holding the strategic initiative. The Soviet Armed Forces increasingly launched a general offensive.
In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups “Center” and “South”.
Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring its own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.
It was not difficult to unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance in the summer of 1943. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, a decision was made to transition to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.
In case the Germans decided not to attack in the Kursk Bulge area, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.
The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and the shelling of one advancing enemy unit from several sides at once was achieved.
Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.
On the German side, 50 German divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.
Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received in fairly large quantities new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, , themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used correctly in the right place.
At this time, new combat aircraft entered service with the German Air Force: Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft. During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the first mass use of La-5, Yak-7 and Yak-9 fighters by the Soviet Air Force took place.
On May 6-8, Soviet aviation with the forces of six air armies struck on a 1,200-kilometer front from Smolensk to the coast of the Azov Sea. The targets for this strike were German Air Force airfields. On the one hand, this really made it possible to inflict some damage on both vehicles and airfields, however, on the other hand, Soviet aviation suffered losses, and these actions did not have a significant impact on the situation in the upcoming Battle of Kursk.
In general, the same can be said about the actions of the Luftwaffe. German planes bombed railways, bridges, and places where Soviet forces were concentrated. It is worth noting that German aviation was often more successful. Claims about this were expressed by units of the Soviet air defense. One way or another, the German troops failed to achieve serious damage and disruption of the communication routes of the Red Army.
Both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the date of the German troops' transition to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.
The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this event was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the German troops suffered significant damage. However, apparently, it was not possible to cause much damage. We know for sure about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the disruption of enemy wire lines. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.
Aviation was supposed to support Soviet troops in countering the artillery attack, but due to the dark time of day, all flights were canceled. At 2:30 on July 5, the aviation units received a readiness directive from the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General Rudenko. In accordance with it, fighter units had to be ready at dawn to repel possible Luftwaffe raids, and attack aircraft and bombers were required to be combat ready by 6:00 am.
Early in the morning, Soviet fighters began fighting German bombers and attack aircraft. In the Maloarkhangelsk area, German Ju-88s, operating under the cover of Focke-Wulf fighters, bombed the location of Soviet units. The pilots of the 157th Fighter Aviation Regiment shot down three Ju-88s and two FW-190s. The Germans shot down five Soviet fighters. In this battle, the Luftwaffe lost its unit commander, Hermann Michael, whose plane, according to German data, exploded in the air.
Until half past seven in the morning on the first day of the battle on the Central Front, Soviet pilots managed to quite successfully repel Luftwaffe attacks. However, then the Germans began to act much more actively. The number of enemy aircraft in the air has also increased. Soviet aircraft continued to fly in groups of 6-8 fighters: an organizational error made by the aviation command had an impact. This led to serious difficulties for the Red Army Air Force fighters. In general, during the first day of the battle, the 16th Air Army suffered quite serious losses in both destroyed and damaged aircraft. In addition to the mistakes mentioned above, the lack of experience of many Soviet pilots also affected.
On July 6, the 16th Air Army accompanied the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps near Maloarkhangelsk. Aircraft of the 221st Bomber Division flew sorties until the afternoon, attacking German troops in Senkovo, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyan and other populated areas. At the same time, German planes continuously bombed Soviet positions. According to Soviet data, Soviet tanks did not suffer heavy losses from bombs - most of the vehicles destroyed and damaged by that time were hit by ground forces.
Until July 9, the 16th Air Army continued not only to conduct active battles, but also at the same time to try to change the tactics of using aviation. They tried to send large groups of fighters ahead of the bombers to “clear” the airspace. Commanders of air divisions and regiments began to receive more initiative when planning operations. But during operations, the pilots had to act in accordance with given goals, without being distracted from the plan.
In general, during the battles of the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, units of the 16th Air Army flew about 7.5 thousand sorties. The army suffered heavy losses, but did everything possible to provide adequate support to its ground forces. Starting from the third day of fighting, the army command changed the tactics of the aircraft, resorting to massive attacks on concentrations of enemy equipment and manpower. These attacks had a positive impact on the development of events on July 9-10 in the battle zone of the Central Front.
In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), combat operations began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the front's military outposts and lasted until late at night.
On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.
The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.
Air support for the Red Army units on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was provided by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. Early in the morning of July 5, German aircraft began bombing the battle formations of the first and second lines of Soviet defense. The sorties of fighter squadrons managed to inflict quite significant damage on the enemy, but the losses of Soviet troops were also high.
On July 6, German tanks launched an assault on the second line of defense of the Soviet troops. On this day, among other Soviet units, the 291st Assault and 2nd Guards Assault Air Divisions of the 16th Air Army should be noted, which for the first time used PTAB 2.5-1.5 cumulative bombs in battle. The effect of these bombs on enemy equipment was described as "excellent".
The problems and shortcomings that were noted in the actions of Soviet aviation of the 2nd and 17th Air Armies are very similar to similar problems in the 16th Army. However, here too the command tried to adjust the tactics of using aircraft, solve organizational problems as quickly as possible and strive with all its might to increase the efficiency of air force operations. Apparently, these measures achieved their goal. Increasingly, words began to appear in the reports of commanders of ground units that Soviet attack aircraft made it much easier to repel German tank and infantry attacks. The fighters also inflicted significant damage on the enemy. Thus, it was noted that only the 5th Fighter Air Corps in the first three days reached the mark of 238 downed enemy aircraft.
On July 10, bad weather set in on the Kursk Bulge. This sharply reduced the number of sorties from both the Soviet and German sides. Among the undoubtedly successful battles of this day, one can note the actions of 10 La-5s from the 193rd Fighter Regiment, who managed to “disperse” a group of 35 Ju-87 dive bombers with a cover of six Bf.109s. Enemy planes randomly dropped bombs and began to retreat to their territory. Two Junkers were shot down. A heroic feat in this battle was performed by junior lieutenant M.V. Kubyshkin, who, saving his commander, went into the oncoming ram of a Messerschmitt and died.
On July 12, at the height of the Battle of Prokhorov, aircraft on both sides could provide only very limited support to ground units: weather conditions continued to be bad. The Red Army Air Force made only 759 sorties on this day, and the Luftwaffe - 654. However, in the reports of German pilots there is no mention of destroyed Soviet tanks. Subsequently, the superiority in the air on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge gradually passed to Soviet aviation. By July 17, the activity of the German 8th Air Corps had dropped to almost zero.