The vitality and intensity of this effort depends on the surrounding conditions. In his opinion, for psychology the question of free will is insoluble, because scientific psychology “must deal exclusively with the general laws of volitional actions, with ideas,” with the conditions for the emergence of efforts. “Psychology ignores manifestations of free will, without, of course, denying their possibilities” [ibid., p. 353]. At the same time, James emphasized the ethical and cognitive significance of volitional effort. In the first case, its presence in a particular individual acts as a criterion for the social assessment of this individual; in the second, it reveals “the inner essence of our spiritual nature” [ibid., p. 354]. According to Vygotsky L.S. James's theory is a type of voluntaristic theory in which the author was unable to avoid “all spiritualistic and metaphysical explanations” of the will. This assessment mainly concerned James’s thesis about the consent of the will (fiat – Latin “let it be!”) on the dominance in the consciousness of one of the rather weak motives. 2.3 THEORIES OF WILL IN MODERN DOMESTIC PSYCHOLOGY Various definitions of will are presented in accordance with the main approaches to its study developed in domestic psychological science: mastery, regulation, control of behavior; motivational; choice. Within the framework of the first approach, we will consider the concept of Vygotsky L.S. about will as the highest mental function; concepts of Selivanova V.I., Puni A.Ts. about will as a conscious level of regulation of human behavior and activity; Ilyin E.P.’s concept of will as a type of voluntary control. Vygotsky L.S. refers will to the highest mental functions of a person, the development of which is carried out as a person mastering his own behavior using various means. Characteristic signs of mastering one’s own behavior are manifested mainly in the free choice of action. Free choice between two possibilities, determined not from the outside, but by the subject (child) himself, was experimentally simulated by creating ambiguity of motives for action and their struggle. As a result, it was found that in complex, difficult cases for the child (time limit for choice, uncertainty, indifference, balance or diversity of motives for the chosen actions), he voluntarily resorts to drawing lots to make a choice. Thus, the child “introduces new stimuli into the situation, completely neutral in comparison with the entire situation, and gives them the power of motive”; he influences his own choice of action by creating an auxiliary motive. Analyzing the well-known volitional act described by James W. using the example of getting out of bed in the morning, Vygotsky L.S. highlights the following points: “1) you have to get up (motive), 2) you don’t want to (motive), 3) counting to yourself: one, two, three (auxiliary motive) and 4) getting up by three. This is introducing an auxiliary motive, creating a situation from the outside that forces me to stand up... This is will in the true sense of the word. ... I mastered my behavior through an additional stimulus or auxiliary motive." Vygotsky L.S. sees the uniqueness of will in the fact that a person changes the environment through his external activity, i.e. forces you to serve your goals, subordinates, directs in your own way the “power of things” over behavior, and thus influences your own behavior, subordinating it to yourself [ibid., p. 281]. Will means those means by which we master action. “In this sense, will means domination over an action that is carried out by itself; we create only artificial conditions for it to be carried out; therefore, will is always an indirect, immediate process” [ibid., p. 288]. In the concept of Selivanov V.I. will is understood as a psychological tool that allows an individual to cope with impulsiveness and not succumb to routine and habit. Will is defined as a conscious level of regulation by a person of his behavior and activities, expressed in the ability to overcome internal and external obstacles when performing purposeful actions and deeds. Volitional regulation is considered by Selivanov as the highest form of activity (consciously directed activity) of the individual, in which a person’s ability to control himself and fight to achieve his goal is manifested. Such regulation is accomplished with the help of volitional efforts, being concretized in volitional processes, states, properties, and actions. According to Selivanov V.I. volitional regulation cannot be considered complete if it is not expressed externally by execution. In the concept of Puni A.Ts. will is defined as “the active side of the mind and moral feelings, allowing a person to control himself, especially in the conditions of overcoming obstacles of varying degrees of difficulty.” According to Puni A.Ts., obstacles are a necessary condition for the actualization and development of the will. They arise as a result of a discrepancy between a person’s capabilities (his ideas, thoughts, feelings, actions) and objective conditions and characteristics of activity and are divided into external and internal. External obstacles were understood as any objective conditions and features of the external environment and activity that become an obstacle to achieving a goal or solving particular problems; under internal obstacles - objective changes and conditions of the internal environment of his body arising under the influence of external conditions of a person’s life and activity, which serve as an obstacle to achieving goals. According to Puni A.Ts., understanding internal obstacles only as purely mental phenomena (unfavorable emotional and conflict mental states) is not always justified, because mental phenomena are secondary, derivative, the subjective side of objective changes and states of the internal environment of the body. External and internal obstacles interact, manifesting themselves in difficulties of varying degrees. In the concept of Ilyin E.P. will is understood as a type of 13 voluntary control, realized through volitional actions, an essential feature of which is the presence of volitional effort. Declaring selfhood as the main essence of will, the author defines it as self-determination and conscious intentional planning by a person of his actions, including self-command, self-stimulation, self-control over his actions and states. Actually, will, according to E.P. Ilyin, is self-government of behavior with the help of consciousness, which presupposes a person’s independence in decision-making, initiation, implementation and control of one’s own actions. So, despite the existing differences in regulatory theories of will, several common points can be identified. Firstly, will is associated with a means of mastering a person, mainly his own behavior. Secondly, attention is drawn to the indirectness of volitional behavior. Thirdly, decisive importance is attached to the execution of volitional action. In the motivational-activity theory of Ivannikov V.A. will is defined as “a person’s ability for conscious intentional activity or for self-determination through work on the internal plane, providing additional incentive (inhibition) to action based on an arbitrary form of motivation.” Additional motivations often turn out to be personal, ethical, aesthetic motives, i.e. not related to specific activities with a substantive result. In this regard, Ivannikov considers will as “the last stage in a person’s mastery of his own processes, namely, as mastery of his own motivational process.” The characteristic features of volitional behavior are considered by Ivannikov in connection with the situation, mental status and organization (methods of implementation and motivation) of actions. In this regard, volitional behavior is actualized when there is a lack or undesirability of the incentive to action (it is necessary to perform an action that is not related to the current need, in the presence of internal and external obstacles). In terms of mental status, a volitional action is considered as an action with two meanings (one of these meanings is given by the motive of an imaginary situation), and in terms of its organization – as doubly voluntary. Thus, the essence of will, or rather, volitional action, lies in the transformation of its motivational part. As part of the analysis of choice as a specific sign of will, we will consider the signs of volitional choice in the concept of Vygotsky L.S. and in the theory of regulatory-volitional processes by L.M. Wecker. Based on the results of the analysis of Levin’s experiments, K. Vygotsky distinguishes two independent parts in a volitional action: − the final part of the volitional process or the moment of a person’s decision to act in a certain way depending on the draw of the lot; this part is built according to the mechanism of habit, like an “artificially created conditioned reflex”; − the executive part or the execution of a volitional action (after casting lots); this part functions as a ready-made conditioned reflex, as an action according to instructions. The identification of two parts of volitional action allowed Vygotsky to focus on the paradox of will, which consists in the creation with its help of an involuntarily operating mechanism. Volitional choice is understood by Vygotsky as a complex, free (and not externally given according to the experimenter’s instructions) choice, which has the following characteristics. Firstly, volitional choice is “the action of a closure mechanism, i.e. closing the connection between a given stimulus and a reaction; then everything happens as with an externally given choice. Secondly, “with volitional choice, it is not stimuli that fight, but reactive formations, entire systems of attitudes" [ibid., p. 284], motives [ibid., p. 285]. Thirdly, the struggle of motives shifts in time and takes place long before the actual actual situation in which a person needs to act (ibid.).Fourthly, motives fight not for execution, but for the closing part of the action (ibid.).Fifthly, with volitional choice there is an illusion (among the subject himself and psychologists) that the volitional action is directed along the line the greatest resistance [ibid., p. 286], but in fact there is human freedom as a recognized necessity.Sixthly, with a volitional choice, a person himself creates instructions for the performing mechanisms [ibid., p. 288]. In the theory of regulatory-volitional processes of Wecker L.M. will is considered as the highest specific voluntary regulation of behavior and activity by a person, the conditions for its actualization are: 1) the presence of at least two levels of regulatory processes (i.e., different levels of generalization of cognitive and emotional-moral mental structures); 2) the need to differentiate, correlate and select the level of regulatory processes that meets the criteria of intellectual, emotional, moral and general social value. Will, according to Wecker, although it requires energy and strength, functions on the principle of energy self-sufficiency and can subjugate all lower levels of mental regulation of human activity, down to the most basic, elementary ones. Wecker emphasizes that the choice of a specific action option is characteristic only of mental organization; at the same time, at each level of mental regulation - involuntary, voluntary and volitional - choice has its own specific characteristics. Thus, at the mental involuntary level, movements are controlled by sensory-perceptual images, but without any prior intention, accountable and controlled by the integral subject. The involuntary choice of one or another motor decision is carried out without preliminary enumeration of options for the action program; in fact, it is adopted during the execution of the action and is determined from the outside, purely statistically. 16 At an arbitrary level of regulation, action programs are accountable and controlled by the subject of the activity, “who here precedes the practical execution of the regulated action by the verbal formulation of its programs”; however, the whole personality may not be involved in the process of voluntary regulation. The subject’s arbitrary choice of one or another motor decision includes a preliminary selection of options for action programs before its actual execution, and is psychologically free within the framework of given options for possible solutions, but related to the same level of mentally reflected social values. At the volitional level of regulation of behavior and activity, characteristic of an integral personality, the choice is made according to the criteria of intellectual, emotional, moral and general social value between alternative action programs; and these programs themselves relate to different levels of mental regulation. Volitional choice is characterized by a high degree of freedom, because it is carried out within the framework of a multi-level hierarchy of mental regulation. Thus, in theories that consider volitional choice, attention is paid to a person’s experience of freedom when making this choice before the start of the action. So, in various concepts of will, developed in domestic psychology, its various definitions are given, attention is drawn to its various functions, signs, and conditions of actualization. Essentially, the theory of will that takes place in modern Russian psychology is represented by a number of the following oppositions: - the study of will in the context of a person mastering his own behavior - the study of will in the context of the characteristics of a person’s motivational sphere; − analysis of the will on the model of volitional actions - analysis of the will on the model of a strong-willed, integral personality; 17 – completion of a volitional act in the motivational part of the action before the immediate execution of the action – completion of a volitional act only after the execution of the action; - description of volitional effort, choice as specific signs of will - denial of the specificity of these signs for the will; - focusing on the struggle of motives and the outcome of this struggle in the act of will - focusing on the function of the will - the fight against the struggle of motives; − focusing on external and internal obstacles as conditions for the actualization of the will – focusing on the internal obstacle as a condition for the actualization of the will; − consideration of the influences of the will, first of all, on the behavior and activity of a person - consideration of the influences of the will within the limits of the life-building of the individual; − emphasis on cultivating the will through training in self-control of actions - emphasis on cultivating the will through the cultivation of internal (intrinsic) motivation; − description of intrapsychic techniques of will in the forms of self-orders - description of intrapsychic techniques of will in the forms of requests, promised rewards, threats, intrigues in a person’s relationship to himself. 3 FUNCTIONS OF THE WILL The volitional function as an inhibitory, delaying function was first proposed by Ribot T. . It, in his opinion, manifests itself under conditions of insufficiently strong arousal (delay is impossible if strong arousal immediately leads to action), association between two states (for example, horror causes numbness), the emergence of antagonistic states of consciousness (for example, anger is delayed by the idea of duty). The essence of this function is to suppress competing motives in the mind in order to ensure the victory of one of them. In the modern interpretation, attention is drawn to the function of the will (general for volition in general) of inhibiting spontaneous activity and overcoming established stereotypes. Basov M.Ya. 5 functions of mental phenomena were identified: perceptual, reproductive, associative (intelligence), reactive (emotions), regulatory (will). Thus, the will has a monopoly on the regulatory function, the essence of which Basov saw in controlling the flow of other mental processes (calling, accelerating, slowing down, strengthening, weakening, stopping, coordination) and in their assessment by the individual. A person as an individual is characterized by the presence and severity of the regulatory function of the will. This function was called “volitional function” by Basov, the form of existence of which was declared to be volitional attention. In the form of attention, the will regulates perception, memory, thinking, emotions. Thus, the regulatory function was assigned to the will, considered as embodied in attention, and regulation itself was interpreted as primarily carried out in relation to mental processes, and not in relation to the behavior of the individual as a whole. The regulatory function of the will is currently recognized by all authors. Researchers believe that volitional regulation is conscious self-regulation or self-determination of human behavior and activity, which is carried out in relation to movements and their parameters, emotional behavior, actions and their parameters, motives, and various mental states. It prevents the disorganizing generalization of emotional arousal and promotes retention of the primary goal; warns, overcomes or mitigates the effect of an obstacle that has already arisen. The function of organizing mental functions by will and mobilizing mental resources is highlighted by Kalin V.K. . The cited author interprets will 19 as a system of consciousness mechanisms that ensure self-government of the organization of mental functions. “The procedural aspect of the will - volitional regulation - is the choice and implementation by the subject of the activity of the most effective method (form) of transforming the original, actual organization of mental functions into the necessary, most adequate to the goals of the activity. This transformation determines the possibility of establishing and maintaining the order of actions chosen by the subject (or forms of activity)... the problem of will is the problem of the form of providing the form of activity (or in other words: the problem of will is the problem of self-subjective relations)... The function of incentives or initiation of actions has traditionally been attributed to the will by most researchers. Attention was paid to the conditions for actualizing the function of motivation: the presence of obstacles and competing motives, the absence of an actually experienced desire to carry out an action. The reflective function of the will was discussed in Soviet psychology in connection with volitional actions. It was postulated that the objects of reflection are both the goal of the activity in relation to the actual activity being performed, and the conditions and environment of the action, as well as such phenomena as the struggle of motives, decision-making, determination, level of aspirations, volitional effort. The properties of the so-called volitional reflection included mediation, selectivity, active-personal character and relation to higher regulation aimed at achieving a goal. The function of “freedom from” and “freedom for”, realized by the will, was highlighted by V. Frankl, emphasizing the freedom of a person in realizing the meaning of life in conditions of limitation of this freedom by objective circumstances. A person is free in relation to his inclinations, heredity and factors and circumstances of the external environment. A person is free to take responsibility for his own destiny, listen to the voice of his conscience, make decisions about his destiny and change himself. 20
Various definitions of will are presented in accordance with the main approaches to its study developed in Russian psychological science: mastery, regulation, behavior management; motivational; choice.
Within the framework of the first approach, we will consider the concept of Vygotsky L.S. about will as the highest mental function; concepts of Selivanova V.I., Puni A.Ts. about will as a conscious level of regulation of human behavior and activity; Ilyin E.P.’s concept of will as a type of voluntary control.
Vygotsky L.S. (6) relates will to the highest mental functions of a person, the development of which is carried out as a person mastering his own behavior using various means. Characteristic signs of mastering one's own behavior are manifested mainly in the free choice of action. Free choice between two possibilities, determined not from the outside, but by the subject (child) himself, was experimentally simulated by creating ambiguity of motives for action and their struggle. As a result, it was found that in complex, difficult cases for the child (time limit for choice, uncertainty, indifference, balance or diversity of motives for the chosen actions), he voluntarily resorts to drawing lots to make a choice. Thus, the child “introduces new stimuli into the situation, completely neutral in comparison with the entire situation, and gives them the power of motive” (6, p. 277); he influences his own choice of action by creating an auxiliary motive.
Analyzing the well-known volitional act described by James W. using the example of getting out of bed in the morning, Vygotsky L.S. highlights the following points: “1) you need to get up (motive), 2) you don’t want to (motive), 3) counting to yourself: one, two, three (auxiliary motive) and 4) rise by three. This is the introduction of an auxiliary motive, creating a situation from the outside that forces me to stand up... This is will in the true sense of the word... I mastered my behavior through an additional stimulus or auxiliary motive" (6, pp. 279-280). Vygotsky L.S. sees the uniqueness of will in the fact that a person changes the environment through his external activity, i.e. forces him to serve his goals, subordinates him, directs in his own way the “power of things” over behavior, and, thus, influences his own behavior, subordinating it to himself (ibid., p. 281). Will means those means by which we master action. “In this sense, will means domination over an action that is carried out by itself; we create only artificial conditions for it to be carried out; therefore, will is always an indirect, immediate process” (ibid., p. 288).
IN Selivanov's concepts IN AND. (16; 17) will is understood as a psychological tool that allows an individual to cope with impulsiveness and not succumb to routine and habit. Will is defined as a person’s conscious level of regulation of his behavior and activities, expressed in the ability to overcome internal and external obstacles when performing purposeful actions and deeds. Volitional regulation is considered by Selivanov as the highest form of activity (consciously directed activity) of the individual, in which a person’s ability to control himself and fight to achieve his goal is manifested. Such regulation is accomplished with the help of volitional efforts (19), being concretized in volitional processes, states, properties, and actions. According to Selivanov V.I. volitional regulation cannot be considered complete if it is not expressed externally by execution.
IN concepts of Puni A.Ts. will is defined as “the active side of the mind and moral feelings, allowing a person to control himself, especially in the conditions of overcoming obstacles of varying degrees of difficulty” (14, p. 29). According to Puni A.Ts., obstacles are a necessary condition for the actualization and development of the will. They arise as a result of a discrepancy between a person’s capabilities (his ideas, thoughts, feelings, actions) and objective conditions and characteristics of activity and are divided into external and internal. External obstacles were understood as any objective conditions and features of the external environment and activities that become an obstacle to achieving a goal or solving particular problems; under internal obstacles - objective changes and conditions of the internal environment of his body arising under the influence of external conditions of a person’s life and activity, which serve as an obstacle to achieving goals. According to Puni A.Ts., understanding internal obstacles only as purely mental phenomena (unfavorable emotional and conflict mental states) is not always justified, because mental phenomena are secondary, derivative, the subjective side of objective changes and states of the internal environment of the body. External and internal obstacles interact to manifest themselves in varying degrees of difficulty (13).
IN concepts of Ilyin E.P.(11, p. 41) will is understood as a type of voluntary management, realized through volitional actions, an essential feature of which is the presence of volitional effort. Declaring selfhood as the main essence of will, the author defines it as self-determination and conscious intentional planning by a person of his actions, including self-command, self-stimulation, self-control over his actions and states. Actually, will, according to E.P. Ilyin, is self-government of behavior with the help of consciousness, which presupposes a person’s independence in decision-making, initiation, implementation and control of one’s own actions.
So, despite the existing differences in regulatory theories of will, several common points can be identified. Firstly, will is associated with a means of mastering a person, mainly his own behavior. Secondly, attention is drawn to the mediation of volitional behavior. Thirdly, decisive importance is attached to the execution of volitional action.
IN motivational activity theory Ivannikova V.A. will is defined as “a person’s ability for conscious intentional activity or for self-determination through work on the internal plane, providing additional incentive (inhibition) to action based on an arbitrary form of motivation” (10, p. 93). Additional motivations often turn out to be personal, ethical, aesthetic motives, i.e. not related to specific activities with a substantive result. In this regard, Ivannikov considers will as “the last stage in a person’s mastery of his own processes, namely, the mastery of his own motivational process” (9, p. 26).
The characteristic features of volitional behavior are considered by Ivannikov in connection with the situation, mental status and organization (methods of implementation and motivation) of actions. In this regard, volitional behavior is actualized when there is a lack or undesirability of the incentive to action (it is necessary to perform an action that is not related to the current need, in the presence of internal and external obstacles). According to its mental status, a volitional action is considered as an action with two meanings (one of these meanings is given by the motive of the imaginary situation), and according to its organization, it is considered as doubly arbitrary.
Thus, the essence of will, or rather, volitional action, lies in the transformation of its motivational part.
As part of the analysis choice As a specific sign of will, we will consider the signs of volitional choice in the concept of Vygotsky L.S. and in the theory of regulatory-volitional processes by L.M. Wecker.
Based on the results of the analysis of Levin’s experiments, K. Vygotsky (6, p. 282) distinguishes two independent parts in volitional action:
the final part of the volitional process or the moment of a person’s decision to act in a certain way depending on the draw of the lot; this part is built according to the mechanism of habit, like an “artificially created conditioned reflex”;
the executive part or the execution of a volitional action (after casting lots); this part functions as a ready-made conditioned reflex, as an action according to instructions.
The identification of two parts of volitional action allowed Vygotsky to focus on the paradox of will, which consists in the creation with its help of an involuntarily operating mechanism (6, p. 283).
Volitional choice is understood by Vygotsky as a complex, free (and not externally given according to the experimenter’s instructions) choice, which has the following characteristics. Firstly, volitional choice is “the action of a closure mechanism, i.e. closing the connection between a given stimulus and a reaction (6, p. 285); then everything happens as with an externally given choice. Secondly, “with volitional choice they fight not stimuli, but reactive formations, entire systems of attitudes" (ibid., p. 284), motives (ibid., p. 285). Thirdly, the struggle of motives shifts in time and takes place long before the actual actual situation in which a person one must act (ibid.). Fourthly, motives fight not for execution, but for the closing part of the action (ibid.). Fifthly, with a volitional choice, there is an illusion (among the subject himself and psychologists) that the volitional action is directed along the line of greatest resistance (ibid., p. 286), but in fact, human freedom takes place as a recognized necessity.Sixthly, with a volitional choice, a person himself creates instructions for performing mechanisms (ibid., p. 288).
In theory Wecker's regulatory-volitional processes L.M. (3) will is considered as the highest specific voluntary regulation of human behavior and activity, the conditions for its actualization are: 1) the presence of at least two levels of regulatory processes (i.e., different levels of generalization of cognitive and emotional-moral mental structures); 2) the need to differentiate, correlate and select the level of regulatory processes that meets the criteria of intellectual, emotional, moral and general social value (3, pp. 195-196). Will, according to Wecker, although it requires energy and strength, functions on the principle of energy self-sufficiency and can subjugate all lower levels of mental regulation of human activity, down to the most basic, elementary ones.
Wecker emphasizes that the choice of a specific action option is characteristic only of mental organization; at the same time, at each level of mental regulation - involuntary, voluntary and volitional - choice has its own specific characteristics. Thus, at the mental involuntary level, movements are controlled by sensory-perceptual images, but without any prior intention, accountable and controlled by the integral subject. The involuntary choice of one or another motor decision is carried out without preliminary enumeration of options for the action program; in fact, when performing an action, it is determined from the outside, purely statistically.
At an arbitrary level of regulation, action programs are accountable and controlled by the subject of the activity, “who here precedes the practical execution of the regulated action by the verbal formulation of its programs” (3, p. 194); however, the whole personality may not be involved in the process of voluntary regulation. The subject's arbitrary choice of one or another motor decision includes a preliminary selection of options for action programs before its actual execution, and is psychologically free within the framework of given options for possible solutions, but related to the same level of mentally reflected social values.
At the volitional level of regulation of behavior and activity, characteristic of an integral personality, the choice is made according to the criteria of intellectual, emotional, moral and general social value between alternative action programs; and these programs themselves relate to different levels of mental regulation. Volitional choice is characterized by a high degree of freedom, because it is carried out within the framework of a multi-level hierarchy of mental regulation.
Thus, in theories that consider volitional choice, attention is paid to a person’s experience of freedom when making this choice before the start of the action.
So, in various concepts of will, developed in domestic psychology, its various definitions are given, attention is drawn to its various functions, signs, and conditions of actualization. Essentially, the theory of will that takes place in modern Russian psychology is represented by a number of the following oppositions:
1) the study of will in the context of a person mastering his own behavior (5; 6; 19) - the study of will in the context of the characteristics of a person’s motivational sphere (10; 21);
2) analysis of the will on the model of volitional actions (10) - analysis of the will on the model of the strong-willed (7), holistic (2) personality;
3) completion of the volitional act in the motivational part of the action before the direct execution of the action (10) - completion of the volitional act only after the execution of the action (17-19);
4) description of volitional effort, choice as specific signs of will (13; 14; 18; 19) - denial of the specificity of these signs for will (7; 12; 22);
5) focusing on the struggle of motives and the outcome of this struggle in the act of will (4; 8) - focusing on the function of the will - the fight against the struggle of motives (2);
6) focusing on external and internal obstacles as conditions for the actualization of the will (13; 14; 18; 19) – focusing on the internal obstacle as a condition for the actualization of the will (1);
7) consideration of the influences of the will, first of all, on human behavior and activity (10; 14; 19) - consideration of the influences of the will in the limit of the life-building of the individual (2; 7);
8) emphasis on the education of the will through training in self-control of actions - an emphasis on the education of the will through the cultivation of internal (intrinsic) motivation (7);
9) description of intrapsychic techniques of will in the forms of self-orders (14; 20) - description of intrapsychic techniques of will in the forms of requests, promised rewards, threats, intrigue in a person’s relationship to himself (2).
1.5. Will as a special form of mental regulation
Although I.M. Sechenov is considered the “father” of the reflex theory of will, he can just as well be called the first scientist who introduced the understanding of will as a special form of mental regulation. After all, his words that the will is the active side of reason and moral sense are nothing more than a reflection of just such an understanding.
One of the first researchers to pay attention to will as a special form of mental regulation of behavior was M. Ya. Basov. He understood will as a mental mechanism through which a person regulates his mental functions, adjusting them to each other and rearranging them in accordance with the task at hand. The power of the individual over his mental states “is possible only if there is a certain regulatory factor. A healthy personality always possesses such a factor in reality. And his name is will” [ibid., p. 14]. However, this regulatory function, in essence, was reduced to attention by M. Ya. Basov. It is attention, in accordance with the ideas of this researcher, that regulates perception, thinking, feeling, movements - through a change in the content of consciousness, i.e. through switching attention. The will is deprived of the ability to generate actions and thoughts, it only regulates them, believed M. Ya. Basov.
Sechenov knocks the ground out of supporters of absolute free will, masterfully proving that the will itself is not the motivator (motive) of this or that action. The specific function of the will is expressed in the regulation of activity (launching movements and actions, their strengthening and weakening, acceleration and deceleration, temporary delay and resumption, stopping, etc.).
Selivanov V. I. 1992. P. 177
L. S. Vygotsky considered voluntary regulation of behavior and mental processes to be the main content of the concept of will. Will, according to Vygotsky, is one of the mechanisms that allows a person to control his own behavior, mental processes, and motivation. In its developed forms, voluntary regulation is mediated by artificial signs and is carried out by combining various mental functions into a single functional system that regulates activity or any mental process.
V.I. Selivanov also emphasized, along with the incentive, the regulating function of the will. For him, will is a person’s ability to consciously regulate his behavior. “...Will is a regulatory function of the brain,” he wrote, “expressed in a person’s ability to consciously control himself and his activities, guided by certain motives and goals.”
The will of an individual is nothing more than a certain set of properties that has developed in the process of life, characterizing the level of conscious self-regulation of behavior achieved by the individual.
Will is a side of a person’s entire consciousness; it correlates with the entire consciousness, and not with any particular mental process.
Will is the basic purposefulness of a person, determined by his life ideal, in accordance with which he organizes all his activities.
Selivanov V. I. 1992. pp. 132, 176, 177
The regulating role of will was also noted by A. Ts. Puni, B. N. Smirnov, P. A. Rudik, N. P. Rapokhin, M. Brikhtsin and others.
R. May characterized will as a category that determines the ability of an individual to organize his behavior in such a way that movement is made towards a given goal, in a given direction. Unlike desire, will implies the possibility of choice, carries the features of personal maturity and requires developed self-awareness.
V.K. Kalin believed that research into the phenomenon of will within the framework of the analysis of objective action did not lead to success in revealing the essence of will. In his opinion, the specificity of the concept of will cannot be highlighted when analyzing motivation, as well as when considering will only as a mechanism for overcoming obstacles. This researcher saw the specificity of will in a person’s regulation of his own mental processes (restructuring their organization to create an optimal mode of mental activity) and in transferring the goal of volitional actions from the object to the state of the subject himself. Like L. S. Vygotsky, V. K. Kalin believed that the main task of the will is to ensure that a person masters his own behavior and mental functions. This means that the will reflects self-subjective relationships, i.e., human activity directed not at the outside world or at other people, but at oneself.
V.K. Kalin put forward the idea of understanding will as a problem of self-subjective relations... Its specificity is expressed in the transformation of the functional organization of the psyche, the choice of an effective method for this transformation and the creation of a state of optimal mobilization adequate to the achievement of the goal. As a starting point, he chose the concept of “volitional regulation,” the function of which is “optimization of the processes of formation and retention of the necessary form of activity, i.e., formative processes secondary in genesis,” when it is necessary to “overcome oneself.” At such moments, most often critical, the subject’s consciousness temporarily “breaks away” from the object (subject of activity) and switches to itself “in order to eliminate the discrepancy that has arisen between its state and the requirements for activity” [Kalin, 1989].
The originality and, as we believe, the dubiousness of V.K. Kalin’s concept lies in the fact that the will, in his opinion, does not include the regulation of the objective content of activity. Apparently, therefore, illustrating his ideas about the will, he one-sidedly interprets the volitional manifestations of the pilot in a situation of “blind flight” at night and in the clouds, when orientation in space is disturbed, the illusion of flight with a strong roll, inverted flight, etc. arises. Referring to the article pilot I.V. Kocharovsky, V.K. Kalin notes the direction of his volitional effort only “to overcome the involuntary desire to fly according to “immediate impression” and suppress false sensations, i.e. “to fight the pilot with himself” [p. 48]. At the same time, he “does not notice” the pilot’s description of the external picture of his volitional manifestations, which was a “frantic struggle with the plane,” when the pilot, by force of will, forces himself to act in accordance with instrument readings. And in another work, V.K. Kalin did not pay attention to the fact that when the integral organization of the mental reflection of reality was distorted, “Volitional effort contributed to the solution of a particular task: to pay all attention to piloting the aircraft” [Zavalova N.D. et al., 1986, p. 97].
What has been said, apparently, quite convincingly indicates that the pilot’s volitional actions to master himself and control the aircraft are a manifestation of both self-subjective and subject-object relationships. This understanding of the regulatory function of the psyche, including its highest level, is in line with the consideration of any real activity as having external and internal plans, inextricably linked [Bozhovich L. I. et al., 1976, p. 212].
Smirnov B. N. 2004. P. 65
V.K. Kalin gave the following detailed definition of will: “Volitional regulation (the procedural aspect of will) is the conscious creation of a state of optimal mobilization, an optimal mode of activity, mediated by the goals and motives of objective activity, and the concentration of this activity in the right direction, i.e., choice and implementation by the subject of the activity of the best way (form) of transforming the original actual functional organization of the psyche into a necessary one, adequate to the goals and conditions of the activity, allowing it to achieve its greatest effectiveness.” This, in other words, is the process of self-organization of the psyche to achieve a goal in the most effective way.
In connection with his definition of volitional regulation, V.K. Kalin raised the question of individual styles of volitional regulation. By this he meant stable ways of organizing volitional actions, i.e., the structure of volitional regulation. The individual style of volitional regulation ensures the correlation between the functioning of the psyche and the requirements of activity. Unfortunately, the author did not give specific examples of the manifestation of different styles of volitional regulation, and therefore it remains unclear what the specifics of this new concept are in comparison with the styles of activity repeatedly described in the literature.
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Basic approaches to the study of will:
mastery, regulation, behavior management;
motivational;
Within regulatory approach Let's consider the concept of Vygotsky L.S., Selivanov V.I. and Ilyina E.P.
Vygotsky L.S. classifies will among the highest mental functions of a person, the development of which is carried out as a person mastering his own behavior by creating an additional motive. Characteristic signs of mastering one's own behavior are manifested mainly in the free choice of action.
Will means those means by which we master action.
In concept Selivanova V.I. will is defined as a person’s conscious level of regulation of his behavior and activities, expressed in the ability to overcome internal and external obstacles when performing purposeful actions and deeds. According to Selivanov V.I. volitional regulation cannot be considered complete if it is not expressed externally by execution.
In concept Ilyina E.P. will is understood as a type of voluntary control, realized through volitional actions, an essential feature of which is the presence of volitional effort.
So, despite the existing differences in regulatory theories of will, several common points can be identified. Firstly, will is associated with a means of mastering a person, mainly his own behavior. Secondly, attention is drawn to the mediation of volitional behavior. Thirdly, decisive importance is attached to the execution of volitional action.
IN motivational activity theory Ivannikova V.A. will is defined as “a person’s ability for conscious intentional activity or for self-determination through work on the internal plane, providing additional incentive (inhibition) to action based on an arbitrary form of motivation.” Volitional behavior is actualized when there is a lack or undesirability of the incentive to action. In a situation of choice between two motives, a person creates in his imagination a third motive, which has a different character.
As part of the analysis choice as a specific sign of will Let's consider the concepts of Vygotsky L.S. and Wecker L.M.
Vygotsky L.S. distinguishes two independent parts in a volitional action: the final part of the volitional process or the moment of a person’s decision to act in a certain way depending on the outcome of the lot; and the executive part or the execution of a volitional action (after casting lots).
Volitional choice is understood by Vygotsky as a complex, free (and not externally given according to the experimenter’s instructions) choice.
In theory regulatory-volitional processes of Vecker L.M. will is considered as the highest specific voluntary regulation of human behavior and activity.
Thus, in theories that consider volitional choice, attention is paid to a person’s experience of freedom when making this choice before the start of the action.
THE PROBLEM OF WILL AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDREN
As we did when considering all problems, let me begin today with a short schematic historical introduction to the current state of this problem in science.
As is known, the attempt to theoretically comprehend and theoretically develop the problem of will and give an analysis of its manifestations in an adult and a child goes in two directions, one of which is usually called heteronomous, and the other - autonomous theory.
Under heteronomous theory This refers to that group of theoretical and experimental studies that try to explain the volitional actions of a person, reducing them to complex mental processes of an involuntary nature, to associative or intellectual processes. Any theory that tries to seek explanations of volitional processes outside the will (454) joins heteronomous theories. Autonomous, or voluntaChristian, theories The explanation of will is based on the unity and irreducibility of volitional processes and volitional experiences. Representatives of this school try to explain the will based on the laws inherent in the volitional action itself.
If we consider with you first in particular, and then in general, both directions in the study of the will, we will see what is the main thing that makes up their content. When considering heteronomous theories, we will see that here we are dealing with the oldest theories: associative and intellectualistic, which I will not analyze in detail, because they are rather of historical interest, and I will designate them only schematically.
The essence of associative theories came close to the study of the problem of will in the spirit in which reflexology and behavioral psychology (behaviorism) try to present it. According to this theory, the following points are central to the will. As you know, any association is reversible. If I, say, in an experimental experiment with memory, established an association between the first nonsense syllable, which we call A, and the second, which we will call bae, it is natural that when I then hear the syllable A, I will also reproduce the syllable bae. But the opposite is also natural. This simplest phenomenon was once called the law of reversibility of associations. Its essence boils down to the fact that both an adult and a child initially act blindly, involuntarily, impulsively and reactively, that is, they completely unfreely and unreasonably determine their activities in relation to the situation within which the goal is achieved.
However, such activity, performed involuntarily, leads to a certain result, thus establishing an association between the activity itself and its results. But since this associative connection is reversible, it is natural that in the course of further development a simple reversal of the process from end to beginning can occur. I will use the example of G. Ebbinghaus.
If a child initially instinctively reaches for food, then over the course of a series of experiments he establishes an associative connection between satiation and individual links in the process of satiation itself; this connection turns out to be sufficient for the reverse process to arise, that is, for the child to consciously look for food when he is hungry. According to Ebbinghaus’s definition, will is an instinct that arises on the basis of a reversible association, or, as he figuratively said, a “sighted instinct” conscious of its goal. (455)
Other theories, essentially close to the intellectualistic one, tried to prove that an action that is presented as a volitional action is in fact a complex combination of mental processes not of the volitional, but of the intellectual type. Representatives of this direction include a number of French, German and English psychologists. A typical representative of this theory is I. F. Herbart.
From the point of view of intellectualists, it is not the associative connection in itself that explains volitional processes: they are explained not on the basis of the concept of “association”, but on the basis of the concept of “volitional process”, which changes in the development of functions. They understood the nature of the volitional process as follows: at the lower stage of development there is an instinctive, reactive, impulsive action, then an action developed as a result of habit, and, finally, an action associated with the participation of the mind, i.e. volitional action.
Every action, Herbart's students say, is volitional insofar as it is reasonable.
Both associative and intellectualistic theories are characterized by an attempt to reduce the volitional process to a process of a simpler nature, lying outside the will, to explain the will not from moments adequate to volitional processes, but from moments lying outside the volitional processes.
This is a significant shortcoming of these theories, not to mention the fact that the basic view of associationism and intellectualism is false. But we can’t stop there today. It seems to me that it is much more important to emphasize what was positive in these theories of the will, what raised them to a higher level compared to previous theories and what was pushed aside because it ran counter to voluntarist theories. The grain of truth that was contained in them, the pathos with which the entire doctrine of the will was permeated, was the pathos of determinism. This was an attempt to counter medieval spiritual theories, which spoke of the will as a “basic spiritual force” that could not be considered in terms of determinism. Associationists and determinists tried to theoretically explain and justify in what way, for what reason, on the basis of what determination, a volitional, expedient, free action of a person can arise.
What is interesting for intellectualistic theories is precisely the emphasis on the fact that in trying to solve any problem, experiment must come to the fore; An example of analysis should first of all be the meaningfulness of the situation for the person himself, the internal connection between the understanding of the situation and the action itself, as well as the free and arbitrary nature of this action. (456)
The difficulties of the theories we mentioned lay in the fact that they could not explain the most essential thing in the will, namely the volitional nature of acts, arbitrariness as such, as well as the internal freedom that a person experiences when making this or that decision, and the external structural diversity of action, by which volitional action differs from involuntary action.
Thus, just as with regard to intelligence, the old theories could not explain the most important thing - how irrational activity becomes rational, in the same way they could not explain how an involuntary action becomes volitional, and this led to the emergence of a number of psychological theories that tried to resolve this issue not by scientific means, but by means of metaphysical constructions. These were, in particular, autonomous theories that tried to solve the problem of will, understanding it as something primary, as a unity that cannot be deduced from other mental processes.
The transition to these theories was the second group of theories, namely affective theories of will. The brightest representative of this trend is W. Wundt, who is known in the history of psychology as a voluntarist, although in essence he derived will from affect. Wundt’s point of view is as follows: associative and intellectualistic theories explain volitional processes by taking from these processes the most insignificant for the will, excluding the moment of effectiveness and relevance; after all, from the subjective side, these moments are experienced in a unique way, and from the objective side, mental experience associated with volitional processes reveals a much closer connection with human activity than experiences of a different nature.
It is characteristic of the associationist, says Wundt, that he explains the will through memory; for the intellectualist, that he explains the will through the intellect; the real way to explain the will lies through affect; affect is indeed a state, first of all, active, that is, one that is equally characterized, so to speak, by bright, intense internal content and active human action. Wundt says: if we want to find the genetic prototype of an action in the structure typical of the prototype, we must resurrect, remember a very angry or very frightened person, and then we will see that a person experiencing a strong affect is not in a state of serious mental activity . We find, therefore, that the most essential thing for the volitional process is the activity of external action, directly related to internal experiences. “The prototype of will is affect, and on the basis (457) of this affective action, through transformation, a volitional process in the proper sense of the word arises.
We will not trace in detail either this theory or other, perhaps more clearly formulated, emotional and affective theories of the will. It is important for us to outline the links in the development of this problem, because Wundt himself stood with one foot in the position of voluntarists (under this name he became known in psychology, since in philosophy he became open to the point of view of voluntarism), and with the other foot he remained in his previous position heteronomous theory. Here we see how historically the theory of the will developed one-sidedly, going half in the wrong direction. This is what led to disintegration within these same theories and nullified even the positive knowledge that was contained in them.
Theories of autonomous will proceed from the fact that the way to explain will lies not through memory, not through intellect, not through affect, but through will itself. For them, activity is the primary beginning. Representatives of this theory are E. Hartmann and A. Schopenhauer, who believe that the will is guided by a superhuman principle, some world activity that operates constantly and subjugates all the forces of a person, regardless of the mind, heading towards known goals.
Along with this understanding of the will, the concept of the unconscious entered psychology. And this was the fact that for a long time delayed the further development of the doctrine of the will. The introduction of the concept of the unconscious into modern psychology was the overcoming of the type of idealism that was contained in intellectualism. Almost all representatives of the doctrine of the unconscious are to a greater or lesser extent Schopenhauerians, that is, they proceed from a voluntaristic understanding of the nature of the human psyche, which scientists such as Z. Freud have recently come to.
We will not dwell on the various aspects and variants of this voluntarist theory. For a schematic presentation of the course of our thought, we will name only two extreme poles between which all theories fluctuated, and then we will try to find what is common and new that these theories introduced into science. The poles are as follows. Firstly, the recognition of the will as primary, something that remains alien to the conscious side of the human personality, which represents some initial force that equally moves the material side of life and its spiritual side. Secondly, on the other At the extreme is the theory of spiritualists, whose representatives are historically connected with the philosophy of R. Descartes and, through him, with Christian medieval philosophy. As is known, the Cartesian theory takes as its basis the spiritual principle, (458) which supposedly turns out to be able to control the entire soul of a person, and hence - all of his behavior.
In essence, this is a Cartesian theory, revived and further developed in the series of those spiritualistic teachings about the will that dominated idealistic psychology over the last quarter of the last century. This is, for example, the theory of W. James. We combined the James system with a wide variety of theories and trends. In particular, James, as a pragmatist, tries to avoid all spiritualistic and metaphysical explanations in all problems, with the exception of will. James created a theory of will, which he called the Latin word “fiat”, taken from the Bible, which means “let it be!”, with the help of a creator god who created the world. According to James, in every volitional act there is a certain particle of such volitional power, which often gives preference to the weakest of the mental processes. When a patient, being on the surgeon's table, experiencing terrible pain and the desire to scream, nevertheless lies completely calm and allows the doctor to do his job, then we have, says James, a clear example of will, voluntary behavior.
The question arises, what does this person represent, acting contrary to immediate impulses, despite the fact that he is attracted to the opposite method of action?
According to James, this example reveals the entire inconsistency of Wundt’s affective theory, because, according to this theory, an affect stronger than pain makes a person lie down. In fact, says James, it would obviously be absurd to think that his desire not to shout is greater than the desire to shout. He wants to shout much more than to remain silent. This discrepancy between the introspective and objective analysis of human behavior makes one think that here his behavior follows the line of greatest resistance, that is, it represents cases of exception to the world laws of physics. How can we understand this connection between spiritual and physical phenomena? ?
These facts, according to James, are inexplicable, because, remaining on this point of view, we must admit: if this person still continues to lie on the table, then, obviously, his physical organization is excited and follows the line of least resistance, i.e. That is, physically we are not dealing with exceptions from physics, but with confirmation of its rules. However, if we try to answer the question of how this is possible, then we must assume that there is a sending of some kind of spiritual energy here, which, joining the weakest impulse, is capable of ensuring victory over a stronger factor. According to the figurative expression of James in a letter to (459) K. Stump fu 23, every act of will resembles the struggle of David and Goliath and the victory that David won over the giant Goliath with the help of the Lord God. Here a particle of creativity, spiritual energy interferes with the process and distorts its course.
In other theories, in particular in the theory of A. Bergson, the starting point is what he, having defined the essence of the intuitive method, called “analysis of the immediate data of consciousness.” Bergson draws evidence of free will, its independence, its originality from the analysis of immediate experiences. Like James, Bergson actually succeeded in demonstrating the well-known fact that V In the system of experiences, we are able to distinguish an action that we experience as unfree from those actions that we experience as free or independent.
Thus, we have two polar types of voluntaristic theory, of which one considers will as the original world force embodied in this or that person, and the other (considers will as a spiritual principle that contains material and nervous processes and ensures victory for the weakest of them. What do these theories have in common? They both recognize that will is something primary, primordial, not included in the series of basic mental processes, representing some kind of outlandish exception from all other processes of the human psyche and not amenable to determinism, causal explanation.
In particular, for the first time in relation to volitional actions, along with causal psychology, the idea of teleological psychology arose, which explained volitional action not on the basis of indicating reasons, but from the point of view of the goals that drive this action.
It can be shown that, in general, being extremely retrograde in the history of the development of scientific ideas about the will, these voluntaristic theories still had the positive aspect that they always focused the attention of psychologists on the peculiar phenomena of the will, they always contrasted their teaching with those concepts , who generally tried to put an end to volitional processes. By the way, they also played a second role - they for the first time split psychology into two separate tendencies, into a causal tendency, natural science, and a teleological tendency.
Now we will try to draw a conclusion from this consideration and determine what are the main difficulties in solving the problem of will that all modern researchers are struggling with, no matter what direction they belong to, what riddle this problem poses for researchers of our generation. The main (460) difficulty, the main riddle is, on the one hand, to explain the deterministic, causal, conditioned, so to speak, natural course of the volitional process, to give a scientific concept of this process, without resorting to a religious explanation, and on the other hand, using such a scientific approach to explaining the volitional process is to preserve in the will what is inherent in it, precisely what is commonly called the arbitrariness of a volitional act, i.e., what makes a deterministic, causal, conditioned action of a person in certain circumstances a free action. In other words, the problem of experiencing a free will process - what distinguishes volitional action from others - is the main mystery that researchers of various directions are struggling with.
A few more comments from the field of modern experimental research on the will. An extremely interesting attempt to experimentally separate intellectual and volitional actions was made by K. Koffka, who belonged to the Berlin school. Koffka says: rational actions in themselves are not yet volitional actions;<ни со стороны те леологической, ни со стороны переживаний, ни со стороны структурной, ни со стороны функциональной эти действия не волевые, в то время как раньше думали, что все действия, как импульсивные, автоматические, так и произвольные, являются волевыми. Отчасти воспроизводя опыты В. Келера, отчасти ставя заново опыты над животными и людьми, Коффка сумел показать, что некоторые действия, которые совершает человек, по структуре не являются волевыми действиями в собственном смысле слова В другом примере ему удалось показать обратное, что существуют собственно волевые действия, которые могут иметь в составе чрезвычайно неясно выраженные интеллектуаль ные моменты. Таким образом, работа Коффки как бы отграни чила разумные действия от волевых и позволила, с одной сторо ны, сузить круг волевых действий, с другой - расширить мно гообразие различных видов действия человека.
K-Levin did similar work in relation to affective-volitional processes. As is known, Lewin’s work consists of studying the structure of affective-volitional actions and in an effort to prove that a person’s affective activity and volitional activity are basically built on the same thing. However, very soon Levin discovered facts, which he summarized as follows. It turned out that an affective action in itself is not in any way a volitional action, that a number of actions that are always considered in psychology as typically volitional, in fact do not reveal the nature of truly volitional actions, but are only close to them. (461)
Levin's first research work in this regard was a study of the modification of N. Ach's experiments, typical of old psychology experiments, applied to an experimentally developed action, i.e., to a response to a conditioned signal; it was then expanded to study a range of actions, particularly intention-based actions. The main thing in Lewin’s work was the indication that even a whole series of actions related to the future, actions associated with intention, essentially proceeds according to the type of voluntary affective actions; in other words, they are associated with a feature of the state that Lewin calls tense (Spanung).
From similar experiments, Levin also concluded that “if I wrote a letter and, having put it in my coat pocket, had the intention of putting the letter in the mailbox, then this action itself is automatic and is performed involuntarily, despite the fact that in its external structure it extremely resembles the action which we carry out according to a pre-planned plan, i.e. a volitional action.
Here, as in Koffka’s experiments, some volitional actions are classified as affective and involuntary actions, close to volitional in structure, but not forming specifically volitional actions. Only after this did Levin show the variety of forms of human actions that exhibit the same patterns.
K. Levin came close to the problems of will, however, from the negative side. Conducting similar experiments on children and adults, he draws attention to an extremely curious point, namely: while an adult can form any, even meaningless, intention, a child is powerless in this regard. At the early stages of the development of the will, the child is not able to form any intention. Each situation determines the range of possible intentions that a child can form. This is, as Levin figuratively puts it, a germ, but not a born intention. Levin studied, firstly, the formation of so-called any intentions, even meaningless ones, and arbitrariness in relation to their formation, although the latter fact must be accepted conditionally. We adults also cannot form any arbitrary, meaningless intentions, ones that contradict our basic principles or our moral views. If we take a wide group of actions that do not conflict with our attitudes, then only in relation to them do we form any intention; This will distinguish the developed will of an adult from the underdeveloped will of a child.
The second fact is that Lewin figured out the structure of volitional action. He showed that in primitive (462) forms, volitional action has extremely unique manifestations, which were then studied by K. Goldstein and A. Gelb and for which they tried to give an appropriate neurological explanation
K. Levin comes to the conclusion that with the help of a peculiar mechanism in experiments with a meaningless situation, a person looks for a kind of reference point outside and through it determines one way or another his own behavior. For example, in one of these series, the experimenter did not return to the subject for a long time, but from another room watched what he was doing. The subject usually waited 10-20 minutes, finally ceased to understand what he should do, and remained for a long time in a state of hesitation, confusion, and indecision. Almost all of Lewin's adult subjects carried out various methods of action in this situation, but with the common feature that they were looking for points of support for their actions outside. A typical example would be a subject who determined her actions clockwise. Looking at the clock, she thought: “As soon as the hand reaches a perpendicular position, I will leave.” The subject, therefore, modified the situation: let’s say she waits until half-past two, and leaves at half-past two, and then the action was automatic: “I’m leaving.” By this, the subject, modifying the psychological field, as Levin puts it, or creating a new situation for herself in this field, transferred her meaningless state into an allegedly meaningful one. I recently heard about similar experiments (about the experiments of T. Dembo 24 on meaningless actions) during Koffka’s stay in Moscow. The subject is given a series of meaningless instructions and how he reacts to this is studied. What is interesting is the tendency revealed in the execution of meaningless orders to comprehend them at all costs by creating a new situation, a change in the psychological field in which a meaningful, but not meaningless action would be desirable.
Let me very briefly, omitting a number of particulars, point out a peculiar mechanism that is of extremely great importance in the development of volitional function in a child and which Goldstein pointed out. In experiments with nervous patients, Goldstein drew attention to that curious mechanism that every psychologist has to deal with: an action that the patient fails with one verbal instruction, he succeeds with another instruction. For example, the patient is asked to close his eyes. He tries to complete the assignment and close his eyes, but does not close them. Then they ask him: “Show me how you go to bed.” The patient points and closes his eyes. And this turns out to be enough so that the next (463) time, fulfilling the order to close his eyes, he could do it. A simple action turns out to be executable under one instruction and impossible under another.
K. Goldstein explains this by purely structural factors. He says: in patients with difficulty moving as a result of epidemic encephalitis, changes appear in the structure of consciousness, depending on which the performance of individual actions becomes impossible. Roughly speaking, according to the old neurologist, the “close your eyes” irritation, entering a certain center of the brain, does not find transmission paths to the centers of eye movement. The patient understands what “close your eyes” means and wants to do it, he knows how to close his eyes, but due to the disease the corresponding capabilities are impaired and there is no connection between these two centers. A modern neurologist says that this is an extremely complex structure that arose on the basis of a known situation, and the formation of any such structure, any action not caused by the situation, becomes impossible. When you ask a patient to show how he goes to bed, he is not faced with an isolated action that he must introduce into a new, complex structure, but a more or less holistic situation.
Goldstein considers that typical for the neurological construction of a normal volitional act is the presence of conditions when not a direct connection is formed between two points of the cortex, but a structure that only indirectly leads to the completion of the action. The starting point of this process leads to a complex internal construction of a new structure, which can be resolved by the old structure through the construction of an auxiliary structure. Only in this case are we dealing with a volitional process. In addition to strong, fixed paths between two points, a complex indirect connection between individual structures is possible. This connection may have the character of complex mediating structural formations that are brought into a dynamic state in cases where two points cannot directly communicate with each other.
Thanks to this, it becomes possible for the emergence of some new structure, in which all three moments are combined with each other. According to Goldstein, the same mechanism is established by the subject, who decides to leave according to a clockwise signal. What Goldstein brings to the analysis of this fact is the following: he attaches extremely great importance to external speech, recognizing as untenable the prevailing view in old psychophysiology that the more complex the control over the course of any activity, the more directly the action occurs. Apparently, we are dealing here with such structures when a person, speaking, (464) listens to himself completely and carries out his own instructions.
I would like to finish by pointing out the extent to which the development of a child’s will, starting with primitive voluntary movements, performed initially according to verbal instructions, and ending with complex volitional actions, proceeds in direct dependence on the collective activity of the child. To what extent do the primitive forms of children's volitional activity represent the child's own use of the same methods in relation to himself that an adult uses in relation to him? To what extent does the child’s volitional behavior manifest itself as a unique form of his social behavior in relation to himself?
If you force a child to often do something in a count of “one, two, three,” then he himself gets used to doing exactly the same thing as, for example, we do when throwing ourselves into the water. Often we know that we need to do something, say, following the example of W. James, get out of bed, but we don’t want to get up, and we just can’t find an incentive to get ourselves up. And at such moments, a proposal to ourselves from the outside helps us get up, and, as James says, we, unnoticed by ourselves, find ourselves standing up. It would be extremely important to bring together all this data, trace it by age and determine the unique stages or stages through which the development of a child’s will passes.
I will skip this now and end by pointing out that we have in this area relatively rare cases when the research of pathological psychology, theoretically conceptualized in terms of both neurological and genetic psychology, coincide with each other and make it possible to approach the problem in a new way. solving the most important issues in psychology.