What did Napoleon want from Russia? At first he almost became an officer in the Russian army, then he wanted to become related to the Russian imperial family. The “Russian factor” became fatal for Napoleon. His campaign against Moscow was the beginning of the end of the Empire...
Military career
Perhaps Napoleon’s very first plans for Russia were his desire to join the Russian army.
In 1788, Russia recruited volunteers to participate in the war with Turkey. Governor General Ivan Zaborovsky, commander of the expeditionary force, came to Livorno to “ look after for military affairs» Christian volunteers: militant Albanians, Greeks, Corsicans.
By this time, Napoleon graduated with honors from the Paris Military School with the rank of lieutenant. In addition, his family was in poverty - his father died, the family was left with practically no means. Napoleon submitted a request for readiness to serve the Russian army.
However, just a month before Bonaparte’s request for enrollment, a decree was issued in the Russian army - to accept foreign officers into the Russian corps with a reduction by one rank. Napoleon was not satisfied with this option. Having received a written refusal, the purposeful Napoleon ensured that he was accepted by the head of the Russian military commission.
But this did not produce results and, as they say, the offended Bonaparte ran out of Zaborovsky’s office, promising that he would offer his candidacy to the King of Prussia: “The King of Prussia will give me the rank of captain!” True, as you know, he did not become a Prussian captain either, remaining to pursue a career in France.
Be related to the Russian Emperor
In 1809, already being emperor, Napoleon, to his regret, learned about the infertility of Empress Josephine. Perhaps the disease developed during her imprisonment in Carmes prison, when the French Revolution was roaring.
Despite the sincere affection that bound Napoleon and this woman, the young dynasty needed a legitimate heir. Therefore, after much outpouring and tears, the couple separated by mutual desire.
Josephine, like Napoleon, did not belong to blue blood; in order to secure his position on the throne, Bonaparte needed a princess. Oddly enough, there was no question of choice - according to Napoleon, the future French empress should have been the Russian Grand Duchess.
Most likely, this was due to Napoleon’s plans for a long-term alliance with Russia. He needed the latter in order, firstly, to keep all of Europe in subjection, and secondly, he counted on Russia’s helping hand in Egypt and in the subsequent transfer of the war to Bengal and India. He made these plans back in the time of Paul I.
In this regard, Napoleon urgently needed a marriage with one of the sisters of Emperor Alexander - Catherine or Anna Pavlovna. At first, Napoleon tried to achieve Catherine’s favor, and most importantly, the blessing of her mother Maria Fedorovna. But, while the Grand Duchess herself said that she would rather marry the last Russian stoker than “ for this Corsican“, her mother began to hastily look for a suitable match for her daughter, so that she would not go to the French “usurper,” who was unpopular in Russia.
Almost the same thing happened to Anna. When in 1810 the French ambassador Caulaincourt approached Alexander with Napoleon's semi-official proposal, the Russian emperor also vaguely answered him that he had no right to control the destinies of his sisters, since by the will of his father Pavel Petrovich, this prerogative was completely given to his mother Maria Feodorovna.
Russia as a springboard
Napoleon Bonaparte did not at all intend to stop at subordinating Russia. He dreamed of the empire of Alexander the Great; his further goals lay far away in India. So he was going to sting Britain where it hurt the most with the peak of the Russian Cossacks. In other words, take over the rich English colonies.
Such a conflict could lead to the complete collapse of the British Empire. At one time, according to the historian Alexander Katsur, Paul I also thought about this project. Back in 1801, the French agent in Russia Gitten conveyed to Napoleon “ ...Russia from her Asian possessions...could lend a helping hand to the French army in Egypt and, acting jointly with France, transfer the war to Bengal».
There was even a joint Russian-French project - a 35 thousand army under the command of General Massena, joined by Russian Cossacks in the Black Sea region, through the Caspian, Persia, Herat and Kandahar were supposed to reach the provinces of India. And in a fairy-tale land, the allies immediately had to “ grab the English by the cheeks».
Napoleon's words are known, already during his exile on the island of St. Helena, which he said to the Irish doctor Barry Edward O'Meara assigned to him: “If Paul had remained alive, you would have already lost India.”
Moscow was not included in the plans
The decision to march on Moscow was not military for Napoleon, but political. According to A.P. Shuvalov, relying on politics was Bonaparte’s main mistake. Shuvalov wrote: “ He based his plans on political calculations. These calculations turned out to be false, and his building collapsed.”
The ideal decision from the military side was to stay in Smolensk for the winter; Napoleon discussed these plans with the Austrian diplomat von Metternich. Bonaparte stated:
“My enterprise is one of those whose solution is given by patience. Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there."
These same plans were voiced by Bonaparte and according to the memoirs of General de Suger. He recorded the following words of Napoleon, spoken by him to General Sebastiani in Vilna: “ I will not cross the Dvina. To want to go further during this year is to go towards your own destruction.”
Obviously, the campaign against Moscow was a forced step for Napoleon. According to historian V.M. Bezotosny, Napoleon “expected that the entire campaign would fit within the framework of the summer - at most the beginning of the autumn of 1812.” Moreover, the French emperor planned to spend the winter of 1812 in Paris, but the political situation confused all his cards. Historian A.K. Dzhivelegov wrote:
“To stop for the winter in Smolensk meant reviving all possible discontent and unrest in France and in Europe. Politics drove Napoleon further and forced him to violate his excellent original plan."
Grand coup
The tactics of the Russian army came as an unpleasant surprise to Napoleon. He was sure that the Russians would be forced to give a general battle to save their capital, and Alexander I would ask for peace to save it. These forecasts turned out to be disrupted. Napoleon was ruined by both the retreat from his original plans and the retreat of the Russian army under the leadership of General Barclay de Tolly.
Before the castling of Tolly and Kutuzov, the French were awarded only two battles. At the beginning of the campaign, this enemy behavior played into the hands of the French emperor; he dreamed of reaching Smolensk with few losses and stopping there. The fate of Moscow was to be decided by a general battle, which Napoleon himself called a grand coup. Both Napoleon and France needed it.
But everything turned out differently. At Smolensk, the Russian armies managed to unite and they continued to draw Napoleon deep into the vast country. The Grand coup was postponed. The French entered empty cities, consumed their last supplies and panicked. Later, sitting on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon recalled:
“My regiments, amazed that after so many difficult and deadly marches the fruits of their efforts were constantly moving away from them, began to look with anxiety at the distance that separated them from France.”
Alisa Muranova, Alexey Rudevich
F. ENGELS
The French government considered it necessary, through the Parisian newspaper Gonstitutionnel, to again inform the whole world about how the war would be conducted in the coming months. Similar exposes [statements. Ed.] They are now becoming not only fashionable, but also periodic, and although they often contradict each other, they still give a good idea of what chances for success the French government currently has. Taken together, they represent a collection of all possible plans for Louis Bonaparte's military campaigns against Russia and as such deserve some attention as they concern the fate of the Second Empire and the possibility of a national revival in France.
So it looks like there's no "grande guerre" ["great war". Ed.] will not happen, 500,000 Austrians and 100,000 French will never appear on the Vistula and Dnieper. Nor will there be a general uprising of those “oppressed nationalities” whose eyes are constantly turning to the West. The Hungarian, Italian and Polish armies will not appear with a wave of the magic wand of the man who destroyed the Roman Republic. All this is now in the past. Austria has fulfilled its duty towards the West. Prussia fulfilled its duty. The whole world has done its duty. Everyone is happy with each other. The current war is not a big war at all. It does not pursue the goal of reviving the glory of the previous wars of the French against the Russians, although Pelissier, by the way, in one of his reports claims the opposite. French troops are not sent to Crimea to reap the glory of victories there; they are simply performing police service there. The issue that needs to be resolved is of purely local significance - dominance in the Black Sea - and it will be resolved there, on the spot. To expand the scope of the war would be madness. The Allies will “respectfully but firmly” repel any Russian attempt to resist on the Black Sea and its coast; and when this is done, then, of course, they either the Russians or both sides will agree to peace.
Thus, another Bonapartist illusion was dispelled. Dreams of the French border along the Rhine, of the annexation of Belgium and Savoy, dissipated, and an unusually sober modesty took their place. We are not waging a war in order to return France to its rightful position in Europe. Not at all. We are not fighting for civilization, as we have repeatedly stated quite recently. We are too modest to claim such an important mission. The war is being waged simply because of the interpretation of the third paragraph of the Vienna Protocol! This is the language now spoken by His Imperial Majesty Napoleon III, who by the grace of the army and thanks to the tolerance of Europe became Emperor of the French.
But what does all this mean? We are told that the war is being waged to resolve a question of purely local significance and can be successfully brought to an end by purely local means. Only deprive the Russians of actual dominance in the Black Sea, and the goal of the war will be achieved. Having become masters of the Black Sea and its coast, hold on to what you have captured, and Russia will very soon give in. This is the latest of numerous campaign plans drawn up by the main headquarters in Paris. Let's look at it in more detail.
Let us describe the current state of affairs. The entire sea coast from Constantinople to the Danube, on the one hand, and the Circassian coast, Anapa, Kerch, Balaklava to Evpatoria, on the other, were taken from the Russians. So far only Kafa and Sevastopol are holding out, and Kafa is in a difficult situation, and Sevastopol is so located that if a serious threat arises, it will have to be abandoned. Moreover, the Allied fleet plies the waters of the inland Sea of Azov; their light ships reached Taganrog and attacked all important coastal points. It can be considered that not a single section of the coast remained in the hands of the Russians, with the exception of the strip from Perekop to the Danube, that is, one fifteenth of what belonged to them on this coast. Now let's assume that Kafa and Sevastopol also fell and Crimea ended up in the hands of the allies. What then? Russia, being in this position, will not make peace, it has already publicly stated this. That would be crazy on her part. This would mean abandoning the battle due to the fact that the vanguard was thrown back at the very moment when the main forces were approaching. What can the Allies do after achieving such success at the cost of enormous sacrifices?
We are told that they can destroy Odessa, Kherson, Nikolaev and even land a large army in Odessa, fortify there so as to repel the onslaught of any number of Russians, and then act depending on the circumstances. In addition, they can send troops to the Caucasus and almost destroy the Russian army under the command of Muravyov, which now occupies Georgia and other parts of Transcaucasia. Well, let’s assume that all this has been accomplished, but here the question arises again: what will happen if even after this Russia refuses to make peace, and it will certainly do so? It should not be forgotten that Russia is in a different position than France and England. England can afford to conclude an unfavorable peace. After all, as soon as John Bull feels that he has had enough of unrest and war taxes, he will make every effort to get out of trouble and leave his respected allies to sort out the mess themselves. The guarantee of the real power of England and the sources of its strength should not be sought in this direction. For Louis Bonaparte, too, the moment may come when he will prefer an inglorious peace to a life-and-death war, for it should not be forgotten that when such an adventurer finds himself in a desperate situation, the opportunity to extend his reign for another six months will prevail over all others. considerations. At the decisive moment, Türkiye and Sardinia, with their pitiful resources, will be left to their own devices. There is no doubt about it. Russia, like Ancient Rome, can not make peace while the enemy is on its territory. Over the past one hundred and fifty years, Russia has never concluded a peace in which it would have to make territorial concessions. Even the Peace of Tilsit led to the expansion of its territories, and it was concluded at a time when not a single Frenchman had yet set foot on Russian soil. Making a peace at a time when a large army was in readiness on Russian territory, a peace which involved the loss of territory or at least the limitation of the Tsar's power within his own dominions, would mark a sharp break with the traditions of the last century and a half. A king who has just ascended the throne and is new to the people, whose actions are being watched with concern by a strong national party, cannot take such a step. Such a peace cannot be concluded until all offensive and, above all, all defensive Russian resources. And such a time will certainly come, and Russia will be forced to abandon interference in other people's affairs, but this will be done by a completely different enemy than Louis Bonaparte and Palmerston, and as a result of a much more decisive struggle than the “local” punitive measure applied to her in her Black Sea possessions. Suppose, however, that the Crimea is conquered and 50,000 allies are stationed on its territory, the Caucasus and all possessions in the south are cleared of Russian troops, the army of the allies holds back the Russians in the Kuban and Terek, Odessa is taken and turned into a fortified camp, in which there are, say, 100,000 Anglo-French soldiers, and Nikolaev, Kherson and Izmail were destroyed or occupied by the allies. Let us even assume that, in addition to these “local” operations, some more or less important results were achieved in the Baltic Sea, although based on the data at our disposal it is difficult to predict what achievements there may be. What will happen next?
Will the allies limit themselves to those. that they will hold their positions and wear down the Russian forces? Diseases would claim Allied soldiers in the Crimea and the Caucasus faster than replacements could arrive. Their main forces, for example in Odessa, will have to be supplied with the help of the fleet, since the lands for hundreds of miles around Odessa are not cultivated. The Russian army, having at its disposal Cossack units, especially useful when operating in the steppes, will attack the allies whenever they try to leave their camp, and may be able to take up permanent positions near the city. Under such conditions it will be impossible to force the Russians to give battle; they will always have the great advantage that they will be able to lure the enemy into the interior of the country. They would respond to every Allied advance with a slow retreat. Meanwhile, it is impossible to keep a large army in a fortified camp inactive for a long time. The gradual increase in indiscipline and demoralization will force the Allies to take some decisive action. Illness will also complicate the situation. In a word, if the allies occupy the main points on the coast and wait there for the moment when Russia deems it necessary to concede, this will lead to nothing. There are three chances against one that the Allies will be the first to tire and the graves of their soldiers on the shores of the Black Sea will soon number in the hundreds of thousands.
Such a course of action would be wrong from a military point of view. To dominate the coast it is not enough to capture its main points. Only possession of inland territory guarantees possession of the coast. As we have seen, the circumstances arising from the very fact of the Allies' capture of the coast in southern Russia will force them to move their troops inland. But this is where the difficulties begin. Up to the borders of Podolsk, Kyiv, Poltava and Kharkov provinces, the land is a poorly irrigated, almost uncultivated steppe, on which nothing grows except grass, and in summer the grass dries out from the sun's heat. Suppose that Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson will be turned into operational bases, but where is the object of operations against which the allies could direct their efforts? There are few cities there, they are located far from each other, and among them there is not a single one so significant that its capture would give the operations a decisive character. There are no such significant points before Moscow, and Moscow is 700 miles away. To march on Moscow you need five hundred thousand people, but where can you get them? The situation is certainly such that if events unfold in this direction, then a “local” war will in no case yield decisive results. And let Louis Bonaparte, with all the wealth of his strategic imagination, try to find a different way!
However, to implement all these plans, not only the strict neutrality of Austria is needed, but also its moral support. Whose side is this power on now? In 1854, Austria and Prussia declared that they would consider the advance of Russian troops into the Balkans as a casus belli [cause for war. Ed.] against Russia. Where is the guarantee that in 1856 they will not consider the French attack on Moscow or even Kharkov as a reason for war against the Western powers? It should not be forgotten that any army moving from the Black Sea into the interior of Russia will have an exposed flank from Austria no less than the Russian army that is moving into Turkey from the Danube; therefore, at a certain distance, her communications with the base of operations, that is, her very existence, will be made dependent on the mercy of Austria. In order to force Austria not to enter the war, at least for a while, it will have to be bribed by giving Bessarabia to Austrian troops. Having reached the Dniester, the Austrian army will be as complete master of Odessa as if this city had been occupied by the Austrians. Could the Allied army, under such conditions, rush into a madcap pursuit of the Russians into the interior of the country? That would be crazy! But this madness, we recall, is a logical consequence of Louis Bonaparte’s latest plan - the plan of “waging a local war.”
The first plan of the campaign was "grande guerre", in alliance with Austria. This plan assigned to the French army in numerical terms the same subordinate place in comparison with the Austrian one as the English army now occupies in comparison with the French one. This plan provided Russia with revolutionary initiative. Louis Bonaparte could do neither the first nor the second. Austria refused to participate in the war; the plan was dropped. The second plan was a “war of nationalities.” This plan would have caused a storm among the Germans, Italians and Hungarians on the one hand, and a revolt of the Slavs on the other, which would have immediately affected France and swept away the empire of the decline of Louis Bonaparte in a shorter time than it took to create it. The fake "iron man" posing as Napoleon retreated in horror. The third and most modest of all plans is the plan for “local war in the name of local goals.” The absurdity of this plan is immediately apparent. Once again we are forced to ask the question: what next? After all, it is much easier to become Emperor of the French when all circumstances favor it, than to be this Emperor, even when long exercises in front of the mirror have made His Majesty an excellent connoisseur of all the external attributes of imperial power.
Published as an editorial in the New York Daily Tribune No. 4431, July 2, 1855
Printed according to newspaper text
Translation from English
Published in Russian for the first time
What did Napoleon want from Russia? At first he almost became an officer in the Russian army, then he wanted to become related to the Russian imperial family. The “Russian factor” became fatal for Napoleon. His campaign against Moscow was the beginning of the end of the Empire.
Military career
Perhaps Napoleon’s very first plans for Russia were his desire to join the Russian army. In 1788, Russia recruited volunteers to participate in the war with Turkey. Governor General Ivan Zaborovsky, commander of the expeditionary force, came to Livorno to “look after Christian volunteers for military affairs”: warlike Albanians, Greeks, Corsicans. By this time, Napoleon graduated with honors from the Paris Military School with the rank of lieutenant. In addition, his family was in poverty - his father died, the family was left with practically no means. Napoleon submitted a request for readiness to serve the Russian army.
However, just a month before Bonaparte’s request for enrollment, a decree was issued in the Russian army - to accept foreign officers into the Russian corps with a reduction by one rank. Napoleon was not satisfied with this option. Having received a written refusal, the purposeful Napoleon ensured that he was accepted by the head of the Russian military commission. But this did not produce results and, as they say, the offended Bonaparte ran out of Zaborovsky’s office, promising that he would offer his candidacy to the King of Prussia: “The King of Prussia will give me the rank of captain!” True, as you know, he did not become a Prussian captain either, remaining to pursue a career in France.
Be related to the Russian Emperor
In 1809, already being emperor, Napoleon, to his regret, learned about the infertility of Empress Josephine. Perhaps the disease developed during her imprisonment in Carmes prison, when the French Revolution was roaring. Despite the sincere affection that bound Napoleon and this woman, the young dynasty needed a legitimate heir. Therefore, after much outpouring and tears, the couple separated by mutual desire.
Josephine, like Napoleon, did not belong to blue blood; in order to secure his position on the throne, Bonaparte needed a princess. Oddly enough, there was no question of choice - according to Napoleon, the future French empress should have been the Russian Grand Duchess. Most likely, this was due to Napoleon’s plans for a long-term alliance with Russia. He needed the latter in order, firstly, to keep all of Europe in subjection, and secondly, he counted on Russia’s helping hand in Egypt and in the subsequent transfer of the war to Bengal and India. He made these plans back in the time of Paul I.
In this regard, Napoleon urgently needed a marriage with one of the sisters of Emperor Alexander - Catherine or Anna Pavlovna. At first, Napoleon tried to achieve Catherine’s favor, and most importantly, the blessing of her mother Maria Fedorovna. But, while the Grand Duchess herself said that she would rather marry the last Russian stoker than “this Corsican,” her mother began to hastily look for a suitable match for her daughter, so long as it did not go to the unpopular French “usurper” in Russia. .
Almost the same thing happened to Anna. When in 1810 the French ambassador Caulaincourt approached Alexander with Napoleon's semi-official proposal, the Russian emperor also vaguely answered him that he had no right to control the destinies of his sisters, since by the will of his father Pavel Petrovich, this prerogative was completely given to his mother Maria Feodorovna.
Russia as a springboard
Napoleon Bonaparte did not at all intend to stop at subordinating Russia. He dreamed of the empire of Alexander the Great; his further goals lay far away in India. So he was going to sting Britain where it hurt the most with the peak of the Russian Cossacks. In other words, take over the rich English colonies. Such a conflict could lead to the complete collapse of the British Empire. At one time, according to the historian Alexander Katsur, Paul I also thought about this project. Back in 1801, the French agent in Russia Gitten conveyed to Napoleon “...Russia from its Asian possessions... could give a helping hand to the French army in Egypt and, acting jointly with France, to transfer the war to Bengal." There was even a joint Russian-French project - a 35 thousand army under the command of General Massena, joined by Russian Cossacks in the Black Sea region, through the Caspian, Persia, Herat and Kandahar were supposed to reach the provinces of India. And in the fairy-tale land, the allies immediately had to “grab the British by the cheeks.”
Napoleon's words are known, already during his exile on the island of St. Helena, which he said to the Irish doctor Barry Edward O'Meara assigned to him: “If Paul had remained alive, you would have already lost India.”
Moscow was not included in the plans
The decision to march on Moscow was not military for Napoleon, but political. According to A.P. Shuvalov, relying on politics was Bonaparte’s main mistake. Shuvalov wrote: “He based his plans on political calculations. These calculations turned out to be false, and his building collapsed.”
The ideal decision from the military side was to stay in Smolensk for the winter; Napoleon discussed these plans with the Austrian diplomat von Metternich. Bonaparte stated: “My enterprise is one of those whose solution is given by patience. Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there."
These same plans were voiced by Bonaparte and according to the memoirs of General de Suger. He recorded the following words of Napoleon, spoken by him to General Sebastiani in Vilna: “I will not cross the Dvina. To want to go further during this year is to go towards your own destruction.”
Obviously, the campaign against Moscow was a forced step for Napoleon. According to historian V.M. Bezotosny, Napoleon “expected that the entire campaign would fit within the framework of the summer - at most the beginning of the autumn of 1812.” Moreover, the French emperor planned to spend the winter of 1812 in Paris, but the political situation confused all his cards. Historian A.K. Dzhivelegov wrote: “Stopping for the winter in Smolensk meant reviving all possible discontent and unrest in France and Europe. Politics drove Napoleon further and forced him to violate his excellent original plan."
The tactics of the Russian army came as an unpleasant surprise to Napoleon. He was sure that the Russians would be forced to give a general battle to save their capital, and Alexander I would ask for peace to save it. These forecasts turned out to be disrupted. Napoleon was ruined by both the retreat from his original plans and the retreat of the Russian army under the leadership of General Barclay de Tolly.
Before the castling of Tolly and Kutuzov, the French were awarded only two battles. At the beginning of the campaign, this enemy behavior played into the hands of the French emperor; he dreamed of reaching Smolensk with few losses and stopping there. The fate of Moscow was to be decided by a general battle, which Napoleon himself called a grand coup. Both Napoleon and France needed it.
But everything turned out differently. At Smolensk, the Russian armies managed to unite and they continued to draw Napoleon deep into the vast country. The Grand coup was postponed. The French entered empty cities, consumed their last supplies and panicked. Later, sitting on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon recalled: “My regiments, amazed that after so many difficult and deadly marches the fruits of their efforts were constantly moving away from them, began to look with anxiety at the distance that separated them from France.”
The boy was named in honor Dimitry of Rostov- the imperishable relics of the metropolitan were discovered quite recently, and they had not yet had time to glorify him as a saint. This will happen in a year. And the newborn has his name - Dmitry Dokhturov- will become famous later, during the War of 1812.
This glory, however, is now of some abstract nature. The name seems to be well known and is certainly connected with the Patriotic War, but in what way is not entirely clear. Many people even remember him only for the reason that his last name is funny - is he really a doctor?
The hit is accurate. The ancestor of the Dokhturovs, Kirill Ivanovich, arrived in Russia back in the 16th century. And indeed he was a doctor at the court of Ivan the Terrible.Calling - to save
In an incomprehensible way, the family vocation was passed on to our hero, an infantry general. What is the meaning of being a doctor? Save life and health. What was Dokhtur, as Dmitry Sergeevich was nicknamed by the soldiers, known for, besides the fact that he was wounded four times and never left the battlefield? “He showed himself most clearly where the Russian army was on the verge of extermination. You could say he saved the army every time.”
The role is unenviable and certainly not brilliant. A true hero is always ahead, on a dashing horse, his enemies tremble before him, he leads his “miracle heroes” from victory to victory. And Dokhturov, according to his contemporary, General Alexey Ermolov, is not at all like that: “It was not often that he led troops to victories; it was not under the banners of the immortal Suvorov that he established himself in military virtues.”
Reproduction of a fragment of the panorama of the Battle of Borodino “Command post of General D.S. Dokhturov” by artist Franz Alekseevich Roubaud. Canvas, oil. 1910-1912. From the Panorama Museum "Battle of Borodino".
They constantly tried to steal these “military virtues” from him. A characteristic moment is the very beginning of the campaign of 1812. Dokhturov’s corps was cut off from the main forces from the very first days of Napoleon’s offensive. The French should have simply destroyed it, and the Russian command, it seems, had come to terms with the loss in advance. Dokhturov, at the cost of truly Suvorov-like marches of 60 versts per day, as well as constant skirmishes and battles, manages to save the troops. A clear failure for Napoleon. But, instead of recognizing the skill of the Russian general, Bonaparte blames his failure on... the Russian climate: “It was pouring rain for thirty-six hours in a row, the excessive heat turned into piercing cold... This terrible storm saved Dokhturov’s corps.” These songs about “Colonel Buryu and General Frost” will be sung to us more than once. But, unfortunately, it will be forgotten that Napoleon began to blame his defeats on the forces of nature precisely after his meeting with Dokhturov.
By the way, Dmitry Sergeevich didn’t even look like a hero should. “Small in stature, with a purely Russian physiognomy, in a shabby uniform, he showed no outbursts of brilliant courage, but rode calmly, like a good landowner between working villagers.” By the way, this review Fedor Glinka, a veteran of the War of 1812, refers to the Battle of Borodino. To the hottest and most terrible part of the battle - it was there, according to Lermontov, that “a mountain of bloody bodies prevented the cannonballs from flying.” And even to the very moment when Bagration was mortally wounded. When the entire left wing of the Russians, having lost their command, was simply obliged to flee or fall, dooming the entire army to defeat. When the prince sent to replace Bagration Alexander of Württemberg, the uncle of the Russian emperor, shows cowardice - he does not dare to approach the front line and take command.“No time for crosses”
But Dokhturov appears. What he did in this sector can be summed up in a short quote from the award presentation: “Having taken command after Prince Bagration, he did not lose a single step of the position he had taken.” And we can remember something else. “Death, which met him at every step, only increased his zeal. Under him, two horses were killed and one was wounded...” “I found Dokhturov calmly sitting on a drum, cannonballs and grenades showered him...” “Manfully repelling the dangers and encouraging the example of his soldiers, he said: “Moscow is behind us!” Everyone should die, but not a step back!”
In principle, in order to immortalize your name, this would be quite enough. But Dokhturov’s fate was such that during the war of 1812 everything was going from strength to strength. At the very beginning, he saved only his corps. In the Battle of Borodino there was already a whole army. There seems to be nowhere else to go. Or are there still options?
It turned out that there is. Dokhturov had to save neither more nor less, but the fate of the entire campaign. By and large - the fate of Russia.
This happened near Maloyaroslavets. It is now known that it was there that Napoleon planned to turn south in order to feed the fairly hungry and shabby troops in “the most fertile Ukrainian provinces” and continue the war with new forces. These intentions were not so obvious then. Dokhturov initially entered into battle only with the general’s division Alexis Delzon, but very soon discovered that the entire Napoleonic “Great Army” was falling on him in “heavy force.” Until our main forces arrived, he had to stay alone. Eyewitnesses will best tell you what exactly the battle of Maloyaroslavets was like: “The streets could only be distinguished by the pile of corpses. At every step there were severed arms and legs, crushed heads, and piles of human bones smoldered under the coals of collapsed houses.” The surviving residents of Maloyaroslavets collected and sold 500 pounds of lead bullets, and used gun stocks and butts for heating for two more winters.Napoleon's adjutant Philippe Paul de Segur, remembering Maloyaroslavets, lamented: “Do you remember the ill-fated battlefield on which the conquest of the world stopped, where twenty years of continuous victories crumbled into dust?” And not a word about the fact that the “conquest of the world” was, in fact, thwarted by a modest, good-natured, very sick man, the Russian general Dokhturov. Which, by the way, did not demand any awards or honors for himself: “I really care very little about this. Now there’s no time for crosses when the Fatherland is in danger.”
Napoleonic plans
An extensive literature is devoted to the plans of opponents in 1812, but there is still debate among historians, and even a historiographical analysis of this problem is of great interest, since this is a key point that helps answer the questions that arise later. And one of the main questions for a Westerner is how Napoleon, with such an incredibly gigantic army and such large-scale preparations, managed to lose the Russian campaign miserably (to say the least)? It cannot be said that a similar question has not worried our compatriots for a long time, although in a different tone - did we really defeat the most brilliant Napoleon?
In France, unlike other European states, at the beginning of the 19th century there was only one commander, who was also the French emperor, on whom the process of planning military operations entirely depended. The weight of the glory of the victories won and the successful combination of monarch and military leader in one person made his authority as a military leader unshakable. The origin of plans and their implementation were Napoleon's monopoly and were not subject to approval or control. The concentration of power in the hands of one person had a positive aspect - it made it possible to accept and implement any daring plan. At the same time, Bonapartist barracks centralism, lack of control and lack of criticism were fraught with an obvious danger - the likelihood of disaster in the event of a miscalculation by the leader.
French army on the banks of the Neman. 1812 Engraving by H. W. Faber du Fort. 1830s
Each time he began military operations, Napoleon did not connect the leadership of his troops with a predetermined plan in detail, based on geographical and mathematical calculations. Only for himself alone, he sketched out the plan of war in his mind, having several options in stock, and revealed the details only to some of his assistants and executors. Being a talented military organizer and having well-functioning and well-established staff organs, Napoleon on the eve of the war gave orders and set step-by-step tasks for his marshals. The final operational plan was actually drawn up at the last moment and was easily changed depending on the circumstances. The main attention was paid to a thorough knowledge of the situation and a sober analysis of the situation. With the precise execution of his will, quick victories were born, based on bold improvisations and daring decisions, since the essence of his plans always boiled down to a quick search for a battle under unfavorable conditions for the enemy.
Initially, Napoleon, as an experienced commander, understood perfectly well that the war would not begin before the spring of 1812, but proceeded from the premise that the Russians would be the first to begin hostilities by invading the Duchy of Warsaw and Prussia. This scenario was preferable for the French emperor, since then he had a chance, using a huge numerical advantage, to victoriously decide the outcome of the war on the lands of Prussia and Poland, to conduct a fleeting campaign without even invading Russian territory. And from a political point of view, Napoleon would have looked in the best light in the eyes of Europeans - a victim of a Russian attack, he did not want war, but he defended Europe from the invasion of Russian barbarians. In accordance with this, he planned all the movements of his troops in Germany until they reached the Vistula. If the Russians crossed the borders, they were supposed to be contained by a barrier on the Vistula, and Napoleon's main forces would deliver a powerful blow from the north from East Prussia.
Today it is difficult to speak unambiguously about Napoleon’s final strategic plans. The French commander had a habit of not revealing all his cards until the end of the game. Perhaps he hoped that after the defeat of the Russian troops he would impose a joint expedition through Russian territory (through the Caucasus or Central Asia) to India, in order to end the merchant greatness of England with one blow from the rear. Perhaps he also intended to cut off the western regions from Russia and try to recreate the Polish state. In playing the “Polish card,” Napoleon was not original, but used a policy that was traditional for his predecessors (including the Bourbons). It is no coincidence that in the first appeal to his troops the French emperor used the term “Second Polish War”, by analogy with the war of 1806–1807. Although in the Polish question he had to act with caution and take into account the negative position of his unreliable allies - Austria and Prussia. Many options arose, but he could make the final choice depending on tactical successes, that is, his potential strategic goals were determined and dependent on tactical successes. Thus, the germs of the impending collapse of the Great Army in Russia were already visible in Napoleon’s strategic model.
Among the French proposals for waging war against Russia, it is necessary to indicate the project of E. Bignon, which dealt with the strategic concept. The purpose of the 1812 campaign, in his opinion, was to prepare an expedition to India, and Russia “will either join voluntarily, or, as a result of the laws of victory, will be drawn into the great movement that should change the face of the world.” He even presented a detailed picture of future actions: a contingent would be sent into the depths of Asia “from a third or a quarter of the European army, going to deliver a mortal blow to England, while the rest would be stationed on the banks of the Vistula, Dvina and Dnieper to guarantee the rear of those who will participate in the expedition " In this case, plans regarding Ukraine cannot be ignored. In the spring of 1811, Yu. Poniatowski suggested that Napoleon send Polish troops there, where they would find support from the Polish gentry. There were also memorial projects by M. Sokolnitsky, which proposed dividing the war into two stages: in 1812, to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; in 1813, adding 100 thousand people from the rebel gentry, to deal a mortal blow to the Russian Empire. He also penned a plan for the creation of a “Napoleonid” state on the territory of Ukraine. Two of these authors - Binion and Sokolnitsky - played a prominent role in the leadership of French intelligence, and Poniatowski oversaw the intelligence activities of the Duchy of Warsaw. Polish projects hardly played any noticeable role in determining the actions of the French commander, since they were focused on launching an active offensive towards the southwestern outskirts of Russia (this did not happen), and military operations in this region were local in nature. Most likely, Napoleon abandoned these projects for political reasons, since Austria and Prussia, participants in the partitions of Poland, were his allies. In addition, by moving the line of operations to the south, he would have had the main Russian forces threatening his communications from the north. The French emperor decided to limit himself to delivering an auxiliary strike to the south in order to divert part of the Russian forces there from the central direction. He also hoped, based on information from Polish intelligence officers, that even the appearance of small Napoleonic units in Ukraine would cause a general uprising there. For this purpose, T. Morsky was specially sent to Ukraine as the future leader of the rebels, and General V.I. Sangushko was seconded to Napoleon’s main apartment. According to the French emperor, the Ukrainian (Polish) rebels and parts of the Great Army should have been supported by the Turks from the flank. He did not believe that Turkey would agree to make peace with the Russians and at the beginning of the war he hoped that the Turkish army would strike from Moldova and land troops in Crimea. For example, Article 9 of the text of the military alliance of March 14, 1812 between France and Austria directly stated that Turkey would have to join the treaty. According to Napoleon, the entire specified conglomerate of forces should have reliably provided the right flank of the Grand Army, so he was very disappointed when he learned of the conclusion of peace between the Porte and Russia. Very soon his hopes for an uprising of the Polish gentry in Ukraine did not come true. At the same time, no strictly formalized strategic or operational plan of Napoleon himself has survived. They probably never existed in written form.
In the military historical literature, there is no particular disagreement about the Napoleonic operational plan, which can easily be reconstructed on the basis of staff correspondence, based on the pre-war deployment of the Grand Army. Analyzing the pre-war situation, Napoleon rightly believed that “...in such a huge theater of military operations, success can only be achieved with a carefully drawn up plan and strictly coordinated its elements.” Already on the eve of the war, outlines of Napoleon's initial operational plans were revealed in the deployment of units of the Grand Armies. The left-flank group (220 thousand) under the command of the French emperor himself was deployed against Barclay’s army. The troops of the right flank (80 thousand), entrusted to Jerome, were located in the Duchy of Warsaw. The center (80 thousand) was commanded by E. Beauharnais. This deployment of units of the Grand Army shows that Napoleon intended to deliver the main blow with the forces of the left flank, the central group - an auxiliary blow, and Jerome's troops performed a distracting role as a deterrent cover against a possible Russian invasion of the duchy.
The French emperor acted according to the Bource principle, “developing a plan with several options,” subsequently accepting the enemy’s actions as adjustments to the plan. We find confirmation of this in the correspondence of Napoleon with the marshals. He believed that when the essence of his movements was discovered, the enemy would make one of the decisions: “... either concentrate within the state to gather forces and give battle, or go on the offensive.” All pre-war instructions to the marshals show that Bonaparte, predicting the likely actions of the Russians, considered it more likely that Bagration's army would invade Poland at the beginning of the war, supported by part of the forces of the 1st Western Army. He was in no hurry to open hostilities, wanting to allow the grass to rise in order to provide food for his numerous cavalry.
When it became clear that the Russian command was patient and did not intend to drive its troops into a trap, like the new Ulm and Austerlitz, Napoleon decided to modify his operational plan and strike first, since time pressure was already beginning to take its toll. Still believing that Bagration would begin an offensive movement from the Narev and Bug area at the beginning of the campaign, Napoleon on June 10, 1812, in a letter to Berthier, drew the following scheme of actions: “... the general plan consists of retreating back (demonstration and delay of the enemy. - V. B.) the right flank and moving forward on the left...". On June 15, he informed Berthier about the details of the plan and the location of the crossing of the Neman: “In this situation, my intention is to cross between Kovna and Olita” - to build 5 bridges and, using the support of the central group of troops, to reach Vilno. Napoleon gave the same instructions to Jerome: “First, establish the belief that you are moving to Volyn, and keep the enemy in this belief as long as possible. At this time, I, having bypassed his extreme right flank, will gain from twelve to fifteen transitions in the direction of St. Petersburg; ...crossing the Neman, I will capture Vilna from the enemy, which is the first subject of the campaign.”
Napoleon's army crossing the Neman. Artist J. H. Clarke. 1816
Napoleon's final operational plan was to maneuver the main forces against Barclay's right flank, while Jerome would pin down Bagration's actions, holding him in place, and Beauharnais's units would support the actions of the left flank group, advancing in the gap between the two Russian armies. The French emperor's goal was clear. Using numerical superiority, defeat isolated Russian armies one by one in border battles and capture the capital of Lithuania. It must be said that Napoleon’s operational plan had a number of shortcomings - it was built on insufficiently accurate intelligence data, and the option of a deep strategic retreat of Russian troops was not calculated.
There are different points of view among historians regarding the planned timing of Napoleon's initial operations and the entire campaign. In this case, one can cite direct evidence from the French emperor only about his estimated duration of the war. On May 21 (June 1), 1812, Napoleon wrote from Posen to his wife Empress Marie-Louise: “I think that in 3 months everything will be finished.” Obviously, he expected that the entire campaign would fit within the framework of the summer - the maximum of the early autumn of 1812. For the initial operations, which would have resulted in defeats in the border areas of the Russian armies, they were probably given 1 to 2 months, the rest of the time - to pursue the remaining Russian forces, occupy as much territory as possible, including, in particular, Moscow or St. Petersburg, and conclude a peace treaty signed “on the drum” and making Russian policy directly dependent on France.
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