The boy was named in honor Dimitry of Rostov- the imperishable relics of the metropolitan were discovered quite recently, and they had not yet had time to glorify him as a saint. This will happen in a year. And the newborn has his name - Dmitry Dokhturov- will become famous later, during the War of 1812.
This glory, however, is now of some abstract nature. The name seems to be well known and is certainly connected with the Patriotic War, but in what way is not entirely clear. Many people even remember him only for the reason that his last name is funny - is he really a doctor?
The hit is accurate. The ancestor of the Dokhturovs, Kirill Ivanovich, arrived in Russia back in the 16th century. And indeed he was a doctor at the court of Ivan the Terrible.Calling - to save
In an incomprehensible way, the family vocation was passed on to our hero, an infantry general. What is the meaning of being a doctor? Save life and health. What was Dokhtur, as Dmitry Sergeevich was nicknamed by the soldiers, known for, besides the fact that he was wounded four times and never left the battlefield? “He showed himself most clearly where the Russian army was on the verge of extermination. You could say he saved the army every time.”
The role is unenviable and certainly not brilliant. A true hero is always ahead, on a dashing horse, his enemies tremble before him, he leads his “miracle heroes” from victory to victory. And Dokhturov, according to his contemporary, General Alexey Ermolov, is not at all like that: “It was not often that he led troops to victories; it was not under the banners of the immortal Suvorov that he established himself in military virtues.”
Reproduction of a fragment of the panorama of the Battle of Borodino “Command post of General D.S. Dokhturov” by artist Franz Alekseevich Roubaud. Canvas, oil. 1910-1912. From the Panorama Museum "Battle of Borodino".
They constantly tried to steal these “military virtues” from him. A characteristic moment is the very beginning of the campaign of 1812. Dokhturov’s corps was cut off from the main forces from the very first days of Napoleon’s offensive. The French should have simply destroyed it, and the Russian command, it seems, had come to terms with the loss in advance. Dokhturov, at the cost of truly Suvorov-like marches of 60 versts per day, as well as constant skirmishes and battles, manages to save the troops. A clear failure for Napoleon. But, instead of recognizing the skill of the Russian general, Bonaparte blames his failure on... the Russian climate: “It was pouring rain for thirty-six hours in a row, the excessive heat turned into piercing cold... This terrible storm saved Dokhturov’s corps.” These songs about “Colonel Buryu and General Frost” will be sung to us more than once. But, unfortunately, it will be forgotten that Napoleon began to blame his defeats on the forces of nature precisely after his meeting with Dokhturov.
By the way, Dmitry Sergeevich didn’t even look like a hero should. “Small in stature, with a purely Russian physiognomy, in a shabby uniform, he showed no outbursts of brilliant courage, but rode calmly, like a good landowner between working villagers.” By the way, this review Fedor Glinka, a veteran of the War of 1812, refers to the Battle of Borodino. To the hottest and most terrible part of the battle - it was there, according to Lermontov, that “a mountain of bloody bodies prevented the cannonballs from flying.” And even to the very moment when Bagration was mortally wounded. When the entire left wing of the Russians, having lost their command, was simply obliged to flee or fall, dooming the entire army to defeat. When the prince sent to replace Bagration Alexander of Württemberg, the uncle of the Russian emperor, shows cowardice - he does not dare to approach the front line and take command.“No time for crosses”
But Dokhturov appears. What he did in this sector can be summed up in a short quote from the award presentation: “Having taken command after Prince Bagration, he did not lose a single step of the position he had taken.” And we can remember something else. “Death, which met him at every step, only increased his zeal. Under him, two horses were killed and one was wounded...” “I found Dokhturov calmly sitting on a drum, cannonballs and grenades showered him...” “Manfully repelling the dangers and encouraging the example of his soldiers, he said: “Moscow is behind us!” Everyone should die, but not a step back!”
In principle, in order to immortalize your name, this would be quite enough. But Dokhturov’s fate was such that during the war of 1812 everything was going from strength to strength. At the very beginning, he saved only his corps. In the Battle of Borodino there was already a whole army. There seems to be nowhere else to go. Or are there still options?
It turned out that there is. Dokhturov had to save neither more nor less, but the fate of the entire campaign. By and large - the fate of Russia.
This happened near Maloyaroslavets. It is now known that it was there that Napoleon planned to turn south in order to feed the fairly hungry and shabby troops in “the most fertile Ukrainian provinces” and continue the war with new forces. These intentions were not so obvious then. Dokhturov initially entered into battle only with the general’s division Alexis Delzon, but very soon discovered that the entire Napoleonic “Great Army” was falling on him in “heavy force.” Until our main forces arrived, he had to stay alone. Eyewitnesses will best tell you what exactly the battle of Maloyaroslavets was like: “The streets could only be distinguished by the pile of corpses. At every step there were severed arms and legs, crushed heads, and piles of human bones smoldered under the coals of collapsed houses.” The surviving residents of Maloyaroslavets collected and sold 500 pounds of lead bullets, and used gun stocks and butts for heating for two more winters.Napoleon's adjutant Philippe Paul de Segur, remembering Maloyaroslavets, lamented: “Do you remember the ill-fated battlefield on which the conquest of the world stopped, where twenty years of continuous victories crumbled into dust?” And not a word about the fact that the “conquest of the world” was, in fact, thwarted by a modest, good-natured, very sick man, the Russian general Dokhturov. Which, by the way, did not demand any awards or honors for himself: “I really care very little about this. Now there’s no time for crosses when the Fatherland is in danger.”
The development of the Russian plan for waging war with the French Empire was affected by the hesitation of diplomats. The period of preparation for the war with France can be quite clearly divided into two stages: the first - from the end of 1809 to the beginning of 1811; the second - from mid-1811 to early 1812.
After the meeting in Erfurt (it took place from September 27 to October 14, 1808), the Russian military leadership determined the situation as unfavorable. There was a need to have a plan in case of war with the French Empire. On March 2 (14), 1810, Minister of War Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly presented a memorandum to Emperor Alexander I - “On the protection of the western borders of Russia.” This report talked about the preparation of the western regions of the empire for war. Russia was not going to start the war first. The defensive line was supposed to run along the Western Dvina and Dniester rivers. At this point they planned to create a number of fortifications and concentrate food and other supplies necessary for the army. The plan provided for two stages of the war. At the first stage, they planned to conduct border battles until all available means of fighting were completely exhausted (without entering into a decisive battle with the main forces of the enemy). After exhausting all capabilities, the troops retreated to the main defensive line. The use of “scorched earth tactics” was envisaged - the French, who had moved away from their warehouses, were going to leave the devastated territory - without food, livestock, or vehicles. At the second stage, they were going to continue to adhere to a defensive strategy, but with the inclusion of offensive actions if necessary. The plan noted that victory required a skillful disposition of troops (to be able to concentrate maximum forces) and a well-prepared rear base.
Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly.
The Minister of War's plan provided for three options for the action of the Russian armed forces, depending on the direction of the enemy's main attack. In the event of an attack by Emperor Napoleon's army on Ukraine, the left flank of the Russian army retreated to Zhitomir, where a fortified camp was to be built. At the same time, the forces of the Russian right flank were supposed to strike the enemy’s flank through East Prussia. In the event that Napoleon Bonaparte launched a major attack on St. Petersburg in the northern direction, the Russian troops of the right flank were supposed to retreat to a fortified camp in the Friedrichstadt-Jacobstadt area. And the troops of the left flank will strike the enemy’s flank, advancing in the Warsaw direction. When the French advanced along the Smolensk-Moscow line, Russian troops in the central direction were pulled back to the Dnieper, while the troops of the left and right wings attacked the flanks and rear of the enemy.
To fight the French army, it was planned to form three armies. The first army, consisting of four divisions, was supposed to cover the border from Polangen to Kovno. The second army, consisting of seven divisions, concentrated in Volyn and Podolia. The third army (reserve), consisting of four divisions, was supposed to deploy between Vilna and Minsk and help the army that would be attacked. Such a deployment of forces and means involved maneuvering over a large territory bounded by the Dvina, Dnieper and Polesie.
Barclay de Tolly's proposals were approved. Reporting on the measures envisaged by the War Ministry, Barclay de Tolly emphasized that his defensive strategy also included offensive operations. The War Ministry began preparatory work in the fortresses located on the Western Dvina, Berezina and Dnieper. The process of filling the bases with various supplies for military needs was underway. The Ministry conducted a series of reconnaissance missions using officers from the quartermaster unit. The data obtained were brought together and in mid-September 1810 the Saxon Baron Ludwig von Wolzogen(in 1807 he was accepted into the Russian service as a major in the quartermaster unit) presented his considerations on their basis to Barclay de Tolly. Wolzogen proposed, in the event of an invasion of enemy troops, to withdraw with battle into the interior of the country and rely on the line of fortifications created on the Western Dvina and Dnieper. An army opposing the main forces of the enemy had to wear down the enemy with battles, relying on fortifications. The other army was supposed to strike at the enemy’s flanks and operate in his rear with the help of partisan detachments. As a result, Wolzogen's proposals were reinforced by Barclay de Tolly's considerations.
At the end of 1811, an important foreign policy event occurred - Prussia proposed an alliance, and the Russian government accepted it. A convention was signed that provided for joint waging of war with the French Empire. In St. Petersburg, the idea of an offensive, preventive war arises. Proponents of an offensive war believed that it was necessary to prevent Napoleon Bonaparte from using the forces and means of Central Europe against Russia. Use the forces of Prussia and Sweden yourself in the fight against the enemy. The offensive plan provided for the deployment of Russian armies directly at the borders and a vigorous offensive in the direction of the Oder, which was supposed to become the demarcation line between Russia and France. But this plan was not approved. It should be noted that Napoleon foresaw such a development of events - for a long time it was believed that the Russian army itself would go on the offensive and be able to defeat it in several oncoming battles.
The plan for a preventive war was abandoned after it became completely clear that neither Prussia, nor Austria, nor, especially, the Duchy of Warsaw would take part in the war against the French Empire on the side of Russia. In addition, the issue of war with the Ottoman Empire was not removed from the agenda - a peace treaty was signed only on May 22, 1812. Therefore, it was decided to continue developing a defensive plan. But its development encountered so many difficulties that until the very beginning of the war it was not possible to draw up a full-fledged operational plan and bring it to the generals.
It must be said that almost immediately the uncompromising nature of the war was adopted. Back in May 1811, Russian Emperor Alexander I explained his attitude towards the upcoming war to the French ambassador to Russia Armand de Caulaincourt (who was opposed to the war with Russia): “If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, then it is possible and even likely that he will beat us , if we accept the battle, but this will not give him peace. ... We have an immense space behind us, and we will maintain a well-organized army. ... If the lot decides the case against me, then I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than cede my provinces and sign treaties in my capital that are only a respite. The Frenchman is brave, but long hardships and bad climate tire and discourage him. Our climate and our winter will fight for us.”
Difficulties of the Russian command. Until March 1812, it was unclear how Austria and Prussia would behave during Russia's war with France. The location of troops on the western border and in the Balkan direction depended on the actions of these powers. Alarming information from Mikhail Kutuzov, and then Admiral Pavel Chichagov about the concentration of Austrian troops forced St. Petersburg to keep significant forces on the Danube and allocate troops to cover the direction to Kyiv. In addition, before the signing of peace with Turkey, it was necessary to keep significant reserves on the Dniester.
The Russian command had to decide on the choice of the main operational direction. Of the three directions in which French troops could launch an offensive - northern (St. Petersburg), central (Moscow), southern (Kyiv), the first was considered the most important. Many believed that Napoleon would launch an attack on the capital of the Russian Empire. Therefore, much attention was paid to strengthening the fortresses on the Western Dvina and Riga. Considerable attention was also paid to the southern direction: measures were taken to reconstruct the Kyiv fortifications, and engineering work was underway in Bobruisk and Mozyr. The central direction was considered less dangerous: work to strengthen Smolensk and Borisov was insignificant. Only on April 8, 1812, an order was received to urgently strengthen Borisov in order to cover the communications passing through it and protect the store being created in it.
When developing the war plan, it was stipulated that the retreat of Russian troops should not go further than the line of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. It was proposed to fight a decisive battle and defeat the enemy.
"Pfuhl's Plan"
Simultaneously with the developments of Barclay de Tolly and Wolzogen, from June 1811, the development of the so-called Pfuel plan (sometimes written Fulya) was underway in Alexander’s Main Apartment. Württemberg baron Karl Ludwig von Pfuhl served in Prussia, on the Prussian general staff. After the Battle of Jena, the baron left Prussia and was accepted into Russian service with the rank of major general. Pfuhl was considered a major military theorist and gained the trust of Emperor Alexander I, who instructed him to draw up a plan of military action with France.
Pfuel's ideas partly repeated the developments of Barclay de Tolly, but there were also differences. He also envisioned fighting with three armies, one of the armies was supposed to hold back the French forces from the front, and the other to act from the flank and rear. Active defensive actions of the 1st and 2nd armies on the lines of communication of the French forces should have forced the enemy to retreat, since, according to Pfuel, he could not remain for a long time on the devastated land. True, Pfuhl proposed to begin active offensive operations already at the first stage of military operations. And Barclay de Tolly believed that offensive actions should be taken at the second stage, when the enemy breaks away from his bases and faces stubborn resistance from Russian troops and a lack of funds in the devastated territory. According to Pfuel's plan, two armies were to bear the brunt of the fight against the enemy: the 1st in Lithuania (120 thousand soldiers and officers) and the 2nd in Belarus (80 thousand people). According to this plan, it was assumed that Napoleon would strike through Kovno to Vilno, and then move to St. Petersburg or Moscow. The St. Petersburg direction was considered the most likely. In the event of an enemy invasion, the weaker 2nd Army had to retreat deeper into the theater of operations, and the 1st Army would take a fortified flank position on Drissa. The Drissa fortified camp was built on the left bank in the bend of the Western Dvina, between the town of Drissa (now Verkhnedvinsk) and the village of Shatrovo. Barclay de Tolly's 1st Army, relying on the Drissa fortified camp, was supposed to deliver a decisive blow to the flank and rear of the advancing enemy, moving through Memel to Tilsit and further to Insterburg. Pfuhl saw the key to victory in a strong flank position.
Alexander did not see any contradictions in Pfuel’s proposals with the previously adopted plan of Barclay de Tolly and approved them. It is clear that Pfuel’s proposals can only be conditionally called a war plan. The proposals were not formalized in the form of an operational plan, and the Russian generals had little idea about them until the very beginning of the war.
Other offers
In addition to the plan of Barclay de Tolly and the developments of Baron Pfuel, there were other proposals. Thus, a participant in Suvorov’s Swiss campaign, the anti-French campaign of 1805, and the Turkish campaigns of 1806 and 1809 Karl Fedorovich Toll(he was appointed Quartermaster General of the 1st Army in 1812) presented his views through Prince Pyotr Mikhailovich Volkonsky. P. M. Volkonsky was the manager of His Imperial Majesty's Retinue in the quartermaster department; the prince can be considered the founder of the Russian general staff. Karl Toll pointed out that the time to go on the offensive had been lost, so it was necessary to adhere to a defensive strategy.
Unlike other analysts, Toll correctly guessed the main direction of attack of the French army - Moscow. The Kiev direction, in his opinion, was auxiliary. Toll proposed to locate the forces of the 1st Army between Bialystok and Grodno, and the 2nd - between Siemiatychi and Brest. Cover the Riga direction with one body, placing it near Kovno. As a result, the main forces were located at a front of 170-180 miles and could act more coherently. In his opinion, the key to victory was in the concentration of forces.
He proposed his plan Prince Peter Volkonsky. He presented it to the emperor on April 7, 1812. The prince considered the extended position of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies extremely dangerous. Volkonsky proposed concentrating the first army in the Bialystok region, the second - near Kovel, and the auxiliary - near Pruzhany. Behind the main forces, Volkonsky proposed placing two reserve armies at Borisov and Mozyr. And also strengthen the flanks with one corps at Kovno and a third reserve army at Tarnopol. He also proposed, after the end of the war with Turkey, to use the Danube Army to attack the French flank through Bukovina.
Another plan was proposed on June 3, 1812 by Colonel Gaverdovsky. The colonel, like Karl Toll, correctly guessed the main direction of the enemy attack - towards Moscow. Therefore, he proposed concentrating all the main forces and means in this direction for its defense.
The commander of the 2nd Army, Prince Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration, also had his own war plan. His plan differed from most others in its offensive strategy. Bagration believed that it was possible to establish a demarcation line along the Oder with Napoleon. At the same time, Russia must be prepared for an offensive war. The sudden and rapid offensive of Russian troops (Suvorov's school) made it possible to take good positions on the Vistula River and remove the theater of military operations from Russia. To wage an offensive war, Bagration proposed forming a 100,000-strong Bialystok Army; the 2nd Army of the same size was supposed to strike through East Prussia. The actions of the two advancing armies were to be supported by 50 thousand. reserve army. The army advancing through Prussia was to be assisted by the Baltic Fleet. In May, the Bialystok army was supposed to strike the enemy and, with a forced march, occupy Prague (a suburb of the Polish capital), and then Warsaw. The 2nd Army was to cross the Vistula and besiege Danzig. At the same time, Danzig was blocked from the sea by ships of the Baltic Fleet. At this time, the reserve army was supposed to enter the Duchy of Warsaw. Thus, the Duchy of Warsaw was removed from the ranks of the enemies of the empire and could not become a base for an invasion of Russia or a supplier of significant military contingents. In addition, the active offensive actions of the Russian army forced Prussia to take the side of Russia, and Austria to maintain neutrality. The Belarusian military governor, Prince Alexander of Württemberg, also advocated the offensive nature of the actions of the Russian army. He also proposed conducting active hostilities in the Duchy of Warsaw.
Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration.
But all offensive plans were ignored by Alexander. It should be noted that the emperor acted strangely in relation to the commanders-in-chief of the armies: neither Bagration nor the commander of the 3rd Army, Alexander Petrovich Tormasov, were informed of the decisions made. And Barclay de Tolly was not fully privy to the emperor’s plans and remained confident that everything was going according to the plan of 1810. On April 10, 1812, Bagration received a letter from Barclay de Tolly informing him that Emperor Alexander had adopted a preliminary plan of action in the event of a defensive war. The 1st and 2nd armies, having superior enemy forces in front of them (finding themselves in the direction of the main attack), had to retreat and avoid a decisive battle. The army, which was not attacked by the main enemy forces, received the task of launching an offensive, destroying the enemy units encountered, and threatening the flank and rear of the main French forces. Bagration's 2nd Army, in the event of an attack by the enemy's main forces in the southern direction, was supposed to retreat through Zhitomir to Kyiv. Near Kyiv, the 2nd Army could choose a place for a decisive battle.
A few days later, Bagration received a new letter from Barclay de Tolly. It indicated that it was necessary to bring the two main armies closer together. Bagration concluded that there was a war plan in the Main Apartment and asked to send “detailed comments.” But the commander of the 1st Army was able to give him only general instructions: to adhere to the defensive plan until he received instructions to attack.
On June 6, 1812, Bagration once again tried to change the war plan and suggested to Alexander “not to wait for an attack, to resist the enemy within his borders.” Two days later, in a new letter to the emperor, he again points out the need for an offensive strategy. “Why should we be afraid and exhaust the army with methodical maneuvers?” asks the commander. In response, he received a letter from Barclay de Tolly, who reported that the left flank of the 2nd Western Army was secured by the location of Tormasov's 3rd Army. Alarmed Bagration reports the danger of the deployment of troops in a defensive strategy - Napoleon has a good opportunity to cut off all the armies from each other and will try to destroy them separately.
During the same period, Leonty Leontievich Bennigsen insisted on an offensive operation(commander-in-chief of the Russian army in 1807). On April 27, 1812, Bennigsen was returned to service (he was in disgrace) with the appointment to serve under the person of Emperor Alexander I without specific assignments. The most experienced general (he began his military service as a 14-year-old boy in the Hanoverian infantry and participated in the last campaign of the Seven Years' War) considered the refusal of preventive war a mistake. He believed that Russia, having 160 thousand in the first echelon. the army may well “play the right game.” In such a scenario, Prussia could take the side of Russia. Even in the event of failure, which could befall the Russian army between the Vistula and the Oder, Russia was in a more advantageous position than when the French army invaded Russia. When enemy troops invaded Russia, the command, with its forces and assets scattered, had to retreat in order to concentrate troops and avoid the defeat of individual large units of the army. In reality, this is how it all turned out.
Bennigsen considered Pfuel's ideas completely unsatisfactory. They did not correspond to “neither the character of the people, nor the mood of the army, nor the localities, and even less the circumstances and conditions in which both sides found themselves.” He, like Bagration, considered it necessary to forestall the enemy and strike at Oudinot’s corps, which had moved forward and was in a relatively isolated position.
St. Petersburg received several more offers from foreign military and political figures. They proposed to wage a defensive war. So, at the request of the Neapolitan ambassador to the Russian Empire, Duke Serra-Caprion, d'Alonville drew up his plan. The plan was transmitted to the emperor through Admiral Mordvinov. D'Alonville recommended that the emperor lure the enemy deep into Russia: “It is necessary to involve Napoleon in a slow and ruinous war.”
An interesting fact is that such a war, “slow and ruinous,” was beneficial to London. Even if Napoleon won, France emerged from the war greatly weakened. And in the event of a counter war on the territory of Poland and Germany, Russia and France could remain their own, which was not part of England’s plans.
Similar advice was given by the former Marshal of France, Crown Prince of Sweden, de facto ruler of the Kingdom of Sweden, Jean Baptiste Bernadotte (Bernadotte). He believed that the Russian army could retreat beyond the Dvina and beyond. Bernadotte recommended waging a protracted war. If the Russian army was successful, he proposed to deliver the main blow in the northern direction - through Königsberg to Danzig. In the war in northern Germany, the Russian army was supposed to be helped by the Swedish army.
The Prussian representative Baron Karl Friedrich Knesebeck, who was in the Russian capital at the beginning of 1812, also insisted on the defensive actions of the Russian army. The French emigrant nobleman, Adjutant General Emmanuel Frantsevich Saint-Prix also submitted a note on strengthening the western borders.
The Patriotic War of 1812 began on June 12 - on this day Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman River, unleashing wars between the two crowns of France and Russia. This war lasted until December 14, 1812, ending with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian and allied forces. This is a glorious page of Russian history, which we will consider with reference to the official history textbooks of Russia and France, as well as to the books of bibliographers Napoleon, Alexander 1 and Kutuzov, who describe in great detail the events taking place at that moment.
➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤Beginning of the war
Causes of the War of 1812
The causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, like all other wars in the history of mankind, must be considered in two aspects - the causes on the part of France and the causes on the part of Russia.
Reasons from France
In just a few years, Napoleon radically changed his own ideas about Russia. If, having come to power, he wrote that Russia was his only ally, then by 1812 Russia had become a threat to France (consider the emperor) a threat. In many ways, this was provoked by Alexander 1 himself. So, this is why France attacked Russia in June 1812:
- Violation of the Tilsit agreements: easing of the continental blockade. As you know, the main enemy of France at that time was England, against which the blockade was organized. Russia also participated in this, but in 1810 the government passed a law allowing trade with England through intermediaries. This effectively rendered the entire blockade ineffective, which completely undermined France's plans.
- Refusals in dynastic marriage. Napoleon sought to marry into the Russian imperial court in order to become “God’s anointed.” However, in 1808 he was denied marriage to Princess Catherine. In 1810 he was denied marriage to Princess Anna. As a result, in 1811 the French emperor married an Austrian princess.
- Transfer of Russian troops to the border with Poland in 1811. In the first half of 1811, Alexander 1 ordered the transfer of 3 divisions to the Polish borders, fearing an uprising of Poland, which could spread to Russian lands. This step was regarded by Napoleon as aggression and preparation for war for Polish territories, which by that time were already subordinate to France.
Soldiers! A new, second Polish war begins! The first ended in Tilsit. There, Russia promised to be an eternal ally for France in the war with England, but broke its promise. The Russian emperor does not want to give explanations for his actions until the French eagles cross the Rhine. Do they really think that we have become different? Are we really not the winners of Austerlitz? Russia presented France with a choice - shame or war. The choice is obvious! Let's go ahead, let's cross the Neman! The second Polish howl will be glorious for French arms. She will bring a messenger to the destructive influence of Russia on European affairs.
Thus began a war of conquest for France.
Reasons from Russia
Russia also had compelling reasons for participating in the war, which turned out to be a liberation war for the state. The main reasons include the following:
- Large losses for all segments of the population from the break in trade with England. The opinions of historians on this point differ, since it is believed that the blockade did not affect the state as a whole, but exclusively its elite, who, as a result of the lack of opportunity to trade with England, lost money.
- France's intention to recreate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1807, Napoleon created the Duchy of Warsaw and sought to recreate the ancient state in its true size. Perhaps this was only in the event of the seizure of its western lands from Russia.
- Napoleon's violation of the Peace of Tilsit. One of the main criteria for signing this agreement was that Prussia should be cleared of French troops, but this was never done, although Alexander 1 constantly reminded about this.
For a long time, France has been trying to encroach on Russia's independence. We always tried to be meek, hoping to deflect her attempts to seize us. With all our desire to maintain peace, we are forced to gather troops to defend our Motherland. There are no possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the conflict with France, which means there is only one thing left - to defend the truth, to defend Russia from invaders. I don't need to remind commanders and soldiers about courage, it's in our hearts. The blood of the victors, the blood of the Slavs, flows in our veins. Soldiers! You defend the country, defend the religion, defend the fatherland. I'm with you. God is with us.
Balance of forces and means at the beginning of the war
Napoleon's crossing of the Neman occurred on June 12, with 450 thousand people at his disposal. Around the end of the month, another 200 thousand people joined him. If we take into account that by that time there were no large losses on both sides, then the total number of the French army at the start of hostilities in 1812 was 650 thousand soldiers. It is impossible to say that the French made up 100% of the army, since the combined army of almost all European countries fought on the side of France (France, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, Prussia, Spain, Holland). However, it was the French who formed the basis of the army. These were proven soldiers who had won many victories with their emperor.
Russia after mobilization had 590 thousand soldiers. Initially, the army numbered 227 thousand people, and they were divided on three fronts:
- Northern - First Army. Commander - Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Toli. Number of people: 120 thousand people. They were located in the north of Lithuania and covered St. Petersburg.
- Central - Second Army. Commander - Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. Number of people: 49 thousand people. They were located in the south of Lithuania, covering Moscow.
- Southern - Third Army. Commander - Alexander Petrovich Tormasov. Number of people: 58 thousand people. They were located in Volyn, covering the attack on Kyiv.
Also in Russia, partisan detachments were active, the number of which reached 400 thousand people.
The first stage of the war - The offensive of Napoleon's troops (June-September)
At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12, 1812, the Patriotic War with Napoleonic France began for Russia. Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman and headed inland. The main direction of the attack was supposed to be on Moscow. The commander himself said that “if I capture Kyiv, I will lift the Russians by the feet, if I capture St. Petersburg, I will take them by the throat, if I take Moscow, I will strike the heart of Russia.”
The French army, commanded by brilliant commanders, was looking for a general battle, and the fact that Alexander 1 divided the army into 3 fronts was very beneficial to the aggressors. However, at the initial stage, Barclay de Toly played a decisive role, who gave the order not to engage in battle with the enemy and to retreat deeper into the country. This was necessary to combine forces, as well as to strengthen reserves. Retreating, the Russians destroyed everything - they killed livestock, poisoned water, burned fields. In the literal sense of the word, the French moved forward through the ashes. Later, Napoleon complained that the Russian people were carrying out a vile war and did not behave according to the rules.
Northern direction
Napoleon sent 32 thousand people led by General MacDonald to St. Petersburg. The first city on this route was Riga. According to the French plan, MacDonald was supposed to capture the city. Connect with General Oudinot (he had 28 thousand people at his disposal) and move on.
The defense of Riga was commanded by General Essen with 18 thousand soldiers. He burned everything around the city, and the city itself was very well fortified. By this time, MacDonald had captured Dinaburg (the Russians abandoned the city at the beginning of the war) and did not take further active action. He understood the absurdity of the assault on Riga and waited for the arrival of artillery.
General Oudinot occupied Polotsk and from there tried to separate Wittenstein's corps from the army of Barclay de Toly. However, on July 18, Wittenstein launched an unexpected blow on Oudinot, who was saved from defeat only by Saint-Cyr's corps, which arrived in time. As a result, balance came and no more active offensive operations were carried out in the northern direction.
South direction
General Ranier with an army of 22 thousand people was supposed to act in the young direction, blocking the army of General Tormasov, preventing it from connecting with the rest of the Russian army.
On July 27, Tormasov surrounded the city of Kobrin, where Ranier’s main forces gathered. The French suffered a terrible defeat - in 1 day 5 thousand people were killed in the battle, which forced the French to retreat. Napoleon realized that the southern direction in the Patriotic War of 1812 was in danger of failure. Therefore, he transferred General Schwarzenberg’s troops there, numbering 30 thousand people. As a result of this, on August 12, Tormasov was forced to retreat to Lutsk and take up defense there. Subsequently, the French did not undertake active offensive actions in the southern direction. The main events took place in the Moscow direction.
The course of events of the offensive company
On June 26, the army of General Bagration advanced from Vitebsk, whose task Alexander 1 set to engage in battle with the main forces of the enemy in order to wear them down. Everyone realized the absurdity of this idea, but only by July 17 was it possible to finally dissuade the emperor from this idea. The troops began to retreat to Smolensk.
On July 6, the large number of Napoleon's troops became clear. To prevent the Patriotic War from dragging on for a long time, Alexander 1 signed a decree on the creation of a militia. Literally all residents of the country are enrolled in it - there are about 400 thousand volunteers in total.
On July 22, the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly united near Smolensk. The command of the united army was taken over by Barclay de Tolly, who had 130 thousand soldiers at his disposal, while the front line of the French army numbered 150 thousand soldiers.
On July 25, a military council was held in Smolensk, at which the issue of accepting the battle was discussed in order to launch a counteroffensive and defeat Napoleon with one blow. But Barclay spoke out against this idea, realizing that an open battle with an enemy, a brilliant strategist and tactician, could lead to a monumental failure. As a result, the offensive idea was not implemented. It was decided to retreat further - to Moscow.
On July 26, the retreat of the troops began, which General Neverovsky was supposed to cover by occupying the village of Krasnoye, thereby closing the bypass of Smolensk for Napoleon.
On August 2, Murat with a cavalry corps tried to break through the defenses of Neverovsky, but to no avail. In total, more than 40 attacks were launched with the help of cavalry, but it was not possible to achieve the desired result.
August 5 is one of the important dates in the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon began the assault on Smolensk, capturing the suburbs by evening. However, at night he was driven out of the city, and the Russian army continued its massive retreat from the city. This caused a storm of discontent among the soldiers. They believed that if they managed to drive the French out of Smolensk, then it was necessary to destroy it there. They accused Barclay of cowardice, but the general implemented only one plan - to wear down the enemy and take a decisive battle when the balance of forces was on the side of Russia. By this time, the French had all the advantage.
On August 17, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov arrived in the army and took command. This candidacy did not raise any questions, since Kutuzov (a student of Suvorov) was highly respected and was considered the best Russian commander after the death of Suvorov. Having arrived in the army, the new commander-in-chief wrote that he had not yet decided what to do next: “The question has not yet been resolved - either lose the army, or give up Moscow.”
On August 26, the Battle of Borodino took place. Its outcome still raises many questions and disputes, but there were no losers then. Each commander solved his own problems: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow (the heart of Russia, as the Emperor of France himself wrote), and Kutuzov was able to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, thereby making the initial turning point in the battle of 1812.
September 1 is a significant day, which is described in all history textbooks. A military council was held in Fili, near Moscow. Kutuzov gathered his generals to decide what to do next. There were only two options: retreat and surrender Moscow, or organize a second general battle after Borodino. Most of the generals, on the wave of success, demanded a battle in order to defeat Napoleon as soon as possible. Kutuzov himself and Barclay de Tolly opposed this development of events. The military council in Fili ended with Kutuzov’s phrase “As long as there is an army, there is hope. If we lose the army near Moscow, we will lose not only the ancient capital, but also all of Russia.”
September 2 - following the results of the military council of generals, which took place in Fili, it was decided that it was necessary to leave the ancient capital. The Russian army retreated, and Moscow itself, before the arrival of Napoleon, according to many sources, was subjected to terrible looting. However, this is not even the main thing. Retreating, the Russian army set the city on fire. Wooden Moscow burned down almost three-quarters. The most important thing is that literally all food warehouses were destroyed. The reasons for the Moscow fire lie in the fact that the French would not get anything that could be used by the enemies for food, movement or in other aspects. As a result, the aggressor troops found themselves in a very precarious position.
The second stage of the war - Napoleon's retreat (October - December)
Having occupied Moscow, Napoleon considered the mission completed. The commander's bibliographers later wrote that he was faithful - the loss of the historical center of Rus' would break the victorious spirit, and the country's leaders had to come to him asking for peace. But this did not happen. Kutuzov settled down with his army 80 kilometers from Moscow near Tarutin and waited until the enemy army, deprived of normal supplies, weakened and itself made a radical change in the Patriotic War. Without waiting for a peace offer from Russia, the French emperor himself took the initiative.
Napoleon's quest for peace
According to Napoleon's original plan, the capture of Moscow was to be decisive. Here it was possible to establish a convenient bridgehead, including for a campaign against St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia. However, the delay in moving around Russia and the heroism of the people, who fought for literally every piece of land, practically thwarted this plan. After all, a trip to the north of Russia in winter for the French army with irregular food supplies actually amounted to death. This became clearly clear towards the end of September, when it began to get colder. Subsequently, Napoleon wrote in his autobiography that his biggest mistake was the campaign against Moscow and the month spent there.
Realizing the gravity of his situation, the French emperor and commander decided to end the Patriotic War of Russia by signing a peace treaty with it. Three such attempts were made:
- September 18. A message was sent through General Tutolmin to Alexander 1, which stated that Napoleon revered the Russian emperor and offered him peace. All he demands from Russia is to give up the territory of Lithuania and return to the continental blockade again.
- September 20. Alexander 1 received a second letter from Napoleon with a peace proposal. The conditions offered were the same as before. The Russian emperor did not respond to these messages.
- The 4th of October. The hopelessness of the situation led to Napoleon literally begging for peace. This is what he writes to Alexander 1 (according to the major French historian F. Segur): “I need peace, I need it, at all costs, just save your honor.” This proposal was delivered to Kutuzov, but the Emperor of France never received a response.
Retreat of the French army in the autumn-winter of 1812
It became obvious to Napoleon that he would not be able to sign a peace treaty with Russia, and that staying for the winter in Moscow, which the Russians had burned while retreating, was reckless. Moreover, it was impossible to stay here, since constant raids by militias caused great damage to the army. So, during the month that the French army was in Moscow, its strength decreased by 30 thousand people. As a result, the decision was made to retreat.
On October 7, preparations began for the retreat of the French army. One of the orders on this occasion was to blow up the Kremlin. Fortunately, this idea did not work out for him. Russian historians attribute this to the fact that due to high humidity, the wicks got wet and failed.
On October 19, the retreat of Napoleon's army from Moscow began. The purpose of this retreat was to reach Smolensk, since it was the only major nearby city that had significant food supplies. The road went through Kaluga, but Kutuzov blocked this direction. Now the advantage was on the side of the Russian army, so Napoleon decided to bypass. However, Kutuzov foresaw this maneuver and met the enemy army at Maloyaroslavets.
On October 24, the battle of Maloyaroslavets took place. During the day, this small town passed from one side to the other 8 times. In the final stage of the battle, Kutuzov managed to take fortified positions, and Napoleon did not dare to storm them, since the numerical superiority was already on the side of the Russian army. As a result, the French plans were thwarted, and they had to retreat to Smolensk along the same road along which they went to Moscow. It was already a scorched land - without food and without water.
Napoleon's retreat was accompanied by heavy losses. Indeed, in addition to clashes with Kutuzov’s army, we also had to deal with partisan detachments that daily attacked the enemy, especially his rear units. Napoleon's losses were terrible. On November 9, he managed to capture Smolensk, but this did not bring a fundamental change in the course of the war. There was practically no food in the city, and it was not possible to organize a reliable defense. As a result, the army was subjected to almost continuous attacks by militias and local patriots. Therefore, Napoleon stayed in Smolensk for 4 days and decided to retreat further.
Crossing the Berezina River
The French were heading to the Berezina River (in modern Belarus) to cross the river and cross to the Neman. But on November 16, General Chichagov captured the city of Borisov, which is located on the Berezina. Napoleon's situation became catastrophic - for the first time, the possibility of being captured was actively looming for him, since he was surrounded.
On November 25, by order of Napoleon, the French army began to imitate a crossing south of Borisov. Chichagov bought into this maneuver and began transferring troops. At this point, the French built two bridges across the Berezina and began crossing on November 26-27. Only on November 28, Chichagov realized his mistake and tried to give battle to the French army, but it was too late - the crossing was completed, albeit at the loss of a huge number of human lives. 21 thousand French died while crossing the Berezina! The “Grand Army” now consisted of only 9 thousand soldiers, most of whom were no longer capable of combat.
It was during this crossing that unusually severe frosts occurred, to which the French emperor referred, justifying huge losses. The 29th bulletin, which was published in one of the newspapers in France, said that until November 10 the weather was normal, but after that very severe cold came, for which no one was prepared.
Crossing the Neman (from Russia to France)
The crossing of the Berezina showed that Napoleon's Russian campaign was over - he lost the Patriotic War in Russia in 1812. Then the emperor decided that his further stay with the army did not make sense and on December 5 he left his troops and headed to Paris.
On December 16, in Kovno, the French army crossed the Neman and left Russian territory. Its strength was only 1,600 people. The invincible army, which terrified all of Europe, was almost completely destroyed by Kutuzov's army in less than 6 months.
Below is a graphical representation of Napoleon's retreat on the map.
Results of the Patriotic War of 1812
The Patriotic War between Russia and Napoleon was of great importance for all countries involved in the conflict. Largely thanks to these events, England's undivided dominance in Europe became possible. This development was foreseen by Kutuzov, who, after the flight of the French army in December, sent a report to Alexander 1, where he explained to the ruler that the war needed to be ended immediately, and the pursuit of the enemy and the liberation of Europe would be beneficial to strengthening the power of England. But Alexander did not listen to the advice of his commander and soon began a campaign abroad.
Reasons for Napoleon's defeat in the war
When determining the main reasons for the defeat of Napoleonic army, it is necessary to dwell on the most important ones, which are most often used by historians:
- A strategic mistake by the Emperor of France, who sat in Moscow for 30 days and waited for representatives of Alexander 1 with pleas for peace. As a result, it began to get colder and provisions ran out, and constant raids by partisan movements brought a turning point in the war.
- Unity of the Russian people. As usual, in the face of great danger, the Slavs unite. It was the same this time. For example, the historian Lieven writes that the main reason for the defeat of France lies in the massive nature of the war. Everyone fought for the Russians - women and children. And all this was ideologically justified, which made the morale of the army very strong. The Emperor of France did not break him.
- The reluctance of Russian generals to accept a decisive battle. Most historians forget about this, but what would have happened to Bagration’s army if he had accepted a general battle at the beginning of the war, as Alexander 1 really wanted? 60 thousand of Bagration's army against 400 thousand of the aggressor army. It would have been an unconditional victory, and they would hardly have had time to recover from it. Therefore, the Russian people must express words of gratitude to Barclay de Tolly, who, by his decision, gave the order for the retreat and unification of the armies.
- The genius of Kutuzov. The Russian general, who received excellent training from Suvorov, did not make a single tactical miscalculation. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov never managed to defeat his enemy, but managed to tactically and strategically win the Patriotic War.
- General Frost is used as an excuse. To be fair, it must be said that the frost did not have any significant impact on the final result, since at the time the abnormal frosts began (mid-November), the outcome of the confrontation was decided - the great army was destroyed.
The outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 was caused by Napoleon's desire for world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England maintained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially irritated by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops and created military warehouses there. The threat of invasion looms over Russia's borders. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.
Napoleon became the aggressor
He began military operations and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people the war became a liberation and Patriotic war, since not only the regular army, but also the broad masses of the people took part in it.
Balance of power
In preparation for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were perfectly armed and trained troops, seasoned in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of that time - Napoleon Bonaparte. The weak point of his army was its motley national composition. The aggressive plans of the French emperor were deeply alien to the German and Spanish, Polish and Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers.
Active preparations for the war that Russia had been waging since 1810 brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders - M. I. Kutuzov, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration, A. P. Ermolov, N. N. Raevsky, M. A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by extensive military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder reserves.
However, at the initial stage of the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian one. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia numbered 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 210 thousand people, divided into three armies. The 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, the 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, the 3rd - under General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction .
Plans of the parties
Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign a new treaty with Alexander to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan was based on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from uniting and deciding the outcome of the war in one or more border battles.
Even on the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. If the clash was successful, they intended to transfer hostilities to the territory of Western Europe. In case of defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (all the way to Kamchatka, according to him) to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first border battle. The project remained unrealized, since the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of forces forced the Russian command to initially choose a strategy of active defense. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.
Stages of the war
The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 is divided into two stages. First: from June 12 to mid-October - the retreat of the Russian army with rearguard battles in order to lure the enemy deep into Russian territory and disrupt his strategic plan. Second: from mid-October to December 25 - a counter-offensive of the Russian army with the goal of completely expelling the enemy from Russia.
Beginning of the war
On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and invaded Russia by forced march.
The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, avoiding a general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with individual units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him.
The Russian troops faced two main tasks - to eliminate disunity (not to allow themselves to be defeated individually) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first task was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant solving the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on August 17. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle. She was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.
battle of Borodino
M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered by artificial earthen fortifications - flushes. In the center there was an earthen mound where the artillery and troops of General N.N. Raevsky were located. The army of M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.
Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, encircle it and completely defeat it.
The balance of forces was almost equal: the French had 130 thousand people with 587 guns, the Russians had 110 thousand regular forces, about 40 thousand militias and Cossacks with 640 guns.
Early in the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The fight for flushes lasted until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. Bagration was seriously wounded. (He died from his wounds a few days later.) Taking the flushes did not bring any particular advantages to the French, since they were unable to break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an orderly manner and took up a position near the Semenovsky ravine.
At the same time, the situation in the center, where Napoleon directed the main attack, became more complicated. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky, M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks of M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid behind French lines. The sabotage, which was not very successful in itself, forced Napoleon to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. The battery of N.N. Raevsky changed hands several times and was captured by the French only at 16:00.
The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean Napoleon's victory. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. The losses on both sides were enormous. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while Napoleonic's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.
From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets
After Borodino, Russian troops began to retreat to Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not strive for a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command took place in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.
M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutino march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and in the Krasnaya Pakhra area reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the French from seizing the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon’s army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested and were replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.
The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented case in history), it burned in the fire. There was no food or other supplies in it. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace or begin a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M. I. Kutuzov and Alexander I.
On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians or at least break into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the town of Maloyaroslavets. Once again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had destroyed.
Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia
The retreat of the French army looked like a disorderly flight. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of the Russians.
The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon entered Russia. Robbery and looting French. The Russian soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on their native land. History includes the names of ordinary people (G. M. Kurin, E. V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina) who organized partisan detachments. “Flying detachments” of regular army soldiers led by career officers (A.S. Figner, D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, etc.) were also sent to the French rear.
At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy’s forces were melting every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and north-west. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near the city of Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50 thousand people of the retreating army were captured or died in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops across the Berezina River on November 14-17. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. M.I. Kutuzov’s order to the army of December 21 and the Tsar’s Manifesto of December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.
The meaning of war
The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian history. During its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all layers of society and especially ordinary people for their Motherland were clearly demonstrated. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. During the hostilities, about 300 thousand people died. Many western regions were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.
What did Napoleon want from Russia? At first he almost became an officer in the Russian army, then he wanted to become related to the Russian imperial family. The “Russian factor” became fatal for Napoleon. His campaign against Moscow was the beginning of the end of the Empire...
Military career
Perhaps Napoleon’s very first plans for Russia were his desire to join the Russian army.
In 1788, Russia recruited volunteers to participate in the war with Turkey. Governor General Ivan Zaborovsky, commander of the expeditionary force, came to Livorno to “ look after for military affairs» Christian volunteers: militant Albanians, Greeks, Corsicans.
By this time, Napoleon graduated with honors from the Paris Military School with the rank of lieutenant. In addition, his family was in poverty - his father died, the family was left with practically no means. Napoleon submitted a request for readiness to serve the Russian army.
However, just a month before Bonaparte’s request for enrollment, a decree was issued in the Russian army - to accept foreign officers into the Russian corps with a reduction by one rank. Napoleon was not satisfied with this option. Having received a written refusal, the purposeful Napoleon ensured that he was accepted by the head of the Russian military commission.
But this did not produce results and, as they say, the offended Bonaparte ran out of Zaborovsky’s office, promising that he would offer his candidacy to the King of Prussia: “The King of Prussia will give me the rank of captain!” True, as you know, he did not become a Prussian captain either, remaining to pursue a career in France.
Be related to the Russian Emperor
In 1809, already being emperor, Napoleon, to his regret, learned about the infertility of Empress Josephine. Perhaps the disease developed during her imprisonment in Carmes prison, when the French Revolution was roaring.
Despite the sincere affection that bound Napoleon and this woman, the young dynasty needed a legitimate heir. Therefore, after much outpouring and tears, the couple separated by mutual desire.
Josephine, like Napoleon, did not belong to blue blood; in order to secure his position on the throne, Bonaparte needed a princess. Oddly enough, there was no question of choice - according to Napoleon, the future French empress should have been the Russian Grand Duchess.
Most likely, this was due to Napoleon's plans for a long-term alliance with Russia. He needed the latter in order, firstly, to keep all of Europe in subjection, and secondly, he counted on Russia’s helping hand in Egypt and in the subsequent transfer of the war to Bengal and India. He made these plans back in the time of Paul I.
In this regard, Napoleon urgently needed a marriage with one of the sisters of Emperor Alexander - Catherine or Anna Pavlovna. At first, Napoleon tried to achieve Catherine's favor, and most importantly, the blessing of her mother Maria Fedorovna. But, while the Grand Duchess herself said that she would rather marry the last Russian stoker than “ for this Corsican“, her mother began to hastily look for a suitable match for her daughter, so that she would not go to the French “usurper,” who was unpopular in Russia.
Almost the same thing happened to Anna. When in 1810 the French ambassador Caulaincourt approached Alexander with Napoleon's semi-official proposal, the Russian emperor also vaguely answered him that he had no right to control the destinies of his sisters, since by the will of his father Pavel Petrovich, this prerogative was completely given to his mother Maria Feodorovna.
Russia as a springboard
Napoleon Bonaparte did not at all intend to stop at subordinating Russia. He dreamed of the empire of Alexander the Great; his further goals lay far away in India. So he was going to sting Britain where it hurt the most with the peak of the Russian Cossacks. In other words, take over the rich English colonies.
Such a conflict could lead to the complete collapse of the British Empire. At one time, according to the historian Alexander Katsur, Paul I also thought about this project. Back in 1801, the French agent in Russia Gitten conveyed to Napoleon “ ...Russia from her Asian possessions...could lend a helping hand to the French army in Egypt and, acting jointly with France, transfer the war to Bengal».
There was even a joint Russian-French project - a 35 thousand army under the command of General Massena, joined by Russian Cossacks in the Black Sea region, through the Caspian, Persia, Herat and Kandahar were supposed to reach the provinces of India. And in a fairy-tale land, the allies immediately had to “ grab the English by the cheeks».
Napoleon's words are known, already during his exile on the island of St. Helena, which he said to the Irish doctor Barry Edward O'Meara assigned to him: “If Paul had remained alive, you would have already lost India.”
Moscow was not included in the plans
The decision to march on Moscow was not military for Napoleon, but political. According to A.P. Shuvalov, relying on politics was Bonaparte’s main mistake. Shuvalov wrote: “ He based his plans on political calculations. These calculations turned out to be false, and his building collapsed.”
The ideal decision from the military side was to stay in Smolensk for the winter; Napoleon discussed these plans with the Austrian diplomat von Metternich. Bonaparte stated:
“My enterprise is one of those whose solution is given by patience. Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there."
These same plans were voiced by Bonaparte and according to the memoirs of General de Suger. He recorded the following words of Napoleon, spoken by him to General Sebastiani in Vilna: “ I will not cross the Dvina. To want to go further during this year is to go towards your own destruction.”
Obviously, the campaign against Moscow was a forced step for Napoleon. According to historian V.M. Bezotosny, Napoleon “expected that the entire campaign would fit within the framework of the summer - at most the beginning of the autumn of 1812.” Moreover, the French emperor planned to spend the winter of 1812 in Paris, but the political situation confused all his cards. Historian A.K. Dzhivelegov wrote:
“To stop for the winter in Smolensk meant reviving all possible discontent and unrest in France and in Europe. Politics drove Napoleon further and forced him to violate his excellent original plan."
Grand coup
The tactics of the Russian army came as an unpleasant surprise to Napoleon. He was sure that the Russians would be forced to give a general battle to save their capital, and Alexander I would ask for peace to save it. These forecasts turned out to be disrupted. Napoleon was ruined by both the retreat from his original plans and the retreat of the Russian army under the leadership of General Barclay de Tolly.
Before the castling of Tolly and Kutuzov, the French were awarded only two battles. At the beginning of the campaign, this enemy behavior played into the hands of the French emperor; he dreamed of reaching Smolensk with few losses and stopping there. The fate of Moscow was to be decided by a general battle, which Napoleon himself called a grand coup. Both Napoleon and France needed it.
But everything turned out differently. At Smolensk, the Russian armies managed to unite and they continued to draw Napoleon deep into the vast country. The Grand coup was postponed. The French entered empty cities, consumed their last supplies and panicked. Later, sitting on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon recalled:
“My regiments, amazed that after so many difficult and deadly marches the fruits of their efforts were constantly moving away from them, began to look with anxiety at the distance that separated them from France.”
Alisa Muranova, Alexey Rudevich