Commanders
Strengths of the parties
World War I(July 28, 1914 - November 11, 1918) - one of the most large-scale armed conflicts in human history. The first global armed conflict of the 20th century. As a result of the war, four empires ceased to exist: Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and German. The participating countries lost more than 10 million people in soldiers killed, about 12 million civilians killed, and about 55 million were wounded.
Naval warfare in the First World War
Participants
Main participants of the First World War:
Central Powers: German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria.
Entente: Russian Empire, France, Great Britain.
For a full list of participants see: First World War (Wikipedia)
Background to the conflict
The naval arms race between the British Empire and the German Empire was one of the most important causes of the First World War. Germany wanted to increase its navy to a size that would allow German overseas trade to be independent of British goodwill. However, increasing the German fleet to a size comparable to the British fleet inevitably threatened the very existence of the British Empire.
1914 Campaign
Breakthrough of the German Mediterranean Division into Turkey
On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Mediterranean squadron of the Kaiser's Navy under the command of Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon (battlecruiser Goeben and light cruiser Breslau), not wanting to be captured in the Adriatic, went to Turkey. The German ships avoided collisions with superior enemy forces and, passing through the Dardanelles, came to Constantinople. The arrival of the German squadron in Constantinople was one of the factors that pushed the Ottoman Empire to enter the First World War on the side of the Triple Alliance.
Actions in the North Sea and English Channel
Long-range blockade of the German fleet
The British fleet intended to solve its strategic problems through a long-range blockade of German ports. The German fleet, inferior in strength to the British, chose a defensive strategy and began laying minefields. In August 1914, the British fleet carried out the transfer of troops to the continent. During the cover of the transfer, a battle took place in the Heligoland Bight.
Both sides actively used submarines. German submarines acted more successfully, so on September 22, 1914, U-9 sank 3 British cruisers at once. In response, the British fleet began to strengthen anti-submarine defense, and the Northern Patrol was created.
Actions in the Barents and White Seas
Actions in the Barents Sea
In the summer of 1916, the Germans, knowing that an increasing amount of military cargo was arriving in Russia by the northern sea route, sent their submarines to the waters of the Barents and White Seas. They sank 31 Allied ships. To counter them, the Russian Arctic Ocean Flotilla was created.
Actions in the Baltic Sea
Both sides' plans for 1916 did not include any major operations. Germany maintained insignificant forces in the Baltic, and the Baltic Fleet constantly strengthened its defensive positions by constructing new minefields and coastal batteries. Actions were reduced to raiding operations by light forces. In one of these operations, on November 10, 1916, the German 10th flotilla of “destroyers” lost 7 ships at once in a minefield.
Despite the generally defensive nature of the actions of both sides, losses in naval personnel in 1916 were significant, especially in the German fleet. The Germans lost 1 auxiliary cruiser, 8 destroyers, 1 submarine, 8 minesweepers and small ships, 3 military transports. The Russian fleet lost 2 destroyers, 2 submarines, 5 minesweepers and small ships, 1 military transport.
1917 campaign
Dynamics of losses and reproduction of tonnage of allied countries
Operations in Western European waters and the Atlantic
April 1 - a decision was made to introduce a convoy system on all routes. With the introduction of the convoy system and the increase in anti-submarine defense forces and means, losses in merchant tonnage began to decline. Other measures were also introduced to strengthen the fight against boats - the mass installation of guns on merchant ships began. During 1917, guns were installed on 3,000 British ships, and by the beginning of 1918, up to 90% of all large-capacity British merchant ships were armed. In the second half of the campaign, the British began to massively lay anti-submarine minefields - in total, in 1917 they laid 33,660 mines in the North Sea and Atlantic. During 11 months of unlimited submarine warfare, it lost 1037 ships with a total tonnage of 2 million 600 thousand tons in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean alone. In addition, the allies and neutral countries lost 1085 ships with a capacity of 1 million 647 thousand tons. During 1917, Germany built 103 new boats, and lost 72 boats, of which 61 were lost in the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean.
Cruiser's voyage Wolf
German cruiser raids
On October 16-18 and December 11-12, German light cruisers and destroyers attacked the “Scandinavian” convoys and achieved major successes - they sank 3 British convoy destroyers, 3 trawlers, 15 steamers and damaged 1 destroyer. In 1917, Germany stopped operating on Entente communications with surface raiders. The last raid was carried out by a raider Wolf- in total, he sank 37 ships with a total tonnage of about 214,000 tons. The fight against Entente shipping shifted exclusively to submarines.
Actions in the Mediterranean and Adriatic
Otran barrage
Combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea were reduced mainly to the unrestricted operations of German boats on enemy sea communications and Allied anti-submarine defense. During 11 months of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, German and Austrian boats sank 651 ships of the Allies and neutral countries with a total tonnage of 1 million 647 thousand tons. In addition, over a hundred ships with a total displacement of 61 thousand tons were blown up and lost by mines laid by minelayer boats. The Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean suffered major losses from boats in 1917: 2 battleships (English - Cornwallis, French - Danton), 1 cruiser (French - Chateaurenault), 1 minelayer, 1 monitor, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine. The Germans lost 3 boats, the Austrians - 1.
Actions in the Baltic
Defense of the Moonsund Archipelago in 1917
The February and October revolutions in Petrograd completely undermined the combat effectiveness of the Baltic Fleet. On April 30, the sailors' Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (Tsentrobalt) was created, which controlled the activities of officers.
From September 29 to October 20, 1917, using quantitative and qualitative advantages, the German Navy and ground forces carried out Operation Albion to capture the Moonsund Islands in the Baltic Sea. In the operation, the German fleet lost 10 destroyers and 6 minesweepers, the defenders lost 1 battleship, 1 destroyer, 1 submarine, and up to 20,000 soldiers and sailors were captured. The Moonsund archipelago and the Gulf of Riga were abandoned by Russian forces, and the Germans managed to create an immediate threat of military attack for Petrograd.
Actions in the Black Sea
Since the beginning of the year, the Black Sea Fleet has continued to blockade the Bosphorus, as a result of which the Turkish fleet has run out of coal and its ships have been stationed in bases. The February events in Petrograd and the abdication of the emperor (March 2) sharply undermined morale and discipline. The fleet's actions in the summer and autumn of 1917 were limited to destroyer raids, which continued to harass the Turkish coast.
Throughout the 1917 campaign, the Black Sea Fleet was preparing for a major landing operation on the Bosporus. It was supposed to land 3-4 rifle corps and other units. However, the timing of the landing operation was repeatedly postponed; in October, the Headquarters decided to postpone the operation on the Bosporus to the next campaign.
1918 Campaign
Events in the Baltic, Black Sea and North
On March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk by representatives of Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. Russia emerged from the First World War.
All subsequent military operations that took place in these theaters of combat historically refer to
The Black Sea Fleet was not affected by the Russo-Japanese War. It had 8 squadron battleships, 2 cruisers and 4 mine cruisers.The reconstruction of naval forces remained one of the priority problems for Russia. Prominent domestic shipbuilders A.N. were involved in its solution. Krylov, N.N. Kuteynikov, I.G. Bubnov and others. A voluntary fundraiser has been announced among the population for the needs of the fleet. A “Committee to strengthen the fleet using voluntary donations” was established. Over five years, the Committee collected a substantial amount - 17 million rubles. With these funds, it was decided to build 20 destroyers of the General Kondratenko and Ukraina type. They laid the foundation for a new fleet. In 1913, a significant event occurred in the development of the class of domestic destroyers. On September 4, in St. Petersburg, the Putilov plant handed over to the fleet the lead destroyer Novik, which brought well-deserved glory to Russian military shipbuilding. For several years, Novik was the fastest ship in the world (37.5 knots).
The Novika project was created in accordance with the technical specifications developed by the Marine Technical Committee under the leadership of A.N. Krylova, I.G. Bubnova, and G.F. Schlesinger.
The lead one was followed by the construction of serial ships with some elements of improvement. They were built by three factories in St. Petersburg, as well as factories in Revel, Riga and Nikolaev. By the beginning of the First World War, all Russian fleets had 75 destroyers of various types and 11 were being completed. In addition, the fleets had 45 destroyers of earlier construction. Total for 1913-1917 17 Novik-class destroyers entered the Baltic Fleet, and 14 Novik-class destroyers entered the Black Sea Fleet.
The experience of the war with Japan showed the important role of cruisers in squadron battles. The need for every possible increase in their speed and maneuverability, as well as strengthening of artillery weapons, became apparent. A subclass of battlecruisers has appeared in foreign fleets. In Russia, their construction began only in 1913-1915, when the cruisers “Izmail”, “Kinburn”, “Borodino” and “Navarin” were laid down, but the outbreak of the World War did not allow them to be completed.
And immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, cruisers were built at domestic and foreign shipyards for the Russian fleet, the prototype of which was the Bayan, which had proven itself well in the role of a squadron cruiser and showed high survivability of combat and technical means. Thus, the cruiser “Admiral Makarov” was built in France, the new “Bayan” and “Pallada” - in St. Petersburg, the cruiser “Rurik”, built in England, differed from the cruiser “Bayan” in the main caliber (instead of two 203-mm guns, four 254 mm guns).
In 1913, 6 light cruisers of the Svetlana type were laid down with a displacement of 6800-7800 tons, armed with fifteen 130 mm guns. Of these, only three cruisers (Svetlana, Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral Lazarev) were completed (during the Soviet period).
By the beginning of the war, the Russian fleet included 14 cruisers of various types.
England was the first to draw a conclusion from the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima, and, above all, from the circumstances and causes of the death of the squadron battleships. Already at the end of 1905, English shipbuilders began building the original armored ship “Dreadnought” with a displacement of about 13,000 tons, with steam turbines, classified as a battleship. The main caliber artillery on the Dreadnought consisted of ten 305 mm guns located in two-gun turrets. Four turrets, controlled from one central post, could simultaneously participate in a battleship's broadside. The side of the ship was fully armored.
Russian shipbuilders built dreadnought battleships according to the design of I.G. Bubnov and with the participation of A.N. Krylov, which surpassed the English prototype in many respects. In 1909, the battleships “Sevastopol”, “Gangut”, “Poltava” and “Petropavlovsk” were laid down at the St. Petersburg shipyards.
The linear arrangement of twelve 305-mm guns, placed in three-gun turrets, made it possible to fire from any side simultaneously with all barrels. If the weight of a salvo of one of the first English dreadnoughts “Vengard” was 3003 kg, then on “Sevastopol” it reached 5650 kg. In one minute, the domestic battleship produced up to 11.5 tons of metal and explosives. The main armor belt had a thickness of 225 mm. For the Black Sea in Nikolaev in 1915-1917. The dreadnought battleships Empress Maria, Emperor Alexander III and Catherine II were also built. The fourth battleship, Emperor Nicholas 1, laid down in 1915, was not completed.
In connection with the construction of battleships, the Russian Maritime Ministry noted that the results of testing these ships showed the full readiness of our factories, which were the first to build ships of such a significant displacement, as well as very powerful turbine-type mechanisms.
Pre-dreadnought battleships “Andrei Pervozvanny” and “Imperator Pavel 1”, laid down during the Russian-Japanese War, became part of the Baltic Fleet in 1912. During their construction, a number of significant changes were made to the original project, taking into account the experience of the past Russian- Japanese war.
The use of mine weapons in the Russo-Japanese War and its further development required the fleet to take effective measures to ensure mine defense. First of all, the fleet needed ships equipped with sweeping devices. Such ships were included in the small shipbuilding program. The world's first specially built minesweepers "Minrep" and "Vzryv" were laid down at the Izhora plant in 1909. In accordance with the tactical and technical requirements, the minesweepers had a displacement of 150 tons. The main armament of the ship were Schultz trawls (snake and boat). There was also one 57 mm gun. The ships entered service in 1911. Before the First World War and during the war, minesweepers of slightly larger displacement such as “Cluse” (190 tons) and “Capsul” (248 tons) were built.
In 1909-1910 two ships specially designed for laying mines entered service. These are minelayers “Amur” and “Yenisei” with a displacement of 2926 tons. They could take 324 mines on board. Artillery included five 120 mm guns and two 75 mm anti-aircraft guns.
For the Caspian and river flotillas, gunboats with a displacement of 600-400 tons with artillery of 120-152 mm caliber were built.
Submarine shipbuilding also gained momentum. The first combat boat “Dolphin”, designed under the leadership of I.G. Bubnova, entered service in 1904. I.G. Bubnov also designed the submarine “Akula”, which was built at the Baltic Shipyard (1910). The submarine was armed with eight torpedo tubes.
After the Akula, the Russian fleet included submarines of the Kalmar type (according to the American design), Lamprey (displacement 123/150 tons) and Walrus (displacement 630/790 tons).
However, the main core of the Russian submarine fleet was made up of Bars-class submarines - also designed by I.G. Bubnova. Their construction began in 1913-1914. in St. Petersburg and Revel. The surface displacement of the Bars was 650 tons, the underwater displacement was 782 tons. Two diesel engines with a total power of 3000 hp. allowed the submarine to develop a surface speed of 18 knots, its cruising range was within 2250 miles. In a submerged position, the full speed reached 9.6 knots. It was ensured by the operation of two electric motors with a power of 900 hp. At this speed, the submarine could travel 25 miles underwater. The working depth of immersion was limited to 50 m, the maximum -100 m. The armament consisted of four torpedo tubes (two each in the bow and stern) and two guns of 57 mm and 37 mm calibers.
A special place in the domestic submarine shipbuilding industry is occupied by the world’s first underwater minelayer “Crab” designed by M.P. Naletova. Developments on its creation, begun by the designer back in Port Arthur, were interrupted by the Russian-Japanese War. However, after the war, work was continued at the Nikolaev shipyards, and in August 1912 the ship was launched, and in June 1915 it was accepted into the Black Sea Fleet. Up to 60 minutes were taken on board the “Crab”. The armament includes two bow torpedo tubes and a 76-mm gun.
In July 1915, “Crab” made its first military campaign. Near the Bosphorus they laid a minefield, on which the enemy cruiser Breslau was blown up.
The underwater minelayers “Ruff” and “Forel” were built for the Baltic Fleet according to the “Crab” type, and three minelayers of smaller displacement were also laid down. By the beginning of the First World War, the Russian fleet had 15 combat submarines.
The main naval theaters of combat for Russia during the First World War were the Baltic and Black Seas. From the beginning of the war, the Baltic Fleet equipped the central mine and artillery position Nargen - Porkkala-Udd in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through into the Gulf of Finland. The entrance to the Gulf of Riga was covered by another mine and artillery position. With the help of mine laying in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, enemy sea communications were disrupted and damage was caused to the German fleet. It was especially important to limit the functioning of the sea route along which strategic raw materials were transported from Sweden to Germany.
The mine threat created by the Russians in the Baltic turned out to be so effective that the Germans, having lost a large number of warships and transport vessels, abandoned naval warfare for a long time at the end of 1914. During the First World War, the Baltic Fleet deployed about 40 thousand mines. An important task of the fleet was also to assist groupings of ground forces on the coastal flanks, which it successfully accomplished.
In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet was inferior in combat power to the Turkish fleet, reinforced by the German battle cruiser Goeben and the cruiser Breslau. However, later, replenished with new battleships, it was able to block the German-Turkish fleet in the Bosphorus and sharply reduce the enemy’s maritime transport. Operating on the coastal flanks. The Black Sea Fleet provided significant assistance to the army with artillery fire, supported it with landings, and provided transportation of troops and equipment. During the war years, his ships deployed more than 13 thousand mines.
During the First World War, the Russian fleet did not participate in major naval battles like Jutland. At the same time, there were numerous military clashes with the enemy of individual formations and ships of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets (battles at Cape Sarych and Gotland Island, the Moonsund operation, etc.).
Created in September 1916, the Arctic Ocean flotilla provided maritime transport with the allies and fought against enemy submarines and mine danger. After the October events of 1917, Russia withdrew from the war.
On March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was concluded between Soviet Russia on the one hand and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria on the other. According to the agreement, all Russian ships were subject to transfer to domestic ports or disarmament on the spot. The ships and vessels of the Baltic Fleet located in Finland were supposed to remain there until navigation began. Thus, there was a threat of loss of naval forces in this naval theater, the main core of which was concentrated in Helsingfors.
The leadership of Soviet Russia decided, despite the difficult ice situation in the Gulf of Finland, to transfer all ships to Kronstadt.
During March-April 1918, the legendary Ice Campaign of the ships of the Baltic Fleet took place. 226 ships and vessels were saved for Russia, including 6 battleships, 5 cruisers, 59 destroyers and destroyers, 12 submarines. In addition, two air fleet brigades and various military equipment were removed by ships.
In May 1918, the German command, threatening to disrupt the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, demanded that Russia surrender its ships of the Black Sea Fleet. To prevent this, by order of V.I. Lenin in June 1918, in the areas of Novorossiysk and Tuapse, the battleship “Free Russia” (formerly “Ekaterina II”), 11 destroyers and destroyers, and 6 transports, which came here from Sevastopol, were sunk.
With the outbreak of the civil war and foreign intervention, the revolutionary-minded part of the sailors, junior commanders, officers and admirals of the fleet went over to the side of the new government, the other part, primarily admirals and officers, went over to the side of the White Army. Former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A.V. Kolchak in November 1918 self-proclaimed himself the Supreme Ruler of Russia, leading the counter-revolutionary struggle in Siberia. Most of the ports and bases of the domestic fleet ended up in the hands of interventionists from the Entente countries and Japan. The Russian naval forces practically ceased to exist. To assist the ground forces, the commands of the opposing sides in the civil war created river and lake flotillas that conducted active combat operations. The flotillas, as a rule, included gunboats converted from steamships, armed with two to four 75-130 mm guns, as well as armed tugs, floating batteries, messenger ships and boats. In some cases, flotillas were replenished with ships transferred from fleets along inland waterways. The flotillas attacked the flanks and rear of the enemy, ships and vessels, defended or destroyed crossings, landed troops, and provided transportation.
After the defeat of the White Army, Lieutenant General P.M. Wrangel in the Crimea in 1920, the bulk of the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet (33 pennants) under the command of Vice Admiral M.A. Kedrov went to the French naval base of Bizerte (Tunisia).
St. Andrew's flags on these ships were lowered on October 24, 1924 after the recognition of the USSR by the French government. Russian sailors switched to the status of refugees.
The decade preceding the World War can be marked in the field of naval development by three facts: the growth of the German navy, the restoration of the Russian fleet after its catastrophic defeat during the Japanese war, and the development of the submarine fleet.
Naval preparations for war in Germany were carried out in the direction of building a fleet of large warships (7.5 billion marks in gold were spent on this over several years), which caused strong political excitement, especially in England.
Russia developed its fleet exclusively with active-defensive missions in the Baltic and Black Seas.
The greatest attention was paid to the submarine fleet in England and France; Germany shifted the center of gravity of the naval struggle to it already during the war itself.
Comparative strength of the warring powers' navies
The comparative strength of the navies of the warring powers is shown in the table. Old-built vessels that have served for 10 years or more are not included in the table.
To these naval forces should be added, in favor of the Triple Alliance, the Turkish fleet, which, however, consisted, in addition to several old battleships purchased from the Germans, of 3 cruisers and 12 destroyers, which were in good condition.
Distribution of naval forces of both sides before the start of the war
In the overall balance of naval forces of the warring states, the British and German fleets had a dominant role in their power, a combat meeting of which was expected with particular alarm throughout the world from the first day of the war. Their collision could immediately have very serious consequences for one of the parties. On the eve of the declaration of war, there was a moment when, according to some assumptions, such a meeting was part of the calculations of the British Admiralty. Already starting in 1905, British naval forces, until then scattered along the most important sea routes, began to converge on the shores of England into three “home” fleets, i.e. intended for the defense of the British Isles. When mobilized, these three fleets were united into one “Big” fleet, which in July 1914 consisted of a total of 8 squadrons of battleships and 11 cruising squadrons - a total of 460 pennants together with small ships. On July 15, 1914, an experimental mobilization was announced for this fleet, which ended with maneuvers and a royal review on July 20 at the Spitgad roadstead. Due to the Austrian ultimatum, the demobilization of the fleet was suspended, and then on July 28 the fleet was ordered to sail from Portland to Scapa Flow (strait) near the Orkney Islands off the northern coast of Scotland.
At the same time, the German High Seas Fleet was cruising in Norwegian waters, from where it was returned to the shores of Germany on July 27-28. The English fleet sailed from Portland to the north of Scotland not along the usual route - west of the island, but along the eastern coast of England. Both fleets sailed in the North Sea in opposite directions.
By the beginning of the war, the English Grand Fleet was located in two groups: in the far north of Scotland and in the English Channel near Portland.
In the Mediterranean, according to the Anglo-French agreement, ensuring the maritime supremacy of the Entente was entrusted to the French fleet, which, as part of its best units, was concentrated near Toulon. His responsibility was to provide communication routes with North Africa. There was an English cruiser squadron off the island of Malta.
British cruisers also served as guards for sea routes in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Australia, and, in addition, significant cruising forces were located in the western region of the Pacific Ocean.
In the English Channel, in addition to the second English fleet, a light squadron of French cruisers was concentrated near Cherbourg; it consisted of armored cruisers supported by a flotilla of mine ships and submarines. This squadron guarded the southwestern approaches to the English Channel. There were 3 light French cruisers in the Pacific Ocean near Indochina.
The Russian fleet was divided into three parts.
The Baltic Fleet, vastly inferior in strength to the enemy, was forced to take an exclusively defensive course of action, trying at the Revel-Porcallaud line to delay, as far as possible, the advance of the enemy fleet and landing force into the depths of the Gulf of Finland. In order to strengthen ourselves and equalize the chances of battle, it was planned to equip a fortified mine position in this area, which was far from completed at the time of the start of the war (or rather, just started). On the flanks of this so-called central position, on both sides of the bay, on the islands of Makilota and Nargen, batteries of long-range large-caliber guns were installed, and a minefield was placed in several lines throughout the entire position.
The Black Sea Fleet remained in the Sevastopol roadstead and was inactive, failing even to properly lay minefields at the entrance to the Bosphorus. However, one cannot fail to take into account the entire difficulty of the position of the Black Sea Fleet, not only in relation to the insufficiency of combat forces, but also in the sense of the absence of other operational bases other than Sevastopol. It was very difficult to be based in Sevastopol to monitor the Bosporus, and operations to block the enemy’s entry into the Black Sea under these conditions were completely unsecured.
Far Eastern squadron - of its 2 light cruisers (Askold and Zhemchug) tried to cruise off the southeastern coast of Asia.
The German High Seas Fleet consisted of 3 squadrons of battleships, a cruising squadron and a flotilla of fighters. After cruising off the coast of Norway, this fleet returned to its shores, with 1 linear and cruising squadron stationed at Wilhelmshaven in the roadstead, under the cover of batteries on the island of Heligoland, and 2 other linear squadrons and a flotilla of fighters at Kiel in the Baltic Sea. By this time, the Kiel Canal had been deepened for the passage of dreadnoughts, and thus squadrons from Kiel could join the North Sea squadrons if necessary. In addition to the aforementioned High Seas Fleet, along the German coast there was a large defensive fleet, but made up of outdated ships. The German cruisers Goeben and Breslau skillfully slipped into the Black Sea past the English and French cruisers, which later caused quite a lot of trouble for the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the coast. In the Pacific Ocean, German ships were partly at their base - Qingdao, near Kiao-chao, and Admiral Spee's light squadron of 6 new cruisers cruised near the Caroline Islands.
The Austro-Hungarian fleet was concentrated on the Paul and Catarro raids in the Adriatic Sea and took cover behind the coastal batteries from the cruisers and mine ships of the Entente.
Comparing the naval forces of both coalitions, the following can be noted:
1. The forces of England alone exceeded the strength of the entire fleet of the Central Powers.
2. Most naval forces were concentrated in European seas.
3. The English and French fleets had every opportunity to act together.
4. The German fleet could gain freedom of action only after a successful battle in the North Sea, which it would have to fight with the most unfavorable balance of forces, i.e. in fact, the German surface fleet found itself locked in its territorial waters, having the opportunity to undertake offensive operations only against the Russian Baltic Fleet.
5. The naval forces of the Entente were the actual masters of all water spaces, with the exception of the Baltic and Black Seas, where the Central Powers had a chance of success - in the Baltic Sea during the fight of the German fleet with the Russian and in the Black Sea during the fight of the Turkish fleet with the Russian.
The table is borrowed from Wilson's book "Ships of the Line in Battle"
August 11, 1914 Turkey allowed the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau through the straits to Constantinople, which were soon purchased by the Turks. The receipt by the Turkish fleet of this reinforcement from Germany changed the entire strategic situation in the Black Sea: the presence of the Goeben more than doubled the strength of the Turkish fleet. "Goeben" was one of the newest battlecruisers, having no rivals among the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Thanks to its long speed (27 knots), it was practically invulnerable to obsolete battleships (which had a speed of 16 knots); the power of its artillery exceeded that of the two Evstafiev (battleship of the Black Sea Fleet). Only the entry into service of the dreadnoughts restored the situation, but new ships of the Black Sea Fleet could enter service only a year later.
During the First World War (1914-1918), the enemy of the Russian Empire on the Black Sea was the German-Turkish fleet. And although the Young Turk government for a long time doubted who to fight with and who to be friends with, it adhered to neutrality. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and intelligence closely monitored internal political events in Turkey: Minister of War Enver Pasha and Minister of Internal Affairs Talaat Pasha advocated an alliance with the German Empire, and Minister of the Navy, head of the Istanbul garrison Jemal Pasha, advocated cooperation with France. They informed the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, A. A. Eberhard, about the state of the Turkish fleet and army, their preparations, so that he could correctly respond to the actions of a potential enemy.
Admiral A. A. Ebergard.
With the outbreak of war (Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914), the government instructed Admiral A. A. Eberhard to avoid aggressive actions that could trigger a war with the Ottoman Empire, strengthening the arguments of the Turkish “war party.” The Black Sea Fleet had the right to begin hostilities only by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (he was Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (Junior) from July 20, 1914 to August 23, 1915), or according to the Russian ambassador in Istanbul. Although the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) showed the fallacy of this position, when the Japanese fleet suddenly attacked the Russian Port Arthur squadron and temporarily paralyzed its activities, which allowed the Japanese to carry out an unhindered landing of ground armies. The imperial government, 10 years later, “stepped on the same rake,” the fleet commander was bound by the government directive, the instructions of the high military command, and was unable to implement all measures to increase the combat readiness of the fleet, including the possibility of a preemptive strike. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet, although significantly stronger than the Turkish naval forces, was forced to passively wait for an enemy attack.
Balance of forces: Russian Black Sea Fleet and German-Turkish Fleet
Before the war, the Black Sea Fleet, in all respects, had complete superiority over the enemy: in the number of pennants, in firepower, in combat training, and in the training of officers and sailors. It consisted of: 6 battleships of the old type (the so-called battleships, or pre-dreadnoughts) - the flagship of the fleet "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" (built 1904-1911), "Panteleimon" (formerly the notorious "Prince Potemkin" -Tauride", built in 1898-1905), "Rostislav" (built in 1894-1900), "Three Saints" (built in 1891-1895), "Sinop" (built in 1883-1889); 2 Bogatyr-class cruisers, 17 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 4 submarines. The main base was Sevastopol, the fleet had its own shipyards in Sevastopol and Nikolaev. Another 4 powerful modern battleships (dreadnoughts) were built: “Empress Maria” (1911-July 1915), “Empress Catherine the Great” (1911-October 1915), “Emperor Alexander III” (1911-June 1917) .), “Emperor Nicholas I” (since 1914, unfinished due to the sharp deterioration of the political, financial and economic situation after the February Revolution of 1917). Also, during the war, the Black Sea Fleet received 9 destroyers, 2 aircraft (prototypes of aircraft carriers), 10 submarines.
At the beginning of 1914, the emergence of the Turkish fleet from the Bosphorus Strait to fight the Russian fleet seemed fantastic. The Ottoman Empire had been in decline for almost two centuries, and by the 20th century the processes of decomposition only intensified. Turkey lost three wars to Russia in the 19th century (1806-1812, 1828-1829, 1877-1878), and was victorious in the Crimean War (1853-1856), but only due to an alliance with England and France ; already in the 20th century it was defeated by Italy in the war for Tripolitania (1911-1912), and in the Balkan War (1912-1913). Russia was one of the five world leaders (Great Britain, Germany, USA, France, Russia). By the beginning of the century, the Turkish navy was a pitiful sight - a collection of outdated ships. One of the main reasons for this is the complete bankruptcy of Turkey; there was no money in the treasury. The Turks had only a few more or less combat-ready ships: 2 armored cruisers "Mecidiye" (built in the USA 1903) and "Gamidiye" (England 1904), 2 squadron battleships "Torgut Reis" and "Hayreddin Barbarossa" (battleships type "Brandenburg", purchased from Germany in 1910), 4 destroyers built in France (1907 type "Durendal"), 4 destroyers of German construction (purchased from Germany in 1910, type "S 165"). A distinctive feature of the Turkish naval forces was the almost complete lack of combat training.
It cannot be said that the Turkish government did not try to change the situation in its favor: in 1908, a grandiose fleet renewal program was adopted, it was decided to purchase 6 new-style battleships, 12 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 6 submarines and a number of auxiliary vessels. But the war with Italy and two Balkan wars devastated the treasury, orders were disrupted. Turkey ordered more ships from France and England (interestingly, Russia’s allies in the Entente, but they were building ships for Turkey, Russia’s potential enemy on the Black Sea), so a battleship, 4 destroyers and 2 submarines were built in England. This replenishment could seriously change the balance of power in favor of the Ottoman Empire, but as soon as the war began, England confiscated the ships in favor of its fleet. Only the arrival from the Mediterranean Sea on August 10, 1914 of two newest German cruisers: the heavy Goeben (called Sultan Selim) and the light Breslau (Midilli), they became part of the Turkish fleet along with their crews, allowed Turkey to conduct fighting in the Black Sea basin. The commander of the German Mediterranean Division, Rear Admiral V. Souchon, led the combined German-Turkish forces. "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the Russian battleships would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" escaped, taking advantage of its high speed.
Plans of the parties
The main goal of the Black Sea Fleet was complete dominance in the Black Sea in order to reliably protect strategically important objects near the sea, cover the flank of the Caucasian Army, and ensure the transfer of troops and supplies by sea. At the same time, disrupt Turkish shipping along its Black Sea coast. When the Turkish fleet appeared near Sevastopol, the Russian fleet was supposed to destroy it. In addition, if necessary, the Black Sea Fleet was preparing to conduct the Bosphorus operation - to capture the Bosphorus Strait, by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and landing units. But after the appearance of German cruisers in Turkey, the plans of the Russian command were confused; Admiral Souchon was not going to engage in battle with the main forces of the Russian fleet, but using his speed, carried out targeted strikes and left before the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet arrived.
German cruiser Goeben
In 1915, when the newest battleships of the Empress Maria type entered the fleet, the fleet was tasked with using all its might to disrupt the supply of coal and other supplies to the Bosporus area and provide assistance to the troops of the Caucasian Front. For this purpose, 3 ship groups were created, each of which was more powerful than the German cruiser Goeben. They were supposed to, changing each other, constantly be near the Turkish coast and thereby fulfill the main task of the fleet.
The strategic intent of the commander of the combined German-Turkish fleet, Rear Admiral Souchon, was to launch a surprise attack almost simultaneously on the main base of the Russian fleet of Sevastopol, the ports of Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. Sink or seriously damage the warships and merchant ships located there, as well as the most significant military and industrial facilities on the shore and, thereby weakening the Russian Black Sea Fleet, achieve the possibility of complete superiority at sea. Thus, the German admiral planned to repeat the experience of the Japanese in 1904. But despite the success of the operation, the Russian fleet did not suffer serious losses; Souchon simply did not have enough firepower. If the Turkish fleet had been more powerful, the Black Sea Fleet could have received a severe blow, which would have sharply worsened the position of the Russian Caucasian Army and disrupted the Black Sea communications.
Beginning of hostilities: “Sevastopol wake-up call”
Vice Admiral A. A. Ebergard received news of the departure of the German-Turkish squadron from the Bosphorus on October 27. He took the Black Sea Fleet out to sea and waited all day on the approaches to Sevastopol in the hope of meeting the enemy. But on the 28th, the fleet headquarters received an order from the Supreme Command “not to seek a meeting with the Turkish fleet and to engage in battle with it only in case of emergency.” The Black Sea Fleet returned to base and no longer took active action. Although Admiral A.A. Eberhard acted on orders from above, this does not relieve him of the guilt for passivity; I think Admiral S.O. Makarov would not have taken rank into account if the honor of the Russian Fleet was at issue.
Of course, the fleet command took action to prevent a surprise attack by the Turkish fleet. Reconnaissance was carried out, three destroyers were on patrol on the approaches to Sevastopol, the main forces of the fleet were at the base in full readiness. But all this turned out to be not enough. The command did not make any orders to prepare the fleet forces, including the Sevastopol fortress, to repel an enemy attack. The head of the raid security wanted to turn on the minefield, but A.A. Ebergard forbade this, as he was expecting the approach of the Prut minelayer. But the raid commander nevertheless warned the fortress artillery commander about the possible arrival of an enemy squadron. And the coastal artillery more or less completed its task.
As a result, the Black Sea Fleet did not fulfill its main task - it was unable to protect the Russian coast, it missed the enemy fleet, which calmly went to the Bosphorus. On October 29-30, the German-Turkish fleet launched an artillery strike on Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia, and Novorossiysk. This event was called “Sevastopol Reveille”. In Odessa, the destroyers “Muavenet-i Millet” and “Gayret-i-Vataniye” sank the gunboat “Donets” and shelled the city and port. The battle cruiser "Goeben" approached Sevastopol and for 15 minutes walked freely through our minefield, without opposition, firing at the city, port and ships stationed in the outer roadstead. The minefield's electrical circuit was turned off, and no one turned it on without orders. The Konstantinovskaya battery was silent, waiting for the German cruiser to enter the targeted square, but opening fire, it immediately hit the target three times. "Goeben" immediately gave full speed and retreated to the sea. On the way back, he met the Prut minelayer, which was expected in Sevastopol with a full load of mines. Trying to save the Prut, three old destroyers that were on patrol (Lieutenant Pushchin, Zharkiy and Zhivochiy) launched an attack on the Goeben. They did not have a single chance of success, but “Goeben” could not drown them, “they parted in peace.” The Goeben's gunners easily repulsed this attack. The commander of the minelayer, Captain 2nd Rank G. A. Bykov, sank the ship, which is interesting: “Goeben” fired at it - 1 hour 5 minutes, on a practically unarmed ship. But it was a success, because the Prut carried most of the naval sea mines. The cruiser Breslau laid mines in the Kerch Strait, on which the ships Yalta and Kazbek were blown up and sank. This is the great fault of the commander and his staff, especially the Supreme Commander, who with his instructions bound the initiative of A. A. Eberhard, was to blame. But in the end, the German-Turkish plan still did not work: the forces of the first strike were too dispersed, and there was not enough firepower.
This is how Türkiye entered the first world war and the last war with Russia. On the same day, Russian ships began voyages to the enemy’s shores. The fire from the cruiser "Kahul" destroyed huge coal storage facilities in Zonguldak, and the battleship "Panteleimon" and destroyers sank three loaded troop transports. The Turks were amazed by such activity of the Russian fleet, they miscalculated, imagining that they had gained time, the Black Sea Fleet was alive and operating.
The fighting in the Black Sea began unexpectedly for the Russian Empire. The Black Sea Fleet was taken by surprise and only the lack of sufficient firepower and the dispersal of forces prevented the German-Turkish fleet from becoming master of the sea. The main reasons for this are the high command’s fear of provoking a war with the Ottoman Empire and the lack of initiative of the Black Sea Fleet command.
But as history has shown, for Russia, war very often begins unexpectedly, but the Russians very quickly “enter” the process and seize the strategic initiative from the enemy. The Black Sea Fleet did not take a “break”, but immediately responded: on November 4-7, destroyers, under the cover of battleships, laid mines (in total, during the war years, the Black Sea Fleet laid 13 thousand mines) near the Bosporus, the battleship “Rostislav”, the cruiser “Kahul” and 6 destroyers fired at Zunguldak, destroying coal storage facilities and 2 Turkish transports. On the way back, the squadron sank 3 Turkish minesweepers, and more than 200 people were captured. On November 15-18, the Russian squadron goes out to search for enemy ships, shells Trebizond and meets the German cruiser Goeben on the way back.
Battle at Cape Sarych (November 18, according to Art. 5th)
The remoteness of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, from the Bosphorus did not allow establishing a permanent blockade of the Turkish fleet. The Russian squadron was forced to periodically return for repairs and rest. Since the Goeben was superior to any Russian battleship in firepower and speed, the Russian command had to keep the main forces together. The fleet headquarters believed that the German cruiser could move at a speed of 29 knots, but in reality, due to the impossibility of high-quality repairs in Turkey, the speed of the Goeben did not exceed 24 knots. For example: the flagship of the Russian squadron “Eustathius” could travel at a maximum speed of 16 knots, the cruiser “Kahul” - 23 knots. But the Russian squadron had one interesting novelty - before the war, they practiced firing a formation of ships at one target.
On November 17, “Goeben” and “Breslau” went to sea with the goal of intercepting Russian ships and, if the outcome was favorable, attacking. On the same day, Admiral A. A. Ebergard received a message from the Naval General Staff about the Germans going to sea. But the lack of coal did not allow the search to begin and, increasing vigilance, the squadron moved towards the Crimea. The collision occurred on the 18th, about 45 miles from Cape Chersonesus, near Cape Sarych. At 11.40, the enemy ship noticed the Almaz cruiser on reconnaissance mission, and at the same time a radio interception was made. The Russian ships reduced the intervals between themselves, and the destroyers pulled up to the main forces. Then the Almaz, which was on reconnaissance mission, and the cruisers Kagul and Memory of Mercury were recalled.
cruiser "Almaz"
Due to heavy fog and smoke ahead of the flagship, the battle came down to a shootout between “Geben” and “Eustathius” (1st Rank Captain V.I. Galanin). Senior artilleryman V.M. Smirnov, who directed the fire of the brigade of battleships (was on the John Chrysostom), was unable to accurately determine the distance to the enemy ship, so the shells from the remaining battleships flew over time. The battle lasted only 14 minutes, Russian ships (with 34-40 cables, 6-7 km) fired 30 main-caliber shells. Russian artillerymen "Eustathius" hit the target from the very first salvo, the 12-inch "hotel" pierced the 150-mm armor of the German, causing a fire in the aft casemate on the left side. It was a success, usually even good gunners (like the Germans) hit with the 3rd salvo. "Goeben" changed course and returned fire. The Germans soon realized that the Russians had learned the bloody lesson of Tsushima; in 14 minutes of battle, the Goeben received 14 hits, including 3 and 305 mm shells. He took advantage of his superior speed and, before the other Russian battleships took aim, went into the fog. The duel with the outdated Russian hero was not cheap for the Germans - total losses ranged from 112 to 172 people (according to various sources). But the Eustathius also suffered losses; out of the 19 280 mm shells that the German cruiser fired, four (4) hit the Russian battleship. The flagship lost 58 people (33 killed, 25 wounded).
What conclusions could be drawn after this fleeting battle? Firstly, a brigade of old battleships could easily resist a new type of battleship (dreadnought). One battleship will be defeated, but in a formation they represent a formidable force if the crews are well trained, which was confirmed by the battle of May 10, 1915. Secondly, the battle showed the good training of the Russian gunners, but the mediocre training of the squadron’s high command - A. A. Eberhard was unable to organize a combined attack of his forces.
On December 13 (26), the Goeben was blown up by 2 mines near the Bosphorus Strait, the area of the hole on the left side was 64 square meters. meters, and the right one - 50 square meters. meters, “drank water” from 600 to 2000 tons. Specialists from Germany had to be called in for repairs; restoration work was largely completed by April 1915.
At the very end of 1914, 5 German submarines ("UB 7", "UB 8", "UB 13", "UB 14" and "UB 15") crossed into the Black Sea from the Mediterranean, and this complicated the situation.
1915
Consistently, the Black Sea Fleet got rid of shortcomings. Destroyers and seaplanes began to be used for reconnaissance of Turkish routes, and the effectiveness of agent actions was increased. But still, the lack of a base in the southwestern part of the sea did not allow a complete blockade of Turkish forces. From the beginning of January to the end of March 1915, the Russian squadron made 9 trips to enemy shores, and carried out artillery strikes on Zunguldak and Trebizond. Dozens of steamships and sailing ships carrying military cargo were sunk. Russian submarines began to patrol the Bosphorus area. The Batumi destroyer detachment was created - the 5th division ("Zavidny", "Zavetny", "Zvonky" and "Zorky"). On March 28, the Black Sea squadron fired and bombed for the first time (the Nikolai I seaplane transport with 5 seaplanes) on the fortifications of the Bosphorus. The ports in the Kozlu, Eregli, and Zunguldak regions were also shelled.
The Odessa Operation Plan and Its Failure
Admiral V. Souchon decided to take advantage of the fact that the Goeben had been largely restored and strike back at Odessa. Why did you choose Odessa? It was in Odessa that the Russian landing force could concentrate to capture the Bosphorus, therefore, by destroying the transports, Souchon thwarted the plans of the Russian command and at the same time showed that the Turkish fleet was alive and combat-ready. The Ottoman Empire at this moment could have been defeated due to an attack from 3 directions: on February 18, the Anglo-French fleet attacked the Dardanelles, the Dardanelles operation began; the Russian fleet is shelling the Bosporus and preparing an amphibious army in Odessa, and the Russian capture of Constantinople-Istanbul has been a nightmare for the Turks in recent decades. And at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, Russian troops destroy the 3rd Turkish army near Sarykamysh, the path to Anatolia is open. And here there is an opportunity to eliminate the threat from one direction. The plan of the operation was quite simple: “Goeben” and “Breslau” cover the attack forces from Sevastopol, the cruisers “Mejidiye” and “Gamidiye” with 4 destroyers at this time shell Odessa, destroying landing transports. The Turks' plan was doomed to success. However, Russian minefields spoiled the matter. The Russian Empire at that time was the world leader in the field of mine weapons. The Turks and Germans clearly underestimated the mine danger. For which they paid.
The commander of the operation was the German captain of the cruiser "Medzhidiye" - Büksel. On April 1, the Turkish detachment left the Bosphorus, and on the night of the 3rd it was in the Odessa region. The detachment lost its course somewhat at night and reached the coast about 15 miles east of the intended point. Büchsel changed course and moved west, towards Odessa. He planned to begin shelling from the north, then moving south and southeast to continue the shelling. Destroyers with trawls walked ahead to search for mines. Behind them exactly in the wake of the cruiser. Suddenly, at 6.40, the Medzhidiye exploded, the explosion occurred on the left side, the cruiser began to quickly sink with a list to the left side. He didn't drown completely; the depth was too shallow. The Turks threw out the gun bolts, destroyed the radio, and the destroyers removed the crew. At 7.20 one of the destroyers torpedoed the cruiser, with the aim of completely sinking it. The Turkish detachment retreated. The Russian fleet left Sevastopol and attacked the German cruisers, they did not accept the battle and disappeared. Interestingly, the enemy was discovered for the first time using seaplanes.
On June 8, 1915, “Medzhidiye” was raised, initial repairs were carried out in Odessa, then major repairs were carried out in Nikolaev, it was re-equipped and a year later in June 1916 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet as “Prut”. As part of the fleet, he participated in several operations; in May 1918, he was captured by the Germans, handed over to the Turks, and there, thanks to Russian repairs, he served in the Turkish fleet until 1947.
Bosphorus Operation Plan
After the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Russian Empire planned different options for waging war with the Ottoman Empire. After the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1877. It became finally clear that only ground forces can win at the cost of heavy losses, resource consumption and loss of time. The distance from the Danube and the Caucasus to Istanbul is too long, and it is also protected by strong fortresses.
Therefore, with the revival of the Black Sea Fleet, the idea of conducting the Bosphorus operation arose. With its help, it was possible to decapitate the old enemy with one blow and realize the age-old Russian dream - to return ancient Constantinople to the fold of the Orthodox world. To implement this plan, a powerful armored fleet was needed, an order of magnitude stronger than the Turkish naval forces. The fleet has been built since 1883, with battleships of the “Empress Catherine the Great” type laid down; a total of 4 ships were built (“Chesma”, “Sinop”, “George the Victorious”), and two of them also participated in the First World War - “Sinop” and “George” Victorious." In addition, the destroyer fleet and the Volunteer Fleet (for transporting troops) were intensively developed. In the event of war, these battleships would be quite enough to eliminate the Turkish fleet. They were built to perform two tasks: 1) squadron combat; and 2) destruction of coastal fortifications, suppression of enemy batteries.
But defeat in the Russo-Japanese War pushed these plans aside. The task of reviving the fleet came to the fore. But until the appearance of the Goeben with the Breslau in Turkey, theoretically the Black Sea Fleet could carry out this operation; there were enough forces.
After the Allies launched the Dardanelles operation, the Russian fleet systematically carried out demonstrative actions against the Bosphorus. If the British had succeeded in the Dardanelles, the Black Sea Fleet would have occupied the Bosphorus. Russian troops converged on Odessa, and demonstrative loading onto transports was carried out. The frantic activity created the appearance of preparing a large-scale landing operation. Although it would hardly have been successful before the commissioning of new battleships. And the German offensive of 1915 did not allow the allocation of large forces for the operation.
A real opportunity arose only in 1916: the Caucasian Front carried out a successful Erzurum operation, the Southwestern Front successfully defeated the Austro-Hungarians, German troops tried to defeat the Anglo-French armies in the West. The Russian command now had reserves for the operation. 2 new battleships were put into operation, and the Goeben was neutralized. The operation was planned to begin in 1917, but the February Revolution threw the empire into the abyss of anarchy and Civil War. The dream of Russian Slavophiles never became a geopolitical reality - Constantinople did not become the third capital of the Russian Empire.
From March 28 to May 10, the Russian fleet fired at the Bosporus 4 times. At the same time, 2 battleships fired at coastal fortifications, 3 provided cover from the sea. On May 10, the Goeben attacked the ships under cover (Eustathius, John Chrysostom and Rostislav). Neither side achieved success when the 4th Russian battleship Panteleimon entered the battle and immediately made three hits with 305-mm shells. The Goeben was not seriously damaged, but realizing that the superiority was on the enemy’s side, it left. The shootout itself lasted only 23 minutes.
On September 3, Bulgaria took the side of Germany. In September 1915, when 2 new Dreadnought-class battleships joined the Black Sea Fleet, 3 brigades of ships were created, each superior in power to the Goeben. 1st consisting of the dreadnought "Empress Maria" and the cruiser "Cahul". 2nd consisting of: the dreadnought "Empress Catherine the Great" and the cruiser "Memory of Mercury". 3rd consisting of: battleships "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" and "Panteleimon". The battleships "Three Saints" and "Rostislav" formed a combat-ready reserve. Organizationally, the dreadnoughts "Empress Maria", "Empress Catherine the Great" and the Cahul-class cruisers were consolidated into the 1st brigade of the fleet, and the battleships "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" and "Panteleimon" - into the 2nd brigade of Black Sea battleships fleet.
In general, from that time on, the Russian fleet gained complete superiority; it constantly bombarded the enemy coast. With the advent of new submarines in the fleet, including the Crab-class minelayer, it became possible to cross enemy communications using them. At the beginning, the submarines used the positional method - they took up a position and were on duty, waiting for the enemy ship. Since the summer of 1915, the cruising method was used, when the boat patrolled in a certain area, taking turns replacing each other. A new feature of the Russian fleet was the interaction of submarines and destroyers. This method paid off and increased the effectiveness of the blockade of the Bosphorus and coal districts in Turkey. Aerial reconnaissance also developed rapidly; Russian naval pilots were among the world leaders in this field.
1916
In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet strengthened its superiority and almost completely controlled the sea. Three brigades of battleships were formed, destroyer forces were actively operating, and submarine forces and naval aviation were increasing their combat experience. Conditions were created for the Bosphorus operation.
In 1916, evil fate threw up several unpleasant “surprises”: on August 14 (27), Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, but since its armed forces were of very dubious combat capability, they had to be strengthened by Russian troops, the Black Sea Fleet also assisted sides of the Balkan coast and the Danube. The underwater threat to the fleet has increased; German submarine forces in the Black Sea have grown to 10 submarines. The Black Sea Fleet did not have anti-submarine protection, so it had to be created on the approaches to Sevastopol.
In 1916, the fleet simultaneously performed several important tasks:
1) continued to block the Bosphorus Strait;
2) regularly supported the right flank of the advancing Caucasian Front;
3) provided assistance to the troops of Romania and the Russian units located there;
4) continued to disrupt enemy sea communications;
5) protect your bases and communications from enemy submarine forces and his cruising raids.
The main link was considered to be the blockade of the strait, which was of enormous military and strategic importance. Using the mine experience of the Baltic Fleet, it was decided to cover the Bosporus with mines. From July 30 to August 10, a mine-laying operation was carried out, 4 barriers were placed, about 900 mines in total. By the end of the year, another 8 mine installations were made, with the task of strengthening the main barrier and blocking coastal waters - to interfere with small ships and submarines. In total, 14 mine chains (about 2200 mines) were laid during the war. To protect the minefields from minesweepers, a patrol of destroyers and submarines was installed; since the end of the summer, mainly submarine forces have been on duty. The enemy lost several warships, submarines, and dozens of transport steam and sailing ships in the minefields. The mine blockade disrupted Turkish shipping, and the Ottoman capital began to experience difficulties in supplying food and fuel. But it was still not possible to carry out a complete blockade of the Bosphorus.
The assistance to the actions of the Caucasian Front was of a large-scale nature, it was constant and played an important role in conducting offensive operations, for example Trebizud. The fleet supported the ground forces with artillery, landed distracting troops and sabotage detachments, provided protection from a possible attack from the sea, and supplied supplies and reinforcements. The transportation of troops and supplies was carried out by a special transport flotilla (in 1916 - 90 ships).
So, at the beginning of 1916, the Batumi detachment of destroyers was reinforced, with 2 gunboats ("Donets", Kubanets) and 2 destroyers ("Strict" and "Swift"). To help carry out the Erzurum operation, it temporarily included the battleship " Rostislav" and the destroyers "Lieutenant Pushchin", "Zhivoy".
Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet
The Russian Empire was one of the world leaders in the theory of the use of aircraft at sea and the construction of seaplanes. Back in 1910, the famous Russian test pilot L. M. Matsievich wrote about the importance of using aircraft in maritime affairs and the construction of seaplanes. In 1911-1912 he was supported by the inventor D. P. Grigorovich. Work on hydroaviation in Russia kept pace with other leaders in the field of aircraft construction: the first French seaplane by A. Faber in 1910; American plane G. Curtis; and the Russian “Gakkel-V” in 1911.
After the plane of Ya. M. Gakkel, in 1912 the planes of I. I. Sikorsky were created. However, the Naval Ministry did not support the good initiative of Russian inventors in 1911-1913. seaplanes of American and French brands were purchased.
Since 1913, the construction of domestic seaplanes began to expand. The main role in that matter belonged to Russian designers, and not to the state. They were able to quickly create designs for naval aircraft that surpassed foreign ones and soon supplanted them from Russian naval aviation. These devotees are Grigorovich, Willisch, Engels, Sedelnikov, Friede, Shishmarev, as well as the design bureau of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works and the Aviation Test Station. Up to 15% of aircraft produced in Russia were for water use; this was not the case anywhere in the world.
At the beginning of the war, there were 8 seaplanes on the Black Sea, based on the Curtis type. The head of the Fleet Communications Service was Senior Lieutenant Stakhovsky. The aircraft were based at a 1st category station in Sevastopol (Kilen Bay), 1st category stations were built in Ovidiopol, Ak-mosque; 2nd category stations – Zolokarakh and Klerovka. Before the war, 3 and then 24 observation posts were created, from the Danube to Batum. This made it possible to quickly transfer aircraft along the entire Russian Black Sea coast. At the end of 1914, hangars from Ovidiopol and Ak-Mosque began to be transferred to Round Bay in Sevastopol and in May 1915 an aviation station was opened.
From August to the end of October 1914 (before the start of the war with the Ottoman Empire), they managed to complete the deployment of air units, train personnel, and develop some tactics. It became clear that aircraft could be used to detect enemy sea mines and submarines.
With the outbreak of war in the Black Sea Fleet, two steamships were rebuilt into aircraft “mothers”: “Emperor Nicholas I” and “Alexander I”; then they were joined by the hydrocruiser Romania. They could carry 6-8 aircraft. In addition, 1 seaplane was placed on the cruiser Almaz.
The first experience of using naval aviation took place on March 24, 1915: the Russian squadron made a trip to Rumelia (a region of Turkey in Europe), the squadron included “Nicholas I” with 4 aircraft. They were planned to be used for aerial reconnaissance, but then they were used for bombing coastal targets. This was the first experience of Russian naval aviation off enemy shores. On March 27, 1915, a squadron with the participation of 2 air transports (cruiser Almaz, Nikolai), planes conducted reconnaissance of the strait and established that there were no large ships, dropped 3 bombs on coastal fortifications and a destroyer.
By April 1915, the air squad had grown to 18 aircraft, in April 5 FBA seaplanes arrived, and from May the old Curtis aircraft began to be replaced with M-5 seaplanes designed by D. P. Grigorovich.
On May 3, Russian seaplanes made the first raid on the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. These actions showed that aviation was beginning to play a major role not only for reconnaissance, but also for attack operations. Until the end of the year, combat training and interaction between aircraft and ship crews were improved. In October 1915, the Russian squadron made a trip to the shores of Bulgaria, Varna and Evksinograd were shelled, and on the 25th an air raid was carried out.
On January 1, 1916, the Black Sea air detachment had: 30 officers, 371 other personnel, 30 aircraft, 2 air transport and the cruiser Almaz. At the end of the year, another aircraft, Romania, entered service. The Black Sea detachment consisted of the 1st and 2nd naval detachments (on “Nikolai” and “Alexandra” - 13 pilots), a hydroaviation detachment of the Caucasian Front (8 pilots), a combat training unit in Round Bay (5 pilots), the formation of an airship detachment began .
On January 8-15, exercises were conducted, techniques of aerial photography, reconnaissance, and bombing were practiced. On January 24, the Russian squadron approached Zunguldak. The Zunguldak coal region was the second most important area of influence of the Russian fleet (after the Bosporus). Due to the underdevelopment of the railway network, coal was transported mainly by sea. Usually only ships attacked it; the pilots were given the task of bombing the ship; secondary targets were the port, power plant, and railway. Although the pilots were hampered by heavy clouds and anti-aircraft fire, they were able to drop 18 large and 20 small bombs, set fire to and sink a 7,000-ton steamship and several ships, destroyed a railway junction building, and set fire to several mines.
A similar operation was carried out on August 25 against the Austro-German forces in Varna, but this time the enemy offered strong resistance; when the squadron left, it was attacked by enemy planes that dropped several dozen bombs.
Another task for hydroaviation was to assist in large-scale landing operations. In April 1916, both air transports took part in escorting a transport flotilla of 27 ships from Novorossiysk and Mariupol to the Rize region. The planes provided air cover for the landing troops and provided anti-submarine protection. A month later, "Alexander" took part in the landing at Trebizond. At the beginning of December 1916, the air squad included 45 M-5 seaplanes (reconnaissance, artillery fire spotter), 45 M-9 (heavy seaplane for bombing coastal targets and ships), 10 M-11 (the first in world (!) fighter seaplane) all Russian-made, designer D. P. Grigorovich.
The naval order defined the tasks of naval aviation:
1) attack of enemy ships, its bases and coastal fortifications;
2) fight against enemy air forces;
3) anti-submarine warfare;
4) surveillance and aerial reconnaissance;
5) protecting the fleet at sea from enemy aircraft and its submarines;
6) adjustment of artillery fire of ships.
By the beginning of 1917, naval aviation forces had grown to 110 aircraft; in the summer, 8 land fighters (“Nieuports”) arrived. The Black Sea air division was formed - the 1st brigade included 4 naval detachments (then 6), the 2nd brigade included 13 land-based detachments. In March 1917, a grandiose operation to capture the Bosphorus was supposed to begin, it was supposed to be supported from the air by over 150 seaplanes, but the death of the empire destroyed the plans of this operation. After the February Revolution, “Alexander” was renamed “Republican”, and “Nikolai” was renamed “Aviator”. On May 24-27, the Aviator made its last trip to aerial photography and bombing of Sinop. Further activities of the naval aviation of the Black Sea Fleet ended due to the outbreak of the Civil War, the pilots were scattered by fate on different sides of the front.
The mystery of the death of the battleship "Empress Maria"
The Russo-Japanese War revealed a number of significant shortcomings of the Russian fleet; battleships became outdated. England is building a new battleship, the Dreadnought, but Russian inventors are not inferior to the world's advanced developments. Russian shipbuilders built battleships (“dreadnoughts”) according to the plans of I.G. Bubnova and A.N. Krylov, which surpassed the English prototype in many characteristics. In 1909, the ships “Sevastopol”, “Gangut”, “Poltava” and “Petropavlovsk” were laid down at the Baltic shipyards.
battleship Empress Maria
The linear placement of 12 305 mm guns in three-gun turrets made it possible to fire all guns simultaneously from both sides. The weight of a salvo of one of the first English battleships of the new type, Vengard, was 3003 kg; on Sevastopol it reached 5650 kg. In one minute, the Russian battleship fired up to 11.5 tons of metal and explosives. The main armor belt was 225 mm thick. For the Black Sea Fleet in the Nikolaev shipyard in 1915-1917, according to the “Emperor” project, the battleships “Empress Maria”, “Emperor Alexander III” and “Ekaterina II” were built. The 4th dreadnought “Emperor Nicholas I” was laid down in 1915, but due to revolutionary events it was not completed.
On June 25, 1915, the battleship "Empress Maria" left the Nikolaev port and, under the guard of the squadron, headed for Sevastopol. This day became a holiday for shipbuilders and for the entire Black Sea Fleet. On October 13-15, 1915, the battleship covered the actions of the 2nd battleship brigade in the Zunguldak region. On November 2-4, 6-8, 1915, he covered the 2nd Brigade from the sea during the shelling of Varna and Euxinograd. From February 5 to April 18, he assisted in the Trebizond operation. During the course of hostilities, it became clear that the battleships of the Empress Maria type lived up to the hopes placed on them. During the first year of service, the ship made 24 military campaigns and sank many Turkish ships.
In the summer of 1916, by decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Emperor Nicholas) of the Russian Army, the Black Sea Fleet was headed by Vice Admiral Alexander Kolchak. The admiral made the Empress Maria the flagship of the fleet and systematically went to sea on it. Having laid a glorious start, in the fall of 1916 the battleship was placed in the Sevastopol roadstead for preventative repairs. And this autumn became fatal for “Empress Maria”. The morning of October 7 (20), 1916 did not foretell trouble; an ordinary day began. Over the Northern Bay, a wake-up call was given to ship crews every day. On the battleship everything went according to a certain routine. Suddenly, at 6.20, the surrounding area was rocked by a powerful explosion, followed by 15 explosions lasting about another hour. Frightened Sevastopol residents ran out to the embankment and became eyewitnesses of the terrible picture. The battleship Empress Maria was dying while standing in the roadstead in her native bay. The ship listed to starboard, capsized and sank. The wounded were located right on the shore and first aid was provided here. There was black smoke over the city. By evening, the extent of the disaster became known: 225 sailors were killed, 85 were seriously injured, and the most powerful ship of the Black Sea Fleet was lost.
The tragedy shocked the entire Russian Empire. A commission of the Naval Ministry, headed by a combat officer (participant in the defense of Port Arthur), member of the Admiralty Council, Admiral N.M. Yakovlev, began to determine the reasons for the death of the ship. A well-known shipbuilder, one of the authors of the Black Sea battleships project, a comrade-in-arms of Admiral S.O. Makarov, Academician A.N. Krylov, also became a member of the commission, who drew up a conclusion that was approved by all members of the commission.
Three main versions of the death of the battleship have been put forward:
1. spontaneous combustion of gunpowder;
2. carelessness in handling fire or gunpowder;
3. malicious intent.
The commission was inclined to the second version (negligence), since the gunpowder was, in the opinion of all the gunners of the battleship, of high quality. As for malicious intent, even establishing violations in the rules of access to artillery magazines and a lack of control over the workers on the ship. For example: the head of the ship's weapons, Prince Russov, pointed out that the hatch to the powder magazine was not locked or guarded at all. The commission considered this version unlikely. As a result, none of the hypotheses put forward by the commission found sufficient facts to confirm.
Also investigating the causes of the explosions were the Sevastopol Gendarmerie Directorate and the counterintelligence department of the General Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, created on the initiative of the sailors at the end of 1915. But they were also unable to discover the true cause of the death of the flagship. Revolutionary events finally stopped the investigation.
German trace: already in the Soviet period, it became clear that Germany was closely monitoring all changes in the Russian fleet, including the new dreadnoughts. And in Germany they understood how dangerous Operation Constantinople (Bosphorus Operation) was, where battleships had to play a very important role. In 1933, during the investigation of sabotage at the Nikolaev shipyard, Stalin's security officers exposed the German intelligence network led by V.E. Verman. The goal of the organization was to disrupt the shipbuilding program of the military and merchant fleet of the USSR. During the investigation, many interesting facts were revealed that go back to the pre-revolutionary period. Verman himself was an experienced intelligence officer (he was a senior electrical engineer), and began his activities back in 1908, when a large-scale program for the restoration of the Russian fleet began. The network covered all major cities of the Black Sea region, with special attention paid to Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol, and Novorossiysk. During interrogation, Werman said that German intelligence was planning sabotage on the battleship, and the group was led by saboteur Helmut von Stitthoff. He was considered the best specialist in the field of mining and ship blasting. In the summer of 1916, Helmut von Stithoff began working at the Nikolaev shipyard as an electrician. The plan was to blow up the battleship right at the shipyard. However, something went wrong, Stitthoff urgently curtailed the operation and left for Germany. But Werman’s group continued to work independently and did not curtail its activities; it had the opportunity to access the battleship. After an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the warship Empress Maria, the command transferred Helmut von Stitthoff to the next mission. During this period, British intelligence (a certain Haviland) tried to recruit him.
Helmut von Stitthoff
In 1942, the honored German saboteur Helmut von Stithoff was shot by the secret police (Gestapo). The trail leading to the solution to the death of the battleship "Empress Maria" was erased.
1945 - Koenigsberg, a German archive was found in a destroyed house by Soviet soldiers. There they found an album containing a whole series of photographs of the battleship Empress Maria, one of the photographs depicting the moment of the explosion. It seems as if someone knew the time and place of the sabotage in advance and carefully filmed everything.
English trace: on the night before the death of the giant, Commander Voronov was on duty at the main tower. His duties were: inspection and measurement of the temperature of the artillery cellar. This morning, Captain 2nd Rank Gorodyssky was also on combat duty on the ship. At dawn, Gorodyssky ordered his Voronov to measure the temperature in the cellar of the main tower. Voronov went down to the cellar and no one saw him again. And after some time the first explosion occurred. Voronov's body was never found among the bodies of the dead. The commission had suspicions about him, but there was no evidence and he was listed as missing.
But recently new information has appeared: the English writer Robert Merid, who has long been involved in the mysterious death of the battleship, undertook his own investigation. And from it we learn very interesting (and shameful for the “ally” of the Russian Empire) information. The British naval intelligence lieutenant served in Russia from 1914 to 1916; a week after the explosion, he left Russia and arrived in England as a lieutenant colonel. After the end of the war, he retired and left the country. After some time, he appeared in Canada, bought an estate, began to equip it, and lived the ordinary life of a rich gentleman. And in 1929 he died under strange circumstances: in the hotel where he spent the night there was a fire, everyone was saved (including a woman with a small child and a paralyzed old man in a wheelchair), but the military officer was unable to escape from the 2nd floor.
This begs the question: who was hindered by the colonel in the deep periphery of world processes while in retirement? Research of photo archives led to unexpected results - Lieutenant Colonel of British intelligence John Haviland and gunner of the battleship "Empress Maria" Voronov are one and the same person. The same Voronov who disappeared on October 7, 1916 during the explosion of the battleship Empress Maria. It is also interesting that shortly before his death, some Russian immigrants, including the former electrician of the battleship Empress Maria, Ivan Nazarin, attempted to assassinate him. Maybe they also got on the trail and tried to at least somehow take revenge for their ship!?
To summarize, in any crime, motive and opportunity are important. German intelligence had both motive and opportunity. By destroying the battleship, they helped their ally (the Ottoman Empire), disrupted the Bosphorus operation, and dealt a heavy psychological blow to their main enemy. Yes, and there was an opportunity: unfortunately, the Security Service was not developed in the Russian Empire; any agent of the German intelligence network (and more than one) could penetrate the battleship under construction, and since he could work there, he could carry the “infernal machine.” Anyone familiar with the realities of Soviet-Russian factories will confirm this: you can take something out or bring it in.
The British Empire was an ally of Russia in that war, but from the course of history it is known that it was one of the first to have a powerful intelligence and sabotage service, and Britain was an old enemy of the Russian Empire. The motive for the destruction of the battleship? The English elite thought with horror about the day when “Oleg’s shield” would again be nailed to the gates of Constantinople. This would be the day of the collapse of the centuries-old machinations and intrigues of England against Russia. The Straits were not to be given to the Russians at any cost. The capabilities of British intelligence in Russia were no worse than those of Germany, and besides, England often did its business with the hands of others. Perhaps the battleship was destroyed by the forces of the German intelligence network, but under the leadership of the British. And the cover is good, who is to blame (?) – the Germans!
On the resignation of Admiral A. A. Ebergard (July 1916)
In the summer of 1916, Admiral A. A Eberhard was replaced by Admiral A. Kolchak. The reasons for this event are not the failures and mistakes of Eberhard, but rather a tribute to court circles and public opinion.
Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak
A. A. Eberhard did not listen to the opinions of the greats of this world, acting based on the interests of the Black Sea Fleet, aroused their anger and Emperor Nicholas decided to compromise. Eberhard went into honorable exile to the State Council, and was replaced by a young admiral, who continued to do what the fleet had done before him.
This story began from the very beginning of the war, when German cruisers entered the straits (August 10, 1914). The Ottoman Empire was then a neutral country and did not have the right to allow warships through the straits. A. A. Eberhard decided to go with the entire fleet to Istanbul and demand their exit to the Mediterranean Sea, where the English squadron was waiting for them. In case of refusal, he wanted to attack them directly at the roadstead, where their advantage in speed disappeared. This plan was Russian in spirit, in the best traditions of F.F. Ushakov and P.S. Nakhimov. But the government categorically forbade doing this; they still hoped that Turkey would not enter the war.
Even when the German-Turkish fleet went to sea, clearly not for a walk, Eberhard was restrained by orders not to “provoke” the enemy. As a result, we received the “Sevastopol wake-up call”. But even here, the admiral did not carry out the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich), about the main task - “defense of one’s shores” and immediately responded by marching to the enemy’s shores. The admiral understood that it was possible to defend his shores only by eliminating enemy ships from the Black Sea. The best defense is an attack. Not everyone at Headquarters understood this, and things even came to the point of direct insults by the “Grand” Duke of the admiral. But the admiral apparently understood that there was only one Motherland, but there were many fools, and he continued to do his job. On November 18, 1914, German Admiral Souchon attempted to intercept Eberhard, who was returning from the shelling of Trebizond. “Intercepted”, but got “on the nose”. Since then, Souchon no longer sought a fight with the entire Russian squadron, but limited himself to tactics according to the pirate principle - “Hit and leave.” Soon the Goeben was blown up by a Russian mine near the Bosphorus and was out of action for several months.
At the beginning of 1915, new high-speed destroyers of the Novik type began to arrive in the fleet. This made it possible to launch constant attacks on the Turkish coast, destroying enemy transports and destroying their shipping
"Goeben" after repairs resumed raids on the Russian coast. These attacks caused minimal damage, but greatly irritated the St. Petersburg society. In addition, 1915 was a very difficult year for Russia, the initial patriotic frenzy faded, and difficulties arose. Creeping talk began about the “treason of the German admiral,” although his family was of Swedish origin. The command demanded to protect its shores, but Eberhard continued to destroy the enemy’s naval forces.
The second battle of Russian battleships with the Goeben near the Bosporus (May 1915) was also in favor of A. A. Eberhard. The German-Turkish fleet was unable to prevent several landings in 1916. The Black Sea Fleet confidently controlled the sea, which, as in the old days (under the first Rurikovichs), again became Russian. But Petrograd heard little about the small victories of the Black Sea Fleet, which, with small bricks, prepared the overall Victory. Dirty talk continued about the admiral's passivity and mediocrity; that the Germans rule the sea, apparently some forces sponsored some of the newspapers.
At the end of May 1916, Russian battleships shelled Varna, and the Empress Maria covered them from the sea. The English admiral Phillimore, who was present on Panteleimon, called, after this campaign, the Russian battle fleet: “the best combat formation in the world.” This campaign coincided with the increased activity of German submarine forces, and on July 4, 1916, the Goeben bombarded Tuapse.
This was the last straw, A. A. Eberhard was replaced by A. Kolchak. But, interestingly, he did the same as A. A. Eberhard: he continued mining the exit from the Bosphorus (the Goeben and 6 German submarines were blown up again) to block Turkish forces; Russian destroyers and submarines tormented the Turkish coast with their cruising operations. One of the reasons for Kolchak's appointment was that he was believed to be an expert in landing operations and mine warfare.
And from the end of 1916, systematic preparations were underway for the “Operation Constantinople”: landing and landing training was underway, constant reconnaissance trips to the Bosphorus were underway, the coast was being carefully studied, and aerial photographic reconnaissance was carried out. Kolchak had every chance to go down in the history of the empire as a hero who hoisted the Russian banner over the ancient capital of the Christian world.
Literature
- Kozlov D. Yu. "Strange War" in the Black Sea (August-October 1914). - M.: Quadriga, 2009. - 223 p. - ISBN 978-5-904162-07-8
- Zolotarev V.L., Kozlov I.A. Russian navy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.. - M.: Nauka, 1988. - 208 p.
Mine transport of the Baltic Fleet (minelayer) "Yenisei"
For well-known reasons, the Baltic Fleet of the First World War is remembered in the mass memory only by the revolutionary “brothers” in machine-gun belts on armored cars and the Aurora, which, for all its merits, did not belong to the main ships of the theater of operations.
It seems that for almost three years the fleet went to rallies, chased after its own officers and sometimes, purely by chance, met the Germans in the morning fog of the Gulf of Riga.
In terms of the scale of the confrontation, the fighting in the Eastern Baltic, of course, cannot be compared with the British-German war in the North Sea and the Atlantic. But the “work” of the Baltic Fleet began even before the declaration of war. The workers of that war will be discussed below.
The tactics of combat operations were chosen based on the main task - the defense of the capital of the Empire at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and action on German communications to Sweden. The ships of the Baltic Fleet also defended the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, protected communications with Finland (then still part of the Empire) and quite successfully engaged in mine laying (including off the German coast). At a difficult moment, Britain sent submarines, which helped us a lot in the defense of the Baltic states.
The geography of the theater of operations, and the Eastern part of the Baltic is not replete with large deep-sea spaces like the Black Sea, and the comparative weakness of the fleet made the use of large formations of surface ships ineffective. There were no naval battles, like Jutland, in Baltic waters. The sea mine became a successful Russian weapon.
Floating mine designed by E.V.Kolbasyev. 1909
“By the beginning of the war, the Russian fleet had at its disposal 15.5 thousand mines (mostly of the 1908 model), of which 7 thousand were in the Baltic, 4.5 thousand in the Black Sea, 4 thousand in Vladivostok. In addition, There were another 5,250 mines, of which 2.5 thousand were at the stage of filling explosives.
The "Plan of Operations of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea" defined as a priority task: to prevent an enemy breakthrough into the Gulf of Finland during the first two weeks of the war. This ensured the mobilization of the Guards Corps and the Petrograd Military District, as well as their preparation to repel the German landing with the aim of capturing the capital.
To solve this problem, the operational plan of the Baltic Fleet provided for the creation of a Central mine-artillery position at the Revel - Porkalaudd line. The laying of mines was planned to be carried out before the start of hostilities, during the deployment of naval forces. Strictly in accordance with the plan, on July 18, 1914, five hours before the announcement of general mobilization, the minelayers Ladoga, Narova, Amur and Yenisei, under the cover of the main forces of the fleet, began laying mines. It took four and a half hours to set up a barrage of 2,129 mines.
In subsequent years, the Central mine position was strengthened several times. In total, by the end of 1917, over 11 thousand mines were displayed here, including 1158 mines of the 1908 model and “Rybka” - in an anti-submarine version, with a recess of 18.3 m.
In 1915, the Baltic Fleet began equipping a new defensive line - the Advanced Mine Position. Over the course of three years of war, over 8 thousand mines were installed here. On the night of October 28-29, 1916, 7 of the 11 destroyers of the X Flotilla of the German Navy were blown up by mines at the Forward Position and sank. German sailors called this event “Black Monday.”
Since 1915, the third major defensive line in the Baltic was the Irbe mine position, which blocked the enemy’s entrance to the Gulf of Riga. In total, Russian sailors deposited about 11 thousand mines here." Korshunov Yu. L. "Mines of the Russian Navy"
In total, during the war, the ships of the Baltic Fleet laid 38,932 mines. 69 enemy ships were blown up on them, 48 of them were killed. We are talking here only about warships. The losses of the merchant fleet of Germany and neighboring states that traded with it are not taken into account in the figure.
Map of minefields laid by the Russian fleet in the southern part of the Baltic Sea in 1914-1915.
Russian mine washed up on the German shore
Active minelaying in the Baltic turned out to be very effective. So on November 4, 1914, the armored cruiser Friedrich Karl was blown up by two mines and sank near Memel; on January 12, 1915, the cruisers Augsburg and Gazelle were blown up near Bornholm and Rügen on the same day; on November 19, at a minefield near Gotland the cruiser Danzig was blown up, on December 4, north-west of Vindava, the cruiser Bremen and the destroyer V-191 were killed, and six days later the destroyer S-177 died there.
German armored cruiser Friedrich Karl.
Cruiser "Danzig"
List of ships of the Russian Baltic Fleet that died in 1914-1917.
No. Date of destruction Name of the ship Fleet Area of destruction Note
Battleships
1 4.IO.I917 "Slava" Baltic Fleet Moonsund Strait Scuttled by the crew due to damage
Cruisers
1 09/28/1914 "Pallada" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Finland Sunk by a German submarine
2 11/6/1916 "Rurik" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Finland Exploded by a mine
Destroyers
1 11/29/1914 "Executive" Baltic Fleet Mouth of the Gulf of Finland
2 11/29/1914 "Flying" Baltic Fleet Mouth of the Gulf of Finland
3 08/21/1916 "Volunteer" Charity Fund Irbensky Strait
4 10/28/1916 "Kazanets" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Finland Sunk by German square.
5 08/22/1917 "Stroyny" Charitable Fleet Gulf of Riga
6 09/26/1917 "Okhotnik" Baltic Fleet Irbensky Strait Exploded by a mine
7 10/14/1917 "Thunder" Baltic Fleet Kassarsky Reach (Moonzund Strait) Scuttled by the crew due to major damage
8 11/27/1917 "Vigilant" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Bothnia Exploded by a mine
Submarines
1 03/1/1916 "Shark" Charity Fund In the Libau region Memel
2 05/10/1916 "Som" Charity Fund In the region of the Aland Islands
3 05/13/1917 "Bars" BF Central part of the Baltic. seas
4 06/1/1917 "Lioness" BF In the region of. Gotland
5 06/8/1917 "AG-15" BF In the Ganges region (Gangut)
6 1.11.1917 "AG-14" BF In the Libau region
7 12/1/1917 "Cheetah" BF Central part of the Baltic. seas
Gunboats
1 08/06/1915 "Sivuch" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Riga Sunk by German ships
2 08/07/1915 "Korean" BF Gulf of Riga Scuttled by the crew due to severe damage
Interdictors
1 05/22/1915 "Yenisei" Baltic Fleet In the area of the Baltic port
Minesweepers
1 08/14/1914 "Provodnik" Charity Fund In the region of. Dago
2 9.09.1914 "Mineweeper No. 07" Baltic Fleet In the region of. Dago
3 9.09.1914 "Mineweeper No. 08" Baltic Fleet In the region of. Dago
Kireev I. A. Trawling in the Baltic Sea during the war of 1914–1917. - M-L.: Voenmorizdat NKVMF USSR, 1939.