Abdication of the throne. Abdication of rights to the throne according to the laws of the Russian Empire

The topic in the title of the article may seem highly specialized, but it touches almost the very foundations of the monarchical worldview, because concerns the understanding of one of the most important moments in the history of our Monarchy and Dynasty - the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II and the events that followed. Their legal understanding in the mass consciousness still bears indelible traces of revolutionary unrest, which leads to all sorts of distortions of the monarchical legal consciousness, right up to the notorious “Zemsky Sobor”.

The overwhelming majority of monarchists recognize the abdication of the Sovereign as invalid, but the reasons given for this are very diverse and are always not the ones that are needed. Here there is confirmation, and some kind of mythical oath given at the coronation, and the lack of provision for the abdication of the reigning Emperor in the laws, and incorrect information about the situation in the capital. A particularly “weighty” reason is the “forcedness” of renunciation, as if not the absolute majority of our actions are forced by one or another circumstance.

Many people with monarchical sympathies, but who do not want to burden themselves with unnecessary problems, believe that Nicholas II continues to reign to this day, recognize themselves as his “subjects” and feel quite comfortable at the same time - such a “reign” will not only never end , but cannot cause anyone the slightest disturbance.

But not everyone is satisfied with this kind of necromonarchism. After all, it is known that the Sovereign transferred power to his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, who agreed to accept it only if there was the will of the people, expressed by the constituent assembly. Among the most thoughtful analysts, it is customary to quietly rejoice at the fact that this meeting supposedly “did not have time” to resolve the issue of the form of government. True, this joy is slightly clouded by sadness when it becomes known that the notorious “constituent body,” despite the short duration of its existence, perfectly “managed” to proclaim a republic. What conclusions follow from this for monarchists and whether they should become republicans - these questions remain unclear.

It can be even worse - the Grand Duke appears in the role of “Emperor Michael II.” And his one and a half day “reign” is marked by one glorious act - he transfers power to the people, from whom the Romanovs supposedly took it in 1613 - for temporary, presumably, use. This “emperor,” unconditionally recognized by the republicans, is himself the product of a deeply and hopelessly democratic worldview.

Sometimes a third “emperor” appears - Alexei Nikolaevich, who, interestingly, fits perfectly with the previous two, not excluding either the first or the second.

However, there is no need to continue. What has been said is quite enough to make it clear that the most important, turning point in the destinies of the Russian monarchy, which, like no other, needs correct understanding, represents in this regard genuine Augean stables, the clearing of which is high time to at least begin. Let's try to do this. But for our, so to speak, Archimedean lever, we need to find a solid fulcrum. The most reliable such point will be the Laws of the Russian Empire. Let's see what they say on the topic that interests us.

Two articles of the Basic Laws, placed in the chapter “On the order of inheritance of the Throne,” are devoted to the issue of renunciation of rights to the Throne. These articles are:

"37. Under the operation of the rules described above regarding the order of inheritance of the Throne, the person who has the right to it is given the freedom to renounce this right in such circumstances when this does not entail any difficulty in the further inheritance of the Throne.

38. Such a renunciation, when it is made public and turned into law, is then recognized as irrevocable.”

The first thing that is clear from these articles is that issues of renunciation of rights to the Throne are regulated by the norms of public law. This brings to mind the difference between public and private law, which was known back in Ancient Rome. The classical Roman jurist Ulpian formulated it this way: “Public law is that which relates to the position of the Roman state, private law - which relates to the benefit of individuals.”

If everything is clear with the “benefit of individuals”, then only their duties can relate to the “position of the state” on the part of its subjects. The division of law into these two areas is based on the differentiation of interests. Public law, unlike private law, protects the interests of the state. Its norms differ from private law ones in their nature - they are always imperative, i.e. imperative. The most important branch of public law, along with financial, criminal, judicial, etc., is state law.

In the sphere of private law, when a person inherits any property, it would be very strange to establish a special law giving a person the right not to take what belongs to him by law. In the system of public law, the replacement of the Throne by a certain person in the prescribed manner represents a duty to the state. Its nature is exactly the same as the civil duties of subjects, such as military service. Only a higher power can free you from it.

This approach to issues related to succession to the throne is very characteristic of Russian law, where the state point of view has never been clouded by any vestiges or foreign impurities. In Western Europe, things were somewhat different. The system of relations called feudal that formed there in the Middle Ages was distinguished by its comprehensive private legal character. Land grants from monarchs to their vassals were accompanied by certain powers of authority, which also acquired the properties of private ownership.

This, in turn, had a negative impact on state relations themselves, which were very much “privatized.” The medieval definition of a monarch as “first among equals” in relation to his own vassals is widely known. Even when liquidating the feudal system and restoring state relations, monarchs often acted using the same feudal methods, simply acting as the strongest rulers. In the transformation of feudal relations into state ones, the ideological heritage of Roman public law played a large role, which led to the formation of the so-called. absolutism.

In Germany the situation was much worse. There, the feudal estates themselves were transformed into sovereign states. The confusion of private and public principles has become a real curse of German state law. These mixtures could be the most bizarre. For example, “wills were not allowed, but agreements were allowed,” although both are typical features of private law. The “family statutes” of the ruling houses were included with all their “civilisms” in the basic state laws, etc.

In Russia, the formation of state relations took a slightly different path. The ancestral ownership of the Russian land, the corresponding ancestral relations between members of the ruling princely family - such archaism historically preceded even the very division of law into private and public. Manifestations of private law principles, which were a product of the decomposition of this system, were immediately used (the will of princely estates, the “purchase” of Ivan Kalita, etc.) to transform clan relations into state ones.

The last echoes of private law, and even generic concepts, still noticeable in the legal consciousness of the last Moscow Rurikovichs, were finally “cleaned up” with the suppression of this dynasty. When Boris Godunov was called to the kingdom, replacing the throne was already considered a state matter common to all “ranks”, in which the Rurikovich clan was not even taken into account as the bearer of any rights.

From the point of view of public law, refusal to accept the Throne represents simply an unwillingness to fulfill one's duty. But the attitude to the rights to the Throne has one component, which at first glance can be mistaken for private law, especially since in medieval legal consciousness it was precisely that. The fact is that it is just as impossible to force someone to reign as it is to force them to own any property.

According to the theory of Roman private law, ownership requires two components: “body” - actual possession, and “soul” - desire, intention to have a thing as one’s own. It is this “soul” that is absolutely necessary for accepting supreme power. But we should not see any deep private legal essence here. This is the same desire, consent that is necessary for the fulfillment of any state, and even public office.

One can, of course, force one to do this - in ancient democracies people were appointed to positions by lot - but due to historical practice this was simply considered inappropriate. The performance of a position is inextricably linked with the manifestation of will; for its effective execution, an indispensable condition is the readiness and consent of the person to perform it.

This consent, of course, can be motivated by duty, but both desire and ability play a decisive role here. Thus, for the exercise of supreme power, as the performance of a public office, consent is necessary, i.e. To accept the Throne, you must agree to reign.

This agreement in the world of medieval traditions, where the Throne was viewed as private possession, was taken for granted. But in the system of public law, accession to the Throne is not only the acceptance of a public office, but also an obligation. It turns out that consent is necessary to fulfill the obligation. Moreover, this position consists of nothing more than the fulfillment of the function of supreme power - it is impossible to force one to do this in any way - there cannot be a higher power than the supreme one.

The law considers this conflict in the system of public legal relations and resolves it through the action of its inherent state legal mechanisms. The law recognizes reluctance to reign as a sufficient reason for abdication. But the very expression of this reluctance does not yet create a renunciation in the legal sense. Only turning it into law makes it such.

Considering Art. 38 Basic Laws outside the general context, one might think that turning to law is just one of two (along with promulgation) conditions for the irrevocability of renunciation. But its significance is by no means limited to this. Moreover, in the system of public law it is the only thing that makes renunciation a legal fact. This is most clearly seen from Art. 37.

First of all, Art. 37 provides the right to abdicate. From here it is clear that initially no one has such a right as something natural. Moreover, this right is subject to conditions. It doesn’t even matter what exactly this condition is; the main point is that renunciation may not be allowed.

Of course, the reigning Emperor may not approve the abdication of the Heir, but it is difficult to imagine how it would be possible to force him to reign later. It is even more difficult to imagine how one can not allow a person whose turn to inherit has already come to abdicate. This is very similar to a favorite technique of Roman law - legal fiction - the assumption of something that does not exist in reality, but which helps a legal act more accurately achieve its purpose. Art. 37 achieves this in full - it clearly and vividly demonstrates the public legal nature of the attitude to the right to the Throne in Russian laws.

Articles on renunciation were introduced by Emperor Nicholas I. Before this, this issue was not addressed in any legal provisions. It is not difficult to see that the motivating reason for its legislative implementation was the circumstances associated with the abdication of Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich.

In the history of this renunciation, two possible situations in this case were “lost.” The first is the abdication of the Heir, approved by the reigning Emperor. Alexander I turned it into law with a special manifesto, in which the next in line of succession, Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich, was proclaimed the Heir. But this document would not have been made public, and this gave Nicholas a reason to consider the abdication invalid, which is why he swore an oath to Constantine as Emperor.

Thus, he created a second situation in which Constantine had to abdicate a second time - this time as the person to whom the right of succession to the throne was directly transferred. Nicholas I turned this renunciation into law with his manifesto on his accession to the Throne, as the next in line to inherit after the abdicator.

There is an opinion that Nicholas I wanted Constantine, if he decided to abdicate, to first accept the Throne, and then abdicate as Emperor. If so, then there is an attempt to apply a well-known technique of Roman law - the creation of a new legal status by committing an “imaginary” legal act, which in this case would be the adoption of the Throne by Constantine.

But with his refusal he created a new precedent - the abdication of the person to whom the right of inheritance directly came. The role of the supreme power, turning this renunciation into law, is played here by its owner next in line of succession. Here it is interesting to observe the “empirical” way in which the renunciation of inheritance rights, which under the dominance of private law relations was carried out unilaterally, was adapted and formalized in the system of public law.

Regarding the abdication of the Throne of the reigning Emperor, it is customary to express doubts about its very possibility - in view of the fact that it is not provided for by law. But before Constantine’s abdication, the law did not say anything about renouncing rights to the Throne in general. The point here, apparently, is the traditional private law view of the issue of renunciation. The fact that ownership of an inheritance could be refused seemed too natural to be specifically stipulated.

Concepts relating to the relationship to the Throne, having been passed through the private legal atmosphere of the Middle Ages, were so saturated with its spirit that even in the context of developed state law they often remained some kind of untouched oasis, a reserve of private legal relics, and this was habitually perceived as the norm. This is even reflected in the terminology. The relationship to the Throne is defined precisely as a right, and right and duty are diametrically opposed concepts.

But if we look at the relationship between rights and obligations from a state point of view and remember the “monarchical installation of rights based on obligations”, which L.A. Tikhomirov wrote about, then we will see that the right to the Throne directly follows from the obligation to occupy it.

The very concept of “renunciation” also has private legal content. This term defines the unilateral act of relinquishing one's possession. To give it legal force in public law, it is “turned into law,” i.e. an additional act informs it of its public legal status.

A typical manifestation of private legal consciousness was the reaction of Tsarevich Constantine to the oath taken to him. They say that before taking the oath, they had to ask my consent. And it is very difficult to object to this from the point of view of public law. It is indeed impossible to force someone to reign without consent.

Public law is forced to recognize reluctance to reign as a sufficient reason for exemption from such an obligation and give it legal force through its own means. Thus, concepts formed under the strong influence of private legal views are mastered in the context of public law. An interesting example of this is Art. 37 and 38 of our laws. We do not know whether this issue was addressed in the legislation of other monarchies, but it is obvious that most of them leave it in its original, untouched form.

In the fact that the possibility of renunciation was not initially provided for by law, in addition to the remnants of private legal consciousness, one can also find its own public legal logic. The law establishes an obligation, but not a means of evading it. He seems to be waiting for the appropriate incident in order to react to it, but he himself does not model such a “negative” situation in advance.

Likewise, the abdication of the Emperor from the Throne, if it had occurred under normal conditions, might then have been reflected in the law. But, most likely, it would be considered that those articles that already exist are sufficient. Although they are talking about renouncing not the Throne, but the rights to it, they also occupy the Throne on the basis of the existing right. Thus, the concept of renunciation of rights to the Throne includes renunciation of the throne itself, and the second can well be considered as a special case of the first.

The abdication of Emperor Nicholas II indeed cannot be considered valid. And the reason for this is that it was not turned into law. Its registration and publication by the “reformed Senate” have nothing to do with the “Russian Republic”, but nothing to do with the laws of the Russian Empire. In the light of the latter, the abdication of the Emperor could be turned into law only by the supreme authority, namely, by the person next in line of succession, who would occupy the vacated Throne - in direct analogy with the abdication of Tsarevich Constantine.

The analogy here is, of course, not complete. In one case, the reigning monarch abdicates, in the other, the person to whom the right of inheritance directly came, but in no case “Emperor Constantine I.” But both abdications can be turned into law only in one, completely identical way - by a manifesto on the accession to the Throne of the person next in line of succession.

The question may arise: why couldn’t the Sovereign, as the holder of supreme power, turn his will into law? Yes, because here his will would conflict with his duty. To free oneself from one's own obligation, and, moreover, through the powers that arise from this same obligation - this would be the height of legal absurdity.

The reigning Emperor, as the holder of the direct right to the Throne, if he wishes to renounce it, has to act on common grounds, so to speak, with potential bearers of this right according to the requirements of Art. 37 and 38, leaving the translation of his will into law to his successor. This ensures one of the most important properties of supreme power - its continuity. The abdication of the Sovereign from the Throne becomes possible only if there is a successor.

In addition, this is how the condition-limitation of Art. 37 ( “when there will be no difficulty in the further inheritance of the Throne” ), which in other cases might seem like a legal fiction. Thus, in the absence of a successor, the Emperor’s abdication of the Throne cannot legally take place. That is, if the Sovereign refuses to reign, then, of course, it is impossible to force him to do so. But by virtue of the public law principle, his reign will continue dejure until his legitimate successor accepts the Throne and converts the abdication of his predecessor into law.

As you know, Emperor Nicholas II handed over the Throne to his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. In this regard, it is quite rightly noted that he did not have the right to bypass his son in the line of succession. Mikhail could only take power as a ruler under the minor Emperor Alexei Nikolaevich. But for the convenience of reasoning, let’s assume that Mikhail would be next in line of succession after the Sovereign. Let us admit such a legal fiction, especially since it was unanimously accepted by all participants in those events.

So, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich did not accept the Throne, but did not abandon it either. He agreed to accept the crown only on one condition: “if such is the will of our people, who must, by popular vote, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish a form of government and new Basic Laws of the Russian State” . It follows from this that he did not agree to accept the Throne by other means. Including according to the laws of the Russian Empire - "by the force of the inheritance law itself".

It is appropriate to recall here that the Constituent Assembly is nothing more than an organ of democracy, i.e. the supreme power of the people. His idea is that all power belongs to the people, who, through their representatives, establish state bodies and establish laws. In an autocratic monarchy, all this is done by the holder of supreme power - the monarch, but in a people's autocracy, democracy, the people elect special representatives for this purpose.

The idea that the Constituent Assembly could establish an autocratic monarchy is naive. This is, perhaps, the only thing that it could not establish, because... itself belongs to a fundamentally different state system, and can only act within its framework. Moreover, there was no need to establish an autocratic monarchy. It was already “established” a long time ago. The only thing the Dynasty could count on under the “new system” was the establishment of the so-called. constitutional monarchy, i.e. preservation of the institution of monarchy (the position of monarch) within the framework of parliamentary democracy.

The compilers of the text signed by Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich (V.D. Nabokov and Baron B.E. Nolde) also mentioned as a matter of course the “new basic laws” that the proposed assembly was supposed to establish. Of course, the “old” laws, which were based on the autocratic power of the monarch, were completely unsuitable for the “new Russia”. All this is relevant to the laws of the Russian Empire in only one point: according to these laws, Mikhail refused to accept the Throne.

The Swedish republican and expert on the Russian monarchy S. Scott wrote on this occasion that if Michael had abdicated unconditionally, he would thereby have ceded the right to the throne to the next in line of succession - Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. But with his conditional refusal-consent, Mikhail allegedly “knocked the crown out from under” Kirill. Leaving aside the question of the whereabouts of the crown in the view of the Republicans, we only note that by his refusal to accept the Throne according to the law, Michael, in the light of the same law, presented the crown to Cyril on a velvet pillow with gold tassels. All that remained was to give it legal status.

This, as is known, was not done. Kirill Vladimirovich, along with other adult Members of the Imperial House, signed a statement (drafted by Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich), which included the following words: “Concerning our rights, and in particular mine, to the Succession to the Throne, I, passionately loving my Motherland, fully join those thoughts that are expressed in the act of refusal of Vel. Prince Mikhail Alexandrovich" .

Of course, a statement about joining thoughts deserves the same legal qualification as these thoughts themselves, but this was not turned into law, and there was no one to do it.

At a superficial glance, the motives for the actions of the Members of the Imperial House can be explained by the desire to preserve the monarchy and the Dynasty in the new “legal field”, in the scope of the “new fundamental laws” - especially since Michael’s statement says this in plain text. There is, of course, nothing wrong with this, but this problem is already beyond the scope of our “old” Fundamental Laws and goes beyond the scope of the topic under consideration.

If we consider all this in the light of the legal norms of the Russian Empire, then first of all we will see a number of renunciations, but all of them will be legally void. The next thing that cannot be ignored is the deep loyalty of Dynasty Members to the rights of their predecessors in the line of succession. None of them considered themselves entitled to deprive their elders in line, incl. Emperor Nicholas II himself, the opportunity to take back his renunciations in circumstances that could change favorably.

To Republicans who believe that members of royal families do nothing but snatch crowns from under each other’s feet, such a motive may seem unrealistic. But in the history of our monarchy there is a known case when two brothers - Konstantin and Nikolai Pavlovich - ceded the Throne to each other within 20 days.

Be that as it may, not a single one of the renunciations of 1917 was turned into law, i.e. all of them remained legally void, and the reign of Emperor Nicholas II continued dejure until his death.

The highest Act that put an end to the revolutionary turmoil, if not throughout Russia, then at least in the legal consciousness of the remnant of the faithful (in the scope of the Fundamental Laws on the Succession of the Throne), was the manifesto of 1924, in which Sovereign Kirill Vladimirovich announced the assumption of the rights and title of All-Russian Emperor belonging to him by law. There was not a single word mentioned in this document about the abdication of Nicholas II. And this is understandable: legally, renunciation did not exist, and there was no point in turning it into law posthumously.

The only motive for publishing the Manifesto is the final conviction that Nicholas II and those following him in line to inherit the Throne, Tsarevich Alexei and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, are no longer alive. It follows from this that the reign of Kirill Vladimirovich began, according to the law, “from the day of the death of his predecessor” (Article 53).

This article, introduced by Emperor Nicholas I, is even more justified by his personal experience than even articles on renunciation. The concessions of the crown to each other between him and Tsarevich Constantine lasted a little less than a month, but in the manifesto of December 12, 1825, Nicholas I names November 19, the day of the death of his predecessor, Alexander I, as the day of his accession to the Throne.

During the Great Troubles of the twentieth century, the “hitch” with the succession to the throne lasted a little longer. The apparent reason for this, named in the 1924 manifesto, has already been discussed. But it also took time to properly understand the relationship between one’s rights and responsibilities.

Emperor Kirill realized his rights completely in the spirit of the laws of the Empire. Not only as a right, but also as a duty. He himself said it best: “I will only say that, according to the law, I am the All-Russian Emperor and that I am aware of my duty. I know that the time will come when Russia will need a legitimate Tsar. I demand from everyone that they fulfill their duty towards the Motherland, and therefore I am the first to do this.”

Notes:

The same duty is royal service from a religious, Christian point of view, but we do not touch on this aspect here, limiting ourselves exclusively to the legal side of the issue.

In relation to feudal relations, one can speak specifically about private ownership, but in no case about private property. Here it is appropriate to recall the well-known aphorism of Roman law: “There is nothing in common between property and possession.” You can own something without being the legal owner; You can be an owner, but not own. Of course, there is still something in common between these two types of relationships. The coincidence of ownership and ownership is the optimal norm.

Feudal “conditional ownership” of land is a kind of chronic right of ownership, with no alternative to the right of ownership in the system of normative feudal relations, but with a strong tendency to degenerate into such in the course of the decomposition of the latter.

In turn, the feudal lords turned to Roman private law to justify their interests, which allowed them to view their possessions, including the people living on them, as private property.

The theory of Roman absolutism in the history of the European monarchy played a far from clear role. Being a powerful ideological weapon of royal power in the fight against competitors, it did her a disservice in the future. The Roman doctrine, which grew out of republican-democratic soil, looked at imperial power as the sum of republican powers, and at the emperor as the bearer of the supreme power of the people.

This power, as the power of the majority, was not limited by anyone or anything, not even by any divine law, but ultimately the question could arise: is it time to return it to its rightful owner - the people, which is what happened subsequently. The own ideological content of the European monarchy, which grew out of the social system and the Christian faith, did not develop and, suppressed by Roman doctrine, withered away.

Quote from M. Zyzykin’s book “Tsarist Power and the Law of Succession to the Throne in Russia.” Published in 1924, it remains the most significant example of anti-legitimist literature. The conciliators never created anything more serious.

One of the main ideas of this essay is this. Russian laws relating to Succession to the Throne and the Imperial Family are entirely “received” from German law, and in order to correctly understand Russian laws, one must turn to German “primary sources”.

Without bothering to prove this postulate, M. Zyzykin proposes to consider our laws from the point of view of German law with all its feudal-medieval private legal remnants and atavisms. In other words, into Russian laws, which were initially free from all this, all the historical legal garbage that German law itself did not know what to do with should be introduced.

In the light of this theory, our Law on Succession to the Throne and the Establishment of the Imperial Family are supposedly some kind of “family statutes” of the German noble houses, in which all power, “if the house ceases to reign,” belongs to the “agnates of the house,” i.e. . the totality of all adult male members of the surname.

This ideological provocation by M. Zyzykin, with the temptation to turn the Imperial House into a “dynastic republic,” failed. Members of the Royal Family were at the top of their game at that time and the absolute majority (with the exception of a well-known odious personality [meaning Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich the Younger, who “kneeled begging” Nicholas II to abdicate - ed.], with his brother and nephew) recognized Emperor Kirill.

Subsequently, it became simply indecent to “congregate”, and M. Zyzykin himself signed his allegiance to Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich. But then, during the gradual extinction and decomposition of the Russian emigration, these theories were “reborn” and were brought to post-Soviet Russia, where some are considered to be among the “golden fund” of the heritage of the Russian Abroad. So M. Zyzykin’s opus still awaits a detailed critical analysis.

The circle of persons entitled to inherit the Russian Throne is not limited to Russian subjects. The dynasties of Europe are full of descendants of female figures of the House of Romanov, who have their place in the line of succession. But they could hardly have been of any use during the events described. But with male Dynasty Members, things are not so simple. In addition to Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, there were several other minors among them. They could not renounce their rights due to their incapacity, and their parents and guardians not only could not dispose of their rights, but were also obliged to protect them.

“The Conversation of the Sovereign Emperor with an English Correspondent” is included in the collection “Russian Foreign Congress. 1926 Paris. Documents and materials", M. "Russian Way", 2006, pp. 265-271.

The book is issue No. 6 of the series “Studies of Contemporary Russian History” edited by A. Solzhenitsyn. The preface to the document says that “a prominent representative of major press organs, Mr. Steinthal,” spoke with the Sovereign, be

Edward's abdication is supposedly the eighth, but judging by his personal signature, then FIRST:

Look at the signature: "Eduard R 1".

The fact that he is “eighth” could have been corrected later. But they were afraid to forge his signature.

Then Grandma Lisa's uncle was Edward (VII) I, and her father was not George VI, but George (V) I.

That is, Edward I and George I.

They are not on the screenshots at all! This entire ancient royal dynasty of Windsor begins with Grandma Lisa herself.

And one more “hello” from the Connaught Cossacks:

At the time of his birth, the prince was ninth in line to the British throne.

Alastair died unexpectedly next year in Ottawa at the age of 28 for unknown reasons. IN diaries Sir Alan Lascelles Private Secretary to King George VI, published in 2006 , it is said that “the Earl of Athlone and the officers of the regiment in which Alastair served considered him an incompetent and incapable military man; he fell out of the window when I was drunk and died from hypothermia at night ". At the time of his death, Alastair was twelfth in line to the throne. He was not married and had no descendants.

Date of death of Alastair Windsor (Connaught) 1943.

In 1942, he inherited the titles from his grandfather Duke of Connaught and Stracharne, Earl of Sussex.

That is, there was another dynasty, the Windsors of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who lived in Windsor Castle in the 19th century, while Victoria took her photographs for the gossip department exclusively on the street and under the fence.

This Windsor dynasty of the Connaught Cossacks, the Elston old guard, was interrupted only in 1943. It looks like he was killed and killed as the heir.

You see, there is a failure there between 1918 and 1945. There are NO contemporary Windsors as rulers of Great Britain. Missing!

By the way, here they found another “blunder” in the abdication of Edward (V)I:

For comparison: the abdication of Nicholas (rootless) because there is no surname (family). Last name (family, clan) not specified.

And Nikolai Neizvestny writes, as befits a colonel of the Red (German) army, the German occupier-commandant of the St. Petersburg fortress, in the name of the Chief of Staff. Like any subordinate and any military man serving in the state army. True, he writes not according to the Charter, but the army there was not according to the Charter, not the State Army in our understanding, but the Cossack party of Social Democrats, an army-style organized crime group. What an army, such a language, such a Charter. There are exactly the same colonels there with the Church Slavonic language, which Dal himself understood only with his dictionary.

Nikolai's date is in numbers, not in words.

For comparison: a sample of writing a document in English. Dates are in numbers.

In addition, this is how the condition-limitation of Art. 37 ( “when there will be no difficulty in the further inheritance of the Throne”), which in other cases might seem like a legal fiction. Thus, in the absence of a successor, the Emperor’s abdication of the Throne cannot legally take place. That is, if the Sovereign refuses to reign, then, of course, it is impossible to force him to do so. But by virtue of the public law principle, his reign will continue dejure until his legitimate successor accepts the Throne and converts the abdication of his predecessor into law.

So, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich did not accept the Throne, but did not abandon it either. He agreed to accept the crown only on one condition: “if such is the will of our people, who must, by popular vote, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish a form of government and new Basic Laws of the Russian State”. It follows from this that he did not agree to accept the Throne by other means. Including according to the laws of the Russian Empire - "by the force of the inheritance law itself".

Here it is appropriate to recall that the Constituent Assembly is nothing more than an organ of democracy, i.e. the supreme power of the people. His idea is that all power belongs to the people, who, through their representatives, establish state bodies and establish laws. In an autocratic monarchy, all this is done by the holder of supreme power - the monarch, but in a people's autocracy, democracy, the people elect special representatives for this purpose.

The idea that the Constituent Assembly could establish an autocratic monarchy is naive. This is, perhaps, the only thing that it could not establish, because... itself belongs to a fundamentally different state system, and can only act within its framework. Moreover, there was no need to establish an autocratic monarchy. It was established a long time ago. The only thing the Dynasty could count on under the “new system” was the establishment of the so-called. constitutional monarchy, i.e. preservation of the institution of monarchy (the position of monarch) within the framework of parliamentary democracy.

The Swedish republican and expert on the Russian monarchy St. Scott wrote on this occasion that if Michael had abdicated unconditionally, he would thereby have ceded the right to the throne to the next in line of succession - Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. But with his conditional refusal-consent, Mikhail allegedly “knocked the crown out from under” Kirill. Leaving aside the question of the whereabouts of the crown in the view of the Republicans, we only note that by his refusal to accept the Throne according to the law, Michael, in the light of the same law, presented the crown to Cyril on a velvet pillow with gold tassels. All that remained was to give it legal status.

Of course, a statement about joining thoughts deserves the same legal qualification as these thoughts themselves, but this was not turned into law, and there was no one to do it.

At a superficial glance, the motives for the actions of the Members of the Imperial House can be explained by the desire to preserve the monarchy and the Dynasty in the new “legal field”, in the scope of the “new fundamental laws” - especially since Michael’s statement says this in plain text. There is, of course, nothing wrong with this, but this problem is already beyond the scope of our “old” Basic Laws and goes beyond the scope of the topic under consideration.

If we turn to the legal norms of the Russian Empire, then first of all we will see a number of renunciations, but all of them will be legally void. The next thing that cannot be ignored is the deep loyalty of Dynasty Members to the rights of their predecessors in the line of succession. None of them considered themselves entitled to deprive their elders in line, incl. Emperor Nicholas II himself, the opportunity to take back his renunciations in circumstances that could change favorably.

To Republicans who believe that members of the royal families do nothing but snatch crowns from under each other's feet, this approach may seem unrealistic. But in the history of our monarchy there is a known case when two brothers - Konstantin and Nikolai Pavlovich - ceded the Throne to each other within 20 days.

Be that as it may, not a single one of the renunciations of 1917 was turned into law, i.e. all of them remained legally void, and the reign of Emperor Nicholas II continued dejure until his death.

During the Great Troubles of the twentieth century, the “hitch” with the succession to the throne lasted somewhat longer. The apparent reason for this, named in the 1924 manifesto, has already been discussed. But it also took time to properly understand the relationship between one’s rights and responsibilities.

The book is issue No. 6 of the series “Studies of Contemporary Russian History” edited by A. Solzhenitsyn. The preface to the document states that “a prominent representative of major press organs, Mr. Steinthal,” spoke with the Sovereign; the conversation “was published in many newspapers in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and America.”

- abdication of the throne of Emperor Nicholas II. Over the 100-year period since February 1917, many memoirs and studies on this topic have been published.

Unfortunately, deep analysis was often replaced by very categorical assessments based on the emotional perception of those ancient events. In particular, it is widely believed that the act of abdication itself did not comply with the laws of the Russian Empire in force at the time of its signing and was generally made under serious pressure. Obviously, it is necessary to consider the question of the legality or illegality of the abdication of Nicholas II itself.

It cannot be categorically stated that the act of renunciation is a consequence of violence, deception and other forms of coercion in relation to Nicholas II.

“The act of renunciation, as is clear from the circumstances of the signing... was not a free expression of His will, and is therefore null and void,”

Many monarchists argued. But this thesis is refuted not only by eyewitness accounts (many of them can be cited), but also by the emperor’s own entries in his diary (for example, an entry dated March 2, 1917).

“In the morning Ruzsky came and read a very long conversation on the phone with Rodzianka. According to him, the situation in Petrograd is such that now the ministry from the Duma is powerless to do anything, since the Social Democrats are fighting it. the party represented by the working committee. My renunciation is needed. Ruzsky conveyed this conversation to Headquarters, and Alekseev - to all commanders-in-chief. By 2.5 o'clock the answers came from everyone. The point is that in the name of saving Russia and keeping the army at the front calm, you need to decide to take this step. I agreed…"

(Diaries of Emperor Nicholas II. M., 1991. P. 625).

“There is no sacrifice that I would not make in the name of the real good and for the salvation of Russia,”

These words from the sovereign’s diary entries and his telegrams dated March 2, 1917 best explained his attitude towards the decision made.

The fact of the emperor’s conscious and voluntary abdication of the throne was not in doubt among his contemporaries. So, for example, the Kiev branch of the monarchical “Right Center” noted on May 18, 1917 that “the act of renunciation, written in extremely godly and patriotic words, publicly establishes a complete and voluntary renunciation... To declare that this renunciation was personally extorted by violence was would be extremely insulting, first of all, to the person of the monarch, in addition, it is completely untrue, for the sovereign abdicated under the pressure of circumstances, but nevertheless completely voluntarily.”

But the most striking document, perhaps, is the farewell speech to the army, written Nicholas II March 8, 1917 and then issued in the form of order No. 371. It, in full awareness of what was accomplished, speaks of the transfer of power from the monarch to Provisional Government.

“For the last time I appeal to you, my beloved troops,” wrote Emperor Nicholas II. - After I abdicated for myself and for my son from the Russian throne, power was transferred to the Provisional Government, which arose at the initiative of the State Duma. May God help him lead Russia along the path of glory and prosperity... Whoever now thinks about peace, who desires it, is a traitor to the Fatherland, its traitor... Fulfill your duty, valiantly defend our great Motherland, obey the Provisional Government, obey your superiors, remember , that any weakening of the order of service only plays into the hands of the enemy...”

(Korevo N.N. Succession to the throne according to the Basic State Laws. Information on some issues relating to succession to the throne. Paris, 1922. pp. 127-128).

Also noteworthy is the assessment of well-known telegrams from front commanders that influenced the sovereign’s decision in the memoirs of the Quartermaster General of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s headquarters Yu. N. Danilova, an eyewitness to the events:

“Both the Provisional Committee of the State Duma members, the Headquarters and the commanders-in-chief of the fronts... interpreted the question of abdication ... in the name of preserving Russia and bringing the war to the end, not as a violent act or any revolutionary “action”, but from the point of view of completely loyal advice or petition , the final decision on which had to come from the emperor himself. Thus, one cannot blame these individuals, as some party leaders do, for any treason or betrayal. They only honestly and openly expressed their opinion that the act of voluntary abdication of Emperor Nicholas II from the throne could, in their opinion, ensure the achievement of military success and the further development of Russian statehood. If they made a mistake, then it’s hardly their fault...”

Of course, following the conspiracy theory against Nicholas II, it can be assumed that coercion could be applied to the sovereign if he did not accept the abdication. But the monarch’s voluntary decision to abdicate the throne excluded the possibility of anyone forcing him to such an action.

It is appropriate in this regard to quote the Empress Dowager's account Maria Feodorovna, mother of Nicholas II, from her “memory book”:

“...March 4/17, 1917 At 12 o’clock we arrived at Headquarters, in Mogilev, in a terrible cold and hurricane. Dear Nicky met me at the station, we went together to his house, where lunch was served with everyone else. There were also Fredericks, Sergei Mikhailovich, Sandro, who came with me, Grabbe, Kira, Dolgorukov, Voeikov, N. Leuchtenbergsky and Doctor Fedorov. After lunch, poor Nicky told about all the tragic events that had happened in two days. He opened his bleeding heart to me, we both cried. First came a telegram from Rodzianko, saying that he must take the situation with the Duma into his own hands in order to maintain order and stop the revolution; then - in order to save the country - he proposed to form a new government and... abdicate the throne in favor of his son (unbelievable!). But Niki, naturally, could not part with his son and handed over the throne to Misha! All the generals telegraphed to him and advised the same, and he finally gave in and signed the manifesto. Nicky was incredibly calm and dignified in this terribly humiliating position. It’s like I’ve been hit over the head, I can’t understand anything! I returned at 4 o'clock and talked. It would be nice to go to Crimea. Real meanness is only for the sake of seizing power. We said goodbye. He is a real knight"

(GA RF. F. 642. Op. 1. D. 42. L. 32).

Supporters of the version of the illegality of abdication claim that there is no corresponding provision in the system of Russian state legislation. However abdication provided for Article 37 of the Code of Basic Laws of 1906:

“In the operation of the rules ... on the procedure for inheriting the throne, the person who has the right to it is given the freedom to renounce this right in such circumstances when this does not entail any difficulty in the further inheritance of the throne.”

Article 38 confirmed:

“Such a renunciation, when it is made public and turned into law, is then recognized as irrevocable.”

The interpretation of these two articles in pre-revolutionary Russia, in contrast to the interpretation of the Russian diaspora and some of our contemporaries, was not in doubt. In the course of state law by the famous Russian jurist Professor N. M. Korkunova noted:

“Can someone who has already ascended the throne renounce it? Since the reigning sovereign undoubtedly has the right to the throne, and the law grants everyone who has the right to the throne the right to abdicate, then we must answer this in the affirmative..."

A similar assessment was contained in a course on state law written by an equally famous Russian legal scholar, professor at Kazan University V. V. Ivanovsky:

“According to the spirit of our legislation... a person who has once occupied the throne can renounce it, as long as this does not cause any difficulties in the further succession to the throne.”

But in emigration in 1924, a former private assistant professor at the Faculty of Law of Moscow University M. V. Zyzykin, giving a special, sacred meaning to the articles on succession to the throne, separated “renunciation of the right to the throne,” which, according to his interpretation, is possible only for representatives of the ruling house before the start of the reign, from the right to "abdication", which those already reigning supposedly do not possess. But such a statement is conditional. The reigning emperor was not excluded from the reigning house; he ascended the throne, having all the legal rights to do so, which he retained throughout his reign.

Now about the renunciation of the heir - Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich. The sequence of events is important here. Let us recall that the original text of the act corresponded to the version prescribed by the Basic Laws, i.e. the heir was supposed to ascend the throne under the regency of the emperor’s brother - Mikhail Romanov.

Russian history has not yet known the facts of the abdication of some members of the reigning house for others. However, this could be considered unlawful if it was carried out for an adult, capable member of the imperial family.

But, Firstly, Nicholas II abdicated for his son Alexei, who reached only 12.5 years in February 1917, and came of age at 16. The minor heir himself, of course, could not take any political and legal acts. According to the assessment of the deputy of the IV State Duma, a member of the Octobrist faction N.V. Savich,

“Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich was still a child; he could not make any decisions that had legal force. Therefore, there could be no attempt to force him to abdicate or refuse to take the throne."

Secondly, The sovereign made this decision after consultations with his physician, Professor S. P. Fedorov who declared the heir's incurable disease (hemophilia). In this regard, the possible death of the only son before he reaches adulthood would become the very “difficulty in the further inheritance of the throne” that Article 37 of the Basic Laws warned about.

After the abdication of the Tsarevich took place, the act of March 2, 1917 did not create insoluble “difficulties in the further succession to the throne.” Now great Prince Mikhail Alexandrovich would have headed the House of Romanov, and his heirs would have continued the dynasty. According to a modern historian A. N. Kamensky,

“The manifesto and telegram became essentially legal documents of those years and a written decree on changing the law on succession to the throne. These documents automatically recognized the marriage of Michael II with Countess Brasova. Thus, automatically Count Georgy Brasov (son of Mikhail Alexandrovich - Georgy Mikhailovich - V. Ts.) became the Grand Duke and heir to the throne of the Russian state.”

Of course, it should be remembered that at the time of drawing up and signing the act of abdication, the sovereign could not have known about the intention of his younger brother (who was in Petrograd in those days) not to accept the throne until the decision of the Constituent Assembly...

And the last argument in favor of the illegality of renunciation. Could the emperor make this decision in accordance with his status as head of state, since the Russian Empire after 1905 was already a Duma monarchy, and legislative power was shared by the tsar with legislative institutions - the State Council and the State Duma?

The answer is given by Article 10 of the Basic Laws, which established the priority of the sovereign in the executive branch:

“The power of administration in its entirety belongs to the sovereign emperor within the entire Russian state. In supreme management, his power acts directly (that is, it does not require coordination with any structures. - V. Ts.); in matters of government of a subordinate, a certain degree of power is entrusted from him, according to the law, to the places and persons acting in his name and according to his commands.”

Of particular importance was also the 11th article, which allows the issuance of normative acts individually:

“The Sovereign Emperor, in the order of supreme government, issues, in accordance with the laws, decrees for the organization and implementation of various parts of state administration, as well as commands necessary for the execution of laws.”

Of course, these individually adopted acts could not change the essence of the Basic Laws.

N. M. Korkunov noted that decrees and commands issued “in the manner of supreme government” were of a legislative nature and did not violate the norms of state law. The act of abdication did not change the system of power approved by the Basic Laws, preserving the monarchical system.

An interesting psychological assessment of this act was given by the famous Russian monarchist V. I. Gurko:

“...The Russian autocratic tsar has no right to limit his power in any way... Nicholas II considered himself to have the right to abdicate the throne, but did not have the right to reduce the limits of his royal powers...”

The formal aspect of the act of renunciation was not violated either. It was sealed with the signature of the “subject minister”, since according to the status of the Minister of the Imperial Court, Adjutant General Count V. B. Fredericks sealed all acts related to the “establishment of the imperial family” and related to succession to the throne. Neither the sovereign’s pencil signature (later protected by varnish on one of the copies) nor the color of the ink or graphite changed the essence of the document.

As for the formal procedure for final legalization - approval of the act by the Governing Senate - there were no difficulties on this side. On March 5, 1917, the new Minister of Justice A.F. Kerensky handed over to the Chief Prosecutor P. B. Vrassky the act of abdication of Nicholas II and the act of “non-acceptance of the throne” by Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. As the participants of this meeting recalled,

“Having considered the issue proposed for its discussion, the Governing Senate decided to publish both acts in the “Collection of Legislation and Government Orders” and inform about this by decrees to all officials and government places subordinate to the Senate. Both acts were passed by the Senate to be preserved in perpetuity.”

In the context of an ongoing war, victory over the enemy became the most important thing. For the good of the Motherland, essentially, for the sake of this victory the sovereign abdicated the throne. For her sake, he called on his subjects, soldiers and officers, to take a new oath.

The formal legal interpretation of the legality or illegality of abdication did not in any way detract from the moral feat of the sovereign. After all, the participants in those distant events are not soulless subjects of law, not “hostages of the monarchical idea,” but living people. What was more important: keeping the vows given when crowning the kingdom, or preserving stability, order, preserving the integrity of the entrusted state, so necessary for victory at the front, as members of the State Duma and front commanders convinced him of? What is more important: the bloody suppression of the “rebellion” or the prevention, albeit for a short time, of the impending “tragedy of fratricide”?

For the passion-bearer sovereign, the impossibility of “stepping over blood” during the war became obvious. He did not want to retain the throne by violence, regardless of the number of victims...

“In the last Orthodox Russian monarch and members of his family, we see people who sought to embody the commandments of the Gospel in their lives. In the suffering endured by the royal family in captivity with meekness, patience and humility, in their martyrdom in Yekaterinburg on the night of July 4/17, 1918, the conquering light of Christ's faith was revealed, just as it shone in the lives and deaths of millions of Orthodox Christians Christians who suffered persecution for Christ in the twentieth century,”

This is how the moral feat of Emperor Nicholas II was assessed in the determination of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church on the glorification of the new martyrs and confessors of the Russian twentieth century (August 13-16, 2000).

Vasily Tsvetkov,
Doctor of Historical Sciences

02.03.2017

Acts of renunciation

Vladimir RUDAKOV, Nikita BRUSILOVSKY, Elena VILSHANSKAYA

What are the documents on the abdication of Nicholas II and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, is there any reason to question their authenticity and how legitimate were the acts drawn up then? To answer these questions, the magazine “Historian” went to the State Archives of the Russian Federation

Both acts of abdication - of the emperor and his younger brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich - are kept in the personal fund of Nicholas II. In the State Archive of the Russian Federation, which under Soviet rule was called the Central State Archive of the October Revolution (TsGAOR), this fund is listed under number 601.

SIGNATURE IN PENCIL

Chief specialist of the Russian Civil Aviation, Doctor of Historical Sciences Zinaida Peregudova I worked in the archives all my life. She brings us ordinary cardboard folders with case numbers on the title page: one of them contains documents that put an end to the history of the Russian Empire.

According to Peregudova, the abdication documents were transferred to the TsGAOR in 1973 from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, where they had been kept since 1929. They also came there from the manuscript department of the Library of the Academy of Sciences (BAN), where they had lain in one of the desk drawers since the fall of 1917. But this is a separate story, and more on it later.

In the meantime, we hold in our hands sheets with the autographs of the last reigning Romanovs. Nicholas' renunciation was typed on a typewriter on A3 sheet folded in half. The date and place of signing are indicated below - “city. Pskov”, there is a pencil signature “Nicholas”, as well as a visa inscribed with a pen - “Minister of the Imperial Household, Adjutant General Count Fredericks”. Michael’s renunciation was written by him in his own hand in ink on an A4 sheet. Both documents have traces of folds: it is clear that they were folded several times...

The Emperor signed a document stating his abdication of supreme power in Pskov on the night of March 2 (15) to March 3 (16), 1917, between 11 p.m. 32 min. and 0 o'clock. 28 min. However, the document itself says something else: “March 2, 3 p.m.” This is the time when Nikolai personally wrote telegrams to the Chairman of the State Duma Mikhail Rodzianko and Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Mikhail Alekseev about his readiness to abdicate the throne in favor of his son. The Emperor, by putting this hour on the abdication document, sought to show that he made the decision not under pressure, but independently - in the name of preserving Russia.

That same night, Chief of Staff of the Northern Front, General Yuri Danilov, transmitting the contents of the document by telegraph from Pskov to Mogilev, where the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was located, called the document itself “an act of abdication.” This is the earliest mention of it as an act of renunciation Nicholas II. However, historians have been arguing for a hundred years: can this paper be called an act of renunciation?

The first thing that catches your eye is the emperor, as opposed to the minister of the court Vladimir Fredericks, who endorsed the document, signed not with a pen, but with an ordinary pencil. Zinaida Peregudova, who has repeatedly held in her hands documents issued by the Tsar’s office, does not see anything extraordinary in this: “Nicholas, like his father Alexander III, often signed with a pencil, usually blue, but sometimes red or plain.” In addition, she reminds us, we have evidence of the emperor’s aide-de-camp Anatoly Mordvinova, who in his memoirs “From Experiences” noted: “His Majesty signed them [two copies of the renunciation. – "Historian"] in the dining car at about one o'clock in the morning, silently, standing, with a pencil, which was accidentally found at the aide-de-camp of Duke N. of Leuchtenberg, and in the presence of only us, his closest retinue ... "

SOMEONE "NIKOLAY"

However, Zinaida Peregudova admits, most skeptics are confused not so much by the pencil signature as by the overall design of the document. So, one of the skeptics is a St. Petersburg historian, candidate of historical sciences Mikhail Safonov not so long ago he presented well-founded arguments in favor of the dubiousness of the “act”.

“It is easy to notice that nowhere is the person on whose behalf this document was written referred to as either an autocrat or an emperor. It's just someone "Nikolai"; not named by first and last name and the addressee is general Mikhail Alekseev“- emphasizes the researcher. According to him, it turns out that a certain Nikolai reports his decision to the nameless chief of staff. Strictly speaking, from the point of view of a historian, this “manifesto” is not an act of renunciation or a legally binding document in general.

For the highest manifestos, a stable design formula was developed. It was reproduced typographically on the printed forms of the Ministry of the Imperial Household: “By the Grace of God We, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, and so on, and so on, and so on.” Then a phrase was usually placed indicating to whom the manifesto was addressed: “We declare to all Our faithful subjects.” The text was necessarily followed by the final formula: “Dan,” that is, the place where the manifesto was signed was indicated, for example, “in Pskov,” and the date was indicated, for example, “on the third day of March, in the year of the Nativity of Christ one thousand nine hundred and seventeen, of Our Reign at twenty-three." The document was completed by the signature of the autocrat. The hour and minute of the signature, as in the “act” submitted to Headquarters, were never indicated.

In addition, there was a strictly established procedure for issuing manifestos. Despite the fact that at the end of the 19th century typewriters appeared in Russia and they began to be used to draw up draft documents, the text of the manifesto, copies of which were signed by the emperor, was necessarily copied by hand. Only a document drawn up in this way received legal force. Special scribes who had especially beautiful handwriting served in the office of the Ministry of the Imperial Household. It was called “rondeau”, and the people who owned it were called “rondists”. Only they were involved in the copying of important papers: rescripts, charters and manifestos.

Refusal of the throne of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich on March 3 (16), 1917. Script. Civil Aviation of the Russian Federation

Of course, no blots or erasures were allowed in such documents: any correction would no less deprive the document of legal force, Safonov emphasizes. The “Act”, signed by Nikolai, contains a very noticeable erasure: according to one version, the elderly Count Fredericks was unable to fit the sweeping signature at the bottom of the page on his first attempt, so he had to clean it up and put it again.

The same Mordvinov wrote that when they came to Fredericks’s compartment to have him certify the documents, it was not easy for the 78-year-old minister to endorse such an act. “With what indescribable excitement the poor old man, coping with difficulty with a trembling hand, signed them for a very long time,” recalled the aide-de-camp.

It is noteworthy that when it came to the publication of the act of abdication of Nicholas in the armies of the Northern Front, General Danilov, who on the night of March 2 (15) to March 3 (16) transmitted the contents of the document to Mogilev, turned to Headquarters with a request to telegraph the corresponding text to Pskov “entirely, not excluding the title.” From Headquarters they replied: the act is “the text of the manifesto on abdication of the throne, which was received by telegraph from you. Does it need to be repeated? There are no changes there." Danilov was perplexed: is a title needed and what kind? He couldn’t believe that the text he handed over was an act of renunciation.

The editorial offices of some newspapers found themselves in exactly the same situation. So, for example, “Morning of Russia” published the text of Nicholas’s telegram on abdication with the heading required for any manifesto, that is, “By the Grace of God We, Nicholas the Second...”, since it seemed incredible that the manifesto would not have a title. With such a heading, leaflets with the text of renunciation were also published.

Fedor Gaida

Of course, the emperor's abdication was not provided for by law. At first glance it seems incredible: how is it possible that an autocratic monarch does not have the right to abdicate? But the fact of the matter is that from a legal point of view, Nicholas II was obliged to first issue a law on the procedure for abdication, and only then abdicate according to this law. And of course, he could only deny for himself, but not for his son. In addition, the act of abdication in favor of his brother stated that Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich must take an “inviolable oath” that he would rule in unity with “representatives of the people.” However, taking an oath on the part of the monarch is also going beyond the limits of the legislation in force at that time.

Thus, from the point of view of the law existing at that time, the signing of Act 2 (15) March 1917 by Nicholas II was accompanied by a number of very serious violations. In this sense, it does not matter at all how it is composed, whether the emperor signed it in pencil or not, whether the original is in our hands or not. These are minor, purely technical things. From a legal point of view, there are things that are much more significant.

And what was the act of March 3 (16), that is, the act of renunciation of power by Mikhail Alexandrovich? Strictly speaking, this act is not a renunciation at all. In fact, this document has no legal status at all. Mikhail did not assume power and, as is known, asked Russian citizens to support the Provisional Government and the Constituent Assembly. It was a kind of political declaration that stated the fact of the victory of the revolution. An interesting touch: both of these acts were published together, on the same day. Thus, they affirmed the cessation of the previous legal order. From that moment, from the publication of the two recantations, a new, revolutionary legitimacy came into force, within the framework of which the previous legal norms were perceived solely as conventions.

Fedor Gaida

SIGNED TO DISPUTE

Mikhail Safonov has his own version: he believes that the emperor deliberately signed the text, which could be challenged if something happened.

“Why did the autocrat put his signature under this nonsense? – the historian asks. “He was trying to save his family.” Safonov recalls that by this time, from Headquarters in Pskov, the emperor “was given false information that his wife and sick children, left unguarded in Tsarskoe Selo, could become hostages.” Nikolai was really blackmailed, I’m sure MSU Associate Professor, Candidate of Historical Sciences Fedor Gaida.“The generals knew that the royal family was not in the hands of the rebels,” he notes, “but they tried to force the abdication at any cost.”

This, according to Safonov, predetermined Nicholas’s further tactics: “The Tsar announced his readiness to abdicate, nevertheless, he was not at all going to part with power, but was only looking for a way to preserve it and save his family.”

Empress Alexandra Feodorovna understood better than others the situation in which Nicholas found himself. In a letter to her husband (which he, however, did not receive), she advised him to sign whatever he was forced to sign. “It’s clear that they want to prevent you from seeing me until you sign some kind of paper, a constitution, or some other horror of that kind. And you are alone, without an army behind you, caught like a mouse in a trap, what can you do? I can’t give any advice, just be yourself, dear. If you have to submit to circumstances, then God will help you free yourself from them,” she believed.

The entry in the diary of Nicholas II for March 2 (15), 1917 ends with the famous phrase: “There is treason, cowardice, and deception all around!” Script. Civil Aviation of the Russian Federation

According to her, legally, everything signed by Nikolai subsequently should not have been valid, because he signed not of his own free will, but under coercion. “That’s why the tsar signed a document that, under favorable circumstances, could easily be challenged as legally untenable,” says Mikhail Safonov.

The main argument in favor of the version of the legal inconsistency of abdication is the fact that the emperor abdicated not only for himself, but also for his son. Indeed, initially Nicholas II was going to transfer supreme power to his son. The draft abdication sent from Headquarters to Pskov said: “In accordance with the order established by the Basic Laws, we pass on our heritage to our dear son... Alexei Nikolaevich and bless him to ascend the throne of the Russian State. We entrust our brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, with the duties of ruler of the empire until our son comes of age. We command our son, as well as during his minority, the ruler of the empire, to rule over state affairs in complete and inviolable unity with the representatives of the people in legislative institutions on those principles that will be established by them.”

However, the final act contained a fundamentally different scheme for the transfer of power: “Not wanting to part with our beloved son, we transfer our heritage to our brother Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich and bless him to ascend the throne of the Russian State. We command our brother to rule over state affairs in complete and inviolable unity with the representatives of the people in legislative institutions on those principles that will be established by them, taking an inviolable oath to that effect.”

An act recognizing the authenticity of texts about the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. October 26, 1929. Script. Civil Aviation of the Russian Federation

As we see from the act of renunciation, in comparison with the original version, first of all, the mention of the Basic Laws was removed: the compilers were well aware that their formula did not correspond to them at all. The throne was transferred not to Alexei, but to Mikhail, which blatantly contradicted the order of succession to the throne established back in 1797 Paul I.

Later Pavel Milyukov, who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government in March 1917, was annoyed: “Not having at hand the text of Emperor Paul’s manifesto on the succession to the throne, we did not realize then that the tsar’s very act was illegal. He could deny for himself, but he had no right to deny for his son.” Later, after leaving the political scene, Miliukov expressed suspicions that Nicholas II deliberately violated the Basic Laws of the Russian Empire in order to have the opportunity in the future to regain the throne by canceling his legally insignificant abdication manifesto. In his memoirs, the former cadet leader wrote that a few days after the coup, Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich told him that “all the grand dukes immediately realized the illegality of the emperor’s act.”

Chief specialist of the Russian Civil Aviation, Doctor of Historical Sciences Zinaida Peregudova

Mikhail Safonov develops Miliukov’s suspicions: “Undoubtedly, Nikolai had a certain intention in all this: he drew up documents that, under favorable circumstances (for example, when the Provisional Government and the Council “bit off each other’s heads”) could be declared invalid.”

WAS THERE A REJECTION?

Is it possible, based on these circumstances, to consider the document signed by Nicholas a renunciation? Despite everything, most modern historians answer this question positively.

“During revolutionary events, legitimacy is always on the side of those who have power in their hands,” notes Fyodor Gaida, “and power at that moment was on the side of Nicholas’s opponents. Therefore, they were not confused by either the form or the meaning of the act.” And Nicholas himself subsequently never once questioned his departure from power.

In his diary he wrote about his renunciation: “I agreed. A draft manifesto was sent from Headquarters. In the evening, Guchkov and Shulgin arrived from Petrograd, with whom I spoke and gave them the signed and revised manifesto.” Alexandra Fedorovna, in a letter to her husband dated March 4 (17), 1917, indirectly confirmed the legitimacy of what happened: “Only this morning we learned that everything was handed over to M[isha] and Baby [heir to the throne Alexey Nikolaevich. – “Historian”] is now safe - what a relief!

Receipt for acceptance of the acts of abdication of Emperor Nicholas II and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich for storage. July 31 (August 13), 1917. Script. Civil Aviation of the Russian Federation

The Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, mother of Nicholas II, also wrote in her diary about the abdication as a fait accompli: “March 4 (17). At 12 o'clock we arrived at Headquarters, in Mogilev, in a terrible cold and hurricane. Dear Nicky met me at the station, we went together to his house, where lunch was served with everyone else. After lunch, poor Nicky told about all the tragic events that had happened in two days. He opened his bleeding heart to me, we both cried. First came a telegram from Rodzianko, saying that he must take the situation with the Duma into his own hands in order to maintain order and stop the revolution; then - in order to save the country - he proposed to form a new government and... abdicate the throne in favor of his son (unbelievable!). But Niki, naturally, could not part with his son and handed over the throne to Misha! All the generals telegraphed to him and advised the same, and he finally gave in and signed the manifesto. Nicky was incredibly calm and dignified in this terribly humiliating position. It’s like I’ve been hit over the head, I can’t understand anything!”

An envelope in which the acts of abdication of Emperor Nicholas II and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich were kept from 1917 to 1929. Script. Civil Aviation of the Russian Federation

Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich had no doubt about the legitimacy of Nicholas’ abdication, admitting that “my brother abdicated for himself,” and “it turns out that I am abdicating for everyone.”

THE CASE OF ACADEMICS

However, it was not only Miliukov, who found himself in exile, who suspected that Nikolai had deceived everyone, which means that, if he wanted, he could, by appealing to the illegality of the act of abdication, challenge the legitimacy of the overthrow of the monarchy. Apparently, the monarchists who remained in the USSR had high hopes for the document signed by the emperor on the night of March 2 (15) to March 3 (16), 1917. It was they who were able to preserve the authentic act of renunciation...

Zinaida Peregudova says that, apparently, during the Civil War, and then during the NEP era, no one in power was interested in the fate of the most important documents on the history of the revolution. But in October 1929 the situation changed. There has been a change in leadership at the Library of the Academy of Sciences. Acting Assistant Director of the BAN and Senior Scholar Curator of the Manuscript Department Fedor Pokrovsky was removed from the post of deputy, and was appointed to this position Innokentiya Yakovkina. The new authorities demanded information about the most valuable documents stored in the manuscript department. On a day off, when the chief scientific custodian of the department Vsevolod Sreznevsky was not at his workplace, Pokrovsky took Yakovkin to the Manuscript Department and “familiarized” him with the documents that the custodian kept secretly from other employees in his desk drawer under a sheet of paper. It was an envelope with the inscription “G.E. Staritsky. No. 607." Inside the envelope was a receipt from the Chief Prosecutor of the First Department of the Governing Senate Georgy Staritsky, dated July 31 (August 13), 1917: “The act of abdication of Nicholas II on March 2, 1917 and Mikhail on March 3, 1917 was accepted for safekeeping by the acting chief prosecutor of the First Department of the Governing Senate, Fyodor Ivanovich Khrushchev.” And it turned out that all this time the acts of abdication of Nicholas II and Mikhail Alexandrovich were located here.

A special commission of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate of the USSR was created to inspect the apparatus of the Academy of Sciences, which was headed by a member of the presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Yuri Figatner. The materials discovered in the manuscript department of the BAN were subjected to a thorough examination, and a corresponding report was drawn up. Experts came to the conclusion that the signatures on the papers are original, and the documents themselves are originals.

According to Sreznevsky, which, however, is not documented by anything, the package with the acts of abdication of Nicholas II and Grand Duke Mikhail was given to him by the actual head of the BAN Mikhail Dyakonov September 3 (16), 1917 with a request to keep them secret, which was carried out for 12 years. In turn, Academician-Secretary of the Department of Humanities of the Academy of Sciences Sergey Platonov, despite the proposals made to him by Sreznevsky, did not report these documents to government agencies and transfer them to another place. During interrogation, the academician himself stated that he did not consider the documents valuable and claimed that they existed in several copies.

The case about the secret storage of archival documents was only the first part of the large so-called “Academic Case” - about the “monarchist counter-revolutionary organization” in Leningrad. In addition to the main accused Sergei Platonov, historians were in prison Evgeniy Tarle, Nikolay Likhachev, Sergey Bakhrushin, Yuri Gauthier, Matvey Lyubavsky and many others. All of them were sentenced to various terms of exile. 72-year-old academician Platonov died in 1933 in exile in Samara.

Why did academicians pretend that they did not understand the significance of the acts signed by Nicholas II and Grand Duke Mikhail? Why didn’t they register them and kept the most important state documents illegally? For obvious reasons, the academicians themselves did not provide answers to these questions. The investigative authorities did this for them. To accuse the staff of the Academy of Sciences of seeking to overthrow the Soviet regime and restore the constitutional-monarchical regime, it was quite enough that the Manuscript Department of the BAN secretly kept a document that could provide grounds for disavowing the abdication of the last Russian autocrat and declaring the abolition of the monarchy invalid.

The “Historian” magazine expresses gratitude to the Director of the Russian Civil Aviation Larisa Alexandrovna Rogova for assistance in preparing the material.

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: HISTORY LESSONS*

Remove yourself from the state

Alexander Samarin ,
Doctor of Historical Sciences

The history of Russia has known a number of cases of rulers relinquishing power. Most often these were forced decisions, and only in isolated cases were they voluntary...

It is naive to believe that before Nicholas II in the history of Russia there have never been crowned abdications. They, of course, took place, but each of them differed significantly from the previous one. And the monarchs themselves behaved differently in such unusual, let’s say, circumstances...

DARK AND TERRIBLE

The complex vicissitudes of the feudal war of the second quarter of the 15th century, when power passed from hand to hand of grandchildren Dmitry Donskoy, gave rise to a situation of formal renunciation of the throne. In February 1446, the Moscow Grand Duke Vasily II was captured and blinded on the orders of his cousin Dmitry Shemyaka, who took the grand-ducal throne. Vasily, who received the nickname Dark after being blinded, was exiled to Uglich. There, a few months later, a ceremony of reconciliation between the brothers took place. Vasily kissed the cross, blaming “before his eldest brother” (that is, Shemyaka) and before all “Christianity” for lawlessness and crimes.

Vasily II the Dark

Thus, Vasily formally renounced his claims to supreme power, thanks to which he was released to Vologda, which was allocated to him as an appanage. However, the struggle soon broke out with renewed vigor. Hegumen of the Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery Trifon freed the prince from the sin of violating the kiss of the cross: “You kissed the hedgehog against your will.” Subsequently, Vasily the Dark managed to defeat Shemyaka and regained the Moscow great reign.

Already in the 16th century, the master of the political game Ivan groznyj twice announced his resignation from the throne. For the first time, leaving Moscow at the end of 1564, he sent letters to the capital addressed to the Metropolitan, the Boyar Duma and the townspeople. They were published on January 3 (hereinafter the dates are given according to the old style) 1565. The tsar reported that “out of great pity of heart... he left his state and went where to settle, where God will guide him, the sovereign.” The calculation turned out to be correct. The people demanded the return of the tsar, and he introduced the division of the country into the oprichnina and the zemshchina, receiving carte blanche to carry out a purge within the ruling elite.