The operation was carried out with the aim of defeating the enemy’s Oryol grouping and eliminating the Oryol salient, where the 2nd Tank and 9th armies of Army Group Center were defending. They numbered 37 divisions, including 8 tank and 2 motorized, up to 600 thousand people, more than 7 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 1.1 thousand combat aircraft. The troops of the Bryansk, Central Fronts and the left wing of the Western Front had 1,286 thousand people, more than 21 thousand guns and mortars, 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns and more than 3 thousand combat aircraft. The superiority over the enemy was 2 times in manpower, 3 times in artillery and mortars, more than 2 times in tanks, and almost 3 times in aviation.
The plan of Operation Kutuzov was to dismember the enemy group with four strikes in converging directions towards Oryol and defeat it piece by piece. At the same time, the 50th and 11th Guards Armies of the Western Front were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses southwest of Kozelsk, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, encircle and destroy his group in the Bolkhov area. Subsequently, it was planned to develop the attack on Khotynets, to prevent the enemy from retreating from the Oryol area to the west and, in cooperation with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, to destroy it. From the air, the actions of the strike group were supported by formations of the 1st Air Army.
The 3rd and 63rd armies of the Bryansk Front attacked from the Novosil area to Orel, enveloping the enemy from the north and south. Air support was provided by units of the 15th Air Army.
The troops of the Central Front on the morning of July 15 were supposed to launch a counteroffensive in the general direction of Kromy and further to the north-west to cover Orel from the south in order to, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, defeat the enemy’s Oryol group. In accordance with the decision of the front commander, General Rokossovsky, the troops of the 48th, 13th, 70th and 2nd tank armies were ordered to reach the Nagorny, Preobrazhenskoye, Shamshin, Novopolevo, Rozhdestveno, Kamenka (12 km northwest) line by the end of July 17 stations Maloarkhangelsk), Vesyoly Poselok, Lebedikha, Voronets, Morozikha, Katomki. In the future, it was planned to develop the offensive in the general direction of Staroe Gorokhovo, Filosovo, Ploskoye, and Nesterovo.
The main role in the upcoming counteroffensive was to be played by the 13th and 70th armies, reinforced by the 9th and 19th tank corps, respectively. The 2nd Tank Army was planned to be brought into battle after the troops of the 13th Army reached the line Soglasny, Buzuluk, Shirokoe Boloto, Saborovka. The formations of the 2nd Tank Army were tasked with delivering the main blow in the direction of Snova, Senkovo, Gremyachevo, capturing the Olgino, Gnilusha, Shusherovo area by the end of the day on July 17, and then developing the offensive towards Nikolskoye and Nesterovo. The aviation of the 16th Air Army was supposed to support the attack of the infantry and tanks of the strike group of the 13th Army, and then provide assistance to the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies, preventing the enemy from retreating to the north and north-west of the Novopolenovo-Gremyachevo line, Voronets. The formations of the 60th Army were ordered to stubbornly defend their positions, ensuring the actions of the main forces of the front.
The offensive of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the armies of the Bryansk Front began on July 12 after powerful artillery and air preparation. By the end of the day on July 19, the 1st and 5th tank corps of the Western Front bypassed Bolkhov from the west and southwest and, wedged deep into the enemy’s position, created a threat to his main communications connecting Orel and Bryansk.
In the Bryansk Front, troops of the 61st Army, in cooperation with the 20th Tank Corps, completed a breakthrough of the enemy’s defense on July 18 and, having advanced up to 20 km, created a threat to bypass Bolkhov from the southeast. The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies reached the river. Oleshnya, where they met stubborn enemy resistance and were forced to go on the defensive. To increase the force of the strike and accelerate the breakthrough of enemy defenses, on July 19, the 3rd Guards Tank Army (800 tanks and self-propelled guns) was introduced into the battle. By the evening of July 20, she reached the Oka River, crossed it in the Otrada area and captured a bridgehead. As a result, favorable conditions were created for the offensive of the Bryansk Front. His 3rd Army captured Mtsensk on the same day. On July 24, formations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army occupied Stanovoy Kolodez, and troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies reached the Oka and Optukha rivers, where the front edge of the enemy’s rear defense line was located, covering the approaches to Orel from the east.
On July 26, the 4th Tank Army was brought into battle on the left wing of the Western Front. She provided great assistance to the troops of the 61st Army in the liberation of Bolkhov on July 28. The entry of Soviet troops into the Bolkhov area, and especially the 4th Tank Army to the Orel-Bryansk railway, predetermined the stability of the entire Oryol bridgehead.
The troops of the right wing of the Central Front went on the offensive on July 15. The enemy, having concentrated in the offensive zone of the main forces of the front seven infantry divisions (216, 78, 86, 292, 31, 7, 258th), the 10th motorized and 4th tank divisions, part of the forces of the 2nd tank division and three Jaeger battalions (8th, 13th and 9th), stubbornly resisted, often counterattacked with tanks. Lieutenant General of Artillery G.S. Nadysev, analyzing the reasons for the slow advance of the front’s strike group, wrote: “After fierce fighting, the enemy went on the defensive on July 12 and until July 15 regrouped troops and all fire weapons in accordance with the nature of the combat operations ahead of him. In two or three days, our artillery reconnaissance and corrective reconnaissance aircraft were unable to sufficiently fully open the entire German defense system. Therefore, the artillery strike during the fire raid did not hit all targets. On the night of July 15, many of the previously explored targets turned out to be in completely different places. We, the artillery headquarters of the front and armies, are also to blame, for whom the lack of intelligence about the enemy was no secret. Apparently, in this case, the combat use of artillery should have been structured differently. I believe that in the context of accelerated preparations for the offensive, it was necessary to allocate more guns for direct fire - to defeat specific targets in the first position of the Nazi defense.".
Within three days, the 2nd Tank Army, 9th and 19th Tank Corps, together with formations of the 48th, 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front, after stubborn battles, completely restored the position lost in defensive battles and continued to advance in the general direction of Kromy . General Rokossovsky, trying to break enemy resistance, ordered the troops of the 13th, 70th and 2nd Tank Armies to resume the offensive on the morning of July 19 with the support of all aviation of the 16th Air Army. They were supposed to deliver the main blow to the western bank of the river. Oka in the general direction to Kromy, by the end of July 20 reach the river line. Kroma on the site Shumakovo, Bolshaya Kolcheva, Kutafino, Krasnaya Roshcha. In the future, it was planned to develop the offensive in the direction of Orel and Naryshkino.
At 7 a.m. on July 19, the troops of the Central Front resumed their offensive after a short artillery attack. Having broken enemy resistance along the Kursk-Orel highway, they advanced up to 6 km. The enemy, having brought up reserves, began to put up more and more stubborn resistance, especially in the 13th Army zone. This forced General Rokossovsky to make a decision at ten o’clock in the evening on July 20 to transfer her troops to the defensive. The enemy's stubborn defense thwarted all the plans of the commander of the Central Front to reach the Kromy region by the deadline. He had to reschedule it for the end of the day on July 22.
The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, which began on July 17, had a significant impact on the course of events in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal E. von Manstein, at the request of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, was forced to give the order to withdraw the 2nd and 3rd tank corps from the battle in the Voronezh Front sector and transfer them to the south, to reinforce the 6th th field army operating against the Southern Front.
General Rokossovsky, meanwhile, continued attempts to reach the Kromy area. To this end, the troops of the Central Front resumed their offensive on the morning of July 25. This time, the formations of the 70th Army, having overcome enemy resistance, began to successfully advance in the general direction of Chuvardino. The next day, the front commander decides to bring the 2nd Tank Army into the breakthrough with the task of reaching the Krasnaya Roshcha, Gnezdilovo, Chuvardino area by the end of the day on July 26. By decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, from 24 hours on July 26, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was transferred from the Bryansk Front to the disposal of General Rokossovsky, which was required to be used on the right wing of the Central Front in cooperation with the troops of the 48th Army.
By the end of the day on July 27, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front, with the support of aviation from the 16th Air Army, broke through the enemy’s intermediate defensive line and advanced 35–40 km. The enemy began to withdraw his troops to the west in front of the left wing of the Bryansk and the right wing of the Central Front. In this regard, General Rokossovsky decided on the morning of July 28 to introduce the 3rd Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough on the left flank of the 48th Army with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the river. Malaya Rybnitsa and go to the Khmelevaya area (15–20 km north of Kromy).
On the morning of July 28, the 3rd Guards Tank Army went on the offensive. Its formations crossed Malaya Rybnitsa and reached the approaches to Filosofovo. However, the enemy counterattacked forced some parts of the army to retreat to the right bank of the river. General Rokossovsky, trying to avoid unjustified losses, turned to the Supreme High Command Headquarters with a request to withdraw the 3rd Guards Tank Army from the battle. In addition, on the evening of July 30, he decided to stop the offensive with the forces of the 48th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies and firmly gain a foothold on the achieved lines.
The enemy, taking advantage of the slow advance of the right wing of the Central Front, hastily withdrew its units to the northern bank of the river. Krom and to the western bank of the river. Nezhivka, where he intended to go on the defensive and prevent a breakthrough of Soviet troops in the northern and northwestern directions. General Rokossovsky, trying to thwart the enemy's plan, ordered the 48th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies to resume the offensive on the morning of August 1 and complete previously assigned tasks. At the same time, the 70th and 2nd tank armies were to go on the offensive, which were supposed to bypass the enemy’s Oryol grouping from the south.
Stalin, who observed the development of events in the Oryol direction, was dissatisfied with the actions of General Rokossovsky. At about three o'clock in the morning on August 1, he sent him directive No. 30158, which stated:
“Recently, in connection with the offensive of the troops of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western Front, the enemy has significantly weakened its group operating in front of the Central Front, removing five tank divisions, two motorized divisions and up to two or three infantry divisions from this sector. At the same time, the Central Front was significantly strengthened by tanks, having received 3 Rybalko tanks. All this led to an improvement in the position of the front troops and created favorable conditions for decisive offensive actions. However, these conditions have not yet been used enough by the front command.".
Stalin demanded to immediately prepare and deliver a decisive blow with the forces of the 70th and 2nd Tank Armies in the general direction of Chuvardino, Krasnaya Roshcha, Apalkovo. At the same time, the 13th Army was ordered to break through the enemy’s defenses west of Koroskovo, preparing the conditions for the entry of the 3rd Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough. By August 4–5, it had to complete concentration in the area south of Koroskovo with the task of developing the success of the 13th Army and striking in the general direction of Kromy to collapse the enemy’s defenses along the western bank of the river. Oka and thereby contribute to the advancement of the 48th Army. Subsequently, it was ordered to act with the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Guards Tank Armies, bypassing Orel from the west, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the enemy’s Oryol group and capturing the city of Orel.
The commander of the Central Front, having received a directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters, was forced to suspend the offensive of the 48th Army, which was tasked with going on the defensive in its positions. The troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were withdrawn from the battle and by the morning of August 3 were transferred to the area 24–25 km. southwest of Rybnitsa. The commander of the 9th Tank Corps was ordered to begin pursuing the enemy on the evening of August 1 and prevent him from gaining a foothold on the river. Chrome.
On August 4, Rokossovsky clarified the tasks of the troops of the right wing of the front. The formations of the 70th Army were supposed to intensify combat operations, and the 2nd Tank Army and the 9th Tank Corps were to strike at the enemy’s rear in the general direction of Kolka, Krasnaya Yagoda and assist the troops of the 70th Army in collapsing the enemy’s defenses. The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army was ordered to go on the offensive at one o'clock in the afternoon with the task of crossing the river. Kroma on the Kolki, Krasnaya Roshcha site. After that, she had to develop a strike in the general direction of Khmelevaya, Gniloye Boloto, Khotkovo in order to cut off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and southwest from the Kromy, Orel, and Naryshkino areas. The troops of the 13th Army were supposed to assist the crossing of the 3rd Guards Tank Army across the river with infantry and artillery fire. Krom, and then, using its success, rapidly move forward with the task of reaching the Maryinsky, Krasny Pakhar, Krasnaya Niva, Dolzhenki line by the end of the day on August 4.
Meanwhile, troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies of the Bryansk Front liberated Orel on August 5. The Supreme High Command headquarters, trying to consolidate the success achieved, with its Directive No. 30159, ordered on August 6 the commander of the Bryansk Front to concentrate his main efforts on the rapid capture of Khotynets and Karachev. The commander of the Central Front was ordered “to use the 2nd and 3rd tank armies to strike in the direction of Shablykino with the task, in cooperation with the right wing of the Bryansk Front advancing on Karachev, to destroy the enemy retreating from Orel to the west.” All aviation forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts were ordered to assist in the accomplishment of this task.
However, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Guards Tank Armies failed to complete their assigned tasks. Their actions aroused dissatisfaction on the part of General Rokossovsky, who around midnight on August 6 signed order No. 00525/op with the following content:
“The enemy is retreating in a western direction and, clinging to random, unprepared lines, seeks to delay the advance of our troops and thereby ensure the systematic withdrawal of the Oryol group.
The 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Tank Army, despite the favorable situation for us and contrary to my order, marked time for three days and did not complete their tasks. This was a consequence of the fact that commanders of tank units and formations show indecision, do not know how to force their subordinates to complete tasks, and manage the battle of their units, formations and armies extremely poorly. I order:
1. 3rd Guards Tank Army and 2nd Tank Army - on the morning of August 7, 1943, with all the forces of the armies, break through the enemy’s defense front and, developing a strike in the general direction of Shablykino, cut off the escape routes of his Oryol group to the west and south -west from the line Naryshkino, Ostanino, Cow Swamp, Nizhnyaya Fedotovka;
a) 3rd Guards Tank Army - break through the defense front of enemy covering units in the Krasny Pakhar, Dolzhenki sector and, developing an attack on Maslovo, Soskovo, by the end of the day on August 7, 1943, capture the Troitsky, Soskovo, Zvyagintsevo, Maslovo area; further advance on Shablykino and capture Shablykino, Novoselki, Gerasimovo, Volkovo, Robier.
b) 2nd Tank Army - to break through the front of defense of enemy covering units in the sector (claim) Krasnaya Roshcha, (claim) Volobuevo and, developing an attack on Gnezdilovo, by the end of the day of August 7, 1943, capture the Efimovka, Goncharovka, Gnezdilovo area , Gorodishche; further advance in the general direction towards Zhikharevo, Lobki, Kolosok and capture the area of Gavrilovo, Turishchevo, Kolosok.
2. 16th Air Army - with all the forces of the army to facilitate the offensive of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to carry out the tasks I have assigned.
3. The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Tank Army categorically demand that all officers carry out tasks accurately and unconditionally. Under no circumstances should we allow an offensive by scattered groups, demanding an offensive by the entire mass of tanks and motorized infantry of the corps and armies.
4. Commanders of units and formations that do not carry out tasks will be subject to severe liability, up to and including trial by a Military Tribunal.
Despite the measures taken, the advance of the troops of the Central Front was slow. On the right wing they advanced only 10 km. Troops of the 65th and 70th armies, supported by aviation from the 16th Air Army, liberated Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky on August 12. On the same day, formations of the 13th Army, having encountered organized enemy resistance from the western banks of the Vodocha and Lokna rivers, were forced to go on the defensive.
By this time, the 3rd Guards Tank Army had suffered significant losses. Therefore, on August 13, by directive No. 40202 of the General Staff, it (without the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps) was withdrawn from the Central Front to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. All tanks and self-propelled guns were ordered to remain as part of the Central Front, and the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps was to be included in the 2nd Tank Army.
By August 18, the troops of the Bryansk, Western and Central Fronts reached the forward positions of the heavily fortified defensive line "Hagen" and were stopped on a line east of Lyudinovo, 25 km. east of Bryansk, west of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky. This completed Operation Kutuzov, during which troops from three fronts advanced up to 150 km, eliminating the enemy’s Oryol bridgehead. However, significant errors were made during the operation. When preparing the operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters showed haste in determining the timing of its start. As a result, the troops went on the offensive without fully completing its preparation, and a stronger group was not created on the left wing of the Western Front. Tank armies and corps were used to successively break through several enemy defensive lines, which sharply reduced their ability to develop an offensive in operational depth. Front-line aviation was unable to completely solve the problem of isolating the combat area from the approach of enemy operational reserves. As a result, instead of a swift blow, the operation took on a protracted character. The enemy, in essence, was slowly squeezed out of the Oryol ledge, which allowed him to regroup his troops and withdraw them from the Oryol area in an organized manner. All this determined the low pace of the offensive (up to 4 km per day) and significant losses of Soviet troops: irrevocable - 112,529, and sanitary - 317,361 people; 2586 tanks, 892 guns and mortars, 1014 combat aircraft. The formations of the 2nd Tank Army, forced to break through deeply layered defenses, lost more than 300 tanks, having only 36 vehicles in service by the end of the operation.
The peculiarity of the Kursk offensive operation was that it was carried out on a wide front by large forces of three fronts - Central, Voronezh and Steppe, with the participation of troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. The offensive of the Soviet troops was divided territorially into the Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov), which was carried out by the troops of the left wing of the Western, as well as the Central and Bryansk fronts, and the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev), the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. Operation Kutuzov involved 1.28 million people, more than 21 thousand guns and mortars, 2.4 thousand tanks and over 3 thousand aircraft.
The Oryol offensive operation was launched on July 12, 1943 by attacks from the Western and Bryansk fronts, under the command of Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky and Markian Mikhailovich Popov. On July 15, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky also launched a counteroffensive. Army Group Center in the Oryol direction had a main defensive line with a depth of about 5-7 km. The German defensive line consisted of strong points connected to each other by a network of trenches and communication trenches. In front of the front edge, wire barriers were placed in 1-2 rows of wooden posts, reinforced in important directions with wire fences with metal posts and spirals. The defense was strengthened by anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields. In the main directions, German fortifiers installed a significant number of armored caps with machine guns, which made it possible to create strong crossfire. All settlements were adapted for all-round defense, for battle under encirclement. Anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers were installed along the river banks. However, the process of creating a dense defense was not completed. Great hopes were associated with Operation Citadel. The defense on the Oryol ledge was held by the German 2nd Tank Army, 55th, 53rd and 35th Army Corps. Units of the 9th Army operated against the Central Front. German troops in this direction numbered about 600 thousand people, 7 thousand guns and mortars, 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns, and more than 1 thousand aircraft.
Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky (1897 - 1968).
Soviet command plans
The Soviet command, despite the decision made in the spring of 1943 to temporarily give the enemy the strategic initiative and switch to deliberate defense, did not intend to abandon offensive operations. The concentration of large German forces at the Kursk salient, including selected tank formations, meant a significant weakening of German defenses on other sectors of the front. The German defenses in these directions could be broken through and great success achieved before the arrival of enemy reserves. In addition, the German tank divisions, which suffered heavy losses during Operation Citadel, were to lose the ability to effectively resist the advancing Soviet troops.
Markian Mikhailovich Popov (1902 - 1969).
Planning for the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts began in the spring of 1943. By the end of the winter campaign of 1942-1943. In the Orel region, a protrusion was formed with the front to the east; it was formed by the troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts. Such a protrusion suggested the formation of a “boiler”. Powerful blows to the base of the Oryol ledge could lead to the encirclement of significant forces of the German Army Group Center. However, when information was received about the preparation of Operation Citadel by the German command, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to postpone the start of the offensive operation in the Oryol direction. The central front received orders to prepare for defense. A counter strike against a powerful German strike force did not promise much success. But the plan for the offensive operation was not forgotten, it was only changed. After the defensive operation, three Soviet fronts were supposed to deliver strong blows to the German group in the Orel area, cut it apart and destroy it. The operation received the code name “Kutuzov”, in honor of the winner of Napoleon’s “Great Army” in the Patriotic War of 1812.
Due to the fact that the Central Front had to withstand the attack of the advancing German group, it dropped out of the number of active participants in the offensive operation. The Bryansk Front was supposed to strike at the “top” of the Oryol bulge, cutting it in two. Front troops launched two enveloping attacks: the first - from the Novosil area, covering Oryol from the south; the second - from the area northeast of Bolkhov, in the general direction of Bolkhov, in order, together with the troops of the Western Front, to eliminate the Bolkhov enemy group, and then attack Orel from the north.
The troops of the left wing of the Western Front received the task of breaking through the German defenses on the northern front of the Oryol ledge, southwest of Kozelsk. After breaking through the enemy's defenses, the strike group of the Western Front was divided for an offensive in two diverging directions. The first group was supposed to take part in the defeat of the Bolkhov enemy group, the second was to advance in the general direction of Khotynets, where there was a highway junction and a station on the Orel-Bryansk railway. As a result, Soviet troops had to intercept the main supply line of the Wehrmacht in the Orel area. Bolkhov was considered the “key to the Eagle”. As a result, the forces of the Western Front had to defeat the German troops covering Oryol from the north and northwest, deeply envelop the enemy group from the west, together with the troops of the Bryansk Front, and eliminate it. Considering the variety of tasks assigned to the Western Front, its strike group was the most powerful. The central front, after repelling the attack of the 9th German Army, was supposed to go on the offensive in the general direction of Kromy. Without the participation of the Central Front in the operation, cutting off the Oryol ledge was impossible.
T-34s, equipped with PT-3 mine trawls, are moving towards the front. July-August 1943
To implement the assigned tasks, four strike groups were created:
- at the northwestern tip of the Oryol ledge, at the confluence of the Zhizdra and Resseta rivers, it included the 50th Army and the 11th Guards Army (the left flank of the Western Front;In the northern part of the ledge, in the area of the city of Bolkhov - the 61st Army and the 4th Tank Army (formed on July 15, 1943 on the basis of the 19th Cavalry Corps) of the Bryansk Front;
In the eastern part of the ledge, in the Novosil area - the 3rd Army, the 63rd Army, the 1st Guards Tank Corps and the 3rd Guards Tank Army (was in the reserve of Headquarters).
In the southern part of the Oryol bulge, in the area of Ponyri station - the 13th, 48th, 70th armies and the 2nd tank army of the Central Front.
From the air, the offensive of the troops was supported by three air armies - the 1st, 15th and 16th, as well as long-range aviation. In the reserve of Headquarters in the western direction, to develop success or parry German counterattacks, are the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Vladimir Kryukov and the 11th Army of Ivan Fedyuninsky, consisting of 8 rifle divisions and 3 tank regiments. The 3rd Guards Tank Army was also initially in reserve, but after the start of the operation it was transferred to the Bryansk Front.
According to the original plan, the operation was supposed to last a very short time - 4-5 days. This period made it possible to achieve a decisive result before the command of Army Group Center withdrew the shock formations of the 9th Army from the battle and sent them to liquidate the Soviet breakthrough. The delay meant strengthening the defensive formations of the Oryol salient at the expense of the mobile formations of the German 9th Army, which participated in Operation Citadel. However, Operation Kutuzov dragged on until mid-August, and the battle broke up into several separate operations.
Before the start of the operation, the Soviet command still had doubts about the correctness of the decisions made. In particular, the question was raised about the direction in which the 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of Pavel Semenovich Rybalko would be used. There were doubts about the need to use it in the Novosil - Orel direction. Here the enemy had a strong defense that had to be broken through, suffering heavy losses. It seemed more expedient to use the Guards Tank Army in the northern direction in the offensive zone of the 11th Guards Army of Ivan Bagramyan and the 61st Army of Pavel Belov. However, the head of the Automotive and Tank Directorate of the Red Army, Yakov Fedorenko, failed to convince the command of the Bryansk Front to give Rybalko’s promised army to the Western Front. As a result, Soviet troops began not to cut off the Oryol ledge with converging blows to the base, but to dismember it into pieces.
Advance of the Bryansk Front in the Oryol direction
In the easternmost part of the Oryol salient, in the Novosil area, the front remained stable for several months, which allowed the opponents to thoroughly study the terrain and build a dense defense. In addition, the Zusha River flowed along the front. It was quite shallow in places, but the steep banks and muddy bottom made it difficult for armored vehicles and other heavy weapons to reach. Therefore, initially the Soviet command wanted to launch an attack from small bridgeheads that were occupied on Zoucha back in 1942. It was possible to build crossings on them in advance and transfer tanks along them. It is clear that the Germans built the most dense defense opposite the bridgeheads. An alternative solution was proposed by the commander of the 3rd Army, Alexander Gorbatov. He proposed that the 3rd Army be given an independent sector for a breakthrough with crossing the river in the Izmailovo and Vyazhi area. This diverted the enemy's attention from the 63rd Army. If the 3rd Army was successful, it was proposed to introduce the 3rd Guards Tank Army into the offensive zone of Gorbatov’s army. The idea was supported, and Army Commander Gorbatov’s plan was approved.
Alexander Vasilievich Gorbatov (1891-1973).
As a result, the 63rd and 3rd armies attacked from the east in the Oryol direction. The shock group of Gorbatov’s army included 3 rifle divisions and 2 tank regiments. One division was supposed to cross the Zusha River, the second was to advance from a bridgehead near the village of Vyazha, the third was in the second echelon. In total, the 3rd Army consisted of 6 rifle divisions, its total strength reached 85.5 thousand people. The pace of the offensive was set to be very high - breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the first day, in three days - they planned to advance 34-36 km.
The strike group of the 63rd Army under the command of Vladimir Kolpakchi included 6 rifle divisions. They were supported by 6 separate tank regiments (162 tanks, most KV and T-34), 5 self-propelled artillery regiments (60 self-propelled guns). The strike force was supposed to advance from the bridgehead on Zoucha. In total, the Kolpakchi army had 7 rifle divisions; the army numbered more than 67 thousand people. In addition, they planned to introduce the 1st Guards Tank Corps under the command of Mikhail Panov into the breakthrough in the offensive zone of the 63rd Army. The army had to cover 42-44 km in three days.
Such a high rate of advance by the 3rd and 63rd armies was planned in connection with the weakening of the German defenses on the Oryol salient due to Operation Citadel. The defense in this direction was held by the 35th Army Corps under the command of Lothar Rendulic. Its 4 infantry divisions occupied a front of 140 kilometers. From north to south the front was held by the 34th, 56th, 262nd and 299th infantry divisions.
Lothar Rendulic.
The armies of the Bryansk Front delivered the main blow to the junction of the 56th and 262nd German infantry divisions. From the air, the armies of the Bryansk Front were supported by the 15th Air Army, which consisted of about 1 thousand combat aircraft. On July 11, the troops of the Bryansk Front conducted a strong reconnaissance in force. This battle made it possible to reveal the fire system of the German defense and the location of the front line of defense. The German command was under the impression that the Soviet troops were launching a decisive offensive, which forced them to withdraw infantry and firepower from shelters to repel the attack. The 380th Infantry Division captured a German stronghold on the outskirts of Vyazhay, which facilitated the army’s offensive the next day.
At 2 am on July 12, the artillery of the Bryansk Front - about 4 thousand barrels - began a strong artillery barrage. Soon, Soviet aircraft also attacked German positions. At 5.30, under the cover of artillery fire, Soviet infantry crossed Zusha. The strike force of Gorbatov’s army advanced successfully and advanced 5-7 kilometers in a day. The offensive of the 63rd Army from the bridgehead went worse. The Germans created a dense defense system on the heights opposite the bridgehead and, despite the support of a significant amount of artillery and armored vehicles, the Kolpakchi army stalled. Therefore, on the evening of July 12, Popov gave the order to bring Panov’s 1st Guards Tank Corps into the breakthrough in the 3rd Army’s offensive zone.
On the same day, the commander of Army Group Center, Hans von Kluge, gave the order to transfer the 12th 18th, 20th tank and 36th infantry divisions, as well as heavy artillery and assault guns, to the 2nd Panzer Army. He planned to quickly introduce reserves into the battle to stabilize the situation. Rendulic's 35th Corps was sent to assist the 36th Infantry Division. Aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet were also deployed in the eastern part of the Oryol salient.
The Luftwaffe played a vital role in the events of the next day. The 1st Guards Tank Corps crossed Zusha early in the morning of July 13 and concentrated behind the rifle units. The introduction of this mobile formation into battle could lead to the collapse of the German defense in this direction. But in the concentration area, Soviet tank units came under heavy attack from German aircraft. The corps suffered greatly from airstrikes, especially its automotive equipment. Only in the middle of the day was the 1st Guards Tank Corps brought into relative order and brought into battle. The Germans were able to prevent the collapse of their defense in this direction; the tank brigades of the corps, instead of breaking through into depth, slowly moved under air attacks. Soviet aviation tried to cover the hull from the air, but was unsuccessful. The Germans were winning in the area of tactics. The German 6th Air Fleet used large groups of several dozen aircraft. German fighters engaged Soviet patrols of 8-16 vehicles in battle, and the Junkers attacked the ground forces. Soviet reinforcements usually did not make it to the site of the air battle. Due to the actions of German fighters, Soviet bombers also suffered heavy losses. On July 13, 1943, the 15th Air Force lost 94 vehicles.
It is clear that the Luftwaffe was not asked to completely stop the Soviet offensive, but the German pilots slowed down the pace of the Red Army's movement, gaining time to bring up reserves. So the 35th Army Corps was reinforced with two brigades of assault guns (30 vehicles) and a Ferdinand company (8 vehicles). Its anti-tank capabilities were seriously strengthened. During the fierce battle, Rendulic's corps was able to hold the line of defense. The shock group of Gorbatov's army suffered heavy losses. They tried to bring the 1st Guards Tank Corps into battle in the 63rd Army zone, but this did not bring success.
A unit of tank destroyers and assault guns on vacation. The picture shows Marder II and StnG40 Ausf F/8.
In order to restore the strike potential of the 3rd Army, it was given the 25th Rifle Corps, consisting of two rifle divisions. The 1st Guards Tank Corps was regrouped again. The introduction of fresh forces into the battle allowed the Bryansk Front to advance a few more kilometers. But on July 16, the 35th Army Corps received the 2nd and 8th tank divisions transferred from the 9th Army. Therefore, the Soviet troops were unable to achieve decisive success.
Under these conditions, it was decided to introduce the Sami powerful reserve of the Headquarters into the battle - the 3rd Guards Tank Army Rybalko. On July 14, the High Command transferred the army to the Bryansk Front. Rybalko's army was supposed to crush the German defenses on the approaches to Orel. The tank army was brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 3rd Army. The 3rd Guards Tank Army was a fresh, well-equipped formation. It consisted of the 12th, 15th tank corps, and the 91st separate tank brigade. By June 10, 1943, the army was fully equipped with tanks according to the state - 228 T-34 tanks and 147 T-70 tanks. On July 16 - 17, 1943, the 2nd Mechanized Corps was added to the army, which further increased the striking power of the army. The number of tanks in the army by July 18 increased to 681 (461 - T-34, 220 - T-70), self-propelled guns - 32 vehicles (SU-122). The army's potential was enhanced by a significant number of guns, including 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. However, there was a serious shortage of road transport - on July 15, the road transport battalions of the Guards Tank Army had only 46% of the required transport. Motorized riflemen were forced to move on foot. Rybalko’s armies were given an ambitious task - to advance in the direction of Bortnoye, Stanovaya, Stanovoy Kolodez, Kromy, and, in cooperation with the troops of the Central Front, destroy enemy forces.
On the morning of July 19, 1943, the offensive of the 3rd and 63rd armies, after artillery preparation, resumed. The 25th Rifle Corps advanced 3-4 km, expanding the breakthrough towards the flanks. German troops were pushed back from the line of the Oleshnya River, which made it possible to bring tank units into battle. Having gone deeper into the enemy’s defenses, the 12th and 15th tank corps turned to the southeast, they were supposed to break through south of Orel, to the rear of the 9th German Army. However, there was no quick breakthrough to the rear of the Germans. The Germans were only pushed back from the river; their defensive formations did not collapse. Tank units began to break into German defenses, suffering heavy losses. However, the offensive of the 3rd Guards Tank Army was an unpleasant surprise for the German command. The left wing of the 35th Army Corps near Mtsensk was under threat of encirclement. Therefore, the German command decided to withdraw troops to the Oka line, to the near approaches to Orel.
This situation forced the Soviet command to take immediate retaliatory measures to seize the crossings across the Oka River. The consolidation of German troops at this line seriously complicated the further offensive. The decision was made at the level of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Rybalko’s army was deployed and thrown towards the Oka. The task of the 3rd Guards Tank Army was made easier by the fact that the 3rd Mechanized Corps had not yet been brought into battle and was easily deployed to the river. The 15th Tank Corps also moved in the same direction. Along the way, tankers defeated several retreating German columns and captured a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oka. Soon the rifle units of Alexander Gorbatov’s army reached the river.
On the evening of July 20, Rybalko’s army received an order from the Bryansk Front headquarters to transfer its actions to the south, into the offensive zone of the 63rd Army. The 3rd Guards Tank Army was again supposed to attack Stanovoy Kolodez. At this time, the German command concentrated large forces in order to reset Soviet troops from the bridgeheads in the Oka. The first German attacks repulsed more parts of Rybalko’s army. After her departure, the position of the 3rd Army became seriously complicated. Constant shelling, airstrikes and constant attacks by infantry and tanks resulted in heavy losses. Soviet troops fought to the death, but in the end, by order of the command, they were forced to retreat to the eastern bank of the Oka.
At this time, the German command transferred new reinforcements to the Orel area - the 12th Panzer Division and the 78th Assault Division. German troops suffered heavy losses, but held back the attacks of Soviet tank units. After several unsuccessful attempts to break through the German defenses, the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Tank Corps were withdrawn to the rear.
The battle for Orel was continued by the forces of the 3rd and 63rd armies. On the morning of July 25, under the cover of artillery fire and air strikes, units of the right flank of the 3rd Army crossed the Oka River; after some time, sappers established crossings along which they began to transfer tanks and self-propelled guns. The offensive of Soviet troops on Orel and the crisis situation in other directions forced the German command on July 26 to order the withdrawal of troops from the Oryol ledge. On August 1, 1943, the advanced units of the 3rd Army discovered the retreat of enemy troops to the west. The army of General Gorbaty began pursuing the enemy.
It cannot be said that the advance of the Soviet troops from that moment was easy. German troops put up stubborn resistance at intermediate lines to make it possible to evacuate hospitals and warehouses from Orel and destroy the city's infrastructure. In addition, the 3rd Army was drained of blood, the number of divisions advancing in the first echelon fell to 3.3-3.6 thousand people. However, the loss of the strong Oka defense line did not allow the Germans to create a stable defense system, and they continued to retreat. On August 3, units of the 35th Army Corps in the Orel area were surrounded by a semicircle. In order to save the city from complete destruction, a special group was formed from the tank units of the 3rd Army to liberate the city. By 16.00 on August 4, Soviet troops liberated the eastern part of the city. By the morning of August 5, Orel was completely liberated from the Nazis. The liberation of Orel and Belgorod was marked by 12 salvoes from 120 guns.
Residents of the liberated city of Oryol and Soviet soldiers at the entrance to the cinema before the screening of the newsreel documentary film “The Battle of Oryol”. 1943
From July 10 to August 12, 1943, the Bryansk Front lost more than 81 thousand people (over 22 thousand people were irretrievable losses). The front lost up to 40% of its members. The 3rd Army of General Gorbaty suffered the highest losses - over 38 thousand people. Such high losses were caused by the powerful German defense system in the Oryol salient area, created during a long pause in hostilities. The German defense system in the Orel area was one of the most advanced in the entire Great Patriotic War. It is also necessary to note the quick reaction of the German command, which dismantled the strike force advancing in the defense zone of the Central Front and transferred reserve divisions to the Orel area.
Samsonov Alexander
The Oryol offensive operation "Kutuzov" was strategically important and became one of the key ones for the victory over the Wehrmacht troops. This large-scale operation was prepared by the best tacticians and strategists who served in the Red Army. The history, chronology, conduct and results are described in this article.
General information
The operation to liberate Orel and Belgorod was offensive in nature. It began on July 12, 1943 and lasted until August 18 of the same year. This large-scale operation also included the Battle of Kursk, which ended with the destruction of the fascist group near Orel.
The Western Front was commanded by Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky, and the Bryansk Front was commanded by Colonel General M.M. Popov. The troops under their command began an offensive towards the city of Orel.
On July 15, in order to reach the lines of German troops, as well as launch a counteroffensive, the Central Front was involved in the attack. As a result of this, on July 19, the Red Army troops of the Central Front launched a strategic counteroffensive in the direction of Kursk-Kromsk. Soon they joined Bryansk and for the further liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Enemy forces
The fascist forces in the Oryol direction amounted to about 37 divisions. These included two motorized and eight tank ones. The total number of soldiers was about 1 million, and there were more than 1,800 tanks, about 1,500 aircraft and more than 7,000 anti-tank and field guns.
The main line of the Nazis was equipped and fortified to a depth of five to seven kilometers. The Nazis converted absolutely all major settlements into well-fortified fortifications. The cities of Bolkhov, Orel, Karachev and Mtsensk were best prepared by the Nazis for the attack of the Red Army.
The approximate date for the liberation of Orel and Belgorod was determined, and the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts began their offensive.
Liberation of the Eagle
Already on August 3, 1943, the soldiers of the Red Army took Orel into a semi-circle. The 17th Guards Tank Group and the 308th Motorized Rifle Division were approaching the city from the north-eastern direction. Tankers fought their way into some of the city's streets, and for the first time during the occupation, a red flag appeared on one of the buildings.
With artillery support from tanks and mortars, on August 4, units of the 63rd and 3rd armies approached the outskirts of the city from the other side. The Nazis created special units to blow up and set fire to buildings in the city to complicate the advance of the Red Army. Fierce battles with the fascist invaders, after pushing them out from the outskirts, continued in the city itself. The fighting on the streets of Orel was very fierce and lasted more than 40 hours. The Red Army soldiers were greatly helped by local residents who warned about minefields, ambushes and the presence of Nazi troops. They also showed various workarounds that would help get behind enemy lines.
Early in the morning of August 5, 1943, Red Army troops completely liberated the city. And a few hours later, at midnight, fireworks thundered in the capital in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, which was taken on the same day. This was the very first fireworks display dedicated to the victory over the Nazis.
Liberation of Belgorod
The battles for Belgorod began in the early morning of August 5th. This city, like the entire Oryol-Belgorod direction, was very well fortified by the Nazis. The offensive was complicated by numerous minefields. The Red Army conducted artillery preparations, enemy troops were fired upon from mortars and tanks, and aviation constantly bombed Nazi units. Unable to hold back the rapid attack of the Red Army, the Nazis began to retreat to the city center.
Having pushed back the enemy, the soldiers of the 69th Army continued the offensive together with the troops of the Seventh Guards Army. Heavy attacks by Soviet soldiers crushed the Nazi defenses in the eastern, western and northern regions of Belgorod.
The first to break through to the city center were the soldiers of the 270th Guards Rifle Regiment, and then the 111th and 305th divisions. By six o'clock in the evening on August 5, the city was completely liberated from the Nazis. The enemy fled, abandoning the wounded and military equipment. The red banner of the winners appeared over the city. The liberation of Orel and Belgorod took place on the same day. The result of the operation was successful, but at the cost of heavy losses.
Losses of the parties
Both in Belgorod and Orel there were fierce battles in urban conditions. And this is associated with large losses due to the locality of the battles. Despite the assistance of artillery, aviation and tanks, the final result was achieved through automatic (machine gun) and grenade battles on the streets and inside houses.
The liberation of Belgorod and Orel from the Nazis came at a great price. Of the entire group of the Red Army, numbering 1,287,600 people who participated in Operation Kutuzov, irretrievable losses amounted to 112,529 killed (who died from wounds in the hospital), as well as 317,361 wounded. The total number of casualties was 429,890. The losses of military equipment amounted to: 2,586 tanks and self-propelled guns (self-propelled artillery), 892 mortars and guns, as well as 1,014 aircraft (attack aircraft, fighters, bombers).
On the part of Nazi Germany, losses amounted to 18,912 killed and 85,233 wounded. Also during this operation, 15,859 Nazis went missing. Data on the losses of fascist military equipment are very contradictory, but there is an opinion that they amounted to more than half of those initially participating in the battles.
Results of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod
Based on the results of the liberation operation of the Red Army from the Nazis of cities that were of key strategic importance, several factors can be noted. In addition to the high price paid by the Soviet troops for this victory, the Red Army gained a vital strategic advantage. These victories are as important as the Kursk Bulge.
Thanks to these victories, it was possible to turn the entire course of the war and force the fascist troops to retreat. A year later, the American and British governments decided to open a second front, which Stalin spoke about back in 1941. The victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany became obvious to them, and they hastened to join the winner. The fifth of August is the date of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod from the fascist occupiers, the day that turned the tide of the Great Patriotic War.
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Oryol strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov"
On July 12, 1943, when an oncoming tank battle unfolded in the Prokhorovsky direction, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front, Bryansk and Central Fronts went on the offensive, marking the beginning of the Oryol strategic offensive operation (code name “Kutuzov”).
The operation was carried out with the aim of defeating the enemy’s Oryol grouping and eliminating the Oryol salient, where the 2nd Tank and 9th armies of Army Group Center were defending. They numbered 37 divisions, including 8 tank and 2 motorized, up to 600 thousand people, more than 7 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 1.1 thousand combat aircraft. The troops of the Bryansk, Central Fronts and the left wing of the Western Front had 1,286 thousand people, more than 21 thousand guns and mortars, 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns and more than 3 thousand combat aircraft. The superiority over the enemy was 2 times in manpower, 3 times in artillery and mortars, more than 2 times in tanks, and almost 3 times in aviation.
The plan of Operation Kutuzov was to dismember the enemy group with four strikes in converging directions towards Oryol and defeat it piece by piece. At the same time, the 50th and 11th Guards Armies of the Western Front were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses southwest of Kozelsk, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, encircle and destroy his group in the Bolkhov area. Subsequently, it was planned to develop the attack on Khotynets, to prevent the enemy from retreating from the Oryol area to the west and, in cooperation with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, to destroy it. From the air, the actions of the strike group were supported by formations of the 1st Air Army.
The 3rd and 63rd armies of the Bryansk Front attacked from the Novosil area to Orel, enveloping the enemy from the north and south. Air support was provided by units of the 15th Air Army.
The troops of the Central Front on the morning of July 15 were supposed to launch a counteroffensive in the general direction of Kromy and further to the northwest to cover Orel from the south in order to, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts, defeat the enemy’s Oryol group. In accordance with the decision of the front commander, General Rokossovsky, the troops of the 48th, 13th, 70th and 2nd tank armies were ordered to reach the line Nagorny, Preobrazhenskoye, Shamshin, Novopolevo, Rozhdestveno, Kamenka (12 km northwest of the station) by the end of July 17 Maloarkhangelsk), Vesyoly Poselok, Lebedikha, Voronets, Morozikha, Katomki. In the future, it was planned to develop the offensive in the general direction of Staroye Gorokhovo, Filosovovo, Ploskoye, Nesterovo.
The main role in the upcoming counteroffensive was to be played by the 13th and 70th armies, reinforced by the 9th and 19th tank corps, respectively. The 2nd Tank Army was planned to be brought into battle after the troops of the 13th Army reached the line Soglasny, Buzuluk, Shirokoe Boloto, Saborovka. The formations of the 2nd Tank Army were tasked with delivering the main blow in the direction of Snova, Senkovo, Gremyachevo, capturing the Olgino, Gnilusha, Shusherovo area by the end of the day on July 17, and then developing the offensive towards Nikolskoye and Nesterovo. The aviation of the 16th Air Army was supposed to support the attack of the infantry and tanks of the strike group of the 13th Army, and then provide assistance to the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies, preventing the enemy from retreating to the north and north-west of the Novopolenovo-Gremyachevo line, Voronets. The formations of the 60th Army were ordered to stubbornly defend their positions, ensuring the actions of the main forces of the front.
The offensive of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the armies of the Bryansk Front began on July 12 after powerful artillery and air preparation. By the end of the day on July 19, the 1st and 5th tank corps of the Western Front bypassed Bolkhov from the west and southwest and, wedged deep into the enemy’s position, created a threat to his main communications connecting Orel and Bryansk.
In the Bryansk Front, troops of the 61st Army, in cooperation with the 20th Tank Corps, completed a breakthrough of the enemy’s defense on July 18 and, having advanced up to 20 km, created a threat to bypass Bolkhov from the southeast. The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies reached the river. Oleshnya, where they met stubborn enemy resistance and were forced to go on the defensive. To increase the force of the strike and accelerate the breakthrough of enemy defenses, on July 19, the 3rd Guards Tank Army (800 tanks and self-propelled guns) was introduced into the battle. By the evening of July 20, she reached the Oka River, crossed it in the Otrada area and captured a bridgehead. As a result, favorable conditions were created for the offensive of the Bryansk Front. His 3rd Army captured Mtsensk on the same day. On July 24, formations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army occupied Stanovoy Kolodez, and troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies reached the Oka and Optukha rivers, where the front edge of the enemy’s rear defense line was located, covering the approaches to Orel from the east.
On July 26, the 4th Tank Army was brought into battle on the left wing of the Western Front. She provided great assistance to the troops of the 61st Army in the liberation of Bolkhov on July 28. The entry of Soviet troops into the Bolkhov area, and especially the 4th Tank Army to the Orel-Bryansk railway, predetermined the stability of the entire Oryol bridgehead.
The troops of the right wing of the Central Front went on the offensive on July 15. The enemy, having concentrated in the offensive zone of the main forces of the front seven infantry divisions (216, 78, 86, 292, 31, 7, 258th), the 10th motorized and 4th tank divisions, part of the forces of the 2nd tank division and three Jaeger battalions (8th, 13th and 9th), stubbornly resisted, often counterattacked with tanks. Lieutenant General of Artillery G.S. Nadysev, analyzing the reasons for the slow advance of the front’s strike group, wrote: “After fierce fighting, the enemy went on the defensive on July 12 and, until July 15, regrouped troops and all fire weapons in accordance with the nature of the combat operations ahead of him. In two or three days, our artillery reconnaissance and corrective reconnaissance aircraft were unable to sufficiently fully open the entire German defense system. Therefore, the artillery strike during the fire raid did not hit all targets. On the night of July 15, many of the previously explored targets turned out to be in completely different places. We, the artillery headquarters of the front and armies, are also to blame, for whom the lack of intelligence about the enemy was no secret. Apparently, in this case, the combat use of artillery should have been structured differently. I believe that in the conditions of accelerated preparations for the offensive, it was necessary to allocate more guns for direct fire - to defeat specific targets in the first position of the Nazi defense.”
Within three days, the 2nd Tank Army, 9th and 19th Tank Corps, together with formations of the 48th, 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front, after stubborn battles, completely restored the position lost in defensive battles and continued to advance in the general direction of Kromy . General Rokossovsky, trying to break enemy resistance, ordered the troops of the 13th, 70th and 2nd Tank Armies to resume the offensive on the morning of July 19 with the support of all aviation of the 16th Air Army. They were supposed to deliver the main blow to the western bank of the river. Oka in the general direction to Kromy, by the end of July 20 reach the river line. Kroma on the site Shumakovo, Bolshaya Kolcheva, Kutafino, Krasnaya Roshcha. In the future, it was planned to develop the offensive in the direction of Orel and Naryshkino.
At 7 a.m. on July 19, the troops of the Central Front resumed their offensive after a short artillery attack. Having broken enemy resistance along the Kursk-Orel highway, they advanced up to 6 km. The enemy, having brought up reserves, began to put up more and more stubborn resistance, especially in the 13th Army zone. This forced General Rokossovsky to make a decision at ten o’clock in the evening on July 20 to transfer her troops to the defensive. The enemy's stubborn defense thwarted all the plans of the commander of the Central Front to reach the Kromy region by the deadline. He had to reschedule it for the end of the day on July 22.
The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, which began on July 17, had a significant impact on the course of events in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal E. von Manstein, at the request of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, was forced to give the order to withdraw the 2nd and 3rd tank corps from the battle in the Voronezh Front sector and transfer them to the south, to reinforce the 6th th field army operating against the Southern Front.
General Rokossovsky, meanwhile, continued attempts to reach the Kromy area. To this end, the troops of the Central Front resumed their offensive on the morning of July 25. This time, the formations of the 70th Army, having overcome enemy resistance, began to successfully advance in the general direction of Chuvardino. The next day, the front commander decides to bring the 2nd Tank Army into the breakthrough with the task of reaching the Krasnaya Roshcha, Gnezdilovo, Chuvardino area by the end of the day on July 26. By decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, from 24 hours on July 26, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was transferred from the Bryansk Front to the disposal of General Rokossovsky, which was required to be used on the right wing of the Central Front in cooperation with the troops of the 48th Army.
By the end of the day on July 27, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front, with the support of aviation from the 16th Air Army, broke through the enemy’s intermediate defensive line and advanced 35–40 km. The enemy began to withdraw his troops to the west in front of the left wing of the Bryansk and the right wing of the Central Front. In this regard, General Rokossovsky decided on the morning of July 28 to introduce the 3rd Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough on the left flank of the 48th Army with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the river. Malaya Rybnitsa and go to the Khmelevaya area (15–20 km north of Kromy).
On the morning of July 28, the 3rd Guards Tank Army went on the offensive. Its formations crossed Malaya Rybnitsa and reached the approaches to Filosofovo. However, the enemy counterattacked forced some parts of the army to retreat to the right bank of the river. General Rokossovsky, trying to avoid unjustified losses, turned to the Supreme High Command Headquarters with a request to withdraw the 3rd Guards Tank Army from the battle. In addition, on the evening of July 30, he decided to stop the offensive with the forces of the 48th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies and firmly gain a foothold on the achieved lines.
The enemy, taking advantage of the slow advance of the right wing of the Central Front, hastily withdrew its units to the northern bank of the river. Krom and to the western bank of the river. Nezhivka, where he intended to go on the defensive and prevent a breakthrough of Soviet troops in the northern and northwestern directions. General Rokossovsky, trying to thwart the enemy's plan, ordered the 48th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies to resume the offensive on the morning of August 1 and complete previously assigned tasks. At the same time, the 70th and 2nd tank armies were to go on the offensive, which were supposed to bypass the enemy’s Oryol grouping from the south.
Stalin, who observed the development of events in the Oryol direction, was dissatisfied with the actions of General Rokossovsky. At about three o'clock in the morning on August 1, he sent him directive No. 30158, which stated:
“Recently, in connection with the offensive of the troops of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western Front, the enemy has significantly weakened its group operating in front of the Central Front, removing five tank divisions, two motorized divisions and up to two or three infantry divisions from this sector. At the same time, the Central Front was significantly strengthened by tanks, receiving 3 Rybalko tanks. All this led to an improvement in the position of the front troops and created favorable conditions for decisive offensive actions. However, these conditions have so far been insufficiently used by the front command.” .
Stalin demanded to immediately prepare and deliver a decisive blow with the forces of the 70th and 2nd Tank Armies in the general direction of Chuvardino, Krasnaya Roshcha, Apalkovo. At the same time, the 13th Army was ordered to break through the enemy’s defenses west of Koroskovo, preparing the conditions for the entry of the 3rd Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough. By August 4–5, it had to complete concentration in the area south of Koroskovo with the task of developing the success of the 13th Army and striking in the general direction of Kromy to collapse the enemy’s defenses along the western bank of the river. Oka and thereby contribute to the advancement of the 48th Army. Subsequently, it was ordered to act with the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Guards Tank Armies, bypassing Orel from the west, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the enemy’s Oryol group and capturing the city of Orel.
The commander of the Central Front, having received a directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters, was forced to suspend the offensive of the 48th Army, which was tasked with going on the defensive in its positions. The troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were withdrawn from the battle and by the morning of August 3 were transferred to an area 24–25 km southwest of Rybnitsa. The commander of the 9th Tank Corps was ordered to begin pursuing the enemy on the evening of August 1 and prevent him from gaining a foothold on the river. Chrome.
On August 4, Rokossovsky clarified the tasks of the troops of the right wing of the front. The formations of the 70th Army were supposed to intensify combat operations, and the 2nd Tank Army and the 9th Tank Corps were to strike at the enemy’s rear in the general direction of Kolka, Krasnaya Yagoda and assist the troops of the 70th Army in collapsing the enemy’s defenses. The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army was ordered to go on the offensive at one o'clock in the afternoon with the task of crossing the river. Kroma on the Kolki, Krasnaya Roshcha site. After that, she had to develop a strike in the general direction of Khmelevaya, Gniloye Boloto, Khotkovo in order to cut off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and southwest from the Kromy, Orel, and Naryshkino areas. The troops of the 13th Army were supposed to assist the crossing of the 3rd Guards Tank Army across the river with infantry and artillery fire. Krom, and then, using its success, rapidly move forward with the task of reaching the Maryinsky, Krasny Pakhar, Krasnaya Niva, Dolzhenki line by the end of the day on August 4.
Meanwhile, troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies of the Bryansk Front liberated Orel on August 5. The Supreme High Command headquarters, trying to consolidate the success achieved, with its Directive No. 30159, ordered on August 6 the commander of the Bryansk Front to concentrate his main efforts on the rapid capture of Khotynets and Karachev. The commander of the Central Front was instructed to “use the 2nd and 3rd tank armies to strike in the direction of Shablykino with the task, in cooperation with the right wing of the Bryansk Front advancing on Karachev, to destroy the enemy retreating from Orel to the west.” All aviation forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts were ordered to assist in the accomplishment of this task.
However, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Guards Tank Armies failed to complete their assigned tasks. Their actions aroused dissatisfaction on the part of General Rokossovsky, who around midnight on August 6 signed order No. 00525/op with the following content:
“The enemy is retreating in a western direction and, clinging to random, unprepared lines, seeks to delay the advance of our troops and thereby ensure the systematic withdrawal of the Oryol group.
The 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Tank Army, despite the favorable situation for us and contrary to my order, marked time for three days and did not complete their tasks. This was a consequence of the fact that commanders of tank units and formations show indecision, do not know how to force their subordinates to complete tasks, and manage the battle of their units, formations and armies extremely poorly. I order:
1. 3rd Guards Tank Army and 2nd Tank Army - on the morning of August 7, 1943, with all the forces of the armies, break through the enemy’s defense front and, developing a strike in the general direction of Shablykino, cut off the escape routes of his Oryol group to the west and south -west from the line Naryshkino, Ostanino, Cow Swamp, Nizhnyaya Fedotovka;
a) 3rd Guards Tank Army - break through the defense front of enemy covering units in the Krasny Pakhar, Dolzhenki sector and, developing an attack on Maslovo, Soskovo, by the end of the day on August 7, 1943, capture the Troitsky, Soskovo, Zvyagintsevo, Maslovo area; further advance on Shablykino and capture Shablykino, Novoselki, Gerasimovo, Volkovo, Robier.
b) 2nd Tank Army - to break through the front of defense of enemy covering units in the sector (claim) Krasnaya Roshcha, (claim) Volobuevo and, developing an attack on Gnezdilovo, by the end of the day of August 7, 1943, capture the Efimovka, Goncharovka, Gnezdilovo area , Gorodishche; further advance in the general direction towards Zhikharevo, Lobki, Kolosok and capture the area of Gavrilovo, Turishchevo, Kolosok.
2. 16th Air Army - with all the forces of the army to facilitate the offensive of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to carry out the tasks I have assigned.
3. The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Tank Army categorically demand that all officers carry out tasks accurately and unconditionally. Under no circumstances should we allow an offensive by scattered groups, demanding an offensive by the entire mass of tanks and motorized infantry of the corps and armies.
4. Commanders of units and formations that do not carry out tasks will be held severely accountable, up to and including being brought before a Military Tribunal.” .
Despite the measures taken, the advance of the troops of the Central Front was slow. On the right wing they advanced only 10 km. Troops of the 65th and 70th armies, supported by aviation from the 16th Air Army, liberated Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky on August 12. On the same day, formations of the 13th Army, having encountered organized enemy resistance from the western banks of the Vodocha and Lokna rivers, were forced to go on the defensive.
By this time, the 3rd Guards Tank Army had suffered significant losses. Therefore, on August 13, by directive No. 40202 of the General Staff, it (without the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps) was withdrawn from the Central Front to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. All tanks and self-propelled guns were ordered to remain as part of the Central Front, and the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps was to be included in the 2nd Tank Army.
By August 18, the troops of the Bryansk, Western and Central Fronts reached the forward positions of the heavily fortified defensive line “Hagen” and were stopped on a line east of Lyudinovo, 25 km east of Bryansk, west of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky. This completed Operation Kutuzov, during which troops on three fronts advanced up to 150 km, eliminating the enemy’s Oryol bridgehead. However, there were significant shortcomings during the operation. When preparing the operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters showed haste in determining the timing of its start. As a result, the troops went on the offensive without fully completing its preparation, and a stronger group was not created on the left wing of the Western Front. Tank armies and corps were used to successively break through several enemy defensive lines, which sharply reduced their ability to develop an offensive in operational depth. Front-line aviation was unable to completely solve the problem of isolating the combat area from the approach of enemy operational reserves. As a result, instead of a swift blow, the operation took on a protracted character. The enemy, in essence, was slowly squeezed out of the Oryol ledge, which allowed him to regroup his troops and withdraw them from the Oryol area in an organized manner. All this determined the low pace of the offensive (up to 4 km per day) and significant losses of Soviet troops: irrecoverable - 112,529, and sanitary - 317,361 people; 2586 tanks, 892 guns and mortars, 1014 combat aircraft. The formations of the 2nd Tank Army, forced to break through deeply layered defenses, lost more than 300 tanks, having only 36 vehicles in service by the end of the operation.
Oryol strategic offensive operation, Oryol offensive operation, "Kutuzov" - a Soviet offensive operation that was carried out from July 12 to August 18, 1943 during the Battle of Kursk for the final defeat of the enemy group near Orel.
According to the plan for Operation Kutuzov, on July 12, troops of the Western (commander - Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commander - Colonel General M.M. Popov) fronts began an offensive in the Oryol direction. On July 15 (according to Directive No. 00408/op), in order to reach the lines occupied before the German offensive, the Central Front went on a counteroffensive, and by the end of July 18 it had completely restored its previous position. On the morning of July 19, the Central Front troops launched a strategic offensive in the Kursk-Kromsk direction, fully participating in the operation under the code name "Kutuzov".
The enemy forces on the Oryol bridgehead amounted to up to 37 divisions (including 8 tank and two motorized divisions, as part of the 9th Army and 2nd Tank Army). The main defense line of the German troops was equipped to a depth of 5-7 km, the enemy turned large settlements into strong strongholds. The cities of Orel, Bolkhov, Mtsensk and Karachev were especially well prepared for all-round defense. It should be noted that the 2nd Tank Army was withdrawn from the front at the end of August and had been in the Balkans since September 1943.
In the first two days of the offensive, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy’s tactical defense zone on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. The offensive unfolded in a wide zone, which allowed the Central Front to strike in the direction of Krom. On July 29, Bolkhov was liberated, and by the morning of August 5, Oryol was liberated. By August 18, Soviet troops approached the enemy’s defensive line “Hagen” east of Bryansk. With the major defeat of Army Group Center near Orel, the plans of the German command to use the Oryol bridgehead for an attack in an eastern direction collapsed. The counteroffensive began to develop into a general offensive of the Red Army to the west.
Preparations for the attack on Oryol
The results of the military operations of the winter of 1942–1943 (the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad) introduced fundamental changes in the nature of combat operations on the eastern front. The captured strategic initiative allowed Soviet troops to transfer military operations from defense to offense.
As part of the summer military campaign of 1943, Soviet troops had to liberate territories captured by Nazi troops in the first months of the war, which meant that they had been well fortified by the enemy for two years and had a developed supply network.
During the period of preparation for the summer offensive (April-July 1943), the active army received a significant amount of modern weapons, and the formation of rocket artillery divisions (Katyusha) was completed. A salvo of such a division was about 3,500 thousand shells, with a total mass of over 300 tons.
T-34s drive along Moskovskaya Street of liberated Orel
Two options were considered as the location of the main attack: the first - south of Kursk in the direction of Kharkov; the second - north of Kursk in the direction of Orel. The bet was the second option. There was a danger that the forces of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, which had not fully recovered after the winter campaign, might not be able to overcome German resistance in the direction of Kharkov.
The Oryol-Kursk offensive operation was developed. Stalin gave this operation the name of the great Russian commander - “Kutuzov”.
It was planned to use strikes from three fronts (Western, Bryansk and Central), converging in the direction of Orel, to defeat the German group located there and liberate the city of Orel. The defense of the city was entrusted to the German General Model, whom the Fuhrer himself called the “lion of defense.” It was Walter Model who saved the Rzhev group from complete encirclement by Soviet troops.
The first to enter the operation were the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts. They were not involved in the defense of the Kursk Bulge and were already fully ready for the offensive in June. The Central Front was supposed to launch its counter-offensive towards them.
In preparation for the offensive, the engineering troops took into account and used natural terrain barriers, ravines and gullies as starting and intermediate points for the concentration of troops. Under the cover of these obstacles, the troops pulled up and rearranged, preparing for the attack. Where it was not possible to find such shelters, they moved at night, creating during the day false signs of strengthening the defense, so that the enemy would think that the Soviet army was going to defend and not attack.
The fact that the ruse was a success is evidenced by the statement of Colonel General Keitel, who was part of the German high command: “We never expected that the Red Army was not only ready to repel our attack, but also itself had sufficient reserves to launch a powerful counteroffensive.” .
Four days after the Germans launched attacking operations in the Kursk direction, having assessed the current situation, the VGK headquarters made a final decision on the start date of the operation