Scientific paradigms- this is a set of prerequisites that determine this particular study, recognized at this stage of the development of science and associated with a general philosophical orientation. The concept of a paradigm appeared in the work of T. Kuhn “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”. Translated, it means “sample”, a set of universally recognized scientific achievements that determine in a given era the model for posing scientific problems and their solution. This is an example of the creation of new theories in accordance with those accepted at a given time. Within the framework of paradigms, general basic provisions used in theory are formulated, and ideals of explanation and organization of scientific knowledge are set. Working within the framework of a paradigm helps to clarify concepts, quantitative data, improve experiments, and allows us to identify phenomena or facts that do not fit into a given paradigm and can serve as the basis for a new one.
The tasks of a scientist: observation, recording information about phenomena or objects, measuring or comparing the parameters of phenomena with others, setting up experiments, formalizing the results before creating an appropriate theory. A scientist collects new specific information, processes it, rationalizes it, and presents it in the form of laws and formulas, and this is not related to his political or philosophical views. Science solves specific problems, i.e. claims to have private knowledge of the world; scientific results require experimental verification or are subject to strict logical inference. Scientific truths are universally valid and do not depend on the interests of certain sections of society. But paradigms function within the framework of scientific programs, and scientific programs operate within the framework of scientific programs.
within the framework of the cultural and historical whole. And this cultural and historical whole determines the value of a particular problem, the method of solving it, the position of the state and society in relation to the needs of scientists.
Scientific knowledge is constantly changing in its content and scope, new facts are discovered, new hypotheses are born, new theories are created that replace the old ones. A scientific revolution (HP) is taking place. There are several models for the development of science:
history of science: progressive, cumulative, progressive process;
history of science as development through scientific revolutions;
history of science as a set of particular situations.
The first model corresponds to the process of knowledge accumulation, when the previous state of science prepares the subsequent one; ideas that do not correspond to basic ideas are considered erroneous. This model was closely connected with positivism, with the works of E. Mach and P. Duhem, and was leading for some time.
The second model is based on the idea of absolute discontinuity in the development of science, i.e. after HP, the new theory is fundamentally different from the old one and development may go in a completely different direction. T. Kuhn noted that humanists argue more about fundamental problems, and natural scientists discuss them so much only at critical moments in their sciences, and the rest of the time they calmly work within the framework limited by fundamental laws and do not shake the foundation of science. Scientists working in the same paradigm rely on the same rules and standards, thus science is a complex of knowledge of the corresponding era. A paradigm, he said, consists of “universally recognized scientific achievements that, over a period of time, provide a model for posing problems and their solutions to the scientific community.” This content ends up in textbooks and penetrates the mass consciousness. The goal of the normal development of science is to link new facts and their explanation with the paradigm. The paradigm determines the setting up of new experiments, clarification and clarification of the meanings of specific quantities, and the establishment of specific laws. Science becomes more precise, new detailed information accumulates, and only a dedicated scientist can recognize any anomalies. Kuhn called the change of paradigms a scientific revolution.
An example is the transition from the ideas of the world according to Aristotle to the ideas of Galileo-Newton. This abrupt transition is unpredictable and uncontrollable; rational logic cannot determine which path science will take further and when the transition to a new worldview will take place. In the book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” by T. Kuhn
writes: “One often hears that successive theories are getting closer to the truth, approximating it better and better... I have no doubt that Newtonian mechanics improved Aristotle’s, and Einstein’s improved Newton’s as a means of solving specific problems. However, I cannot discern in their alternation any consistent direction in the development of the doctrine of being. On the contrary, in some, though certainly not all, respects, Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle's than either of them is to Newton's.”
The third model for the development of science was proposed by the British philosopher and historian of science I. Lakatos. Scientific programs (SP) have some structure. Irrefutable provisions are the “core” of the NP; it is surrounded by a “protective belt” of hypotheses and assumptions, which allow, if there is some discrepancy between experimental data and theories from the “core,” to make a number of assumptions that explain this discrepancy, rather than question the basic theories. This is a “negative heuristic.” There is also a “positive heuristic”: a set of rules and assumptions that can change and develop “refuted versions” of the program. This is how some modernization of the theory occurs, preserving the original principles and not changing the results of experiments, but choosing the path of changing or adjusting the mathematical apparatus of the theory, i.e. preserving the sustainable development of science. But when these protective functions weaken and exhaust themselves, this scientific program will have to give way to another scientific program that has its own positive heuristics. HP will occur. So, the development of science occurs as a result of competition between NPs.
The concept of “scientific revolution” (HP) contains both concepts of the development of science. When applied to the development of science, it means a change in all its components - facts, laws, methods, the scientific picture of the world. Since facts cannot be changed, we are talking about changing their explanation.
Thus, the observed movement of the Sun and planets can be explained both in the Ptolemaic world scheme and in the Copernican scheme. The explanation of facts is built into some system of views and theories. Many theories describing the world around us can be collected into a holistic system of ideas about the general principles and laws of the structure of the world or into a single scientific picture of the world. There have been many discussions about the nature of scientific revolutions that change the entire scientific picture of the world.
The concept of permanent revolution was put forward by K. Popper. According to his principle of falsifiability, only a theory can be considered scientific if it can be falsified. In fact, this happens with every theory, but as a result of the collapse of a theory, new problems arise, which is why the progress of science is the movement from one problem to another. Whole
The scientific system of principles and methods cannot be changed even by a major discovery, therefore one such discovery must be followed by a series of other discoveries, the methods of obtaining new knowledge and the criteria for its truth must radically change. This means that in science the process of spiritual growth itself is important, and it is more important than its result (which is important for applications). Therefore, testing experiments are carried out in such a way that they can refute one or another hypothesis. As A. Poincaré put it, “if a rule is established, then first of all we must examine those cases in which this rule has the greatest chance of being incorrect.”
An experiment aimed at refuting a hypothesis is called decisive, since only it can recognize this hypothesis as false. Perhaps this is the main difference between the law of nature and the law of society. A normative law can be improved by the decision of the people, and if it cannot be broken, then it is meaningless. The laws of nature describe unchanging regularities; they, according to A. Poincaré, are the best expression of the harmony of the world.
So, the main features of the scientific revolution are as follows: the need for theoretical synthesis of new experimental material; a radical change in existing ideas about nature as a whole; the emergence of crisis situations in explaining facts. In terms of its scale, the scientific revolution can be private, affecting one area of knowledge; comprehensive- affecting several areas of knowledge; global - radically changing all areas of knowledge. There are three global scientific revolutions in the development of science. If we associate them with the names of scientists whose works are significant in these revolutions, then these are Aristotelian, Newtonian and Einsteinian.
A number of scientists who consider the beginning of scientific knowledge of the world to be the 17th century, distinguish two revolutions: the scientific one, associated with the works of N. Copernicus, R. Descartes, I. Kepler, G. Galileo, I. Newton, and the scientific and technical 20th century, associated with the works of A. Einstein, M. Planck, N. Bohr, E. Rutherford, N. Wiener, the emergence of atomic energy, genetics, cybernetics and astronautics.
In the modern world, the applied function of science has become comparable to the cognitive one. People have always used practical applications of knowledge, but they developed for a long time independently of science. Science itself, even when it arose, was not focused on the conscious application of knowledge in the technical field. Since modern times, practical applications of science began to develop (and more intensively) in Western culture. Gradually, natural science began to converge, and then transform into technology, and a systematic approach to objects began to develop with the same approaches as in science - mathematics and experiment. For several centuries there has been a need for
special understanding of the role of technology in connection with the growth of its importance in the cultural progress of mankind in the 19th-20th centuries. “Philosophy of technology” has existed as an independent scientific direction for about a century. But not only man created technology, but technology also changed its creator.
- these are examples of problem posing and problem solving that a particular scientific community adheres to when studying the nature of a phenomenon. The scientific paradigm also includes a set of concepts and technical means for observing and explaining phenomena. Scientific paradigms indicate scientific achievements that: 1) are considered by a certain community as the basis for research activities;
ity (i.e. they set the direction of research activity); 2) have unresolved internal problems (they are open in nature). The concept of a paradigm shows that science as an activity presupposes the existence of communities. The concept of a paradigm was proposed by T. Kuhn, but in modern philosophy of science, the question of the need to use this concept when constructing the history of science is debatable. Multiple paradigms can exist within a discipline because applied research and problem solving continue even as paradigms change. So, for example, the equations of classical mechanics are used to solve some applied problems, although the scientific community can no longer fully accept the way of explaining the world that it offers.
Paradigms arise only in advanced science, when a community of scientists is willing to accept some theory as a basis for research. T. Kuhn also reveals the pre-paradigm period in the development of science, when different ways of explaining a phenomenon coexist, different scientific schools with incompatible points of view on fundamentally important issues. For example, until the end of the 17th century, i.e., before the emergence of the first paradigms, there was no single physical point of view on the nature of light, but there were several schools that represented the nature of this phenomenon in different ways: for some scientists, light was a property of the environment that is located between subject and object, for others - the property of material bodies, for others - the perception of light depended only on the abilities of the human eye. However, in modern physics, which has passed the stage of paradigm formation, there is a generally accepted point of view on the nature of light - the particle-wave theory, and all research in this area develops and supports it. However, modern discoveries in the field of optics are expressed in a language that is not understandable to the general public; theories of the pre-paradigmatic period were accessible to the broad masses. Thus, one of the main signs of the formation of a paradigm is the esoteric nature of the research conducted within its framework.
We can talk about three main functions of a paradigm in science:
- uniting separate groups of scientists into a scientific community, whose task is to organize and conduct research, and the goal is to ensure scientific progress;
- a paradigm in science saves effort because it relieves the scientist of the need to define initial concepts and principles (this function is performed only if the paradigm is accepted without evidence);
- allows you to solve problems with ease, as it makes it possible to detect similarities between known and unknown situations.
The paradigm presupposes both a strictly defined set of facts and rules for conducting experiments and observations, which makes it possible to pose and solve new particular problems, as well as, by accumulating empirical material, to expand the scope of application of the generally accepted theory. In addition, the paradigm also influences philosophical views, since it contributes to the formation of a picture of the world. This level of functioning of the paradigm is called metaphysical, since the beliefs of scientists are not confirmed by experience, as, in fact, the positions that are opposite to them. Thus, one has to accept one of two positions: things either consist of qualitative
but homogeneous atoms located in the void, or from matter and the forces that act on it. Within the same paradigm, these provisions cannot coexist. The paradigm is a closed system in which the conditions for development are not laid down, therefore any significant changes occur as a result of scientific revolutions, the necessary conditions of which are scientific discoveries and new theories.
The concept of scientific paradigms by T. Kuhn was criticized by K. Popper, who believed that a paradigm is only a dominant theory that does not imply the need for research, inhibits the development of science and is not an essential element of it. The acceptance of any paradigm by the community of scientists generally excludes scientific activity, which consists solely of producing new theories. Those who solve problems within the framework of the paradigm are not scientists in the proper sense, but can only be called “applied scientists.”
/7. G. Kryukova
“Paradigm shift” is one of those terms that everyone uses but no one understands.
“Paradigm” is a fashionable word that people from the world of science, culture and other fields boldly use. However, the breadth of use of this term often confuses ordinary people. In the modern sense, the concept of a paradigm was introduced by the American historian of science Thomas Kuhn, and today it is firmly established in the vocabulary of the “intellectual elite.”
Etymology
The word “paradigm” is a derivative of the Greek noun παράδειγμα - “template, example, model, sample”, which combines two lexemes: παρά “near” and δεῖγμα “showed, sample, sample” - derived from the verb δείκνυμι “show , I point out."
Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms
How to figuratively imagine the development of science? Is it possible to take, for example, a bucket into which, from the very birth of scientific thought until today, scientists around the world have been throwing “knowledge”? Theoretically, why not... But what will be the volume of this bucket? “Bottomless,” you will answer, and you will probably be right. But can we say that a certain “unit” of knowledge, falling into this bucket, forever and irrevocably finds its place there? Let's not rush to answer this question.
Let's return to the material world and discuss where scientific knowledge is stored. How does each of us know that the Earth is round and man belongs to the animal kingdom? Of course, from books, at least from textbooks. What is the average thickness of a textbook? 200-300 pages... Is this volume really enough to reflect the contents of our bottomless vessel, which people have been working on filling for several thousand years?
“Stop fooling us,” you say, “after all, school textbooks reflect only the basics of a particular area, the basis that is sufficient for understanding the elementary laws of the world order!” And again you will be absolutely right! But the fact is that if the “fall” of any scientific idea into our bucket was irreversible, then textbooks would begin with the categorical statement that the Earth is flat, and would end with a contradictory statement that it is also round... But in fact, being once a generally accepted scientific fact, turtles and elephants holding the Earth, at one fine moment flew out of the bucket like a bullet, and in their place reigned a ball, which, by the way, relatively recently also left its warm place, giving way to ellipsoid (and if you go to the end in your tediousness, then now the geoid has firmly settled in the bucket)!
So, in simple words, a paradigm is those basic ideas and approaches accepted by the scientific community as axioms, serving as a starting point for further research.
Scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts
We have already agreed that a paradigm is a basic idea accepted as a scientific fact and a starting point for research. So how did it happen that the theory that the Earth is flat, which did not need proof, suddenly ceased to be relevant? The fact is that, according to Kuhn's theory, any, even the most stable and seemingly indestructible paradigm, sooner or later encounters the appearance of so-called anomalies - inexplicable phenomena within the accepted axiomatic framework; At this moment, science comes into crisis. Initially, one or two scientists in the world notice this, begin to test the current paradigm, verify it, find weak points, and, in the end, it turns out that these revolutionaries are conducting alternative research in a direction perpendicular to their contemporaries. They publish articles, speak at conferences and... meet complete misunderstanding and rejection from colleagues and society. That’s where Giordano Bruno got burned, by the way! A and Niels Bohr, with their ideas about the structure of the atom, have long been considered visionaries. However, life goes on as usual, and the seed of doubt, planted by “oppositionists” from the world of science, grows in the minds of an increasing number of scientists, and opposing scientific schools appear.
This is how a scientific revolution occurs, as a result of which sooner or later a new paradigm is formed, and the old one, as we have already agreed, leaves its home.
Examples of modern paradigms in the exact sciences
In the modern world, the theory outlined by Kuhn, which we examined earlier, looks overly simplified. Let me explain with an example: at school we study the so-called Euclidean geometry. One of the basic axioms is that parallel lines do not intersect. At the end of the 19th century, Nikolai Lobachevsky published a work in which he refuted this generally accepted scientific postulate. Obviously, the alternative view was not received very warmly, but there were also a few supporters of this idea. Only more than a hundred years later, Lobachevsky's geometry not only became established, but also served as the basis for other non-Euclidean geometries of spatial relations. Now these theories are widely used in physics, astronomy, etc. However, neither the geometry of our great compatriot nor other “non-Euclidean” ideas supplanted the classical one - they supplemented it, built on it, that is, the paradigms exist in parallel, describing the same object in different aspects.
A similar situation is observed in programming paradigms. In relation to this area of knowledge, the term “polyparadigmality” is even used.
New paradigms do not replace old ones, but offer methods for solving certain problems with a reduction in time and financial costs. At the same time, the “old” paradigms remain in service, being used either as a basis for new ones, or as an independent set of tools. For example, the Python programming language allows you to write code using any of the existing paradigms - imperative, functional objective-oriented, or a combination of them.
Paradigms in the humanities
In the humanities, the theory of paradigms is slightly modified: paradigms describe not a phenomenon, but primarily an approach to its study. So, for example, in linguistics at the beginning of the last century, mainstream research studied language in a comparative historical aspect, that is, it either described changes in language over time, or compared different languages. Then a system-structural paradigm was established in linguistics - language was understood as an ordered system (research in this direction is still ongoing). Today it is believed that the anthropocentric paradigm dominates: “language in man and man in language” are studied.
In modern sociology it is believed that there are several stable paradigms. Some researchers are of the opinion that this is evidence of a crisis state of society. Others, on the contrary, assert the multiparadigm nature of sociology (George Ritzer's term), based on the idea of the complex and multidimensional nature of social phenomena.
Development paradigm
The term “paradigm” has gone beyond its use in the Kuhnian sense in recent decades. You can increasingly see the phrase “development paradigm”: in the titles of conferences, collections of scientific articles, and even in newspaper headlines. This phrase was established after the 1992 UN Conference on environmental problems and the evolution of civilization. The paradigms of sustainable development and innovative development (this is how they were stated at the conference) are essentially complementary and interconnected concepts of the progress of the world order. The general idea is that, subject to achieving constant economic growth, the internal policy of the state should be aimed at developing human potential, preserving and/or restoring the environment through the introduction of scientific and technical developments.
Personal paradigm
The term “personal paradigm” is (in simple words) a system of ideas of an individual about the surrounding reality. In the human sciences, the concept “picture of the world” is used in the same meaning. The personal paradigm depends on a large number of factors, ranging from historical (the era in which a person lives) and geographical, ending with moral principles and individual life experience. That is, each of us is the bearer of a unique personal paradigm.
Other meanings of the word "paradigm"
In linguistics, the term "paradigm" took root before its popularization by Kuhn and can include several meanings:
- “assortment” of a separate grammatical category. For example, the number paradigm in Russian is much narrower than in English and includes present, past and future tenses (compare with the variety of verb tense systems in English);
- a system of changing word forms in accordance with grammatical categories, for example, conjugation or declension, etc.
In history, a paradigm and its change quite often, especially in the Western tradition, are understood as significant events that radically change the way of life, in particular, the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Now they are talking about a digital historical paradigm.
General scheme (model) of the historical-scientific process proposed Thomas Kuhn , includes two main stages: “normal science”, where the paradigm reigns supreme, and the “scientific revolution” - the collapse of the paradigm, competition between alternative paradigms and, finally, the victory of one of them, i.e. the transition to a new period of “normal science” " Kuhn believes that the transition from one paradigm to another through revolution is a common development pattern characteristic of mature science. Moreover, scientific development, in his opinion, like the development of the biological world, is a unidirectional and irreversible process.
The most important concept of Kuhn's concept is the concept of paradigm. The content of this concept remains not entirely clear, but as a first approximation we can say that A paradigm is a set of scientific achievements, primarily theories, recognized by the entire scientific community in a certain period of time.
Generally speaking, a paradigm can be called one or more fundamental theories that have received general acceptance and have guided scientific research for some time. Examples of such paradigmatic theories are Aristotle's physics, Ptolemy's geocentric system, Newton's mechanics and optics, Lavoisier's oxygen theory of combustion, Maxwell's electrodynamics, Einstein's theory of relativity, Bohr's atomic theory, etc. Thus, the paradigm embodies indisputable, generally accepted knowledge about the subject under study areas of natural phenomena.
However, speaking of the paradigm. Kuhn does not only mean some knowledge expressed in laws and principles. Scientists—the creators of a paradigm—not only formulated some theory or law, but they also solved one or more important scientific problems and thereby provided examples of how problems should be solved. For example, Newton not only formulated the principles of the corpuscular theory of light, but in a number of experiments showed that sunlight has a complex composition and how this can be detected. The original experiments of the creators of the paradigm, purified from accidents and improved, are then included in textbooks from which future scientists learn their science. By mastering these classical examples of solving scientific problems during the learning process, the future scientist understands more deeply the fundamentals of his science, learns to apply them in specific situations and masters a special technique for studying those phenomena that are included in the subject of this scientific discipline. A paradigm provides a set of samples of scientific research in a specific area—this is its most important function.
But that's not all. By setting a certain vision of the world, the paradigm outlines a range of problems that have meaning and solutions; anything that does not fall within this circle is not worthy of consideration from the point of view of paradigm adherents. At the same time, the paradigm establishes acceptable methods for solving these problems. Thus, it determines what facts can be obtained in empirical research - not specific results, but the type of facts.
With Kuhn, the distinction between science and metaphysics, which was so important for logical positivism, largely disappears. In his methodology, metaphysics is a precondition for scientific research, it is explicitly included in scientific theories and is implicitly present in all scientific results, penetrating even the facts of science. The acceptance of a certain metaphysical system, according to Kuhn, precedes scientific work.
Clarifying the concept of paradigm. Kuhn introduced the concept of the disciplinary matrix. The latter includes elements of three main types: symbolic generalizations, or laws; models and ontological interpretations; problem solving samples. Ontological interpretation indicates those entities to which the laws of the theory apply. Symbolic generalizations and their accepted ontological interpretation, if expressed explicitly in certain statements, form, so to speak, an explicit metaphysical element of the paradigm. However, an even greater role in the paradigm is played by implicit metaphysics, hidden in examples and patterns of solutions to problems and in ways of obtaining scientific results.
Analyzing the concept of scientific data, Kuhn makes a distinction between external stimuli that affect the human body, and sensory impressions, which represent his reactions to stimuli. It is sensory impressions that serve as data or facts, not external stimuli. What sensory impressions a scientist will receive in a given situation, therefore, what facts he will establish, are determined by his upbringing, education, and the paradigm within which he works. Training a student using samples and examples is important precisely because in this process the future scientist learns to form certain data in response to influencing stimuli, to isolate facts from the stream of phenomena. This learning process is difficult to guide with explicit general rules, since much of our experience involved in generating data is not expressed verbally at all. Mastery of the arsenal of exemplars, as well as the learning of symbolic generalizations, is an essential part of the process by which the student gains access to the meaningful achievements of his professional group. Without the samples, he would never have learned much of what the group knows about such fundamental concepts as force and field, element and compound, nucleus and cell.
With the help of samples, the student not only assimilates the content of theories that is not expressed in explicit formulations, but also learns to see the world through the eyes of the paradigm, to transform incoming stimuli into specific data that makes sense within the paradigm. The flow of stimuli affecting a person can be compared to the chaotic interweaving of lines on paper. Some meaningful figures (say, animals like a duck and a rabbit) may be hidden in this tangle of lines. The content of the paradigm, assimilated by the student, allows him to form certain images from the flow of external influences, to see the duck in the interweaving of lines, eliminating everything else as an unimportant background. The fact that the interweaving of lines depicts a duck, and not something else, will seem an undoubted fact to all adherents of the paradigm. It requires the assimilation of another paradigm in order to see a new image - a rabbit - in the same interweaving of lines and thus obtain a new fact from the same material. It is in this sense that Kuhn says that each paradigm forms its own world in which the supporters of the paradigm live and work.
Thus, in Kuhn's methodology, metaphysical assumptions are a necessary prerequisite for scientific research; irrefutable metaphysical ideas about the world are clearly expressed in the original laws, principles and rules of the paradigm; finally, a certain metaphysical picture of the world is implicitly imposed by the supporters of the paradigm through samples and examples. We can say that Kuhn's paradigm is a huge metaphysical system that determines the fundamental principles of scientific theories, their ontology, experimental facts and even our reactions to external influences.
The concept of a scientific community is closely related to the concept of paradigm; moreover, in a sense, these concepts are synonymous. Indeed, what is a paradigm? is a certain view of the world accepted by the scientific community. What is the scientific community? is a group of people united by faith in one paradigm. You can become a member of the scientific community only by accepting and assimilating its paradigm. If you do not share faith in the paradigm, you remain outside the scientific community. Therefore, for example, modern psychics, astrologers, researchers of flying saucers and poltergeists are not considered scientists and are not included in the scientific community, because they all either reject some fundamental principles of modern science or put forward ideas that are not recognized by modern science. But for the same reason, the scientific community rejects innovators who encroach on the foundations of the paradigm, which is why the life of pioneers in science is so difficult and often tragic.
NORMAL SCIENCE. Kuhn calls science developing within the framework of a generally accepted paradigm normal, believing that it is precisely this state that is common and most characteristic for science. Unlike Popper, who believed that scientists are constantly thinking about how to refute existing and accepted theories, and for this purpose they strive to set up refuting experiments. Kuhn is convinced that in real scientific practice, scientists almost never doubt the truth of the fundamental principles of their theories and do not even raise the question of testing them. Scientists in the mainstream of normal science do not set themselves the goal of creating new theories; moreover, they are usually intolerant of the creation of such theories by others. On the contrary, research in normal science is aimed at developing those phenomena and theories whose existence the paradigm obviously assumes.”
The paradigm established in the scientific community initially contains only the most fundamental concepts and principles and solves only some of the most important problems, setting a general perspective on the nature and general strategy of scientific research. But this strategy still needs to be implemented. The creators of the paradigm sketch only the general contours of the picture of nature; subsequent generations of scientists write down individual details of this picture, color it with colors, and clarify the initial sketch. Kuhn identifies the following types of activities characteristic of normal science:
1. The facts that are most indicative, from a paradigmatic point of view, for the essence of things are highlighted. The paradigm sets a tendency to clarify such facts and to recognize them in an increasing number of situations. For example, in astronomy they sought to more and more accurately determine the positions of stars and stellar magnitudes, periods of eclipse of double stars and planets; in physics, the calculation of specific gravities, wavelengths, electrical conductivities, etc. was of great importance; in chemistry it was important to accurately establish the compositions of substances and atomic weights, etc. To solve such problems, scientists are inventing more and more complex and subtle equipment. We are not talking about the discovery of new facts; no, all such work is carried out to clarify known facts.
2. Significant efforts are required from scientists to find these facts, which could be considered direct confirmation of the paradigm. Reconciling a scientific theory, especially if it uses mathematical means, with reality is a very difficult task and there are usually very few facts that can be considered as independent evidence in favor of its truth. And scientists always strive to obtain more such facts, to find a way to once again verify the reliability of their theories.
3. The third class of experiments and observations is associated with the development of paradigmatic theory in order to eliminate existing ambiguities and improve solutions to those problems that were initially only approximately resolved. For example, in Newton's work it was assumed that there should be a universal gravitational constant, but to solve the problems that interested him in the first place, the value of this constant was not needed. Subsequent generations of physicists spent a lot of effort to determine the exact value of the gravitational constant. The same work was required to establish the numerical values of the Avogadro number, Joule coefficient, electron charge, etc.
4. Development of a paradigm includes not only the clarification of facts and measurements, but also the establishment of quantitative laws. For example, Boyle's law, which relates the pressure of a gas to its volume, Coulomb's law, and Joule's formula, which relates the heat emitted by a conductor carrying a current to the current strength and resistance, and many others have been established as part of normal research. Without a paradigm to guide research, such laws would not only never have been formulated, but they would simply not make any sense.
5. Finally, a vast field for the use of the strengths and abilities of scientists is provided by the work to improve the paradigm itself. It is clear that a paradigm theory cannot appear immediately in the brilliance of complete perfection; only gradually its concepts acquire more and more precise content, and it itself acquires a more harmonious deductive form. New mathematical and instrumental tools are being developed to expand the scope of its applicability. For example, Newton's theory was initially mainly concerned with solving problems of astronomy and considerable effort was required to show the applicability of the general laws of Newtonian mechanics to the study and description of the motion of earthly objects. In addition, when deriving Kepler's laws, Newton was forced to neglect the mutual influence of the planets and take into account only the attraction between an individual planet and the Sun. Since the planets also influence each other, their actual motion differs from the trajectories calculated according to theory. To eliminate or reduce these differences, it was necessary to develop new theoretical means that would make it possible to describe the motion of more than two simultaneously attracting bodies. It was precisely this kind of problem that Euler, Langrange, Laplace, Gauss and other scientists who devoted their work to improving the Newtonian paradigm were occupied with.
To emphasize the special nature of the problems developed by scientists during the normal period of scientific development. Kuhn calls them puzzles, comparing them to solving crossword puzzles or making pictures from painted cubes. A crossword or puzzle is characterized by the fact that: a) there is a guaranteed solution for it and b) this solution can be obtained in some prescribed way. When you try to put together a picture from cubes, you know that such a picture exists. At the same time, you do not have the right to invent your own picture or fold the cubes the way you like, at least this will result in more interesting images - from your point of view. You must stack the cubes in a certain way and get the prescribed image. The problems of normal science are of exactly the same nature. The paradigm guarantees that a solution exists, and it also specifies the acceptable methods and means of obtaining that solution. Therefore, when a scientist fails in his attempts to solve a problem, it is his personal failure, and not evidence against the paradigm. A successful solution to a problem not only brings glory to the scientist, but also once again demonstrates the fruitfulness of the recognized paradigm.
Considering the types of scientific activity characteristic of normal science, we can easily notice that Kuhn paints an image of science very different from the one portrayed by Popper. According to the latter, the soul and driving force of science is criticism - criticism aimed at overthrowing existing and accepted theories. Of course, an important part of a scientist's job is to invent theories that can explain facts and have greater empirical content than previous theories. But no less, and perhaps a more important part of a scientist’s activity is the search and performance of experiments that refute the theory. Scientists, Popper believes, are aware of the falsity of their theoretical constructions; the only thing is to quickly demonstrate this and discard known theories, making way for new ones.
Kuhn has nothing like this. The Kuhn scientist is convinced of the truth of the paradigm theory; it does not even occur to him to question its fundamental principles. The job of a scientist is to refine the paradigm and solve puzzles. Perhaps the most surprising feature of the problems of normal science, writes Kuhn, is that scientists are very little focused on major discoveries, be it the discovery of new facts or the creation of a new theory. According to Kuhn, the activity of a scientist is almost completely devoid of the romantic aura of a discoverer striving for the unknown or mercilessly questioning everything in the name of truth. It rather resembles the activity of a craftsman, guided by a given template and producing quite expected things. It was precisely for such a down-to-earth portrayal of the scientist’s activities that Popper’s supporters subjected Kuhn’s concept to sharp criticism.
It should be noted, however, that in the polemic between the Popperians and Kuhn, the truth was on the side of the latter. Apparently he was more familiar with modern science. If you imagine tens of thousands of scientists working on solving scientific problems, it is difficult to argue with the fact that the overwhelming majority of them are busy solving puzzle problems within a prescribed theoretical framework. There are scientists who think about fundamental problems, but their number is negligible compared to those who have never questioned the basic laws of mechanics, thermodynamics, electrodynamics, optics, etc. It is enough to take this circumstance into account to make it clear that Popper romanticized science , the image of science of the 17th-18th centuries hovered before his mind’s eye, when the number of scientists was small and each of them alone tried to solve a wide range of theoretical and experimental problems. XX century gave birth to huge scientific teams engaged in solving those puzzle problems that Kuhn talks about.
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION. The concept of scientific revolution is the central concept of Kuhn's concept. Many researchers see Kuhn's main contribution to the philosophy of science precisely in the fact that he drew attention to this concept and to the problems that arise in connection with the analysis of major conceptual transformations in science. Some Marxist philosophers have sought to downplay the significance of Kuhn's work, citing the fact that Marxist dialectics has always spoken of leaps, breaks of gradualness inherent in any development, so from a philosophical point of view there is nothing new in Kuhn's work. It should be taken into account, however, that dialectics spoke about qualitative transformations, about the negation of the old by the new in an abstract-scholastic way, at all, and Kuhn showed how all this happens in the concrete process of scientific development. And if the abstract apparatus of dialectics remained fruitless, Kuhn's work evoked a wide response. And the scientific revolution in Kuhn’s description appeared not simply as an abstract transition of quantity into quality or from one qualitative state to another, but as a complex multilateral process with a lot of specific features.
We remember that normal science is mainly concerned with solving puzzles. In general, this process is proceeding successfully, the paradigm acts as a reliable tool for solving scientific problems. The number of established facts increases, the accuracy of measurements increases, new laws are discovered, the deductive coherence of the paradigm increases, in short, knowledge accumulates. But it may well turn out—and often turns out—that some puzzles, despite all the efforts of scientists, cannot be solved; for example, theoretical predictions constantly diverge from experimental data. At first they don't pay attention to this. It is only in Popper's view that the scientist only has to fix the dis-. When theory meets fact, he immediately questions the theory. In reality, scientists always hope that over time the contradiction will be eliminated and the puzzle will be solved. But one day it may be realized that the problem cannot be solved using the existing paradigm. The point is not in the individual abilities of this or that scientist, not in increasing the accuracy of instruments and not in taking into account side factors, but in the fundamental inability of the paradigm to solve the problem. Kuhn calls this problem an anomaly. While there are few anomalies, scientists are not too worried about them. However, the development of the paradigm itself leads to an increase in the number of anomalies. Improvement of instruments, increased accuracy of observations and measurements, rigor of conceptual means - all this leads to What discrepancies between the predictions of the paradigm and facts that previously could not be noticed and realized are now recorded and recognized as problems due to the introduction of new theoretical assumptions into the paradigm, disrupting its deductive harmony, making it vague and loose.
An illustration is the development of the Ptolemaic system. It was formed during the last two centuries BC and the first two centuries of the new era. Its basic idea, as is known, was that the Sun, planets and stars revolve in circular orbits around the Earth. For a long time, this system made it possible to calculate the positions of the planets in the sky. However, the more accurate astronomical observations became, the more noticeable were the discrepancies between the calculated and observed positions of the planets. To eliminate these discrepancies, the assumption was introduced into the paradigm that the planets rotate in auxiliary circles - epicycles, the centers of which already rotate directly around the Earth. This is why, when observed from Earth, it may sometimes appear that the planet is moving in the opposite direction than usual. However, this did not help for long. Soon it was necessary to introduce the assumption that there could be several epicycles, that each planet had its own system of epicycles, etc. Ultimately, the entire system became so complex that it turned out to be difficult to use. However, the number of anomalies continued to grow.
As anomalies accumulate, trust in the paradigm decreases. Her inability to cope with the problems that arise indicates that she can no longer serve as a tool for successful puzzle solving. A state occurs that Kuhn calls crisis. Scientists find themselves faced with many unsolved problems, unexplained facts and experimental data. For some of them, the recently dominant paradigm no longer inspires confidence, and they begin to look for new theoretical means that may be more successful. The thing that united scientists—the paradigm—is leaving. The scientific community is splitting into several groups, some of which continue to believe in the paradigm, others put forward a hypothesis that claims to be a new paradigm. Normal research is dying out. Science, in fact, ceases to function. Only during this period of crisis, Kuhn believes, do scientists conduct experiments aimed at testing and screening out competing theories. But for him this is the period of the collapse of science, a period when science, as he notes in one of his articles, becomes similar to philosophy, for which the competition of different ideas is the rule, not the exception.
The period of crisis ends when one of the proposed hypotheses proves its ability to cope with existing problems, explain incomprehensible facts, and thanks to this attracts the majority of scientists to its side. It acquires the status of a new paradigm. The scientific community is restoring its unity. Kuhn calls the paradigm shift scientific revolution. So how does this transition happen? And what do scientists rely on when abandoning the old paradigm and accepting a new one?
To fully understand Kuhn's answer to these questions, one must more clearly imagine what a scientific revolution is in his understanding. To interpret this transition simply as replacing the postulates or axioms of one theory with the postulates of another while preserving the rest of the content of the scientific field under consideration means completely misunderstanding Kuhn. He is talking about a much more fundamental change. As already noted, the dominant paradigm not only formulates some general statements, but also determines which problems make sense and can be solved within its framework, declaring pseudo-problems or transferring to other areas everything that cannot be formulated or solved by its means. The paradigm sets methods for solving problems, establishing which of them are scientific and which are unacceptable. It develops standards for decisions, norms of accuracy, acceptable argumentation, etc. The paradigm determines the content of scientific terms and statements. With the help of sample solutions to problems, the paradigm instills in its adherents the ability to highlight certain facts, and to filter out everything that cannot be expressed by its means as background noise. Kuhn expresses all this in one phrase: the paradigm creates the world in which the scientist lives and works. Therefore, the transition from one paradigm to another means for a scientist a transition from one world to another, completely different from the first - with specific problems, methods, facts, with a different worldview and even with different sensory perceptions.
Now we can ask: How is there or could there be a transition from one paradigm to another? With this understanding of the essence of this transition, can supporters of the old and new paradigms jointly discuss their comparative advantages and disadvantages and, based on some criteria common to them, choose the best of them? Such a comparison, Kuhn argues, is impossible because there is no common ground that proponents of competing paradigms can accept. If there were facts common to both paradigms or a neutral language of observation, then it would be possible to compare the paradigms in their relation to the facts and choose the one that best fits them. However, in different paradigms the facts will be different and a neutral language of observation is impossible. In addition, a new paradigm is usually less consistent with the facts than its predecessor: over the long period of its existence, the dominant paradigm has managed to adapt quite well to a huge amount of facts, and it takes time for its young rival to catch up with it in this regard. Thus, facts cannot serve as a general basis for comparing paradigms, and if they could, then scientists would always be forced to preserve the old paradigm, despite all its imperfections.
One could try to compare competing paradigms in terms of the number of problems they solve and justify the transition of scientists to a new paradigm on the basis that it solves more problems and, therefore, is a more fruitful research tool. However, this path also turns out to be dubious. Firstly, the old and new paradigms do not solve the same problems. What was a problem in the old paradigm may turn out to be a pseudo-problem from the point of view of the new one; a problem that was considered important by adherents of one paradigm and attracted the best minds to its solution may seem trivial to adherents of another. Secondly, if when comparing paradigms we focus on the number of problems solved, then we will again have to prefer the old developed paradigm: a new paradigm at the beginning of its existence usually solves very few problems and it is not known whether it is capable of more. To find out, we need to start working within a new paradigm.
Thus, if we take into account how completely the Kuhnian paradigm dominates the thinking of its supporters, it becomes clear how difficult it is to find common grounds for comparison and choice between competing paradigms. Moreover, from the point of view of all existing methodological standards, the new paradigm will always seem worse than the old one: it does not correspond so well to most facts, it solves fewer problems, its technical apparatus is less developed, its concepts are less precise, etc. In order to improve it, to develop its potential, we need scientists who can accept it and begin to develop it, but making a decision of this type can only be based on faith.
Scientists who have accepted the new paradigm begin to see the world in a new way: for example, they previously saw a vase in the drawing. It takes effort to see two human profiles in the same picture. But once the switching of the image has occurred, supporters of the new paradigm are no longer able to make the reverse switch and cease to understand those of their colleagues who are still talking about the vase. Supporters of different paradigms speak different languages and live in different worlds, they lose the ability to communicate with each other. What makes a scientist leave the old, lived-in world and rush along a new, unfamiliar and complete unknown road? – The belief that it is more convenient than the old, well-worn track, religious, metaphysical, aesthetic and similar considerations, but not logical and methodological arguments. Competition between paradigms is not a type of struggle that can be resolved by argument.
In one of his lectures 10. Kuhn showed very clearly why, in his opinion, universal methodological standards and criteria such as those formulated by Popper will always be insufficient to explain the transition of scientists from one paradigm to another.
He identifies several requirements that philosophy of science sets for scientific theories. In particular: 1) the requirement of accuracy - the consequences of the theory must be consistent to a certain extent with the results of experiments and observations; 2) the requirement of consistency - the theory must be consistent and must be compatible with other recognized theories; 3) requirement regarding the scope of application - the theory must explain a fairly wide range of phenomena, in particular, the consequences of the theory must exceed the area of observation for which it was originally intended; 4) the requirement of simplicity - the theory must bring order and harmony where chaos reigned before it; 5) the requirement of fruitfulness - the theory must predict facts of a new kind. It is believed that these or similar requirements must be satisfied by a good scientific theory.
Kuhn quite agrees that all requirements of this kind play an important role in the comparison and selection of competing theories. In this he does not disagree with Popper. However, if the latter believes that these requirements are sufficient to select the best theory and the methodologist can limit himself to only their formulation. Kuhn goes further and poses the question: How can an individual scientist use these standards in a given choice? When trying to answer this question, it turns out that these standards are not enough for a real choice.” First of all, all methodological characteristics of a good scientific theory are imprecise, and different scientists may interpret them differently. In addition, these characteristics may conflict with each other.
For example, accuracy forces a scientist to choose one theory, while fruitfulness favors another. Therefore, scientists are forced to decide which characteristics of the theory are more important for them, and a decision of this kind can be determined, Kuhn believes, only by the individual characteristics of each individual scientist. When scientists must choose between two competing theories, two people accepting the same list of selection criteria may nonetheless come to very different conclusions. Perhaps they understand simplicity differently, or have different opinions about the areas with which the theory should fit... Some of the differences I have in mind are the result of the scientist's previous individual experiences. In what part of the scientific field was he working when he was faced with the need to choose? How long did he work in it, how successfully and to what extent does his work depend on the concepts and means changed by the new theory? Other factors also related to choice are completely outside science. Not only methodological standards determine the choice that a particular scientist makes; this choice is determined by many more individual factors.
Kuhn's above considerations explain why the transition from the old paradigm to the new one, from his point of view, cannot be justified rationally - based on logical and methodological standards, facts, experiment. The adoption of a new paradigm is most often due to non-rational factors - the age of the scientist, his desire for success and recognition or material wealth, etc. But such a statement means that the development of science is not completely rational, science, the basis of rationalism, itself turns out to be irrational! This conclusion caused fierce criticism of Kuhn's understanding of scientific revolutions and became the basis for discussing the problem of scientific rationality.
The pre-paradigm period is characterized by the rivalry of various schools and the absence of generally accepted concepts and research methods. This period is especially characterized by frequent and serious disputes about the legitimacy of methods, problems and standard solutions. At a certain stage, these differences disappear as a result of the victory of one of the schools. With the recognition of the paradigm, the period of “normal science” begins, where the most diverse and multi-level (even philosophical) methods, techniques and norms of scientific activity are formulated and widely applied (though not by everyone and not always consciously).
The crisis of a paradigm is at the same time a crisis of its inherent “methodological prescriptions.” The bankruptcy of existing rules and regulations means a prelude to the search for new ones and stimulates this search. The result of this process is a scientific revolution - the complete or partial displacement of the old paradigm by a new one, incompatible with the old one.
During the scientific revolution, a process occurs such as a change in the “conceptual grid” through which scientists viewed the world. A change (and a cardinal one) of this “grid” necessitates a change in the methodological rules and regulations. Scientists - especially those with little connection to previous practice and tradition - may see that the rules are no longer suitable, and begin to select another system of rules that can replace the previous one and which would be based on a new “conceptual grid”. For these purposes, scientists, as a rule, turn to philosophy and discussion of fundamental principles for help, which was not typical for the period of “normal science.”
Kuhn notes that during the period of the scientific revolution, the main task of professional scientists is precisely the abolition of all sets of rules, except one - the one that “follows” from the new paradigm and is determined by it. However, the abolition of methodological rules should not be their “bare denial”, but their “removal”, while preserving the positive. To characterize this process, Kuhn himself uses the term “reconstruction of prescriptions.”
T. Kuhn introduces the concept of “paradigm”, in this case a scientific paradigm (Latin: sample) - a model of science as a body of knowledge, methods, samples of problem solving, techniques, values, unconditionally shared by the scientific community. The paradigm is based on past achievements: theories, standards of knowledge. These achievements are beginning to be interpreted as a model for solving all scientific problems, acting as the theoretical and methodological basis of science in its specific historical space.
With a change of paradigm (under the pressure of new facts, scientific achievements), the stage of normal science begins, according to Kuhn. Here science is characterized by the presence of a clear program of activity. This leads to the selection of alternative and anomalous meanings for this program. Referring to the activities of scientists in the space of normal science, T. Kuhn argued that they “do not set themselves the goal of creating new theories, moreover, they are intolerant of the creation of such theories by others.” This means that predictions of new types of phenomena, i.e. those that do not fit into the context of the dominant paradigm, are not the goal of normal science.
It turns out, according to Kuhn, that at the stage of normal science the scientist works within the strict framework of the paradigm, that is, the scientific tradition. The question arises: how does science develop? What achievements will there be in this case? The answer is: A scientist in such a situation systematizes known facts, gives them an explanation within the framework of the existing paradigm, discovers new facts, relying on the predictions of the prevailing theory. Thus, science develops here within the framework of tradition. Kuhn showed that tradition does not inhibit this development, but even acts as its necessary condition.
But the history of science shows that traditions are changing and new paradigms are emerging. In other words, radically new theories (models, examples of problem solving) appear. We are talking about such phenomena (facts, events), the existence of which scientists did not even suspect within the framework of the old paradigm. But things go in such a way that the scientist somehow randomly comes across phenomena that cannot be explained within the framework of the current paradigm. This is where the need arises to change the rules of scientific research, that is, the need for a new paradigm. At the same time, the paradigm, as it were, sets the angle of vision, and what is outside of it is not perceived for the time being, but the limit comes.
A Scientific Paradigm is “a universally accepted scientific achievement that has provided, over a considerable period of time, patterns of problems and solutions to the community of scientists” (Kuhn, 1962). Kuhn was criticized for the variety of meanings of the term (for example, in relation to groups, life forms, etc.) However, the main reason for this was his desire to draw attention to two facts: science is a phenomenon of “flesh and blood; its character and achievements cannot be adequately understand if you reduce science to abstract theories
Before the school of Galileo, the main activity of natural science was considered to be a physical explanation of the nature of phenomena. There was a positive process of rollback from the demonic ideas of antiquity and the Middle Ages. Galileo brought about a revolution. He established descriptive knowledge of nature, where mathematics became the source of fundamental concepts. Let me remind you of the well-known example of a falling body. The medieval scientist tried to find the cause of the fall. Instead, Galileo formulated the law of motion as s=4.9t**2, where s is the distance that an object in free fall travels in time t. The reason is not important, the description of the movement is important. The researcher's attention shifted from the question "why?" to the questions "how?" and how many?". This, on the one hand, directly met the needs of practice, on the other, it was justified by the fact that God is a skilled mathematician, and knowledge of the quantitative side of the behavior of the world is a kind of service to God. In fact, the opposite happened. A powerful breakthrough in science has allowed a person to achieve outstanding success in the field of skill, but the answers to the question “how much?” did not elevate us spiritually in any way. A paradoxical and tragic simplification occurred (“Adam’s fall” in science) - skill became evidence of knowledge, it began to be interpreted as knowledge.
PARADIGM
scientific (from the Greek paradeigma - example, sample) - a set of scientific achievements recognized by the entire scientific community at one time or another and serving as the basis and example of new scientific research. The concept of P. became widespread after the publication of the book. Amer. historian of science T. Kuhn “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962).
To date, the concept of “P.” has not yet received an exact meaning, but in the most general sense, P. can be called one or more fundamental theories that enjoy universal recognition and for some time guide scientific research. Examples of such theories are Aristotelian dynamics, Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian mechanics, Lavoisier's oxygen theory of combustion, Maxwell's electrodynamics, Bohr's atomic theory, etc. P. embodies indisputable, generally accepted knowledge about the area of phenomena under study. However, when speaking about P., they mean not only some knowledge expressed in principles and laws. Scientists - the creators of P. - did not just formulate some theory or law, but they also solved one or more important scientific problems and thereby provided examples of how problems should be solved. The original experiments of the creators of P., purified from accidents and improved, are then included in textbooks from which future scientists learn their science. By mastering these classical examples of solving scientific problems during the learning process, the future scientist understands more deeply the fundamentals of his science, learns to apply them in specific situations and masters a special technique for studying those phenomena that are part of the subject of this scientific discipline. In addition, by setting a certain vision of the world, P. outlines a range of problems that have meaning and solutions; everything that does not fall into this circle does not deserve consideration from the perspective. supporters of this P. At the same time, P. establishes acceptable methods for solving these problems. Thanks to this, it determines the type of facts obtained in the process of empirical research. Thus, P. serves as the basis of a certain scientific tradition.
Clarifying the meaning of P., Kuhn introduced the concept of a disciplinary matrix. The latter includes elements of three main types: symbolic generalizations, or laws; models and ontological interpretations; sample solutions to problems. Ontological interpretation indicates those entities to which the laws of the theory apply. Symbolic generalizations and their accepted ontological interpretation define the world (aspect, a slice of reality) that the proponent of P. has studied. Having accepted this world, the scientist transforms stimuli coming from the outside world into specific “data” that makes sense within the framework of P. The flow of stimuli affecting a person can be compared to a chaotic interweaving of lines on paper. Some figures may be “hidden” in this tangle of lines, say, a duck, a rabbit, a hunter or a dog. The content of P., assimilated by the scientist, allows him to form certain images from the flow of external influences, to “see” in the interweaving of lines a duck, and not a rabbit or a dog. The fact that the interweaving of lines depicts a duck, and not something else, will seem like an undoubted “fact” to all adherents of P. It is necessary to master other P. in order to see a new image in the same interweaving of lines and, thus ., to obtain a new “fact” from the same material. It is in this sense that each P. forms its own world in which its supporters live and work.
The concept of "P." is closely related to the concept of the scientific community: P. - that which is accepted by the scientific community; scientific community - a community of scientists who accept one P. (see SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION).